{"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_count": 10, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01659412", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01659412.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 1 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \n-x \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n x \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM \nIN SUPPORT OF DETENTION \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nActing United States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nAttorney for the United States of America \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n- Of Counsel - \nEFTA01659412\n", "char_count": 447}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 2 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \n-x \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n x \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM \nIN SUPPORT OF DETENTION \nFor the reasons set forth herein, the Government respectfully submits that Ghislaine \nMaxwell, the defendant, poses an extreme risk of flight; that she will not be able to rebut the \nstatutory presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the \nappearance of the defendant as required, 18 U.S.C. § 3 I42(e)(3)(E); and that the Court should \ntherefore order her detained. \nThe charges in this case are unquestionably serious: the Indictment alleges that Ghislaine \nMaxwell, in partnership with Jeffrey Epstein, a serial sexual predator, exploited and abused young \ngirls for years. As a result of her disturbing and callous conduct, Maxwell now faces the very real \nprospect of serving many years in prison. The strength of the Government's evidence and the \nsubstantial prison term the defendant would face upon conviction all create a strong incentive for \nthe defendant to flee. That risk is only amplified by the defendant's extensive international ties, \nher citizenship in two foreign countries, her wealth, and her lack of meaningful ties to the United \nStates. In short, Maxwell has three passports, large sums of money, extensive international \nconnections, and absolutely no reason to stay in the United States and face the possibility of a \nlengthy prison sentence. \nEFTA01659413\n", "char_count": 1587}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 3 of 10 \nBACKGROUND \nOn June 29, 2020, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned a \nsealed indictment (the \"Indictment\") charging the defendant with one count of conspiracy to entice \nminors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of enticing \na minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and 2; one count of \nconspiracy to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; \none count of transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 \nand 2; and two counts of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. \nThe charges arise from a scheme to sexually abuse underage girls at Epstein's properties \nin New York, Florida, and New Mexico, between approximately 1994 and 1997. During that time, \nMaxwell had a personal and professional relationship with Epstein and was one of his closest \nassociates. \nBeginning in at least 1994, the defendant enticed and groomed multiple minor girls to \nengage in sex acts with Epstein, through a variety of means and methods. In particular, she played \na key role in Epstein's abuse of minors by helping Epstein to identify, groom, and ultimately abuse \nunderage girls. As a part of their scheme, the defendant and Epstein enticed and caused minor \nvictims to travel to Epstein's residences in different states, which the defendant knew and intended \nwould result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse. \nAs the Indictment details, the defendant enticed and groomed minor girls to be abused in \nmultiple ways. For example, she attempted to befriend certain victims by asking them about their \nlives, taking them to the movies or on shopping trips, and encouraging their interactions with \nEpstein. She put victims at ease by providing the assurance and comfort of an adult woman who \nseemingly approved of Epstein's be\n... [truncated, 2081 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01659412/2 or ?id=EFTA01659412&page=2]", "char_count": 2081}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 4 of 10 \nthe defendant would encourage victims to accept Epstein's offers of financial assistance, including \noffers to pay for travel or educational expenses. The victims were as young as 14 years old when \nthey were groomed and abused by Maxwell and Epstein, both of whom knew that their victims \nwere minors. \nThe Indictment further alleges that the defendant lied under oath to conceal her crimes. In \n2016, the defendant gave deposition testimony in connection with a civil lawsuit in the Southern \nDistrict of New York. During the deposition, the defendant was asked questions about her role in \nfacilitating the abuse of minors. The defendant repeatedly lied under oath when questioned about \nher conduct with minor girls. \nARGUMENT \nI. \nApplicable Law \nUnder the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., federal courts are empowered to \norder a defendant's detention pending trial upon a determination that the defendant is either a \ndanger to the community or a risk of flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). A finding of risk of flight must \nbe supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d \n789, 793 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. \nChimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). A finding of dangerousness must be supported by \nclear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. \n1995); Patriarca, 948 F.2d at 792; Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 405. \nThe Bail Reform Act lists four factors to be considered in the detention analysis: (1) the \nnature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; \n(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the person's \"character . . . [and] \nfinancial resources\"; and (4) the seriousness of the danger posed by the defendant's release. See \n3 \nEFTA01659415\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 5 of 10 \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Evidentiary rules do not apply at detention hearings, and the Government is \nentitled to present evidence by way of proffer, among other means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2); \nsee also United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (Government entitled \nto proceed by proffer in detention hearings). \nWhere a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that \"no condition or combination of \nconditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any \nother person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before \ntrial.