{"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_count": 12, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00728114", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00728114.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "JANE DOE NO. 2,\nPlaintiff,\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO.: 08-CIV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON\nVS.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\nRelated cases:\n08-80232, 08-08380, 08-80381, 08-80994,\n08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,\n09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092\nDEFENDANT'S, AMENDED MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND\nRECONSIDERATION OF THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER DATED JUNE 1, 2010 (DE\n555), OR ALTERNATIVE RULE 4 APPEAL, WITH INCORPORATED OBJECTIONS\nAND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW\nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter \"Epstein\"), by and through his undersigned\nattorneys, hereby files his Motion for Modification and Reconsideration of the Magistrate's\nOrder (DE 555) pursuant to Rule 60, or Alternative Rule 4, Rule 4(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)\n(the \"Motion and Rule 4 Appeal\"), and other applicable Federal Rules and Local Rules and\nMotion for Protective Order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). In support, Epstein states:\nProcedural Background\n1. This court entered an order (DE 555) stating that Alfredo Rodriguez\n(\"Rodriguez”) (DE 469), must produce, to the extent in his possession, \"...any and all journal,\nnotes, diaries, and writings relating to Jeffrey Epstein including the journal described by\nEFTA00728114\n", "char_count": 1262}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Rodriguez to Palm Beach Police that [allegedly] contains the names of girls who visited the\nresidence.\" (the \"journal” or “book”) (DE 555, p.2)\n2. On or around-June 4, 2010, Epstein filed his initial Motion and Rule 4 Appeal\n(DE 559). On or about that same day, counsel for Jane Does 2-8 came into possession of the\njournal or book by and through the Federal Public Defender's office, Dave Brannon, Esq.. At or\naround that same time, Counsel for Jane Does 2-8 provided a copy of the book or journal to\ncounsel for Jane Doe, Mr. Bradley Edwards. Upon learning of Jane Does 2-8's counsel and\nJane Doe's counsel coming into possession of the journal or book in the face of a Rule 4 Appeal,\nthe undersigned and those attorneys reached an agreement that they will not disseminate the\nbook to any other third parties or attach any portion of same to any pleadings pending the\noutcome of the Rule 4 Appeal. See infra\nArgument\n3.\nAs set forth in Rodriguez's deposition, he was an employee of Epstein.\nRodriguez Deposition, Exhibit \"A\" at p. 12-13. Moreover, as an individual employee,\nRodriguez claims he executed a confidentiality agreement with Epstein. Exhibit \"A\" at p. 135.\nFurthermore, in his plea agreement, Rodriguez \"admitted removing [a book or journal] from\nEpstein's home without Epstein's permission. . . .\" Plea Agreement, Exhibit \"B\" at p.8. In\nshort, according to Rodriguez's sworn testimony (including his plea agreement), he stole the\nproperty from Epstein's home and neither Epstein nor anyone else gave him permission to\nremove the book or journal, conduct which would be constitutes a clear a breach of his fiduciary\nobligations as an employee, a clear breach of the Employment Agreement he testified he\nexecuted and, again according to Rodriguez' own representations, an invasion of Epstein's\n'The initial Rule 4 Appeal has been replaced with this Amended Rule 4 Appeal and Motion for protective Order.\nBoth are timely under the applicable Rule.\nEFTA00728115\n", "char_count": 1973}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "privacy rights and, given Epstein's business, potentially his commercially sensitive financial and\ntrade secret information.\n4. Courts have often enjoined the dissemination of confidential or private\ninformation wrongfully obtained from the employer by an (now) ex-employee during the course\nof his employment, either through a free-standing action for injunctive relief or in conjunction\nwith a tort action for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Saini v.\nInternational Game Technology, 434 F.Supp.2d 913, 924 (D.Nev. 2006) (court finds that\ncompany had shown likelihood of success in proving breach of implied covenant of good faith\nand fair dealing where former employee's \"decision to distribute internal IGT documents to a\nparty adverse to IGT in litigation demonstrates a deliberate attempt to violate the spirit of his\nconfidentiality agreements with IGT;\" injunction issued); see also In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474\nF.Supp.2d 385, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (court has power to enjoin dissemination of stolen\ndocuments obtained in violation of court's protective order). Even where the employee is not\nsubject to a formal confidentiality agreement, \"an employee may still be enjoined from using\nconfidential information where he or she has obtained such information by wrongful means, such\nas theft or intentional memorization.