{"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_count": 18, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02406470", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02406470.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "From: \nOffice of Terje Rod-Larsen <executiveoffice@ipinst.org> \nSent: \nMonday, March 5, 2012 7:19 PM \nSubject: \nMarch 3 update \n3 March, 2012 \nArticl= 1. <https://mailgoogle.com/mailh/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#a> \nThe Atlantic \nObama to Iran and Israel: 'As Pres=dent of the United States, I Don't Bluff \nJeffrey Goldberg \nArticl= 3. chttps://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_filesiblank_quirks.htmlftc> \nThe daily Beast \nShimon Peres's Influence Wanes a= Israel Grows More Bellicose Toward Iran \nDan Ephron \nArticl= 5. <https://mail.google.com/mail/40/html/compose/static_filesiblank_quirks.html#e> \nThe Daily Star \nHamas rattles the Resistance Axis<=span> \nRami G. Khouri \nArticl= 6. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_filesiblank_quirks.htmltff> \nPew Research Center \nMillennials will benefit and suffe= due to their hyperconnected lives \nEFTA_R1_01448819 \nEFTA02406470\n", "char_count": 924}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "(Overview) \nAr=icle 1. \nThe Atlantic=/p> \nObama to Iran=and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff'<=b> \nJeffrey Goldberg </=pan> \nMar 2 2012 -- At the White House on Monday, President Obama wil= seek to persuade the Israeli prime minister, \nBenjamin Netanyahu, to postp=ne whatever plans he may have to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities in the coming months. \nObama will argue that unde= his leadership, the United States \"has Israel's back,\" and that=he will order the U.S. military \nto destroy Iran's nuclear program if econo=ic sanctions fail to compel Tehran to shelve its nuclear ambitions. \nIn the most extensive interview he has given about the looming Iran crisis,=Obama told me earlier this week that both \nIran and Israel should take seri=usly the possibility of American action against Iran's nuclear facilities.=\"I think that the \nIsraeli government recognizes that, as president of the United States, I don't bluff.\" H= went on, \"I also don't, as a matter \nof sound policy, go around adver=ising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and th= Israeli \ngovernments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapo=, we mean \nwhat we say.\" The 45-minute Oval Office convers=tion took place less than a week before the president was scheduled \nto add=ess the annual convention of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group, and then meet, the next day, with Prime \nMinister Netanyahu=at the White House. In the interview, Obama stated specifically that \"=all options are on the table,\" \nand that the final option is the \"=military component.\" But the president also said that sanctions organized by his \nadministration have put Iran in a \"wo=ld of hurt,\" and that economic duress might soon force the regime in =ehran to \nrethink its efforts to pursue a nuclear-weapons program. &q=ot;Without in any way being under an illusion about \nIranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of tha=\n... [truncated, 3975 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/1 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=1]", "char_count": 3975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "want a distraction in whic= suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim?\" He also said he would try to convince \nNetanyah= that the only way to bring about a permanent end to a country's nuclear p=ogram is to convince the country \nin question that nuclear weapons are not =n its best interest. \"Our argument is going to be that it is important for us to \nsee if we can solve this thing permanent=y, as opposed to temporarily,\" he said, \"and the only way histor=cally that a \ncountry has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons wit=out constant military intervention has been when they \nthemselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That's what hap=ened in Libya, that's what happened in South Africa.\" \nAnd=though broadly sympathetic to Netanyahu's often-stated fear that Iran's nu=lear program represents a Holocaust-\nscale threat to the Jewish state, and the Jewish people, Obama suggested strongly that =istorical fears cannot be the \nsole basis for precipitous action: \"The=prime minister is head of a modern state that is mindful of the profound c=sts of \nany military action, and in our consultations with the Israeli government, I think they take those costs, =nd potential \nunintended consequences, very seriously.\" Bu= when I asked the president if he thought Israel could damage its \nreputati=n among Americans with an attack on Iran -- an attack that could provoke Iranian retaliation against American \ntargets, an= could cause massive economic disruption -- he said, \"I think we in t=e United States instinctively sympathize \nwith Israel.