{"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_count": 26, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01181056", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01181056.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹\n> \nSubject: September 10 update \nDate: Tue, 11 Sep 2012 23:00:22 +0000 \n10 September, 2012 \nArticle 1. \nNYT \nA New Kind of Warfare \nEditorial \nArticle 2. \nThe Economist \nWar and diplomacy in Syria \nArticle 3. \nAl-Monitor \nWill Morsi Really Offer Change for Gaza \nSophie Claudet with Saleh Jadallah \nArticle 4. \nGuardian \nGaza: an early warning of disaster \nRobert Turner \nArticles. \nThe Economist \nAsia's next revolution \nArticle 6. \nThe Daily Beast \nIsrael's settler movement - stronger than ever \nDan Ephron \nArticle 7. \nAl-Ahram Weekly \nPolitical Islam versus modernity \nTarek Heggy \nArucic I. \nNYT \nA New Kind of Warfare \nEditorial \nSeptember 9, 2012 -- Cybersecurity efforts in the United States have \nlargely centered on defending computer networks against attacks by \nEFTA01181056\n", "char_count": 823}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "hackers, criminals and foreign governments, mainly China. Increasingly, \nhowever, the focus is on developing offensive capabilities, on figuring out \nhow and when the United States might unleash its own malware to disrupt \nan adversary's networks. That is potentially dangerous territory. \nSuch malware is believed to have little deterrent value against criminals \nwho use computers to steal money from banks or spies who pilfer \nindustrial secrets. But faced with rising intrusions against computers that \nrun America's military systems and its essential infrastructure — its power \ngrid, for instance, and its telecommunications networks — the military \nhere (and elsewhere) sees disruptive software as an essential new tool of \nwar. According to a study by the Center for Strategic and International \nStudies, the 15 countries with the biggest military budgets are all investing \nin offensive cyber capabilities. \nThe latest step occurred last month when the United States sent out bids for \ntechnologies \"to destroy, deny, degrade, disrupt, corrupt or usurp\" an \nadversary's attempt to use cyberspace for advantage. The Air Force asked \nfor proposals to plan for and manage cyberwarfare, including the ability to \nlaunch superfast computer attacks and withstand retaliation. \nThe United States, China, Russia, Britain and Israel began developing \nbasic cyberattack capabilities at least a decade ago and are still figuring out \nhow to integrate them into their military operations. Experts say \ncyberweapons will be used before or during conflicts involving \nconventional weapons to infect an adversary's network and disrupt a target, \nincluding shutting down military communications. The most prominent \nexample is the Stuxnet virus deployed in 2010 by the United States and \nIsrael to set back Iran's nuclear program. Other cyberattacks occurred in \n2007 against Syria and 1998 against Serbia. \nCrucial questions remain unanswered, including what laws of war would \napply to decisions to launch\n... [truncated, 2458 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/1 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=1]", "char_count": 2458}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Another big concern is China, which is blamed for stealing American \nmilitary secrets. Washington has not had much success persuading Beijing \nto rein in its hackers. There is a serious risk of miscalculation if, for \nexample, there is a confrontation in the South China Sea. China could \nmisinterpret a move, unleash a cyberattack and trigger a real cyberwar. \nWhat's clearly needed are new international understandings about what \nconstitutes cyber aggression and how governments should respond. \nMeanwhile, the United States must do what it can to protect its own \nnetworks. \nAnicic 2. \nThe Economist \nWar and diplomacy in Syria \nSep 8th 2012 -- Lakhdar Brahimi, the experienced Algerian peacemaker \nwho recently replaced Kofi Annan as the UN's special envoy for Syria, \ndescribes his new task as \"nearly impossible\". That seems a sound \njudgment. Syria's beleaguered but ruthless regime refuses to talk to its \nopponents until they lay down their arms. For their part, the outgunned, \nfractious but resilient rebels will not talk to the regime until President \nBashar Assad goes. The rest of the world watches in dismay or quietly \nfuels the conflict, as misery mounts. In August alone, the number of Syrian \nrefugees applying for asylum abroad doubled, to 200,000. Mr Assad has \ntried various tactics to stamp out the uprising, now entering its 18th month. \nFirst he promised reform, as his security forces shot at peaceful protesters. \nThen the regime claimed that all was well but for a few rogue \"terrorists\". \nNow, having admitted that he is fighting a real war, Mr Assad is offering a \nchoice: his regime must be accepted or his army will scorch the earth of \nthose who go against it. The regional governor in charge of Daraya, a \nrebellious working-class suburb of the capital, Damascus, that was \ndevastated by Mr Assad's forces in August, recently visited it bearing \nbread. A kindly speech about resupplying the stricken town was followed \nby a stark warning, says a resident at the sce\n... [truncated, 2336 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/2 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=2]", "char_count": 2336}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "found dumped by the road in government-held areas. On September 5th, 45 \nsuch bodies were said to have been retrieved in one incident. Ruthless \nloyalist assaults have kept central Damascus firmly under government \ncontrol. Loyalist forces have regained patches of ground in Aleppo, the \nfiercely contested second city. Yet there are signs of ebbing government \nstrength. The practice of pushing oil drums full of explosives out of \nhelicopters suggests that the air force may be running out of bombs. The \nregime has also begun drafting reservists into the army, whose combat \nstrength, on paper, of 280,000 men is being badly depleted by casualties, \ndefections and dipping morale. \"We don't know if they need us or just \nwant us so we can't fight against them,\" says a 30-year-old who left for \nLebanon as soon as the police came knocking to call him up. \nBut the regime's threats and its determination to consolidate may work in \nsome areas. Its narrative of an armed Islamist and sectarian uprising is \nbecoming self-fulfilling, thanks largely to the violence inflicted \noverwhelmingly against Syria's Sunni Muslim majority. Playing on fears \nof Sunni vengeance, the ruling clan now offers arms to local self-defence \nmilitias that draw from minorities other than its own Alawite sect, which \nmakes up a tenth of the population but dominates the security