{"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_count": 13, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00792289", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00792289.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA \nTHIRD DISTRICT \nDCA CASE NO.: 3D18-1997 \nL.T. CASE NO.: 2014-021348 CA 01 \nRECEIVED, 11/5/2018 4:55 PM, Mary Cay Blanks, Third District Court of Appeal \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nAppellant/Defendant, \nVS. \nJEAN-LUC BRUNEL, individually, \nand MC2 MODEL & TALENT MIAMI, LLC, \nAppellees/Plaintiffs. \n \nI \nANSWER BRIEF OF APPELLEES/PLAINTIFFS \nOn Appeal from a Non-Final Order of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial \nCircuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida \nJoe Titone \nAttorney for Appellant \nFlorida Bar No. 203882 \n62 1SE 5th Street \nPompano Beach, FL 33060 \nPhone: (954)729-6490 \njoetitone708@comcast.net \n1 \nEFTA00792289\n", "char_count": 671}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES \n \n4 \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS \n \n5 \nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT \n \n7 \nARGUMENT \n \n8 \nStandard of Review \n \n8 \nIntroduction \n \n8 \nI. \nThe process server's affidavit \ndoes not definitively rule out \nthe possibility that two prior \nattempts were made at service \nat Epstein's place of business  \nII. \nThe process servers' affidavit \ndoes not definitively reflect \nthat the person served with \nprocess at Defendant's place of \nbusiness was not the person \nin charge of the business \n8 \n9 \nIII. \nF.S. 48.031(1)(a) does not \nexplicitly require an averment \non the return of service that \nthe person served was \norally informed of the \npapers' contents.  \n \n10 \n2 \nEFTA00792290\n", "char_count": 722}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "IV. \nEpstein's place of business \nis a valid place to serve \nhim individually, as the \nlegislature could not have \nintended an individual \nto be essentially beyond \nthe reach of legal service of \nprocess, as in the instant case. \n10 \nCONCLUSION \n \n11 \nCERTIICATE OF SERVICE \n \n12 \nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE \n \n13 \n3 \nEFTA00792291\n", "char_count": 330}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nBoca Stel2 LLC vs. JP Morgan ChaseBank National Association, \n159 So.3d 140, 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) \n8 \nDelaney v. Tobias, \n10 \n26 So.3d 77, 80 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2010) \nHull v. Lending House, Inc., \n10 \n19 So.3d 404 (Fla. 3'd DCA 2009) \nLinville v.Home Say. Of America, FSB, \n10 \n629 So.2d 295,296 (Fla. 4'h DCA 1993) \nSnowden v. Wells Fargo Bank, \n8 \n172 So.3d 506, 507 (Fla. 1s' DCA 2015) \nFlorida Statute 48.031(1)(a) \n7, 10 \nFlorida Statute 48.031(2)(b) \n8,9 \n4 \nEFTA00792292\n", "char_count": 499}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS \nThe Amended Complaint in this case was filed on January 26, 2015. \n(Defendant's App. A). After an unsuccessful attempt to serve Defendant Epstein \n(Epstein) at his New York residential address, (in which his housekeeper answered \nthe door) Epstein successfully moved to quash the service of process against him \n(Defendant's App. C, p.24). Brunel then requested leave to serve Epstein, which \nthe trial court granted on October 5, 2016 (Defendant's App. E, p.48). The trial \ncourt gave Brunel 120 days to properly serve Epstein. Id. Brunel properly served \nEpstein at his Virgin Islands business address on November 17, 2016 (Defendant's \nApp. F, p.52). This service was well within the 120 day limit set by the trial court \nin its order granting Brunel leave to serve Epstein (Defendant's App. E, p.48). \nAdditionally, Brunel did not serve Epstein at his home address in the Virgin \nIslands, as Epstein lives on his own private island (Little St. James), which is \ninaccessible to the public (Defendant's App. F, p.62-65). \nAfter Epstein's counsel at that time wrote to the undersigned on December \n2, 2016, stating that service on Epstein in the Virgin Islands was improper, \n(Defendant's App. H, p.106), Brunel then filed a Motion for Ruling on Service of \nProcess on March 16, 2017 (Defendant's App. G). Epstein then filed a motion to \nquash the service or dismiss until March 30, 2017 (Defendant's App. H,I,J). \ns \nEFTA00792293\n", "char_count": 