{"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_count": 128, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01656708", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01656708.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of \nPrisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey \nEpstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in \nNew York, New York \n* \n* \n* \nINVESTIGATIONS DIVISION \n23-085 \nJUNE 2023 \nEFTA01656708\n", "char_count": 241}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY \nInvestigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of \nPrisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey \nEpstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in \nNew York, New York \nIntroduction and Background \nAccording to its website, the Federal Bureau of Prisons \n(BOPys current mission statement is \"Corrections \nprofessionals who foster a humane and secure \nenvironment and ensure public safety by preparing \nindividuals for successful reentry into our \ncommunities? However, the Department ofJustice \n(DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has \nrepeatedly identified long-standing operational \nchallenges that negatively affect the BOP's ability to \noperate its institutions safely and securely. Many of \nthose same operational challenges, including staffing \nshortages, managing inmates at risk for suicide, \nfunctional security camera systems, and management \nfailures and widespread disregard of BOP policies and \nprocedures, were again identified by the OIG during \nthis investigation and review into the custody, care, and \nsupervision of one of the BOP's most notorious \ninmates, Jeffrey Epstein. \nThe OIG initiated this investigation upon receipt of \ninformation from the BOP that on August 10, 2019, in \nthe Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, \nNew York (MCC New York), Epstein was found hanged \nin his assigned cell within the Special Housing Unit \n(SHU). The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, \nCity of New York, determined that Epstein had died \nby suicide. \nThe OIG conducted this investigation jointly with the \nFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with the OIG's \ninvestigative focus being the conduct of BOP personnel. \nAmong other things, the FBI investigated the cause of \nEpstein's death and determined there was no \ncriminality pertaining to how Epstein had died. \nThis report concerns the OIG's findings regarding MCC \nNew York personnel's custody, care, and supervision of \nEpstein while detained at the facility from his arrest on \nfederal\n... [truncated, 3959 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/1 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=1]", "char_count": 3959}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "psychological observation, for Inmates who are \nstabilizing but not yet ready to return to a housing unit. \nEpstein was removed from suicide watch on July 24 but \nremained under psychological observation until July 30. \nEpstein first told MCC New York staff he thought his \ncellmate had tried to kill him, but later said he did not \nknow what occurred and did not want to talk about \nhow he had sustained his injuries. Epstein also later \nasked if he could be housed with the same cellmate. \nMother inmate housed on the same SHU tier told the \n016 that he heard Epstein's cellmate call for assistance, \nand that Epstein's cellmate told him that Epstein tried \nto hang himself from the bunkbed ladder. Disciplinary \ncharges against Epstein for alleged self-mutilation were \nnot sustained due to insufficient evidence. \nFollowing the July 23 incident, the Psychology \nDepartment determined Epstein needed to be housed \nwith an appropriate cellmate, and on July 30 it sent an \nemail to over 70 MCC New York employees informing \nthem of this requirement. The Warden at the time told \nthe OIG that he selected a new cellmate for Epstein in \nconsultation with BOP executive leadership. That \ninmate remained Epstein's cellmate until August 9. \nEvents of August 8-10, 2019, and \nEpstein's Death \nOn August 8, the U.S. Marshals Service sent two emails \nnotifying numerous MCC New York staff that Epstein's \ncellmate was being transferred to another facility on \nAugust 9. However, no action was taken to ensure \nEpstein was assigned another cellmate. \nAlso on August 8, Epstein met with his attorneys at the \nprison, as he had on prior occasions, and signed a new \nLast Will and Testament. MCC New York officials did \nnot learn about the new Will until after Epstein's death. \nThe following day, August 9, Epstein's cellmate was \ntransferred to another facility and he was not assigned \na new cellmate. Additionally, on that date, the \nU.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unsealed \napproximately 2,0\n... [truncated, 4882 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/2 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=2]", "char_count": 4882}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "cause of death was hanging and the manner of death \nwas suicide. Blood toxicology tests did not reveal any \nmedications or illegal substances in Epstein's system. \nThe Medical Examiner who performed the autopsy told \nthe OIG that Epstein's injuries were consistent with \nsuicide by hanging and that there was no evidence of \ndefensive wounds that would be expected if his death \nhad been a homicide. Epstein did not have marks on \nhis hands, broken fingernails or debris under them, \ncontusions to his knuckles that would have evidenced a \nfight, or, other than an abrasion on his arm likely due to \nconvulsing from hanging, bruising on his body. \nThe Limited Available Video Evidence \nRecorded video evidence for August 9 and 10 for the \nSHU area where Epstein was housed was only available \nfrom one prison security camera due to a malfunction \nof MCC New York's Digital Video Recorder system that \noccurred on July 29, 2019. While the prison's cameras \ncontinued to provide live video feeds, recordings were \nmade for only about half the cameras. MCC New York \npersonnel discovered this failure on August 8, 2019, but \nit was not repaired until after Epstein's death. As \ndetailed in this report, like many other BOP facilities, \nMCC New York had a history of security \ncamera problems. \nThe available recorded video footage from the one SHU \ncamera captured a large pan of the common area of \nthe SHU and portions of the stairways leading to the \ndifferent SHU tiers, Including Epstein's cell tier. Thus, \nanyone entering or attempting to enter Epstein's SHU \ntier from the SHU common area would have been \npicked up by that video camera. Epstein's cell door, \nhowever, was not in the camera's field of view. The OIG \nreviewed the video and found that, between \napproximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 and about \n6:30 a.m. on August 10, no one was seen entering \nEpstein's cell tier from the SHU common area. The OIG \ndetermined that movements captured on video before \nand after those times were ge\n... [truncated, 5148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/3 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=3]", "char_count": 5148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "SHU staff told the OIG that at approximately 8 p.m. on \nAugust 9, all SHU inmates, including Epstein, were \nlocked in their cells for the evening and we found no \nevidence to the contrary. The prison's recorded video \ndid not identify any staff or other individuals \napproaching Epstein's SHU tier from the SHU common \narea between approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 \nand about 6:30 a.m. on August 10. Additionally, the \nO16 did not observe on the recorded video that Noel \nand Thomas, who were seated at the desk at the SHU \nOfficers' Station immediately outside the area where \nEpstein was housed, at any time during the time period \nrose from their seats or approached the cell block. We \nadditionally found that Thomas's and Noel's reaction on \nthe morning of August 10 upon finding Epstein hanging \nin his cell, as described to us by Thomas, Noel, the \nresponding Lieutenant, and inmates, was consistent \nwith their being unaware of any potential harm to \nEpstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein's cell at about \n6:30 a.m. on August 10. \nNone of the MCC New York staff members we \ninterviewed were aware of any information suggesting \nEpstein's cause of death was something other than \nsuicide. Additionally, none of the inmates we \ninterviewed had any credible information suggesting \nEpstein's cause of death was something other than \nsuicide. Further, the SHU staff and three interviewed \ninmates with a direct line of sight to Epstein's cell door \non the night of his death stated that no one entered or \nexited Epstein's cell after the SHU staff returned Epstein \nto his cell on August 9. \nAs noted, the surveillance camera in the SHU area \nwhere Epstein was housed was live streaming \nmovement in the hallway outside of Epstein's cell. \nAlthough the camera was not recording the captured \nvideo, the camera was in plain view of the inmates and \ntherefore inmates would have been aware that any \nhallway movements, including into or out of Epstein's \ncell, could be monitored by BOP staf\n... [truncated, 4997 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/4 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=4]", "char_count": 4997}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Table of Contents \nChapter 1: Introduction \n1 \nChapter 2: Background \n5 \nI. \nSignificant Entities and Individuals \n5 \nIL \nMethodology \n6 \nIII. \nApplicable Law, Regulations, and BOP Policies  \n7 \nA. \nStandards of Conduct \n7 \nB. \nFalse Statements and Lack of Candor \n8 \nC. \nRelevant BOP Policies Regarding the Operation of Correctional Facilities \n8 \nChapter 3: Timeline of Key Events \n14 \nChapter 4: Custody and Care of Epstein Prior to His Death \n21 \nI. \nEpstein's Arrest and Detention on July 6 \n 21 \nII. \nMCC New York's Special Housing Unit \n22 \nIII. \nEpstein's Initial Cell and Cellmate Assignment from July 7 to July 23 \n28 \nIV. \nEvents of July 23 and the Placement of Epstein on Suicide Watch and Psychological Observation \nfrom July 23 to July 30 \n29 \nV. \nThe Psychology Department's Post-July 23 Determination that Epstein Needed to Have an \nAppropriate Cellmate \n32 \nVI. \nSelection of Epstein's Cellmate After Psychological Observation \n33 \nVII. \nEpstein's Cell Assignment from July 30 to August 10 \n33 \nVIII. \nPsychological Evaluations of Epstein from July 6 to August 9 \n41 \nChapter 5: The Events of August 8-10, 2019, and Epstein's Death \n50 \nI. \nEpstein Signs a New Last Will and Testament on August 8 \n50 \nII. \nCourt Order on August 9 Releasing Epstein-Related Documents in Pending Civil Litigation \n50 \nIII. \nTransfer of Epstein's Cellmate on August 9 to Another Institution and Failure to Replace Him with \nAnother Inmate \n51 \nA. \nNotice on August 8 of the Impending Transfer of Epstein's Cellmate on August 9 \n51 \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Reject Epstein Attorney's Request that Epstein be Housed Without a \nCellmate \n 51 \nC. \nRemoval on August 9 of Epstein's Cellmate from MCC New York \n52 \nD. \nFailure to Assign Epstein a New Cellmate on August 9 \n53 \nIV. \nEpstein is Allowed to Make an Unmonitored Telephone Call on August 9 \n58 \nV. \nFailure to Conduct SHU Inmate Counts and Staff Rounds on August 9--10 \n61 \nEFTA01656713\n", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "A. \nSHU Inmate Counts \n61 \nB. \nStaff Rounds in the SHU \n67 \nVI. \nEpstein's Death on August 10 \n70 \nA. \nDiscovery of Epstein Hanged in Cell and Emergency Response \n70 \nB. \nItems Found in Epstein's Cell on August 10 Following His Death \n76 \nC. \nAutopsy Results \n79 \nChapter 6: The Availability of Limited Recorded Video Evidence Due to the Security Camera \nRecording System Failure \n81 \nI. \nBackground on the Security Camera System at MCC New York \n81 \nII. \nDiscovery of Security Camera System Recording Issues in August 2019 \n82 \nA. \nDiscovery on August 8 of the DVR 2 Failure that Occurred on July 29 \n82 \nB. \nResponse on August 8 and 9 to Discovery of the Recording Failure \n83 \nC. \nSHU Camera Locations and Operational Status on August 10 \n84 \nD. \nFBI Forensic Analysis of the DVR System \n92 \nChapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations \n94 \nI. \nConclusions \n94 \nA. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that Epstein Had a Cellmate on August 9 as Instructed by \nthe Psychology Department on July 30 \n98 \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct Mandatory Rounds and Inmate Counts Resulting in \nEpstein Being Unobserved for Hours Before His Death \n102 \nC. \nMCC New York Staff Allowed Epstein to Place an Unmonitored Telephone Call on August 9 107 \nD. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct and Document Cell Searches and Eliminate Safety \nHazards in Epstein's Cell on August 9 Leaving Epstein with Excessive Linens in His Cell \n 108 \nE. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that the Institution's Security Camera System was Fully \nFunctional Resulting in Limited Recorded Video Evidence \n109 \nII. \nRecommendations \n110 \nAppendix A: The BOP's Response to the Draft Report \n115 \nAppendix B: OM Analysis of the BOP's Response \n118 \nEFTA01656714\n", "char_count": 1740}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Chapter 1: Introduction \nThe Federal Bureau of Prisons (13OP) is a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that operates \n122 institutions across the United States. According to its website, the BOP's current mission statement is \n\"Corrections professionals who foster a humane and secure environment and ensure public safety by \npreparing individuals for successful reentry into our communities.\" However, the DOJ Office of the \nInspector General (OIG) has issued numerous reports over more than a decade identifying long-standing \noperational challenges facing the BOP that have negatively affected its ability to operate its institutions \nsafely and securely. Those reports have contained dozens of recommendations to the BOP. As we detail in \nthis report, many of those same operational challenges and systemic issues, including significant staffing \nshortages, providing appropriate custody and care of inmates at risk for suicide, the absence of functional \nsecurity camera systems, and management failures and widespread disregard of BOP policies and \nprocedures, were once again identified by the OIG during the course of this investigation and review into \nthe custody, care, and supervision of one of the SOP's most notorious inmates, Jeffrey Epstein. We \ntherefore make further recommendations to the BOP in the conclusion of this report to help it address \nthese recurring issues. \nThe OIG initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information from the BOP that on the morning of \nAugust 10, 2019, in the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), \ninmate Jeffery Epstein was found hanged in his assigned cell within the Special Housing Unit (SHU). The SHU \nis a housing unit where inmates are securely separated from the general inmate population and kept locked \nin their cells for approximately 23 hours a day, to ensure their own safety as well as the safety of staff and \nother inmates. Epstein had been placed in the SHU on July 7, 20\n... [truncated, 4240 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/7 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=7]", "char_count": 4240}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "moved by medical staff to the MCC New York Health Service Unit., The Clinical Nurse continuously \nadministered CPR until he was relieved by outside Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) when they arrived \nat the Health Services Area minutes later. The EMTs continued CPR, intubated Epstein, and administered \nmedication and fluids in their efforts to revive him. At approximately 7:10 a.m., Epstein was transported by \nthe EMTs in an ambulance to New York Presbyterian Lower Manhattan Hospital, where he was pronounced \ndead by an emergency room physician at 7:36 a.m. On August 11, 2019, the Office of the Chief Medical \nExaminer, City of New York, performed an autopsy on Epstein and determined that the cause of death was \nhanging and the manner of death was suicide. \nThe OIG conducted this investigation jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with the OIG's \ninvestigative focus being the conduct of BOP personnel. Among other things, the FBI investigated the cause \nof Epstein's death. The FBI determined that there was no criminality pertaining to how Epstein had died. \nThis report concerns the OIG's findings regarding MCC New York personnel's custody, care, and supervision \nof Epstein during his detention at the facility from his arrest on July 6, 2019, until his death on \nAugust 10, 2019. \nThe OIG investigation and review identified numerous and serious failures by MCC New York staff, as well as \nmultiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies and procedures. Among the most significant was the \nfailure to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August 9, 2019, after Epstein's cellmate was transferred out of \nMCC New York that day. Epstein was required to have a cellmate at all times pursuant to a written direction \nthat the MCC New York Psychology Department issued on July 30 after Epstein was removed from suicide \nwatch and psychological observation following a possible attempted suicide by him on July 23. As a result of \nthe failure to assign him a new cellm\n... [truncated, 4085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/8 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=8]", "char_count": 4085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "that they had conducted all of the required counts of inmates and 30-minute rounds during their shifts \nwithin the SHU. As described in greater detail in Chapter 2, inmate counts and 30-minute rounds are two \nmeans by which the BOP accounts for inmates and assesses their safety, security, and well-being. BOP and \nMCC New York policies require that staff members count all inmates in each housing unit within the facility \nat designated times each day. Additionally, SOP and MCC New York policies require that a staff member \nobserve all SHU inmates at least once during the first 30 minutes of each hour (e.g., 12 a.m. to 12:30 a.m.) \nand again during the second 30 minutes of the hour (e.g., 12:30 a.m. to 1 a.m.), thus ensuring that inmates \nare observed at least twice per hour. SOP staff are required to document inmate counts and 30-minute \nrounds on official BOP forms, which are often referred to as \"count slips\" and \"round sheets.\"2\nDuring the OIG's investigation, the OIG obtained information that the staff assigned to the MCC New York \nSHU did not conduct any counts of inmates within the SHU from August 9, 2019, at approximately 4 p.m., \nuntil Epstein was found hanged in his cell on the morning of August 10, 2019. However, in documentation \ncompleted by the SHU staff on duty during that period, staff members falsely certified in the count slips that \nthey had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned \nto the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately \n10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during that period had falsely certified in \nthe round sheet that the required rounds were conducted. The combination of these and other failures led \nto Epstein being unmonitored and locked alone in his cell, which the OIG found contained an excessive \namount of bed linens, from approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 until he was discovered hanged in h\n... [truncated, 4141 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/9 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=9]", "char_count": 4141}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Epstein was housed, from the common area of the SHU between approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 and \napproximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10. \nFinally, the Medical Examiner who performed the autopsy detailed for the OIG why Epstein's injuries were \nmore consistent with, and indicative of, a suicide by hanging rather than a homicide by strangulation. The \nMedical Examiner also cited to the absence of debris under Epstein's fingernails, marks on his hands, \ncontusions to his knuckles, or bruises on his body that evidenced Epstein had been in a struggle, which \nwould be expected if Epstein's death had been a homicide by strangulation. \nAs discussed in greater detail in the Conclusions and Recommendations chapter of this report, this is not \nthe first time that the OIG has found significant job performance and management failures on the part of \nBOP personnel and widespread disregard of SOP policies that are designed to ensure that inmates are safe, \nsecure, and in good health. The OIG has investigated numerous allegations related to the falsification of \nofficial SOP documentation concerning inmate counts and rounds and has repeatedly found deficiencies \nwith the BOP's staffing levels, the custody and care of inmates at risk for suicide, and security camera \nsystems at BOP institutions. The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance \nfailures documented in this report all contributed to an environment in which arguably one of the most \nnotorious inmates in BOP's custody was provided with the opportunity to take his own life. The BOP's \nfailures are troubling not only because the BOP did not adequately safeguard an individual in its custody, \nbut also because they led to questions about the circumstances surrounding Epstein's death and effectively \ndeprived Epstein's numerous victims of the opportunity to seek justice through the criminal justice process. \nThe fact that these failures have been recurring ones at the BOP does not excuse them and gi\n... [truncated, 3356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/10 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=10]", "char_count": 3356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Chapter 2: Background \nI. \nSignificant Entities and Individuals \nJeffrey Epsteinwas born in 1953 and, prior to his arrest, worked at various jobs in the financial industry and \nultimately developed considerable wealth. On July 2, 2019, a federal grand jury of the U.S. District Court for \nthe Southern District of New York returned an indictment that charged Epstein with engaging in sex \ntrafficking and a sex trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 44 371, 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2. These \ncharges were based on allegations that between 2002 and 2005, Epstein paid girls as young as 14 years old \nhundreds of dollars in cash each for engaging in sex acts with him at his Florida and New York residences. \nThe indictment further alleged that Epstein also paid each of these minor victims hundreds of dollars in cash \nto recruit other girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein. \nOn July 6, 2019, Epstein was arrested at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey upon his return to the United States \nfrom France and was transported to the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Metropolitan Correctional Center, \nlocated at 150 Park Row in New York, New York (MCC New York). Following a detention hearing on July 15, \n2019, the court ordered that Epstein be detained pending trial based on the court's finding that he was a \ndanger to the community and a flight risk. \nMCC New York is a federal administrative detention facility operated by the BOP that primarily provides \npretrial detention services for the U.S. District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. \nThe BOP temporarily closed MCC New York in October 2021 due to substandard conditions that are \nunrelated to this investigation. When it was operational, MCC New York housed approximately 750 inmates \nat any given time. Prior to its closure, the majority of MCC New York's inmate residents were individuals \nwith pending criminal charges (as opposed to individuals who had been convicted of offenses and were \nserving a sente\n... [truncated, 3600 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/11 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=11]", "char_count": 3600}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "referred to as a \"round sheet\") falsely stating that she and Thomas had conducted such rounds when, in \nfact, they had not.5\nOn November 19, 2019, a federal grand jury of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York \nreturned an indictment that charged Noel and Thomas with one count each of conspiracy and multiple \ncounts each of falsification of records, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4§ 371, 1001(a)(3), and 2. The indictment \nalleged that on August 9, 2019, Noel failed to conduct the mandatory 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. counts of inmates \nin the MCC New York SHU, and that on August 10, 2019, both she and Thomas failed to conduct the \nmandatory 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts and mandatory 30-minute rounds within the MCC New York \nSHU. The indictment further alleged that Noel and Thomas created, certified, and submitted false \ndocumentation indicating that the counts and rounds had been done as required to conceal their failure to \nperform their assigned duties. As a result, it appeared from documentation that prisoners in the SHU, \nincluding Epstein, were being regularly monitored when, in fact, no CO had checked on Epstein from \napproximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019, until approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10, 2019, when \nEpstein was found hanged in his cell. \nOn May 25, 2021, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York entered into deferred \nprosecution agreements with Noel and Thomas. Their respective agreements, which are part of the court \nrecord in their cases, included admissions by Noel and Thomas that they falsely certified that they had \nconducted counts and rounds. The agreements also required each of them to truthfully and completely \ndisclose all information related to their activities and employment with the BOP; be interviewed by the \nU.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and the OIG; complete 100 hours of \ncommunity service; refrain from violating the law; and fulfill other conditions\n... [truncated, 3751 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/12 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=12]", "char_count": 3751}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "requested to provide information.' The BOP employees and contractors we interviewed included \nemployees involved in various aspects of the emergency response, who worked at MCC New York in the \ndays leading up to the response and following the response, as well as other individuals with information \npertinent to our investigation. Additionally, the OIG participated in interviews of 15 inmates who had been \nhoused at MCC New York during time periods relevant to our investigation, including three who were \nhoused in the L Tier of the SHU on the day Epstein died.' Those three L-Tier inmates were housed in cells \nopposite Epstein's cell and therefore had a direct line of sight to Epstein's cell on the night of August 9-10. \nThe OIG also reached out to one of Epstein's attorneys to discuss the possibility of providing information, \nbut ultimately the attorney declined to be interviewed, citing attorney-client privilege (the attorney-client \nprivilege survives a client's death) and issues related to ongoing litigation involving Epstein's estate. \nThe OIG also collected over 127,000 documents, as well as MCC New York video and photographs. Among \nthese were BOP documents, including staff rosters; daily logs and reports; investigative and incident reports; \ndocumentation regarding inmate counts and 30-minute rounds; inmate housing assignment \ndocumentation; inmate transfer documents; Psychology Department reports and medical records relating \nto Epstein; Epstein's institutional phone call records; MCC New York records of Epstein's visits with his \nattorneys; electronic communications, including text messages and emails of BOP employees and \ncontractors; MCC New York security camera surveillance video; records from contractors regarding the MCC \nNew York security camera system; service records for MCC New York's security camera system; MCC \nNew York photographs, including photographs taken of efforts to revive Epstein on the morning of \nAugust 10, 2019; BOP policies and prog\n... [truncated, 3707 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/13 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=13]", "char_count": 3707}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "in an honest effort to perform official duties.\", The ethical regulations also mandate that federal employees \nnot use federal property \"for other than authorized activities.\",\nBOP policy (Program Statement 3420.11, Standards of Employee Conduct) imposes several additional \nstandards of conduct on its employees. At all times, BOP employees must \"[c]onduct themselves in a \nmanner that fosters respect for the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Government.\" \nBecause \"[i]nattention to duty in a correctional environment can result in escapes, assaults, and other \nincidents,\" BOP employees \"are required to remain fully alert and attentive during duty hours.\" BOP policy \nprovides that employees can use government property for authorized purposes only, and further specifies \nthat personal use of government office equipment, such as computers, \"will not take place during official \nworking hours.\" BOP policy requires that employees \"obey the orders of their superiors at all times.\" \nB. \nFalse Statements and Lack of Candor \nUnder federal law, \"whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive...branch of the \nGovernment of the United States, knowingly and willfully...makes or uses any false writing or document \nknowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry\" has violated \n18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). The terms \"knowingly and willfully\" mean that the subject acted with knowledge that \nthe conduct was, in a general sense, prohibited by law. It is not required that the subject was aware of the \nexistence of Section 1001. \nUnder BOP standards of conduct discussed above, employees are required to cooperate fully with official \ninvestigations, which includes providing \"all pertinent information they may have\" and \"truthfully responding \nto questions.