{"efta_number": "EFTA00769737", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00769737", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00769737.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00769737", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Grant title: THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIVERSAL MORAL \nPIs: \nMarc Hauser, PI \nWalter Sinnott-Armstrong, \nAssociated Researchers: \nAntonio Damasio \nKieran Healy \nRay Jackendoff \nJohn Mikhail \nRichard Shweder \nElizabeth Spelke \nCognitive Science \nCo-PI \nPhilosophy \nNeuroscience \nSociology \nLinguistics \nLaw \nAnthropology \nDevelopmental \nGRAMMAR \nPsychology \nThe scientific study of moral beliefs, emotions, deliberation, and \ndecision was born only recently, but it is growing fast and has the \npotential to play a pivotal role in not only basic scientific \ndiscoveries of mind and brain, but in policy, education and law. So far \nthis new field consists largely of disjointed studies of disparate \nmoral phenomena using different methods. The history of scientific \nendeavors suggests that progress in the science of moral judgment would \nbe greatly facilitated by developing and testing a detailed general \nmodel that provides a coherent picture of various aspects of our moral \nfaculty or faculties. Even if this initial model turns out not to be \ncompletely adequate, it would still promote the development of \ncontrasting models and thereby stimulate successful science in the long \nrun. \nOne prominent candidate for a model of moral judgment is the \nlinguistic analogy. Taking its cue from Chomsky, this hypothesis claims \nthat a set of unconscious and inaccessible principles or rules govern \nhow we judge what is morally forbidden, permissible, or obligatory and \npossibly also what is morally good or bad. The underlying principles \nare abstract (i.e., no specific content) with cross-cultural variation \nentering at the level of parametric variation so that local culture \ndetermines a particular setting out of a limited set of options, as \nwith languages. \nLittle is known about the nature of these moral principles and \nparameters, but the general picture provided by the linguistic analogy \nraises a series of fascinating questions and predictions that are \nreadily tested with current empirical tools. Specifically, if our \ncapacity for moral judgment is guided by a set of abstract principles \nand parameters, then: \n• What is the content of these moral principles and parameters? \nHow many principles are there? How many parameters? How are they \nrelated to each other? \n• To what extent do these principles and parameters provide a \ndescriptively adequate account of mature moral judgment? Does it \nhandle all areas of morality equally well or are there areas of \nmorality (such as sexual morality) that are not covered by this \nmodel? \n• How are these principles and parameters related to motivation \nand behavior? How do they affect emotions or the way individuals \nfeel about their own actions and the actions of others inside or \noutside their society? \nEFTA00769737\n", "char_count": 2784}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00769737", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "• To what extent are individuals aware of these principles? When \nthey are not conscious, to what extent can they be made \naccessible to conscious awareness and then be used to guide \nexplicit moral reasoning or reflection? \n• Which, if any, of these principles are innate? To what extent, \nand how, do children acquire these principles and parameters? Is \nthere a critical period for setting the parameters, and if so, \ndoes subsequent acquisition of different moral distinctions take \non a different pattern from early acquisition? \n• To what extent are the principles that underpin our moral \njudgments immune to contextual pressures? For example, although \nwe are more likely to judge a short line as long if three \nconfederates call it long (as in the classic Asch studies), we \nare not likely to change our minds on the answer to 2+2 even if \nthree confederates say the answer is 5, 10, or 22. Is morality \nmore like perception or arithmetic in this regard? When do we \nstick with our moral judgments regardless of whether everyone \nelse disagrees? \n• How and to what extent can society and culture affect the \nsettings of parameters in an individual? How do religion, gender, \nand socio-economic status affect how people can and do fill out \nabstract principles and apply them to dilemmas that they face in \neveryday life? \n• Once moral parameters are set, how much can individuals or \ncultures change them? When are people willing to see alternative \nperspectives based on different parameter settings (or possibly \nnovel principles) as morally permissible? \n• If certain aspects of our moral capacity operate like \nlanguage, then could anyone be bimoral in the same way that \npeople can be bilingual? That is, could a person acquire and \nendorse distinct moral systems (such as one in which bribing is \npermissible and another in which bribing is not permissible)? \n• To what extent are there neurobiological mechanisms dedicated \nto moral judgment and to what extent do our moral judgments rely \non domain-general neural mechanisms? If there are dedicated \nmechanisms (as in language), then when these areas are injured or \nsuppressed (e.g., by transcranial magnetic stimulation), we \nshould find selective breakdown of moral processes, but not other \naspects of cognition. Do we find this? \nMany more questions will arise as we develop the linguistic analogy in \nmore detail. That is one of the benefits of a general model: it raises \nquestions that we could not ask without it. And as these questions are \nraised, and addressed with experimental tools, we will refine the model \nto enable more specific predictions. \nHere we propose a multi-year project, involving collaborators in \nseven distinctive disciplines (cognitive science, philosophy, \nneuroscience, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, and developmental \npsychology) to investigate these questions and explore the linguistic \nanalogy model in depth. The members of our assembled team have \ncontributed in important ways to understanding our moral psychology, \nbut critically, not all have endorsed the linguistic analogy. We \nconsider this tension important, as it will enable us to critically \nevaluate the assumptions and predictions of the linguistic analogy, \nwhile remaining