\" President Obam= also shared fascinating insights about his sometimes tension-filled relationship with \nNetanyahu -- and spoke at lengt= about Syria -- but for that, you'll have to read the entire interview. He=e is a transcript \nof our conversation: \nJEFFREY GOLDBERG: From what we understand, Prime Minister Netanyahu =s going to ask you for some specific \nenunciations of red lines, for specif=c promises related to the Iranian nuclear \n... [truncated, 5546 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/2 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=2]", "char_count": 5546}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say. Let =escribe very specifically why this is \nimportant to us. \nIn addition to the profound threat that it poses to Israel, one of our stro=gest allies in the world; in addition to the \noutrageous language that has =een directed toward Israel by the leaders of the Iranian government -- if =ran gets a \nnuclear weapon, this would run completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation. The risk= of an Iranian nuclear \nweapon falling into the hands of terrorist organiza=ions are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region \nw=uld feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race i= the \nmost volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable gov=rnments and sectarian tensions. And it would also \nprovide Iran the additio=al capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are \nless fearf=l of retaliation. \nGOLDBERG: What would your position be if Israel weren't in this pict=re? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: It would still be a profound national-security inte=est of the United States to prevent Iran from \ngetting a nuclear weapon. \nGOLDBERG: Why, then, is this issue so often seen as binary, always d=fined as Israel versus Iran? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: I think it has to do with a legitimate concern on t=e part of Israel that they are a small country in a \ntough neighborhood, an= as a consequence, even though the U.S. and Israel very much share assessm=nts of how \nquickly Iran could obtain breakout capacity, and even though there is constant consultation and inte=ligence \ncoordination around that question, Israel feels more vulnerable. A=d I think the prime minister and the defense minister, \n[Ehud Barak,J feel = profound, historic obligation not to put Israel in a position where it cannot act decisively and \nunilate=ally to protect the state of Israel. I understand those concerns, and as a=conse\n... [truncated, 4693 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/3 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=3]", "char_count": 4693}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "friend and ally, and as one that has devoted the l=st three years to making sure that Israel has additional security \ncapabili=ies, and has worked to manage a series of difficult problems and questions over the past three years, I do=point \nout to them that we have a sanctions architecture that is far more e=fective than anybody anticipated; that we have a \nworld that is about as un=ted as you get behind the sanctions; that our assessment, which is shared by the Israelis, is \nthat Iran does no= yet have a nuclear weapon and is not yet in a position to obtain a nuclea= weapon without us having \na pretty long lead time in which we will know th=t they are making that attempt. In that context, our argument is going \nto be that it is important for us t= see if we can solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily. An= the only \nway, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to =et nuclear weapons without constant military \nintervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons]=off the table. That's what happened in Libya, \nthat's what happened in Sout= Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion abo=t Iranian \nintentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interes=ed. They recognize that \nthey are in a bad, bad place right now. It is poss=ble for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes \nmuch=further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best \ndeci=ion for Israel's security. These are difficult questions, and again, if I =ere the prime minister of Israel, I'd be \nwrestling with them. As president=of the United States, I wrestle with them as well. \nGOLDBERG: Could you shed some light on your relationship with the pr=me minister? You've met with him more than \nwith any other world leader. It=s assumed that you have a dysfunctional relationship. What is it like? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: I actually thi\n... [truncated, 5036 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/4 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=4]", "char_count": 5036}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think you're right to describe it as a continuum.=There is no doubt they are isolated. They have a \nvery ingrown political sy=tem. They are founded and fueled on hostility towards the United States, l=rael, and to some \ndegree the West. And they have shown themselves willing to go outside international norms arc' international rules to \nachieve their objectives. All of this makes them =angerous. They've also been willing to crush opposition in their own \ncount=y in brutal and bloody ways. \nGOLDBERG: Do you think they are messianic? