{"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_count": 26, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01263246", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01263246.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nIN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA \nx \nC \n19 Misc. 149 (CM) \nSEALED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S APPLICATION TO MODIFY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER \nMcMahon, C.J.: \nThe Government has filed an application for modification of a March 18, 2016 pretrial \nprotective order, entered by the late Hon. \nin a civil defamation action, \nv. Maxwell, No. 15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y.) (\"the \nAction\"), in order to permit the law firm of \nBoles Schiller Flexner LLP (\"Boies Schiller\") to comply with a grand jury subpoena. \nThe application is granted. \nI. \nBackground \nA. \nThe Protective Order \nIn September 2015, \ncommenced a civil suit against Ghislaine \nMaxwell, alleging that Maxwell had defamed \nby stating that \nwas not the victim \nof sex crimes perpetrated by, among others, Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\"). (15-cv-\n7433, Dkt. No. I.) Boies Schiller represented the plaintiff in the litigation, and continues to \nrepresent her on a pending post-settlement appeal, which is described below. \nOn March 3, 2016, Maxwell moved before the assigned judge, the Hon. \nM , for entry of a protective order for materials produced in discovery. Maxwell cited \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_GM_00000875 \nEFTA_00114959 \nEFTA01263246\n", "char_count": 1298}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nstatutory and common law privacy concerns. (Dkt. No. 38 at 1.) Maxwell submitted a proposed \nform of order for Judge \nconsideration. (Dkt. No. 39-1.) \nrepresented that she \"[did] not oppose the entrance [sic] of a Protective Order in \nthis case, but [did] oppose a Protective Order in the form proposed by Defendant because it is \noverly broad and can lead to abuse and over designation[.]\" (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 40 at 2.) \nredlined Maxwell's proposed protective order, deleting some provisions and (insofar as \nis relevant) adding language to paragraph 4—stating that confidential information \"shall not be \ndisclosed or used for any purpose except the preparation and trial of this case\"—to provide that \nconfidential materials also could be disclosed with impunity \"in any related matter, including but \nnot limited to, investigations by law enforcement.\" (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 41-5 ¶ 4.) Maxwell \nopposed these modifications. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49.) \nAt a hearing held on March 17,2016, Judge \nconcluded that \"of course\" a \nprotective order was warranted. (Hrg. Tr., 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 66, at 4:25-5:1.) He gave no \nreason, but as Maxwell made her motion on the basis of privacy concerns, and \nconsented \nto entry of some form of a protective order for the same reason, I assume that Judge \nfound \nprivacy concerns to constitute good cause—which, given the subject matter of the lawsuit, would \ncertainly have been warranted. \nJudge \ndid not, however, resolve any of the disputes between the parties about what \nshould or should not be in the order. Instead, he directed the parties to come up with an \nagreement to which everyone could stipulate. (Id at 5:1-12.) By the end of the hearing, \nwho was eager to take Maxwell's deposition, agreed to the form of order originally proposed by \nMaxwell. (Id 9:7-24.) The court agreed that it would \"so order\" Maxwell's proposed version \n2 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSONY_GM_000001376 \nEFTA_00114960 \nEFTA01263247\n", "char_count": 1977}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \npursuant to the parties' stipulation. Judge \nmade no specific findings about any provision \nof that order. (Id 9:25-10:6.) \nOn March 18, 2016, the court formally entered the Protective Order. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. \nNo. 62.) It provided, as such orders generally do, that any documents, materials and/or \ninformation designated confidential by the parties (the \"Confidential Materials\") would be \nsubject to the protections of, and could be disclosed to non-parties only in accordance with the \nterms of, the Protective Order. (Id. 111-5.) The Protective Order also required all parties, at the \nconclusion of the case, either to return to the party who made the confidentiality designation, or \n(in the alternative) to destroy, each document and all copies of Confidential Materials in their \npossession. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 12.) This destruction obligation extended to the parties' lawyers as well \nas to the parties themselves. (Id. ¶ 12.) \nThe Protective Order specified that if Confidential Materials were contained in any \ndocument presented to the court, the filing \"shall be accompanied by a Motion to Seal pursuant \nto Section 6.2 of the Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions for the Southern District of \nNew York.\" (Id. ¶ 10.) The docket sheet in \nv. Maxwell reveals that such motions were \nfrequently made and routinely granted. As a result, a vast amount of the \nAction was \nconducted, in effect, in secret—despite the fact that there was immense public interest in the \nmatter. \nThe \nAction was settled and dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a joint \nstipulation for dismissal on May 25, 2017, which was shortly before the trial was to begin. (15-\ncv-7433, Dkt. No. 919.) The terms of the settlement remain confidential. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. \n953 at 10.) \n3 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_GM_00000877 \nEFTA_00114961 \nEFTA01263248\n", "char_count": 1854}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nB. \nAttacks on the Protective Order \nBoth during and after the settlement of the \nAction, third parties made highly-\npublicized applications to have documents that were filed under seal by order of Judge \nunsealed and made public. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. Nos. 362, 550, 935.) Harvard Law professor and \ncriminal defense lawyer Alan Dershowitz, whom \npublicly alleged of perpetrating sex \ncrimes alongside Epstein, moved to unseal a limited portion of the record in order to clear his \nname. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 364 at 1.) Alt-right activist and provocateur Michael Cemovich \nalso sought to unseal the papers filed as part of Maxwell's motion for summary judgment, \narguing, \"Cemovich Media cannot conduct its Forth [sic] Estate function if this Court allows the \nParties to conduct their dispute outside of the normal sunlight of transparency and accessibility.