{"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_count": 12, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01206074", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01206074.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 1 of 12 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRNJOHNSON \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2, \nPlaintiffs \nv. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nDefendant \nINTERVENORS' REPLY To JANE DOES' RESPONSE \nOPPOSING A PROTECTIVE CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER \nINTRODUCTION \nGiven that the parties are first focused on litigating the circumstances regarding whether \nthere was a sanctionable violation of the CVRA, the portion of the correspondence authored by \nEpstein's counsel to the government, foreseeably, is irrelevant to the resolution of this issue for it \nwas only the government, not Epstein, who had obligations under the statute. The theory that \nEpstein was responsible for the government's construction and implementation of the CVRA is \naddressed herein. In short, it is neither rational nor true to suggest that the U.S. Attorney and \nthen the Department of Justice — which extensively reviewed the non-prosecution agreement \n(\"NPA\") during the months between its September 2007 execution and its June 30, 2008 \nfinalization with Epstein's state plea — were acting, during this time period or during any other, \nimproperly or corruptly or were engaged in a \"deliberate conspiracy\" in any way by \nadvocating, in this case and on a nationwide basis, the same construction of the CVRA that \nEpstein's counsel were also advocating. The Plaintiffs' repeated accusation that the Department \nEFTA01206074\n", "char_count": 1506}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 2 of 12 \nof Justice and Epstein's counsel were \"engaged in a deliberate conspiracy\" to violate the law (cf. \nDE 189, at p. 12, n. 6), simply because they were each advocating the same legal position — a \nposition other courts (albeit not this one) have also adopted — is a fundamental myth that has not \nand will not be proven. \nThe position of Epstein's counsel on the proper construction of the CVRA in the unusual \ncontext of a matter where there is to be no federal charge was ethical and proper advocacy that in \nno way can be construed as conspiratorial. Epstein and the Government were adversaries, not \n\"co-conspirators.\" There is simply no threshold evidence that there was a \"deliberate\" conspiracy \nthat would begin to make relevant the correspondence at issue. For these reasons, and because \nthe correspondence of Epstein's counsel is not relevant to the Court's determination of whether \nthe Government violated the CVRA, Epstein seeks a protective order. \nARGUMENT \nOn June 18, 2013, this Court entered two orders pertinent to the Intervenors' pending \nmotion for a limited protective order: (1) the order denying the Intervenors' privilege objections \nto production of documents to the Plaintiffs (DE 188) and (2) the order denying the \ngovernment's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (DE 189). These orders \nincluded the following rulings that should inform the rights of the parties and intervenors \nconcerning the public dissemination at this point in time of the correspondence between \nEpstein's various counsel and the government that memorializes the negotiations relating to the \nsigning and implementation of the NPA on September 24, 2007. \nFirst, while the Court rejected the Intervenors' arguments against the production of that \ncorrespondence to Plaintiffs' counsel, the Court expressly withheld any ruling on the relevance \n2 \nEFTA01206075\n", "char_count": 1968}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 3 of 12 \nand admissibility of the correspondence' to the Plaintiffs' argument that Epstein somehow used \nhis wealth and purported political influence to improperly, unethically or illegally \"conspire\" \nwith the government to violate the Plaintiffs' rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of \n2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (the \"CVRA\"), or to any other material issue between the government \nand the Plaintiffs. \nSecond, the Court2 ordered the Plaintiffs to \"file unredacted pleadings, including the \nattached correspondence, in the open court file\" without considering the legal distinction \nbetween the public's right of access to pleadings, as opposed to access to discovery whose \nrelevance, as previously noted, has not been determined. See DE 188:10 (emphasis added).;\nThird, in overruling the government's objections to allowing the Plaintiffs to challenge \nthe NPA, the Court deferred ruling on the existence of a potentially insurmountable hurdle for \nthe requested remedy of rescission: That a fully developed