{"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_count": 20, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01081439", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01081439.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 1 of 20 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 \nv. \nUNITED STATES \nJANE DOE NO. 3 AND JANE DOE NO. 4'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION \nPURSUANT TO RULE 21 FOR JOINDER IN ACTION \nCOME NOW Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 (also referred to as \"the new victims\"), \nby and through undersigned counsel, to file this reply in support of their motion pursuant to \nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to join this action (DE 280), on the condition that they not re-\nlitigate any issues already litigated by Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 (also referred to as \n\"the current victims\"). The Government's response (DE 290) fails to contest the new victims' \nspecific argument that good cause exists for allowing them to join. Instead, the Government \nraises technical arguments about allegedly applicable statutes of limitations found in the CVRA \nor in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). But the CVRA does not contain the time limit that the Government \nreads into the Act. And § 2401(a) does not bar the action here. The Court should accordingly \nallow joinder of the new victims.' \nI. \nTHE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT CONTESTED THE VICTIMS' POSITION \nTHAT GOOD CAUSE EXISTS FOR ALLOWING THEM TO JOIN THIS \nACTION UNDER RULE 21. \nTo be clear, this motion is brought on behalf of all four victims — Jane Does No. I, 2, 3 \nand 4. As indicated throughout their pleadings, the victims do not seek to duplicate effort but \nrather (represented through the same legal counsel) to pursue a single, consolidated approach. \nEFTA01081439\n", "char_count": 1646}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 2 of 20 \nIn their motion for joinder, the new victims advanced several specific reasons why \njoinder was appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, including the facts that their participation \nwould prove a consistent pattern of failing to notify victims, reinforce the relevancy of several \ndocument production requests currently pending before the Court, and elucidate the interface \nbetween the Government and the victims. DE 280 at 8-10. In a later pleading (responding to \narguments from putative intervenor Alan Dershowitz), the new victims also advanced eight \nspecific reasons why their allegations related specifically to current issues in the case, including \nissues of motive, the scope of any remedy that might be awarded, and the crime/fraud exception \nto the attorney-client privilege. DE 291 at 17-26. \nTellingly, the Government does not directly contest any of these assertions. Instead, the \nGovernment raises several technical objections as to why joinder is not possible. The victims \nrespond to each and every objection in the pages that follow. But to the extent the question \nbefore the Court is one calling for an exercise of discretion, the Court should act against a \nbackdrop of uncontested reasons demonstrating that joinder of the new victims would be useful. \nII. \nTHE CVRA DOES NOT CONTAIN A TIME LIMIT APPLICABLE TO THIS \nENFORCMENT ACTION. \nRather than contest the reasons for allowing two new crime victims to join this CVRA \naction, the Government attempts to manufacture a time limit out of the CVRA itself. The \nGovernment contends that the new victims' motion for joinder is \"barred\" by 18 U.S.C. § \n377I(d)(5), which provides: \nA victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if—\n(A) the victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during the \nproceeding at issue and such right was denied; \n2 \nEFTA01081440\n", "char_count": 1939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 3 of 20 \n(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within \n14 days; and \n(C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest offense \ncharged. \nThis paragraph does not affect the victim's right to restitution as provided in title \n18, United States Code. \nThe Government's argument fails for the simple reason that the time limit applies only to a \nmotion to \"re-open a plea or sentence.\" The victims are seeking (among other things) rescission \nof an illegal non-prosecution agreement, not reopening of a \"plea or sentence\" — two different \nthings. The Court has previously ruled to this effect, specifically discussing § 3771(d)(5). The \nCourt held that lapthough this particular statutory enforcement provision expressly refers to the \nre-opening of a `plea' or `sentence' — events falling in the post-charge stage of criminal \nproceedings — the court concludes that the statute is properly interpreted impliedly to authorize a \n're-opening' or setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreements made in derogations of the \ngovernment's CRA conferral obligations as well.