{"efta_number": "EFTA02731977", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02731977", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02731977.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02731977", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 1 of 4\nTroutman Sanders LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\ntroutman.com\n\ntroutmar?\nsanders\n\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nbennet.moskowitz@troutman.com\n\nJanuary 24, 2020\nECF\nHon. Andrew L. Carter Jr.\nThurgood Marshall\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\nRe:\n\nv. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as\nexecutors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF\n\nDear Judge Carter:\nWe represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (together, the to -Executors\"), in the above-referenced action. We write\npursuant to Your Honor's Individual Practice § 2(A) to set forth the bases for the Co-Executors'\nanticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the time-barred claims and\n(\"Plaintiff\") Complaint (ECF No. 1).\npunitive damages demand in Plaintiff\n1. Plaintiff is a South African resident who alleges Decedent committed torts against\nher from 2002 to 2004 when she was an adult, in various jurisdictions.\nPlaintiff, who claims South African citizenship and residency, alleges that, from 2002 (when she\nwas 20) to 2004, Mr. Epstein (\"Decedent\"), now deceased, committed various sexual offenses\nagainst her in the U.S. Virgin Islands (\"USVI\"), France, Florida, New Mexico and New York.\n(Compl. ¶¶ 16, 38, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action -- battery and intentional\ninfliction of emotional distress -- and demands punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 54-64, p. 15.)\n2. Plaintiff's causes of action are time-barred.\nCPLR § 202 provides that, when a non-N.Y. resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action\naccruing outside N.Y., the complaint must be timely under the statute of limitations (\"SOL\") of\nboth N.Y. and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued.' Plaintiff's causes of action expired by:\n2006 per the USVI's 2-year SOL (5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A)); 2008 per FL's 4-year SOL (Fla. Stat. §\n95.11 (3)(O)); 2007 per N.M.'s 3-year SOL (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); and 2005 or 2007 per N.Y.'s 1or 3-year SOL (CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3)).\n3. Plaintiff's attempts to plead around the statutes of limitations fail.\nPlaintiff erroneously alleges her claims are timely per CPLR § 213-c or § 215(8)(a), her claims\nwere equitably tolled, and that the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting an SOL\ndefense (Compl. ¶y 12-15). Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.\n\"In diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202.\" Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche\nBank Nat? Tr. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).\n\nEFTA02731977\n\n\f", "char_count": 2667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02731977", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 2 of 4\nHon. Andrew L. Carter Jr.\nJanuary 24. 2020\nPage 2\n\ntroutmariP\nsanders\n\nFirst, neither CPLR § 213-c nor § 215(8)(a) applies here. The 20 year SOL in CPLR § 213-c\nbecame effective as of September 18, 2019; the SOL was 5 years as of 2006 and 1 year before\nthen. (L. 2006, ch 3, § 5(b).) However, the 20-year SOL does not apply retroactively except\n\"where the applicable [SOL] in effect on the date of such act or omission has not yet expired.\" L.\n2019, ch. 315, §4. Therefore, CPLR § 213-c cannot revive Plaintiff's claims arising from torts\ncommitted in N.Y.\nSeparately, CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the\nsame defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a\nclaim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the\ntermination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action\" (emphasis added).\nDecedent's criminal indictment (the \"Indictment\") attached to Plaintiff's Complaint does not\nconcern Plaintiff's allegations. Rather, the indictment charges Decedent sexually abused \"minor\ngirls\" (Compl., Ex. A at ¶ 1), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking of \"minors.\" (Id.,\nEx. A at ¶¶2 - 4, 6, 8, 11- 15, 18 - 20, 22.) Because Plaintiff alleges she was an adult when\nDecedent abused her, her action and the Indictment arise from different occurrences.\nNew York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d\n595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of February\n26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those two\ndays that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gaffina v. Thatcher, No.\n2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR §\n215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil\naction occurred on different dates): McElligott v. City of N.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LOS), 2017 U.S. Dist.\nLEXIS 201829, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable to claims against\ncivil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events\ngave rise to both actions). Plaintiff alleges a far more tenuous connection to the Indictment than\nthe criminal-civil links unsuccessfully asserted in those cases.\nSecond, even if CPLR § 213-c and § 215(8)(a) apply, which they do not, Plaintiff's claims for\ntorts committed outside N.Y. are still untimely per the limitations periods of those jurisdictions\nand CPLR § 202. While Plaintiff alleges Decedent raped her within 20 years of filing her\nComplaint (Compl. ¶13), she does not allege that occurred in N.Y. Plaintiff's claims for torts\noutside N.Y. are untimely.