1473}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Finally, on October 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a follow-up Motion for Ruling \non Service of Process on Epstein (Defendant's App. K). Epstein then filed a \nMotion in Opposition. (Defendant's App. L). The trial court heard both motions \non September 14, 2018, and correctly ruled in favor of Brunel (Defendant's App. \nM). \n6 \nEFTA00792294\n", "char_count": 337}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT \nPlaintiffs' service upon Defendant Jeffrey Epstein comes with the \npresumption of validity from the trial court. In addition: \n• First, the record as reflected in Defendant's Appendix, does not necessarily \nrule out the fact that at least two prior attempts were made to serve \nDefendant at his place of business. \n• Second, the record does not definitively reflect that the person served with \nprocess at Defendant's place of business was not the person in charge of the \nbusiness. \n• Third, the plain language of F.S. 48.031(1)(a) does not explicitly require an \naverment on the return of service that the person served was orally informed \nof the papers' contents. \n• Fourth, Epstein's place of business is a valid place to serve him individually, \nas the legislature could not have intended an individual to be essentially \nbeyond the reach of legal service of process, as in the instant case. \nIf this Court believes that the above points could be construed in Plaintiff \nBrunel's favor, then an affirmance of the trial court judgment, or at the very \nleast, a reversal and remand for an evidentiary hearing, is warranted. \n7 \nEFTA00792295\n", "char_count": 1170}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "ARGUMENT \nStandard of Review \n\"A trial court's ruling on a motion to quash service of process is subject to a \nde novo standard of review.\" Boca Stel2 LLC vs. JP Morgan ChaseBank National \nAssociation, 159 So.3d 140, 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). \nINTRODUCTION \nThe trial court's ruling in favor of Brunel comes with a presumption of \ncorrectness. \"It is well-settled that \"the burden is on the appellant to make \nreversible error appear.\" Snowden v. Wells Fargo Bank, 172 So.3d 506, 507 (Fla. \n1 g DCA 2015). \"Even under a de novo standard of review, the trial court's final \njudgment \"has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to \ndemonstrate error.\" Id. Defendant's appendix is not accompanied by a transcript \nof the hearing, so appellate review is limited to this appendix. Id at 508. \nI. \nThe process server's affidavit does not definitively rule out the \npossibility that two prior attempts were made at service at Epstein's place of \nbusiness \nFlorida Statute 48.031(2)(b) states in relevant part that service upon the \nperson in charge of the business at the time is permissible of service if two \nattempts to serve the owner have been made at the place of business. In the instant \ncase, the affidavit of the process server reflects that an attempt was made to serve \nEpstein's place of business in the Virgin Islands (Defendant's App. F, p.52). It \n8 \nEFTA00792296\n", "char_count": 1399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "does not state that two previous attempts were made to serve Epstein himself; \nhowever, the statute does not explicitly require the server to affirmatively state that \nprevious attempts were made. F.S. 48.031(2)(b). Accordingly, the affidavit is not \nfatally flawed in this manner, despite Epstein's claims to the contrary. However, \nshould this Court require evidence of two prior attempts at service upon Epstein \nhimself, then a remand for an evidentiary hearing would be appropriate. Linville \nv.Home Say. Of America. FSB, 629 So.2d 295,296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The \nprocess server could testify under oath as to any prior attempts he made to serve \nEpstein himself. The testimony would definitively clear up any issues as to the \nnumber of attempts to serve Epstein himself at his place of business. \nII. The process servers' affidavit does not definitively reflect that the person \nserved with process at Defendant's place of business was not the person in \ncharge of the business. \nThe affidavit of the process server clearly states that the person served, \nJeanne Brenna, was the office manager at Epstein's place of business at the time \nservice was made (Defendant's App. F, p.52). Defendant's argument