\" See DE 189 at 8. \nMoreover, on the facts of this case, the Government's construction leads to an absurd \nresult. As the Court is aware, the Government arranged for Epstein to execute his NPA on about \nSeptember 24, 2007 — in secret. At that time, the victims could not \"assert[] the right to be heard \nbefore or during the proceeding,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5) (emphasis added), because no \n\"proceeding\" was held and the Government concealed what it was doing from the victims. And, \nof course, the victims could not have then filed for mandamus appellate review \"within 14 days\" \nbecause the Government did not reveal the NPA until almost a year later, and only then after \nbeing compelled to do so. Section 3771(d)(5) should not be construed to demand the impossible \nof crime victims. \n3 \nEFTA01081441\n", "char_count": 1998}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 4 of 20 \nThe CVRA's legislative history makes clear Congress did not intend for courts to \nconstrue § 3771(d)(5) in the perverse fashion advocated by the Government. Senator Kyl, one of \nthe two co-sponsors of the Act, explained that \"[Oils provision [§ 3771(d)(5)] is not intended to \nprevent courts from vacating decisions in non-trial proceedings, such as proceedings involving \nrelease, delay, plea, or sentencing, in which victims' rights were not protected, and ordering \nthose proceedings to be redone.\" 150 CoNG. REC. 22954 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) \n(emphasis added). He went on to emphasize that \"[l]t is important for victims' rights to be \nasserted and protected throughout the criminal justice process, and for courts to have the \nauthority to redo proceedings such as release, delay, pleas, and sentencings, where victims' \nrights are abridged.\" /d.2\nThe Government also half-heartedly refers to various time limits in 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(d)(3). See DE 290 at 3. But the only time limits applicable to the victims in that provision \nconcern appellate relief after a district court has denied relief. Of course, proceedings before this \nCourt are still continuing — no denial of relief has occurred to trigger any obligation by the \nvictims.3 Simply put, nothing in the CVRA contains any limit that bars Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane \n2 Section 3771(d)(5) also does not bar all of the new victims' claims. By its plain terms, \nthe provision is inapplicable to a request for restitution. The current victims have sought \nrestitution, among other forms of relief, see DE 127 at 15, and the new victims seek to simply \njoin in that claim. \n3 The Government also argues that victims' counsel did not request \"forthwith\" action at \nthe July 11, 2008, hearing in this case. DE 290 at 2 (citing DE 15 (tr. July 11, 2008) at 25-27). \nOf course, at that time the action had been pending for just four days. The Gover\n... [truncated, 2502 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/3 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=3]", "char_count": 2502}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 5 of 20 \nDoe No. 4's motion for joinder in this case. And reading any such limitation into the Act would \nclearly contravene the obvious congressional purpose of giving victims the \"right to participate \nin the system.\" 150 CoNG. REC. 54263 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein), \nIII. \nTHE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND IN 28 U.S.C. § 2401(A) DOES NOT \nAPPLY TO THIS CVRA ENFORCEMENT ACTION. \nThe Government next resorts to a civil statute of limitation as a barrier to the new victims \nprotecting their rights. This effort, too, is unavailing. \nA. A CVRA Enforcement Action is not a \"Civil Action\" Against the United States. \nThe Government contends that the six-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § \n2401(a) bars the new victims' entry into this case. The statute covers \"civil actions,\" providing: \n[E]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless \nthe complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues. The \naction of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim \naccrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases. \nThis provision does not apply to this CVRA enforcement proceeding because it is not a \"civil \naction\" against the Government. To be sure, this Court has determined that convenience dictates \nthat the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure \"govern the general course of this proceeding.\" See \nDE 257 at 3. But that procedural determination does not alter the substance of this case. Indeed, \nthe Government itself takes the position that this CVRA enforcement action is not a civil action, \nbut rather is an \"ancillary criminal proceeding[].