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Additionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with \ncommitting an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be \npresumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure \nthe appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3142(e)(3)(E). \nII. \nDiscussion \nFor the reasons set forth below, the defendant presents an extreme risk of flight, and \ntherefore she cannot overcome the statutory presumption in favor of detention in this case. Every \none of the relevant factors to be considered as to flight risk — the nature and circumstances of the \noffense, the strength of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the defendant — counsel \nstrongly in favor of detention. \nA. \nThe Nature and Circumstances of the Offense and the Strength of the Evidence \nThe \"nature and circumstances\" of this offense favor detention. As the Indictment alleges, \nthe defendant committed serious crimes involving the sexual exploitation of minors. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3142(gX1) (specifically enumerating \"whether the offense. . . involves a minor victim\" as a \nfactor in bail applications). Indeed, the crimes of enticing and transporting minors for illegal sex \n4 \nEFTA0\n... [truncated, 2008 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01659412/4 or ?id=EFTA01659412&page=4]", "char_count": 2008}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 6 of 10 \nacts are so serious that both crimes carry a statutory presumption that no condition or combination \nof conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 \n(e)(3)(E). The defendant repeatedly engaged in this conduct, targeting girls as young as 14 years \nold, for a period of years, and involving multiple minors. \nThese offenses carry significant penalties, and the defendant faces up to 35 years' \nimprisonment if convicted. The possibility of a substantial sentence is a significant factor in \nassessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Moscaritolo, No. 10 Cr. 4 (JL), 2010 WL 309679, \nat *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 2010) (\"[T]he steeper the potential sentence, the more probable the flight \nrisk is, especially considering the strong case of the government . . . .\") (quoting United States v. \nAlindato—Perez, 627 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66 (D.P.R. 2009)). Here, the defendant is facing a statutory \nmaximum of decades in prison. This fact alone would provide a compelling incentive for anyone \nto flee from prosecution, but the incentive to flee is especially strong for this defendant, who, at \nage 58, faces the very real prospect of spending a substantial portion of the rest of her life in prison. \nThe strength of the evidence in this case underscores the risk that the defendant will become \na fugitive. As the facts set forth in the Indictment make plain, the evidence in this case is strong. \nMultiple victims have provided detailed, credible, and corroborated information against the \ndefendant. The victims are backed up contemporaneous documents, records, witness testimony, \nand other evidence. For example, flight records, diary entries, business records, and other evidence \ncorroborate the victims' account of events. This will be compelling evidence of guilt at any trial \nin this case, which weighs heavily in favor of detention. \nThe passage of time between the defendant's co\n... [truncated, 2258 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01659412/5 or ?id=EFTA01659412&page=5]", "char_count": 2258}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 7 of 10 \ndate of the amendment,' to permit a prosecution at any point during the lifetime of the minor \nvictim. See United States v. Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that because \nCongress extended the statute of limitations for sex offenses involving minors during the time the \nprevious statute was still running, the extension was permissible); United States v. Pierre-Louis, \nNo. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (same). Moreover, while \nthe conduct alleged in the Indictment may have occurred years ago, the risk of a significant term \nof incarceration — and thus the motive to flee — is of course only very recent. \nEach of these factors — the seriousness of the allegations, the strength of the evidence, and \nthe possibility of lengthy incarceration — creates an extraordinary incentive to flee. And as further \ndescribed below, the defendant has the means and money to do so. \nB. \nThe Characteristics of the Defendant \nThe history and characteristics of the defendant also strongly support detention. As an \ninitial matter, the defendant's extensive international ties would make it exceptionally easy for her \nto flee and live abroad. The defendant was born in France and raised in the United Kingdom, \nwhere she attended school. Although she became a naturalized citizen of the United States in \n2002, she also remains a citizen of the United Kingdom and France. Travel records from \nUnited States Customs and Border Protection (\"CBP\") reflect that she has engaged in frequent \ninternational travel, including at least fifteen