{"efta_number": "EFTA02731981", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02731981", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02731981.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02731981", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 1 of 4\n\nBSF\n\nBOIES\nSCHILLER\nFLEXNER\nTelephone: (212) 446-2300\nEmail: jischiller@bsflIp.com\nJanuary 29, 2020\n\nVIA ECF\nThe Honorable Andrew L. Carter Jr.\nDistrict Court Judge\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\nRe:\n\nv. huh he el al., Case No. 19-cv-10479\n\nDear Judge Carter,\nPursuant to Individual Rule 2(A), Plaintiff\nhereby responds to Defendants'\nrequest for a pre-motion conference in connection with their anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt.\n12. Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's statutes of limitation and the doctrine of\nequitable estoppel, and Defendants' proposed motion \"to dismiss\" Plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages is procedurally improper. For the following reasons, the Court should deny Defendants'\nanticipated motion in its entirety.\nI.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under New York Law.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are timely under New York's CPLR § 215(8)(a), which provides:\n\"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced\nwith respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the\nplaintiffshall have at least one yearfrom the termination of the criminal action . . . to commence\nthe civil action.\" (Emphasis added). Here, Epstein's criminal action in this District terminated on\nAugust 29, 2019. Compl. ¶ 36. Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint less than three months later,\nthe action is timely under CPLR § 215(8Xa). Defendants' arguments against CPLR § 215(8)(a)'s\napplication to these facts are meritless.\nFirst, Defendants' argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply because Plaintiff was\nnot named as a victim in Epstein's indictment is incorrect. New York courts have held that CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) is \"plain, clear and unambiguous\" that it does not require that the plaintiff be \"the\nvictim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed.\" Clemens v. Nealon, 202\nA.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).\nSecond, Defendants' narrow construction of § 215(8)(a)'s \"event or occurrence\" language\nis improper, especially in light of the breadth of Epstein's indictment. The charges were not limited\nto crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex\ntrafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, \"including minor\nvictims identified herein.\" Compl., Ex. A (S.D.N.Y Indictment) ¶ 22(a) (emphasis added). As\nanother example, the Indictment's sex trafficking count charged Epstein with the sex trafficking\nof \"numerous individuals .. . including but not limited to Minor Victim-1.\" Id. ¶ 24. Nor did the\nBOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\nSS Hudson Yards, Now York. NY 100011(t) 21244623001(0212 446 2350 1 www bsflip com\n\nEFTA02731981\n\n\f", "char_count": 2845}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02731981", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 2 of 4\n\nBSF\nIndictment describe the sex trafficking conspiracy as exclusively targeting minor victims—it\nexplicitly acknowledged that some victims were not underage at the time of the sexual abuse. Id.\n¶ 11 (\"[Epstein] knew that many of his New York victims were underage.\"). The Indictment was\ntargeted at Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme as a whole, and that scheme is the event or occurrence\nfrom which Plaintiff's civil claims arose. See Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 56-57,\n62 (2d Cir. 2019) (guilty plea conceding \"knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan\"\nallowed victims of the atrocities in Sudan use 2 1 5(8Xa) because causes of action arose out of\ndefendant's general conspiracy with Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions put in place to stop atrocities).\nBecause Plaintiff's claims arise out of this common scheme, they fall within CPLR § 2 I 5(8Xa).\nThe cases Defendants cite are inapposite because the criminal charges in those cases were\nmuch narrower than Epstein's, and related to events that occurred on specified dates. See\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (prosecution commenced\nonly in connection with events on two dates); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y.\nMisc. LEXIS 8435, at •3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (indictment \"charged [the defendant] for\nincidents occurring on three (3) specific dates\"). Epstein's Indictment was much broader, covering\nsexual abuse that occurred \"over the course of many years\" \"from at least in or about 2002, up to\nand including at least in or about 2005.\" S.D.N.Y. Indictment ¶¶1-2, 8, 20, 24 (emphases added).\nPlaintiff's claims are therefore timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a) because the scheme the S.D.N.Y.\nIndictment targeted is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arise.\nPlaintiff's claims are also timely under CPLR § 213-c, which provides for a twenty year\nlimitations period for \"all civil claims or causes of action brought by any person for physical,\npsychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which\nwould constitute rape\" or other enumerated sex crimes. The Complaint alleges that Epstein raped\nPlaintiff numerous times within the past twenty years. See Compl. ¶ 44 (\"Epstein repeatedly raped\nJuliette by forcible compulsion.\"). Plaintiff's claims fall squarely within CPLR § 213-c's coverage.