\" DE 290 at 2.4 The victims' all agree. Given \nentirely reasonable. Indeed, any other course would have been foolhardy. \n4 The Government's concession readily distinguishes Center for Biological Diversity v. \nHamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/4 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=4]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 6 of 20 \nthe agreement of both sides that this case is a \"criminal\" proceeding, it is hard to understand how \nthere can even be any argument that § 2401(a)'s limitation for \"civil actions\" is applicable. \nConfirming this conclusion is the standard definition of a \"civil action,\" which is \ncommonly defined as \"a noncriminal litigation.\" Black's Law Dictionary 34 (9th ed. 2009) \n(emphasis added). Indeed, as the case law interpreting § 2401(a) makes clear, the phrase 'civil \naction' as used in § 2401(a) is a term of art judicially and statutorily defined as one 'commenced \nby filing a complaint with (a) court.'\" Oppenheim v. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C. Cir. \n1978) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). In this case, the victims never filed a \"complaint.\" Instead, \nthey filed a \"Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act,\" DE 1 — as language in the \nCVRA itself suggests was the proper procedure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (providing that \ncrime victims' rights \"shall be asserted in the district court\" and referring to a \"motion\" to \nprotect rights). \nThe federal courts — including the Eleventh Circuit — have been unwilling to stretch the \nmeaning of the phrase \"civil action\" so far as to cover proceedings ancillary to a criminal case. \nSee, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 832 F.2d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1987) (\"Just in terms of \nthe plain meaning of words, it seems self-evident that an order denying a motion to quash a \nsubpoena issued by a grand jury investigating possible criminal violations is not part of a 'civil \naction.'\"); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir.) (D.C. Cir. 1998) (\"the courts \nhave uniformly concluded that habeas corpus proceedings — and their cousins, section 2255 \nproceedings — are not 'civil actions\"); United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir.) \n(finding deportation proceeding conducted as part of a criminal sentencing not a \"civil actio\n... [truncated, 2113 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/5 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=5]", "char_count": 2113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 7 of 20 \ncriminal\"); In re Apr. 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 584 F.2d 1366, 1368 (6th Cir. 1978) (\"From \na simple reading of the statute itself, it seems self-evident that a grand jury investigation of \npossible criminal tax violations should not be characterized as a `civil action\"); United States v. \nWade, 93 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'ds 255 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (third party \nintervention in criminal proceeding to oppose abatement order was not a \"civil action\" because \n\"as the statute's plain language excludes criminal cases, the Court will not parse criminal cases \ninto criminal and 'civil-like' proceedings\"); Quinn v. Book Named \"Sixty Erotic Drawings From \nJuliett,\" 316 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D. Mass. 1970) (where a proceeding to determine whether book \nis obscene is ancillary to a criminal prosecution and serves to aid in the enforcement of criminal \nlaw, such a proceeding does not come within the term 'civil action\"). \nA crime victim's petition to enforce CVRA rights looks nothing like a conventional civil \naction against the Government. A CVRA enforcement proceeding does not grant any monetary \nrelief to a victim. The CVRA directly bars a victim from \"pursuing a damages action against the \ngovernment for violation of the [CVRA], and there is no implied private right of action under the \n[CVRA].\" 3B Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 932 (4th ed. 2014); see 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(d)(6) (\"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a cause of action for \ndamages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person \nfor the breach of which the United States . . . could be held liable in damages.\"); Cunningham v. \nU.S. Dept of Justice, 961 F. Supp. 2d. 226 (D.D.C. 2013) (\"[The] CVRA expressly disallows a \nsuit for damages against the federal government or its officials . . . and Mr. Cunningham has \nfailed to carry his 'heav\n... [truncated, 2190 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/6 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=6]", "char_count": 2190}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 8 of 20 \nU.S. a \nreL U.S. Prob. Office New York City Staff Breach of Crime Victims Act, 2013 WL \n6673612, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"This petition is brought pursuant to the CVRA, which does \nnot provide for a private right of action.