that this was \nmerely a title conferred by the process server is unavailing, as nothing in F.S. \n48.031(2)(b) explicitly states that the process server must affirmatively provide \nidentification of the person served. Jeanne Brenna could have introduced herself to \nthe process server as the office manager, and the server could've noted her title as \nsuch. Should this Court require more evidence as to the role of Jeanne Brenna, an \n9 \nEFTA00792297\n", "char_count": 1663}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "evidentiary hearing where the process server testifies is an option. Linville v.Home \nSay. Of America, FSB,at 296. \nIII. \nF.S. 48.031(11(a) does not explicitly require an averment on the return \nof service that the person served was orally informed of the papers' contents. \nDefendant's argument that the person served in the instant case was not \ninformed of the contents of the papers left at the office has no merit. F.S. \n48.031(1)(a) does not require the affidavit to explicitly reflect the fact that the \nperson being served was informed of the papers' contents. This is an issue that the \ntrial court was in the best position to determine. \nIV. \nEpstein's place of business is a valid place to serve him individually, as \nthe legislature could not have intended an individual to be essentially beyond \nthe reach of legal service of process, as in the instant case. \nEpstein was served at the Office of the Southern Trust Company, Inc. \n(Defendant's Appendix F, p.52). There was no access to his island place of abode, \n\"The process server could not gain access to the property by any reasonable means \nto serve the papers personally.\" Hull v. Lending House. Inc. 19 So.3d 404 (Fla. 3rd\nDCA 2009). There was no direct access to the property. Id. \"...[I]itigants have \nthe right to choose their abodes; they do not have the right to control who may sue \nor serve them by denying them physical access.\" Delancy v. Tobias, 26 So.3d 77, \n80 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2010). \"...there is no rule of law which requires that the officers \nof the court be able to breach the self-imposed isolation in order to inform the \ndefendant that a suit is filed against him.\"). Id. Plaintiff properly resorted to \n10 \nEFTA00792298\n", "char_count": 1708}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "substituted service on Defendant Epstein. Id. Additionally, Defendant Epstein \ntravels by private jet. Federal aviation rules prevent public access to a passenger \non a private jet, whether arriving or departing (Defendant's Appendix G, p.96). \nIn the instant case, Epstein is de facto avoiding proper service of process by \nhis self-imposed lifestyle. There is simply no way to properly serve him, as he is \nnot the owner of a sole proprietorship. This could not possibly have been the result \nthe Legislature intended, as they did not contemplate lifestyles like Epstein's. \nCONCLUSION \nPlaintiffs request the following relief from this Court: \n• First, an affirmance of the trial court order stating that service of process on \nDefendant Epstein was proper; or \n• Second, a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to resolve any \nissues as stated above that this Court believes are in need of clarification; \nand \n• Third, any other relief this Court deems fit to award to Plaintiff. \n11 \nEFTA00792299\n", "char_count": 1018}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was served by electronic mail \nto the Appellant's counsel: \nLINK & ROCKENBACH, PA \nCounsel for Appellant \n1555 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., Suite 930 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n(561) 847-4408 telephone \n(561) 855-2891 facsimile \nKara Berard Rockenbach, Esq. \nPE: \nScott J. Link Es . \nPE: \n2E: \n2E: \nthis 6 day of November 2018. \n12 \n/s/ Joe Titone \nJoe Titone \nAttorney for Appellant \nFlorida Bar No. 203882 \n62 1SE 5th Street \nPompano Beach, FL 33060 \nPhone: \nEFTA00792300\n", "char_count": 540}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00792289", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that this brief complies with Florida Rule of Appellate \nProcedure 9.210(a) (2), requiring fourteen-point Times New Roman Font. \n/s/ Joe Titone \nJoe Titone \nAttorney for Appellant \nFlorida Bar No. 203882 \n62 1SE 5th Street \nPompano Beach, FL 33060 \nPhone: \n13 \nEFTA00792301\n", "char_count": 318}]}