forces. A \nmysterious spate of attacks attributed by the regime to \"terrorists\" has \nstoked anxieties in Jaramana, a sprawling Damascus suburb that houses \nmany Christians and Druze. \"Some people want to throw their hands up \nand say OK, whoever, we just want it to stop,\" says a local. Mr Assad may \nbe signalling a willingness to spread fires abroad, too. In Lebanon alleged \ntranscripts of an interrogation by the Lebanese police of Michel Samaha, a \nformer government minister close to Mr Assad arrested in August, suggest \nthat top Syrian security officers had supplied him with bombs intended to \nkill various Lebanese Sunni and Chris\n... [truncated, 2637 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/3 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=3]", "char_count": 2637}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "government supply convoys have stranded remoter army units and ground \nassaults on air bases are beginning to take a toll on Mr Assad's air force: \nthree out of its 27 bases may no longer be operable. Helicopters are now \nrarely sighted in Syria's rebel-dominated north-west because fighters have \nfashioned weapons to shoot them down. Pointing to their successes, rebel \ncommanders say they will push on, with or without outsiders' help. The \nAmerican administration has licensed the Syrian Support Group, an \norganisation of exiles, to ignore the American arms embargo and fund \nopposition fighters. Western leaders are growing less squeamish about \ndishing out aid. \"We are behind the curve in seeing this as a military \nconflict while other regional actors step up what they are doing,\" admits a \nWestern diplomat, echoing reports of a boost in arms shipments to the \nregime from Iran. Moves by the disparate rebel militias to unify their \ncommand structures have been quietly encouraged, in a sign of the West's \nimpatience with Syria's squabbling political opposition. Rather than press \nfor negotiations, Mr Brahimi may concentrate instead on simply \nmaintaining a UN foothold in Syria's quagmire, with the intention of \nmediating at a more opportune time. That moment is unlikely to result \nfrom a bold diplomatic initiative for a long while. There is no sign of either \nside wanting to cease fire. Perhaps a particularly jarring spike in violence \nmight jolt outside governments into more urgent diplomatic or even \nmilitary action. \"I hope one day I see my home again,\" says a dejected \nyoung writer now in exile. \"But who knows if I will recognise it.\" \nAnicic 3. \nAl-Monitor \nWill Morsi Really Offer Change for Gaza \nSophie Claudet with Saleh Jadallah \nSep 9, 2012 -- Gaza City — When Egypt reopened the Rafah crossing \nborder with Gaza late last month, Palestinians hailed the move as a \npossible end to their isolation from the rest of the world after years of near-\ntotal closure enfor\n... [truncated, 2354 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/4 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=4]", "char_count": 2354}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Egypt said the Rafah terminal would stay open from 9 M. to 6 .., \n6 \ndays a week except Fridays. \nThe Gaza Strip has four main crossings: three of them are controlled by \nIsrael and the Rafah border is under Hamas and Egyptian control since \nIsrael pulled out its settlers and army from Gaza in 2005. Israel-controlled \nErez crossing is mainly used by businessmen, medical patients, foreigners \nand Palestinian officials — all requiring permits that Israel delivers \nsparingly. The other two passages, Karni and Karem Shalom, are used for \ncommercial purposes and unilaterally controlled by Israel. And Gaza can \nonly trade — albeit with great difficulties — by way of land since both its \nseaport and airport were destroyed by Israel during the second Intifada \n(2000-2005). \nBut the Rafah border crossing, which is the only window to the world for \nthe great majority of Gazaans, was closed on Aug. 5 after an attack on an \nEgyptian security site in the Sinai peninsula left 16 Egyptian soldiers dead, \ncreating tensions between the two sides. \nFollowing the attack, Egypt accused Palestinian militants of being involved \nin the attack, claiming that the gunmen came in through tunnels dug \nbetween Gaza and Sinai used to smuggle goods, fuel and construction \nmaterials. The incident resulted in the temporary closing of Rafah. \nBlockade devastated Gaza's fragile economy \nGazaans were all the more upset over the temporary closure since they had \npinned high hopes on the regime change in Egypt following Mubarak's \nouster — on top of which was the reopening of the Rafah border crossing \nafter years of blockade. The sweeping victory of Hamas in the January \n2006 Palestinian general elections and the ensuing 2007 coup the hardline \nIslamist movement staged in the Gaza Strip were met with a near total \nblockade by Israel that was also heeded by Egypt. Years of closure have \nnot only prevented freedom of movement and free trade but also \ncontributed to skyrocketing poverty and unemployment l\n... [truncated, 2462 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/5 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=5]", "char_count": 2462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "meaning that is urgent to find employment opportunities for the Strip's \nevery increasing youth. In fact, the international organization said that as \nthings stand Gaza won't be \"livable\" by 2020. No later than last week, an \n18-year old Gazaan set himself on fire in a desperate attempt to protest his \nfamily's dire economic conditions. He died from his wounds on Monday, \nSeptember 3. \nBut so far, Israel has resisted international pressure to lift its blockade, \nwhich it says prevents weapons from reaching Hamas. \nIn the primary stages of the 2007 blockade, the ousted Egyptian regime \nalso restricted movement. The old Egyptian regime used to open the \npassage three days every two months. And Egypt caused an uproar in the \nArab and Muslim world when it sealed its border with the Palestinian \nterritory during Israel's Cast Lead Operation, a move perceived as giving a \nfree hand to the Jewish state to wage an all-out war on Gaza. Hosni \nMubarak eventually eased the movement of Palestinian passengers after \nIsrael intercepted the Gaza-bound Turkish flotilla in 2010. \nEgypt's new president hailed as potential savior \nAfter Mubarak was toppled by a popular uprising in 2011, Palestinians \nwere happy to see him go as he was perceived to be serving Israel's \ninterests. When Mohammed Morsi was elected president of Egypt in June, \nthousands of Gazaans flooded the streets to express their joy holding \npictures of Morsi to celebrate the Islamist Party's victory: Hamas is very \nclose in its ideology to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In July, Hamas \nPrime Minister Ismail Hanyieh traveled to Cairo to meet with