\"). Rather, the CVRA provides crime victims certain \nrights that are related to the prosecution of the accused and sentencing of the guilty. These rights \nare not civil, but criminal in nature. See In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 352 n.8 (6th Cir. 2010) \n(\"The CVRA was not enacted to short circuit civil litigation to those with valid civil remedies \navailable.\"). \nJane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 are seeking to enforce their rights as crime victims \nunder the CVRA — rights that the Government should have provided to them during its criminal \ninvestigation. They are not seeking monetary damages from the government for the violation of \ntheir CVRA rights, but rather invalidation of an illegal non-prosecution agreement that bars \ncriminal prosecution of Epstein and his potential co-conspirators. The victims' rights are \nultimately enforceable in, and inseparable from, a criminal proceeding. Their action is simply \nnot the type of action covered by § 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations for \"civil actions\" \nagainst the Government. \nThe Government complains that the victims' position means that no statute of limitations \napplies to CVRA cases. DE 290 at 506. Not true. The applicable statute of limitations in this \n\"ancillary criminal proceeding\" is to be found (appropriately enough) in the criminal code — i.e., \nTitle 18 — not in the judicial code — Title 28, as the Government's position would have it. Of \ncourse, the CVRA itself is found in Title 18. And for most crimes, the applicable statute of \nlimitations will be the general five-year statute for filing criminal actions, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 — \nshorter than the six-year civil tort statute the Government points to. Th\n... [truncated, 2044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/7 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=7]", "char_count": 2044}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 9 of 20 \nsexual offenses against children, and the Court should therefore look to the specific statute of \nlimitations covering such crimes. See Edwards v. Shalala, 64 F.3d 601, 605 (11th Cir. 1995) \n(\"[I]t appears contrary to the Supreme Court's directives . . . to apply a statute [of limitations] of \ngeneral applicability when there are other more relevant statutory provisions.\"). In 18 U.S.C. § \n3283, Congress has decreed that \"[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude \nprosecution of an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse . . . of a child under the age of \n18 shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child, or for ten years after the offense, \nwhichever is longer.s5 This statute of limitations governs the underlying criminal prosecution \nand thus this related CVRA case. Because this limitation period has not expired, Jane Doe No. 3 \nand 4's motion to join is timely. Indeed, the Government's position would create an absurd \nresult — i.e., that even though the statute of limitations for prosecuting crimes against Jane Doe \nNo. 3 and No. 4 has not yet expired, their ability to protect their CVRA rights in the investigative \nprocess of those crimes has somehow expired! Surely Congress did not intend such a bizarre \nresult that would limit the CVRA's effectiveness. \n5 In 1994, this statute allowed prosecution of an offense against a child up until the child \nreached the age of 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1994). In 2003, Congress passed the Prosecutorial \nRemedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act (the \"PROTECT Act\"), \nwhich further extended the statute of limitations for offenses involving the sexual or physical \nabuse of a child from when the child reaches the age of 25 years to \"during the life of the child.\" \nPub. L 108-21, Title H, § 202, 117 Stat. 660 (Apr. 30, 2003). See Joint Explanatory Statement \nof the Committee of Conferen\n... [truncated, 2571 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/8 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=8]", "char_count": 2571}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 10 of 20 \nB. \nBecause Jane Doe No. 3 Was \"Beyond the Seas\" When Her Action First \nAccrued, She Has Timely Filed Her Motion. \nEven if 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) applies to the new victims' claims, Jane Doe No. 3's claim is \nstill timely. Congress has written an express tolling provision into the statute: \"The action of any \nperson . . . beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years \nafter the disability ceases.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012) (emphasis added). In this case, Jane Doe \nNo. 3 was hiding from Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators in Australia from the time her \nclaim accrued until October 2013, when she returned to the United States. See Ex. I at 3 (\"I was \nin Australia from late 2002 to October 2013. To be clear, I was never in the United States during \nthese years, not even for a short trip to visit my mother.