\" \nC. \nRelevant BOP Policies Regarding the Operation of Correctional Facilities \n1. Special Housing Units \nSHUs within BOP facilities are governed by federa\n... [truncated, 3266 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/14 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=14]", "char_count": 3266}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Inmates in the SHU are securely separated from general population inmates and are kept locked in their cell \nwhen in their assigned tier within the SHU. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, witnesses told the \nOIG that SHU inmates are locked in their cells for approximately 23 hours a day. BOP policy provides that, \nweather and resources permitting, SHU inmates will have the opportunity to exercise outside their quarters \nS hours per calendar week. Under federal regulations and BOP policy, SHU inmates ordinarily have the \nopportunity to shower at least 3 times a week, typically on different days in 1-hour periods. SHU inmates \nmay also be escorted from their cells by MCC New York staff for visits, including legal visits, court \nappearances, medical and psychological attention. The MCC New York SHU Post Orders require that all \nvisitors to the SHU be documented in a visitor log, and that any inmate visiting the SHU, such as inmates on \nwork details, be searched visually and with a hand-held metal detector, without exception. The MCC \nNew York SHU Post Orders also require that food carts be searched inside and out before being brought \ninto a SHU cellblock and that all meals be delivered to each inmate's cell through the food slot in the \ninmate's locked cell door. \nBOP policy provides that inmates housed in the SHU for 30 continuous calendar days are to be examined \nand interviewed by a mental health staff member to assess the inmate's adjustment and the threat \npresented to self or others. \nBOP policy also requires that all staff assigned to the SHU participate in quarterly training on, among other \nthings, orderly supervision, suicide prevention, and security procedures relating to the unit. When a staff \nmember is assigned to the SHU at the last-minute and has not completed the quarterly training, the staff \nmember must be advised of the general requirements of a SHU post and be permitted to ask questions \nabout the duties. \n2 Inmate Accountability,' \na. \n\n... [truncated, 3779 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/15 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=15]", "char_count": 3779}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Center, which maintains the master count of all inmates, and then remain in the unit until the Control \nCenter accepts the count. If a count reported verbally does not match the master count, then the Control \nCenter must notify the Operations Lieutenant and the staff members must recount the inmates. If the \nsecond count does not match the master count, then the Operations Lieutenant will order a bed-book \ncount, that is, when inmates are counted using their picture cards, which are on file in the Control Center. A \nLieutenant must take at least 1 count in the morning and one in the evening. \nCorrectional staff prepare count slips for each count, which must be prepared in ink, signed by both officers, \nand retained for 30 days. Count slips may not be altered. BOP policy provides that the \"official count will \nnot be cleared until all count slips are received and verified in the Control Center.\" \nb. \n30-Minute Rounds \nThe BOP uses additional accountability measures for inmates who are in administrative detention or \ndisciplinary segregation, i.e., for those detained in a SHU. In such cases, a correctional staff member must \nobserve all inmates at least twice an hour, once during the first 30 minutes (e.g., 12 a.m. to 12:30 a.m.) and \nagain during the second 30 minutes (e.g., 12:30 a.m. to 1 a.m.). BOP policy provides that these 'rounds are \nto be conducted on an irregular schedule and no more than 40 minutes apart.\" These same requirements \nfor rounds are also described in the Post Orders for the MCC New York's SHU. \nc. \nDocumentation Regarding Inmate Status and Confinement \nBOP policy also provides that each institution must prepare a daily change/transfer sheet, which indicates \nchanges to an inmate's status, including housing and job assignments and medical convalescence. The MCC \nNew York SHU Post Orders require that correctional staff assigned to the SHU create a SHU file for each \ninmate housed in that unit and that morning watch officers audit the inmate file\n... [truncated, 3347 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/16 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=16]", "char_count": 3347}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "admission to the institution. The goal of this screening is to determine \"the inmate's security, medical, \npsychological, and/or other special needs.\" The BOP also requires that institutions screen pretrial inmates \n\"returning from court, as events at court may alter the inmate's separation and/or security needs.\" SOP \npolicy further recognizes that there are often \"high security, high profile inmates\" who may present a \nsignificant threat to themselves or others, and that the \"need to identify and monitor these inmates \nregularly is paramount.\" \nb. \nSuicide Prevention \nThe BOP's suicide prevention program is governed by federal regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 552.40-552.42, which \nrequire the BOP to establish a suicide prevention program to identify and manage potentially suicidal \ninmates. Pursuant to these regulations, when an inmate is identified as being at-risk for committing suicide, \nBOP staff must place the inmate on suicide watch until the inmate is no longer an imminent risk. \nBOP policy (Program Statement 5324.08, Suicide Prevention Program) requires that medical staff screen all \nnew inmates, ordinarily within 24 hours, for signs of suicidality. However, at MCCs, among other facilities \nwith high rates of admissions and short lengths of stays, \"comprehensive psychological intake conducted by \nPsychology Services ordinarily will be performed only on inmates who are suspected of being suicidal or \nappear psychologically unstable? Inmates in the SHU are monitored more closely, and inmates exhibiting \nsigns of potential suicide risk are referred to the shift Lieutenant. BOP policy recognizes that inmates who \nare placed in the SHU due to a request for protective custody are at greater risk of committing suicide and \nshould therefore be screened for suicidal ideation within 72 hours of arriving in the SHU. BOP policy \nexplicitly states that \"staff must never take lightly any inmate suicide threats.\" Any staff member who has \nreason to believe that an inmate may be\n... [truncated, 3814 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/17 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=17]", "char_count": 3814}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "4. Suicide Response \nRecognizing that failure to appropriately respond to an emergency can jeopardize the safety of staff and \ninmates and the security of the institution, the BOP's Standards of Employee Conduct require that \n\"employees respond immediately, effectively, and appropriately during all emergency situations.\" The MCC \nNew York General Housing Unit Post Orders outline the required response to a suspected inmate suicide. \nThese orders require that MCC New York staff notify the Operations Lieutenant and Control Center of the \nsituation. The orders further provide that, once there is adequate staff present, immediate action must be \ntaken to open the inmate's airway and initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation, even if MCC New York staff \nbelieve that the inmate \"has been dead for a period of time.\" MCC New York staff are to continue \ncardiopulmonary resuscitation until they are relieved by medical staff or another rescuer. The SOP policy \ngoverning crime scenes and the collection of evidence provides that the need to immediately attend to an \napparent suicide victim, undertake lifesaving measures, and ensure inmate and staff safety take precedence \nover efforts to preserve a crime scene.13\nS. Inmate Discipline \nFederal regulations, 28 C.F.R. 99 541.1-541.8, and BOP policy (Program Statement 5270.09, Inmate Discipline \nProgram) establish an inmate discipline program, which is designed to ensure the safety, security, and \norderly operation of correctional facilities, as well as the protection of the public. The inmate discipline \nprogram applies to all inmates in BOP custody, including inmates with pending criminal charges. One of the \nguiding principles of this program is that BOP staff are to take disciplinary action when and to such a degree \nas necessary to regulate the behavior of inmates to promote a safe and orderly institution. \"Tattooing or \nself-mutilation\" is among the prohibited acts sanctioned through the inmate discipline program. This \nprohibited\n... [truncated, 3830 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/18 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=18]", "char_count": 3830}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "choose a staff representative, make a statement, and call witnesses. The inmate is also allowed to appeal \nthe outcome through the BOP's administrative remedy program. \n6. Conditions of Confinement \na. \nTelephone Calls \nThe federal regulations, 28 C.F.R. H 540.100-540.106, that govern telephone calls for inmates require that \nthe Warden of each BOP institution establish procedures to monitor inmate telephone conversations, which \nis \"done to preserve the security and orderly management of the institution and to protect the public.\" For \nsafety and security reasons, SOP policy (Program Statement P5264.08, Inmate Telephone Regulations) \nrequires that all inmate telephone calls be made through the Inmate Telephone System. BOP policy \nrecognizes that \"on rare occasion, during times of crisis,\" inmates may be permitted to make a telephone \ncall outside of the Inmate Telephone System. In such circumstances, the telephone \"must be placed in a \nsecure area (e.g., a locked office),\" and \"must be set to record telephone calls.\" Additionally, the staff \nmember coordinating the call must notify the BOP's Special Investigative Services via email, providing the \ninmate's name and register number, the date and time of the call, the number and name of the individual \ncalled, and the reason for the call. The Special Investigative Services must enter this information into the \ntelephone recording system within 7 days. \nb. \nPersonal Effects, Medication, and Linens \nFederal regulations governing BOP SHUs provide that inmates in administrative detention status ordinarily \nmay have a reasonable amount of personal property.\" Under SOP policy regarding SHUs, the personal \nproperty of SHU inmates \"may be limited or withheld for reasons of security, fire safety, or housekeeping.\"16\nThe BOP Chief Pharmacist issues medication each workday for inmates in the SHU. Restricted medications \nare administered to inmates during daily SHU rounds. Each institution determines \"the medication(s) and \namou\n... [truncated, 2912 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/19 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=19]", "char_count": 2912}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Chapter 3: Timeline of Key Events \nExcept as otherwise noted, the following information is derived from the Federal Bureau of \nPrisons (BOP) records and the Office of the Inspector General's interviews. \nSeptember 21-24, \n2018 \nMarch 17, 2019 \nJuly 2, 2019 \nJuly 6, 2019 \nJuly 7, 2019 \nThe BOP awards contracts to two companies (Company 1 and 2) to \nupgrade the security camera system at Metropolitan Correctional Center \nin New York, New York (MCC New York). At the time, images from the \nMCC New York's analog video cameras are recorded to a Digital Video \nRecorder (DVR) system, which is divided into two DVR systems. Cameras \nassigned to the DVR 1 system record only to the DVR 1 hard drives, and \ncameras assigned to DVR 2 system record only to the DVR 2 hard drives. \nIn connection with MCC New York's upgrade of its security camera \nsystem, the BOP's Northeast Regional Office begins arranging for \ntechnicians from other BOP institutions to perform temporary duty (TDY) \nassignments to MCC New York to perform necessary mechanical, \nelectrical, plumbing, and wiring work. However, during the course of the \nTDY rotations, work is not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade \nbecause TDY personnel are sometimes used to cover shortages at MCC \nNew York's custody posts. \nAccording to court records, a federal grand jury of the U.S. District Court \nfor the Southern District of New York returns an indictment charging \nEpstein with sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. \nEpstein is arrested at an airport in New Jersey and is transported for \ndetention pending his initial court appearance to the MCC New York as a \npretrial detainee. Epstein is placed in the general inmate population and \nmedically screened. \nAn MCC New York Facilities Assistant asks the Psychology Department to \nevaluate Epstein because he appears \"distraught, sad, and a little \nconfused.\" Epstein is assigned to the MCC New York's Special Housing \nUnit (SHU) because of significant media attenti\n... [truncated, 2340 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/20 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=20]", "char_count": 2340}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "July 8, 2019 \nJuly 9, 2019 \nJuly 10, 2019 \nJuly 11, 2019 \nJuly 15, 2019 \nJuly 16, 2019 \nJuly 18, 2019 \nAccording to court records, Epstein is arraigned in federal court and \nenters a plea of not guilty to all charges. The court sets a detention \nhearing for July 15, 2019. \nMCC New York staff conducts a routine intake screening of Epstein, the \nrecords of which indicate that Epstein denies a history of any mental \nhealth problems. After the Chief Psychologist consults with the National \nSuicide Prevention Coordinator from BOP's Central Office, the Psychology \nDepartment conducts a further evaluation of Epstein after his return from \ncourt. Records show that Epstein denies any suicidal thoughts but was \nplaced on psychological observation due to the presence of risk factors \n(high-profile case, nature of the charges, pre-trial status, and \nongoing proceedings). \nThe Psychology Department administers a formal, in-person suicide risk \nassessment for Epstein. The Psychology Department continues \npsychological observation for another day pending a suitable \nhousing placement. \nThe Psychology Department removes Epstein from psychological \nobservation and returns him to the SHU with a recommendation that he \nhave a cellmate. Epstein is housed with another inmate (Inmate 1). \nAn MCC New York psychologist meets with Epstein briefly and \nrecommends follow-up visit to occur the next week. \nAccording to court records, Epstein appears in court for his \ndetention hearing. \nAt Epstein's request, an MCC New York psychologist meets with him \nduring a legal visit. \nAccording to court records, Epstein appears in court for a ruling on the \nissue of detention. The court orders that Epstein be detained pending \ntrial because he presents a danger to the community and he is a \nflight risk. \nThe Psychology Department conducts 30-day psychology reviews for the \nentire SHU population. Epstein is not in the SHU at the time and \ntherefore his review is not conducted. \n15 \nEFTA01656729\n", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "July 22, 2019 \nAccording to court records, Epstein files an appeal of the court's order \ndenying Epstein pretrial release. \nJuly 23, 2019 \nJuly 24, 2019 \nJuly 25-29, 2019 \nAt approximately 1:27 a.m., SHU staff hears noises coming from Epstein's \ncell. Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 1) says that Epstein has attempted to \nhang himself. SHU staff observes Epstein lying on the floor with a piece of \norange cloth around his neck. Epstein initially tells MCC New York staff \nthat his cellmate tried to kill him. Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 1) tells MCC \nNew York staff that while he was asleep, he felt something hit his legs and \nwhen he turned on the light, he saw Epstein with a string around his neck \nand called the guards.fe \nEpstein is transferred out of the SHU and placed on suicide watch in a cell \nnear the Psychology Department and Health Services Unit. \nLater that morning, Health Services Unit personnel conduct a medical \nassessment and observe that Epstein has a red mark two-thirds of the \nway around the front and sides of his neck. The BOP assesses Epstein for \nrisk of suicide and determines that he should remain on suicide watch. \nAt approximately 8:45 a.m., Epstein is removed from suicide watch but \nremains under psychological observation in the same cell near the \nPsychology Department and Health Services Unit. Medical staff examine \nEpstein at 1:08 p.m. and Psychological Services staff complete a Post \nSuicide Watch Report. In contrast to his prior statement that his cellmate \ntried to kill him, Epstein says he does not remember how he sustained \nthe injuries to his neck. \nEpstein is seen by the Psychology Department daily and on each date \nadamantly denies suicidality or having any memory of what occurred on \nJuly 23, 2019. \nJuly 29, 2019 \nPsychology Department staff determine that Epstein can be released \nfrom psychological observation and transferred back to the SHU.19\nle When interviewed by the OIG, another inmate housed in the same SHU tier (Inmate 2) at the ti\n... [truncated, 2450 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/22 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=22]", "char_count": 2450}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Disk failures occur in DVR 2 of MCC New York's security camera system, \nwhich results in the system being unable to record, although the cameras \ncontinue to work and broadcast live video feed. MCC New York personnel \ndo not learn of the DVR 2 recording failure until August 8, 2 days before \nEpstein's death. Roughly half of MCC New York's security cameras, \nincluding those located in the SHU, are assigned to record to the \nDVR 2 system. \nJuly 30, 2019 \nEpstein is transferred back to the SHU.2° \nAn MCC New York Staff Psychologist from the Psychology Department \nsends an email to over 70 BOP staff members stating that Epstein 'needs \nto be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" Epstein and his new cellmate \n(Inmate 3) are placed in a cell within the SHU that can accommodate the \nelectrical needs of Epstein's medical device. \nMCC New York conducts disciplinary proceedings against Epstein for \nalleged self-mutilation and ultimately concludes that there is insufficient \nevidence to find that Epstein engaged in a prohibited act.2' When Epstein \nis psychologically evaluated in connection with the disciplinary \nproceedings, he says he does not remember how he sustained the marks \naround his neck. \nMCC New York personnel attempt to obtain an estimate from Company 1 \nto run the wiring and conduit for the new camera system, which would \neliminate the need for BOP technicians to perform the work. \nJuly 31, 2019 \nAccording to court records, Epstein appears in court for a status \nconference, at which time the court sets deadlines for motions and \nresponses. Upon his return to MCC New York, the U.S. Marshals Service \nprovide paperwork to BOP that indicates Epstein had \n\"suicidal tendencies.\" \ndatabase that contains information relating to the care, classification, subsistence, protection, discipline, and programs \nof federal inmates, was not updated to reflect this change because it indicated that Epstein was transferred back to the \nSHU on July 29, 2019. \n20 The OIG's investigatio\n... [truncated, 2392 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/23 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=23]", "char_count": 2392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "The Psychology Department conducts a clinical visit with Epstein, who \ndenies any suicidal ideation. \nAugust 1, 2019 \nAugust 2, 2019 \nMCC New York Receiving and Discharge staff notify the Psychology \nDepartment of the notation of \"suicidal tendencies\" on U.S. Marshals \nService paperwork relating to Epstein. The Psychology Department \nconducts a suicide risk assessment of Epstein, who denies that he is \nsuicidal, and determines that suicide watch is not warranted. \nPsychological staff recommend a follow-up in 1 week. \nMCC New York Special Investigative Services complete its investigation \ninto the incident on July 23, 2019, and finds that there is insufficient \nevidence to determine that Epstein harmed himself or that he was \nharmed by his cellmate. \nAugust 8, 2019 \nEpstein is seen by the Psychology Department and denies suicidal \nideation, intention, or plan. \nAugust 9, 2019 \nEpstein meets with his attorneys and, unbeknownst to MCC New York \npersonnel, changes his Last Will and Testament during the meeting. \nMCC New York staff receive notice that Epstein's cellmate will be \ntransferred out of the institution the following day, August 9. \nMCC New York staff discover the disk failures that occurred in the DVR 2 \nsystem on July 29 and that resulted in approximately one half of the \ninstitution's security cameras not recording, although the cameras \ncontinued to broadcast a live video feed. MCC New York staff do not \nperform the work necessary to restore recording functionality of the \nDVR 2 system or address long-standing performance failures with the \ninstitution's camera system. \nAt approximately 8:30 a.m., Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 3) is transferred \nout of MCC New York. Two MCC New York SHU staff members said they \nnotified supervisory staff of Epstein's cellmate's transfer and Epstein's \nneed for a new cellmate. Other witnesses did not corroborate these \nstatements. Epstein is not assigned a new cellmate as required by the \nPsychology Department. \nSometime betwee\n... [truncated, 2146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/24 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=24]", "char_count": 2146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "attorneys ask MCC New York staff members if Epstein could be moved to \na different housing unit or housed without a cellmate. \nMCC New York staff obtain the replacement hard drives to repair the \ninstitution's security camera system but do not complete the repairs \nnecessary to restore recording functionality and address long-standing \nperformance failures with the institution's DVR 2 system. \nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unseals approximately \n2,000 pages of documents in civil litigation involving Ghislaine Maxwell, \nwho is later convicted in December 2021 of conspiring with Epstein to \nsexually abuse minors over the course of a decade. Some of these \ndocuments contain information that may relate to the criminal charges \npending against Epstein. There is extensive media coverage of \ninformation in the unsealed documents. \nAt approximately 6:45 p.m., Epstein leaves the attorney conference room. \nAt approximately 7 p.m., contrary to BOP policy but with the permission \nof a Unit Manager, Epstein is permitted to place an unmonitored \ntelephone call to a number with a New York City area code, purportedly \nto speak with his mother. In actuality, Epstein speaks with someone with \nwhom he allegedly has a personal relationship. After the call, Epstein is \nreturned to his cell, where he remains without a cellmate. \nMCC New York SHU staff members do not conduct the 4 p.m. or 10 p.m. \ninmate counts. After approximately 10:40 p.m., SHU staff members do \nnot conduct the required 30-minute rounds. \nAugust 10, 2019 \nMCC New York SHU staff members do not conduct the 12 a.m., 3 a.m., or \n5 a.m. inmate counts or any of the 30-minute rounds from 12 a.m. until \napproximately 6:30 a.m. \nAt approximately 6:30 a.m., SHU staff begin to deliver breakfast to \ninmates in the SHU through the food slots in the locked cell doors. When \nSHU staff attempt to deliver breakfast to Epstein, SHU staff unlock the \ndoor to the tier in which Epstein's cell was located and then knock o\n... [truncated, 2398 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/25 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=25]", "char_count": 2398}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "buttocks approximately 1 inch to 1 inch and a half off the floor and his \nlegs extended straight out on the floor in front of him. \nSHU staff immediately activate a body alarm, which notified all MCC \nNew York staff of a medical emergency and prompted MCC New York \nstaff in the Control Center to call for 911 emergency services. SHU staff \nthen rip the orange cloth away from the bunkbed, which causes Epstein's \nbuttocks to drop to the ground. SHU staff lay Epstein on the ground and \nimmediately initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). At \napproximately 6:33 a.m., BOP medical staff respond to the SHU, continue \nCPR, apply the automated external defibrillator, and move Epstein to MCC \nNew York's Health Services Unit. Minutes after arriving in the Health \nServices Unit, an ambulance arrives and paramedics continue CPR, \nincubate Epstein, and administer medications and fluids. At \napproximately 7:10 a.m., the ambulance takes Epstein to New York \nPresbyterian Lower Manhattan Hospital, where he is pronounced dead at \n7:36 a.m. by the emergency room physician. \nMCC New York staff unsuccessfully attempts to recover video from the \nDVR 2 system of the SHU and the BOP begins repairing the DVR 2 system. \nThe FBI seizes all hard drives contained in the DVR 2 system as evidence. \nAugust 11, 2019 \nThe Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New York, conducts an \nautopsy of Epstein. \nAugust 14-15, 2019 \nAugust 16, 2019 \nThe FBI returns to MCC New York and seizes additional components of \nthe DVR 2 system and the entire DVR 1 system. The FBI's Digital Forensics \nAnalysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, begins to conduct a forensic analysis of \nMCC New York's DVR systems and determines that there were \ncatastrophic disk failures in the DVR 2 system disk array and no \nrecordings were available on the DVR 2 system after July 29, 2019. \nThe Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New York, releases its \nfindings publicly that the cause of Epstein's death was hanging and th\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/26 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=26]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Chapter 4: Custody and Care of Epstein Prior to His Death \nI. \nEpstein's Arrest and Detention on July 6 \nOn July 2, 2019, a grand jury of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York returned a two-\ncount indictment that charged Epstein with committing sex trafficking and a sex trafficking conspiracy, in \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. H 371, 1591(a), (bX2), and 2, based on allegations that he sexually exploited and \nabused dozens of minor girls, some as young as 14 years old, at his homes in New York and Florida. The \nindictment alleged that from at least 2002 through 2005, Epstein enticed and recruited girls, many of whom \nhe knew were underage, to visit his homes and perform sex acts in exchange for paying each girl hundreds \nof dollars in cash. The indictment further alleged that Epstein, working with employees and associates, \ncreated a vast network of underage victims to sexually exploit in New York and Florida by paying some \nvictims hundreds of dollars in cash each to recruit other minor girls to be similarly abused by Epstein. In \naddition to the two criminal charges, the indictment also contained forfeiture allegations, which sought to \nforfeit to the United States any property that was either used to commit or was a proceed of the charged \nsex trafficking offense, including Epstein's New York residence. \nOn Saturday, July 6, 2019, Epstein was arrested at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey upon his return to the \nUnited States from France. He was transported to the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in \nNew York, New York (MCC New York), where he was initially placed in the general inmate population. MCC \nNew York is a federal administrative detention facility operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The \nBOP temporarily closed MCC New York in October 2021 due to substandard conditions that are unrelated to \nthis investigation. When it was operational, MCC New York housed primarily pretrial detainees who had not \nyet been convicted of a\n... [truncated, 4250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/27 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=27]", "char_count": 4250}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "obligations as a registered sex offender. The court found that the United States had also shown by a \npreponderance of the evidence that Epstein was a flight risk based on the severity of the criminal charges \nand severity of the potential punishment; the strength of the evidence against Epstein; and Epstein's \ncriminal history, sex offender registration, vast wealth and substantial liquid assets, multiple residences, a \nforeign residence, limited family ties in the United States, private plane(s), extensive overseas travel, and \npossession of a foreign passport bearing Epstein's photograph but not his name. Finally, the court found \nthat Epstein's pretrial release proposal was inadequate because, among other things, it did not contain \nsworn, accurate, or comprehensive financial statements; it required excessive court involvement in routine \naspects of the proposed home confinement; the proposed consent to extradition was unenforceable; and \nthe proposed appointment of a trustee to monitor Epstein's compliance with release conditions was \nunacceptably vague and problematic due to the potential conflict of interest presented by monitoring the \nconduct of a person who paid the trustee's salary, and allegations that Epstein engaged in unlawful acts with \nhis employees during the sex trafficking conspiracy. Epstein appealed the court's order on July 22, 2019. \nThis appeal remained pending at the time of Epstein's death. \nII. \nMCC New York's Special Housing Unit \nEpstein was initially assigned to MCC New York's general inmate population, but on July 7, 2019, at \napproximately 7:20 p.m., he was moved to the SHU pending reclassification due to the significant increase in \nmedia coverage and awareness of his notoriety among other MCC New York inmate residents. The SHU is a \nhousing unit within MCC New York where inmates are securely separated from the general inmate \npopulation and kept locked in their cells for approximately 23 hours a day, to ensure their own safety as w\n... [truncated, 4299 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/28 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=28]", "char_count": 4299}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "meet with their clients because Epstein and his attorneys were occupying the attorney conference room, \neven at times when Epstein had to leave the conference room for a medical visit. \nAt MCC New York, the SHU was located on the south side of the institution's ninth floor and was often \nreferred to as \"9 South.