Morsi. A \nmeeting during which the new Egyptian president promised to help \nimprove the lives of Palestinians in Gaza by facilitating their travel and \nsupplying the strip with fuel and power. \nBut so far, little has changed. \nAbed Ghani Abu Salama, a Palestinian teacher at a secondary school, said \nthat reopening the crossing was a good step. However, he said he was \nhopin\n... [truncated, 2379 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/6 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=6]", "char_count": 2379}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Others in Gaza said they were optimistic about the impact of the Muslim \nBrotherhood's election. Abed Rahman al-Khaldi, a university student who \nsupports Hamas, said it was still early to judge the Islamist leaders in \nEgypt but that he was counting on their religious solidarity. His friend \nAbed Rahman, also a Hamas supporter, said: \"I do trust Brotherhood \nleaders but they need a chance until they become stronger. If they have \nenough power, they will not only open the crossing but will liberate \nPalestine.\" \nAbu Al-Waleed, a shop owner, said that after initially worrying about the \nEgyptian president not holding enough power in the face of the Supreme \nCouncil of the Armed Forces (SCAF), he now believes the president had \nno excuse to continue the same policies towards Gaza. \n\"If President Morsi ends up adopting Mubarak's policy toward Gaza, he \nwill be responsible for isolating Gaza from the outside world and for \ncreating humanitarian crisis for all Gaza residents. Now he has enough \npower to end the suffering of Gaza,\" Abu Al-Waleed said. \nMustafa Ibraheem, a Palestinian human rights activist, urged Egypt to treat \nPalestinians fairly and not to inflict punishment on them. \nEgypt should deal with Gaza as they deal with any other country in the \nArab world. Even if someone from Gaza does wrong against Egypt, they \ndo not have the right to impose a collective punishment on a whole \npeople,\" the activist recently wrote online in a veiled reference the \ntemporary closing of Rafah following the Sinai attack. \nA free-trade zone with Egypt? \nPalestinians are still waiting for more from Egypt. \nAccording to an official at the Hamas ministry of interior, about 40,000 \nPalestinians, including medical patients and students have their names \nregistered with the ministry waiting for their turn to travel. Palestinians \nofficials are also hoping to create a free-trade zone between Rafah and \nEgypt, on the very land under which hundreds of tunnels are used by \nPalestinians t\n... [truncated, 2439 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/7 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=7]", "char_count": 2439}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "crossing. But the Hamas government may be getting ahead of itself. \nAlthough the economy ministry sent a plan for a duty-free area to Egypt's \nauthorities, it has yet to receive an answer from Cairo. \n\"Establishing a duty-free zone will play an important role in lifting the \nblockade on Gaza and will strengthen the political unity with Egypt as well \nas with the Arab and Muslim world,\" said Alaa Al-Rafati, the economy \nminister. \"A special delegation from the ministry will travel to Egypt to \ndiscuss the proposition of this zone,\" Rafati added. \nSeparately, Hanyieh urged Egypt on Tuesday (Sept. 4) to let much-needed \nQatari fuel enter the Gaza Strip. \"I call on the Egyptian president \nMohammed Morsi to give orders to the concerned authorities in his \ngovernment to ease the process of sending the shipment of Qatari fuel and \nto accelerate the procedures for establishing the duty-free zone,\" said the \nHamas prime minister as he was presiding over the first cabinet meeting of \nhis reshuffled government. \nTo date, Egypt has not sent the required amounts of Qatari fuel to run \nGaza's only power plant, which only resumed operations in July after six \nyears of inactivity because of the Israeli-Egyptian siege. Besides its own \npower plant, Gaza relies and Israel and Egypt for its electricity and had, \nuntil July, experienced power cuts of up to 18 hours a day. Hamas is also \nhoping to seal an agreement with Cairo to link its electricity grid to \nEgypt's. \nSaleh Jadallah is a Palestinian print and photo freelancer in Gaza. \nArtick 4. \nGuardian \nGaza: an early warning  of disaster \nRobert Turner \n9 September 2012 -- The international system is often accused of failing to \ngive adequate early warning; of being myopic and not furnishing the \nappropriate powers with data and analysis that would allow an effective, \nEFTA01181064\n", "char_count": 1847}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "timely response to predictable disasters. With the recent publication of the \nreport, Gaza in 2020: a Liveable Place?, it would be hard to level these \naccusations at the UN country team in the occupied Palestinian territory. \nThe report is a trend analysis based on data from authoritative sources, \nsuch as the UN's specialised agencies, the World Bank and the IMF, which \nsets out where Gaza will be in less than eight years' time. This is early \nwarning writ large. \nBy 2020 the population of the tiny Gaza Strip will grow by half a million \npeople: 500,000 more to be fed, housed, educated, employed. More than \nhalf of the population will be under 18, with one of the highest youth \npopulations as a proportion anywhere in the world. \nThe lack of safe drinking water is the most urgent concern in Gaza today \nand it will only get worse in the years to come. The coastal aquifer is the \nmain water source, but 90% of its water is not safe for drinking without \nfurther treatment. Three times as much water is currently extracted from \nthe aquifer as is recharged from rainfall every year. Thissituation is not \nsustainable. By 2016, the aquifer may become unusable, and damage to it \nmay be irreversible by 2020 without remedial action now. Already, people \nhave to drill deeper and deeper to reach groundwater. The UN Environment \nProgramme recommends resting the aquifer immediately, as it would \notherwise take centuries for it to recover. At the same time, demand for \nwater is projected to grow to 260m cubic meters per year in 2020, 60% \nmore than is currently extracted from the aquifer. \nOnly one quarter of sewage is currently treated. The remaining three \nquarters are dumped into the Mediterranean sea. Based on population \ngrowth, the amount of sewage and waste water that is generated per year \ncould increase from 44m cubic meters today to 57m cubic meters in 2020. \nCurrent treatment plants need to be expanded and improved, and new ones \nbuilt. \nThese predictions have profound i\n... [truncated, 2429 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/9 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=9]", "char_count": 2429}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Take