\"). The Court can take judicial notice \nthat the distance from West Palm Beach, Florida, to Sydney, Australia, is 9,364 miles — and that \ntravel between the two points would involve passing over the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, Jane \nDoe 3 was plainly \"beyond the seas\" when the events giving rise to her claim occurred, and the \nrunning of the limitations period, if applicable, did not begin until she returned to Florida about \n16 months ago, in October 2013. Jane Doe 3 has therefore filed her action within the three-year \ntime period specified by § 2401(a) for persons returning to this country from beyond the seas. \nConfirming the commonsense conclusion that Jane Doe No. 3 was beyond the seas, \nBlack's Law Dictionary (9ih ed. 2009) defines \"beyond [the] seas\" as: \"(Of a person) \nBeing absent from a jurisdiction or nation; out of the country, esp. across the ocean.\"6\nMoreover, Congress first crafted the \"beyond the seas\" language in 1911, when it plainly \nreferred to persons living outside the United States. The original tolling provision provided: \n6\n... [truncated, 2106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/9 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=9]", "char_count": 2106}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 11 of 20 \nProvided, That the claims of married women, first accrued during marriage, of \npersons under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, and of \nidiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim \naccrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the suit be brought with three \nyears after the disability has ceased.... \nAct of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, para. 20, 36 Stat. 1093 (emphasis added). The decisive \nquestion when construing a statute is what did the words mean \"at the time of the statute's \nenactment.\" Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd..., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (2012). In 1911, the \nphrase \"beyond the seas\" clearly embraced persons who were outside the United States, as \nprevious court decisions had held. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Baker, 16 U.S. 541, 545 (1818) \n(concluding that \"the words 'beyond [the) seas' must be held to the equivalent to 'without the \nlimits of the state\"). \nIn 1948, Congress saw fit to re-codify this provision into Title 28 of the United States \nCode and replaced the statutory references to minors and mentally disabled persons with the \nconsolidated term \"under a legal disability.\" See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 \nStat. 971 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.0 § 2401(a)). But Congress chose to leave the words \n\"beyond the seas\" unaltered — with the result that they continue to have the same meaning as \nthey had in 1911. See IA SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22:33 (7th ed.) \n(\"Provisions of the original act or section which are repeated in the body of an amendment, \neither in the same or equivalent words, are a continuation of the original law\"). \nCongress knows how to write statutes of limitations that do not toll the limitations period \nfor persons \"beyond the seas.\" Cf 18 U.S.C. 2255(b) (containing a tolling provision for crime \nvictims \"under a legal disability,\" but not \n... [truncated, 2128 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/10 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=10]", "char_count": 2128}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 12 of 20 \nWhere Congress has deliberately chosen to toll the running of the limitations period while a \nclaimant is \"beyond the seas,\" as in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), a court lacks the power to narrow the \nscope of the plain meaning of that phrase. See CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 \nF.3d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) (cautioning against allowing \"clearly expressed legislative \ndecisions... [to] be subject to the policy predilections of judges.\"). \nThe Government may try to argue that, in its view, this tolling provision is now somehow \noutdated, given the arrival of technology permitting less expensive international telephone calls \nand the like. But the Government's opinion about whether this tolling provision remains sound \npublic policy is beside the point. Courts do not exist to \"update\" statutes in light of the latest \ntechnological developments. See Myers v. TooJay's Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th \nCir. 2011) (courts \"are not licensed to practice statutory remodeling\"); Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't \nof Corrs., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir.2002) (\"Our function is to apply statutes, to carry out \nthe expression of the legislative will that is embodied in them, not to `improve' statutes by \naltering them.