\" \n(15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 551 at 1.) The Miami Herald Media Company and investigative journalist \nJulie Brown, whose feature story about Epstein recently garnered significant public interest, also \nmoved post-settlement to unseal the entire record. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 936.) \nAll such applications were denied by Judge M. \n(15-cv-7433, Dkt. Nos. 439 (sealed), \n892, 953.) A consolidated appeal from the orders denying the unsealing motions is currently \npending before the Second Circuit. \nv. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (2d Cir.). On March 6, \n2019, the Court of Appeals heard argument on the consolidated appeal, which was widely \ncovered in the legal press. I think it is fair to say that during the argument, the panel seemed \ncritical of the district court's failure to make specific findings about why any particular document \nas to which unsealing was sought should remain sealed. For example, Circuit Court Judge Jose \nA. Cabranes stated that Maxwell's lawyer \"[couldn't] possibly be serious\" when he argued that \nno documents should be made public, even after the case had settled.' \nPriscilla DeGregory, Documents r\n... [truncated, 2239 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/3 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=3]", "char_count": 2239}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nShortly after the oral argument, the Court of Appeals issued an unusual order, giving the \nparties to the appeal ten days to explain why all papers submitted in connection with Maxwell's \nunsuccessful motion for summary judgment should not immediately be unsealed. (18-2868, Dkt. \nNo. 138.) The docket reveals that responsive filings were in fact delivered to the Court of \nAppeals; no further order has been entered in the Second Circuit. \nThe consolidated appeal relates only to the unsealing of what would, but for the \nProtective Order and Judge \nrepeated decisions to permit materials to be filed under seal \nand his refusal to unseal those materials on the motions of the Intervenors, be publicly available \nin the files of the court. They do not address materials that may be in the files of the parties or \ntheir counsel. \nC. \nThe Government's Application \nIn late November or early December 2018, the Government commenced an investigation \ninto Epstein and others for unlawfully trafficking minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, \n1594(c) and unlawfully enticing minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). (Sealed Aft: and \nAppl. of AUSA \ndated Feb. 5, 2019 (\"Gov't Appl.\"), Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 3.) \nAs part of that investigation, the Government issued a subpoena to Boies Schiller \n\"requiring the production of copies of discovery and related materials in [the \nAction].\" \n(Gov't Appl., ¶ 5.) These materials are arguably subject to the Protective Order. \nOn February 5, 2019, the Government made an ex parte, in camera application to Judge \nunder the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), seeking to relieve Boies Schiller from the \nProtective Order so that it could respond to the subpoena. The Government represented in that \napplication that Boies Schiller was willing to comply with the subpoena but for the Protective \n5 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_GM_00000879 \nEFTA_00114963 \nEFTA01263250\n", "char_count": 1919}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nOrder. (Letter from AUSA \nto the Hon. \ndated Feb. 28, 2019 \n(\"Gov't Letter Br.\"), Dkt. No. 2, at 1.) \nJudge \nasked for further briefing. On February 28, 2019, the Government \nsubmitted a letter brief in camera, to which it appended a copy of the Protective Order and a \nproposed order granting the relief requested. (See Gov't Letter Br.) Neither the initial \napplication nor the subsequent letter brief was initially filed with the Clerk of Court. \nPrior to ruling on the Government's application, Judge \ndied. The open application \nwas referred to me. \nI directed that a miscellaneous docket number be assigned to the Government's \napplication and that all materials theretofore sent to Judge \nchambers be filed under seal .2\nI also held two conferences in which I questioned the U.S. Attorney's Office about the \napplication. \nII. \nThe Government's Application, While Irregular, Is Granted \nA. \nProcedural Irregularities Attendant to This Application \nIn the ordinary course, one would expect this application to arise in a different procedural \nposture. \nFirst, one would have expected Boies Schiller, the recipient of the subpoena, to have \neither (1) moved for relief from the Protective Order, or (2) moved to quash the subpoena. See \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1225 (2d Cir. \n1991) (\"The proper procedure ... is . . . to subpoena the deposition transcripts for use in a \npending proceeding such as a grand jury investigation or trial, in which the issue could be raised \n2 \nAll materials under this docket number, 19-mc-149, including this opinion, will be kept under seal as \nrelated to a pending grand jury investigation. \n6 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_GM00000880 \nEFTA_00114964 \nEFTA01263251\n", "char_count": 1766}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nby motion to quash or modify the subpoena . .. or to seek permissive intervention in the private \naction.\") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d \nCir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the \nsubject of the subpoena, was the moving party). \nDuring the conference, the Government was not able to explain why it, rather than Boles \nSchiller, made the application. Boles Schiller is perfectly capable of protecting its own interests. \nThe law firm's failure to seek for itself permission to respond to the subpoena seems particularly \nmysterious in light of the fact that it has filed papers on behalf of \n, in both the district and \nappellate proceedings, supporting the intervenors' applications to unseal the entire record. See, \ne.g., Br. for Pl.-Appellee \nv. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, \n2018), ECF No. 83 at 1 (\"Ms. \n. is now prepared to have the world see what the record \ncontains.\"). I suppose that Boies Schiller might not want to seem too cooperative with the \nGovernment, especially if it is concerned about ending up as a defendant in a lawsuit alleging \nbreach of contract if it has failed to return or destroy the Confidential Materials in its possession. \nSee Aioi Nissay Dowa Ins. Co. v. ProSight Specialty Mgmt. Co., No. 12-cv-3274, 2012 WL \n3583176, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012). But that does not strike this Court as a reason for the \nGovernment to carry the firm's water—the moreso because Judge \nruled some months \nbefore he died that the intervenors' appeals in \nmeant the lawsuit had not \"concluded,\" \nand so had postponed the day when that contractual obligation kicked in. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. \n967 at 6.)3\n3 \nThis ruling came in respons \nion by Maxwell to compel \ncompliance with the document \ndestruction provision. It argued \nobligations thereunder were triggered at the time of settlement. (15-\ncv-7433, Did. Nos. 957.) Judge \ndenied tha\n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/6 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=6]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nAlternatively, the Government could have moved ex parte for permissive intervention in \nthe \nAction, and then sought modification of the Protective Order. Permissive \nintervention is the appropriate procedural device when any non-party seeks to modify a \nprotective order. AT&T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (\"We have \nstated that permissive intervention is the proper method for a nonparty to seek a modification of \na protective order\"); H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Siemens Med Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 \n(2d Cir. 1986) (\"[W]e continue to adhere to our holding in Martindell [v. International Tel. and \nTel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)), that 'this extraordinary writ [mandamus] would \nhardly be available . . . where the only purpose was to obtain modification of a pretrial order for \ninvestigative purposes.'\"). Or it could have filed a writ of mandamus, since \"mandamus lies to \ncompel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation,\" United \nStates v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the \nabove; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. It cites no authority for that \nprocedure. \nNonetheless, there is precedent in this Circuit for granting procedurally puzzling \napplications by the Government to unseal materials for use by a grand jury. For example, in \nDavis, 702 F.2d 418, the Government, which was not a party to the underlying civil litigation, \nsuccessfully \"moved the Bankruptcy Court for an order permitting it access to the materials \nunder seal,\" including transcripts of examinations taken under Rule 205 and exhibits marked at \nthose examinations. Id at 420-21. On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the defendant-\nappellants' argument that the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion in granting the \nGovernment's application: \"A court may direct access to such material upon a proper showing of \n8 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSO\n... [truncated, 2044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/7 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=7]", "char_count": 2044}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nneed. Here such a showing was amply demonstrated. To have refused acres% to these records in \nthe face of a subpoena from a grand jury would have been an abuse of discretion.\" Id at 423. \nI will, therefore, consider the Government's application. \nB. \nThe Martindell Standard Applies \nOrdinarily, \"Where there has been reasonable reliance by a party or deponent, a District \nCourt should not modify a protective order granted under Rule 26(c).\" S.E.C. v. TheStreet Com, \n273 F.3d 222, 229 (24 Cir. 2001). However, the Second Circuit established a limited exception \nto this rule in Martindell v. International TeL and Tel Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979). \nMartindell arose after the Government made an infonnal, telephonic request to the \ndistrict court in a stockholder derivative suit for access to deposition transcripts, which were \nsubject to a protective order and which the Government planned to use in a criminal \ninvestigation. Id at 293. The district court denied the Government's request to modify the \nprotective order to enable it to arons the transcripts. Id. Affirming the lower court, the Second \nCircuit reasoned that, when the Government moves to modify a protective order, it is especially \nappropriate to require a higher showing, because the Government both (i) possesses \nextraordinary police powers that it can use to obtain the information in other ways, and \n(ii) typically seeks the information \"in the context of a public investigation in which the assertion \nof a privilege might be of critical importance.\" In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 \nF.R.D. 559, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d \nat 295). The court concluded, \"After balancing the interests at stake, we are satisfied that, absent \na showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary \ncircumstance or compelling need, none of which appear here, a witness should be entitled to rely \nu\n... [truncated, 2162 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/8 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=8]", "char_count": 2162}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nand that such an order should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the \nGovernment's desire to inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal \ninvestigation[.]\" Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. \nSince Martindell, \"It is well-settled [in this Circuit] . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective order \nmay be overturned or modified [only] based on a finding of improvidence, extraordinary \ncircumstances or compelling need.\" Andover Data Sem, a Div. of Players Computer, Inc. v. \nStatistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080,1083 (2d Cir. 1989). Moreover, the Second Circuit \nhas held that Martindell applies to the Government, as well as to any other third party seeking to \nmodify a protective order. TheStreet Com, 273 F.3d at 229 n.7. \nThe Government argues that Martindell should not apply to the instant application, for \nthree reasons. (Gov't Letter Br. at 3-5.) \nFirst, it argues that the rule of Martindell is inapplicable because here the grand jury \nissued a valid and proper subpoena to Boies Schiller, while in Martindell the Government \"'was \nproceeding outside of its usual investigative powers to secure the requested testimony, not by \ngrand jury subpoena,' Davis, 702 F.2d at 422.\" (See Gov't Letter Br. at 3-4.) However, the \nstatement from Davis that is quoted above concerned the testimony of a non-party appellant \nwhose testimony was not subject to a Rule 26(c) protective order, but rather to an informal \n\"understanding of confidentiality\" that was never reduced to writing. Davis, 702 F.2d at 422. \nThe opinion underscored that the parties' unwritten understanding about the confidentiality of \nthis deponent's testimony would not trump a formal grand jury subpoena. That discussion is \nirrelevant to the question of whether this Court is required to apply the Martindell rule in \nevaluating this application. \n10 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_GM_00000884 \nEFTA_00114968 \nEFTA01263255\n", "char_count": 1935}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nSecond, the Government argues that Martindell does not apply when \"as here, the \nprotective order is on its face temporary or limited.