evidentiary record might well show \nthat the Plaintiffs may have forfeited the remedy of rescission (through the doctrines of \nratification and estoppel) by affirmatively using the NPA to secure huge civil settlements from \nSee DE 188: 9-10 (\"...this order is not intended to operate as a ruling on the relevance or admissibility of any \nparticular piece of correspondence, a matter expressly reserved for determination at the time of final disposition\"). \nThe principal issue Intervenors litigated in the motions leading up to DE 188 was their right to prevent discovery \nin the first place based on evidentiary privileges. The Intervenors never litigated how the discovery, once ordered to \nbe produced, could be publicly used by the Plaintiffs. \nThat this Court did not apparently distinguish between pleadings and discovery was underscored by its reliance on \nUnited States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015\n... [truncated, 2626 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/2 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=2]", "char_count": 2626}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 4 of 12 \nEpstein4 — settlements that the Plaintiffs would be required to refund as a condition of the \nrescission remedy they seek (see infra) — while sitting back and allowing Epstein to \"perform() \nhis part of the bargain\" by serving jail time and accepting a lifetime of sex offender registration \nunder Florida law. See DE 189, at p. 12 & n. 6. The Court allowed the Plaintiffs to proceed \nnonetheless, rather than being estopped in part, to see if they could prove their \"allegation of a \ndeliberate conspiracy between Epstein and federal prosecutors....\" Id. (emphasis added). \nIn their motion for a protective order, the Intervenors have requested that before the \nCourt allows the Plaintiffs to publicly use the details of the correspondence, the Court rule on the \nreserved issues of evidentiary relevancy and admissibility. The Plaintiffs object to that condition \nand in doing so continue to perpetuate fundamentally faulty arguments about what type of \n\"conspiracy\" they must prove to justify even arguing for the nullification of the NPA — along \nwith Epstein's due process right to enforcement of the NPA — despite the Plaintiffs' inability and \nno doubt unwillingness to return him to the status quo ante — a traditional requirement of \nrescission, see United States v. Texarkana Trawlers, 846 F.2d 297, 304 (5th Cir.) (citation \nomitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988),5 even when a contract is secured by fraud, which \nwas not the case with the NPA. \nAs part of the NPA, the government insisted on including — over Epstein's objections all the way to the \nDepartment of Justice — the unprecedented conditions that he waive all objections to liability and pay the legal fees \nof certain of the victims' counsel in the lawsuits filed against him. The United States' Sealed Reply In Support of \nIts Motion To Dismiss (DE 205.6), pp. 11-12, documents in detail how Plaintiffs and other \"victims\" used the NPA\n... [truncated, 2868 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/3 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=3]", "char_count": 2868}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 5 of 12 \nHiring Lawyers To Advocate a Non-Frivolous Legal Position \nIs Not Wrongful As a Matter of Law \nThe first myth fueling this case is the central premise of the Plaintiffs' rescission theory — \nthat Epstein should be denied the due process protections normally attendant to plea bargains \nbecause the \"billionaire\" improperly, unethically or illegally used his financial resources and \npurported \"political\" influence to corruptly entice AUSA Villafana, U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta, \nand high level officials at the Department of Justice (including even the Deputy Attorney \nGeneral) into defrauding the Plaintiffs of their CVRA rights. \nImplicit in this grandiose \n\"conspiracy\" theory is the legally and indeed constitutionally flawed contention that it is \nsomehow wrongful for a non-indigent citizen to hire the best attorneys he can afford and pay \nthem well to use their advocacy skills in an attempt to convince prosecutors to adopt non-\nfrivolous legal positions favorable to their client. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Response, at p. 10 \n(claiming that \"Where has long been suspicion that Jeffrey Epstein was receiving favorable \ntreatment in the criminal investigation because of his wealth and power\").6\nThat the Plaintiffs' legal theory rests on lawyer advocacy rather than wrongful or illegal \nconduct is underscored by their Response in this case. Having received over 500 pages of \ncorrespondence, the only \"examples\" of what Plaintiffs consider relevant to their conspiracy \nContracts.