\"); see also Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332, 1351-52 (11th Cir. \n1999) (Edmonson, J., dissenting) (\"it is the qualities of the text when it was written — and not our \nresponse to it as modern readers — that must be our guide. . . . [W]hat we personally might like \nthis statute to mean . . . in the light of current circumstances . . . has no rightful place in our work \n. . . .\"). Whether to modernize a statute is Congress' decision. See City of Greenwood, Miss. v. \nPeacock, 384 U.S. 808, 834 (1966) (\"[1]f changes are to be made in the long-settled \ninterpretation of the provisions of this century-old . . . statute, it is for Congress and not for this \nCourt to\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/11 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=11]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 13 of 20 \n\"beyond the seas\" — i.e., outside of the borders of the United States — and section 2401(a)'s \nstatute of limitations was tolled.?\nC. \nBecause Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 Were Unaware of Their Ability \nto File a CVRA Action Until Recently, They Timely Filed Their Motions. \nIn arguing that the statute of limitation has lapsed in this case for Jane Doe No. 3, the \nGovernment apparently starts the six-year clock running on September 3, 2008, when the U.S. \nAttorney's Office sent a letter to her in Australia. See DE 290 at 3 (citing letter attached as DE \n290-1).8 But that letter did not clearly communicate that a CVRA cause of action existed. To \nthe contrary, the letter was quite misleading about what was happening. The Government told \nJane Doe No. 3 only that \"there has been litigation between the United States and two other \nvictims regarding the disclosure of the entire agreement between the United States and Mr. \nEpstein.\" DE 290-1 at 3 (emphasis added). \nBut the litigation did not involve disclosing the \nagreement; rather the goal was invalidating the agreement. The Government's intentionally \ndeceptive description confused Jane Doe No. 3, who states that \"[u]nderstanding more about that \n[CVRA) case now, I realize that the letter did not explain that the real purpose of that litigation \nwas not to get `disclosure of the entire agreement' but instead to get criminal charges filed \nagainst Epstein and to uphold the rights of Epstein's victims. I wish that the Government had \n7 This case does not present any occasion for the Court to consider how § 2401(a)'s \nstatute of limitations applies when a person is voluntarily absent from the United States. As Jane \nDoe No. 3 attests in her affidavit, she was involuntarily outside of the United States because she \nwas concealing herself from Epstein. See Ex. 1 at 3 (\"my absence from the United States was \nnot voluntary — I was hiding\n... [truncated, 2433 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/12 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=12]", "char_count": 2433}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 14 of 20 \ntold me that was what was really going on.\" Ex. 1 at 5-6. Given this deception, the Court should \nnot conclude — on the basis of mere pleadings — that Jane Doe No. 3's obligation to file began on \nSeptember 3, 2008. Finally, the September letter informed Doe 3 to call an attorney in Miami \nwho was assigned her representation by the Government through the NPA. That firm had to \nwork within the confines of that Government assignment and direction and therefore could not, \nand did not, inform Jane Doe No. 3 of a right to participate in this CVRA case which was aimed \nat invalidating the very agreement through which this law firm was mandated to operate. \nThe Government's position regarding Jane Doe No. 4 is also mystifying. \nThe \nGovernment asserts that she had legal representation \"as early as 2012.\" DE 290 at 9. Of \ncourse, that date falls well inside the six-year period of limitations, so her claim would not be \ntime barred in any event. \nIV. \nTHE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES NO PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST \nRULE 21 JOINDER. \nFor the reasons just explained, neither the CVRA nor 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) provides any \nbarrier to Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 joining this case. As a result, the path would seem \nto be clear for the Court to simply grant the current victims' motion for joining the new victims \nunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The Government, however, has several other arguments that it throws \nout. None of them is persuasive. \nPerhaps recognizing that Rule 21 broadly allows for the addition of new parties, the \nGovernment contends that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not even govern this action. \nProceeding from the premise that this case is an \"ancillary criminal proceeding\" (DE 290 at 2), \n14 \nEFTA01081452\n", "char_count": 1817}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 15 of 20 \nthe Government points out that the Rules of Criminal Procedure lack a provision for adding new \nparties. Thus, the Government concludes, that no parties can be added here. Id. \nThe Government's hyper-technical argument suffers from two clear flaws. First, the \nCourt has already ruled that, as to procedural matters in this case, the civil rules govern. See DE \n257 at 3 (\"As this Court has previously indicated, see DE 190, the Federal Rules of Civil \nProcedure govern the general course of this proceeding.