\" Primary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door (Main Exterior Entry \nDoor). That door was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. \nAccess into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a \nlimited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. \nSecondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff \nmember in the centralized Control Center. Entry into the SHU from the secondary access point was further \ncontrolled by three additional locked doors, to which a limited number of the COs had keys while on duty. \nThe secondary access doors were used only by staff when facilitating visits between the SHU inmates and \ntheir outside visitors. \nWithin the SHU, inmates were assigned to six separate tiers or groups of cells, three of which were \naccessible via stairs leading up from the common area on the ninth floor (Upper Tiers—G, J, and L Tiers) and \nthree of which were accessible via stairs leading down from the common area on the ninth floor (Lower \nTiers—H, K, and M Tiers). The entrance to each tier could be accessed only via a single locked door at the \ntop or bottom of the staircase leading to the individual tier. A limited number of keys to open the locked tier \ndoors were available only to a limited number of COs while on duty. Each tier had eight cells, each of which \ncould house either one or two inmates. Each individual cell, which was made of cement and metal, could be \naccessed only through a single locked door, to which only a limited number of COs had keys while on duty. \nThe SHU cell doors we\n... [truncated, 3568 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/29 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=29]", "char_count": 3568}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Figure 4.1 \nPrimary SHU Entrance (Ninth Floor) \nNote: The photograph on the right has been modified for security reasons. \nSource: DOJ OIG photographs and DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n24 \nEFTA01656738\n", "char_count": 230}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Figure 4.2 \nSecondary SHU Entrance (Ninth Floor) \nNote: The photograph on the right has been modified for security reasons. \nSource: DOJ OIG photographs and DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n25 \nEFTA01656739\n", "char_count": 232}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Figure 4.3 \nTiered Structure of SHU (2-Dimensional) \nUpper Tiers \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawings depicting the MCC New York SHU \nlower Tiers \n26 \nEFTA01656740\n", "char_count": 163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Figure 4.4 \nTiered Structure of SHU (3-Dimensional) \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n27 \nEFTA01656741\n", "char_count": 136}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Figure 4.5 \nStairways Leading to SHU Upper and Lower Tiers \nNote: The photograph on the right has been modified for privacy reasons. \nSource: DOJ OIG photographs and DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \nIll. \nEpstein's Initial Cell and Cellmate Assignment from July 7 to July 23 \nAccording to the Warden, MCC New York typically housed inmates in the SHU with a cellmate. Upon \nEpstein's initial transfer to the SHU on July 7, 2019, he was assigned a cell in the M Tier of the SHU with \nInmate 1. The Warden explained that Epstein was a high-profile inmate and that he initially selected \nInmate 1 to be Epstein's cellmate because Inmate 1 was another high-profile inmate, and the Warden \nbelieved Inmate 1 to be the least likely SHU inmate to harm Epstein!' Epstein and Inmate 1 were housed \ntogether in cell Z05-124. \n23 In 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty in a Florida state court to a felony charge of procurement of minors to engage in \nprostitution in violation of Florida Statute § 796.03. As a result of this conviction, Epstein was required to register as a \nsex offender. \n28 \nEFTA01656742\n", "char_count": 1116}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "IV. \nEvents of July 23 and the Placement of Epstein on Suicide Watch and \nPsychological Observation from July 23 to July 30 \nAccording to BOP documents, at approximately 1:27 a.m. on July 23, 2019, Senior Officer Specialists 1 and 2 \nheard noise coming from the M Tier in the SHU, the tier where Epstein was housed. Senior Officer \nSpecialist 2 documented in a BOP report that upon checking cell Z05-124, he saw Epstein laying down near \nhis bunk with \"a piece of handmade orange cloth\" around his neck, and Senior Officer Specialist 1 wrote in a \nBOP report that Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 1) said Epstein had attempted to hang himself. In his interview \nwith the OIG, Senior Officer Specialist 1 said that Inmate 1, who appeared shaken up, told him that he had \nbeen asleep on the floor of the cell and was awoken when he felt Epstein land on him. Senior Officer \nSpecialist 2 reported that after he had been alerted by the noise, he grabbed the door keys, called the \nControl Center for assistance, and then he and Senior Officer Specialist 1 entered the cell, where they \nsecured and removed Epstein's cellmate. Senior Officer Specialist 1 reported that he then reentered the \ncell, placed Epstein on his side, and removed \"an orange homemade rope\" from his neck. In his interview \nwith the OIG, Senior Officer Specialist 1 said Epstein had a sheet around his neck, which was attached to the \nbunkbed ladder in the cell. Senior Officer Specialist 1 said that Epstein was sitting on the floor of the cell \nwith his back against the bunkbed ladder. Senior Officer Specialist l's report said that Epstein was \nbreathing, but unresponsive, so he began chest compressions, at which time the Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant and other staff arrived. Senior Officer Specialist 1 confirmed in his OIG interview that they \nstarted cardiopulmonary resuscitation but stopped when they realized that Epstein was already breathing. \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant documented in a BOP report that \n... [truncated, 3926 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/35 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=35]", "char_count": 3926}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant documented in a BOP report that when she returned to the \nHealth Services Unit, Senior Officer Specialist 4 informed her that Epstein had said that his cellmate had \ntried to kill Epstein and had been harassing him. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant then spoke \nwith the cellmate (Inmate 1), who said he was wearing headphones and was asleep when he felt something \nhit his legs. Inmate 1 said he called out to Epstein and when Epstein did not answer, he got up, turned on \nthe light, and saw Epstein sitting on the floor, leaning to the side with a string around his neck. Inmate 1 \ntold the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant that he then called the guards. Inmate 1 provided a similar \nstatement to BOP officials at approximately 2:50 p.m. on July 23, 2019. \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant's report notes that she also spoke with Epstein, who told her that \nhe had returned to his cell after an attorney visit at approximately 8 p.m. the previous day, at which time his \ncellmate was reading the Daily News newspaper. Epstein's said his cellmate turned to a page of the \nnewspaper that had Epstein's picture and reported that Epstein was worth $77 million. Epstein told the \nMorning Watch Operations Lieutenant that he looked at his picture, balled it up, and threw it in the garbage. \nEpstein further stated that he woke up at approximately 1 a.m. to get a drink of water, returned to his bunk, \nand the next thing he remembered was that he was snoring and MCC New York staff were inside his cell. \nWhen asked about the allegations against his cellmate, Epstein said he had been told that if his cellmate \nhurt him, MCC New York staff would not care. \nInmate 2, who was housed in the same SHU tier as Epstein on July 23, told the FBI about an incident that \noccurred in the SHU around 1:20 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. on an unspecified date. Inmate 2 said he was reading a \nbook when he heard an inmate scream and bang on the cell door to get the SHU\n... [truncated, 4350 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/36 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=36]", "char_count": 4350}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "believed that his cellmate had something to do with it. BOP's Special Investigative Services (SIS) opened an \ninvestigation into this incident but was unable to determine whether Epstein harmed himself or had \nbeen assaulted. \nOn July 24, 2019, at approximately 8:45 a.m., Epstein was removed from suicide watch. However, Epstein \nremained in the same cell that he was placed in the previous day and was under psychological observation \nuntil July 30, 2019.2' \nThe MCC New York Chief Psychologist told the OIG that an inmate is placed on suicide watch when the \ninmate is believed to be imminently suicidal. During suicide watch, the inmate is under constant \nobservation by staff; the cell lights are on 24 hours a day; and the inmate is given a special mattress, \nblanket, and smock to wear. The Chief Psychologist explained that although psychological observation is a \nlower classification, at MCC New York the psychological observations were the same as suicide watch except \nthat inmates were allowed to have their clothing and some materials, such as books, as determined by \nPsychology Department. At MCC New York, psychological observation was used to see how an inmate was \ndoing before releasing the inmate to a housing unit. \nThe Chief Psychologist told the OIG that the Psychology Department independently makes the decision who \ngoes on and off suicide watch. The Chief Psychologist also stated that the Psychology Department makes \nrecommendations to the institution's management about where inmates are housed when they come off of \nsuicide watch. According to her, the Psychology Department always recommends that inmates coming off \nof suicide watch be housed with other inmates; however, she said the recommendations cannot always be \ncarried out due to other security factors. When that occurs, the Psychology Department recommends \nconducting increased rounds and keeping an eye on those inmates. \nThe Chief Psychologist further told the OIG that, based on a conversation with th\n... [truncated, 3327 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/37 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=37]", "char_count": 3327}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Senior Officer Specialist 1 told the OIG that after Epstein came off of suicide watch, Epstein asked if he could \nbe paired up with Inmate 1 again. Senior Officer Specialist 1 told Epstein that his request was something he \nwould need to raise with the Operations Lieutenant. Senior Officer Specialist 1 told the OIG that Epstein \nreplied, \"Yeah, but I don't understand, you know, we were bunkies, everything was cool.\" The Chief \nPsychologist also told the OIG that Epstein mentioned to her that he wanted Inmate 1 to continue to be \nhis cellmate. \nV. \nThe Psychology Department's Post-July 23 Determination that Epstein Needed \nto Have an Appropriate Cellmate \nFollowing the events of July 23, the MCC New York Psychology Department determined that Epstein needed \nto be housed with an appropriate cellmate. To ensure Epstein's cellmate requirement was disseminated to \nMCC New York staff, on July 30, 2019, at 12:30 p.m., the Staff Psychologist sent an email to over 70 MCC \nNew York staff members which read, \"Inmate Epstein #76318-054 is being taken off Psych Observation and \nneeds to be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" A review of the email recipients showed that the email \nwas sent to, among others, the Warden, Associate Warden 2, the Captain, the SHU Lieutenant, the SIS \nLieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, and CO 1. The Staff Psychologist also \ncompleted a \"Post-Watch Report,\" which stated that the \"SHU L[ieutenant] informed inmate Epstein needs \nto be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" \nThe Warden told the OIG that the Chief Psychologist had advised him that Epstein was not suicidal and was \nready to return to the SHU. According to the Warden, when he spoke with the Chief Psychologist regarding \nEpstein, she told him to assign Epstein a cellmate. He added that MCC New York would typically house an \ninmate who was previously on suicide\n... [truncated, 3716 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/38 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=38]", "char_count": 3716}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "common practice in the BOP for prisoners coming off of suicide watch to be assigned a cellmate. The SHU \nLieutenant confirmed that a BOP psychologist told him that Epstein had to be housed with a cellmate when \nEpstein returned to the SHU and said that he passed the directive down to the SHU staff. \nAdditionally, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge on August 9, 2019, said he and all other SHU staff were \naware of Epstein's cellmate requirement. MCC New York Psychology Department personnel told the 016 \nthat MCC New York staff members knew of Epstein's cellmate requirement because it was discussed during \nstaff meetings, department head meetings, SHU meetings, morning meetings, and during required \nstaff training. \nForensic Psychologist 1 told the 016 that on August 9, 2019, she was present during a meeting in which one \nof Epstein's attorneys opposed Epstein having a cellmate. Forensic Psychologist 1 said she explained to the \nattorney that Epstein needed to have a cellmate because he was housed in the SHU and he was a \nsex offender. \nVI. \nSelection of Epstein's Cellmate After Psychological Observation \nThe Captain told the OIG that he compiled a list of possible cellmates for Epstein, vetted those inmates, and \nprovided the list of names to the MCC New York Warden. The Warden told the 016 that he identified two \npotential cellmates and tentatively decided on Inmate 3. The Warden said he passed this information on to \nthe BOP Director's Chief of Staff and later received word that he should assign Inmate 3 to be \nEpstein's cellmate. \nThe Warden told the OIG that no inmates were pre-vetted to replace Inmate 3 if he left MCC New York. The \nWarden and the Captain told the OIG that if Inmate 3 had been removed as Epstein's cellmate, they would \nhave had to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to ensure that Epstein was housed with an \nappropriate inmate. According to the Warden and the Captain, if Inmate 3 was no longer detained at MCC \nNew York, SHU staff \n... [truncated, 3465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/39 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=39]", "char_count": 3465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "medical record note reflected that, on this same date, Epstein was provided with his personally-owned \nmedical device. BOP witnesses told the OIG that on that same date, Epstein and Inmate 3 were moved to \ncell Z06-220 in the L Tier of the SHU to accommodate the electrical needs of Epstein's medical device. Of all \nthe cells in the SHU, cell Z06-220 was the closest cell with a direct line of sight to the SHU Officers' Station in \nthe common area of the SHU, which was approximately 15 feet away. \nInmate 3 told the OIG that when he and Epstein were first assigned as cellmates in cell Z06-220 in the L Tier, \nthe Day Watch Operations Lieutenant told Inmate 3 that he had a \"cool bunkie\" for him, an \"old guy\" who \nwould not bother Inmate 3. Inmate 3 said he told the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant that he slept on the \nbottom bunk, and the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant said that would not be a problem because his new \ncellmate slept on the floor. Inmate 3 said he was surprised by this response because he understood that \nsleeping on the floor was not allowed and he had previously been disciplined for doing so. \nWhen Epstein arrived in the cell, Inmate 3 recognized him and said he (Inmate 3) told the Day Watch \nOperations Lieutenant that the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant had \"jammed up\" Inmate 3. Inmate 3 said \nhe knew Epstein had tried to hang himself and had just come from suicide watch. According to Inmate 3, \nthe Day Watch Operations Lieutenant told Inmate 3 not to worry, that Epstein was okay, and that Inmate 3 \nshould keep an eye on him. Inmate 3 asked the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant if he was supposed to \nserve as a suicide prevention advocate, that is, an inmate who is assigned to the suicide watch area. \nInmate 3 said the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant laughed and brushed off Inmate 3's comment. \nAccording to Inmate 3, COs brought two mattresses to the cell for Epstein and placed them on the floor. \nEpstein put the mattresses on the right side of the cell\n... [truncated, 3304 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/40 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=40]", "char_count": 3304}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Figure 4.6 \nSHU L Tier \nSources: DOJ OIG schematic d awing depicting the MCC New York SHU; and photograph taken by the Office of the Chief \nMedical Examiner. City of New York (OCME) \n35 \nEFTA01656749\n", "char_count": 200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Figure 4.7 \nExterior Views of Epstein's Cell \n4 \nNote: Both photographs have been modified for security reasons and the left photograph has been modified for privacy \nreasons. \nSources: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU; OCME photographs \n36 \nEFTA01656750\n", "char_count": 279}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Figure 4.8 \nThe Door to the Cell Occupied by Epstein and Inmate 3 from July 30 to August 9 \nNote: The photograph has been modified for privacy reasons. \nSource: OCME \n37 \nEFTA01656751\n", "char_count": 184}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Figure 4.9 \nView of Epstein's Empty Cell from Cell Door Window \nSource: DOJ OIG photograph and DO OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n38 \nEFTA01656752\n", "char_count": 169}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Figure 4.10 \nInterior View of Epstein's Empty Cell from Just Inside the Cell Door \nSource: DOJ OIG photograph and DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n39 \nEFTA01656753\n", "char_count": 189}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Figure 4.11 \nView of Epstein's Cell Door from the SHU Officers' Station \nEpstein's Cell Door \nNote: The photograph has been modified for security and privacy reasons. \nSource: D0J 0IG photograph and D0J 0IG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n40 \nEFTA01656754\n", "char_count": 274}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Figure 4.12 \nView of the SHU Officers' Station from Epstein's cell \nNote: The photograph has been modified for security reasons. \nSource: DOJ OIG photograph and DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \nVIII. \nPsychological Evaluations of Epstein from July 6 to August 9 \nDuring Epstein's detention at MCC New York, a variety of medical professionals, including a Medical Doctor, \na Clinical Nurse, and Physician Assistant 1, who is a Mid-Level Practitioner, conducted multiple medical \nappointments with Epstein, and Epstein was prescribed a variety of medications for various ailments and \nhealth needs. Epstein was also given an eye and dental exam, as well as a blood panel screening. This \nsection details Epstein's psychological evaluations while he was in MCC New York custody prior to his death. \nOn Saturday, July 6, 2019, at 9:38 p.m., upon Epstein's intake into MCC New York, he was medically screened \nby Physician Assistant 2. The screening included taking vital signs and asking various medical history \nquestions, including questions related to Epstein's mental health. Among other things, Physician Assistant 2 \nannotated that Epstein did not have current suicidal ideation and had denied having a history of suicide \nattempts. Physician Assistant 2 instructed Epstein how he could obtain medical, dental, and mental \nhealth care. \nAt 2:58 a.m. on Sunday, July 7, 2019, a Facilities Assistant emailed the Psychology Department asking that \nsomeone evaluate Epstein because he appeared \"distraught, sad, and a little confused.\" \nOn July 8, 2019, Forensic Psychologist 1 of the Psychology Department conducted an Intake Screening of \nEpstein that included a self-report, staff observation, and a review of information in SENTRY. Forensic \n41 \nEFTA01656755\n", "char_count": 1786}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Psychologist 1 noted that during Physician Assistant l's initial intake evaluation, on the intake questionnaire, \nEpstein denied having a history of mental health treatment and any history of mental health symptoms. \nAdditionally, Forensic Psychologist 1 noted no suicidal ideations, attempts, or self-harm; no history of \nsubstance abuse or treatment; and no sexual offense convictions. \nDuring the evaluation, Epstein stated he had been previously incarcerated for 3 months for \"prostitution,\" \nand that he was currently charged with sex trafficking. Epstein denied recent or present morbid thoughts \nand denied passive or active suicidal ideation. It was noted in BOP records that Epstein's verbalizations \nwere future-oriented and did not have indications of helpless or hopeless thinking. \nAccording to Forensic Psychologist 1, Epstein did not meet the criteria for any psychological diagnosis and \nwas designated as Mental Health Care Code 1. This is indicative of an inmate who does not show any \nsignificant level of functional impairment associated with a mental illness and does not demonstrate a need \nfor regular mental health intervention. Epstein was educated on emergency procedures for contacting the \nPsychology Department staff, and Epstein agreed to contact staff if he needed Psychology Department \nservices in the future. \nThe MCC New York Chief Psychologist told the OIG that based on the Psychological Services Intake \nQuestionnaire, inmates have four different Care Code ratings.27 Code 1 means there are no concerns about \nthe inmate's mental health status; they have no needs and will not be followed up with unless requested by \nstaff or the inmates. Code 2 means there is some history of mental health issues, but the inmate has them \nunder control and the Psychology Department will follow up monthly. Code 3 is more severe, requiring \nweekly visits by the Psychology Department to ensure the inmate is stable and if unstable would be moved \nto observation. Code 4 inmate\n... [truncated, 3733 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/48 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=48]", "char_count": 3733}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "companion program at an institution to utilize inmate observers, who are selected, trained, and supervised \nby the institution's Suicide Prevention Program Coordinator. \nOn July 9, 2019, the Chief Psychologist conducted a suicide assessment of Epstein. She reviewed Epstein's \nmedical record and interviewed him, which revealed that he possessed some risk factors for suicidality. \nEpstein denied having any past or present suicidal ideation, intention, or plan, and also denied having any \nhistory of mental health treatment or any current mental health symptoms. The Chief Psychologists \nassessment was that Epstein had \"protective\" factors present that could decrease his risk of suicide. The \nChief Psychologist assessed factors that included his willingness to engage in treatment, view of death as \nnegative, future orientation, and the fact that he adamantly denied any suicidal ideation, intention, or plan. \nThe Chief Psychologist's assessment was that Epstein had numerous protective factors that outweighed his \nrisk factors for suicidality and that he had a positive outlook regarding his legal case. Epstein remained on \npsychological observation pending a suitable cell assignment, and the Chief Psychologist noted that a \nsuicide watch was not warranted at the time of her report. \nOn July 10, 2019, the Chief Psychologist met with Epstein for a psychological observation and noted that, \naccording to the psychological observation logbook, Epstein had been eating his meals, sleeping, and \ninteracting with other inmates. During this meeting with the Chief Psychologist, Epstein voiced concerns \nover being housed in the SHU. Epstein asked the Chief Psychologist to be \"single-celled\" if he were to be \nhoused in the SHU and had also requested a shower, his property, pen, and paper. The Chief Psychologist \nstated Epstein had been provided a shower on this date. She provided Epstein with coping skills strategies, \nto which he was receptive. Epstein continued to deny any suicidal i\n... [truncated, 3798 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/49 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=49]", "char_count": 3798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "scheduled to be seen again the following week. The Chief Psychologist told the DIG that Epstein and his \nattorney mocked her for thinking Epstein was suicidal.n \nOn July 16, 2019, at Epstein's request, the Chief Psychologist met with Epstein during his attorney \nconference. The Chief Psychologist noted that Epstein did not have any psychological concerns and denied \nsuicidality. The Chief Psychologist noted that she provided Epstein with psychoeducation regarding \nadditional coping strategies. Epstein was educated about routine and emergency procedures to contact \nPsychology Department staff and reminded of self-help books and audiotapes that are available to him. The \nChief Psychologist noted in her clinical contact report that there was no need for follow-up and that Epstein \nwould be seen in the SHU for rounds and monthly SHU reviews. \nAccording to the SOP After Action Review submitted by the Southeast Regional Director, the Chief \nPsychologist's meeting with Epstein on July 16, 2019, at Epstein's request during his attorney conference was \ninappropriate. The Southeast Regional Director wrote in the report that Epstein attempted to \"bring his \nattorneys into the fray regarding the mental hearth treatment being provided by the institution.\" In the \nAfter Action Review, the Southeast Regional Director wrote that it was not typical for the BOP to provide \npsychological intervention in the presence of others, nor was it appropriate for a BOP psychologist to meet \nwith an inmate's attorney. When asked by the OIG about these findings, the Chief Psychologist stated that \nthe intention was to check on Epstein, not to breach any security. \nOn July 18, 2019, the Chief Psychologist conducted a monthly SHU review and noted that Epstein was \nunavailable due to a meeting with his legal team and that she would attempt to interview Epstein in the near \nfuture to complete his monthly review. \nAs noted previously, at approximately 1:27 a.m. on July 23, 2019, Epstein was found lyin\n... [truncated, 3879 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/50 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=50]", "char_count": 3879}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Also on July 23, 2019, the Staff Psychologist conducted a suicide risk assessment that included a clinical \ninterview of Epstein and a review of Epstein's medical record, the psychology data system, and a review of \nthe SENTRY database. According to the Staff Psychologist's report, Epstein denied knowing why he was \nplaced on suicide watch. BOP records state that Epstein recalled getting a drink of water the night prior and \nthen went back to bed. Epstein's next recollection was hearing himself snoring. The BOP assessment \nrecords reflect that Epstein wanted to know why he was on suicide watch and he was informed that he had \nbeen found with a string on his neck. The Staff Psychologist noted that it was unclear whether Epstein had \nplaced the string around his neck or if someone else did. Epstein denied current suicidal or self-harm \nthoughts or ever having these thoughts; denied a history of self-harm and suicide attempts; and denied \nfeeling hopeless and fearing for his safety. Epstein told the Staff Psychologist that he lived to enjoy life and \nthat his future plans included fighting his criminal case and getting back to his normal life. The Staff \nPsychologist noted that Epstein was to remain on suicide watch for further observation. The Staff \nPsychologist told the OIG she had advised BOP staff that Epstein would need a cellmate. \nThe Chief Psychologist said she considered three possibilities to explain the July 23 incident: (1) Epstein \nand/or Inmate 1 were gaming the system to get something they wanted that they were not getting \n(2) Epstein, who really was suicidal, had conducted a rehearsal; or (3) Inmate 1 had assaulted Epstein. The \nChief Psychologist told the OIG that after Epstein told her he wanted to be housed with the same cellmate \nhe originally said had assaulted him, she began to think that the third possibility (assault by Inmate 1) was \nless plausible than the other two possibilities, although she did not know for certain. \nThe following day, Ju\n... [truncated, 4207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/51 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=51]", "char_count": 4207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "concurred with her determination. Epstein was therefore taken off suicide watch and placed on \npsychological observation, during which time BOP records reflect that he was continuously observed by \ninmate companions and seen daily by Psychology Department staff. Forensic Psychologist 2 annotated in \nthe Post Suicide Watch Report that the reason for removing Epstein from suicide watch was due to Epstein \nstating he had no interest in killing himself; he had described having a wonderful life; and Epstein had said it \nwould be crazy to take his own life and he would not do that to himself. Forensic Psychologist 2 told the FBI \nthat following her clinical visit with Epstein on July 24, 2019, she was cautious with Epstein's case and his \nself-reporting of what had occurred the previous day. Forensic Psychologist 2 stated that she observed \nsigns of positivity and that Epstein \"adamantly denied suicide.