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: I think it's entirely legitimate to say that this i= a regime that does not share our worldview or our \nvalues. I do think, and=this is what General Dempsey was probably referring to, that as we look at=how they operate \nand the decisions they've made over the past three decades, that they care about the regime'= survival. They're \nsensitive to the opinions of the people and they are tr=ubled by the isolation that they're experiencing. They know, for \nexample, =hat when these kinds of sanctions are applied, it puts a world of hurt on them. They are able to make \ndecisi=ns based on trying to avoid bad outcomes from their perspective. So if the='re presented with options that lead to \neither a lot of pain from their pe=spective, or potentially a better path, then there's no guarantee that they can't make a \nbetter decision. \nGOLDBERG: It seems unlikely that a regime built on anti-Americanism =ould want to appear to succumb to an American-\nled sanctions effort. \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the question here is going to be: What exac=ly are their genuine interests? Now, what we've \nseen, what we've heard dir=ctly from them over the last couple of weeks is that nuclear weapons are s=nful and un-\nIslamic. And those are formal speeches from the supreme leader and their foreign minister. \nGOLDBERG: Do you believe their sincerity? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: My point here is not that I believe the sincerity o= the statement\n... [truncated, 4176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/5 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=5]", "char_count": 4176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "GOLDBERG: With everybody pointing at everybody else. \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: With everybody pointing at everybody else. \nGOLDBERG: What I'm getting at specifically is, let's assume there's = Hezbollah attack on Israel. Israel responds into \nLebanon. Iran goes on so=e kind of a nuclear alert, and then one-two-three --\nPRESIDENT OBAMA: The potential for escalation in those circumstances=is profoundly dangerous, and in addition to just \nthe potential human costs=of a nuclear escalation like that in the Middle East, just imagine what wo=Id happen in terms \nof the world economy. The possibilities of the sort of energy disruptions that we've ne=er seen before occurring, and the \nworld economy basically coming to a halt= would be pretty profound. So when I say this is in the U.S. interest, I'm=not \nsaying this is something we'd like to solve. I'm saying this is something we have to solve. \nGOLDBERG: One of the aspects of this is the question of whether it's=plausible that Barack Obama would ever use \nmilitary power to stop Iran. Th= Republicans are trying to make this an issue -- and not only the Republic=ns -- saying \nthat this man, by his disposition, by his character, by his party, by his center-left outloo=, is not going to do that. \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: Look, if people want to say about me that I have a =rofound preference for peace over war, that \nevery time I order young men a=d women into a combat theater and then see the consequences on some of the=, if \nthey're lucky enough to come back, that this weighs on me -- I make no apologies for that. Because anyb=dy who is \nsitting in my chair who isn't mindful of the costs of war should='t be here, because it's serious business. These aren't \nvideo games that w='re playing here. Now, having said that, I think it's fair to say that the last three years, I've shown \n=yself pretty clearly willing, when I believe it is in the core national in=erest of the United States, to direct military \nactions, even when they ent=il enormous risk\n... [truncated, 4690 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/6 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=6]", "char_count": 4690}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "GOLDBERG: Is there anything you could do to move it faster? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, nothing that I can tell you, because your cla=sified clearance isn't good enough. (Laughter.) \nThis is part of, by the way, the context in which we have to examine our ap=roach toward Iran, because at a time when \nthere is not a lot of sympathy f=r Iran and its only real ally is on the ropes, do we want a distraction in=which suddenly \nIran can portray itself as a victim, and deflect attention from what has to be the core iss=e, which is their potential \npursuit of nuclear weapons? That's an ex=mple of factors that -- when we are in consultation with all our allies, \ni=cluding the Israelis, we raise these factors, because this is an issue of many dimensions here, and we've got t= factor all \nof them in to achieve the outcome that hopefully we all want.<=r> \nGOLDBERG: Do the Israelis understand that? There have been disagreem=nts between Israel and the U.S. before, but \nthis is coming to a head about=what the Israelis see as an existential issue. The question is: In your mi=d, have you \nbrought arguments to Netanyahu that have so far worked out well? \nPRESIDENT OBAMA: I think that in the end, Israel's leaders will make=determinations based on what they believe is best \nfor the security of Isra=l, and that is entirely appropriate. \nWhen we present our views and our strategy approach, we try to put all our =ards on the table, to describe how we are \nthinking about these issues. We =ry to back those up with facts and evidence. We compare their assessments =ith ours, \nand where there are gaps, we try to narrow those gaps. And what I also try to do is to underscore th= seriousness with \nwhich the United States takes this issue. And I think th=t Ehud Barak understands it. I think that Prime Minister \nNetanyahu, hopefu=ly when he sees me next week, will understand it. \nAnd one of the things that I like to remind them of is that every single co=mitment I have made to the state of Israel and \n\n... [truncated, 4610 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/7 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=7]", "char_count": 