\"); see also Local Rule 88.9 (motions in \ncriminal cases governed by Local Rule 7.1, which parallels Fed. R. Civ. P. 7). Second and more \nfundamentally, the Government's crabbed interpretation of the CVRA would mean that a new \nvictim should never be allowed to join a previously-filed CVRA action. This position is belied \nnot only by the clear intent of Congress to create enforceable rights for crime victims, but also by \nthe Government's own action in previously agreeing to Jane Doe No. 2's motion to join the case. \nSee DE 15 (tr. July 11, 2008) at 14 (Court: \"[D]o you have any objection to Jane Doe 2 being \nadded as a petitioner in this case?\" Government counsel: \"No, I don't.\"). Clearly, as the \nGovernment's own previous agreement demonstrates, some procedural device should allow a \nnew victim to be added to a previously-filed CVRA case, as otherwise the court's docket could \nbe unnecessarily cluttered with separate actions. \nAs a fallback, the Government advances the claim that the rule of civil procedure \ncontrolling the pending motion is not Rule 21 (regarding joinder of parties), but rather Rule 15 \n(regarding amendments to pleadings). See DE 290 at 2. The Government's argument does not \nsquare with the plain language of the two provisions. While Rule 15 deals with amending \npleadings, Rule 21 specifically indicates that, upon motion, the Court has power to \"add . . . a \nparty\"\n... [truncated, 2100 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/14 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=14]", "char_count": 2100}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 16 of 20 \nappropriate for the Court to resolve the issue under Rule 21. As one court has explained, \"Any \nconflict or ambiguity which results from a comparison of [Rule 15(a) and Rule 21] ... must be \nresolved in favor of the specific and against the general. Thus, when a proposed amendment to a \ncomplaint seeks to effect a change in the parties to the action, Rule 21 ... controls and, to that \nextent, limits Rule 15(a).\" Intl Broth. of Teamsters v. AFL-CIO, 32 F.R.D. 441, 442 (RD. \nMich. 1963). While the Government cites three cases allowing the addition of new parties \nthrough Rule 15 (DE 290 at 102), none of these cases address the issue of whether Rule 15 or \nRule 21 is the proper vehicle to do so. Most cases that have discussed directly which of the two \nrules applies have concluded that Rule 21 is the appropriate vehicle for adding a party. See, e.g., \nSouth Dakota ex reL S. Dakota R.R. Auth. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d \n919, 924 (D.S.D. 2003) (\"Pleadings and Motions are dealt with under Part HI of the Rules [i.e., \nRules 8 to 16]. Parties are dealt with under Part IV of the Rules [i.e., Rules 17-25]. If a plaintiff \ncould simply add a party by amending the complaint, there would be no purpose for Rule 19 . . . \n.\"); Joseph v. House, 353 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom. Joseph v. Blair, 482 F.2d \n575 (4th Cir. 1973) (\"Rule 21 . . . provides that parties to an action may be added by order of the \nCourt at any stage of the proceedings. This rule precludes the plaintiffs from being able to file \ntheir amended complaint as of right, which they seek to do. The plaintiffs would ordinarily be \nable to do so under Rule 15(a).\"). \nBecause the Government has refused to stipulate to Jane Doe No. 3's and Jane Doe No. \n4's entry into the case, the victims are contemporaneously filing with this reply a protective \nmotion for amendment under Rule 15 to add the new \n... [truncated, 2138 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/15 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=15]", "char_count": 2138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 17 of 20 \nThe Court should apply Rule 21 and allow Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 to be \nadded to this case at this time. It is well-settled that \"[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward \nentertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder \nof claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.