health: in 2011 there were over 4.4 million patient visits to UNRWA \nhealth centres, that could be expected to rise to over 5.7 million annual \nvisits at current rates. UNRWA's 21 health centres currently have an \naverage catchment of approximately 57,000 registered refugees; without \nnew clinics that would rise to over 74,000 by 2020. To bring UNRWA \ncloser to WHO standards, the agency currently needs an additional 90 \ndoctors and 95 nurses. To maintain current service levels by 2020, \nUNRWA would need to add five new health centres, 220 doctors and over \n300 other health professionals, and that is without improving the present \nlevel of service (over 100 patient visits per doctor per day). \nIn the education sector, urrently UNRWA has 247 schools in 130 buildings, \nwith 93% double shifting — the same building serving two separate shifts of \nstudents and teachers each day. To maintain our current student teacher \nratio we would need over 2,000 teachers and support staff. \nOn social protection UNRWA distributes food to over 900,000 refugees, \nafter which some 44% remain food insecure because of a lack of jobs. \nWithout improvements in the economy that can only come about with the \nlifting of the blockade that figure will rise to over 1 million. An additional \n350,000 refugees by 2020 means some 20,000 new shelters will be \nrequired. \nOur prescription to avert this looming but avoidable catastrophe is simple. \nWhile the UN has condemned the rockets many times, we continue to \ndemand a lifting of the blockade, which is costing the international \ncommunity hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Allow the people of \nGaza to enjoy the standards of development and economic prosperity for \nwhich they yearn. They are capable of self-sufficiency. They do not want \nthe current levels of 80% aid dependency to continue and neither do the \nworld's taxpayers who fund the international aid agencies. Let us address \nthe root causes of this looming disaster rather than expec\n... [truncated, 2199 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/10 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=10]", "char_count": 2199}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Anicic 5. \nThe Economist \nia' i\ns\ns )eJeAwo\n- v 1 ti n \nSep 8th 2012 -- ASIA'S economies have long wowed the world with their \ndynamism. Thanks to years of spectacular growth, more people have been \npulled from abject poverty in modern Asia than at any other time in history. \nBut as they become more affluent, the region's citizens want more from \ntheir governments. Across the continent pressure is growing for public \npensions, national health insurance, unemployment benefits and other \nhallmarks of social protection. As a result, the world's most vibrant \neconomies are shifting gear, away from simply building wealth towards \nbuilding a welfare state. \nThe speed and scale of this shift are mind-boggling (see article). Last \nOctober Indonesia's government promised to provide all its citizens with \nhealth insurance by 2014. It is building the biggest \"single-payer\" national \nhealth scheme—where one government outfit collects the contributions \nand foots the bills—in the world. In just two years China has extended \npension coverage to an additional 240m rural folk, far more than the total \nnumber of people covered by Social Security, America's public-pension \nsystem. A few years ago about 80% of people in rural China had no health \ninsurance. Now virtually everyone does. In India some 40m households \nbenefit from a government scheme to provide up to 100 days' work a year \nat the minimum wage, and the state has extended health insurance to some \n110m poor people, more than double the number of uninsured in America. \nIf you take Germany's introduction of pensions in the 1880s as the \nbeginning and Britain's launch of its National Health Service in 1948 as \nthe apogee, the creation of Europe's welfare states took more than half a \ncentury. Some Asian countries will build theirs in a decade. If they get \nthings wrong, especially through unaffordable promises, they could wreck \nthe world's most dynamic economies. But if they create affordable safety \nnets, they will not just\n... [truncated, 2141 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/11 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=11]", "char_count": 2141}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "failing to redesign states to cope with ageing populations and gaping \nbudget deficits, this could be another area where Asia leapfrogs the West. \nBeyond Bismarck and Beveridge \nHistory offers many lessons for the Asians on what to avoid. Europe's \nwelfare states began as basic safety nets. But over time they turned into \ncushions. That was partly because, after wars and the Depression, \nEuropean societies made redistribution their priority, but also because the \nrecipients of welfare spending became powerful interest groups. The \neventual result, all too often, was economic sclerosis with an ever-bigger \nstate. America has kept its safety net less generous, but has made mistakes \nin creating its entitlements system—including making unaffordable \npension and health-care promises, and tying people's health insurance to \ntheir employment. \nThe record in other parts of the emerging world, especially Latin America, \nis even worse. Governments have tended to collect insufficient tax revenue \nto cover their spending promises. Social protection often aggravated \ninequalities, because pensions and health care flowed to affluent urban \nworkers but not the really poor. Brazil famously has a first-world rate of \ngovernment spending but third-world public services. Asia's governments \nare acutely conscious of all this. They have little desire to replace traditions \nof hard work and thrift with a flabby welfare dependency. The region's \ngiants can seek inspiration not from Greece but from tiny Singapore, where \ngovernment spending is only a fifth of GDP but schools and hospitals are \namong the best in the world. So far, the safety nets in big Asian countries \nhave generally been minimalist: basic health insurance and pensions which \nreplace a small fraction of workers' former income. Even now, the region's \nsocial spending relative to the size of its economies is only about 30% of \nthe rich-country average and lower than any part of the emerging world \nexcept sub-Saharan Africa.