international flights in the last three years to locations \nincluding the United Kingdom, Japan, and Qatar. In addition, CBP records reflect that, consistent \nwith her citizenship status, the defendant appears to possess passports from the United States, \nFrance, and the United Kingdom. \n' Prior to the amendment, the statute of limitations for sexual offe\n... [truncated, 2202 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01659412/6 or ?id=EFTA01659412&page=6]", "char_count": 2202}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 8 of 10 \nIn addition, the defendant appears to have access to significant financial resources that \nwould enable her flight from prosecution. Based on the Government's investigation to date, the \nGovernment has identified more than 15 different bank accounts held by or associated with the \ndefendant from 2016 to the present, and during that same period, the total balances of those \naccounts have ranged from a total of hundreds of thousands of dollars to more than $20 \nmillion. During the same period, the defendant engaged in transfers between her accounts of \nhundreds of thousands of dollars at a time, including at least several such significant transfers as \nrecently as 2019. For example, the defendant transferred $500,000 from one of her accounts to \nanother in March 2019, and transferred more than $300,000 from one of her accounts to another \nin July 2019. She has also reported, including as recently as 2019, that she holds one or more \nforeign bank accounts containing more than a million dollars. \nThe defendant also appears to have reaped substantial income from a 2016 property sale. \nIn particular, in 2016, the defendant appears to have sold a New York City residence for $15 \nmillion through a limited liability company. On or about the date of the sale, amounts totaling \nmore than $14 million were then deposited into an account for which the defendant was listed as \nthe owner. Several days later, more than $14 million was transferred from that account into \nanother account opened in the name of the defendant.2 In short, the defendant's financial resources \nappear to be substantial, and her numerous accounts and substantial money movements render her \ntotal financial picture opaque and indeterminate, even upon a review of bank records available to \nthe Government. \n2 The Government additionally notes that, somewhat further back in time, in transactions occurring \nbetween 2007 and 2011, approximately more than\n... [truncated, 2265 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01659412/7 or ?id=EFTA01659412&page=7]", "char_count": 2265}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 9 of 10 \nThe defendant's international connections and significant financial means would present a \nclear risk of flight under normal circumstances, but in this case, the risk of flight is exacerbated by \nthe transient nature of defendant's current lifestyle. In particular, the defendant has effectively \nbeen in hiding for approximately a year, since an indictment against Epstein was unsealed in July \n2019. Thereafter, the defendant — who had previously made many public appearances - stopped \nappearing in public entirely, instead hiding out in locations in New England. Moreover, it appears \nthat she made intentional efforts to avoid detection, including moving locations at least twice, \nswitching her primary phone number (which she registered under the name \"G Max\") and email \naddress, and ordering packages for delivery with a different person listed on the shipping label. \nMost recently, the defendant appears to have been hiding on a 156-acre property acquired in an \nall-cash purchase in December 2019 (through a carefully anonymized LLC) in Bradford, New \nHampshire, an area to which she has no other known connections. \nThe defendant appears to have no ties that would motivate her to remain in the United \nStates. She has no children, does not reside with any immediate family members, and does not \nappear to have any employment that would require her to remain in the United States. Nor does \nshe appear to have any permanent ties to any particular location in the United States. As such, the \nGovernment respectfully submits that the defendant will not be able to meet her burden of \novercoming the presumption of detention, because there are no bail conditions that could \nreasonably assure the defendant's continued appearance in this case. \nIn particular, home confinement with electronic monitoring would be inadequate to \nmitigate the high risk that the defendant would flee, as she could easily remove a monitoring \nde\n... [truncated, 2207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01659412/8 or ?id=EFTA01659412&page=8]", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01659412", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 4 Filed 07/02/20 Page 10 of 10 \n(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (Gleeson, J.) (rejecting defendant's application for bail in part because \nhome detention with electronic monitoring \"at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant's head start\"); \nUnited States v. Benatar, No. 02 Cr. 099, 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) \n(same); see also United States v. Casteneda, No. 18 Cr. 047, 2018 WL 888744, at *9 (N.D. Cal. \nFeb. 2018) (same); United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). \nCONCLUSION \nAs set forth above, the defendant is an extreme risk of flight. The Government respectfully \nsubmits that the defendant cannot meet her burden of overcoming the statutory presumption in \nfavor of detention. There are no conditions of bail that would assure the defendant's presence in \ncourt proceedings in this case. Accordingly, any application for bail should be denied. \nDated: New York, New York \nJuly 2, 2020 \nRespectfully submitted, \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nActing United States Attorney \nBy: \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n(212) 637-2225 \n9 \nEFTA01659421\n", "char_count": 1115}]}