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 4.) But the Protective \nOrder in this case is at least arguably not temporary or limited. It would have expired had the \ncase gone to trial, but, as the case settled, it appears to me to bind the parties permanently. It is \ntrue that nothing in the Protective Order seems to prevent either \nor Maxwell from \nmaking public documents that were designated confidential by that party once the lawsuit is \nover. However, as to documents designated confidential by the other party, the promise of \nconfidentiality plainly survives termination of the lawsuit—even to the point of requiring that \nthose materials be returned or destroyed. \nThird, the Government argues that applying Martindell to its application here \"would risk \nrendering [Martindell] in even further conflict with the well-reasoned decisions of numerous \nother Circuits.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 5 n.3.) Martindell is indeed an outlier; every other Circuit \nthat has considered the clash between protective orders and grand jury subpoenas has questioned \nits wisdom and has come up with a standard more favorable to the Government's position. See \ngenerally Dane L. Steffenson, Are Rule 26(c) Protective Orders Viable Against Grand Juries?, \n26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 183 (1996); 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2044.1 (3d ed. Nov. 2018). \nI happen to agree with the other Circuits, but Martindell is the law in this Circuit, and I am not at \nliberty to ignore it. \nThe Government argues that the Court should decline to analyze its request pursuant to \nMartindell in light of Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). \nLike this case, Chemical Bank arose in a somewhat unusual posture: a party to a protective order \nunilaterally approached the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, \"suggesting that it had \nevidence of criminal vio\n... [truncated, 2142 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/10 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=10]", "char_count": 2142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \na grand jury subpoena, with which the party (the defendant) complied. At no point did the \ndefendant seek relief from the protective order. Id. When the other party to the protective order \nlearned of the defendant's blatant disregard of its obligations, it moved for sanctions in the civil \naction. Id. \nThe district court condemned the defendant's behavior as \"entirely unnecessary and \ninappropriate,\" but nonetheless refused to sanction the defendant—apparently because, had the \ndefendant sought relief from that order, the judge would have granted its request. Id. at 93-94. \nWhile the Martindell factors were never mentioned expressly by the district court, Judge \nBroderick observed that the confidentiality order did not implicate \"technological trade secrets, \ncurrently sensitive customer lists, or contemporarily sensitive competitive information which \ncould benefit rivals\"-factors that, if present, he would have had more difficulty balancing \nagainst the investigative needs of law enforcement. Id at 94. \nThere are three reasons why Chemical Bank does not justify this Court's refusing to \napply the Martindell factors to the Government's application. First and foremost, the opinion of \nanother district judge does not trump an opinion from the Second Circuit. Second, while a reader \nof Chemical Bank cannot be certain whether the district court complied with Martindell, the \nlanguage quoted above certainly suggests that the district court engaged in the balancing exercise \nthat Martindell contemplated. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that the Government's \ninvestigation in this case was occasioned by Boies Schiller—a point to which I will return later \nin this opinion. \nThe Court will, therefore, analyze the Government's request in light of the Martindell \nfactors. \n12 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSON Y_GM_00000886 \nEFTA_00114970 \nEFTA01263257\n", "char_count": 1892}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nC. \nOn the Current Record, the Court Cannot Find That the Protective Order \nWas \"Improvidently Granted\" \nUnder Martindell, a Rule 26(c) protective order may be modified, for among other \nreasons, where a party can show \"improvidence in the grant.\" 594 F.2d at 296. While the \nGovernment has not moved for modification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the \ncurrent proceedings before the Second Circuit. \nThe term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 \nF.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit \"provided no guidance as to what \nmight constitute `improvidence in the grant of a . protective order\"'). To date, the Second \nCircuit has identified two ways in which an order might be considered \"improvidently granted.\" \nThe first is, essentially, that it was issued in bad faith. However, this is a high bar. For example, \na sealing order is \"improvidently granted\" where the presiding judge \"reasonably should have \nrecognized that [it] would facilitate or further criminal activity.\" Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66. \nBut there is absolutely no evidence that the district court harbored any such realization; indeed, \nat the time Judge \nentered the Order, it appeared that criminal activity against Maxwell and \nEpstein was a thing of the past.' Nothing in the record indicates that the entry of the Protective \n4 \nIn 2007, fmancier Jeffrey Epstein plead guilty to two prostitution charges in state court, arising from \nallegations that he \"assembl(ed] a large, cult-like network of underage girls—with the help of young female \nrecruiters\" (including Maxwell)—whom he coerced into performing sex acts \"behind the walls of his opulent \nwaterfront mansion,\" among other locations, \"as often as three times a day.\" Julie K. Brown, How ajiiture Trump \nCabinet member gave a serial sex abuser the deal of a *time, Miami Herald (Nov. 28, 2018), \nhttps://www.miamiherald.cominewsilocal/article220097825.html. The \n... [truncated, 3173 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/12 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=12]", "char_count": 3173}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nOrder itself facilitated or furthered criminal activity; and the record contains no evidence of bad \nfaith. \nThe second way in which a protective order might be \"improvidently granted\" is if the \npresiding judge did not require the moving party to show \"good cause\" for entering an order that \npermitted documents to be filed with the court under seal. It was long the law that the parties \nneeded to make a document-by-document showing of good cause whenever discovery materials \nwere filed with the court under seal. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 148 \n(2d Cir. 1987) (Agent Orange). \nIn recent years, however, the Second Circuit has relaxed the Rule 26(c) \"good cause\" \nshowing for discovery materials that are never filed with the court, in light of changes to the \nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure. TheStreet Com, 273 F.3d at 233 n.11. The new, more lax \nstandard recognizes that, \"Without an ability to restrict public dissemination of certain discovery \nmaterials that are never introduced at trial, litigants would be subject to needless annoyance, \nembarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.\" Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. \nMotorola, Inc., 165 F. App'x 878, 881 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order) (emphasis added) \n(quoting TheStreet Com, 273 F.3d at 229). \nAs a result, the \"good cause\" showing nereqsary for entry of a blanket pretrial protective \norder like the one entered in \nis not onerous. Dorsett v. Cty. of Nassau, 289 F.R.D. 54, 67 \n(E.D.N.Y. 2012). \"[W]here \"a protective order (1) is entered on a showing of good cause as \nrequired by Rule 26(c), (2) is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and (3) does not \nrestrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources,\" it is not improvidently \ngranted. Id (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984)); see also \nFragranceNetcom, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., No. 06-cv-2225, 2010 WL 11606632, at *4 \n14 \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_\n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/13 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=13]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \n(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) (order was not improvidently granted where \"parties were concerned \nabout exchanging commercially sensitive material with their direct competitors\"). In fact, at \nleast one district court in this Circuit has held that \"stipulated, umbrella confidentiality orders are \nnot per se improvident even if good cause was not shown.\" Intl Equity Invs., Inc. v. Opportunity \nEquity Partners Ltd., No. 05-cv-2745, 2010 WL 779314, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2010) \n(emphasis added), objections overruled, No. 05-cv-2745, 2010 WL 1459178 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, \n2010), affd, 415 F. App'x 286 (2d Cir. 2011). \nThe Protective Order entered by Judge \nwas certainly not \"improvidently granted\" \nunder the standard articulated in Dorsett. The Protective Order was granted on the basis of \nlegitimate privacy concerns on the part of both \nand Maxwell, as well as third parties. See \nIn re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. \n1994) (finding \"no showing of improvidence where the justifications for the Protective Orders \n[were] immediately apparent\"). Material turned over in discovery that was ultimately used at \ntrial would have been publicly available. (Protective Order 1 13 (\"This Protective Order shall \nhave no force and effect on the use of any CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION at trial in this \nmatter.\").) The Second Circuit may well be on the verge of making material used in connection \nwith the summary judgment motions publicly available, though of course I cannot predict what \norder will ultimately issue from the Court of Appeals. And there does not appear to be any \nproblem with the entry of a Protective Order that specifically contemplates case-by-case \nconsideration of whether materials filed with the court should or should not be sealed. \nI have no idea whether Judge \nmade the requisite fmdings in his decisions granting \nthe various motions to seal publicly-filed documents that were made in \nSee, e.g., \nT\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/14 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=14]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nstrong presumption against access to documents . . . we have held more recently in United States \nv. Amodeo, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.1995)(`Amodeo r ), that a subspecies of sealed documents \nin civil cases—so-called 'judicial documents'—deserve a presumption in favor of access.\") \n(emphasis in original). That, I gather, is the subject of the pending appeal. Press reports of the \noral argument suggest that perhaps the necessary findings might not have been made before \ncertain court filings were sealed. I cannot and will not pretend not to know that the issue is out \nthere. However, I know of no reason why it would have been improper to shield sensitive \nmaterials from public disclosure before any court filings were made. \nD. \nIf Any Party Relied on the Protective Order To Shield Confidential \nMaterials from Disclosure to Law Enforcement, That Reliance Was \nUnreasonable \nUnder Martindell, a court must consider the degree to which the party opposing unsealing \n(or, in this case, the party who could be expected to oppose unsealing) reasonably relied on the \nprotective order. \"Once a confidentiality order has been entered and relied upon, it can only be \nmodified if an 'extraordinary circumstance' or 'compelling need' warrants the requested \nmodification.\" F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) \n(internal quotation omitted). \nI will assume, for purposes of argument, that Maxwell would oppose releasing Boies \nSchiller from the terms of the Protective Order in order to accommodate the grand jury \nsubpoena; that is fairly obvious from her refusal to agree to a protective order that would have \npermitted Boies Schiller to comply with the subpoena without a court order authorizing \ncompliance. I further assume she would argue that she relied on the Protective Order in deciding \nwhether and how to comply with various discovery requests. The question to be decided is \nwhether such reliance was reasonable. \nI6 \nCONF\n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/15 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=15]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \n\"An examination of Second Circuit case law reveals the following factors are relevant \nwhen determining whether a party has reasonably relied on the protective order: (1) the scope of \nthe protective order; (2) the language of the order itself; (3) the level of inquiry the court \nundertook before granting the order; and (4) the nature of reliance on the order.