4610}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Articl= 2. \nThe Washington Post=/span> \nMideast peace= with something short of a deal \nRobert Malley and A=ron David Miller \nMarch 3 -- Pre=ident Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will devote =ittle time Monday \n<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-=eeting-obama-to-warn-netanyahu-against-military-\nstrikes-on-iran/2012/03/02=glQA5Wf0mR_story.html> to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in part because of Iran and \nelection-=ear politics. But the principal cause is this: A negotiated, two-state sol=tion is running harder than ever against \nintractable political and psychol=gical realities in Israel, Palestine and the Arab world. These are pushing toward a de \nfacto outcome that will =ot be negotiated, comprehensive or conflict-ending. Even assuming Netanyah= is prepared to \nembrace a two-state solution acceptable to Palestinians, h= would have to take on powerful settler and right-wing \nconstituencies at a time when regional tumult and I=an's nuclear progress exacerbate national feelings of insecurity. \nNetany=hu's assertion that the Palestinian split and instability in the Arab wo=Id counsel against risky moves might be a \nconvenient excuse to do nothing — but that doesn't necessarily ma=e it wrong. And he is unlikely to jeopardize his \npolitical future or his c=untry's security chasing a solution that, to his mind, does both.=/p> \nAmong Palestinians,=the brewing crisis over President Mahmoud Abbas's potential succession, =opular disenchantment \nwith the peace process and the appeal of internation=lizing the conflict mean there are few political incentives for \nflexibility toward Israel. Divisions between the =atah and Hamas factions complicate matters: Their recent agreement is \npaper-thin and highlights that, for now, Palestinians are focused more on immed=ate politics than on their longer-term \nfate. Then there are regional developments: Abbas can no longer rely on in=luential Arab cover for controversial \ncompromises. The Isla\n... [truncated, 4289 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/8 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=8]", "char_count": 4289}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Israeli pullout from parts of the West B=nk, coupled with a mutual cease-fire but without any interaction with or \nr=cognition of the Jewish state, is something Hamas would welcome as a victo=y without endorsing as a deal. \nSuch an outcome wou=d promote the protagonists' short-term interests. Israel would mollify W=stern critics and \nneutralize the Palestinian demographic threat; Fatah cou=d continue building institutions of a future state; Hamas again \nmay claim credit for pushing Israel back without=compromising on core principles. But the conflict would endure. Israel \nwou=d not achieve Arab recognition or an end to Palestinian claims; Fatah woul= not have produced a sovereign, \nindependent state or resolved the refugee issue; and Hamas would have to a=quiesce in the continued presence of a \nJewish state on what it considers P=lestinian land. The ultimate reckoning would still loom, arguably under co=ditions \nmore inimical to the comprehensive resolution all claim to seek. \nSince the inception=of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the status of the land between the Jo=dan River and \nMediterranean Sea has been determined almost invariably by a=ts of war or unilateral decisions. Even the Oslo Accords \naltered the status of Palestinian territory little o= the ground. Someday this may change. For now, events outside the \nnegotiat=ng room again deserve far more consideration than what's happening insid= — and could shape Israeli-\nPalestinian relations for some time to come. \n<1=m> \nRobert Malley i= director of the International Crisis Group's Middle East and North Afri=a Program. Aaron David Miller, a \ndistinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wils=n International Center for Scholars, is the author of the forthcoming book \n\"Can America Have Another Great Pr=sident?\" \nArticl= 3. \nThe daily Beast \nShimon Peres=92s Influence Wanes as Israel Grows More Bellicose Toward Iran \nDan Ephron</=> \nMarch 2, 2012 -- The oddest odd couple in Israeli politics might just be Prime Minist=r \n... [truncated, 3629 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/9 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=9]", "char_count": 3629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "That Israel's two most senior political figures don't see eye t= eye on the weightiest issues of the day is hardly \nunprecedented. Israel=92s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, is said to have imbued the presidency with zero \nexecutive powers precisely to=prevent his political rival, Chaim Weizmann, from having a role in the dec=sion making. \nBut it's a reminder that even as Israel edges toward confro=tation with Iran, in defiance of Washington, how to deal with \nthe mullahs is the subject of fierce debate i=side Israel—not just within the political establishment but also in the =ilitary \nand the intelligence community. It's also a reflection of Netanyahu's dimini=hed status among a certain group of \npoliticians, public figures, and journ=lists who believed three years ago that Netanyahu would surprise everyone 9 \nstriking a deal with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Peres is merely the latest member of the group to face \ndisi=lusionment. \"For a long time, Peres nurtured the hope that with his inpu= and consultation, Netanyahu would be \nmuch more forthcoming and active in =he peace process,\" says David Landau, who has coauthored two books with \nPeres and sees him regularly. \"But of =ate, Peres has given up that hope.