{"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_count": 6, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01263240", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01263240.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nThe Silvio J. Mono Building \nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza \nNew York. New York 10007 \nFebruary 28, 2019 \nTO BE FILED UNDER SEAL \nVIA EMAIL \nThe Honorable Robert W. Sweet \nUnited States District Court \nSouthern District of New York \nUnited States Courthouse \nNew York, New York 10007 \nRe: \nIn re Application to Unseal Civil Discovery Materials, USAO No. 2018R01618 \nDear Judge Sweet: \nThe Government writes respectfully in connection with its sealed application and proposed \norder pursuant to the All Writs Act, Title 28, United States Code, Section 1651, for a limited order \nto unseal discovery materials in the possession of Boies  Schiller & Flexner LLP \n(the \"A\n in connection with the matter \nv. Ghislaine Maxwell, et at \n(a\"), \n15 Civ. 7433 (RWS) (the \"Litigation\"), a copy of which is enclosed as Exhibit A. \nBackground \nAs described in the Application, the Government has served a grand jury subpoena \n(the \"Subpoena\") upon Boies Schiller & Flexner (\"Boies Schiller\") requiring the production of \ncopies of discovery and related materials related to the Litigation. The Subpoena was validly \nissued pursuant to an ongoing investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and others, for possible violations \nof Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591 and 1594(c) (unlawfully trafficking minors) and \nSection 2422(b) (unlawfully enticing minors) (the \"Investigation\"). The production of materials \npursuant to the Subpoena is solely for the purposes of the Investigation, and is subject to the \nprotections and restrictions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). \nThe Government has been advised that Boies Schiller, which is counsel for plaintiffs in the \nLitigation, does not intend to contest the Subpoena. However, the Government is advised that \nalthough Boies Schiller would not otherwise contest compliance with the Subpoena, it believes \nthat a protective order entered in the Litigation (the \"Protective Order\") may preclude com\n... [truncated, 2223 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263240/0 or ?id=EFTA01263240&page=0]", "char_count": 2223}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Page 2 \nDiscussion \nWhere, as here, a grand jury subpoena has validly issued, and the recipient of the subpoena \nis not contesting compliance—but rather seeking authorization to comply with the subpoena—a \ncourt should grant such permission through limited modification of an applicable protective order, \nabsent countervailing interests not present in this case. As described below, a court can and should \nmodify a protective order, or permit limited relief from it, to allow the recipient of a grand jury \nsubpoena to comply with such a subpoena under the circumstances presented here. \nThe Court is best guided by the decision in Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 \nF.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), which rejected an application for a party in civil litigation to be held \nin contempt for complying with a grand jury subpoena despite the existence of a protective order, \nwithout first obtaining authorization from the court, because the court would have granted such \nauthorization had it been sought. Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. As that court explained: \nThe role of the federal courts in law enforcement, exemplified by \nthe Federal Criminal Code (Title 18, USC) and in enforcing Grand \nJury subpoenas argues in favor of making significant information \navailable to enforcement authorities absent a countervailing \nshowing that the need for the information for such purposes is \noutweighed \nby the need for protecting expectations of \nconfidentiality under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). \nId. at 94 (citing United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that the \n\"conflict between protection of private material used in a civil proceeding and public need in a \ncriminal prosecution\" posed in that case was \"easily resolved\" and explaining that \"[a]bsent \napplicable grounds for exception, such as a previously asserted Fifth Amendment privilege, no \nshiled protects the civil evidence\" in that case \"from compellable production before the grand jury \nwhich subpoenaed i\n... [truncated, 3471 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263240/1 or ?id=EFTA01263240&page=1]", "char_count": 3471}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Page 3 \nIndeed, the Chemical Bank opinion specifically rejected judicial protection for the type of \ninformation the Protective Order appears to cover in the Litigation: \nAvoiding embarrassment may be a reason for a party to seek \nconfidentiality. It is not by itself a valid reason for courts to uphold \nconfidentiality as against a legitimate law enforcement need for the \ninformation. Courts must honor restrictions laid down by the Fourt \nor Fifth Amendment or applicable statutes. But aside from those \nrestrictions, hiding possible criminal violations from law \nenforcement authorities is hardly a ground for judicial protection of \nconfidentiality. \nChemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 94 (emphasis added). Although parties may rely on confidentiality \nagreements and protective orders generally, such classification \"is not binding on the court\" and \nthe \"risk of disclosure is well known to the Bar, in part because disclosure may be required where \nsuch information is needed for judicial decisions, to the basis for which the public should have \naccess. Id. (collecting cases). \nUnder some circumstances, courts in this Circuit have applied a balancing test to evaluate \nthe government's ability to obtain access to materials covered by a protective order. Specifically, \nin Martindell v. International Tel. and TeL Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), the government \ninformally—and without use of a grand jury subpoena—sought access to discovery materials from \na civil litigation. The Court held that the Government was not entitled to the materials unless it \ncould show either that the protective order was improvidently granted or some extraordinary \ncircumstance or compelling need for the material; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces \nTecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991 (\"Subpoena Duces Tecum\"), 945 F.2d 1221, 1224 (2d Cir. 1991) (in \nconnection with bankruptcy proceeding, and citing Martindell, vacating denial of a motion to \nquash a grand jury subpoena seeking production of documents su\n... [truncated, 3536 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263240/2 or ?id=EFTA01263240&page=2]", "char_count": 3536}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Page 4 \nMartindel I, the district court opined that had the Government obtained judicial relief to issue an \nuncontested subpoena for \ndocuments—precisely the scenario here—such relief would be \nappropriate. Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 94. \nSecond, any presumption against modification of a protective order is unreasonable where, \nas here, the protective order is on its face temporary or limited. Such protective orders \"that are \non their face temporary or limited may not justify reliance by the parties [and] in such \ncircumstances reliance may be unreasonable.\" S.E.C. v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230-31 (2d \nCir. 2001). \"Where a litigant or deponent could not reasonably have relied on the continuation of \na protective order\"—for example, where such an order was limited to the pretrial stages of \nlitigation—\"a court may properly permit modification of the order.\" Id. (citing In re \"Agent \nOrange\" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Alien v. City of New York, \n420 F.Supp.2d 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Mag. J. Gorenstein) (analyzing the differently-situated \ninterests of civil litigants but where, as here, the relevant protective order specified that a party \ncould object to the designation of a document as confidential, and was also temporary or limited \non its face). In such a case, \"'[w]hether to lift or modify a protective order is a decision committed \nto the sound discretion of the trial court.\"' TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 231 (modification in \noriginal) (citing In re Agent Orange, 821 F.3d at 147) (additional citations omitted). Here, the \nparties in the Litigation explicitly contemplated the public disclosure of such information at trial \nby the very terms of the Protective Order, thereby establishing precisely the kind of temporal limit \ndescribed above. See Prot. Order at 5 (\"This Protective Order shall have no force and effect on \nthe use of any CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION at trial in this matter.\"). The parties could not \nhave—as,\n... [truncated, 3816 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263240/3 or ?id=EFTA01263240&page=3]", "char_count": 3816}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Page 5 \npersons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege is particularly applicable \nto grand jury proceedings.\") (citations omitted).;\nFinally, even were the Court to apply the Martindell test here,4 despite the significant \ndistinguishing factors described above, this Investigation is a paradigmatic example of \nextraordinary circumstances. In the first instance, unlike in Subpoena Duces Tecum, the posture \nof the Application does not involve a motion to quash. Of course, should this Court permit Boies \nSchiller to respond, Boies Schiller would have the right to move to quash—including, for example, \nif a grand jury subpoena made any improper requests, such as for materials subject to privilege. \nBut it is not anticipated that Boies Schiller will do so. \nAdditionally, as set forth in the Application, the existence and scope of the Investigation \nin this district is not publicly known. While counsel for certain victims are aware of the \nInvestigation, neither Epstein nor other subjects of the investigation are believed to be similarly \naware. Accordingly, the ordinary exercise of grand jury power to \"subpoena witnesses to testify, \nregardless of whether they have already testified or furnished documentary evidence in civil \nlitigation,\" Martindell, 594 at 296, would implicate and invite the very risk of disclosure—and the \npossibility of alerting potential criminal targets that they are under investigation, causing them to \ndestroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the Investigation—that \ncaused the Government to proceed via subpoena and its related Application. Cf. Subpoena Duces \nTecum, 945 F.2d at 1224 (in which the party that moved to quash the relevant subpoena argued \nthat the government could not meet its burden of showing need for deposition testimony until it \nhad at least called the witness before the grand jury). \nThe subject matter of the Litigation also demonstrates the extraordinary circumstance\n... [truncated, 3898 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263240/4 or ?id=EFTA01263240&page=4]", "char_count": 3898}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01263240", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Page 6 \nChemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 94 (describing such materials a \"technological trade secrets, \ncurrently sensitive customer lists, or contemporarily sensitive competitive information which \ncould benefit rivals\"). Rather, the Government seeks materials that relate to among the gravest \ncriminal offenses it investigates—the sexual exploitation of minors—which materials, if revealed, \nwould tend to inculpate and/or embarrass some parties to the Protective Order. Indeed, by the very \nterms of the Protective Order, the confidential materials appear to be of the category for which \n\"[a]voiding embarrassment . . . is not by itself a valid reason for courts to uphold confidentiality \nas against a legitimate law enforcement need for the information.\" Id.; see also Prot. Order at 2 \n(designating as \"confidential\" only information that is \"confidential and implicates common law \nand statutory privacy interests of\" the plaintiff and defendant\"). \"Aside from those restrictions \n[laid down by the Fourth or Fifth Amendment or applicable statutes], hiding possible criminal \nviolations from law enforcement authorities is hardly a ground for judicial protection of \nconfidentiality.\" Chemical Bank, 15 F.R.D. at 94. \nFinally, this is unlike a case in which the contours of the civil litigation are publicly \napparent. Cf. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1223 (noting that a \"lengthy report\" of the \nbankruptcy examination in that case \"was made available to the public\"). In Subpoena Duces \nTecum, for example, not only was the government apparently unconcerned with the confidentiality \nof the grand jury investigation, but the government knew from a lengthy public report precisely \nwhat it might replicate through a grand jury investigation. Id. Not so with respect to the Litigation, \nwhich resulted in no such report, no trial, and limited public filings. \nFor all of these reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the Application, the Government \nrespectfully requests that the Court g\n... [truncated, 2208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01263240/5 or ?id=EFTA01263240&page=5]", "char_count": 2208}]}