\" In re Ethylene \nPropylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Ling., 255 F.R.D. 308, 318 (1:10. Conn. 2009). \nThe first factor—the scope of the Protective Order—favors granting the Government's \napplication for modification. As discussed, the Protective Order was \"a broad blanket order, \nstipulated to by the parties, which afforded the parties the discretion to designate whatever they \nproduced as 'confidential.'\" Nielsen Co. (U.S.), LLC v. Success Sys., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 83, \n120 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Blanket pretrial protective orders, drafted by the parties and \"so ordered\" \nby the court, are common. This case was no exception. \"A broad protective order is less likely \nto elicit reliance 'because it is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order \nin producing documents or submitting to a deposition.\" Id (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). \nThe second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself—similarly weighs in favor \nof modification. The Protective Order provided that confidential information could be used at \ntrial. (Protective Order, 11 4, 13.) As the Second Circuit has repeatedly held, a temporary or \nlimiting provision in a protective order undercuts a finding of reasonable reliance, because from \nthe outset there was the very real possibility that material produced in discovery would end up in \nthe public record. See, e.g., Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 147. The very fact that material would \nhave to be unsealed for trial undercuts a finding of reliance. \nAdditionally, where material contained in court filings is concerned, any expectation of \nconfidentia\n... [truncated, 2246 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/16 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=16]", "char_count": 2246}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "To Be Ned Under Seal \nwhile the Protective Order also had a permanent aspect about it—Le., it provides for the return or \ndestruction of documents upon conclusion of the case (see Protective Order ¶ 12)-this provision \nneither trumped the law concerning the public's right of access to materials filed in court, nor \nspecifically required the designating party to maintain confidentiality over its own designated \nmaterials once the Protective Order expired. (See Id.) \nOf course, this case contains an unusual fact that might seem to render Maxwell's \nreliance on a blanket Protective Order reasonable, as against even disclosure pursuant to a grand \njury subpoena. We know that Maxwell refused to agree to any Protective Order containing a \nprovision that is customary in all the protective orders entered by this Court: a provision \npermitting the production of confidential materials to law enforcement without further order of \nthe court. (See Def.'s Reply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. \n49 at 5.) This might seem ironic, since Maxwell argued, in support of her motion for entry of a \nprotective order, that prosecution of anyone based on \nallegations was unlikely. (Id) \nBut whether prosecution seemed likely or not, Maxwell did indeed bargain for such a provision; \nand for whatever reason, \nand Boies Schiller agreed to it. \nHowever, the Protective Order entered by Judge \ncontains a provision that permits \nthe court to order disclosure of Confidential Material in circumstances other than those listed in \nParagraph 5 (a)—(h). See Protective Order ¶ 5 (\"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION shall not, \nwithout the consent of the party producing it or further Order of the Court, be disclosed[.]\") \n(emphasis added). All the list of exceptions at subparagraphs 5(a) through (h) does is indicate \nwhen there is no need for the opponent's consent or a court order before disclosure can be made. \nAs the Protective Order plainly gives the court the power to enter an \n... [truncated, 2177 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/17 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=17]", "char_count": 2177}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nabsence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from \na grand jury's scrutiny. As the court reasoned in EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 321, language stating that \nthe party receiving designated confidential information \"shall not use or disclose the information \nexcept .. . by such orders as may be issued by the Court during the course of this litigation\" did \n\"not lend itself to reasonable reliance that [the Protective Order] will afford permanent secrecy.\" \nSee also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), where, in view \nof a provision that said, \"This Confidentiality Order shall not prevent anyone from applying to \nthe Court for relief therefrom,\" the Second Circuit held, \"Given this provision, it is difficult to \nsee how the defendants can reasonably argue that they produced documents in reliance on the \nfact that the documents would always be kept secret.\" \nThird, there is no evidence before me indicating that the court undertook any sort of \ndetailed inquiry prior to entering the Protective Order. (Hrg. Tr., 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 66 at \n4:25-5:12.). Obviously, I was not there, but I have reviewed the transcript of the argument on \nthe motion for a protective order, and it seems clear that the parties were given ample discretion \nto designate discovery materials as confidential, with virtually no oversight unless those \nmaterials were to be filed with the court—in which case a motion for sealing had to be made.5\n(Protective Order ¶ 10); of Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 122 F.R.D. 433, \n435 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining to enforce protective order where \"the protective order did not \nadjudicate the appropriateness of confidentiality as to particular items of discovery\"). The fact \n\"The question about a protective order, of course there should be a protective order in this case. You are \ngood lawyers, and you have been around this track more times than I have \n... [truncated, 2695 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/18 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=18]", "char_count": 2695}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nthat confidentiality originated with the consent of the parties, and not with a judicial \ndetermination that the materials at issue were deserving of protection, militates against a finding \nof reasonable reliance. \"[C]ourts have been reluctant to find reliance, or that reliance was \nreasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the \nparties.\" In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). \nAs for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh \nagainst modification. \"The classic situation in which a party `relies' on a protective order is \nwhere the party creates material during the course of the litigation on the understanding that it \nwill be kept confidential—for example, by .. . giving confidential testimony.