{"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_count": 6, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01112629", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01112629.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE \nFIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT \nIN AND FOR PALM BEACH \nCOUNTY, FLORIDA \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nPlaintiff, Counter-Defendant, \nvs. \nSCOTT ROTHSTEIN, individually, \nBRADLEY J. EDWARDS, \nindividually, \nDefendants/Counter-Plaintiffs. \nCase No. 50 2009 CA 040800>DOCXMBAG \nJudge: CROW \nPLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S \nMOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF \nBRADLEY J. EDWARDS AS CO-COUNSEL \nPlaintiff/Counter-Defendant Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\"), by and through his \nundersigned counsel, hereby moves this Court to disqualify Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff \nBradley Edwards (\"Edwards\") from acting as his own co-counsel at trial in this matter. In \nsupport of this Motion, Epstein states: \nINTRODUCTION \nBradley J. Edwards should be disqualified from acting as his own as co-counsel at \ntrial in this matter because he is, irrefutably, a key witness, if not the key witness, in this \ntrial. \nSince the inception of this litigation in November 2009, Edwards has been \nrepresented by Searcy Denney Scarola Bamhart & Shipley, P.A. Edwards did not file his \nNotice of Appearance as co-counsel for himself until March 2012; nearly three years after \nhe filed his Counterclaim, which is the only cause of action currently pending. Edwards is \nlisted as a witness on his own witness list, as well as Epstein's. Every issue in this case \nEFTA01112629\n", "char_count": 1382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "hinges, in essence, on actions taken by Edwards. Edwards is a featured witness in his case, \nand as such, an indispensable witness. Edwards acting as his own co-counsel at trial in this \ncase is prohibited by both the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and prevailing case law. \nAccordingly, Edwards must be disqualified. \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW \nEdwards, as the Plaintiff, will be a key witness at the trial of this matter, and his \nknowledge and testimony will concern crucial issues to be determined by the finder of fact. \nThe dual role of an advocate and a witness has been found to prejudice the opposing party \nas the testimony by the attorney is bolstered because it comes from an advocate. \nAlliedSignal Recovery Trust v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 934 So. 2d 675, 678 (Fla. 2nd DCA \n2000). This Court has the authority to disqualify him pursuant to Rule 4-3.7 of the Rules \nRegulating the Florida Bar which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: \n(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial \nin which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the \nclient except where: \n(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; \n(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no \nreason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to \nthe testimony; \n(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in \nthe case; or \n(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the \nclient. \nRule 4-3.7 R. REG. FLA. BAR. See also comments to Rule 4-3.7 (\"[t]he problem can arise \nwhether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing \nparty.\") \"When it is shown that the attorney will be an indispensible witness or when the \nattorney becomes a `central figure' in the case, disqualification is appropriate.\" Fleitman \nv. McPherson, 691 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). \n2 \nEFTA01112630\n", "char_count": 1959}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "In Colimbo v. Puig, 745 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the appellate court, in \nanalyzing this Rule and its applicability to disqualification, stated: \nRule 4-3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a \"lawyer \nshall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a \nnecessary witness on behalf of the client.\" The key words here are \"at a \ntrial.\" Therefore, it follows that a lawyer may act as an advocate at pre-trial \n(before the start of the trial) and post-trial (after the judgment is rendered) \nproceedings. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, \nInformal Op. 89-1529 (1989) (lawyer may take depositions of witnesses and \nengage in other pre-trial proceedings as long as other requirements of the \nRules are met). \nId. at 1107. Likewise, in Larkin v. Pirthauer, 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the \nFourth District Court of Appeal avowed that Rule 4-3.7 \"generally prohibits lawyers from \nbeing advocates at trials at which they will be witnesses on matters of substance.