\" Tactica Intern., Inc. v. Atlantic Horizon Intern., Inc., 154\nF.Supp.2d 586, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F.Supp. 254, 262\n(D.La. 1967)(internal quotation marks omitted). See A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp.,\n268 F.Supp. 289, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)(\"A confidential relationship exists between an employee\nand his employer. It survives the termination of his employment. It does not depend on any\nexpress contract. Disclosure by an employee of a trade secret entrusted to him by his employer\nin the course of his employment is a classic instance of a disclosure which constitutes a breach of\nconfidence and which is the\n... [truncated, 2080 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00728114/2 or ?id=EFTA00728114&page=2]", "char_count": 2080}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "agree not to disclose it\"), aff'd 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).\nThe simple fact is that this court must determine, in camera, what is in the \"book\" or \"journal\",\nwhether it in fact was taken in violation of an employee's fiduciary and employment obligations.\nand whether it contains information that impacts the privacy and business interests of his\nemployer before (rather than after) issues of dissemination, relevance, and litigation use can be\nassessed.; such that relevaney, privileges, privacy interests and commercially sensitive and trade\nseeret privileges can be addressed before disclosure.\n5. Upon information and belief the \"book\" or \"journal\" does in fact contain the\nnames of Epstein's business associates and other highly confidential commercially sensitive\ninformation that would be entirely irrelevant to this action and not reasonably calculated to lead\nto the discovery of admissible evidence.2 Accordingly, there is commercially sensitive and trade\nsecret information contained therein including, but not limited to, lists of business associates\nwhich could result in irreparable harm to Epstein if disseminated. Lynch v. Silcox, 2001 WL\n1200656 (S.D. Fla. 2001).\nAs this court is well aware, there are serious 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment implications\ninvolved in this case. The fact that Rodriguez claims to have stolen the \"book\" or \"journal\"\ngives this court good reason to, at the very least, hold an in camera proceeding to determine if the\nconfidential information set forth therein should be disclosed.\n4.6.\nAccording to Rodriguez's sworn testimony, the book or journal is stolen property\nand, thus, subject to confidentiality, privacy and fiduciary protection. This court should have had\nthe opportunity to review what is in this \"book\" or \"journal\" before it ordered carte blanch\nproduction of same. After review and production of the book or journal to Epstein's civil\nlawyers, the court should provide Epstein an opportunity to as\n... [truncated, 2270 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00728114/3 or ?id=EFTA00728114&page=3]", "char_count": 2270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "legal objections and privileges such as those addressed in paragraphs 3 and 4, supra. Therefore,\nan in camera hearing should occur to determine what objections and privileges must be raised\nbefore further disclosure is made. U.S. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 575 (1989)(disclosing materials\nto the district court does not have the legal effect of terminating a privilege thereby allowing\nparties to disclose documents in camera and make that in camera request - especially when there\nis a question as to whether those documents were obtained by unlawful means); St. Andrews\nPark, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Army Corps of Engineers, 299 F.Supp.2d 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2003)(court\ndetermined that an in camera proceeding was appropriate when it involved a small volume of\ndocuments); see also In re Alberto Duque, 134 B.R. 679 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(in camera inspection\nafforded adequate protection against disclosure of any privileged documentary material). A trial\ncourt departs from the essential requirements of law in ordering production of confidential\ninformation without conducting an in camera review to determine whether the assertion of\nprivilege is valid. See Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis' Gardening & Trimming, Inc., 26 So. 3d 620,\n622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).\n5.7. Moreover, the right to privacy encompasses at least two different kinds of\ninterests, the individual interests of disclosing personal matters and the interest in independence\nin making certain kinds of important decisions. Favalora v. Sidaway, 966 So.2d 895 (Fla. 4th\nDCA 2008). The Supreme Court has \"consistently held that a person has no legitimate\nexpectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to the third parties.\" Smith v.\nMaryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979). To the extent this \"book\" or\n\"journal\" exists, Rodriguez admitted that he took same without Epstein's permission. Therefore,\nEpstein could not have voluntarily given same to him and, as such, Epstein has not waived any\nobjections, privilege\n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00728114/4 or ?id=EFTA00728114&page=4]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "23, Right of Privacy, provides that every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from\ngovernmental intrusion into the person's private life. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 387\n(1986); State v. Jardines, 9 So.3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (the Fourth Amendment clearly protects\nthe right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects from intrusions); New\nJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 375 (1985) (search of a woman's purse by a school administrator\nis a serious invasion of her legitimate expectation of privacy). Based upon the foregoing,\nEpstein should be afforded his due process rights to in camera judicial review of this alleged\n\"book\" and/or \"journal\" in an effort to determine what, if any, legal objections and privileges\nshould be assertedvindicated prior to any disclosure or use of its contents by civil plaintiffs\nadversarial to the rights of the defendant; before disclosure.