§ 69: 50 (4'h ed.) (\"Ordinarily, one cannot in equity seek to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud and, \nat the same time, retain the benefits derived from the contract....\"). \nSee also Jackson v. Beilsouth \nTelecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1278 11i° Cir. 20041areasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned \nSailing Vessel, I. \nSupp. 507, 523 M. Fla. 1978), \nsub nom. Florida v. Treasure Salvors, 621 F.2d 1340 \n(\n... [truncated, 2701 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/4 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=4]", "char_count": 2701}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 6 of 12 \ntheory are excerpts where Epstein's attorneys were \"urg[ing]\" and \"lobbyting)\" prosecutors to \ntake the legal position that the CVRA did not apply pre-indictment. See Plaintiffs' Response, pp. \n13-14. However, there is nothing remotely improper, unethical or illegal about anything cited by \nthe Plaintiffs as \"proof\" of their theory. For instance, during the nine-month period between the \nexecution of the NPA in September of 2007 and Epstein's state guilty plea in June 2008 while \nEpstein was seeking review at the Department of Justice of the NPA, including its unique \nobligations to fund an attorney representative and waive defenses and challenges to jurisdiction \nif sued under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein's lawyers advocated for the Government to take a \nparticular view of the CVRA. That the FBI and United States Attorney then came to the \nconclusion that they should defer any victim notification in order to not burden the future \ncredibility of their witnesses by providing them with notice of monetary incentives contained in \nthe NPA was not part of a \"deliberate conspiracy\" but instead was a decision made by an \nadversary protecting their own interest in the possibility of a future trial. See Declaration of A. \nMarie Villafana in Support of United States' Response to Victims' Emergency Petition for \nEnforcement of Crime Victims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, DE 14 at par 8 (\"the agents and I \nconcluded that informing additional victims could compromise the witnesses' credibility at trial \nif Epstein reneged on the agreement\"). \nIt simply is not a \"misuse\" of resources to retain extremely experienced and highly \ncredentialed counsel to advocate non-frivolous legal positions with the Department of Justice. Cf. \nUnited States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of \nobstruction charges levied by IRS against tax protestor for filing complaint against the IRS, \nh\n... [truncated, 2116 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/5 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=5]", "char_count": 2116}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 7 of 12 \nagents\" was protected by the First Amendment's right to petition for redress of grievances)? To \nthe contrary, Epstein's counsel had a constitutional obligation to do so. See generally Lafler v. \nCooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012). \nIf, as it appears, the only point Plaintiffs seek to prove using the attorney correspondence \nis that counsel were persistent in writing letters to prosecutors and the Department of Justice \nadvocating or \"lobbying\" for the legal position that the CVRA did not apply to pre-indictment \nnon-prosecution agreements, then the protective order should be granted because the point the \nPlaintiffs wish to prove through the letters is not only irrelevant but also constitutionally \nprotected conduct. \nEpstein's Lawyers Were Advocating a Non-Frivolous Legal Position \nThat the Government Has Consistently Taken In All Cases \nThe second myth that the Plaintiffs have tried to perpetuate is that there was something \nimproper, unethical or illegal about Epstein's lawyers advocating the legal position that the \nCVRA did not apply to pre-indictment negotiations over the terms of an NPA. The absurdity of \nthe Plaintiffs' argument is best exposed by the undisputable fact that both the U.S. Department of \nJustice and federal prosecutors in numerous cases entirely unrelated to Epstein's have \nconsistently taken that very same position. For example, on February 8, 2008, in United States v. \nBP Products, M., No. 4:07-cr-434 (E. Tex.), the government explicitly argued to the district \nAs one court explained in the different context of filing a motion to disqualify a judge: \nWe do not endorse the notion that an attorney can do or say anything imaginable within the course of client \nrepresentation under the guise of vigorous representation of his client. However, the fair administration of \njustice provides a valuable right to chal\n... [truncated, 2540 