\n... [truncated, 2531 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/12 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=12]", "char_count": 2531}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "a century after its introduction. It still has three workers for every retired \nperson. \nAnother problem is size, which makes welfare especially hard. The three \ngiants—China, India and Indonesia—are vast places with huge regional \nincome disparities within their borders. Building a welfare state in any one \nof them is a bit like creating a single welfare state across the European \nUnion. Lastly, many Asian workers (in India it is about 90%) are in the \n\"informal\" economy, making it harder to verify their incomes or reach \nthem with transfers. \nCuddly tigers, not flabby cats \nHow should these challenges be overcome? There is no single solution that \napplies from India to South Korea. Different countries will, and should, \nexperiment with different welfare models. But there are three broad \nprinciples that all Asian governments could usefully keep in mind. The \nfirst is to pay even more attention to the affordability over time of any \npromises. The size of most Asian pensions may be modest, but people \ncollect them at an early age. In China, for example, women retire at 55; in \nThailand many employees are obliged to stop work at 60 and can withdraw \ntheir pension funds at 55. That is patently unsustainable. Across Asia, \nretirement ages need to rise, and should be indexed to life expectancy. \nSecond, Asian governments need to target their social spending more \ncarefully. Crudely put, social provision should be about protecting the poor \nmore than subsidising the rich. In fast-ageing societies, especially, \nhandouts to the old must not squeeze out investment in the young. Too \nmany Asian governments still waste oodles of public money on regressive \nuniversal subsidies. Indonesia, for instance, last year spent nine times as \nmuch on fuel subsidies as it did on health care, and the lion's share of those \nsubsidies flows to the country's most affluent. As they promise a broader \nwelfare state, Asia's politicians have the political opportunity, and the \neconomic responsib\n... [truncated, 2507 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/13 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=13]", "char_count": 2507}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "to be a government employee). And use technology to avoid the \ninefficiencies that hobble the rich world's public sector. From making \nelectronic health records ubiquitous to organising transfer payments \nthrough mobile phones, Asian countries can create new and efficient \ndelivery systems with modern technology. In the end, the success of Asia's \ngreat leap towards welfare provision will be determined by politics as \nmuch as economics. The continent's citizens will have to show a \nwillingness to plan ahead, work longer and eschew handouts based on \npiling up debt for future generations: virtues that have so far eluded their \nrich-world counterparts. Achieving that political maturity will require the \nbiggest leap of all. \nThe Daily Beast \nIsrael's settler movement is alive and \nstronger than ever \nDan Ephron \nSeptember 10, 2012 -- Dror Etkes should have been pleased. Six years ago, \nthe 44-year-old Israeli peace activist asked Israel's High Court of Justice to \nintervene in the case of a Jewish settlement outpost in the West Bank built \non Palestinian farmland. Etkes, who spends much of his time fighting \nsettlement expansion, thought the Migron outpost could be a test case. But \nwhen the court finally ordered Israeli authorities to evict the settlement's \n50 families last week, he couldn't bring himself to celebrate. For one thing, \nthe government is now building a much bigger housing project a few miles \naway to accommodate the ousted residents. But the larger issue is that \nmore and more Israelis are migrating to settlements —a disturbing trend \nfor people still hoping to see a Palestinian state established in the West \nBank. Indeed, in the time it took to process the Migron case, the settler \npopulation has swelled by more than 30 percent to 360,000 (not counting \nthose living in East Jerusalem). And with an array of government \nincentives and subsidies, there is little sign that the trend will subside. \"It's \na bitter victory,\" Etkes said, speaking over the gr\n... [truncated, 2116 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/14 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=14]", "char_count": 2116}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "flagship of unauthorized settlement outposts—communities erected \nwithout formal permission from the Israeli government. Its removal is \nundoubtedly a setback for the settler movement. But the story of Migron \nand dozens of other outposts that even Israel deems illegal (most of the \nworld considers all West Bank settlements illegal) is a testament to the vast \ninfluence the settlers wield in Israel and their ability to consistently \noutmaneuver their opponents. Over the past decade, Israeli governments \nhave made repeated promises to dismantle the outposts, including a \nspecific pledge to the United States as part of the 2003 peace plan known \nas the Roadmap. But most are now likely to get retroactive approval and \ngrow into full-fledged settlements, making it harder and harder to imagine \nan Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. \"The objective [of the settlers] was \nto prevent the establishment of an Arab country between Jordan and the \nMediterranean Sea,\" wrote Nahum Barnea, one of Israel's most respected \ncolumnists, in the daily newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth last month. \"It is safe \nto say that the objective has been achieved.\" \nThe saga of Migron began, improbably, with a cellphone tower some 11 \nyears ago, early in the second intifada. Palestinians were ambushing \nIsraelis in the West Bank, and settlers complained that they were losing \nreception at a certain bend in the road south of Ramallah. Worried that if an \nattack ensued, victims wouldn't be able to call for help, Israeli authorities \nplaced a cell tower on a hill high above the bend. The tower required a \nguard—Palestinians were also vandalizing Israeli property—and the guard \nneeded a trailer. By 2002 settlers had towed several more trailers to the \nhilltop and called the place Migron, the name of the biblical town where \nKing Saul camped out before attacking the Philistines. The new squatters \nat Migron never received permission from the Israeli government to build a \nsettlement. But that wasn't unusual.\n... [truncated, 2627 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/15 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=15]", "char_count": 2627}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "confiscate privately held land for the purpose of settlements. The \ndistinction made the squatters at Migron lawbreakers twice over. \nItai Harel, a 38-year-old social worker, was among Migron's first residents. \nHe not only built a home in the settlement, but a horse stable where he \nteaches troubled and disabled kids youths to ride and care for the animals. \nHarel refused to speak to reporters who visited the hilltop last week, a \nrocky plateau with stunning vistas in every direction. The settlers were \nbusy packing their belongings and dismantling light fixtures, before \ndemolition crews arrived. But Harel's father, Israel, did talk to Newsweek, \nscoffing at the idea that residents could establish their community without \nat least implicit support from the government. \"Who installed the \nelectricity, the water, the roads, the security?