\n6. Next, upon review of the book or journal by Epstein's criminal lawyer, Jack\nGoldberger, Esq., it appears the \"book\" or \"journal\" does contain the names of Epstein's\nbusiness associates and other highly confidential commercially sensitive information that would\nbe entirely irrelevant to this action and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of\nadmissible evidence.³ Accordingly, there is commercially sensitive and trade secret information\ncontained therein including, but not limited to, lists of business associates which could result in\nirreparable harm to Epstein if disseminated. Lyneh v. Sileox, 2001 WL 1200656 (S.D. Fla.\n2001).\nMotion for Protective Order\n7.8. Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the Court with the power\nto \"issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or\n3 Because of the relief sought in this Rule 4 Appeal, Epstein's civil lawyers have not obtained a copy of said book or\njournal.\nEFTA00728119\n", "char_count": 1927}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "undue burden or expense, including ... (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limited the\nscope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.\"\n8.9. While the scope of discovery is broad, it is not without limits. Washington v.\nBrown & Williamson Tobacco, 959 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1992). Courts have long held\nthat while the standard of relevancy in discovery is a liberal one, it is not so liberal as to allow a\nparty to roam in the shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matters which does not presently\nappear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so. Food Lion, Inc. v. United\nFood & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012-13 (C.A. D.C. 1997) (string\ncite omitted). See also Capco Properties, LLC v. Monterry Gardens of Pinecrest Condo., 982 So.\n2d 1211, (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that discovery in civil cases must be relevant to the\nsubject matter of the case and must be admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible\nevidence); Morton Plant Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Shahbas, 960 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA\n2007) (holding that \"discovery should be denied when it has been established that the\ninformation requested is neither relevant to any pending claim or defense nor will it lead to the\ndiscovery of admissible evidence,\" citing Tanchel v. Shoemaker, 928 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 5th\nDCA 2006)).\n9.10. Accordingly, consistent with counsels' agreement noted above, a protective order\nshould further be entered ordering that counsel for Jane Doe and counsel for Jane Does 2-8 not\ndisseminate the book to any third parties other than the Court through the pendency of the Rule 4\nAppeal and not attach any portions thereof to any pleading. Although, the journal or book may\nbe produced in camera.\n10.11. Court's have observed that private documents collected during discovery are not\njudicial records. United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986). Thus, while\nEFTA00728120\n", "char_count": 1959}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "the public may enjoy the right of access to \"pleadings, docket entries, orders, affidavits or\ndepositions duly filed,\" Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 569 (11th Cir. 1985)\n(emphasis added), common-law right of access does not extend to information collected through\ndiscovery which is not a matter of public record. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.\n20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2207, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Anderson, 799 F.2d at 1441; United States\nv. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1209 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied sub nom., Miami Herald Publishing\nCo. v. Krentzman, 435 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 1606, 56 L.Ed.2d 59 (1978).\n11.12. In addition, discovery is neither a public process nor typically a matter of public\nrecord. Historically, discovery materials were not available to the public or press. See Seattle\nTimes Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32-34, (pretrial interrogatories and depositions \"were not\nopen to the public at common law\"); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396, 99 S.Ct.\n2898, 2914, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[I]t has never occurred to\nanyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than\nwholly private to the litigants.\"). Moreover, documents collected during discovery are not\n\"judicial records.\" Discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a private process because\nthe litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial preparation.\nThat is why parties regularly agree, and courts often order, that discovery information will\nremain private.\n12.13. The request sought herein is reasonable as Mr. Edwards himself in the past has\nspoken to the media several times as evidenced by his own affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit\n\"C\" at paragraphs 14-28.\n14.\nBased upon the foregoing, the journal is not a \"public\" document subject to\ndissemination to any third parties, including counsel for Jane Doe and Jane Does 2-8.