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/6 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=6]", "char_count": 2540}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 8 of 12 \ncourt that the CVRA did not apply to pre-indictment plea bargaining. See Government's \nResponse to Victims' Motion Filed Pursuant to the Crime Victim Rights Act, United States v. BP \nProducts, M., No. 4:07-cr-434 \nTex. Feb. 8, 2008) (DE 63), attached hereto as Exhibit 1. \nWhile the district court in BP Products did not agree with all of the government's positions, see \nUnited States v. BP Products,.., No. 4:07-cr-434 \nTex. Feb. 21, 2008), 2008 U.S. Dist. \nLEXIS 12893, at **36-39, other district court judges have done so.8\nMoreover, on December 17, 2010, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John E. Bies, \n(apparently yet another co-conspirator under the Plaintiffs' theory) authored a I6-page, single-\nspaced Memorandum representing the official position of the entire Department of Justice that \n\"[t]tle rights provided by the Crime Victims' Rights Act are guaranteed from the time that \ncriminal proceedings are initiated (by complaint, information, or indictment) and cease to be \navailable ... if the Government declines to bring formal charges after the filing of a complaint.\" \nMemorandum Opinion of the Acting Deputy Attorney General, The Availability of Crime \nVictims' Rights Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004, Dec. 17, 2010, attached as Exhibit \n2 (previously filed with the Court at DE 90-1). \nIt is thus ludicrous for the Plaintiffs to continue asserting — without a shred of evidence — \nthat the position taken by the government in the instant case was \"caused\" by some improper, \nunethical or illegal use of Epstein's wealth and alleged political influence. For such a \n\"conspiracy\" theory to fly, the Plaintiffs would have to prove that Epstein not only conspired \ns See, e.g., United States v. Merkosky, No. I:02-cr-0168-01 ( \n. Ohio April II, 2008). 2008 IVL 1744762. at *2 (denying relief \nunder IS U.S.C. § 3771 and 42 U.S.C. § 10607. finding that \"the Crime Victims Restitution Act \n... [truncated, 2644 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/7 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=7]", "char_count": 2644}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 9 of 12 \nwith or corruptly influenced AUSA Villafana but also the U.S. Attorney himself, numerous \nofficials at the Department of Justice, including the Deputy Attorney General, and prosecutors in \nmany other far-flung jurisdictions. \nTo the sure, this Court has disagreed with the Department's and Epstein's construction of \nthe CVRA. However, as evidenced by the numerous courts that have agreed with the \nDepartment's views, Epstein's construction was plainly not so frivolous as to transform its \nadvocacy by his counsel into the type of improper, unethical or illegal conduct that arguably \nmight be enough to nullify Epstein's constitutional right to enforcement of the already-completed \nNPA. The fact that Plaintiffs' counsel cite to nothing in the 500-plus pages of communications \nnow in their possession other than counsels' legitimate advocacy efforts underscores how \nbankrupt their \"conspiracy\" theory truly is. \nThere Was No \"Sweetheart\" Deal \nThe third myth that the Plaintiffs have sought to perpetuate through their ipse dixit \nrhetoric, both in their pleadings and speeches to the press, is that there \"must\" have been \nsomething improper going on because the NPA was a \"sweetheart\" deal that was just too good to \nbe legitimate. Northing could be further from the truth. The NPA contained, at the government's \ninsistence — and over Epstein's objections — numerous and quite onerous conditions that had not \nbeen required by State authorities. The NPA thus obligated Epstein to: (1) plead guilty in state \ncourt to a charge the State would not have initiated absent the NPA, to be sentenced to 18 \nmonths in county jail, to be followed by 12 months of community control; (2) plead to an offense \nthat required lifetime sex offender registration; (3) agree to fund an attorney representative \nwhose function was to sue him; (4) waive his rights to contest both liability (i.e. guilt) and \nsubject-matter ju\n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/8 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=8]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 10 of 12 \nchallenge and to pay each of them a lump sum monetary settlement; and (5) still face numerous \nadditional civil cases brought under statutes other than 18 U.S.C. § 2255. \nThis was no \"sweetheart deal\" by any stretch of the imagination. \nMoreover, as \npreviously noted, the government's decision to enter this \"sweetheart deal\" was not left to the \ndiscretion of a \"line\" AUSA but was