{"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_count": 77, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00723218", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00723218.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "YE, \nJ. MICHAEL BURMAN. PAN \nGREGORY W. COLEMAN. PA. \nROBERT D. CRITTON, JR. P.A. \nBERNARD LESEDEKER. \nMARK T. LL/TTIER. P.A. \nJEFFREY C. PEPIN \nMICHAEL J. PIKE \nHEATHER. MCNAMARA RUDA \nDAVID YAREMA \nI FIORJOA BOARD GUMMED CM!. TRW. LAWYER \nIAOMITIIID TO PRACTICE IN IRMO* AND COLORADO \nBURtvtAN, CRITTON \nLUTTIER&COLEMAN.LLY \nYOUR TRUSTED ADVOCATES \nA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP \nDecember 9, 2009 \nBY HAND DELIVERY \nJudge Donald Hafele \nFifteenth Judicial Circuit \nPalm Beach Conn Courthouse \nRe: \nacember 14, 2009 UMC Hearing \nv. Jeffrey Epstein \nCASE NO.: 502008CA037319)OOOCMB AM \nADELQI,PI J. BENAVENTE \nPAPALIOAL/INV7411GATOR \nJESSICA CADWEU. \nBOBBIE M. MCKENNA \nASHLIE STOKEN-BARING \nBETTY STOKES \nPARALEGALS \nRITA H. BUDNYK \nOP COUNSEL \nED RICCI \nSPECIAL CONSUMER \nJUSTICE COUNSEL \nDear Judge Hafele: \nEnclosed, please find Jeffrey Epstein's Response in Opposition to ll's Motion for \nInspection and to Compel Discovery, which are set for hearing before Your Honor on December \n14, 2009 at 8:30 a.m. The case law is also enclosed. \nid your Honor have any questions or \nconcerns regarding the foregoing, please contact th \n'gned's office. \nV \nours, \nCritton, Jr. \nEnclosures \ncc. \nSpencer Kuvin, Esq. (via facsimile w/o enclosures) \nJack A. Goldberger, Esq. (via facsimile w/o enclosures) \n• PHONE: \n• PAX: \nWWW.BCLCLAW.COM \n• MAILJNBCLCIAW.COM \nEFTA00723218\n", "char_count": 1369}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH \nJUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR \nPALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 502008CA037319XWMB AB \nPlaintiff, \nv. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendants. \nEPSTEIN'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR INSPECTION AND TO \nCOMPEL DISCOVERY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND \nINCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW \nDefendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN (\"Epstein\"), by and through his undersigned \nattorneys, hereby files his Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs, \n(\".\"), Motion for \nInspection and to Compel Discovery (Photographs) (the \"Request\") (attached as \nExhibit \"A\") and further moves for a protective order pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. \n1.280(c), and states: \nI. \nIntroduction \n1. \nMr. Epstein's deposition was set for September 2, 2009, and Mr. Epstein \nwas in attendance for said deposition. Directly after asking Mr. Epstein his name, Mr. \nKuvin then asked Mr. Epstein, \"[ijs it true, sir, that you have what's been described as \nan egg-shaped penis.\" \nAccordingly, Mr. Kuvin immediately set the tone of the \ndeposition in a sarcastic and demeaning manner in an effort to harass, embarrass, \nhumiliate and intimidate Mr. Epstein. Mr. Kuvin continued with this line of questioning \nEFTA00723219\n", "char_count": 1200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "i. \nv. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPage 2 of 14 \nby referencing a document that Mr. Kuvin did not provide to the witness or to \nundersigned counsel and then by asking the following: Isjir, according to the police \ndepartment's probable cause affidavit, one witness described your penis as oval shaped \nand claim[ed], when erect, it was thick towards the bottom but was thin and small - -\ntowards the head portion, and called it egg-shaped . . .\" It was clear that Mr. Kuvin's \ngoal was to use the deposition process to embarrass, humiliate, intimidate and harass \nMr. Epstein and thereafter contact the media and provide it with a copy of said \ndeposition. \n2. \nOne day after the deposition and only a few days before the video of \nEpstein's deposition was released to the media, \non September 3, 2009, served her \nRequest seeking to photograph Epstein's penis. Obviously, this was done in an effort to \nbolster media attention and to harass, intimidate and humiliate Epstein. \n3. \nInterestingly, Plaintiff's deposition has yet to occur, and her interrogatory \nresponses and her Complaint do not provide that she ever saw Epstein's penis or that \nhe penetrated her with his penis.' In fact, once \ndeposition occurs it will be clear \nthat she never saw Epstein's penis, which is consistent with what she told others. \nAccordingly, at least at this juncture, the request (as explained below) is irrelevant, \nharassing, embarrassing and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of \nadmissible evidence. Since \ndeposition has not yet occurred, the Request and \nsubsequent inspection can be utilized by her to bolster, fabricate and tailor her \n' The Interrogatory Responses will be provided at the hearing if requested. \nEFTA00723220\n", "char_count": 1755}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "R\nv. Epstein \ne No. 502008CA037319XMXMB AB \nPage 3 of 14 \ntestimony such that it conforms to what, if anything, she would learn from the inspection \nand photographing. \n4. \nEpstein objects to the Request on the following grounds: \na. Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth \nAmendments in that this Court is being asked to authorize a \ngeneral search and seizure by a private party in violation of \nEpstein's right to privacy and due process; \nb. Violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-\nincrimination; \nc. Not relevant, material or reasonably calculated to lead to the \ndiscovery of admissible evidence; further, has the capacity to \ncompromise the accuracy of the memories of ■ \nand any other \nwitness who is permitted to view the photo and is therefore in \nconflict with the parties interest in a trustworthy fact-finding process; \nd. Overbroad, unduly burdensome, violation of constitutional right of \nprivacy; and harassing; \ne. May allow \nto fabricate and tailor her testimony before her \ndeposition occurs; and \nf. It is an Improper Medical Examination pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. Pro. \n1.360, and Defendant has not placed any medical condition at \nissue. \nEFTA00723221\n", "char_count": 1215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "n. \nEpstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPage 4 of 14 \nII. \nThe Request Violates Epstein's Fifth Amendment Rights Against Self -\nIncrimination \n5. \nThe Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination \"permits a person \nnot to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, \nformal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future proceedings.\" \nSee Edwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 669 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 \nU.S. 70, 77 (1973)). The privilege is accorded liberal construction in favor of the right \nand extends not only to answers that would support a criminal conviction, but extends \nalso to those answers which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to \nprosecute the claimant for a crime. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 \n(1951). Information is protected by the privilege not only if it would support a criminal \nconviction, but also in those instances where \"the responses would merely 'provide a \nlead or clue' to evidence having a tendency to incriminate.\" See United States v. Neff, \n615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). \n6. \nMoreover, the act of production itself may implicitly communicate \nstatements of fact and, for this reason, the Fifth Amendment privilege also \nencompasses the circumstances where the act of producing documents in response to \na subpoena or production request has a compelled testimonial aspect. See United \nStates v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000). Thus, where the existence or location of \nthe requested documents are unknown, or where production would \"implicitly \nauthenticate\" the requested documents, the act of producing responsive documents is \nEFTA00723222\n", "char_count": 1748}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "v, Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPage 5 of 14 \nconsidered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury \nSubpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993). \n7. \nIn the instant case, \nrequests, for example, to inspect Epstein's \ngenitalia. See Exhibit \"A\". Any compelled \"production\" by Epstein in this regard would \ndirectly violate his Fifth Amendment rights in that he is implicitly being asked to \nauthenticate same. This is not the same as asking Epstein to open his home to film the \nlimited scope-pathways which \nallegedly took as Epstein, in that instance, is not \nbeing asked to authenticate or show anything. In this instance, however, Epstein would \nbe required to perform a positive act by showing his genitalia which, in turn, would \nrequire him to authenticate same. If you accept \nallegations in her Request as true, \nphotographing Epstein's genitalia could potentially provide a 'lead or clue' to evidence \nhaving a tendency to incriminate. \n8. \nIn \nJane \nDoe \nNo. \n2 \nv. \nEpstein, \nCase \nNo. \n08-CIV-80119 \nMARRA/JOHNSON, the Court sustained Epstein's Fifth Amendment objections to \nseveral interrogatories asking Epstein to identify information potentially related to the \ncase(s) including, but not limited to, all employees who performed work inside his Palm \nBeach residence, all other employees who came to the residence (Interrogatory Nos. 1 \n— 2), those who gave or were asked to give him massages (Interrogatories Nos. 3 — 6), \ninformation regarding the identity of persons who provided transportation services \n(Interrogatory No. 9), a list of Epstein's employees' telephone numbers (Interrogatory \nNo. 12), any persons or witnesses who have knowledge or are in possession of physical \nevidence pertaining to the events in question (Interrogatories Nos. 13, 14 and 17), and \nEFTA00723223\n", "char_count": 1844}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "in v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319X)MMB AB \nPage 6 of 14 \nseeking information related to alleged sexual abuse or misconduct on a minor \n(Interrogatory No. 15). See August 4, 2009 Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel \nAnswers to Interrogatories