\" Nevertheless, she was not comfortable \ntaking Epstein off suicide watch and instead opted to place Epstein on psychological observation, which was \na step down from suicide watch. Forensic Psychologist 2 told the FBI that\"! made the decision with the \nconsent\" of the Chief Psychologist and Associate Warden 2, with whom she had consulted. Forensic \nPsychologist 2 told the FBI that placing Epstein on psychological observation allowed him to possess hygiene \nproducts, two novels, attend legal visits, and take showers. It also allowed him to have standard inmate \nclothing, a flex pen, a toothbrush and toothpaste, soap, and deodorant. However, Forensic Psychologist 2 \nexplained that it was not healthy for inmates to stay on suicide watch for extended periods of time and they \nare re-evaluated on a day-to-day basis. \nAccording to Forensic Psychologist 2's Post Suicide Watch Report, Epstein expressed a feeling of safety being \nhoused in the psychological observation area rather than the SHU and asked if there was a safer unit for \nhim to be housed. Forensic Psychologist 2 inform\n... [truncated, 4440 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/52 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=52]", "char_count": 4440}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "his personally owned medical device. BOP records state that Epstein was aware he would be returning to \nthe SHU but reported that he did not feel well due to lack of sleep and other medical concerns. Epstein \nasked to stay on psychological observation, where he felt safe, for one more night to get some sleep and \nthen return to the SHU with a cellmate the following day. According to SOP records, the Chief Psychologist \ninformed Epstein that he could stay 1 more night and explained that there were no mental health issues \nprecluding him from returning to the SHU the following day. The Chief Psychologist explained to Epstein \nthat he would be placed in a safe situation in the SHU. Epstein again was provided supportive interventions \nand psychoeducation regarding additional coping strategies. BOP records state that Epstein was somewhat \nreceptive but more concerned with getting phone calls, recreation, and housing placement concerns. \nOn July 30, 2019, according to SOP records, Epstein reported to the Staff Psychologist that he had not slept \nwell, and Epstein discussed how he did not think he would be able to sleep well in the SHU because of the \nnoise. The Staff Psychologist annotated in the clinical contact summary that documentation revealed \nEpstein had eaten and taken a shower the day prior (July 29) and also had eaten breakfast on July 30. The \nStaff Psychologist annotated, Epstein did not display indications of disturbed thought process or content \nand denied current suicidal or self-harm ideation. BOP records further stated that Epstein agreed to \nimmediately report to staff if he began to have suicidal or self-harm thoughts and that Epstein was future-\noriented and did not appear to be a danger to himself. The Staff Psychologist noted in her clinical contact \nreport that she had consulted with the Chief Psychologist and that psychological observation of Epstein \nwould be discontinued. According to her clinical contact report, the Staff Psychologist educated E\n... [truncated, 4400 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/53 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=53]", "char_count": 4400}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "harming others. Epstein also agreed to contact staff immediately if he experienced any suicidal thoughts or \npsychological distress. Forensic Psychologist 3's report further stated that Epstein was receptive to her \nutilization of cognitive behavioral therapeutic techniques. She wrote that there did not appear to be a need \nfor follow-up at the time and Epstein expressed a willingness to self-refer to Psychology Department staff if \nneeded. According to the report, Epstein would continue to be seen during routine SHU rounds and \nSHU reviews. \nOn August 1, 2019, according to BOP records, BOP Receiving and Discharge staff, who are responsible for \nprocessing inmates who enter or leave the facility, notified the Staff Psychologist that the previous day when \nthe U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) had brought Epstein back to MCC New York from court, they had provided \na form on which it was noted that Epstein had \"suicidal tendencies.\" The OIG reviewed the USMS Prisoner \nSchedule Report for July 31, 2019, as well as the USMS Prisoner Custody Alert Notice that had annotated in \nthe remarks that Epstein had \"Mental Concerns: Suicidal Tendencies.\" The Chief Psychologist told the OIG \nthat the USMS annotates suicidal tendencies for many inmates if the USMS was aware the inmate was \npreviously on suicide watch. Therefore, the Chief Psychologist said the annotation was not abnormal since \nEpstein had just come off suicide watch and Epstein may have told the USMS that he had been on \nsuicide watch. \nFollowing receipt of this information from the Receiving and Discharge staff, the Staff Psychologist \nconducted a suicide risk assessment on August 1 that included a review of Epstein's previous clinical \nencounters, medical records, and data in the Psychology Department and SENTRY systems. According to \nthe Staff Psychologist's assessment, Epstein denied stating he was suicidal and was surprised that the form \nnoted that he had suicidal tendencies. The Staff Psychologist said that Epste\n... [truncated, 4258 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/54 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=54]", "char_count": 4258}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "psychoeducation regarding additional coping strategies, to which Epstein was receptive. Epstein was \neducated on routine and emergency procedures for contacting Psychology Department staff and also \nreminded of self-help books and audiotapes that are available to him. The Chief Psychologist wrote that \nEpstein would be seen in weekly SHU rounds and monthly for SHU reviews. The Chief Psychologist told the \nOIG that the fact that Epstein underwent three suicide risk assessments was unusual.3°\nUpon reviewing a draft of this report, the Chief Psychologist noted that it was not unusual for someone with static risk \nfactors like Epstein to have received multiple suicide risk assessments. According to the Chief Psychologist upon \nreviewing a draft of this report, what was unusual was the fact that Epstein was in attomey conference \"day and night \non a daily basis due to his financial resources.\" She noted that It was difficult for Psychology Department staff to \ninterview Epstein because he had a right to his attorney visits, which would last throughout the working day. \n49 \nEFTA01656763\n", "char_count": 1098}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Chapter 5: The Events of August 8-10, 2019, and Epstein's Death \nI. \nEpstein Signs a New Last Will and Testament on August 8 \nIn the weeks following Epstein's death, multiple media outlets reported that Epstein signed a new Last Will \nand Testament on August 8, 2019. At least one media organization published a copy of the notarized \ndocument showing that it was signed by Epstein and two of his attorneys and notarized on August 8, 2019. \nAttorney visitor logs from the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York (MCC New York) \nconfirmed that those attorneys and the notary public visited Epstein on that date. The Office of the \nInspector General (OIG) confirmed via court records that the August 8, 2019 will and other probate-related \ndocuments were filed in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands on August 15, 2019. Among the court filings \nwas an affidavit from another attorney who stated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. \nThe OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on \nAugust 8, 2019. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware \nthat Epstein had changed his will 2 days before he died. \nThe Chief Psychologist said she had heard that Epstein had changed his will from media reporting following \nhis death. The Chief Psychologist did not know if the media reporting was accurate, but she thought that if \nit were true, it would have been useful information to know because it would have been a red flag. The Staff \nPsychologist and the Chief Psychologist told the OIG that if Epstein's attorneys had notified them or the \nPsychology Department that Epstein had changed his will, such information would have been a factor \nwarranting a review of Epstein's mental state and Epstein probably would have been placed back on suicide \nwatch or some type of observation. \nII. \nCourt Order on August 9 Releasing Epstein-Related Documents in Pending \nCivil Litiga\n... [truncated, 2836 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/56 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=56]", "char_count": 2836}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "III. \nTransfer of Epstein's Cellmate on August 9 to Another Institution and Failure \nto Replace Him with Another Inmate \nA. \nNotice on August 8 of the Impending Transfer of Epstein's Cellmate on August 9 \nAs noted above, since July 30, consistent with the Psychology Department's determination that Epstein \nneeded to have a cellmate, Epstein had been housed with Inmate 3, whom the Warden and the Federal \nBureau of Prisons (BOP) executive leadership had selected as an appropriate cellmate. At 10:33 a.m. on \nAugust 8, 2019, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) sent an email to MCC New York personnel assigned to \nReceiving and Discharge, the area within the Correctional Services Department that is responsible for \nprocessing inmates who enter or leave the facility, with the subject \"Transfer of Prisoners from NYM [MCC \nNew York] to GEO.\"32 The body of the email identified Inmate 3 as one of the prisoners to be transferred \nand further stated, \"Please schedule the transfer for Friday 8/9/19.\" \nAt 3:36 p.m. on the same day, the USMS sent a second email to a number of MCC New York personnel, \nincluding Associate Warden 2, the Captain, the SHU Lieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the \nDay Watch Activities Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, another Lieutenant, and the \nSpecial Investigative Services Lieutenant, with the subject \"Prisoner Production 08-09-2019.\" This email \ncontained two attachments, one of which was the Prisoner Schedule Report for MCC New York for August 9, \n2019. The first page of this attachment reflects that Inmate 3 was scheduled to be transferred from MCC \nNew York to GEO (Queens Detention Facility) on August 9, 2019. This attachment also includes the acronym \n\"WAB\" within the Destination/Description portion of the document, which MCC New York personnel told the \nOIG means \"with all belongings.\" During their OIG interviews, MCC New York staff members further \nexplained that the 'WAB\" notation meant that Inmate 3 was being perm\n... [truncated, 3626 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/57 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=57]", "char_count": 3626}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Epstein, and he said he told the second attorney that Epstein could not be housed without a cellmate \nbecause of his prior suicide attempt. \nC. \nRemoval on August 9 of Epstein's Cellmate from MCC New York \nAccording to MCC New York reports, including the Daily Log and the Lieutenant's Log, on August 9, 2019, at \napproximately 8:38 a.m., Epstein's cellmate, Inmate 3, was \"pre-removed\" and transferred out of MCC \nNew York in a routine, pre-arranged transfer. The Daily Log tracks inmate movements throughout MCC \nNew York each day, while MCC New York Lieutenants utilize the Lieutenant's Log to document the daily \nactivities that took place within the institution during their respective shifts. \nThe Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist was the supervisor of Receiving and Discharge on August 9, \n2019, and was responsible for overseeing all inmate movements in and out of the institution that day. The \nSupervisory Correctional Systems Specialist verified that Receiving and Discharge would have used the \nUSMS emails sent on August 8, 2019, to coordinate Inmate 3's transfer out MCC New York, and since \nInmate 3 was listed as 'WAB\" on the USMS emails, that meant he was being transferred from the facility and \nnot coming back. She explained to the OIG that if Inmate 3 had been going to court, as many pretrial \ninmates held at MCC New York often did, the Daily Log would have reflected \"court,\" rather than \"pre-\nremove.\" Since the Daily Log listed Inmate 3 as \"pre-remove,\" the Receiving and Discharge personnel who \nentered the information into the report were made aware that Inmate 3 was being transferred from MCC \nNew York on or before the morning of August 9, 2019. The Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist told \nthe OIG that the language in the USMS emails (\"WAB,\" i.e., \"with all belongings\") and MCC New York reports \n(\"pre-removed\") made it clear that Inmate 3 would not be returning to the SHU or MCC New York. \nThe OIG also interviewed the Correctional Systems Off\n... [truncated, 4008 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/58 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=58]", "char_count": 4008}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "D. \nFailure to Assign Epstein a New Cellmate on August 9 \n1. Day Watch Staff Actions on August 9 \nThe SHU Lieutenant told the OIG that he worked at MCC New York on August 8, 2019, from approximately \n6 a.m. until approximately 2 p.m., and that he was off on August 9, 2019. The SHU Lieutenant, whose shift \nended over an hour before the USMS sent the second email regarding Inmate 3's impending transfer, told \nthe OIG he was not aware that Inmate 3 was scheduled to be transferred out of MCC New York, and \ntherefore he did not notify the Captain that Epstein would require a new cellmate. According to the SHU \nLieutenant, as soon as the SHU staff learned that Inmate 3 would be transferred, they should have notified a \nLieutenant on duty. The Day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the \nOIG that on August 9, 2019, they had oversight of the SHU from approximately 6 a.m. until 2 p.m. due to \ntheir position descriptions and because of the SHU Lieutenant's absence. \nAccording to the MCC New York Staff Roster, on August 9, 2019, SHU Officer #1 was listed as Senior Officer \nSpecialist 5. Although SHU Officer #1 is typically the Officer in Charge, another Senior Officer Specialist told \nthe OIG that, in actuality, he was the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge on August 9 from approximately \n6 a.m. until 2 p.m. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said that since he had the most experience and \nseniority, he was considered by everyone to be the SHU Officer in Charge, which the SHU Lieutenant \nconfirmed. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to have a \ncellmate. He said that, as a general practice, every inmate who is transferred from suicide watch and/or \npsychological observation to the SHU is placed with a cellmate. He also confirmed that the SHU Lieutenant \nhad instructed him that Epstein was to be housed with a cellmate at all times. According to the Day Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge, between July 30 and\n... [truncated, 4181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/59 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=59]", "char_count": 4181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Watch SHU Officer in Charge, he did not select a new cellmate for Epstein because he was not certain that \nInmate 3 had been discharged from the institution, although he assumed that Inmate 3 would not return to \nthe SHU. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that when his shift ended at approximately \n2 p.m., he informed the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and Senior Officer Specialist 5 that, if Inmate 3 \ndid not return to the SHU, Epstein would need a new cellmate upon Epstein's return from his attorney visit. \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said he specifically recalled telling the Evening Watch SHU Officer in \nCharge, in the presence of Senior Officer Specialist 5, \"Make sure this guy gets a bunkie,\" to which the \nEvening Watch SHU Officer in Charge replied, \"All right.\" The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said that, at \nsome point that day, it was likely that he also informed the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, but he could \nnot specifically recall if he had done so. \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that a replacement cellmate should have been identified \nas soon as it was confirmed that Inmate 3 had left the institution. He said a new cellmate could have been \nreassigned before the 4 p.m. SHU count if it was known that Inmate 3 was not coming back, but the SHU \nstaff members had until Epstein returned from his attorney visit to assign Epstein a new cellmate. \nAccording to the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, SHU staff definitely should have realized that Inmate 3 \nwas not returning both during the 4 p.m. count and when Epstein returned from his attorney visit later that \nevening. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that Epstein's daily routine was that he would \nbe with his attorneys in the attorney conference room until approximately 8 p.m., so SHU personnel had \ntime to make a new cellmate assignment. He said all SHU staff members shared the responsibility to find a \nreplacement cellmate and that anyone ass\n... [truncated, 4397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/60 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=60]", "char_count": 4397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "The Day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant both told the OIG that they \ndid not know Inmate 3 had been transferred out of the facility, despite the fact that both were recipients of \nthe second email the USMS sent on August 8 that included the information about Inmate 3's impending \ntransfer out of MCC New York on August 9. Rather, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Day \nWatch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that they believed Inmate 3 had been removed from MCC New York \nfor a court appearance. \nThe Day Watch Activities Lieutenant did not recall Inmate 3 departing the institution with all of his \nbelongings or having any conversations with the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge or anyone else regarding \nInmate 3's departure from MCC New York. According to the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not \nknow that Epstein was without a cellmate. Other senior officials, including the Warden, Associate Warden 1, \nand the Captain, were also unaware of Inmate 3's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate. \nThese officials concurred that while all SHU staff and supervisors were responsible for notifying a supervisor \nin the chain-of-command of the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge \nbore primary responsibility for the notification because he was the SHU Officer in Charge and one of two \npeople who saw Inmate 3 leave the facility with all of his belongings. The Captain told the OIG that since \nEpstein was in the attorney conference room all day, no one may have even thought about it, and may have \nonly become aware when they put Epstein back in his cell after his attorney visit that evening. The Captain \nsaid as soon as the SHU staff became aware that Epstein was without a cellmate, they should have notified \nthe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant. The Captain said that if he had been informed, he would have \ntaken immediate action to ensure that Epstein was either assigned a ne\n... [truncated, 3928 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/61 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=61]", "char_count": 3928}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that he eventually learned later that evening that \nEpstein did not have a cellmate. According to the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, after Epstein \nreturned from his attorney visit and placed a telephone call, he escorted Epstein to his cell and saw that \nInmate 3 was not there. According to the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, after he realized that \nEpstein did not have a cellmate, he, Noel, and the Material Handler, all of whom were working in the SHU \nthat evening, talked about Epstein needing a new cellmate. The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge said \nSHU staff could not just put anyone in the cell with Epstein. In his interview with the OIG, the Evening Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge stated that he called someone (he could not recall who) and notified that person that \nEpstein did not have a cellmate. OIG interviews did not identify an individual who received such a call or \nwho witnessed the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge making it. \nSenior Officer Specialist 5 told the OIG that on August 9, he worked in the SHU from approximately 8:45 a.m. \nuntil 4 p.m. Senior Officer Specialist 5 said when he reported for duty, Epstein was already with his \nattorneys, Inmate 3 had already left the SHU, and neither inmate returned to the SHU prior to his departure. \nSenior Officer Specialist 5 told the OIG that he did not know Inmate 3 had been released from MCC \nNew York and that no one told him Epstein would need a new cellmate, including the Day Watch SHU Officer \nin Charge, the Captain, the SHU Lieutenant, or anyone from the Psychology Department. \nCO 2 told the OIG that on August 9, he worked in the SHU from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m. CO 2 said he did not \nrecall Inmate 3 departing the SHU that day, and that he was unaware that Epstein needed a new cellmate. \nThe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that he was the Operations Lieutenant at the MCC \non August 9 from approximately 2 p.m. until 10 p.m\n... [truncated, 4383 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/62 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=62]", "char_count": 4383}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "had left MCC New York. The Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant did not receive the August 8 USMS \nemail regarding Inmate 3's transfer. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant, who was the Operations \nLieutenant from approximately 10 p.m. on August 9 until 6 a.m. on August 10, told the OIG that she did not \nknow that Epstein was required to have a cellmate, and that the Captain never spoke with her about this \nissue. The Captain confirmed that he did not specifically tell the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant that \nEpstein needed a cellmate; however, the Captain said he believed that the Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant should have known of the requirement, and she was one of the recipients of the email from the \nPsychology Department on July 30, 2019, that informed MCC New York staff that Epstein needed to have an \nappropriate cellmate. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant also received the August 8 USMS email \nnotifying MCC New York supervisory staff of Inmate 3's scheduled transfer out of MCC New York. The \nMorning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that if SHU staff knew that Epstein required a cellmate \nand did not have one, they should have informed her when she visited the SHU at approximately 4 a.m. on \nAugust 10, as part of her Lieutenant rounds. \nThe Material Handler said the SHU was not his regular post and he had not attended SHU training, but he \nhad worked in the SHU approximately 10 to 20 times. According to the Material Handler, on August 9 he \nreported for a voluntary overtime shift from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. and then worked his regular 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. \nshift in the warehouse. At some point during the day shift, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant called and \nasked the Material Handler if he could work overtime in the SHU, and he agreed. The Material Handler said \nhe worked the 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. shift in the SHU with the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and Noel. \nThe Material Handler told the OIG that he felt pressured to work \n... [truncated, 4355 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/63 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=63]", "char_count": 4355}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "he did not know that Inmate 3 was removed from MCC New York on August 9, and that Epstein was without \na cellmate during his shift on August 10. \nIV. \nEpstein is Allowed to Make an Unmonitored Telephone Call on August 9 \nFor safety and security reasons, BOP policy requires that all inmate telephone calls be made through the \nInmate Telephone System. BOP records reflect that Epstein placed an unrecorded, unmonitored telephone \ncall to a telephone number in the local 646 area code using a non-Inmate Telephone System line on \nAugust 9, 2019, from 6:58 p.m. to 7:19 p.m. No other BOP records exist regarding the unmonitored call, \nincluding identity of the person called or a summary of the conversation. The OIG found no evidence that \nEpstein signed an Acknowledgement of Inmate form, as required by BOP policy and necessary for him to \nuse a non-Inmate Telephone System line. The Acknowledgement of Inmate form provides, among other \nthings, that the BOP reserves the authority to monitor and record non-attorney conversations on any \ntelephone located within the institution to preserve the security and orderly management of the institution \nand to protect the public. The OIG did not find that any notification was made to the MCC New York's \nSpecial Investigative Services staff advising the telephone call had been made, the date and time of the \ntelephone call, the name of the person being called, Epstein's name and register number, or a brief \nstatement explaining the purpose of Epstein's telephone call, as BOP policy requires. \nThe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that when he was preparing to escort Epstein back \nto the SHU from the attorney conference room on August 9, 2019, a Unit Manager said to the Evening Watch \nOperations Lieutenant that he was going to escort Epstein, so he could provide Epstein with the opportunity \nto place a telephone call using an unrecorded legal telephone line that is utilized by inmates to call their \nattorneys. The Unit Manage\n... [truncated, 3995 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/64 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=64]", "char_count": 3995}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "a part of his job, and he would allow inmates to place telephone calls if they were unable to make calls \nunder ordinary circumstances. \nThe Unit Manager told the OIG that at approximately 6:45 p.m., he and Senior Officer Specialist 1 escorted \nEpstein from the attorney conference room to the SHU so that Epstein could place a telephone call. The \nUnit Manager said he put Epstein in the shower area to make the telephone call because COs were present \nin that area. The Unit Manager explained that he also chose the shower area because that location ensured \nEpstein would not be able to pull the phone cord into his cell and use it to harm himself. The Unit Manager \nsaid he plugged the telephone line into the legal line, which was not recorded, and dialed the telephone \nnumber that Epstein provided. As noted above, the number that was dialed was in the local 646 area code. \nThe Unit Manager said he allowed Epstein to place the telephone call on the unrecorded legal line because \nhe believed that Epstein had not set up his Inmate Telephone System account that would have allowed him \nto call on the institutions recorded lines. According to the Unit Manager, a male answered, and the Unit \nManager handed the receiver to Epstein. The Unit Manager heard Epstein say, \"Hey, how are you doing? \nHow's everything?' The Unit Manager admitted that he should have verified who was on the line, as Epstein \nhad requested to make a telephone call to speak with his mother, and it was a male who answered the \nphone. The Unit Manager said he could not verify the phone number because he believed that Epstein did \nnot have his Inmate Telephone System account set up, and he did not have any phone numbers associated \nwith his account. The Unit Manager told the OIG that after he handed the telephone to Epstein, his shift \nended so he left the SHU and left MCC New York for the day. \nThe Unit Manager said that when he left the SHU, Epstein was still on the call and the Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in\n... [truncated, 3964 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/65 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=65]", "char_count": 3964}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "telephone call, Epstein told Individual 1 that the press had gotten crazy, and they discussed personal things \nsuch as books, music, and hygiene while incarcerated. According to the representations by Individual l's \ncounsel, Epstein told Individual 1, 'They are trying to keep me safe,\" and that his case would take a little \nlonger than he originally thought. He told Individual 1 he loved her, to be strong, and that he would not be \nable to call her again for another month. \nSenior Officer Specialist 1 told the OIG that he was not a witness to Epstein's August 9 call, but he had \npreviously discussed telephone calls with Epstein and knew that Epstein had the requisite paperwork that \nallowed him to place calls through the Inmate Telephone System. Senior Officer Specialist 1 told the OIG \nthat Epstein was issued the necessary documentation to make telephone calls when Inmate 1 was his \ncellmate. Senior Officer Specialist 1 also advised the OIG about an interaction that he had with one of \nEpstein's attorneys prior to August 9 when he was on an elevator with Epstein and the attorney. According \nto Senior Officer Specialist 1, Epstein's attorney asked him about getting Epstein the necessary \ndocumentation to make calls. Senior Officer Specialist 1 said he then verified that Epstein was able to make \ncalls through the Inmate Telephone System. When Senior Officer Specialist 1 asked Epstein why he had said \nhe was unable to make calls, Epstein responded, \"[T]hey said they monitor those phone calls.