\" Allen v. City of \nN.Y., 420 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The record shows that \nlikely could \nnot have secured Maxwell's deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court \ninvolvement—without the Protective Order.6 Maxwell specifically mentioned \"the specter of \nsome theoretical prosecution\" when arguing in support of the entry of her version of the \nProtective Order. Although, as noted above, she discounted the likelihood of any such \nprosecution (see supra, at 18.), she argued that, \"A witness adverse to Plaintiff would be \nreluctant to testify and may be bullied into asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid the \npotential of information being forwarded to a prosecutor by the Plaintiff or her lawyers.\" (Def.'s \nReply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5); cf. Minpeco \nS.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1987) (\"[O]ne of the primary \nreasons the protective order was originally entered was to prevent plaintiffs from using the threat \n6 \nI cannot possibly second guess how Judge \nran this litigation; he had far more experience tha\n... [truncated, 2580 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/19 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=19]", "char_count": 2580}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nof turning over their discovery to the government in order to coerce a settlement\"). The parties \nalso settled just a short time before trial; such a settlement could have been occasioned, at least in \npart, to avoid the public disclosure of any confidential materials. \nHowever, the only thing on which Maxwell or anyone else might reasonably have relied \nis that \nor her lawyers would not do what the defendant in Chemical Bank did—that is, \nforward discovery materials in their possession to prosecutors for the purpose of fomenting an \ninvestigation. But I am not faced with that situation. Nothing in this record suggests to me that \nor Boies Schiller had anything to do with the Government's decision to convene a grand \njury to look into the matters that were the subject of the \nAction. On the contrary—the \nGovernment has advised the Court that it contacted Boies Schiller as part of its search for parties \nwho might have been victims in its investigation; and that Boies Schiller told the Government \nthat it could not consensually produce at least some documents in its files because of the \nexistence of the Protective Order. There is no evidence of \"collusion,\" to invoke a term of the \nmoment, and it is quite clear that Boies Schiller did not foment the Government's investigation. \nMoreover, the Assistant United States Attorney has represented to this Court that he has no idea \nwhat is in Boies Schiller's files, and that for all he knows every witness who was deposed stood \non his/her Fifth Amendment rights and refused to answer questions. \nThe literal terms of the Protective Order permit the court to authorize the release of \nConfidential Materials by parties to the Order \"for good cause shown.\" (Protective Order, 1 14.) \nAny party who read the order had to be aware that it contained no promise that Confidential \nMaterials would forever be withheld from a prosecuting agency—especially where, as here, a \nduly empowered grand jury seeks their prod\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/20 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=20]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nThis decision accords with those of other courts in this Circuit. \"Where a protective \norder contains express language that limits the time period for enforcement, anticipates the \npotential for modification, or contains specific procedures for disclosing confidential materials to \nnon-parties, it is not reasonable for a party to rely on an assumption that it will never be \nmodified.\" EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 320. More to the point, \"Uncertainty about the ultimate \noutcome of a protective order will mean that no deponent may always effectively rely on a \nprotective order to secure his right against self-incrimination.\" Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d \nat 1084 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988)). \nBecause Maxwell's reliance on the Protective Order to shield her from the court-ordered \ndisclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the \nCourt may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application. \"Where a litigant or \ndeponent could not reasonably have relied on the continuation of a protective order, a court may \nproperly permit modification of the order. In such a case, whether to lift or modify a protective \norder is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.\" TheStreet.Com, 273 \nF.3d at 231 (internal quotation omitted); accord Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, \n142 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (\"If reliance would be unreasonable, it is within the discretion of the court \nto vacate or modify a protective order.\"). \nFor the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that modification of the Protective Order \nis appropriate to aid law enforcement. \nE. \nThe Government Has Shown \"Extraordinary Circumstances\" That Warrant \nModification of the Protective Order \nThe Government has persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, which \nwould entitle it to modification in any event. \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSONY_GM_00000896 \nEFTA_00114980 \nEFTA01263267\n... [truncated, 2001 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/21 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=21]", "char_count": 2001}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nThe term \"extraordinary circumstances\" is not well defined. See Talco Contractors, Inc., \n153 F.R.D. at 511. However, the Second Circuit has recognized that this requirement may be \nmet in circumstances involving significant public interest, particularly where no good cause \nshowing was made to the court initially. See Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 148 (\"exceptionally \npervasive protection granted appellants during the pretrial stages of this litigation, coupled with \nthe fact that appellants never were required to show good cause,\" as well as the fact that there \nwas \"enormous public interest in the Agent Orange litigation,\" demonstrated extraordinary \ncircumstances); but see Ionosphere Clubs, 156 B.R. at 435 r(Mjere breadth\" of a protective \norder does not, by itself constitute \"extraordinary circumstances.