\nEFTA00728121\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Nevertheless, the court ordered that the journal or book be produced to Mr. Horowitz who then\nsubsequently produced it to counsel for Jane Doe, Mr. Bradley Edwards and it was produced\nprior to the defendant being able to intervene and seek reconsideration, appeal, or a protective\norder. Mr. Horowitz and Mr. Edwards are members of the public and should not have been\nafforded access to the journal or book. As such, a protective order should be entered requiring\nMr. Horowitz and Mr. Edwards from further disseminating the journal and book, from attaching\nany portion of same to any pleadings, or from in anyway relying on the contents of and returning\nthe journal or book to advance their litigation interests or to contact third parties identified\ntherein.\n13.15. It is therefore requested that the original and any copies of the journal or book be\nplaced under seal and returned to the Federal Public Defender, David Brannon, pending the\noutcome of this Motion and/or alternative Rule 4 Appeal.\nLocal Rule 7.1 Certification\nCounsel for the movant conferred with counsel for Jane Doe and Jane Does 2-8 and, with\nthe exception of the agreement outlined above, no other agreements were reached.\nWHEREFORE, Epstein requests that this court enter an order:\na.\ngranting the relief requested above inclusive of a modification of\nthe order and/or reconsideration of same for the reasons set out above;\nb.\nfinding that an in camera hearing should occur to determine if\nany privileges, objections, privacy interests, and/or discovery objections can be made by Epstein\nbefore further disclosure is made and granting a reasonable time to do so;\nordering that a protective order be entered requiring that Mr.\nHorowitz and Mr. Edwards not disseminate the journal and book to any third parties, that each of\nthem return same and all copies of same to the Federal Public Defender, David Brannon, pending\nthe outcome of this Amended Rule 4 Appeal and that they refrain from attaching any portion of\nthe book or jo\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00728114/8 or ?id=EFTA00728114&page=8]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "d.\nlikewise, if this court rules that the \"book\" or \"journal\" should or\nwas rightfully produced, Epstein respectfully requests that it do so only after an in camera\nhearing allowing the document to be reviewed and placed on a privilege log outlining why the\ncontent of those documents have no relevance and establishing why the danger of disclosure is\nmore prejudicial than probative, and after this court determines what portions of the requested\ndocument should be deemed privileged including, but not limited to, what portions should be\nprotected from disclosure due to the confidentiality and privacy interests, trade secret and\ncommercially sensitive financial and business information. Again, the foregoing should only\noccur after this court ensures that the document (i.e., the \"journal\" or \"book\") produced is the\nsubject of a heightened-confidentiality/protective order where disclosure will result in the\ndisclosing party being held in contempt of court; and\ne.\nor, alternatively, reversing the Magistrate's Order relative to the\ncarte blanch production of the \"journal\" or \"book\" (DE 555) pursuant to Mag. J. Rule 4, S.D.\nFla. for the reasons set out above;\nf.\nproper.\nfor such other and further relief as this Court deems just and\nBy:\nROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ.\nFlorida Bar #224162\nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.\nFlorida Bar #617296\nCertificate of Service\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was being served this day on all\ncounsel of record identified on the following Service List via electronic mail (EMAIL) on this\nday of\n2010.\nRespectfully submitted,\nBy:\nROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ.\nFlorida Bar No. 224162\nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.\nFlorida Bar #617296\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN\n303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\nPhone\nFax\nEFTA00728123\n", "char_count": 1787}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein)\nCertificate of Service\nJane Doe No. 2 v. Jeffrey Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON\nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.\nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq.\nMermelstein & Horowitz,\n18205 Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 2218\nMiami, FL 33160\nFax:\nBrad Edwards, Esq.\nFarmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos\n& Lehrman, PL\n425 N. Andrews Ave.\nSuite #2\nFort Lauderdale FL 33301\nPhone:\nFax:\nCounsel for Plaintiffs\nIn related Cases Nos. 08-80069, 08-80119, 08-\n80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80993, 08-\n80994\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss,\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\nFax:\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\nCmailto:bedwards@rra-law.comounsel for\nPlaintiff in Related Case No. 08-80893\nPaul G. Cassell, Esq.\nPro Hac Vice\n332 South 1400 E, Room 101\nSalt Lake City, UT 84112\nFax\nCo-counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe\nIsidro M. Garcia, Esq.\nTara A. Finnigan, Esq.\nGarcia Law Firm, P.A.\n224 Datura Street, Suite 900\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\nCounsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-\n80469\nEFTA00728124\n", "char_count": 1081}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00728114", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "EFTA00728125\n", "char_count": 13}]}