{"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_count": 6, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01037380", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA01037380.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "From: Edward Epstein la \nTo: Jeff Epstein <jccracation@gmail.com> \nSubject: FYI \nDate: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 13:23:10 40000 \nHi Jcff \nthought this might interest you \nA Question of Motive \nRussia wasn't trying to elect a particular candidate: Vladimir Putin wanted to delegitimize our \nelections. above all. \nEdward Jay Epstein \nJuly 31. 2017 \nPolitics and law \nThe 2016 presidential campaign was marked by three disclosure operations, all of which \nappear to have had a single author. \"Oppo research\" is the euphemism commonly used in \nelections for such operations. The mechanism is fairly simple: dirt is obtained from \nwherever it can be found to discredit an opponent. It is then \"leaked,\" usually either \nanonymously or on background, to targeted media channels. What makes the 2016 \ncampaign particularly interesting from a counterintelligence perspective is not that both \nsides had their own disclosure operations, but that both sides were offered the din for \nthem by a common source: Russian intelligence. \nAs we now know from the emails of Donald Trump Jr., a thinly veiled intermediary, \nNatalya Veselnitskaya, offered the Trump campaign documents that putatively would \nshow that Hillary Clinton had received illegal donations from Russian financiers; in the \nevent, no such documents were proffered. But it is a reasonable assumption that \nVeselnitskaya could not have made such an offer, especially in a meeting attended by \nthree other Russians, unless the move was approved by the FSB, the Russian security \nservice. \nA second disclosure operation, this one involving supporters of the Clinton campaign, \nwas more layered. The proximate intermediary was Fusion GPS, a research firm used by \nthe law finn Baker Hostetler, and the secondary \"cut-out\" was the British firm Orbis, co-\nfounded by former MI-6 officer Christopher Steele. We know something about this sub-\ncontractor from the depositions Steele gave in defending a libel suit in London. \nAccording to Steele, Fusion GPS not only had him prepare the so-called \"dossier\" on \nTrump but also directed Steele to \"leak\" it to specified reporters at Mother \nJones, Yahoo, the New York Times, the Washington Post, The New Yorker, and CNN. In \nsome cases, Steele was directed to brief the selected journalists personally. The dirt in \nthese \"leaks\" relied heavily on information supplied by two Russian government sources: \nSource A, whom Steele calls \"a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure\"; and Source B, \n\"a former top-level intelligence officer still active in the Kremlin.\" Sources A and B \nprovided information supposedly exposing a long-time Russian FSB operation to get \ncompromising information that could be used to control Trump. The idea that two \nEFTA01037380\n", "char_count": 2740}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Russian intelligence sources would reveal a long-time Kremlin-backed FSB operation \nbears further examination. \nMichael Morell, a former acting CIA director, casts light on the sourcing of the dirt in the \nSteele dossier. \"I had two questions when I first read [the dossier],\" Morell said in an \nNBC interview. \"One was, how did Chris [Steele] talk to these sources? I have \nsubsequently learned that he used intermediaries. I asked myself, why did these guys \nprovide this information, what was their motivation? And I subsequently learned that he \npaid them. That the intermediaries paid the sources and the intermediaries got the money \nfrom Chris.\" \nPaying ex-FSB officers for sensitive information? As Steele is no doubt aware, there is \nno such thing as an er-FSB officer. All Russian intelligence officers, whether currently or \nformerly employed, if in Russia, operate under the same tough security regime. The \nselling of secret information by them is espionage, pure and simple. Selling it to someone \nconnected to an adversary intelligence service greatly compounds the crime. Sources A \nand B (through their intermediaries) knew that they were dealing with an ex-MI.6 man \nwho could use their betrayal of secrets against them. The only safe way for A and B to \nprovide the requested dirt would be to clear it with the security regime at the FSB. This \nprecaution, a required step in such exchanges, would mean that the din in the dossier, \nwhether true or false, was curated by the FSB and spoon-fed to Steele. If so, the FSB was \nthe surreptitious provider of this part of the Steele dossier. \nThe third disclosure operation involved stolen emails from the DNC bearing on the \nunfair treatment by Democratic Party officials of Bernie Sanders, which were posted on \nthe DC Leaks website. President Obama identified the Kremlin as the author of this \noperation, saying \"These data theft and disclosure activities could only have been \ndirected by the highest levels of the Russian government.