\" Larkin, \n700 So. 2d at 183 (emphasis added). Such is the case here, as it is incontrovertible that the \ncrux of Edwards's causes of action against Epstein involves substantial and complex issues \nbetween the parties during the course of several years of litigation. Irrefutably, not only \nwill Edwards's testimony constitute \"matters of substance,\" but it will be the focal point of \nthe case, as both Edwards and Epstein will be calling Edwards as a witness at trial. \nUnquestionably, therefore, Edwards's disqualification is mandated. \nFor example, Edwards may be forced to testify regarding the credibility of his own \ncase filed against Epstein. In Eccles v. Nelson, 919 So. 2d 658, 662 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), \nthe appellate court affirmed a trial court order disqualifying an attorney from trial where \nattorney's knowledge and involvement concerned crucial issues to be determined at trial. \nAs in the Eccles case, Edwards's testimony as a witness in the trial of this matter goes \n\"well beyond a mere formality,\" mandating disqualification. See also City of Lauderdale \nLakes v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 654 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). \n3 \nEFTA01112631\n", "char_count": 2198}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "It is well established law in Florida that an attorney should be prohibited from \nbeing an advocate at trial where the attorney will be a material witness. Graves v. Lapi, \n834 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla, 4th DCA 2003); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 233 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. \n4th DCA 1970); Cerillo v. Highley, 797 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Ha. 4th DCA 2001). In fact, \nthe Florida Supreme Court has held that the \"dual capacity of counsel and witness in the \ntrial of a cause, except as to formal matters, should be avoided if possible.\" Dudley v. \nWilson, 152 Fla. 752, 754, 13 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1943). An attorney is an indispensable \nwitness when the attorney has \"crucial information in his possession which must be \ndivulged.\" Cazares v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 429 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla \n5th DCA 1983). An attorney is essential as a witness if the attorney's testimony could not \nbe established in detail by another witness. See Laura McCarthy, Inc. v. Merrill-Lynch \nRealty/Cousins, Inc., 516 So. 2d 23, 23-4 (Ha. 3rd DCA 1987). \nHere, Edwards will be called as a witness by both Epstein and Edwards. Edwards \nmay be forced to testify regarding the credibility of his own case filed against Epstein. \nWithout Edwards's testimony, Edwards cannot establish his case. Additionally, just like \nthe attorney in Eccles, Edwards is a witness as to all of the issues in dispute and is certainly \nan essential one. Further, his testimony would not be mere formality, as it would go to the \nsubstantive and contested matters of this case. Consequently, this Court must disqualify \nEdwards as co-counsel at trial in this matter. \nCONCLUSION \nBased on the arguments presented above, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein \nrespectfully \nrequests \nthat \nthis Court \nenter \nan \nOrder disqualifying \n4 \nEFTA01112632\n", "char_count": 1815}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Bradley Edwards as co-counsel in this matter, and grant such \nother and further relief as deemed necessary and proper. \nWE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served \nupon all parties listed below, via Electronic Service, this September 9, 2013. \n/s/ Tonja Haddad Coleman \nTonja Haddad Coleman, Esq. \nFla. Bar No.: 0176737 \nLAW OFFICES OF TONIA HADDAD, PA \n315 SE 7th Street \nSuite 301 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \n(facsimile) \n5 \nEFTA01112633\n", "char_count": 505}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01112629", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "SERVICE LIST \nCASE NO. 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG \nJack Scarola, Esq. \nSearcy Denney Scarola et al. \n2139 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd. \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33409 \nJack Goldberger, Esq. \nAtterbury, Goldberger, & Weiss, PA \n250 Australian Ave. South \nSuite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nMarc Nurik, Esq. \n1 East Broward Blvd. \nSuite 700 \nFort Lauderdale, FL 33301 \nBradley J. Edwards, Esq. \nFarmer Jaffe Weissing Edwards Fistos Lehrman \n425 N Andrews Avenue \nSuite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nFred Haddad, Esq. \n1 Financial Plaza \nSuite 2612 \nFort Lauderdale, FL 33301 \nEFTA01112634\n", "char_count": 581}]}