\" Senior \nOfficer Specialist 1 said that in a subsequent conversation with Epstein's attorney, the attorney asked how \nEpstein could get an unmonitored call. Senior Officer Specialist 1 told Epstein's attorney that decision had to \nbe made by a Lieutenant or Unit Manager. \nNoel told the OIG that after Epstein's attorney conference on August 9, the Unit Manager plugged a \ntelephone line in the legal line, and placed Epstein in a shower area within the SHU where he was afforded a \n... [truncated, 4140 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/66 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=66]", "char_count": 4140}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "what happened on that phone call. It could have potentially led to the incident [Epstein's death], but we \ndon't, we will never know.\" \nV. \nFailure to Conduct SHU Inmate Counts and Staff Rounds on August 9--10 \nA. \nSHU Inmate Counts \nAs detailed in the BOP policies section of Chapter 2, the BOP requires COs assigned to guard inmates to \nconduct institution-wide counts of inmates at regularly scheduled intervals each day to ensure that all \ninmates are present and accounted for at the appropriate location within the facility. Performing an \ninstitutional count is one of the basic and essential aspects of a CO's job, and the count was one of the basic \nand essential components of the daily operation of MCC New York. The Captain told the OIG that counts are \na core responsibility of COs and ensure accountability of the inmates. The Evening Watch Operations \nLieutenant said that it is very important that the institutional count is accurate because that is how staff \nmembers know if all inmates are present and if anyone has escaped. \nOn weekdays, MCC New York conducted institutional counts at 12 a.m., 3 a.m., 5 a.m., 4 p.m., and 10 p.m. \nThe 10 p.m. count was a stand-up count, which meant that inmates were required to stand when they were \ncounted. Pursuant to BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders, two COs were required to perform \nthe institutional count for each housing unit, including the SHU. To perform the institutional count in the \nSHU, BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders required two officers to walk from tier to tier to \nobserve and count each individual inmate. During each count, one CO would count the inmates while the \nother officer observed the inmates. The two officers would then switch roles and compare the count \nnumbers. If the totals did not match, then the officers had to conduct another count in the same manner. \nCOs had to document their performance of inmate counts on an official MCC New York form often referred \nto as a count slip.35\n\n... [truncated, 3782 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/67 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=67]", "char_count": 3782}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "result, many SHU staff and supervisors were unaware that Epstein did not have a cellmate as the Psychology \nDepartment had determined was necessary, and Epstein was alone and unobserved in his cell for an \nextended period of time. \n1. \nThe 4 p.m. SHU Count on August 9 \nThe OIG's investigation determined that the 4 p.m. SHU inmate count on August 9, 2019, was inaccurate \nbecause SHU staff did not physically count the inmates as required by BOP policy and instead relied upon a \npredetermined number of inmates believed to be in the SHU at that time. However, Epstein, who was in the \nSHU attorney visitation room, was correctly accounted for during the 4 p.m. and subsequent SHU counts. \nThe OIG determined that the error in the 4 p.m. SHU count was carried over into the next inmate count at \n10 p.m. that counted an inmate who had been transferred out of the SHU. The SHU inmate count was not \ncorrected until 12 a.m. when the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant reviewed the master institutional \ncount and housing unit count slips and informed SHU staff of the correct number of inmates in the SHU at \nthat time. \nSenior Officer Specialist 5 told the OIG that prior to his departure from the SHU at approximately 4 p.m., he \ntold the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge what the SHU count should be. In addition, the Day Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that SHU staff maintain a \"cheat sheet,\" which lists the number of \ninmates believed to be in the SHU at any given time. \nWhen interviewed by the OIG, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge reviewed the 4 p.m. SHU count slip from \nAugust 9, 2019, which was signed by the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and CO Noel. Based on his \nreview, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and \nNoel probably did not count the inmates in the SHU. He said they likely wrote down the numbers they \nthought should have been entered for the count because the count slip inaccurately included\n... [truncated, 3774 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/68 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=68]", "char_count": 3774}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "count slip.36 During his OIG interview, the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge reviewed BOP documents \nregarding the inmate's transfer from the SHU and acknowledged further that based on that transfer, the \nnumber of inmates listed on the SHU count slip he and Noel submitted for the 4 p.m. count, the count slip \nwas incorrect. \nNoel admitted in the deferred prosecution agreement she entered into with the U.S. Attorney's Office for \nthe Southern District of New York that she completed false count slips on August 9 and 10. Noel initially told \nthe OIG that she did not conduct the 4 p.m. count on August 9, but after acknowledging that she signed the \n4 p.m. SHU count slip, Noel said she did not recall if she conducted the count. According to Noel, she and \nother SHU staff filled out the count slip before conducting the counts because they knew the number of \ninmates they were supposed to report. \n2. The 10 p.m. SHU Count on August 9 \nAt the time of the 10 p.m. count, all inmates in the MCC New York SHU, including Epstein, were locked in \ntheir cells for the night. At or around that time, the two officers assigned to the SHU were responsible for \nconducting the 10 p.m. stand up count. At 10 p.m. on August 9, the two assigned SHU officers were Noel \nand the Material Handler. Through review and analysis of the SHU security camera video, witness \nstatements, and SOP records, the OIG determined that MCC New York staff did not perform the 10 p.m. \ncount in the SHU.37 Nonetheless, Noel and the Material Handler completed and signed the 10 p.m. SHU \ncount slip. The 10 p.m. SHU count slip listed the total number of inmates as /3 + 1.\" According to the MCC \nNew York master count sheet for the 10 p.m. count on August 9, 2019, all units had verbally reported their \ninmate counts to the Control Center by 10:30 p.m.33 At approximately 10:36 p.m., the Control Center \ncompleted all paperwork and officially cleared the 10 p.m. institutional count. \nThe Material Handler said he was pres\n... [truncated, 3745 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/69 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=69]", "char_count": 3745}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "documentation shows the count was verbally cleared by the Control Center at 10:30 p.m. It therefore \nappears that the video depicts Noel conducting a later round in the SHU, as she was required to do every \n30 minutes during her shift, and not the 10 p.m. SHU count. \nNoel said she wrote the 73 on the count slip but she did not remember if she or someone else had written \n\"+ 1\" on the count slip and she did not know why \"+1\" was on the count slip. Noel claimed that, unlike the \n4 p.m. count slip, which the Evening Watch Officer in Charge pre-filled, she did not prepare the 10 p.m. \ncount slip in advance of the count. Noel said she did not know that the 10 p.m. SHU count slip, which listed \n73 inmates, was inaccurate, and she could not explain why the 12 a.m. count also inaccurately listed that \n73 inmates were physically present in the SHU, whereas the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. count slips accurately listed \n72 inmates in the SHU. \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 told the OIG that on August 9, 2019, he worked in the Control Center from \napproximately 4 p.m. until 12 a.m., and then he worked as an Internal Officer from 12 a.m. until 8 a.m. on \nAugust 10. According to Senior Officer Specialist 6, he took the August 9 10 p.m. institutional count by \nhimself in the Control Center, and assisted with the 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts on August 10 as an \nInternal Officer. Senior Officer Specialist 6 confirmed to the OIG, as MCC New York records reflect, that he \nhad received verbal counts from all units by 10:30 p.m., and further stated that he had cleared the \ninstitutional count at 10:36 p.m., which was when paperwork was complete and the count was \nofficially complete. \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed the MCC New York 10 p.m. institutional count, which showed that the \nSHU had 73 inmates assigned, whereas the Receiving and Discharge Department had zero inmates assigned \nto the unit. When questioned by the OIG about the 10 p.m. SHU count slip that listed '73 + 1\" inmates an\n... [truncated, 2958 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/70 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=70]", "char_count": 2958}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Figure 5.1 \n10 p.m. Count Slips from the SHU and Receiving and Delivery on August 9 \nMetropolitan Correctional Center \nNew York, New York \n+ I \nOfficial Count Slip \nUnit: \nCount: \n1. Print Name: \nI. Signature: \n2. Print Name: \n2. Signature: \nDate: \nTime: \nNote: The images have been modified for privacy reasons. \nSource: BOP \nMetropolitan Correctional Center \nOfficial Coant Slip \nUnit: \nZA \n \nDate: (••2? • Ct \nCount: \n14:L± \nI \nPrint Name: \nSignature: \nPrint Name: _ \nSignature: \nTime: \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 did not recall if he wrote on the count slips at the time of the 10 p.m. count or \nduring the 12 a.m. count when Inmate 4 was transferred in SENTRY from the SHU to Receiving and \nDischarge. Senior Officer Specialist 6 told the OIG that if he had made the notations at the time of the \n10 p.m. count, he should not have cleared the count. Instead, he should have created a new master count \nsheet and requested that the SHU staff conduct a new count, provide a new count slip, and discard the \ninaccurate SHU count slip. Senior Officer Specialist 6 told the OIG that an Operations Lieutenant would have \nneeded to authorize him to do the \"ghost count\" and write on the count slips, although he could not recall \nprecisely who gave him the authorization or when he had done so. The OIG investigation and review \ndetermined that the only Operations Lieutenant on duty at the time was the Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant, who started her shift at 10 p.m. on August 9. When questioned by the OIG, the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant adamantly denied having authorized a \"ghost count' and the OIG identified no \nrecord or witness (other than Senior Officer Specialist 6) to indicate that she had done so. The OIG \ninterviewed other MCC New York personnel, who said \"ghost counting\" was not permitted, and stressed the \nimportance of an accurate physical count of inmates. \n3. \nThe 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told\n... [truncated, 2796 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/71 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=71]", "char_count": 2796}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she believed she told the SHU staff to conduct a new count \nand create a new count slip, but she did not know if they had actually done so. \nDuring his interview with the OIG, Senior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed BOP records relating to the inmate \ntransfer, the 12 a.m. institutional count, and the housing unit count slips. Based on his review of this \nmaterial, Senior Officer Specialist 6 said the 12 a.m. SHU count slip was inaccurate because it continued to \nlist 73 inmates instead of the 72 inmates who were physically present in the SHU at that time. Senior Officer \nSpecialist 6 reviewed the institutional counts and SHU count slips for the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. counts and told \nthe OIG that they were accurate because they listed the SHU as having 72 inmates. \nAt approximately 12 a.m. on August 10, 2019, Material Handler Thomas replaced the other Material \nHandler, and he and Noel were the only two staff members on duty in the SHU. Noel and Thomas were \nresponsible for conducting the 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts in the SHU. Through review and analysis \nof the SHU security camera video, witness statements, and BOP records, the OIG determined that Noel and \nThomas did not perform any of these counts. Nonetheless, Noel and Thomas completed and signed SHU \ncount slips for each of the three counts, and in reliance on the count slips, the Control Center cleared the \n12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. institutional counts at approximately 12:49 a.m., 3:24 a.m., and 5:30 a.m., \nrespectively. Noel and Thomas both admitted to the OIG that they did not conduct the 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and \n5 a.m. counts on August 10, and that they had falsified the respective count slips. \nNoel told the OIG that she signed the August 10 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. count slips that Thomas had \nprefilled. Noel said she did not know why the 12 a.m. count slip documented that there were 73 inmates in \nthe SHU, whereas the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. slips documented th\n... [truncated, 3734 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/72 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=72]", "char_count": 3734}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Thomas acknowledged that neither he nor Noel conducted any rounds or counts in the SHU during their \nshift between approximately 12 a.m. and approximately 6:30 a.m. Thomas said the August 10, 2019 round \nsheets were signed, but the rounds were not conducted because he was tired that day. Thomas recalled \n'dozing off from here and there\" during his shift, but he did not know if Noel slept. \nThomas did not recall having a conversation with anyone concerning the discrepancy between the 12 a.m. \nSHU count slip, which listed 73 inmates, and the institutional count, which listed 72 inmates in the SHU. \nThomas said he had filled out and signed the 3 a.m. SHU count slip, which listed 72 inmates in the SHU. \nThomas did not know why the number of inmates was different on the 12 a.m. and 3 a.m. count slips and \ndid not recall speaking with the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant about the 12 a.m. count. Thomas \ntold the OIG that he knew he was falsely certifying the count slips when he signed them on August 10, 2019. \nB. \nStaff Rounds in the SHU \n1. \nCO Rounds \nAs detailed in the BOP Policies section of Chapter 2, in addition to inmate counts, BOP policy and MCC \nNew York SHU Post Orders required that COs assigned to the SHU conduct rounds to observe all inmates at \nleast twice an hour. As part of their assigned duties, MCC New York SHU officers had to walk each of the \ntiers of the SHU twice an hour on an irregular schedule, once during the first 30 minutes and again during \nthe second 30 minutes, with both rounds occurring no more than 40 minutes apart. COs working in the \nSHU were required to complete and initial an official MCC New York form, often referred to as a \"round \nsheet,\" which was reviewed and signed by a supervisor, documenting the date and time of each 30-minute \nround in each tier of the SHU.4° \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that SHU staff spoke about conducting rounds on Epstein \nevery day. He said that the Warden, Lieutenants, and other MC\n... [truncated, 2796 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/73 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=73]", "char_count": 2796}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Figure 5.2 \nSign Created by the Day Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge \nLW \nMANADATOR4OUNDS MUST \nBE CONDUCTED EVERY 30 \nMINUTES ON \nEPSTEIN #76318-054 AS PER \nGOD!!!! \nNote: The image has been modified for \nprivacy reasons. \nSource: BOP \nThe Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that \nNoel filled out the round sheet on behalf of everyone who was \nworking in the SHU during his shift. The Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge was not certain if all of the rounds were \nactually conducted. The Material Handler said he believed the \nrounds listed on the round sheet as having occurred between \n4:01 p.m. to 7:36 p.m. probably had been done, but he was \nuncertain about the remaining rounds. The Material Handler \nsaid he had seen officers \"blow off\" 30-minute rounds in the \npast. Noel told the OIG that, as a general practice, when the \nCOs went to the various SHU tiers to distribute food or \nsupplies, they counted that as a round. Noel said she was \naware that she was supposed to conduct two rounds every \nhour during their shift, but that she had never actually \ncompleted rounds every 30 minutes while working in the SHU. \nWhen asked which rounds she conducted on August 9, 2019, \nNoel responded, \"That's hard for me to tell because I didn't \nconduct it every 30 minutes. It was give out food, pick up the \ntrays, give out toilet paper, go down. So those were the rounds \nI conducted.\" Noel verified that her initials were on the round \nsheets for August 9 and 10, 2019, and said, consistent with her \nusual practice, she filled out the round sheets and initialed the \nround sheets at the start of the 4 p.m. and the 12 a.m. shifts. \nNoel and Thomas both admitted to the OIG that they did not conduct any of the rounds reflected on the \nSHU Round Sheet on August 10, 2019, from 12 a.m. until Epstein was found hanged in his cell at \napproximately 6:30 a.m. Nonetheless, Noel completed and signed more than 75 separate 30-minute entries \nstating that she and Thomas had, in fact, conducte\n... [truncated, 3696 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/74 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=74]", "char_count": 3696}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Station. Noel said that during her shift on August 10, 2019, no one went to Epstein's cell and no one other \nthan the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant and CO 3 came into the SHU. \nThrough review and analysis of the SHU video footage, witness statements, and BOP records, the OIG \ndetermined that at approximately 10:40 p.m. a CO, believed to be Noel, carried linen or inmate clothing up \nto the L Tier, which was the last time any CO approached the only entrance to the SHU tier in which Epstein \nwas housed. \n2. Lieutenant Rounds \nBOP policy requires that a Lieutenant visit the SHU during each shift to ensure that all procedures are being \nfollowed. BOP training for new Lieutenants instructs that the Operations Lieutenant must visit the SHU at \nleast once per shift and n(t)his visit will be substantially more than just entering the unit, signing the log \nbook, and talking with staff.\" Additionally, when the SHU Lieutenant is unavailable, the Operations \nLieutenant should make rounds in the SHU on each shift. The training instructs that while in the SHU the \nOperations Lieutenant must walk each range (tier), inspect logs and records, observe activities, and \nperiodically observe SHU inmate counts. The training further outlines that the SHU Lieutenant is \nresponsible for the direct supervision of the unit, including enforcement of rules, review of paperwork, \ncoordination of activities, movement of inmates, and cell searches. The SHU Lieutenant should make \nrounds on the ranges (tiers) each day. \nThe statements of multiple witnesses were consistent with BOP training materials. The Northeast Regional \nDirector, the Warden, Associate Warden 1, the Captain, and the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge all told the \nOIG that Lieutenants should have walked down all of the SHU tiers when conducting a Lieutenant round in \nthe SHU. Noel said the SHU Lieutenant walked the tiers all the time, however, other Lieutenants did not \nalways walk down the tiers. Multiple witnesses also told \n... [truncated, 3982 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/75 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=75]", "char_count": 3982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "because he did not conduct any rounds within the SHU on August 9 and he did not recall signing the form. \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant confirmed that she conducted her round in the SHU at \napproximately 4 a.m. on August 10. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said she went up to the \n10 South Unit and then back down to the SHU because she needed to sign the round sheets. Contrary to \nBOP training for new Lieutenants, which she attended in 2011, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant \ntold the OIG, 'We are not required to go to each individual cell and look at the inmates. When we make \nrounds, we get with the officers.\" The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said she did not conduct a \nround to observe the inmates when she visited the SHU. Noel confirmed that the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant visited the SHU but did not walk down the tiers. \nThrough review and analysis of the SHU security camera video, witness statements, and BOP records, the \nOIG determined that at approximately 4 a.m. on August 10, 2019, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant \nbriefly visited the SHU as part of her supervisory duties and conferred with Noel and Thomas, who were \nseated at and around the SHU Officers' Station in the common area of the SHU. Noel told the OIG that at \napproximately 5:30 a.m., Thomas went to the 10 South Unit, which was adjacent to the SHU, to relieve CO 3, \nand that CO 3 briefly walked through the SHU common area as he left and returned from his break. The \nOIG's review and analysis of the video footage revealed that, aside from those two officers, no one entered \nthe SHU and no one conducted any counts or rounds. \nVI. \nEpstein's Death on August 10 \nA. \nDiscovery of Epstein Hanged in Cell and Emergency Response \nOn August 10, 2019, shortly after 6 a.m., the doorbell to the SHU rang, indicating that a delivery of breakfast \ncarts had arrived at the SHU. Noel and Thomas retrieved the breakfast carts from the double-locked \nentrance to the SHU a\n... [truncated, 3305 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/76 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=76]", "char_count": 3305}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Figure 5.3 \nPhotograph of a Piece of Orange Cloth \nHanging from the Bunkbed in \nEpstein's Cell Following His Death \nThomas explained that when he first entered Epstein's cell, \nEpstein had an orange string, presumably from a sheet or a \nshirt, around his neck. The end of the string was tied to the \ntop portion of the bunkbed. Epstein was suspended from the \ntop bunk in a near-seated position, with his buttocks \napproximately 1 inch to 1 inch and a half off the floor and his \nlegs extended out straight on the floor. Thomas said Epstein \ndid not look discolored or very different from when he last \nsaw Epstein alive. Thomas said he immediately ripped the \norange sheet or shirt away from the bunkbed, and Epstein's \nbuttocks dropped approximately 1 inch to 1 inch and a half to \nthe ground. Thomas then lowered Epstein's entire body to \nthe floor and, because he did not believe Epstein was \nbreathing, Thomas immediately began providing chest \ncompressions until responding MCC New York staff members \narrived approximately 1 minute later. Thomas said he did not \nprovide rescue breaths and was unaware if Epstein was dead \nor alive because he never checked for a pulse before initiating \nchest compressions. Thomas said medical personnel took \nover the emergency response, including chest compressions \nand use of an automated external defibrillator (AED), when \nthey arrived. Thomas said he assisted with bringing Epstein \ndown to the Health Services Unit on the second floor, and \nthat he left MCC New York at approximately 8 a.m. Thomas \nsaid he had received cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) \ntraining during MCC New York annual refresher training and \nhad responded to medical emergencies in the past, but this \nwas the first time he was the first responder. \nSource: Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, \nThomas said he was present in the SHU for his entire shift on \nAugust 10, 2019, from 12 a.m. until the time he attempted to \ndeliver breakfast to Epstein at approximately 6:30 a.m\n... [truncated, 3391 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/77 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=77]", "char_count": 3391}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "and then she heard Thomas rip something. Noel said she observed Thomas lifting Epstein from under his \narms and dragging him back out of the corner of the cell and laid him down on the ground to perform CPR. \nAccording to Noel, within seconds of Thomas calling out for the cutter she hit the body alarm, which is a \nbutton on an MCC staff member's radio that is used to signal distress or an emergency. Noel recalled \nhearing Thomas say, \"Breathe, Epstein, breathe,\" and 'We're going to be in so much trouble.\" Noel said she \nstood at the door about a foot away from Epstein's cell and never went in. Noel said Thomas only \nperformed chest compressions and said she did not see Thomas checking for breath or pulse. Noel said \nthat when she saw Epstein, he looked blue and did not have a shirt on or anything around his neck. Noel \nsaid she did not get the cutter because Thomas did not need it based upon the ripping sound she heard. \nNoel said an MCC New York Lieutenant who responded to the alarm asked her what happened, and before \nshe got the chance to answer, Thomas stated, \"Oh, it's not her fault, we fucked up.\" Noel did not recall \nmaking any comments or statements to the Lieutenant. Other than the Lieutenant, Noel did not recall \nwhich COs responded to the alarm and she did not know what happened in the cell after MCC New York \nstaff arrived because she was waiting at the bottom of the steps outside the L Tier. Noel said she was alone \nin the SHU for 20 minutes after they left with Epstein and she kept calling the Control Center to get \nstatus updates. \nNoel told the OIG that Epstein's cell was approximately 15 feet from the SHU Officers' Station. Noel said she \nwould have known if someone went in or out of Epstein's cell overnight and no one did. She also said that \nthere was no indication that any of the inmates could have gotten out of their cells. Noel said she never \nslept during her shift on August 9-10, 2019. Noel said that when she is seen on the camera at the desk\n... [truncated, 4130 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/78 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=78]", "char_count": 4130}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "then returned to the SHU and worked there for approximately 1 hour, along with the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant and Noel. The Electronics Technician believed he was in the SHU prior to 7 a.m. and \nuntil approximately 8 a.m., but he was not positive with regard to the times. The Electronics Technician said \nhe delivered food to the inmates on one tier while the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant did the same \non another tier while Noel unlocked the doors outside of the tiers for the Electronics Technician and the \nMorning Watch Operations Lieutenant. The Electronics Technician said that when they were delivering food \nto the inmates, he heard the inmates saying, \"You killed him. You weren't making rounds. You killed him.