\" If so, as in the previous cases, \nthe FSB would have curated the dirt. To be sure, oppo-research operatives, because of \ntheir singular focus on getting usable slime, are highly vulnerable to shady offers, but \nwhy would Russia so blatantly feed the slime to all sides in a campaign? \nThe United States has a wide array of tools for monitoring Russian intelligence, \nincluding the world's most sophisticated sensors for intercepting signals, but discovering \nthe Kremlin's motives remains an elusive enterprise because, unlike in a scientific \ninquiry, one cannot fully trust the observable data. While a scientist can safely assume \nthat the microbes he observes through the lens of a microscope are not employing guile \nto mislead him, an intelligence analyst cannot make similar assumptions about the \ncontent of intercepted communications from Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do \nnot know that the channel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the \ndefection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—then the \nintelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the Kremlin's activities and motive. If, \nhowever, it is understood that the Russians know that a channel is being monitored, the \ninformation conveyed over it can be considered a disclosure operation. \nIf, for example, a Mafia family finds out that the FBI is tapping its telephone lines, it can \nuse those lines to burn its rivals. The Kremlin can also use a knowntapped phone line to \nits advantage. Consider, for example, the tapped phone of Russian ambassador Sergey \nKislyak. On December I, 2016, Kislyak went to Trump Tower to meet Jared Kushner \nand Michael Flynn. According to Kushner's version of that meeting, Kislyak suggested \nthat Russian generals could supply information about Russian military operations in \nSyria on the condition that the Trump transition team provide a \"secure line in the \ntransition office.\" Of course, as Kislyak likely knew, transition teams don't have secure \nlines to Moscow. Kushner responded by asking if the Russian embassy could supply such \na \"secure line.\" Kislyak then used an open phone line at his embassy to relay Kushner's \nEFTA01037381\n", "char_count": 4194}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "response to his foreign ministry in Moscow. It is inconceivable that Kislyak did not know \nthat the call would be monitored by the FBI, since the FBI had routinely listened in on \nthese lines for the past 68 years, or that his discussion of Kushner's request would set off \nalarm bells in the intelligence community. \nIf Kislyak had wanted to hide this exchange from U.S. intelligence, he could have easily \nsent it under diplomatic cover directly to Moscow, used a secure line, or relayed it in a \ncoded fashion. By communicating the message en clear, or in plaintext, Kislyak skillfully \nexposed Kushner's incredibly stupid response, which he himself had provoked, to stoke \ndistrust about the incoming president within the U.S. intelligence community. Nor was \nthis the only mistrust Kislyak cultivated: the conversations on the monitored phone led to \nthe firing of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and conversations that Kislyak \nhad with Attorney General Jeff Sessions led to Sessions's recusing himself from the \nRussian investigation, which has now driven a wedge between President Trump and one \nof his most effective and popular cabinet members. \nKislyak's resume indicates that he is a well-regarded and competent player in the game \nof nations: he has served as Second Secretary of the Soviet UN mission in New York, \nFirst Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Deputy Director of the Soviet \nDepartment of International Organizations in Moscow, Permanent Russian representative \nto NATO in Brussels, Deputy Foreign Minister, and Ambassador to the United States. \nNothing in his 37-year career, either during or after the Cold War, suggests that his \nmoves are not aligned with Kremlin strategy. \nBut when it comes to the various disclosures and interventions surrounding the 2016 \nelection, what exactly was that strategy? \nIn a report issued on January 6, 2017, entitled \"Assessing Russian Activities and \nIntentions in Recent U.S. Elections,\" the U.S. intelligence community concluded, based \nboth on its sources and its analysis of stories on the Russian-controlled network RT, that \nPutin wanted to hurt Clinton, help Trump, and discredit the American election. These \nmay well have been motives of the Russian president, but the narrowly focused \nassessment fails to explain, or even take into account, Kislyak's post-election \nensnarement of Kushner, or the discrediting dirt against Trump. If Putin had really \nwanted to help Trump win the election, why did Russian sources provide damaging dirt \nto Steele, which could have cost Trump the election? Why did Kislyak provide the FBI \nwith information, via a known tapped line, that could (and did) compromise key \nmembers of Trump's administration? \nA wider focus can be found, of all places, in Oliver Stone's revealing, if fawning, four-\nhour interview with Putin, in which the Russian dictator makes clear that he views \nAmerican hegemony, including America's standing and respect in the international \ncommunity, as a threat that Russia must counter. One way to undermine America's \nstanding is to provide disclosures that can be used by its own political factions, and the \nmedia, to sow distrust in America's reliability as a democracy founded on transparency. \nPutin tells the truth when he says that it doesn't matter particularly to Russia whether \nClinton or Trump won the election: his goal was to install doubt in the legitimacy of the \nprocess, regardless of how it turned out. \nEdward Jay Epstein c most recent book is How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward \nSnowden, the Man and the Theft, published by Alfred A. Knopf in January. \nEFTA01037382\n", "char_count": 3644}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "EFTA01037383\n", "char_count": 13}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "EFTA01037384\n", "char_count": 13}, {"efta_number": "EFTA01037380", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "EFTA01037385\n", "char_count": 13}]}