\nThird, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify\ntolling or equitable estoppel. Equitable tolling is only applied where a plaintiff is \"prevented in\nsome extraordinary way from exercising h[er) rights.\" Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 10-cv2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by,\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\nUnder this doctrine, a court may, \"under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to\nthe statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.'\" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). \"That\nthe doctrine is to be employed only sparingly -- in 'extraordinary and 'compelling' circumstances\n-- is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is\njustified.\" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A\nlate-filing party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with \"reasonable\n\nEFTA02731978\n\n\f\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 4 of 4 Hon. Andrew L. Carter Jr. January 24, 2020 Page 4  troutmaril sanders  Respectfully submitted, s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz  EFTA02731980", "char_count": 4177}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02731977", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 3 of 4\nHon. Andrew L. Carter Jr.\nJanuary 24, 2020\nPage 3\n\ntroutmariP\nsanders\n\ndiligence\" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at *32 (citation omitted).\nEquitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists but the\ndefendant's conduct causes her to delay in bringing her lawsuit. Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n101744, at '5 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: (i) the defendant\nmade a definite misrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe the plaintiff would rely on it;\nand (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment. Id. (citation\nomitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a\ndefendant that prevented her from timely commencing suit. Id. at '6 (citation omitted).\nPlaintiff's threadbare allegations of \"deception,\" \"threats\" and the like (Compl. ¶14) do not\nestablish \"extraordinary\" circumstances justifying tolling. Nor has Plaintiff alleged (i) that\nDecedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii)\nthat Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her detriment.\n4. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.2\nPlaintiff's punitive damages claim must be dismissed as a matter of law because none of the\njurisdictions where the alleged torts occurred permits punitive damages against a decedent\ntortfeasor's estate. See Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, 18-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861,\nat '6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) (\"Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the\nestate of a wrongdoer who is deceased.\"); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M.\n337, 346 (N.M. 1994) (\"punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery\nof punitive damages from the estate\"); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (\"an action may be brought or\ncontinued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not\nbe awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal\ninjury.\"); Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at *5 n.13 (U.S.V.I.\nSuper. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (Restat. §908(2) \"reflects the common law of this jurisdiction\").3 That is\nthe law in most jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts §\n908 cmt. a (punitive damages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor).°\n\n2 Courts in this District regularly dismiss punitive damages claims.\n\nSee The Cookware Co. (USA), LW v.\nAustin, 15.5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at '17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (dismissing punitive\ndamages claim without leave to replead); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., 03-6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n13227, at '25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claims not statutorily available).\n3 To determine common law, USVI courts consider: (1) whether USVI courts previously adopted a rule;\n(2) the position taken by a majority of other jurisdictions; and (3) which approach is the soundest for the\nUSVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v.\n, No. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639, at '1 (V.I. Feb.\n24, 2014). These factors favor the Co-Executors: (1) pre-Banks, USVI courts expressed approval for\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009) (considering the\nRestat. § 908 (see\ninverse issue)): (2) a majority of other jurisdictions preclude punitive damages against a tortfeasor's\nestate (2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)); and (3) post-Banks, USVI courts\nhave held § 908 is the soundest rule (Powell, supra.).\n\n4 France does not recognize punitive damages. Punitive Damages, supra., at § 22.4 (citation omitted).\n\nEFTA02731979\n\n\f", "char_count": 3818}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02731977", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 4 of 4\nHon. Andrew L. Carter Jr.\nJanuary 24, 2020\nPage 4\n\ntroutmaril\nsanders\n\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\n\nEFTA02731980\n\n\f", "char_count": 219}]}