\" \nThe Electronics Technician told the OIG that the inmates also said Thomas and Noel just sat at the SHU \nOfficers' Station and never checked on the inmates. The Electronics Technician told the OIG he understood \nthe inmates to be saying that Thomas and Noel were responsible for Epstein's death because they had not \nconducted rounds during their shift. The Electronics Technician said he believed that Epstein took his own \nlife and said he had no reason to believe otherwise. \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 said he responded to the emergency call at 6:33 a.m. and when he arrived, staff \nmembers were already performing CPR on Epstein. Senior Officer Specialist 6 said he assisted with \ntransporting Epstein to the Health Services Unit, taking Epstein to the ambulance, and then followed the \nambulance to the hospital in another vehicle, and stayed at the hospital until he was relieved from duty. \nThe OIG also reviewed photographs that were taken in the MCC New York Health Services Unit of EMTs \nattempting to resuscitate Epstein. The photographs show, among other things, Epstein on his back with an \nintravenous line in his arm, his orange BOP-issued shirt ripped open and laying around his arms, and him \nwearing orange BOP-issued boxer shorts. None of \n... [truncated, 4241 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/79 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=79]", "char_count": 4241}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "revive Epstein. Epstein was not responsive. Inmate S said Epstein looked dead when the male CO tried to \npick him up and they both fell. Inmate 5 said officers had trouble getting Epstein onto the stretcher because \nEpstein was basically dead weight. When the officers did get Epstein on the stretcher, Epstein still had on \nheadphones.\" Inmate 5 did not see any marks around Epstein's neck, and he did not see a rope around \nEpstein's neck. However, Inmate S saw a male CO come out of Epstein's cell with a sheet that had a loop \nand knot. \nFigure 5.4 \nLocation of the Cells Assigned to Inmates 5-7 in Relation to Epstein's Cell in the L Tier \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting \nthe MCC New York SHU \nInmate 6 told the OIG that on August 9 and 10, 2019, he was housed within the SHU on L Tier in a cell \ndirectly across from Epstein's cell. Inmate 6 last saw Epstein's cellmate, Inmate 3, on August 9 when \nInmate 3 said, \"See you later. I'm going to court.\" Inmate 6 said Inmate 3 did not return that night and said \nthe SHU officers never conducted their required 30-minute rounds. Inmate 6 believed the COs last checked \non the inmates in the SHU on August 10 between 12:30 a.m. and 1 a.m. Inmate 6 did not observe anyone \nentering Epstein's cell after Epstein returned from his legal visit on August 9, 2019; did not hear noise that \nnight; and said Epstein's door was not opened during the night. Inmate 6 said a male officer discovered \nEpstein dead during breakfast delivery on August 10. Inmate 6 said he observed the male CO entered \nEpstein's cell and began performing CPR, while the female CO, who appeared panicked, stayed outside of \nthe cell. Inmate 6 said he observed Epstein on the floor but did not see a rope over Epstein's head. \nHowever, when Epstein was removed from his cell, Inmate 6 observed the COs holding a rope and a \n44 An MP3 player with headphones was obtained as evidence by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). \n74 \nEFTA01656788\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "defibrillator. Inmate 6 did not see marks on Epstein's neck but did see bruising on his face and observed \nearphones that were still in place on Epstein's ears. \nInmate 7, who was two cells down from Epstein's cell and on the other side of the tier, told the OIG that he \ncould not see into Epstein's cell but he could see the cell door. Inmate 7 said that after dinner was brought \nto Epstein's cell on the evening of August 9, 2019, Inmate 7 did not recall seeing anyone going in or out of \nEpstein's cell until the following morning at around 6 a.m. He further stated that he did not hear any door \n\"pop open\" that evening. Inmate 7 said he remembered waking up around 6 a.m. on August 10, 2019, and \nhearing a voice, possibly male, saying \"Breathe.\" Inmate 7 said he saw Epstein removed from his cell on \na stretcher. \nIn addition, the OIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interviewed seven inmates assigned to \nother tiers in the SHU, none of whom had any direct knowledge of how Epstein died. These inmates \nconsistently reported that the SHU officers did not systematically conduct the counts and rounds as \nrequired on the evening Epstein died and that the last round was either between 9:30-10 p.m. or 12:30-\n1 a.m. Several inmates told the OIG that before Epstein died the SHU staff never conducted rounds at night. \nAccording to the SOP Form 583 Report of Incident, on August 10, 2019, at approximately 6:33 a.m., while \ndelivering the breakfast meal, Epstein was found unresponsive in his cell. Consistent with the required \nresponse to a suspected suicide outlined in the MCC New York General Housing Unit Post Orders that are \ndescribed in Chapter 2, staff called for assistance and began life-saving measures.\" At 6:39 a.m., Epstein \nwas taken to the MCC New York Health Services Unit, and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) arrived to MCC \nNew York at 6:43 a.m. Epstein was transported to the local hospital, New York Presbyterian Lower \nManhattan Hospital, at 7:10 a.m., a\n... [truncated, 3800 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/81 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=81]", "char_count": 3800}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "According to a memorandum attached to the Form 583 from the Correctional Systems Officer dated \nAugust 10, 2019, after Noel called the medical emergency, the Correctional Systems Officer received a call \nfrom staff in the SHU instructing her to call 911 for an ambulance. The Correctional Systems Officer notified \nthe New York Police Department (NYPD) via the MCC New York institutional NYPD telephone. The \nCorrectional Systems Officer then informed NYPD that MCC New York needed an ambulance and medical \nassistance for one of the inmates. The New York City Fire Department and EMS arrived at MCC New York at \n6:43 a.m. and were escorted to the second-floor medical area. EMS departed MCC New York with Epstein \nand a BOP escort via ambulance and chase car to the local hospital at 7:10 a.m. \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she was relieved as the Operations Lieutenant \nprior to 6 a.m. on August 10, 2019, but was still working on things like the Daily Activity Reports and \nLieutenant Logs that she did not get to finish during her shift. At some point, the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant heard that there was a medical emergency in SHU, so she went to assist because she \nknew that inmates would need to be given food and other things would need to be done. The Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant estimated that she went to the SHU around 7 a.m. to help with the inmate \nmeals, and believed the Electronics Technician was also helping out. Noel was there, but she was not \nhelping with delivering food to the inmates. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said that after the \nmeals were delivered, she finished up and went home. \nAll MCC New York staff members who were interviewed by the OIG said they did not know of any \ninformation suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other than suicide. Additionally, no \ninmate provided the OIG with information suggesting that anyone assisted Epstein with taking his own life \nor had any credible \n... [truncated, 3521 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/82 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=82]", "char_count": 3521}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Figure 5.5 \nPhotograph of a Piece of Orange Cloth Tied into \na Noose Recovered from Epstein's Cell \nAfter His Death.\" \nSource: Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of \nNew York \nThe photographs of Epstein's cell on August 10, 2019, \nshow an excess of blankets, linens, and clothing. \nSome of the linens had been ripped into thin strips, \nwhich were tied to the desk and bunkbed inside the \ncell. Some of the strips were tied like a noose. When \nshown a picture of Epstein's cell, Noel verified that it \ncontained a lot of linen and extra clothing. Noel said \nthe mattress on the floor was Epstein's, as he always \nslept on the mattress on the floor. As detailed in the \nBOP policies section of Chapter 2, MCC New York \nSHU Post Orders required that COs assigned to the \nSHU during the daytime tours of duty conduct at \nleast five cell searches each day, and that the entire \nSHU, including all common areas and cells, be \nsearched every week. The OIG investigation \nrevealed, however, that on August 9, 2019, the SHU \nstaff logged only one cell search in TRUSCOPE, and \nthe search was not of Epstein's cell.\" BOP records \ndid not indicate when Epstein's cell was last searched. \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that \nat least five cell searches should be conducted on the \nday and night watch shifts within the SHU, and that \ncell searches are conducted in cells every time the \ninmate departs the cell. He said the SHU Officer in Charge was responsible for making sure the searches \nwere conducted and logged into the BOP TRUSCOPE database. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said \nthat only one cell search was entered into TRUSCOPE on August 9, 2019, because cell searches were tedious \nto enter, and he was busy. He did not believe that it was a problem that only one cell search was logged on \nAugust 9 because he said the SHU staff would have gone into every cell when the inmates took their \nshowers. He said that during the period of Epstein's custody, SHU inmates sho\n... [truncated, 3286 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/83 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=83]", "char_count": 3286}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Figure 5.6 \nPhotograph of Epstein's Cell After \nHis Death \nSource: Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, \nCity of New York \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that in \nAugust 2019, each inmate would have been authorized to \nhave two sheets and one blanket. He said that in the winter, \ninmates are allowed to have an additional blanket. When \ninterviewed by the OIG, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge \nreviewed a picture of Epstein's cell from August 10, 2019, \nafter Epstein had been removed from the cell. The Day \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge said there appeared to be an \nexcess number of linens and blankets in the cell, which he \nbelieved were for both Epstein and Inmate 3, and that there \nwere possibly a couple of extra sheets as well. He noted that \nthere were two mattresses in the cell and deduced that \nInmate 3's assigned items had not yet been removed even \nthough he had departed MCC New York earlier that day. \nAccording to the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, \nInmate 3's items should have been removed as soon as the \nSHU staff knew Inmate 3 was not returning. He told the OIG \nthat any extra linens or blankets should be removed when \nthe inmates take showers and their cells are searched. He \ntold the OIG that he believed the purpose of limiting the \nlinens provided to the inmates was to ensure there was \nenough to go around and that it was more of an \nadministrative matter rather than a security matter. \nThe Captain also reviewed the picture of Epstein's cell from \nAugust 10, 2019, when interviewed by the OIG. He said \nEpstein had too many linens, t-shirts, and blankets in his cell. \nThe Captain said the SHU staff were responsible for \nremoving those items because they did not want to hear the \nother inmates complain that they were not issued the same \nnumber of items. The Captain stated that it is also a security \nissue because it \"gives the inmates the materials to be able to make homemade fashioned and improvised \nnooses\" or \"use it as escape pa\n... [truncated, 3306 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/84 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=84]", "char_count": 3306}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "following suicide watch and psychological observation, Inmate 3 asked Epstein not to kill himself while \nInmate 3 was his cellmate because Inmate 3 had a chance to go home soon. In response, Epstein told \nInmate 3 not to worry and that he was not going to cause him any trouble. \nWhen Inmate 3 left on August 9, he told Epstein that he would leave the clothesline in the cell so that \nEpstein could wash his clothes. Inmate 3 did not say anything about a noose having been in the cell, but he \nsaid there were five blankets in their cell when he left. \nC. \nAutopsy Results \nOn August 11, 2019, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New York, performed an autopsy on \nEpstein and determined that the cause of death was hanging and the manner of death a suicide. One of the \noffice's Medical Examiners performed the autopsy, and the autopsy report was reviewed by the First Deputy \nChief Medical Examiner. In connection with this investigation, the OIG interviewed the Medical Examiner \nwho performed the Epstein autopsy (hereinafter the \"Medical Examiner\"). The Medical Examiner told the \nOIG that the pattern of Epstein's neck bone fractures was consistent with a hanging. The Medical Examiner \nexplained that a different fracture pattern is present if there has been a manual compression of the neck \nversus a sustained pressure like in a hanging, and the pattern of Epstein's neck fractures was that of a \nhanging. The Medical Examiner also said Epstein had petechial hemorrhages, which are pinpoint bleeds in \nskin, on his face and mouth. These hemorrhages are caused when the blood flow is obstructed and the \nsmall skin capillaries burst. The Medical Examiner additionally identified plethora, which is purple \ndiscoloration of the skin, and stated that both petechial hemorrhages and plethora are consistent with \nsuicide by hanging. The Medical Examiner stated that Epstein's petechia and plethora were identified from \nhis neck up. In homicidal strangulations, according to the Me\n... [truncated, 4044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/85 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=85]", "char_count": 4044}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "independent medical judgment and that the Medical Examiner was not pressured or otherwise subjected to \nany attempt to influence her ruling. \n80 \nEFTA01656794\n", "char_count": 159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "Chapter 6: The Availability of Limited Recorded Video Evidence \nDue to the Security Camera Recording System Failure \nIn August 2019, the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York) had \napproximately 150 video security cameras (no audio) placed throughout the institution. The Office of the \nInspector General (OIG) found that approximately 11 cameras were located in and around the Special \nHousing Unit (SHU) where Epstein was confined at the time of his death on August 10, 2019, including one at \nthe end of the L Tier where Epstein was housed that showed any movement in or out of inmate cells and in \nthe Tier's hallway. In addition to broadcasting live video, MCC New York had a system that recorded the live \nvideo feeds. Following Epstein's death, MCC New York officials and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) \ninvestigators attempted to review video recordings related to the incident and discovered that, although the \nsecurity cameras were working and transmitting live video, recorded video from most of the cameras in the \nSHU area was not available due to a malfunction of the video recording system that had occurred on July 29, \n2019, including video from the camera at the end of the L Tier. As a result, while the L Tier video camera \nwas transmitting a live video feed on the night of August 9, 2019, and morning of August 10, 2019, the video \nwas not being recorded. One of the cameras that had available recordings from August 9 and 10 was a \ncamera located outside a housing unit adjacent to the SHU. That camera captured video of a large part of \nthe common area of the SHU, including the SHU Officers' Station and portions of the stairways leading to \nthe different SHU tiers, including the L Tier. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to enter the L Tier from \nthe common area of the SHU, including on August 9 and 10, would have been picked up by the video \nrecorded by that camera. In addition, the recordings showed the SHU Officers' S\n... [truncated, 3564 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/87 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=87]", "char_count": 3564}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "The Electronics Technician told the OIG that, throughout his tenure at MCC New York, the camera system \nwas subject to frequently recurring failures, particularly with respect to the DVR hard drives.a9\nThe Warden, who assumed his responsibilities at MCC New York in May 2018, told the OIG he was generally \naware that there were problems with the security camera system throughout the institution. He further \nstated that efforts were undertaken to determine which cameras were working and which needed to be \nfixed, and that MCC New York officials intended to ultimately seek funding to replace the entire system. \nFederal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) records reflect that on September 6, 2018, the Warden submitted a \nmemorandum to the BOP's Northeast Regional Director to request $800,000 in funding to replace the entire \ncamera system. The memorandum identified an estimated project start date of December 1, 2018, and an \nestimated completion date of February 9, 2019. The BOP approved the funding request, and on \nSeptember 21, 2018, a contract in the amount of $698,108.99 was awarded to Company 1 to provide various \nequipment for the project and associated labor. On September 24, 2018, a separate contract in the amount \nof $34,089.28 was awarded to Company 2 to provide assorted networking equipment and wiring needed to \ninstall the camera system. \nAs the camera upgrade project was beginning, BOP officials recognized that MCC New York's mechanical, \nelectrical, and plumbing systems were also in need of major repairs. MCC New York did not have enough \nqualified technicians on staff to complete both the camera installation and other repairs needed at the \nfacility, so beginning the week of March 17, 2019, the BOP's Northeast Regional Office arranged for \ntechnicians from other BOP institutions to conduct temporary duty (TDY) assignments at MCC New York to \nperform the work. During the course of the TDY rotations, work was not consistently conducted on the \ncamera upgrade because s\n... [truncated, 3822 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/88 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=88]", "char_count": 3822}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "recorded video was available for several of the institution's cameras, so she reported the matter to the \nCommunications Office, and the Electronics Technician arrived to assess the problem sometime before his \nshift was scheduled to end. The Electronics Technician told the OIG that he found that roughly half of the \ninstitution's approximately 150 cameras, which were assigned to record to DVR 2, were displaying a live \nvideo feed but were not recording. \nThe Electronics Technician told the OIG that, before Epstein's death, no one was specifically tasked with \nensuring that video from the cameras was being recorded. The Electronics Technician said he therefore did \nnot perform any daily checks to ensure that video was being recorded. The Warden indicated that SIS staff \nare usually responsible for checking the system for recording functionality and reporting any problems to \nthe Communications Office. However, the SIS Lieutenant told the OIG that it was her belief that the \nElectronics Technician should have been checking the system daily to ensure it was recording. The OIG \nfound that there are no BOP policies that specifically state that institutional staff must perform periodic \nchecks to ensure the camera system is fully functional or that security camera systems have the capacity to \nrecord.50 The Facility Manager told the OIG that since Epstein's death, he now checks to ensure that all \ncameras and the recording system are working on a daily basis, and he subsequently provides a report \nabout the status of the system to the facility's executive staff, the SIS, and the electronics technicians. \nB. Response on August 8 and 9 to Discovery of the Recording Failure \nOn August 8, following discovery of the recording failure, Company 1 service request records reflect that the \nElectronics Technician contacted a Company 1 technical support representative, who ultimately determined \nthat two hard drives within DVR 2 had failed. According to the Electronics Technician a\n... [truncated, 4308 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/89 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=89]", "char_count": 4308}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "the SIS Lieutenant assumed that the Electronics Technician would remain at the institution after his shift \nended that day to correct the issue. The Electronics Technician told the OIG there must have been some \nmiscommunication because he did not say he was going to work overtime and resolve the problem that \nsame evening since he knew the problem could not be fixed in one evening. The Electronics Technician told \nthe OIG that, in hindsight, he should have stayed at the institution to begin work on the problem that \nsame day. \nThe SIS Lieutenant told the OIG that she verbally informed the Captain on August 8 that the cameras were \ndown, but BOP records reflect that the Captain left the institution before the malfunction was discovered. \nThe Captain told the OIG that he did not learn about the DVR recording issue until after Epstein's death on \nAugust 10 when he asked to see video related to the Epstein incident. Associate Warden 1 confirmed she \nwas with the SIS Lieutenant on August 8 when the camera problem was discovered, but she told the OIG she \nonly knew video could not be replayed. She did not know the recording system for certain cameras was \ndown. She could see live video from the cameras on that date, and therefore assumed they were recording. \nAccording to the Electronics Technician, after he reported to work on August 9, 2019, and attended to other \nmatters throughout the day, the Electronics Technician obtained the replacement hard drives and \nattempted to perform the repair sometime late in the day. However, the Electronics Technician told the OIG \nthat no SIS staff were present at that time to give him access to the room in which the DVR room was \nlocated, so he requested access from the only other individual who had a key to the space, Correctional \nOfficer (CO) 4.52 According to the Electronics Technician, CO 4 denied him access to the room because CO \n4's shift was ending at 4 p.m., and CO 4 was unable to stay and accompany him in the space while t\n... [truncated, 3793 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/90 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=90]", "char_count": 3793}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Only two cameras in the vicinity of the SHU area were recording to DVR 1 at the time of Epstein's death.s3\nOne camera was located on the upper-level entrance to the 10 South Unit, a housing unit adjacent to the \nSHU, near the door MCC New York staff referred to as the \"46 door.\" That camera captured video of a large \npart of the common area of the SHU, including the SHU Officers' Station and portions of the stairways \nleading to the different SHU tiers, including the tier containing Epstein's cell. Thus, anyone entering or \nattempting to enter the L Tier from the common area of the SHU on August 9 and 10 would have been \npicked up by the video recorded by that camera. Epstein's cell door, however, was not in that camera's field \nof view. The other camera that was recording was located in one of the ninth floors two elevator bays and \nprovided video of the ninth-floor fire exit and two of the floors four elevators. \nThe available video showed that at approximately 7:49 p.m. on August 9, Epstein was escorted toward the \nL Tier stairway by an individual believed to be the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge.54 At approximately \n10:39 p.m., an unidentified CO appeared to walk up the L Tier stairway, and then reappeared within view of \nthe camera at 10:41 p.m. This is believed to be the last time anyone entered L Tier before approximately \n6:30 a.m. on August 10. Between approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 and just before 6:30 a.m. on \nAugust 10, the OIG did not observe on the recorded video any CO or other individual enter any of the SHU \ntiers, which is consistent with CO Tova Noel and Material Handler Michael Thomas's admissions to the OIG \nthat the SHU rounds and counts were not conducted during that time frame. At approximately 6:28 a.m., an \nunidentified officer was observed on the L Tier stairway, presumably to deliver breakfast food trays. \nBetween 6:28 a.m. and 6:32 a.m., an unidentified officer, believed to be Noel, moved back and forth several \ntimes between \n... [truncated, 4275 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/91 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=91]", "char_count": 4275}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "Figure 6.1 \nSHU Camera Locations and Recording Status on August 10, 2019 \nUpper \nrs \nTiers \n0 \nStreaming and Recording \nCamera \nEl Streaming but not Recording \nCamera \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n86 \nEFTA01656800\n", "char_count": 251}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Figure 6.2 \nLocation of Recording SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South entrance \nNote: The photograph has been modified for privacy reasons. \nSource: DOJ OIG photograph and DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU \n87 \nEFTA01656801\n", "char_count": 242}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Figure 6.3 \nField of View of the SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South Entrance \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU and the BOP \n88 \nEFTA01656802\n", "char_count": 169}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "Figure 6.4 \nPartial View of L Tier Stairway, from the SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South Entrance \nSource: DOJ OIG and the BOP \n89 \nEFTA01656803\n", "char_count": 141}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "Figure 6.5 \nView of SHU Officers' Station from the SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South Entrance \nSource: 00J 0IG and the BOP \n90 \nEFTA01656804\n", "char_count": 138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Figure 6.6 \nField of View of the Recording 9th Floor Elevator Bay Camera \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SW and the BOP \n91 \nEFTA01656805\n", "char_count": 168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "Figure 6.7 \nLocation of Non-Recording Camera in the L Tier of the SHU \narr \na rt_ \nkid\n,OR-Cod \nC am -ra \ng\nift a \nSource: DOJ OIG schematic drawing depicting the MCC New York SHU and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, \nCity of New York \nThe Warden, who was not scheduled to work on August 10, 2019, arrived at the institution later that \nmorning after being notified of Epstein's death and was informed that most of the cameras in the SHU were \nnot recording. He told the OIG that when the SIS Lieutenant arrived at the facility that morning, he informed \nher that the SHU cameras had not been recording, and the SIS Lieutenant explained that the hard drive \nissue had been detected on August 8. He told the OIG that prior to August 10, he was unaware that the \nDVR 2 issue had been detected on August 8, and that approximately half of the facility's cameras, and in \nparticular the cameras in the SHU, were found to not be recording on that date. \nThe Electronics Technician told the OIG that the Warden had instructed Electronics Technician to try and \nrecover any potential SHU video that may have been recorded by the cameras assigned to the \nmalfunctioning DVR 2 system, but the Electronics Technician was unable to find anything. The Electronics \nTechnician further said that the Warden wanted to have all the facility's cameras recording again as soon as \npossible, so he instructed the Electronics Technician to begin repairing DVR 2. \nD. \nFBI Forensic Analysis of the DVR System \nFBI evidence documents revealed that on August 10, 2019, the FBI seized all hard drives contained within \nthe DVR 2 system. On August 14, 2019, the FBI returned to MCC New York and seized additional DVR 2 \ncomponents. On August 15, 2019, the FBI seized the entire DVR 1 system. \n92 \nEFTA01656806\n", "char_count": 1793}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "The FBI's Digital Forensics Analysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, received MCC New York's DVR system on \nAugust 16, 2019, and began to conduct a forensic analysis of the system. According to FBI forensic reports, \nDVR 2 did not start successfully. The Digital Forensics Analysis Unit found that the system contained three \nfaulty hard drives. The FBI forensic reports state that the three drives were repaired by an FBI Advanced \nData Recovery Specialist, but the DVR was never able to be assembled successfully. The forensic reports \nfurther state that an FBI computer scientist and the Company 1 Technician reviewed the DVR 2 controller \nlogs and found that there had previously been \"catastrophic disk failures\" and no recordings would have \nbeen available after July 29, 2019. \nWhen the OIG asked the Electronics Technician about this finding by the FBI, he told the OIG he was \nunaware that cameras were not recording to DVR 2 between July 29 and August 8, 2019. Neither the \nWarden nor the SIS Lieutenant was aware the cameras assigned to DVR 2 had not been recording since \nJuly 29, 2019. The Company 1 Technician could not recall working with the Electronics Technician on any \nDVR issues prior to August 8, 2019, but he said that if the entire DVR 2 server went down on July 29, 2019, no \nvideo would have been able to have been retrieved from that point forward from any of the cameras \nrecording to DVR 2. \n93 \nEFTA01656807\n", "char_count": 1434}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations \nI. \nConclusions \nOur investigation and review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of \nJeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional \nCenter located in New York, New York (MCC New York), including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate \ncounts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies and procedures, which \ncompromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates, and the security of the institution. Specifically, \nwe found that MCC New York staff failed to undertake required measures designed to make sure that, \namong other things, Epstein and other inmates were accounted for and safe, such as conducting inmate \ncounts and 30-minute rounds, searching inmate cells, and ensuring adequate supervision of the Special \nHousing Unit (SHU) and the functionality of MCC New York's security camera system. \nWe further found that multiple BOP employees submitted false documents claiming that they had \nperformed the required counts and rounds and that several MCC New York staff members lacked candor \nwhen questioned by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) about their actions. Two MCC New York \nemployees, Tova Noel and Michael Thomas, were charged criminally with falsifying BOP records relating to \ntheir conducting inmate counts and rounds. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York \nsubsequently entered into deferred prosecution agreements with Noel and Thomas and the court \ndismissed all charges against them after Noel and Thomas successfully fulfilled the terms of their \nagreements. Prosecution was declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York for \nother MCC New York employees assigned to the SHU on August 9-10, 2019, who the OIG found also \ncreated, certified, and submitted false documentation regarding inmate counts and rounds on the day \nbefore and the da\n... [truncated, 3620 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/100 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=100]", "char_count": 3620}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "As detailed in Chapter 4 of this report, the SHU was a housing unit within MCC New York where inmates \nwere securely separated from the general inmate population and kept locked in their cells for \napproximately 23 hours a day, to ensure their own safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. \nAccess to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior \nEntry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. \nAdditionally, there was a second locked door at the main entrance (Main Interior Entry Door), which could \nbe opened only with a key held by a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) while on duty.0 Within the \nSHU, the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via a single locked door at the top or bottom of the \nstaircase leading to the individual tier. Keys to open the locked tier doors were available only to a limited \nnumber of COs while on duty. Each tier had eight cells, each of which could house either one or two \ninmates. Each individual cell, which was made of cement and metal, could be accessed only through a \nsingle locked door, to which only a limited number of COs had keys while on duty. The SHU cell doors were \nmade of solid metal with a small glass window and small locked slots that correctional staff used to handcuff \ninmates and provide food and toiletries to inmates. As a further security measure, during each shift a \nlimited number of the COs had keys while on duty. \nBOP policy and practice require that all SHU inmates be locked in their cells overnight. The OIG found no \nevidence indicating that the door to Epstein's cell or any other cell in the SHU tier in which Epstein was \nhoused was unlocked on the evening of August 9-10, 2019, after SHU staff locked Epstein in his cell at \napproximately 8 p.m. SHU staff told the OIG that at approximately 8 p.m. on August 9, all SHU inmates were \nlocked in their cells for the evening and that there \n... [truncated, 4346 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/101 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=101]", "char_count": 4346}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "the L Tier during that timeframe other than the inmates who were locked in their assigned cells on that tier \nof the SHU. \nWe also noted that the surveillance camera in the L Tier, as shown in the photograph in Figure 6.7, was in \nplain view of the inmates and therefore inmates would have been aware that any hallway movements, \nincluding into or out of Epstein's cell, were being live streamed and could be monitored, even if, \nunbeknownst to them, the Digital Video Recorder (DVR) system was not recording the live stream at that \ntime. As the OIG has noted in numerous prior reports regarding the BOP's camera system, BOP staff and \ninmates are aware of where prison cameras are located and often engage in wrongdoing in locations where \nthey know cameras are not located.56 Additionally, the OIG did not observe on the recorded video of the \nSHU common area that Noel and Thomas, who were seated at the desk at the SHU Officers' Station \nimmediately outside the L tier during that time period, at any time rose from their seats or approached the \nL Tier. We additionally found that Thomas's and Noel's reaction on the morning of August 10 upon finding \nEpstein hanging in his cell, as described to us by Thomas, Noel, the responding Lieutenant, and inmates, \nwas consistent with their being unaware of any potential harm to Epstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein's \ncell at about 6:30 a.m. on August 10. \nWe further noted that Epstein had previously been placed on suicide watch and psychological observation \ndue to the events of July 23, 2019; that numerous nooses made from prison bed sheets were found in his \ncell on the morning of August 10; and that he had signed a new Last Will and Testament on August 8, 2 days \nbefore he died. No weapons were recovered from Epstein's cell after his death. Additionally, the inmates \nwho were interviewed consistently reported that on the evening Epstein died the SHU staff did not \nsystematically conduct the required rounds and counts, which was o\n... [truncated, 3951 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/102 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=102]", "char_count": 3951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "management failures at multiple levels within the BOP.,' Similar to the Bulger report, the numerous and \nserious transgressions that occurred in this matter came to light largely because they involved a high-profile \ninmate. The fact that serious deficiencies occurred in connection with high-profile inmates like Epstein and \nBulger is especially concerning given that the BOP would presumably take particular care in handling the \ncustody and care of such inmates. \nRegrettably, the OIG has encountered similar issues on many other occasions. For example, the OIG has \ninvestigated numerous allegations related to the falsification of official BOP documentation concerning \ninmate counts and rounds, several of which have resulted in criminal prosecution. The OIG currently has \ntwo open investigations into allegations of falsified inmate count and round documentation, each involving \nan inmate death (by suicide and homicide) or escape from a BOP facility. \nThis investigation and review also revealed the direct impact of insufficient staffing levels on inmate safety. \nWitnesses repeatedly told the OIG that counts, rounds, cell searches, and other methods of inmate \naccountability were not undertaken because correctional staff were working multiple shifts—including one \nstaff member who worked 24-hours straight—and were tired and overwhelmed with other duties. As \ndiscussed in greater detail in our recommendations, the OIG has repeatedly found the need for BOP to \naddress staffing shortages. Most recently, in March 2023, the OIG found that the coronavirus disease 2019 \n(COVID-19) pandemic exacerbated the effects of preexisting BOP medical and nonmedical staffing \nshortages, an issue the OIG has identified as a concern for the BOP since at least 2015.58\nFurther, the OIG has repeatedly found that BOP personnel have not consistently been attentive to the needs \nof inmates at risk for suicide. In this investigation, that inattention manifested in the failure of MCC \nNew York staf\n... [truncated, 3566 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/103 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=103]", "char_count": 3566}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance failures documented in this \nreport all contributed to an environment in which arguably one of the most notorious inmates in BOP's \ncustody was provided with the opportunity to take his own life, resulting in significant questions being asked \nabout the circumstances of his death, how it could have been allowed to have happen, and most \nimportantly, depriving his numerous victims, many of whom were underage girls at the time of the alleged \ncrimes, of their ability to seek justice through the criminal justice process. The fact that these failures have \nbeen recurring ones at the BOP does not excuse them and gives additional urgency to the need for \nDepartment of Justice (DOJ) and BOP leadership to address the chronic staffing, surveillance, security, and \nrelated problems plaguing the BOP. \nThe OIG has completed its investigation and is providing this report to the BOP for appropriate action. \nUnless otherwise noted, the OIG applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining \nwhether DOJ personnel have committed misconduct. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board applies this \nsame standard when reviewing a federal agency's decision to take adverse action against an employee \nbased on such misconduct. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B) and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii). \nA. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that Epstein Had a Cellmate on August 9 as \nInstructed by the Psychology Department on July 30 \nOn July 30, 2019, the MCC New York Psychology Department sent an email to over 70 BOP staff members \nstating that Epstein \"needs to be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" The Psychology Department's \ndirective that Epstein have an appropriate cellmate arose out of the events that occurred on July 23, 2019, \nwhen Epstein was found lying on the floor of his cell with a piece of orange cloth around his neck. Epstein's \ncellmate at the time (Inmate 1) told MCC New York staff that Epstein h\n... [truncated, 3747 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/104 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=104]", "char_count": 3747}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "resulted in Epstein being housed without a cellmate at the time of his death, which was contrary to the \nPsychology Department's directive issued just 10 days earlier. \nBOP standards of conduct require that employees \"obey the orders of their superiors at all times.\"\" MCC \nNew York Post Orders for the SHU require, among other things, that all SHU officers \"maintain a log of \npertinent information regarding inmate activity, detailing time, persons involved (if pertinent) and the event, \nwhich must be logged into TRUSCOPE.\"62 Importantly, the SHU Post Orders clarify that they 'are not \nintended to describe in detail all the officers responsibilities. Good judgment and common sense are \nexpected in all situations not covered in these post orders.\" \nOn August 9, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, and CO \nTova Noel were each assigned to the MCC New York SHU as their permanent quarterly assigned post and \nserved as the SHU Officer in Charge during their respective shifts.63 The OIG investigation found that each \nof these employees knew that Epstein was required to have a cellmate at all times per the Psychology \nDepartment's directive. \nThe OIG further found that on August 9 the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge, and Noel each became aware at various times during their respective shifts that Epstein's \ncellmate, Inmate 3, had been transferred from the institution with all of his belongings, a status known to all \nMCC New York staff members as meaning the inmate was being permanently transferred out of the \ninstitution. Specifically, the OIG investigation found that on the morning of August 9, the Day Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge and CO 1, who was also assigned to the SHU, reviewed the MCC New York daily call out list, \na document that identifies all inmates who were leaving their housing units each day, which listed Inmate 3 \nas being scheduled to depart MCC New York with all of his belongi\n... [truncated, 3717 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/105 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=105]", "char_count": 3717}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "The OIG investigation also found that during the next shift in the MCC New York SHU, both the Evening \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge and Noel became aware that Epstein was without a cellmate. The Evening \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that when he escorted Epstein back to his cell after Epstein's \ntelephone call, he saw that Inmate 3 was not there and then he, Noel, and the Material Handler discussed \nthe need for Epstein to have a new cellmate. The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge also told the OIG \nthat he notified an unspecified supervisor. However, other witnesses did not corroborate his account. Noel \ntold the OIG that she was unaware both that Epstein needed to have a cellmate and that Inmate 3 had been \nremoved from the institution. Noel also told the OIG that she went to Epstein's cell at approximately \n10 p.m.—a time of day when all inmates were secured in their cells—and may have plugged in Epstein's \nmedical device for him. The OIG did not credit Noel's statements that she did not know that Epstein needed \na cellmate or that Inmate 3 had been removed from the SHU based on contradictory witness statements \n(including her own) regarding SHU staffs knowledge of Epstein's cellmate requirement and Inmate 3's \ntransfer out of the SHU.66\nThe OIG investigation concluded that on August 9, 2019, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Evening \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge, and Noel failed to notify a supervisor as required after Epstein's cellmate was \npermanently removed from the MCC New York SHU, which constituted a violation of BOP standards of \nconduct. Additionally, their inaction violated MCC New York SHU Post Orders because none of these \nindividuals documented the fact the Epstein needed a new cellmate as required. Finally, all of these officers \nfailed to exercise good judgment and common sense, as required by the SHU Post Orders, by not \nimmediately undertaking steps through their chain-of-command to ensure that a high-profile inmate who \nhad \n... [truncated, 3912 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/106 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=106]", "char_count": 3912}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "shifts, and the Captain had oversight over all of the Lieutenants.\" The OIG found that the failure of these \nindividuals to adequately supervise SHU staff and ensure that a high-profile inmate who had recently been \non suicide watch and psychological observation had an appropriate cellmate constituted a job performance \nfailure. \n3. Failure to Have a Contingency Plan for Assigning Epstein a Cellmate \nAdditionally, the OIG found that the Warden's failure to have a back-up cellmate assignment for Epstein \nconstituted poor judgment. The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that although he knew \nthat Epstein needed to be assigned another cellmate, SHU staff could not just put anyone in the cell with \nEpstein. The Warden confirmed this in his OIG interview, when he explained that he and BOP executive \nleadership selected Inmate 3 as Epstein's cellmate following the events of July 23, 2019. The Warden told \nthe OIG that no inmates were pre-vetted to serve as Epstein's cellmate if Inmate 3 left MCC New York.\" The \nNortheast Regional Director, the Warden, and the Captain all told the OIG that if Inmate 3 had been \nremoved as Epstein's cellmate, they would have had to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to \nensure that Epstein was housed with an appropriate inmate. This selection process, which involved multiple \nsteps undertaken by high-level BOP management, would be difficult to accomplish in a short period of time \nand ultimately may have impeded SHU officers' ability to house Epstein with a cellmate on August 9, 2019. \n4. Lack of Candor \nBOP policy requires that \"[c]uring the course of an official investigation, employees are to cooperate fully by \nproviding all pertinent information they may have. Full cooperation requires truthfully responding \nto questions.\" \nAs discussed above, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge and the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told \nthe OIG that they notified supervisory personnel regarding the need to assign \n... [truncated, 3654 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/107 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=107]", "char_count": 3654}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "email identifying the cellmate requirement; and the statements of multiple witnesses who told the OIG that \nEpstein's cellmate requirement was widely disseminated verbally by MCC New York leadership. \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct Mandatory Rounds and Inmate Counts \nResulting in Epstein Being Unobserved for Hours Before His Death \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed that on August 9 and 10, 2019, MCC New York SHU staff did not \nconduct the mandatory rounds and inmate counts during their shift in the SHU. The failure to undertake \nthese required measures to account for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing—and the supervisors' failure to \nproperly supervise the SHU staff, as discussed further below—resulted in Epstein being unobserved for \nhours before his death, which compounded the failure of MCC New York staff to ensure that Epstein had an \nappropriate cellmate. \n1. Failure to Conduct Rounds and Inmate Counts in the SHU \nFederal regulations require that employees \"use official time in an honest effort to perform official duties.\"' \nAdditionally, BOP standards of conduct required that employees \"[c]onduct themselves in a manner that \nfosters respect for the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Government:1n Because \n\"[i]nattention to duty in a correctional environment can result in escapes, assaults, and other incidents,\" \nBOP standards of conduct also require employees \"to remain fully alert and attentive during duty hours.\" \nBOP policy also requires \"[c]ontinuous inmate accountability,\" which is accomplished through rounds and \ninmate counts!' Among other things, rounds and inmate counts enable staff to observe inmates and \nensure that they are safe and secure in their cells and are in good health. \nBOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders set out the requirements for these inmate accountability \nmeasures, specifying that correctional staff must conduct rounds on an irregular schedule at least twice \neach hour, no more than \n... [truncated, 3612 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/108 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=108]", "char_count": 3612}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "on the evening of August 9 and the morning of August 10. Noel told the OIG that she conducted the 10 p.m. \ncount on August 9. The OIG did not credit her statement based on: (1) its review of the SHU security \ncamera video, which reflects Noel walking up and down the stairs leading to some, but not all, of the tiers \nseveral minutes after the SHU inmate count had been called into the Control Center; (2) the 10 p.m. count \nslip, which erroneously included the SHU Inmate 4, who had been internally transferred to Receiving and \nDelivery; (3) other BOP records; and (4) the Material Handler's statement to the OIG that no one conducted \nthe 10 p.m. count because everyone was tired. \nInstead of performing the required duties to account for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing, the OIG found \nthat officers assigned to the SHU on August 9 and 10, including the Material Handler, Noel, and Thomas \nprimarily remained seated in the SHU Officers' Station—sometimes without moving for a period of time, \nsuggesting that they were asleep—and conducted a variety of Internet searches on MCC New York \ncomputers. Thomas also admitted to the OIG that he \"dozed off' for periods of time during his shift. The \nOIG's analysis of the SHU security camera video revealed that after approximately 10:40 p.m., no CO \nentered Epstein's tier in the SHU until just before 6:30 a.m. when Noel and Thomas began to serve breakfast \nto the inmates. \nThe OIG investigation and review concluded that the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material \nHandler, Noel, and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory rounds and inmate counts during their \nrespective shifts in the MCC New York SHU on August 9 and 10, 2019, and that their actions constituted \nviolations of S C.F.R. §§ 2635.101(b)(5) and 2635.705(a), BOP Program Statements 3420.11 and 5500.14, and \nMCC New York SHU Post Orders. \n2 False Statements and Lack of Candor \nThe OIG's investigation and review found that on August 9 and 10, 2019, the Evening Watch SHU\n... [truncated, 3648 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/109 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=109]", "char_count": 3648}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "inmate was accounted for.76 Only after all the count slips have been collected from each housing unit, and \nthe numbers on the count slips had been matched to the institution's overall inmate count sheet, could the \ninstitutional count be deemed \"cleared\" or completed. \nThe Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, Noel, and Thomas each prepared and/or \nsigned a false count slip to create the impression that they had fulfilled their inmate accountability \nresponsibilities when, in fact, they had not.J7 These individuals admitted to the OIG that instead of \nperforming their assigned duties, they pre-filled the count slips with the number of inmates they believed \nwere in the SHU based on what officers from the previous shift had told them and signed off on the \ndocuments knowing that they falsely attested to having completed the counts. Additionally, Noel admitted \nto the OIG that she had prefilled the official MCC New York forms documenting the times of the 30-minute \nrounds, often referred to as round sheets, and falsely attested to having completed the rounds!' \nNoel and Thomas were indicted by a grand jury for their false certifications of having conducted counts and \nrounds. Subsequently, each entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office \nfor the Southern District of New York. The U.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District of New York \ndeclined prosecution for the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and the Material Handler. \nThe OIG investigation has found that the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, Noel, \nand Thomas knowingly and willingly falsified BOP records in violation of federal law by attesting that they \nhad completed the mandatory rounds and inmate counts on the evening of August 9, 2019, and morning of \nAugust 10, 2019. \nAdditionally, as noted above, BOP policy requires employees to cooperate fully with an official investigation \nand truthfully respond to questions. The OI\n... [truncated, 3172 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/110 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=110]", "char_count": 3172}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "minimum elapsed time of on 'days off will be fifty-six (56) hours, except when the employee requests \nthe change.\" \nThe Material Handler told the OIG that on August 9 he reported for a voluntary overtime shift from 12 a.m. \nto 8 a.m. and then worked his regular 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift in the warehouse. At some point during the day \nshift, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, a higher ranking official, called and asked the Material Handler \nif he could work overtime in the SHU and he agreed. The Material Handler told the OIG that he felt \npressured to work the third shift, which resulted in him working 24 hours straight, from 12 a.m. on August 9 \nthrough 12 a.m. on August 10. As discussed previously, the Material Handler admitted to the OIG that on \nthe evening of August 9, during his third shift which he worked in the SHU, he did not conduct the \nmandatory inmate counts and rounds because he was too tired. \nThe OIG investigation and review concluded that the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant exercised poor \njudgment when he requested that the Material Handler work a third consecutive shift. As the Day Watch \nOperations Lieutenant, he had access to the staff roster and schedule and therefore he should have known \nthat the Material Handler had already worked 16 straight hours. Additionally, the Day Watch Operations \nLieutenant's action was inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement and did not reflect sound \ncorrectional judgment, as it would have been extremely difficult for the Material Handler to have effectively \nperformed his duties during his third shift. \n4. Clearing the 10 p.m. Institutional Count Knowing that It Was Inaccurate \nThe OIG's investigation and review determined that on August 9, 2019, MCC New York staff cleared the \n10 p.m. institutional count knowing that the inmate counts from two housing units were inaccurate. \nBOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders require that COs conducting an institutional count relay the \ncount verbally to the\n... [truncated, 3564 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/111 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=111]", "char_count": 3564}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "count. Senior Officer Specialist 6 explained that the action he took was known as \"ghost counting,\" \nsomething he said he would not have done without authorization from the Operations Lieutenant or \nsomeone of a higher rank than himself. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant denied having \nauthorized a \"ghost count\" and we found no evidence to corroborate Senior Officer Specialist 6's claim that \nthe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant knew of and approved the false count. \nThe OIG found that Senior Officer Specialist 6 modified the count slips received from the SHU and Receiving \nand Discharge, failed to request a recount of the SHU inmates, and cleared the 10 p.m. institutional count \nknowing that it was inaccurate in violation of BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders. \n5. Failure to Adequately Supervise SHU Staff and Conduct Lieutenant Rounds \nThe OIG also found that MCC New York supervisory personnel failed to effectively perform their duties, \nwhich contributed to the fact that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death. As discussed \nabove, federal regulations require that MCC New York supervisory personnel \"put forth honest effort in the \nperformance of their duties,\" which includes appropriate supervision of SHU personnel.81 Additionally, BOP \npolicy requires that a Lieutenant visit the SHU during each shift to ensure that all procedures are \nbeing followed.82\nThe OIG's investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant had oversight of the SHU during their respective shifts.83 The Evening Watch \nOperations Lieutenant told the OIG that on August 9, 2019, he did not supervise the 4 p.m. count or conduct \nany rounds in the SHU. He acknowledged that he signed some of the pages of the 4 p.m. count, but he did \nnot sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning at 10 p.m. on August 9, the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the SHU. The Mornin\n... [truncated, 3909 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/112 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=112]", "char_count": 3909}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "is inconsistent with the statements of many other supervisors and BOP Lieutenant training, all of which \nemphasized the need for Lieutenants to walk down all of the SHU tiers during a round. During their \ninterviews with the OIG, the Northeast Regional Director, the Warden, Associate Warden 1, and the Captain \nclarified that they expected a Lieutenant conducting a round in the SHU to check in with the officers, walk \ndown each of the tiers in the SHU, speak with inmates, and address inmate concerns. They explained that \nthe Lieutenants did not act responsibly if they did not walk down each of the tiers to check on the inmates in \nthe SHU. As the Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant explained, unlike inmates in general population, \nSHU inmates cannot approach a supervisor because they are confined within a cell. Further, the BOP \nLieutenant training, which the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant attended in 2011, taught that \nOperations Lieutenants were required to visit the SHU at least once during each shift and that \"[t]his visit \nwill be substantially more than just entering the unit, signing the log book, and talking with staff.