and Production of Documents. See Infra for Attachments. \n9. \nIf the Fifth Amendment protects Epstein from disclosing the identity of any \nperson who has knowledge or are in possession of physical evidence (i.e. photographs, \nvideos, written statements, etc.) pertaining the events in question (Interrogatory Nos. \n13, 14 and 17 supra), it follows that Epstein's production of his genitalia by photograph \nalso violates his Fifth Amendment rights. \n10. \nEpstein has asserted his Fifth Amendment right in this matter. To the \nextent that right has been asserted with regard to the proposed questioning regarding \nthe alleged shape of his genitalia, the Plaintiff will argue for an adverse inference \nrelative to same. If the II is afforded the adverse inference, that is where the Fifth \nAmendment halts \nfurther inquiry relative to her Request. Holding otherwise would \nrequire Epstein to produce himself, which could provide a clue or a link in the chain of \nevidence used to convict him and would therefore violate his Fifth Amendment rights. \nSee infra. \n11. \nAs this court knows, Epstein's Fifth Amendment concerns are not \nunwarranted. In a federal companion case, Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-\nCIV-80119 MARRA/JOHNSON, in the United States District Court for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida, United States Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson found, \"pin 2008, \nEpstein entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States Attorney \nGeneral's Office for the Federal Southern District of Florida and the State Attorney's \nEFTA00723224\n", "char_count": 1809}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case No. 502008CA037319XXXXN1B AB \nPage 7 of 14 \nOffice for Palm Beach County. Under the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, \nany criminal prosecution against Epstein is deferred as long as he abides by the certain \nterms and conditions contained therein. If at any time the United State's Attorney's \nOffice has reason to believe Epstein is in breach of the Agreement, it need only provide \nEpstein's counsel with notice of the breach and then move forward with Epstein's \nprosecution. Accordingly, the undersigned would agree with Epstein ... that the \nfact there exists a Non-Prosecution Agreement does not mean that Epstein is free \nfrom future criminal prosecution, and that in fact, `the threat of prosecution is \nreal, substantial and present!\" See August 4, 2009 Order on Plaintiff's Motion to \nCompel Answers to Interrogatories and Production of Documents at 4 (attached as \nExhibit \"B\") and September 9, 2009 Omnibus Order at 2 (attached as Exhibit \"C\"). \n12. \nBased upon the foregoing, this court cannot logically hold that the \nRequested inspection is not testimonial or communicative in nature, especially in light of \nthe real, substantial and present threat of future criminal prosecution. \nIII. \nThe Request Is Irrelevant, Harassing, Interposed As A Means To Humiliate \nAnd Embarrass Epstein And Is Not Reasonably Calculated To Lead To The \nDiscovery Of Admissible Evidence \n13. \nThe Request and the law surrounding same should be taken seriously, \nand BBs attempt to argue same in a fashion to \"pump\" the media should be \ndisregarded. \n14. \nRule 1.280(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent part, \n1pjarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to \nthe subject matter  of the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of \nEFTA00723225\n", "char_count": 1833}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "I/SEWS \nease No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPage 8 of 14 \nthe party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party....\" (Emphasis \nadded). \n15. \n\"Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material \nfact.\" See Fla. Stat. §90.401. In the instant case, there are no allegations in \ncomplaint that would be proven or disproven by evidence obtained from the \nRequest/inspection, and the inspection will not lead to the discovery of admissible \nevidence. This is not a criminal case where the alleged perpetrator is sought to be \nidentified. Quite the contrary. If \nallegations are accepted as true, she knows \nexactly who Epstein is, what he looked like etc. . . . Moreover,. has failed to allege \nany allegations in her complaint or in her responses to interrogatories that she saw \nEpstein's penis or that he penetrated her with his penis. Further, as stated above, her \ndeposition has yet to occur in this matter and, as a result, her claims in the Request \nhave yet to be challenged. The allegations in the Amended Complaint are as follows: \n. .Mr. Epstein came into a bathroom and shut the door behind him, told \nboth girls to remove their clothes and undressed himself. Mr. Epstein \nthen placed a small washcloth over his genitals and asked both girls to \nrub to \non his naked body. . . . Mr. Epstein then began to masturbate \nwhile \nwas massaging him. ¶14, Amended Complaint. Exhibit \"D\". \n16. \nNowhere in the Amended Complaint or in her answers to interrogatories \ndoes II allege that Epstein removed his towel or that she ever saw Epstein's penis. In \nthat regard, there is not a material fact in