\" \n&=bsp; \nThe backstory of the bromance betw=en Peres and Netanyahu is a complicated one. In 1996 the two had squared o=f in \none of Israel's most fiercely fought elections for prime minister, just months after a right-wing Jew murdered =sraeli \nleader Yitzhak Rabin in a bid to halt the Oslo peace process. Peres=succeeded Rabin, but then lost to Netanyahu by less \nthan half a percentage=point, leaving the Israeli left with the feeling that the assassin had won—and casting a dark cloud \nover=the fate of the peace process. Yossi Beilin, who served as a member of Per=s's cabinet at the time, recalls feeling \nbereft, \"really broken,\" wh=n results were announced. Yet he found Peres remarkably composed. He remembers \noverhearing Peres ask his wife on\n... [truncated, 5437 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/10 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=10]", "char_count": 5437}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "But Peres is irrepressible as always. He says the setbacks are blip= on a graph line that has mostly ascended since the \n'70s and '80s, whe= Israel and the PLO refused to even recognize each other. And he believes there's no real alternative \nto the two-state=solution if Israel wants to maintain its democratic character. Peres recen=ly co-wrote a book with \nLandau about his mentor, Ben-Gurion. It concludes =hat Ben-Gurion's greatest decision was accepting the United \nNations partition plan, which gave Israel a state=but much less territory than it sought. The book is a historical \naccountin= from a man who worked under him for decades. But Landau says Peres also t=inks of it as a contemporary \ntract. \"He's trying to deliver a message to people here and now that nothing =as changed since Ben-Gurion's decision,\" \nLandau said. \"In order to m=intain a democratic country, Israel needs to forgo part of the territory.=94 \nArticl= 4. \nBulletin of the Ato=ic Scientists \nFearful of a =uclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria \nCharles P. Blair \n1 March 2012 -- As =ossible military action against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program Iroms large in the public \narena, far more international concern should be di=ected toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the \nSyrian uprising began more than a year ago, =ew predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter \ntow=rd collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appe=rs inevitable, and Syria's revolution \nwill likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see sim=larities with Libya's civil war, during which \npersistent fears revolved ar=und terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's =se of them \nagainst insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded. \nBut the Libyan chem=cal stockpile consisted of several tons of aging mustard gas leaking from = half-dozen canisters that \nwould have been impossible to utilize as weapon=. Sy\n... [truncated, 3872 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/11 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=11]", "char_count": 3872}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "the fr=ctious country. In contrast to Libya's unusable chemical stockpile, analys=s emphasize that Syrian chemical agents \nare weaponized and deliverable. In=urgents and terrorists with past or present connections to the military might feasibly \nbe able to effectively =inseminate chemical agents over large populations. (The Global Security Newswire \n<http://www.nti.oregsn/article/us-watching-syrian-chemica=-arms-amid-fear-attack-diversionk recently asserted that \n\"[tJhe Assad regime is thought to possess between 100 and 200 Scud missiles carrying wa=heads loaded with sarin nerve \nagent. The government is also believed to ha=e several hundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gas stockpiled that \ncoul= be used in air-dropped bombs and artillery shells, according to information compiled by the James Martin \nCe=ter.\") \nGiven its robust ch=mical weapons arsenal and its perceived need to deter Israel, Syria has lo=g been suspected of \nhaving an active biological weapons program. Despite s=gning the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention in 1972 \n(the treaty prohibits the development, production, and =tockpiling of biological and toxin weapons), Syria never ratified \nthe=treaty. Some experts contend that any Syrian biological weapons program ha= not moved beyond the research and \ndevelopment phase. Still, Syria's biotechnical infrastructure undoubtedly has the capability \n<http://www.dni.gov/reports/2011_report_to_congress_wmd.pdf> to develop numerous biological weapon agents. \nAfter Israel destroyed a clandestine Sy=ian nuclear reactor in September 2007, Damascus may have accelerated its \nc=emical and biological weapons programs. \nIt's hard to guard =MD when a government collapses. Although the United States and its allies =re reportedly monitoring \nSyria's chemical weapons, recent history warns th=t securing them from theft or transfer is an extraordinary challenge. \nFor example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom= more than 330 metric tons of military-grade high explosives\n... [truncated, 5092 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/12 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=12]", "char_count": 5092}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Sunni Muslims -- even those who are not jihadists. Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians could all become targets=for \nWMD-armed Sunni jihadists. Similarly, Shiite radicals could conceivabl= employ WMD agents against Syria's Sunnis. \nReligious fanaticis= and WMD. Evidence of growing religious fanaticism is also reflected in re=ent Syrian suicide attacks. \nSince last December, at least five suicide att=cks occurred in Syria. In the 40 years preceding, only two suicide attacks \nwere recorded. Al Qaeda-linked mujahid=n are believed to be responsible for all of these recent attacks. Civil wa=s are \noften the most violent and unpredictable manifestations of war. With=expanding sectarian divisions, the use of seized \nWMD in Syria's uprising is plausible. To the extent that=religious extremists believe that they are doing God's bidding, \nfundamenta=ly any action they undertake is justified, no matter how abhorrent, since =he \"divine\" ends are believed to \nlegitimize \n<http://www.cs.washington.eduieducation/coursesicsep590/05=u/readings/Bale_Ackerman_FinalReport.pdf> t=e \nmeans. \nThe situation in Sy=ia is unprecedented. Never before has a WMD-armed country fallen into civi= war. All states in the \nregion stand poised to lose if these weapons find =heir way outside of Syria. The best possible outcome, in terms of \ncontrolling Syria's enormous WMD arsenal, wo=ld be for Assad to maintain power, but such an outcome seems \nincreasingly =mplausible. And there is painfully little evidence that democratic forces =re likely to take over in Syria. \nEven if they do eventually triumph, it will take months or years to consol=date control over the entire country. \nIf chaos ensues in =yria, the United States cannot go it alone in securing hundreds of tons of=Syrian WMD. Regional \nleaders -- including some, such as Sunni Saudi Arabia=and Shiite Iran, that are now backing the insurgency and the \nregime, respectively -- must come together and begi= planning to avert a dispersion of Syrian c\n... [truncated, 2915 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/13 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=13]", "char_count": 2915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "This is in line wit= Hamas' gradual slide into a more pragmatic political posture over the p=st decade. During this time \nthe movement has declared its willingness to a=cept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and coexistence with \nIsrael, if the principles of the 2002 A=ab Peace Plan are adopted and the Palestine refugee issue is resolved equi=ably. \nHamas has also signaled a willingness to abandon the armed struggle =n favor of nonviolent resistance against Israel, \nand to agree to a long-term truce with Israel under certai= conditions. \nAt another level, H=mas' decision to leave Syria reflects ongoing internal divisions within =he movement. Islamist \norganizations, in the final analysis, experience the=same dynamics as any grouping of diverse people united by a \ncommon cause, but also divided over the many options th=y have to achieve their goals. \nWe can see this in =he different tactical strands among Hamas officials vis-a-vis the reconc=liation with Fatah. The \nimplications of these various views over issues su=h as negotiations with or recognition of Israel, power-sharing with \nFatah, relations with Iran, or support for A=ab uprisings across the region — which range from hard-line absolutism t= a \nmore accommodating pragmatism — are that groups like Hamas operate ac=ording to a domestic political calculus of \nsurvival that ultimately overrides other forces. \nThis is also seen i= the quiet debate within llamas about whether to consolidate its power base=in Gaza and make do \nwith a diminutive Palestinian statelet that makes litt=e sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and \nreconfigure Palestinian national institutions=such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle \nna=ionally and regionally. \nThis raises the thi=d level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition o= that grouping of states and \nmovements called the Resistance and Deterrenc= Front — namely Syria, Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas.\n... [truncated, 4386 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/14 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=14]", "char_count": 4386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Articl= 6. \nPew Research Center=/span> \nMillennials w=11 benefit and suffer due to their hyperconnected lives \n(Overview)</=> \nFebruary 29, 2012&n=sp; In a survey about the future of the internet, technology experts an= stakeholders were fairly \nevenly split as to whether the younger generatio='s always-on connection to people and information will turn out to be \na net positive or a net negative by 2020. They said ma=y of the young people growing up hyperconnected to each other \nand the mobi=e Web and counting on the internet as their external brain will be nimble,=quick-acting multitaskers who \nwill do well in key respects. \nAt the same time, t=ese experts predicted that the impact of networked living on today's you=g will drive them to thirst \nfor instant gratification, settle for quick ch=ices, and lack patience. A number of the survey respondents argued that it is \nvital to reform education and emp=asize digital literacy. A notable number expressed concerns that trends ar= leading to \na future in which most people are shallow consumers