\"). Indeed, some district courts \nin this Circuit go one step further, holding that \"The heightened Martindell 'extraordinary \ncircumstances' standard . .. is not appropriate in cases with stipulated protective orders that grant \nparties open-ended and unilateral deference to protect whichever discovery materials they \nchoose.\" EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 321. \nHere, as discussed, no party was required to make a good cause showing before \ndesignating any particular discovery materials as confidential. Moreover, there is significant \npublic interest: the Government has convened a grand jury to investigate a serious crime \n(potentially involving multiple victims), which from its inception has garnered extensive \npublicity, and which (most recently) includes troubling allegations of misconduct on the part of \nGovernment officials, including a then-United States Attorney who is now a member of the \nPresident's Cabinet. The Court agrees with the Government that, because the investigation is not \npublicly known, \"the ordinary exercise of grand jury power [i.e., to subpoena witnesses to testify \nand to produce documents] . . . would implicate and invite the\n... [truncated, 2201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/22 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=22]", "char_count": 2201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \ndestroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the Investigation—\nthat caused the Government to proceed via subpoena [to Boies Schiller] and its related \nApplication.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 5.) \nTo be sure, the convenience of having potentially incriminating testimony readily \navailable does not in and of itself rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance. In \nMartindell itself, for example, the Second Circuit found no extraordinary circumstance because \n\"the Government, by discharging the grand jury investigating the matters in connection with \nwhich the Government sought the witnesses' deposition transcripts, apparently chose not to use \ngrand jury investigative processes to obtain their testimony.\" 594 F.2d at 296 n.5. Therefore, \nthe mere unavailability of the information was not extraordinary. Similarly, in Nosik v. Singe, 40 \nF.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1994), the Circuit again declined to find that the Government had made a \nshowing of extraordinary circumstance, explaining, \"[T]he possibility that [an individual] might \none day invoke the Fifth Amendment at her criminal trial does not automatically create for \nprosecutors a compelling need for the testimony that [the individual] might have given [in the \ncivil proceeding] . . . [.] Prosecutors often make do without the testimony of a defendant.\" Id at \n595-96 (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296). \nHere, however, the extraordinary amount of publicity surrounding all aspects of what 1 \nwill call the Epstein matter does create practical limitations to the grand jury's ability to secure \ncertain information with the secrecy it requires to conduct an appropriately thorough and \nthoughtful investigation. Moreover, it does not appear to this Court that we are in a situation in \nwhich the Government seeks information merely to \"ascertain the truth of much of what it has \nindependently discovered.\" Minpeco, 832 F.2d at 743. This is not a case, like United States v. \nOsh\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/23 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=23]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nto use at a trial, rather than seeking information as part of a criminal investigation or grand jury \nproceeding. See also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97-cv-7587, 1998 WL 88745, at \n*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (\"[T]he Government may not use its `awesome' investigative \npowers to seek modification of a protective order merely to compare the fruits of . . . discovery \nin a civil action with the results of a prosecutorial investigation in a criminal action.\"). \nAdditionally, the Government is not on a fishing expedition, merely hoping to inspect the \nprotected materials for possible use in a future criminal investigation. In Martindell, 594 F.2d at \n296, the Second Circuit concluded that the purported public interest in obtaining all relevant \nevidence was less than compelling in view of the Government's subpoena power. Here, \nhowever, a grand jury that is presently conducting an investigation has issued a subpoena for the \nproductionpf documents as part of an ongoing investigation. The Government's interest is \nbolstered when the request is made by a grand jury, rather than informally by the United States \nAttorney. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 94 \nn.4 (2d Cir. 1993). The Government's application is therefore based on more than a desire to \n\"exploit° . the fruits of private litigation.\" Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. And the fact that the \nrequest comes from a grand jury, whose proceedings arc by law conducted in secret, In re \nPetition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1997), gives Maxwell the degree of protection that \ncould reasonably be expected in the context of a criminal investigation. \nFinally, while in other circumstances the breadth of the subpoena might be troubling, \nhere the Government is in no position to narrow its request, because the \nAction was \nlitigated entirely almost under seal. Cf. Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, \n1991, 945 F.2d at 1223 (notin\n... [truncated, 2221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263246/24 or ?id=EFTA01263246&page=24]", "char_count": 2221}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263246", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "To Be Filed Under Seal \nCircuit—even before a final order disposing of the intervenors' appeal—has been critical of that \nfact, and has demanded an explanation for why it should not immediately unseal at least the \nmaterials filed in connection with the motion for summary judgment, lends force to the \nGovernment's request, despite its breadth. \nFor these reasons, the Government has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances \nwarranting a modification of the Protective Order. \nIII. \nConclusion \nFor the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Government's application to \nmodify the Protective Order, in order to pemiit Boies Schiller to comply with the subpoena. \nThe Clerk of Court is ORDERED to file this memorandum opinion and order under seal. \nThe Clerk of Court is also respectfully requested to close the open application at Docket \nNumber 2. All materials in this matter, 19 Misc. 149; are ORDERED to be kept under seal until \nfurther notice. \nDated: April 1 \n2019 \nBY HAND TO AUSA \n26 \nChief Judge \nCONFIDENTIAL \nSDNY_GM_00000900 \nEFTA_00114984 \nEFTA01263271\n", "char_count": 1074}]}