appealed to, and reviewed, and endorsed by, the U.S. \nAttorney and multiple levels of high-ranking officials at the Department of Justice.' The \nexercise of prosecutorial discretion by the U.S. Attorney's Office was also consistent with the \nfact that Epstein's alleged offense conduct fell outside the precedential heartland of the federal \nstatutes at issue and thus was more suitable to state rather than federal prosecution. \nThe Court Should Reject the Plaintiffs' \"Law of the Case\" Argument \nThe Plaintiffs also erroneously contend that the \"law of the case\" doctrine binds Epstein \nto the Court's prior ruling, which ordered the filing of \"unredacted pleadings, including the \nattached correspondence, in the open court file.\" As previously noted, the Court made that ruling \nwithout hearing fully from the parties and failed to distinguish the public's right of access to \nalready-filed pleadings from the public's non-existent right of access to civil discovery.10\nContrary to the Plaintiffs' extreme views, the \"law of the case\" doctrine \"is not an \ninexorable command.\" White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1967). It is a restriction \n\"self-imposed\" on the courts, Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1984), and need \nnot be followed since \"justice is better than consistency.\" William G. Roe & Co., 414 F.2d 862, \n867 (591 Cir. 1969). The doctrine thus does not bar a court from reviewing an earlier decision \n9 These appeals took many months. Much of the correspondence cited by Plaintiffs was auth\n... [truncated, 2405 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/9 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=9]", "char_count": 2405}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 11 of 12 \nwhen \"the previous decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.\" \nWestbrook, 743 F.2d at 769. See also Beverly Beach Propeties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604, \n608 (Fla. 1953) (\"We may change `the law of the case' at any time before we lose jurisdiction of \na cause and will never hesitate to do so if we become convinced, as we are in this instance, that \nour original pronouncement of the law was erroneous and such ruling resulted in manifest \ninjustice. In such a situation a court of justice should never adopt a pertinacious attitude.\") \nAt the time the Court included the public filing clause in its order, the issue of how the \nPlaintiffs could use the discovery once they obtained it was not even ripe, since the litigation up \nuntil that point was solely concerned with the Plaintiffs' access to that discovery. \"[R]ipeness is \npeculiarly a question of timing.\" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 \n(1974). \"[I]t% basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from \nentangling themselves in abstract disagreements....\" Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 \n(1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The conditions \nthat can and should be placed upon the Plaintiffs' public use of the correspondence only became \nripe now. \nThe Court Should Likewise Reject the Plaintiffs' Straw Man Arguments \nThe Plaintiffs also greatly exaggerate the impact of the requested protective order, \nclaiming that they could not even publicly file their \"summary judgment\" motion. Plaintiffs' \nResponse, p. 9. Of course they could file their motion. Indeed, their Response repeats what \nessentially they claim they wish to prove through the correspondence. The problem is that \nnothing in the correspondence proffered so far supports what they actually have to prove to \nsupport their theory. \ncivil rules term. \n... [truncated, 2110 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01206074/10 or ?id=EFTA01206074&page=10]", "char_count": 2110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01206074", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 253 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2014 Page 12 of 12 \nCONCLUSION \nFor all of the foregoing reasons, as well as those presented in the Intervenors' motion, the \nCourt should enter the requested Protective Order. \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/Roy Black \nRoy Black \nJackie Perczek \nBLACK, SREBNICK, KORNSPAN \n& STUMPF \n201 So. Biscayne Blvd \nMiami, Florida 33131 \nTele: (305) 371-6421 \nFax: 305 35 -2 06 \n., Suite 1300 \nAttorneys for Intervenors \n/s/Martin G. Weinberg \nMartin G. Weinberg \n20 Park Plaza, Suite 1000 \nBoston, Massachusetts 02116 \nTele: (617) 227-3700 \nFax: (617) 338-9538 \nAttorneys for Intervenors \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HERE CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was filed via CM/ECF, this 23'd day \nof May, 2014. \n/s/Roy Black \nRoy Black \n12 \nEFTA01206085\n", "char_count": 810}]}