\" United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, \n383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). As discussed in Part I, above, the Government had not contested the \nreasons that support joining the new victims into this case. Instead, the Government's only \narguments pertain to the timing of the motion. But Rule 21 itself makes clear that new parties \ncan be added \"at any time.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. And the cases clearly demonstrate the joinder is \nappropriate, even at very late stages of a proceeding, if justice will be served. See, e.g., Data \nGeneral Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D. Mass. 1993) (where \ncommon question of fact existed about plaintiff student suing under the Civil Rights and two \nother students who were not parties to the suit, it was appropriate for the court to join the two \nother students at the conclusion of the trial when a portion of the relief request was granted). \nOf course, this case is not at a late stage, but is still in a discovery phase. \nThe Government's arguments about undue delay and prejudice are meritless, as the \nvictims discuss in their concurrently-filed motion for amendment under Rule 15.9 But for \npurposes of this Rule 21 motion, one point is decisive. If the Court does not allow the new \nvictims to join this CVRA enforcement action, then they intend to file their own, separate \nenforcement actions. Because there is no statute of limitations for doing so, the separate actions \nwould be proper. But the separate actions would produce entirely duplicative litigation over the \n9 The victims specifically adopt and i\n... [truncated, 2138 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA01081439/16 or ?id=EFTA01081439&page=16]", "char_count": 2138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 18 of 20 \nsame set of facts. This reality should be the decisive factor in favor of allowing joinder here. \nSee Hawkins v. Fulton Oily., 95 F.R.D. 88, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (allowing new parties to be \nadded under Rule 21 because denying motion \"would only result in the filing of a second, \npossibly duplicative suit. This Court is duty bound to prevent that sort of duplication of effort \nwhich is a waste of judicial resources.\"). Indeed, allowing joinder will clearly reduce litigation \nburdens — on both the Court and the Government. The motion seeks to have the new victims \nadded into this action, conditioned on the requirement that they not re-litigate any issues \npreviously litigated. Of course, if Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 were to file new lawsuits, \nthey would not be subject to any such restriction. \nAllowing joinder in this action is clearly consistent with the Crime Victims' Rights Act. \nThe CVRA — the most specific directive to this Court — commands that the Court \"shall ensure \nthat the crime victim is afforded the rights described [in the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1) \n(emphasis added). Congress intended that \"the courts of this country . . . will be responsible for \nenforcing\" victims' rights provided in the CVRA. 150 CoNG. REC. 22953 (Oct. 9, 2004) \n(statement of Sen. Kyl). The best way the Court can \"ensure\" that Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe \nNo. 4's rights are afforded is by allowing them to join this enforcement action. The Court should \naccordingly allow them to join. \nCONCLUSION \nJane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 should be allowed to join Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane \nDoe No. 2 in this action, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The \njoinder should be conditioned on the requirement that Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 not re-\nlitigate any issues previously litigated by Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2. \n18 \nEFTA01081456\n", "char_count": 1971}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 19 of 20 \nDATED: February 6, 2015 \nRespectfully Submitted, \n/s/ Bradley J. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, \nEDWARDS. FIST \n& LEHRMAN, P.L. \nand \nPaul G. Cassell \nPro Hac Vice \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah.\nAttorneys for the victims \nThis daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence \npurposes only and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah \n19 \nEFTA01081457\n", "char_count": 550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01081439", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 20 of 20 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI certify that the foregoing document was served on February 6, 2015, on the following \nusing the Court's CM/ECF system: \n1)e.xNiteanr Lee \neVillafana\nAttorneys for the Government \nThomas Scott \nthomas.scott@csklegal.com \nCOLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. \nor\nDadeland Centre II \n-and-\nKendall Coffey \nkcoffey@coffeyburlington.com \nGabriel Groisman \nBeniamin H. Brodsky \nOFFEY BURLINGTON P.L. \nAttorneys for Alan Dershowitz \n/s/ Bradley J. Edwards \n20 \nEFTA01081458\n", "char_count": 569}]}