\" Instead, \nOperations Lieutenants were trained to, among other things, walk through each range (or tier), inspect logs \nand reports, observe activities, and periodically observe counts within the SHU. \nThe OIG found that the failure of the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant to adequately supervise SHU staff, and of the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant \nto adequately conduct a Lieutenant round in the SHU, which contributed to the SHU staff's failure to \nconduct mandatory rounds and counts, constituted a job performance failure. \nC. \nMCC New York Staff Allowed Epstein to Place an Unmonitored Telephone Call on \nAugust 9 \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed that on the night before his death, Epstein placed an \nunrecorded, unmonitored telephone call using a non-Inmate Telephone S\n... [truncated, 3802 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/113 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=113]", "char_count": 3802}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "investigation established both that Epstein's mother was deceased at the time he asked to telephone her \nand that Epstein had been assigned the necessary documentation that would have allowed him to place \ncalls through the Inmate Telephone System, although he did not take the necessary steps to complete the \nsetup process that would have given him the ability to place calls through that system. The Captain told the \nOIG that when the Unit Manager was escorting Epstein from his attorney visit back to the SHU and Epstein's \nrequested call was discussed, he told the Unit Manager that Epstein's telephone call had to be monitored \nand logged. \nThe Unit Manager told the OIG that he escorted Epstein from his attorney visit to the shower area of the \nSHU, where he connected a telephone into an unrecorded legal line and dialed the phone number provided \nby Epstein. The Unit Manager said that when a male answered the call, he handed the telephone to Epstein, \nand then left MCC New York for the day because his shift had ended. Before leaving the SHU, the Unit \nManager said he told the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, and Noel, who were at \nthe SHU Officers' Station, to make sure Epstein got his 15 minutes on the telephone, but he did not instruct \nthem to monitor the telephone call. The Unit Manager admitted that he did not verify the recipient of the \ntelephone call, and that neither he nor anyone monitored or logged the telephone call as required. \nThe OIG found that the Unit Manager violated BOP policy by allowing Epstein to make an unrecorded and \nunmonitored telephone call, and by failing to verify the telephone call recipient, monitor, and log the call. \nWe further found that the Unit Manager exercised poor judgment when he left MCC New York while Epstein \nwas still on the telephone call that the Unit Manager had arranged and failed to instruct the Evening Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, or Noel to monitor the call. \nD. \nMCC\n... [truncated, 3760 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/114 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=114]", "char_count": 3760}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "TRUSCOPE, but that it was primarily the SHU Officer in Charge's responsibility to do so. The Evening Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that he and other staff members did not conduct any cell searches \nduring his shift in the SHU on August 9. Additionally, the OIG determined that there was an excessive \namount of bed linen within Epstein's cell. The Captain reviewed photographs of Epstein's cell and told the \nOIG that the excessive linens were a security issue because they could give inmates materials to fashion an \nimprovised noose or use as escape paraphernalia. \nThe OIG found that on August 9, 2019, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge either failed to conduct the \nrequired cell searches or failed to document the cell searches that he conducted in the SHU, and that the \nEvening Watch SHU Officer in Charge failed to ensure that MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU \nconducted cell searches and himself failed to log cell searches in violation of BOP policy and MCC New York \nSHU Post Orders. Additionally, the OIG found that it was a performance failure for the Day Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge, the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, and Noel, who served as the SHU Officer in \nCharge during their respective shifts on August 9 and 10, 2019, to have permitted Epstein to have an \nexcessive amount of linens in his cell. \nE. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that the Institution's Security Camera \nSystem was Fully Functional Resulting in Limited Recorded Video Evidence \nThis investigation and review revealed longstanding deficiencies with MCC New York's security camera \nsystem. These deficiencies resulted in nearly all of the cameras in and around the SHU where Epstein was \nbeing housed to not record video starting in late July 2019 and continuing through the date of Epstein's \ndeath on August 10, 2019. According to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death, on \nJuly 29, 2019, a disk failure in MCC New York's DVR 2 system caused approximatel\n... [truncated, 3597 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/115 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=115]", "char_count": 3597}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "MCC New York's failure to ensure that its security camera system was fully functional and make timely \nrepairs is consistent with the OIG's previous observations regarding weaknesses in the BOP's overall system \nof security cameras. Dating back to at least 2013, the OIG has repeatedly observed inadequacies in the \nBOP's overall system of security cameras, including inoperable cameras, an insufficient number of cameras, \npoor video quality, and inadequate video storage. In a 2016 report on the BOP's contraband interdiction \nefforts, the OIG identified specific deficiencies with the camera system, and recommended that the BOP \nevaluate the system to determine needed upgrades.88 In response to the 2016 recommendation, the BOP \nassessed the camera systems at each institution over the next several years and determined that 45 of its \n122 institutions, including MCC New York, required camera system upgrades. The BOP worked to upgrade \nthe systems at those 45 institutions between 2019 and 2021. In June 2021, the BOP reported that it had \nupdated all cameras at the 45 institutions with the latest software and equipment, and that it had installed \nadditional cameras to bolster surveillance. However, as reported in an October 2021 Management Advisory \nMemorandum issued to the BOP, the OIG analyzed the reported upgrades at the 45 institutions and found \nthat the BOP had addressed some but not all of the deficiencies described in the 2016 OIG report. In its \n2021 Management Advisory Memorandum, the OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive \nstrategic plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system. The BOP has provided the OIG with \na strategic plan that includes estimated cost projections and timelines for addressing the camera system \nconcerns and completing the system upgrades.89 As of 2023, the OIG's 2021 recommendation \nremains open. \nThe BOP's failure to address the issue of functional security camera systems across the agency and at \nindividua\n... [truncated, 3621 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/116 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=116]", "char_count": 3621}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "policy does not, however, describe how long the cellmate requirement should last or if any staff must \napprove the removal of the cellmate requirement. The Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement \n5324.08 does not describe any process or procedure that requires cellmate assignments for inmates coming \noff of suicide watch. The Warden stated there was no BOP policy mandating that an inmate coming off of \nsuicide watch have a cellmate, but that doing so was \"sound correctional judgment.\" \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed that there were knowledge gaps among MCC New York staff \nregarding Epstein's cellmate requirement, indicating that improved communication with institutional staff \nwould be beneficial. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP implement a requirement that all \ninmates coming off of suicide watch or psychological observation to be assigned cellmates with criteria for \nexceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations, provide guidance for determining \nwhen a cellmate is no longer required, and implement a process for approving, documenting, and \ncommunicating to institutional staff the assignment and removal of cellmates for these inmates. \n2. \nThe BOP should establish procedures to ensure inmates at high risk for suicide and for \nwhom a cellmate is recommended will continue to have a cellmate until the \nrecommendation is changed or rescinded, including establishing a contingency plan \nfor cellmate re-assignment, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular \nindividual or security considerations. \nThe OIG's investigation and review found that there was no contingency plan in place to assign Epstein a \nnew cellmate when his then-cellmate was transferred out of MCC New York. Although the failure to assign a \nnew cellmate was due, in part, to SHU staff failing to make required notifications and supervisory staff \nfailing to adequate supervise SHU staff, the gap in cellmate assignment was also due to the lack o\n... [truncated, 3661 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/117 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=117]", "char_count": 3661}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "MCC New York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states that inmates on psychological \nobservation will be continuously monitored by either an inmate companion or a staff member. \nA review of the Suicide Watch Chronological Logs for July 23, 2019, revealed Epstein was allowed to leave the \nsuicide watch room to visit with his attorneys for more than 6 hours. According to the Psychological \nReconstruction conducted by the Assistant Director of the Reentry Services Division, during Epstein's \npsychological observation on July 24 through July 30, 2019, Epstein was also allowed to visit with his \nattorneys between 8-11 hours each day without direct observation. Although the MCC New York \nsupplemental policy described an approval process for social and legal visits while an inmate is on suicide \nwatch or psychological observation, the OIG found no evidence that Epstein's legal visits were approved by \nthe Captain or an Associate Warden. Additionally, the BOP Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement \n5324.08 does not describe any process or procedures that allows an inmate to have legal or social visits \nwhile on suicide watch or psychological observation. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP evaluate \nits current process for such visits to be approved and documented. \n4. \nThe BOP should evaluate its methods of accounting for inmate whereabouts and \nwellbeing and make changes as may be appropriate to improve those methods \nthrough policy, training, or other measures. \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed many inmate accountability deficiencies. Most fundamentally, \nMCC New York staff assigned to the SHU on August 9 and 10, 2019, did not conduct many of the required \nrounds and inmate counts. Additionally, there was lacking or delayed documentation regarding inmates, \nincluding cell assignments and internal inmate transfers. Internal reports, such as the daily call out list and \nthe Lieutenant log, are either not retained or subject to contin\n... [truncated, 3235 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/118 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=118]", "char_count": 3235}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "6. \nThe BOP should continue to develop and implement plans to address staffing \nshortages at its prisons. \nSince at least 2015, the OIG has repeatedly found the need for BOP to address staffing shortages, including \nmedical staffing shortages.90 This investigation and review revealed the direct impact of staffing deficiencies \non inmate safety. For example, the Material Handler worked three consecutive shifts-24 hours straight—\non August 9, 2019, which was certainly a contributory cause to the lack of adequate means of accounting for \ninmate location and wellbeing in the SHU. The Material Handler told the OIG that no one did the 10 p.m. \nSHU inmate count because they were tired. Additionally, the OIG's investigation and review found that in \nconnection with MCC New York's upgrade of its security camera system, the BOP's Northeast Regional Office \narranged for technicians from other BOP institutions to perform temporary duty (TDY) assignments to MCC \nNew York to perform necessary mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and wiring work. Yet, during the course of \nthe TDY rotations, work was not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade because sometimes TDY \nstaff were used to cover shortages at MCC New York's custody posts. Without adequate staffing, the BOP \ncannot fulfill its mandate to ensure safe and secure correctional facilities. The OIG therefore recommends \nthat the BOP continue to develop and implement plans to address staffing shortages at its institutions. \n7. \nThe BOP should evaluate its cell search procedures and make changes as may be \nappropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training, or other measures. \nThe OIG's investigation and review found that there was an excessive amount of linens in Epstein's cell at \nthe time of his death. BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders require that SHU cells be searched, \nbut they do not specifically address the issue of excessive bed linens, which the Captain told the OIG \npresent a safety hazard be\n... [truncated, 3609 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/119 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=119]", "char_count": 3609}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "8. \nThe BOP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional security camera \nsystems to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have the capacity to \nrecord video and that BOP institutions must conduct regular security camera system \nfunctionality checks. \nAs discussed in the Conclusions section of this chapter, the OIG found that, even though the highest levels \nof leadership knew of the MCC New York security camera system's recurring deficiencies, prior to Epstein's \ndeath, no one was tasked with the responsibility of checking the security camera system on a routine basis \nto ensure that the system was functional. As a result, when on July 29, 2019, video from approximately half \nof the institution's security cameras was no longer being recorded, the problem went undetected for \n11 days. The OIG also found that there are no BOP policies that specifically state that security camera \nsystems must have the capacity to record or that institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure \nthe camera system is fully functional. Cameras that are failing to provide good quality or any live video \nstreams put the safety of BOP staff members and inmates at risk, and the lack of video recordings can \npotentially hinder investigations of wrongdoing by staff and inmates. The GIG therefore recommends that \nthe BOP enhance existing policies and protocols so they specifically state that all institutional security \ncamera systems must have the capacity to record, and that specified staff at each institution must conduct \nperiodic checks of the security camera system to determine its operational status and take corrective action \nas soon as possible when the system is found to be inoperable. Such routine checks would help ensure that \ncamera system malfunctions are detected and corrective actions are initiated in a timely manner. \n114 \nEFTA01656828\n", "char_count": 1893}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "Appendix A: The BOP's Response to the Draft Report \nU. S. Department of Justice \nFederal Bureau of Prisons \nCentral Office \nOffice of the Director \nWashington. DC 20534 \nMEMORANDUM FOR SARAH E. LAKE \nASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL \nINVESTIGATIONS DIVISION \nFROM: \nColette S. Peters. Director \nSUBJECT: \nJune 22, 2023 \nResponse to the Office of Inspector General's (O1G) Draft Report: \nInvestigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody. Care. \nand Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center \nin New York. New York \nThe Bureau of Prisons (BOP) appreciates the opportunity to formally respond to the Office of the \nInspector General's (O1G) above-referenced draft report. BOP values CMG's carethl review of the \nfacts and circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein and concurs with the \nrecommendations resulting from this engagement. The lessons learned during the course of this \nengagement will be applied to the broader BOP correctional landscape. \nThe facts and circumstances related to those few BOP employees at MCC New York in this \nreport reflect a failure to follow BOP's longstanding policies, regulations. and/or laws. While \nthis misconduct described in this report is troubling, those who took part in it represent a very \nsmall percentage of the approximately 35.000 employees across more than 120 institutions who \ncontinue to strive for correctional excellence every day. \nIn the Report, OIG makes recommendations to enhance BOP policies and practices and improve \naccountability. In response to this and previous OIG and Government Accountability Office \n(GAO) engagements, 13O13 has already begun to evaluate nationwide trends and strengthen \nemployee accountability. \n115 \nEFTA01656829\n", "char_count": 1757}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "O1O Official Draft Report: BOP's Care. Custody. and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at MCC New Yak, \nNew York \nJune 22, 2023 \nPage 2 of 3 \nIn April of this year, BOP's leadership announced its new mission as \"corrections professionals \nwho foster a humane and secure environment and ensure public safety by preparing individuals \nfor successful reentry into our communities.\" BOP's new core values include accountability, \nintegrity, respect, compassion, and correctional excellence. Of note, our core value of \naccountability requires 13O13 employees to be responsible and transparent to the public, \nourselves, and to those in our care and custody by the standards we establish, the actions we take, \nand the duties we perform. As reflected in our mission and core values, BOP is committed to \nproviding a safe environment for both employees and adults in our custody. \nRecommendation One: The BOP should implement a process for assigning a cellmate \nfollowing suicide watch or psychological observation, with criteria for exceptions based on the \nparticular individual or security considerations. \nBOP's Response: The BOP recognizes the importance of careful monitoring of adults in \ncustody who face mental health challenges and therefore concurs with this recommendation. \nOur practice is to carefidly consider both the well-being and safety of the individual involved \nand overarching safety and security concerns. In the years since Mr. Epstein's death, the BOP \nhas updated its process related to suicide watch and psychological observation. Under BOP's \nrevised process, upon removal from suicide watch or psychological observation, psychologists \nmake individualized care recommendations about clinical follow-up and other custodial \nconcerns, including housing and cellmates. Mental health, custody, and unit team employees \nwork collaboratively to ensure that each individual removed from suicide watch is housed \nappropriately. \nRecommendation Two: The BOP should establish procedures to \n... [truncated, 3397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/122 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=122]", "char_count": 3397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "OIG Official Draft Report: BOP's Care, Custody, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at MCC New York, \nNew York \nJune 22, 2023 \nPage 3 of 3 \nBOP's Response: The BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nRecommendation Four: The BOP should evaluate its methods of accounting for innate \nwhereabouts and wellbeing and make changes as may be appropriate to improve those methods \nthrough policy, training, or other measures. \nBOP's Response: The BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nRecommendation Five: BOP policy should clarify what is required of a lieutenant when \nconducting a round. \nBOP's Response: The BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nRecommendation Six: The BOP should continue to develop and implement plans to address \nstalling shortages at its prisons. \nBOP's Response: The BOP concurs with this recommendation. Hiring and retaining qualified \npersonnel is a key priority and BOP has developed and implemented a multi-pronged approach \nthat involves enhanced recruitment efforts and appropriate incentives. While the issues raised in \nthe OIG's report were the result of employees failing to adhere to their duties, as opposed to a \nstaffing shortage, the BOP welcomes the opportunity to continue the significant work that has \nalready been undertaken and that is ongoing regarding staffing. \nRecommendation Seven: The BOP should evaluate its cell search procedures and make changes \nas may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training, or other measures. \nBOP's Response: The BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nRecommendation Eight: The BOP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional \nsecurity camera systems to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have the \ncapacity to record video and that BOP institutions must conduct regular security camera system \nfunctionality checks. \nBOP's Response: The BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nThe BOP appreciates OIG's careful attention to this engagement, and its willingness to provi\n... [truncated, 2258 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/123 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=123]", "char_count": 2258}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "Appendix B: OIG Analysis of the BOP's Response \nThe Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Federal Bureau of Prisons \n(BOP), and the BOP's response is incorporated as Appendix A. The BOP indicated in its response that it \nagreed with all eight recommendations. \nThe following provides the OIG's analysis of the BOP's response and a summary of the actions necessary to \nclose the recommendations. The OIG requests that the BOP provide an update on the status of its response \nto the recommendations within 90 days of the issuance of this report. \nRecommendation 1: The BOP should implement a process for assigning a cellmate following suicide \nwatch or psychological observation, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular individual or \nsecurity considerations. \nStatus: Resolved. \nBOP Response: The BOP reported the following: \nThe BOP recognizes the importance of careful monitoring of adults in custody who face mental \nhealth challenges and therefore concurs with this recommendation. Our practice is to \ncarefully consider both the well-being and safety of the individual involved and overarching \nsafety and security concerns. In the years since Mr. Epstein's death, the BOP has updated its \nprocess related to suicide watch and psychological observation. Under BOP's revised process, \nupon removal from suicide watch or psychological observation, psychologists make \nindividualized care recommendations about clinical follow-up and other custodial concerns, \nincluding housing and cellmates. Mental health, custody, and unit team employees work \ncollaboratively to ensure that each individual removed from suicide watch is housed \nappropriately. \nOIG Analysis: The BOP's response is responsive to this recommendation. The OIG will consider whether to \nclose this recommendation after the BOP (1) provides for the OIG's review a proposed process for assigning \na cellmate following suicide watch or psychological observation, with criteria for ex\n... [truncated, 2813 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/124 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=124]", "char_count": 2813}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "individualized approach to the care and custody of adults in custody. Upon removal from \nsuicide watch or psychological observation, individualized care recommendations are made \nby psychologists, custody, and unit team for each individual. BOP thoroughly evaluates each \nceiling assignment on an individual basis for persons deemed to be at moderate to high risk \nfor suicide. \nOIG Analysis: The BOP's response is not fully responsive to this recommendation. Recommendation 1 \nfocuses on the process for assigning a cellmate following suicide watch and psychological observation. \nRecommendation 2, on the other hand, focuses on procedures to ensure that inmates at high risk for \nsuicide and for whom a cellmate is recommended continue to have a cellmate until the recommendation is \nchanged or rescinded. Our investigation and review determined that BOP employees did not take steps to \nensure that Jeffrey Epstein continuously had a cellmate in response to Psychology Department personnel \nhaving determined that he needed to have an appropriate cellmate, and absent any indication that security \nor other considerations relating to Epstein warranted his not having a cellmate. \nThe OIG will consider whether to close this recommendation after the BOP (1) develops the recommended \nprocedures; (2) provides the procedures to the OIG; and (3) implements the procedures. \nRecommendation 3: The BOP should evaluate its current process for obtaining and documenting \napproval for social or legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or psychological observation, \nwhich allows for institution-specific variations in the process, and provide guidance on standard \ncomponents that each institution should include in its process to mitigate security issues that can \narise when an inmate is on suicide watch or psychological observation. \nStatus: Resolved. \nBOP Response: The BOP reported the following: \nThe BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nOIG Analysis: The BOP concurred with this recomme\n... [truncated, 2900 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/125 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=125]", "char_count": 2900}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "OIG Analysis: The BOP concurred with this recommendation but did not provide any additional \ninformation. The OIG will consider whether to close this recommendation after the BOP (1) evaluates its \nmethods of accounting for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing; (2) makes any appropriate changes to \nimprove those methods through policy, training, or other measures; and (3) provides documentation of \nevaluation and any appropriate changes to the OIG. \nRecommendation 5: BOP policy should clarify what is required of a Lieutenant when conducting a \nround. \nStatus: Resolved. \nBOP Response: The BOP reported the following: \nThe BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nOIG Analysis: The BOP concurred with this recommendation but did not provide any additional \ninformation. The OIG will consider whether to close this recommendation after the BOP (1) updates its \npolicy to clarify what is required of a Lieutenant when conducting a round; (2) communicates the policy \nupdate to all relevant BOP employees; and (3) provides documentation of the policy update and \ncommunication to the OIG. \nRecommendation 6: The BOP should continue to develop and implement plans to address staffing \nshortages at its prisons. \nStatus: Resolved. \nBOP Response: The BOP reported the following: \nThe BOP concurs with this recommendation. Hiring and retaining qualified personnel is a key \npriority and BOP has developed and implemented a multi-pronged approach that involves \nenhanced recruitment efforts and appropriate incentives. While the issues raised in the OIG's \nreport were the result of employees failing to adhere to their duties, as opposed to a staffing \nshortage, the BOP welcomes the opportunity to continue the significant work that has already \nbeen undertaken and that is ongoing regarding staffing. \nOIG Analysis: The BOP's response is responsive to the recommendation. The OIG will consider whether to \nclose this recommendation after the BOP (1) develops and implements plans to address staffing shorta\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01656708/126 or ?id=EFTA01656708&page=126]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01656708", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "OIG Analysis: The BOP concurred with this recommendation but did not provide any additional \ninformation. The OIG will consider whether to close this recommendation after the BOP (1) evaluates its cell \nsearch procedures; (2) makes any appropriate changes to those procedures through policy, training, or \nother measures; and (3) provides documentation of evaluation and any appropriate changes to the OIG. \nRecommendation 8: The BOP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional security \ncamera systems to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have the capacity to record \nvideo and that BOP institutions must conduct regular security camera system functionality checks. \nStatus: Resolved. \nBOP Response: The BOP reported the following: \nThe BOP concurs with this recommendation. \nOIG Analysis: The BOP concurred with this recommendation but did not provide any additional \ninformation. The OIG will consider whether to close this recommendation after the BOP (1) enhances \nexisting policies regarding institutional camera systems to include the recommended language update; (2) \ncommunicates the policy update to all relevant BOP employees; and (3) provides documentation of the \npolicy update and communication to the OIG. \n121 \nEFTA01656835\n", "char_count": 1273}]}