\" said Harel, who helped \nfound the settler movement. \"They got approval from government offices \nfor all these things.\" \nIn a way, Harel is right. In court proceedings, the state admitted knowing \nfrom the outset that the land on which Migron was built belonged to \nPalestinians. \"Because the subject of discussion is an outpost that was built \non private lands, there is no legal possibility to accept its existence,\" \nlawyers for the state wrote in response to the petition. (The judges rejected \nclaims by the settlers that they had legally purchased the land from \nPalestinians). And yet, for more than a decade, government officials \nprovided the settlers at Migron with all the services required for a \ncommunity to function. \nEven after the court sided with Etkes and Palestinian land owners in 2008, \nsuccessive Israeli governments put off dismantling Migron, hoping to \navoid a collision with the powerful settler lobby. Prime Minister Netanyahu \nstalled until the high court practically forced his hand. Still, the Migron \nsettlers have promised to hold a grudge. \"The government of Israel will not \nbe able to wash its hands of the brutal \n... [truncated, 2562 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/16 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=16]", "char_count": 2562}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "better for the settlers. With Israel's economy starting to dip, the high \nfinancial price of settlement expansion is getting more attention than usual. \nDismantling Migron and resettling its residents alone could cost of the state \nmillions of dollars. And yet, polls show nearly half of Israelis continue to \nsupport settlement expansion, while Netanyahu's approval rating remains \nabove 50 percent. Some activists now argue that petitioning the high court \nover settlements should be avoided because they've backfired too many \ntimes. After a court case forced Netanyahu to evacuate roughly 30 families \nfrom another outpost earlier this year, he simply approved the construction \nof hundreds of new homes elsewhere in the West Bank. The Migron \neviction has triggered a similar spree. Nevertheless, Etkes says he'll \ncontinue to fight back. After obtaining land-registry data for the entire West \nBank through Israel's Freedom of Information Act, he now estimates that \nabout 35 percent of the territory on which settlements were built is the \nprivate property of Palestinians. \"It creates a discussion,\" he said about the \ncourt cases. \"It forces Israelis to look at their own reflection in the mirror.\" \nUnfortunately for Etkes, reflections, like beauty, are often in the eye of the \nbeholder. \nAnicic 7. \nAl-Ahram Weekly \nPolitical Islam versus modernity \nTarek Heggy \n\"Bear witness for us, Open/ That we shall not sleep/ That we shall not \ndither between yes' and 'no'\" -- Amal Donqol \nIt is my view that whether political Islam is defined as a religious \ntheocratic movement or a political movement in the modern sense of \npolitical movements, the currents of political Islam have a position \nconcerning the type of value system that contemporary intellectuals in \nadvanced societies recognise as constituting the foundations of a culture of \nprogress and modernity. So a conversation must be held between some of \nthese value systems and the mentality and behaviour of exponents of \ncurrents\n... [truncated, 2159 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/17 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=17]", "char_count": 2159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "associated with modernity and progress. The conception of the modern \nstate: modern Islamists are unable to understand or accept or even admire \nthe modern state system, which is the product or the result of centuries of \npolitical, cultural, social and economic struggle over the course of human \nprogress. When the Prophet took ill (during the last days of his life) he \ntasked his close companion, Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq, with deputising for him \nin leading the prayer. When the prophet passed away shortly afterwards, a \nlarge number of Muslims considered that this entrusting of the leadership \nof the prayer constituted an indication from the Prophet that Abu Bakr was \nto be his preferred successor. And this is what in fact took place in the \naftermath of the problems associated with the Saqifa compact (saqifat bani \nsada). From the very first day Abu Bakr became \"the prophet's 'deputy' or \nsuccessor. \nIt is this historical model that dominates Islamists' thinking. This model \n(necessarily a simplistic one in step with the simplicity of a time of \nexperimentation) prevails still over the mind-set of most Islamists, in \nwhom the interweaving of \"religion\" and \"politics\" is a thoroughgoing one. \nSome decades later, attempts were made to philosophise and theorise this \nexperiment in a number of books known today as works on Al-Ahkam Al-\nSultaniya (Rulings on Governance), such as Al-Mawardi's Al-Ahkam Al-\nSultaniya. Even though the specifics of such rulings do no more than \nreflect the condition and level of evolution in man's political thinking over \na period of five centuries starting from the seventh century AD, specifics \nwhich are simplistic and in many instances downright primitive and silly, \nthe mind-set of contemporary exponents of Islamism still retains an \nadmiration for them as something presenting a comprehensive alternative \nto the system of the modern state. \nPLURALISM: There is little doubt that the culture of more progressive \nsocieties, and their general int\n... [truncated, 2571 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/18 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=18]", "char_count": 2571}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "everyone and everything that opposed the basic foundations of Marxism, \npolitical Islam can do naught else but lead to this same dismissal -- for all \nthe Islamists' declarations of belief in pluralism. This is because the \nIslamist is dominated by the thought that he is 100 per cent in the right. \nAfter all, how can this not be the case given that God himself enters with \nhim into all epistemological, cultural, economic, political, legal and \nconstitutional arenas? And scientific arenas too: where is the Islamist, for \nexample, who accepts the theory of evolution? \nOTHERNESS: This (or the acceptance of the other) is the product of the \ndebate on pluralism. If life (for those who believe in pluralism) is founded \nupon a broad pluralism in various spheres of living, organisation, thinking \nand principles, the first thing it demands of modern man is to accept the \nother (in all that \"other's\" various forms). But if the Islamist -- who \nbelieves that God stands at his side and that he is the closest to truth in all \nmanner of arenas -- maintains any belief in accepting the other, his \nacceptance is a relatively moderate (or at times microscopic) one. He may \ntell us that he believes in the rights of woman, but he will then tell us that \nwomen are qualified to work in \"most\" but not all posts! And he will tell \nus, unequivocally, that a woman (and even a non-Muslim) cannot become a \nhead of state. He will also tell us, in his own words, that he believes in \nreligious freedom, but he will lay down for others what it is that they may \nbelieve in. For the Islamists in Egypt (writing now in 2012) are saying that \na man has a right to be a Muslim or a Jew or a Christian but he does not \nhave the right to be a Buddhist or a Bahaai. In the same way, Islamists \ncannot agree that freedom of religion means that a Muslim can leave Islam. \nRELATIVISM: Out of the womb of faith in pluralism issues faith in \notherness (the acceptance of the other). And out of the womb of either \ncomes\n... [truncated, 2667 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/19 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=19]", "char_count": 2667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "planet today -- is the one who, in his ideology, possesses \"permanent \nsolutions\" that may not be changed to face up to problems which by their \nvery nature are changeable. If you were to say to him that these solutions \nare the product of specific times and places he will become angry and \nsimply reject this logic. For a number of weeks now (writing in August \n2012), the former supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Mandi Akef \ndeclared that anyone who disagrees with the conceptions of the Muslim \nBrotherhood is \"stupid and ignorant\". Words such as these encapsulate the \nIslamists' view and opinion concerning any alternative perception. \nTHE RIGHTS OF MAN: The rights of man, including the right to think \nand the right to express his views, alongside other rights, are the product of \nmankind's struggle conducted over long periods. The problem the Islamist \nhas with the rights of man is that he can only accept their presentation as \nsomething that he believes to be the will of God. If we were to say to him \nthat it is a human right to be a Buddhist or a Bahaai, he will reject this and \nsay that the rights of man in this respect are limited to the three Abrahamic \nfaiths. If we were to say to him that it is a woman's right to dress as she \npleases he would refuse this on the basis of his morals that he also sees as \nexpressing the will of God. And if we were to say to him that it is a \nMuslim's right to become a Jew or a Christian he will once again employ \nhis (absolutist) morals to refuse this human right. Thus, for the Islamist, \nthere is an upper ceiling, or a number of upper ceilings, to the rights of \nman, ceilings that in his conception are also the will of God. \nWOMANKIND: Women as such, the fear of them and the desire that they \ninspire, and at the same time the wish to place her in a cage and keep her \nunder constant supervision, these are some of the most conspicuous \nIslamist standpoints vis-A-vis womankind. There is no doubt that the \nIslamist sees the w\n... [truncated, 2678 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/20 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=20]", "char_count": 2678}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "an Islamic society like Saudi Arabia surrounding the woman with \nunprecedented levels of restrictions, this society has been and is still \nwitnessing the greatest degree of chaos in sexual relations. \nInstead of concerning himself with punishing the man (the wolf), the entire \nfocus of the Islamist is fixed on imprisoning \"the victim\" under observation \nin a cage. As I always say: instead of keeping the flies off, we choose to \nlock up the honey in cupboards! In the light of such a mentality, the rights \nof women have the lowest ceilings imposed upon them. Anyone can put \nthis to the test by asking any Islamist to take another look at such things as \nthe following: the testimony of a woman in court or elsewhere as being \nworth half the testimony of a man (in a Saudi court of law the testimony of \na woman, such as Madame Curie who has won two Nobel Prizes in \nscience, would be worth half the testimony of a man who has barely \nfinished primary school). Alternatively you will not find an Islamist who is \nprepared to take another look at the inheritance of a woman being half that \nof the man, or whether a woman is qualified to occupy the office of head of \nstate, or whether he would agree to a woman being in a position to licence \nmarriage or divorce, or have custody of her sons and daughters, and so on. \nTHE RULE OF LAW IN ITS MODERN CONCEPTION: The Islamist is \nof the firm conviction that submission to positivist constitutional and legal \nrules (that is, those that have been set down by man) is a grievous sin. It is \na sin on the religious level and a sin on the social level too, in that the \nIslamist believes deep down that mortals are not qualified to shape a \nconstitutional and legal system governed by mortals. Ever since Egypt in \n1883 transferred to a modern positivist legal system, Islamists remained \ncritical of the existence of a legal system set down by mortals. When the \nwritings of Sayed Qotb (1906-1966) became the most important literature \nin political Is\n... [truncated, 2659 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/21 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=21]", "char_count": 2659}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Islamist mind-set, is that man should not lay down rules governing \nrelations between men but instead observe the rules established by God and \nnot mankind. Even now no leader of any current of political Islam \nundertakes to review the concept of Al-Hakimiya presented by Sayed Qotb \nin his famous work Milestones on the Way (which is considered to be a \nregurgitation of earlier ideas propounded by Abul-Ala Al-Mawdudi). \nThus the Islamist is faced with a continuing difficulty vis-A-vis all \npositivist, legal, constitutional foundations. Even if a great legal scholar \nsuch as Al-Sanhouri -- the author of the 1984 Egyptian Civil Code -- says \nthat he sees nothing in all of the regulations and materials of this code \nderived from French civil law that contradicts the principles of Islamic \nSharia, nevertheless this counts for nothing among the currents of political \nIslam. The Islamist continues to believe that his primary political mission \nis to apply a comprehensive legal