open to alternative possibilities. \nThe first year will be devoted to a combination of theory \ndevelopment and pilot testing. In particular, we will refine the \ntheoretical details of the linguistic analogy, including formalization \nEFTA00769738\n", "char_count": 3500}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00769737", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "of principles and parameters, together with the creation of a rich set \nof scenarios designed to test the significance of such factors. \nCandidate principles and parameters will be drawn from legal, \nphilosophical, and psychological proposals, so we will start with a \nliterature search and mutual education in order to enable us to draw on \neach others' fields of expertise. We will also hire key personnel, \nwhich will include international collaborators contributing to cross-\ncultural understanding, as well as programmers who can help manage and \nanalyze large data sets that come in from web-based investigations. The \ngroup of researchers will meet in person at Harvard at the beginning of \neach term and at Duke at the end of each term, but they will also \nengage in regular telephone conferences at least bi-weekly throughout \neach term. Graduate students and post-docs will be expected to spend \ntime in the different departments represented in our core group in \norder to enhance cross-disciplinary education as well as the exchange \nof ideas. During this period we will consult with a wide variety of \nsupporters and critics of the linguistic analogy in order to ensure \nthat our experimental designs really will help to resolve the crucial \nissues or at least move the discussion forward. In addition, we plan to \norganize a major international interdisciplinary conference on the \nlinguistic analogy in order to advertise our work and to obtain input \nof fresh ideas. This conference will produce an edited volume of \noriginal papers that will promote interest in the model. \nIn Years 2-3, with post-docs in residence, we will start to carry \nout more formal experiments, beginning with normal populations. We \nexpect to use web-based and paper-and-pencil surveys as well as various \nmanipulations to test causal hypotheses, and to do so in a variety of \ncultures; we are well poised to advance this part of the project as the \nPI has already developed a web based program that has been translated \ninto five languages. Some of our research will involve brain scanning \nas well as suppression of neural activity and, later, studies of \npatients with selective neural deficits. We will also continue our \ndiscussions and design new developmental and cross-cultural experiments \nto be carried out in later years. \nYears 4-5 will be used to test our refined model in new \npopulations. One important group is children and adolescents, because \nwe want to understand when and how principles and parameters are \nmodified in development. This issue could have important implications \nnot only for theory but also for educational practice -- if parameters \nare set early in life, and if the developing brain effectively loses \nits plasticity, opportunities for moral change may be severely \nconstrained. In addition, to determine whether our \"moral grammar\" is \nuniversal, we will test cultures around the world, including a set of \nsmall-scale societies, such as hunter-gather populations. We already \nhave some contacts at potential sites, but significant travel will be \nrequired by a new set of trained graduate students and post-doctoral \nfellows, in addition to training students in some of these countries. \nFinally, it will be illuminating to test our model on patient \npopulations, including individuals with brain damage or mental illness \n(especially people with psychopathy, scrupulosity OCD, and autism). \nThis project involves a wide range of methods and theoretical \nperspectives as well as subject populations. This diversity reflects \nthe complexity of the issues surrounding morality. Hence, to make this \nproject work, we will need constant input from a variety of leaders in \nall of the relevant fields. We will also need adequate funding for a \nvariety of methods including brain scanning and extensive travel to new \npopulations of subjects. This is a large project with potentially large \nEFTA00769739\n", "char_count": 3931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00769737", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "payoff not only in theory but also in practice in areas (such as law \nand education) that depend on moral judgment. \nAlthough many details remain to be worked out, a tentative rough \nbudget might look something like this: \nSummer salary for PI and Co-PI: \n2 people X 5 years X one quarter salary = about $500,000 \nHonoraria for other lead researchers: \n5 years X 12 researchers X $10,000 honorarium = $600,000 \nPost-docs in Years 2-3 and 4-5 (2 at Harvard and 2 at Duke): \n4 years X 4 post-docs X $80,000 (including benefits) \n$1,280,000 \nMeetings of all personnel: \n5 years X 4 meetings per year X 15 researchers X $1000/person \n$300,000 \nConferences in years 1 and 5: \n2 conferences x $50,000 = $100,000 \nProgramming for web surveys: \n5 years X $20,000 per year = $100,000 \nBrain imaging lab costs: \n3 years (3-5) X $300,000 per year \n$900,000 \nPatient studies: \n2 years (4-5) X $100,000 per year \n$200,000 \nTravel for cross-cultural studies: \n2 years (4-5) X $100,000 per year \n$200,000 \nAdministration: \n5 years X $60,000 per year (including benefits) \n$300,000 \nMiscellaneous (for overruns and opportunities): \n5 years X $100,000 per year = $500,000 \nTotal: $4,980,000 \nOf course, these figures are only rough estimates at this point. There \nare also some possibilities for reductions in some areas. We could, for \nexample, provide only 2 months summer salary to the PI and Co-PI and \nhonoraria of only $5000 to other lead researchers, reduce the number of \nlead researchers from 12 to 8 and the number of post-docs from 4 to 2, \ncut the brain scanning as well as patient studies and travel by half, \nand include less for opportunities in the miscellaneous fund. These \nsavings would reduce the overall budget to about $3,000,000 for five \nyears. \nWe are, of course, more than happy to discuss any of these plans \nand expenses in more detail. Indeed, we look forward to many \ndiscussions about this project and about the feasibility of funding a \nlarge scale investigation into the nature of our moral sense. \nEFTA00769740\n", "char_count": 2028}]}