\nDefendants' assertion that CPLR § 213-c does not apply because \"the 20-year SOL does not apply\nretroactively\" is meritless. CPLR § 213-c's text contains no such limitation, and was revised last\nyear (increasing the limitations period from 5 to 20 years) specifically to allow claims such as\nPlaintiff's to proceed. See June 17, 2019, New York Committee Report, 2019 NY S.B. 6574 (NS)\n(noting that \"victims who have suffered in silence for decades have bravely spoken about their\nabuse, and have also laid bare the state's limited ability to prosecute their abusers due to the\npassage of time\" and that \"this bill would increase the time period in which the victim could bring\na civil suit for these offenses to twenty years\").\nDefendants also assert that Plaintiff's claims are untimely under New York's borrowing\nstatute, CPLR § 202. This argument fails for two reasons. First, CPLR § 202 only applies to nonresidents who are injured outside of New York, and the controlling date for determining a\nplaintiff's residence is the date on which the cause of action accrued, not the date on which the\naction was commenced. See, e.g.. DeMartino v.\n148 A.D.2d 568, 570 (N.Y. App. Div.\n1989). Under the borrowing statute, the phrases \"resident\" and \"domicile\" are not synonymous.\n\"Rather, the determination of whether a plaintiff is a New York resident, for purposes of CPLR §\n202, turns on whether [she] has a significant connection with some locality in the State as the result\nof living there for some length of time during the course of a year.\" Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp.,\n473 N.E.2d 742, 746 (N.Y. 1984). The fact that Plaintiff currently lives in South Africa is therefore\nirrelevant. At the time of her repeated sexual assaults, Plaintiff was a resident of New York.\n\nEFTA02731982\n\n\f\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 4 of 4  BSF Respectfully submitted,  Is/Joshua I. Schiller David Boies, Esq. Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)  EFTA02731984", "char_count": 4488}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02731981", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 3 of 4\n\nBSF\nEpstein's co-conspirators got Plaintiff a visa so that she could travel to New York often, and when\nshe visited she stayed at Epstein's New York home for one to two weeks at a time. Compl. ¶¶ 41,\n46. Because Plaintiff had a significant connection with New York at the time her cause of action\naccrued, she was a resident of New York, and CPLR § 202 does not apply.\nSecond, even if New York's borrowing statute did apply and Plaintiff's claims were\notherwise untimely, they would still not be barred because CPLR § 215(8Xa) provides for civil\nactions to commence within \"one year from the termination of the criminal action . . .\nnotwithstanding that the time in which to commence such action has already expired.\"\nII.\n\nPlaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel and Tolling.\n\nEven if Plaintiff's claims were otherwise time-barred under New York's statutes of\nlimitation (they are not), they would still be timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.\nDefendants assert that Plaintiff \"fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances\nsufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\" Dkt. 12 at 2. But the Complaint alleges in detail\nthe methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators used to deter\ntheir victims from seeking justice. Equitable estoppel applies \"where it would be unjust to allow\na defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense,\" Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929\n(N.Y. 2006), due to \"deception, concealment, threats, or other misconduct,\" Zoe G. v. Frederick\nF.G., 208 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The Complaint alleges that Epstein and his\nco-conspirators manipulated victims using \"financial power, promises, and threats;\" that Plaintiff\nwas \"afraid of betraying Epstein because of his money and power\" and was \"afraid he would hurt\nher or her family;\" that Epstein tried to scare her by telling her that he had one of his accusers sent\nto prison; and that Epstein tried to keep in contact with Plaintiff after the abuse ended. Compl.\n27, 47, 51. The allegations concerning Epstein's purposeful silencing of his victims (and Plaintiff\nspecifically) easily provide the requisite \"extraordinary circumstances\" for equitable tolling.\nBecause equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are fact-specific doctrines, Defendants'\nattempt to resolve the issue at motion to dismiss is inappropriate, and any motion challenging\nwhether or not those doctrines apply should be reserved until after the parties have conducted\ndiscovery. See, e.g., Carelock v. UnitedStates, 2015 WL 5000816, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015).\nIII.\n\nThe Court Should Address Punitive Damages After Discovery\n\nFederal Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for \"failure to state a\nclaim upon which relief can be granted.\" Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's\nclaim for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's clams (battery and intentional\ninfliction of emotion distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the allegations in the\nComplaint. The issue of what type of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled should therefore be\ndealt with at a later stage of this litigation. See. e.g., Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F.\nSupp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying \"motion to 'dismiss' plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages as procedurally premature\").\n\nEFTA02731983\n\n\f", "char_count": 3502}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02731981", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 4 of 4\n\nBSF\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nIs/Joshua I. Schiller\nDavid Boies, Esq.\nJoshua I. Schiller, Esq.\nSigrid S. McCawley, Esq.\ncc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)\n\nEFTA02731984\n\n\f", "char_count": 234}]}