system derived from Islamic Sharia, that \nis -- in his view -- the laws that express the will of God. \nVIOLENCE: It is clear that the leadership of most currents of political \nIslam refuse to describe suicide operations undertaken by many Islamists \nagainst non-combatant individuals as terrorist operations. There is no doubt \nthat most of these leaders do not consider someone such as Osama bin \nLaden to be a terrorist. Indeed most of them have, and still do, look upon \nBin Laden brimming with appreciation and admiration for him. When an \nIslamist candidate for the post of president of the Republic of Egypt was \nasked a few months ago whether he considered Osama Bin Laden a \nterrorist or not, he replied \"America is terrorist\". The truth is that the \nIslamist cannot condemn \"violence\" against civilians in all its shapes and \nforms. Nothing demonstrates this more than the failure of contemporary \nman to agree on a universally accepted definition of terrorism. Islamists are \none in maintaining that it is\n... [truncated, 2589 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/22 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=22]", "char_count": 2589}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "human inventiveness in all or most of the spheres of intellectual and \ncultural creativity have ever found their way in a balanced, measured form \ninto the mentality of the Haredi Jew or the fundamentalist Muslim. Or to \nput it another way, if any of the fruits of human inventiveness initiated by \nthe ancient Greek and Roman civilisation, or the fruits of the Renaissance \nand the period following the Industrial Revolution and the French \nRevolution, or the most important products of human creativity over the \nlast three centuries (which are the richest centuries in human history) \nshould make their entry into a man's mental composition, then that man \nsimply cannot be a fundamentalist or a fanatic. I was fortunate enough to \nbe granted the opportunity to see up close what it is that a Haredi Jew or a \nSalafist Muslim, or the militant Muslim followers of the Hanbali school or \nthose who admire the fatwas of Hanbali faqihs and proselytizers like Ibn \nTaymiya and Ibn Qayim and Mohamed Abdel-Wahab (among whom \nfeature all the clerics of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and all the lands of Sunni \nIslam) take for reading material. I got to know up close that the bulk of \nthese folk have never read, and still do not read, anything beyond the \nliterature of their specific religious denomination. Indeed, I might add that \nI have heard the warnings issued by dozens of prominent clerics in Saudi \nArabia against reading what I would call the fruits of human creativity --\nfrom Homer to Dante, from Shakespeare and Racine to Voltaire and Jean \nJacques Rousseau and Diderot, from Descartes to Kant, from Victor Hugo \nto Albert Camus. And I know intimately their rejectionist position on \nsymphonic music, the figurative arts and theatre. Perhaps the following \nanecdotes demonstrate the tragedy we are writing about here: in August \n2012, Chinese astronauts returned to their launch base and a picture was \npublished of a female Chinese astronaut exiting the spaceship aided by one \nof her colleagues. \n... [truncated, 2583 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/23 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=23]", "char_count": 2583}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "were not wearing their veils at the time they were attempting to escape \nincineration. \nHUMANITY: The literature, culture and thinking of Islamists is based \nupon the division of the world (and of its peoples) into two: the first called \nthe Abode of Islam, the second named the Abode of War. This division \nprevails still over the Islamists' mind-set, which, in light of the authority of \nthis literature, has difficulty in understanding, digesting, embracing and \naccepting the modern concept of humanity and the influence it has had on \nbreaking down barriers and frontiers between cultures and societies. I have \nno doubt that Islamists look upon the other (who necessarily belongs to the \nAbode of War) as an enemy in one form or another -- an enemy constantly \nheld to be responsible for all of their problems, starting from colonialism \nand including everything that has happened up to the present day. Two \nyears ago Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, a famous leading light in the \nMuslim Brotherhood who entered the electoral race for the Egyptian \npresidency in May 2012, issued a book in which he stated that all the \nproblems of contemporary Islamic societies were caused by colonialism. \nAbul-Fotouh did not explain to us why it is that the Europeans embarked \non colonising us instead of us colonising the Europeans. Similarly Abul-\nFotouh did not tell us why most regions of the Arabian Peninsula have \nremained deeply backward for a century despite the fact that they were \nnever colonised. \nTAQIYA (CONCEALMENT): Taqiya is a Shia concept that seeps into the \npolitical practices of contemporary Islamist groups be they Shia or Sunni. \nThe concept of taqiya means that at such time as the Islamists on the \nground constitute the weaker power, they have the right to proclaim in \npublic precisely the opposite of what they hold in secret. This manifested \nitself clearly in the behaviour of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the \nfall of the former President Hosni Mubarak. The positions t\n... [truncated, 2490 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01181056/24 or ?id=EFTA01181056&page=24]", "char_count": 2490}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01181056", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "actually think and intend -- is religiously permitted for them for as long as \nthey have yet to attain total empowerment. I have no doubt that had \nNiccolA2 Machiavelli himself heard from some Muslims of the concept of \ntaqiya he would have agreed with them and considered them even more \nMachiavellian than himself. \nIn short, after 40 years of studying political Islam, its literature and \nwritings -- including university theses on the Islamic system of hadd \npunishments -- I can see no possibility of there being any agreement \nbetween political Islam and the values of progress and modernity. At the \nsame time I believe that the pragmatic practice of politics (in the light of \ncontemporary constitutions and laws) may permit developments that may \nrender Islamist political parties similar to Christian parties in Europe. But I \nam speaking here of a possible, and by no means certain, trajectory, and I \nam talking of a long journey, which up to now I see no tangible evidence of \nhaving been embarked upon. \nTarek Heggy is a liberal Egyptian author, political thinker and \ninternational petroleum strategist. \nEFTA01181081\n", "char_count": 1133}]}