of informa=ion, and some mentioned George Orwell's 1984 or \nexpressed their fears of control by powerful interests =n an age of entertaining distractions. \nThese findings come=from an opt-in, online survey of a diverse but non-random sample of 1,021 =echnology \nstakeholders and critics. The study was fielded by the Pew Resea=ch Center's Internet & American Life Project and Elon \nUniversity's Imagining the Internet Center between Augu=t 28 and October 31, 2011. \nThe survey question=about younger users was inspired by speculation over the past several year= about the potential \nimpact of technology on them. Looking toward the year=2020, respondents to this survey were fairly evenly split on \nwhether the results will be primarily positive or m=stly negative. They were asked to read two statements and select the \none t=ey believe that is most likely to be true and then explain their answers. \nSome 55% agreed wit= the statement: \nIn 20\n... [truncated, 2666 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/15 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=15]", "char_count": 2666}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "In 2020, the brains=of multitasking teens and young adults are \"wired\" differently f=om those over age 35 and overall it \nyields baleful results. They do not re=ain information; they spend most of their energy sharing short social messages, \nbeing entertained, and being distracted awa= from deep engagement with people and knowledge. They lack deep-\nthinking c=pabilities; they lack face-to-face social skills; they depend in unhealthy=ways on the internet and mobile \ndevices to function. In sum, the changes in behavior and cognition among t=e young are generally negative outcomes. \nWhile 55% agreed wi=h the statement that the future for the hyperconnected will generally be p=sitive, many who \nchose that view noted that it is more their hope than the=r best guess, and a number of people said the true outcome \nwill be a combination of both scenarios. The researc= result here is really probably more like a 50-50 outcome than the \n55-42 s=lit recorded through survey takers' votes. Respondents were asked to sel=ct the positive or the negative, with \nno middle-ground choice, in order to encourage a spirited and deeply =onsidered written elaboration about the \npotential future of hyperconnected=people. \nWe did not offer a =hird alternative — that young people's brains would not be wired diffe=ently — but some of the \nrespondents made that argument in their elaborat=ons. They often noted that people's patterns of thinking will likely \nchange, though the actual mechanisms of brain func=ion will not change. \nSurvey participants=did offer strong, consistent predictions about the most desired life skill= for young people in 2020. \nAmong those they listed are: public problem-sol=ing through cooperative work (sometimes referred to as crowd-\nsourcing solutions); the ability to search effectivel= for information online and to be able to discern the quality and \nveracity=of the information one finds and then communicate these findings well (ref=rred to as digital literacy); \nsynthesiz\n... [truncated, 4767 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/16 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=16]", "char_count": 4767}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02406470", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "• \n\"The essential skills will be those of rapidly searching, browsing, =ssessing quality, and synthesizing the vast \nquantities of information,\" =rote Jonathan Grudin, principal researcher at Microsoft. \"In contrast, =he ability to read one \nthing and think hard about it for hours will not be=of no consequence, but it will be of far less consequence for most \npeople.=94 \n• \nSome argued that technology is not the issue as much as bedrock human =ehavior is. The \"moral panic\" over \ndigital technology \"seems to be w=red into us,\"—it parallels previous concerns about media that have not led to the \ndownfall of civilization, noted Christopher J.=Ferguson, a professor from Texas A&M whose research specialty is \nt=chnologies' effects on human behavior. \n• \nReform of the education system is necessary to help learners know how =o maximize the best and minimize the \nworst. Reform could start by recogniz=ng that distractions of all kinds are the norm now. Educators should teach the \nmanagement of multiple information streams, emp=asizing the skills of filtering, analyzing, and synthesizing information. \n=Iso of value is an appreciation for silence, focused contemplation, and =93lessons in ignoring people,\" as futurist \nMarcel Bullinga put it. \n* \nOthers noted research that challenges t=e idea that people can be \"multitaskers.\" People really toggle \nbetween=tasks and \"time slice\" their attention into ever-smaller chunks of tim=, argued Nikki Reynolds, director of \ninstructional technology services at Ham=lton College. \nFuturist John Smart= president and founder of the Acceleration Studies Foundation, recalled an=insight of economist \nSimon Kuznets about evolution of technology effects k=own as the Kuznets curve: \"First-generation tech usually causes \n'net negative' social effects; second-generation =91net neutral' effects; by the third generation of tech—once the tech \n=s smart enough, and we've got the interface right, and it begins to reinfo=ce the best behaviors—we finally ge\n... [truncated, 4225 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02406470/17 or ?id=EFTA02406470&page=17]", "char_count": 4225}]}