controversy pursuant to which the Request \ncould lead to the discovery of relevant and admissible evidence. \n17. \ncite to Harrell v. Hense, 2009 Wt. 409875 (C.D.CaI.) could not better \nsupport Epstein's argument herein. Harrell involves a matter where the petitioner was \nEFTA00723226\n", "char_count": 1917}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "R\nv. Epstein \ne No. 502008CAD37319XXXXMB AB \nPage 9 of 14 \nconvicted of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance including, but not limited to, a \nblack baggie containing crack cocaine allegedly tucked away in the foreskin of his \nuncircumcised penis. Id. at *2. In Harrell, photographs were placed into evidence by \nDefense Counsel to show that petitioner was allegedly circumcised in an effort to show \nthe jury that it was impossible for petitioner to hide the crack cocaine in a penis that was \ncircumcised. Id. Accordingly in Harrell, there was a material question placed in front of \nthe jury by defense counsel, to wit whether the physiology of petitioner's penis allowed \nhim to hide crack cocaine in his foreskin.2 During the prosecutor's case-in-chief, a \nmotion was made to require petitioner to submit to a physical examination to \nphotograph petitioners penis such that the prosecution could use its own photos to aid \ntheir case. Counsel for petitioner, as the court noted, did not object to the inspection \nand only asked to be present at the examination. In the instant matter, there are no \nallegations or quandaries alleged as to the shape of Epstein's genitalia. As stated \nabove, to the extent such allegations were made and Epstein invoked his Fifth \nAmendment right thereto,. would argue for an adverse inference — which halts the \ninquiry. See supra. Harrell provides an outline for this court, even though the case is \nclearly distinguishable, that any such inspection could only be had if Epstein places his \ngenitalia in question and only right before or during trial. \n18. \nIn Boyle v. Buck, 858 So.2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the court ordered a \nDefendant to produce his vehicle involved in an accident resulting in a death. Id. The \nCourt found that the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination was not violated \n2 No similar allegations exist in the Instant matter making Epstein's genitalia material. \nEFTA00723227\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "IS v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXIMB AB \nPage 10 of 14 \nbecause the vehicle itself did not amount to the production of testimonial or \ncommunicative evidence; however, the court noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege \nagainst self-incrimination exists primarily to assure an individual is not compelled to \nproduce evidence which later may be used against him as an accused in a criminal \naction. Id. at 392. Here, as stated supra, producing Epstein for the inspection could \nlater be used as a link in the chain of evidence used to convict him of a crime and/or \ncould aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. \nId. at 292-293. \nThis request goes to the heart of testimonial and communicative \nevidence, especially in light of the NPA. See supra. \n19. \nBased upon the foregoing, an inspection of Epstein's genitalia would \nviolate his constitutional right to privacy. See Fla. Const., Art I. §23. The constitutional \nright of privacy in the Florida Constitution is broader than the protection provided in the \nUnited States Constitution. See Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA \n1997), citing Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. \n1987). Orders compelling discovery constitute state action that may impinge on the \nconstitutional right of privacy. See Berkeley, 699 So. 2d at 790. The court must \nbalance the competing interests, privacy versus the need for discovery, that would be \nserved by granting or denying discovery. Id. at 791. \n20. \nThe fact \nwants to photograph Epstein's genitalia amplifies the invasion \nof privacy. \nAgain, the Fifth Amendment is implicated and, as well, the Fourth \nAmendment could be implicated here for the reasons set forth in Epstein's Objections \nTo \nRequest For Entry Upon Land, Motion For Protective Order And Incorporated \nEFTA00723228\n", "char_count": 1876}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XWMB AB \nPage 11 of 14 \nMemorandum Of Law previously filed with this court and incorporated herein by \nreference. Exhibit \"E\". The physical violation of his person is the chief evil against \nwhich the Fourth Amendment is directed and a principal protection against unnecessary \nintrusions. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). \n21. \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny'. Request and enter \na protective order, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c), prohibiting such discovery as it is \nharassing, humiliating, and not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the \ndiscovery of admissible evidence and it violates Epstein's constitutional right to privacy. \nIV. \nAlternatively, If An \nection Occurs, It Should Be Sal \nTo Further \nCourt Ruling Based Upon\n Deposition Testimony, Only Afte \nDeposition \nHas Occurred And Just Prior To Trial And Only After The Appropriate Motion Can \nBeF\nully And Intelligently Briefed and Ruled Upon By This Court Based Upon \nDeposition Testimony \n22. \nIf this court allows the inspection, it should: (a) be subject to further court \nruling based upon \ndeposition testimony; (b) occur after IM deposition has \noccurred and just prior to trial; (c) occur only after the appropriate motion can be fully \nand intelligently briefed and ruled upon by this court based upon \ndeposition \ntestimony; and (d) the photograph should be strictly limited by confidentiality agreement \nand should, among other things, not be disclosed to any person other than BBs counsel \nand returned to Epstein after the conclusion of this litigation. Likewise, any expert \npermitted to view the photographs should be required to sign an assurance providing \nthat he or she agrees to abide by the terms of a confidentiality order, and disclosure will \noccur only after good cause has been shown to the court. \nEFTA00723229\n", "char_count": 1883}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "I\nt\n v. Epstein \nase No. 502008CA037319)000(MB AB \nPage 12 of 14 \n23. \nDue to the substantial due process and privacy concerns articulated \nherein, the Court should further order that a violation of the confidentiality order be \npunishable by contempt of court. In \nattorneys have not been shy about contacting \nthe press. \n24. \nIf the Court permits an inspection, it should also take place shortly before \ntrial, but only after \nhas been deposed to avoid any attempt by \nto tailor her \ntestimony to the information obtained from the inspection and only after a subsequent \nMotion has been filed detailing deposition testimony. An analogy can be made to \ncases involving impermissibly suggestive showups.3 See e.g. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. \n188 (1972). In Neil, the United States Supreme Court, addressing suggestive showups, \nnoted that the primary evil to be avoided is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable \nmisidentification.\" Id. at 198. (Internal quotations omitted). It went on to state that \nsuggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of \nmisidentification, which would violate a defendant's due process rights. Id. \n25. \nJust like a victim's propensity to misidentify a criminal suspect in a \nsuggestive showup, there is a strong likelihood that \nwill tailor her recollection and \ntestimony to the photographs taken at the inspection. There would be no way to test \nwhether her testimony was a result of independent recollection of the alleged events or \nfrom viewing the photographs. This would, of course, violate Epstein's due process \nrights. \n3 A \"showup\" is a pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is confronted with a witness to or the \nvictim of a crime. Unlike a lineup, a showup is a one-on-one confrontation. See Black's Law Dictionary \n(8th ed. 2004). \nEFTA00723230\n", "char_count": 1846}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "l\nv. Epstein \ne No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPage 13 of 14 \n26. \nOn the other hand,. will not be prejudiced by postponing the inspection \nuntil after her deposition and another hearing is had regarding this subject matter. \nWHEREFORE, Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, respectfully requests the Court \ndeny the Request and enter the appropriate protective order or, in the alternative, enter \na protective order limiting the inspection as follows: (a) be subject to further court ruling \nbased upon \ndeposition testimony; (b) occur afters deposition has occurred and \njust prior to trial; (c) occur after the appropriate motion can be fully and intelligently \nbriefed and ruled upon by this court based upon. deposition testimony; and (d) the \nphotograph should be strictly limited by confidentiality agreement and should, among \nother things, not be disclosed to any person other than BBs counsel and returned to \nEpstein after the conclusion of this litigation. \nCertificate of Service \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was sent by fax and U.S. \nMail to the following addressees on this £ day of December, 2009: \nTheodore J. Leopold, Esq. \nSpencer T. Kuvin, Esq. \nFax: \nCounsel for Plaintiff'''. \nJack Goldberger, Esq.\nss, P.A. \nFax: \nCo-counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nEFTA00723231\n", "char_count": 1304}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPage 14 of 14 \nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER \n& COLEMAN, LLP \n(561) 515-31 \nax \nBy: \nR \nD. Critton, Jr. \norida Bar #224162 \nMichael J. Pike \nFlorida Bar #617296 \n(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) \nEFTA00723232\n", "char_count": 257}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE \n15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND \nFOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, \nFLORIDA \nCASE NO: \n502008CA037319XXXXMli All \n• \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nMOTION FOR INSPECTION AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (PHOTOGRAPHS) \nPlaintiff, M., by and through undersigned counsel, hereby files this Motion for \nInspection and to Compel Discovery and requests this Court to order Defendant, JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN, to submit to have his genitalia photographed by an independent medical examiner; \nand as grounds therefore states as follows: \n1. Relevant evidence is defined as any evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact. \nFla. Stat. § 90.401 (2009). If evidence is logically probative, it is relevant and admissible \nunless there is an independent reason for not allowing the jury to consider it. Lavallee v. \nState, 958 So.2d 509, (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citations omitted). \n2. Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint charges Defendant with Sexual Battery. \n3. Defendant has not admitted to any sexual contact with Plaintiff. \nt's DEFENDANT'S \nEXHIBIT \n \n, \n5  A \nEFTA00723233\n", "char_count": 1086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "4. Unless Defendant admits Plaintiff observed his genitalia an inherent factual issue exists as to \nwhether any sexual contact occurred. Whether Plaintiff can identify Defendant's genitalia at \ntrial will become a crucial factual issue if Defendant argues the incident never occurred. \n5. The shape of Defendant's genitalia is unique. In the Probable Cause Affidavit (Probable \nCause Affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit \"A'), Defendant's genitalia is described as \n\"deformed,\" \"oval shaped,\" and \"egg-shaped.\" \n6. Defendant's attorneys have refused to allow Defendant to answer questions regarding the \nshape of his penis. (Deposition of Jeffrey Epstein taken September 2, 2009, attached hereto \nas Exhibit \"B\"). \n7. The proposed photographs of Defendant's genitalia are non-testimonial in nature which \nmeans the Defendant cannot assert his Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination. \nBoyle v. Buck, 858 So.2d 391, 393 (Fla. 416 DCA 2003) (\"The Fifth Amendment privilege \ndoes not shield every kind of incriminating evidence. Rather, it protects only testimonial or \ncommunicative evidence, not real or physical evidence which is not testimonial or \ncommunicative in nature.\") (citations omitted). \n8. Defendant may aigue such photographs are embarrassing and harassing however Defendant \nshould not now be able to clothe from inspection the same genitalia he exposed to then \nfifteen year old Plaintiff in order to avoid civil prosecution. \n9. In Harrell v. Hense, 2009 WL 409875 (C.D.Cal. 2009), the court denied Defendant's Habeas \nCorpus petition and held that the court OrdeiclijilVicadexamination of Defendant's penis \nwas proper. The court stated the examination did not violate Defendant's Fourth \nAmendment rights as the examination was necessary for the jury to evaluate the facts of the \ncase. Id. at 10. \"In sum, the examination was ordered for reasonable purpose in a reasonable \n• ..... \n• \n,.... \n.. \nNli..le \n. \n. \nPage 2 of 3 \nEFTA00723234\n", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "manner and thus was neither compulsory self-incrimination nor an unlawful search and \nseizure.\" Id. (citations omitted). \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court order Defendant, JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN, submit to have his genitalia photographed by an independent medical examiner. \nHEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished by U. S. \nMail, postage prepaid, this \nday ofe 1  2-CO9 to Jack A Goldberger, Esq., 250 Australian \nAvenue, Suite 1400, West Palm Beach, FL 334101; Bruce E. Reinhart, Esq., \nMO Robert D. Critton, Jr., Michael J. Pike, \nLEOPOLD-KUVIN, P.A. \n1.1\nM1\n(561) 5 \nfacsimile) \n•••••...1\nBy: \nENCER KUVIN, Esq. \nFlorida Bar No.: 0089737 \nADAM J. LANGINO, Esq. \nFlorida Bar No.: 0031368 \nPage 3 of 3 \nEFTA00723235\n", "char_count": 768}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 1 of 22 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 3, \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 4, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 5, \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80381-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nVS. \n1 \n[\nDEFENDANT'S \ng \nIT\n1 \nEFTA00723236\n", "char_count": 557}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 2 of 22 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 6, \nCASE NO.: 08-80994-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 7, \nCASE NO.: 08-80993-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nC.M.A., \nCASE NO.: 08-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE, \nCASE NO.: 08- 80893-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nVS. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN et al, \n2 \nEFTA00723237\n", "char_count": 519}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 3 of 22 \nDefendants. \nDOE II, \nCASE NO.: 09- 80469-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN et al, \nDefendants. \nJANE DOE NO. 101, \nCASE NO.: 09- 80591-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 102 \nCASE NO.: 09-\n80656-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nORDER \nTHIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Answers to \nInterrogatories and Production of Documents (D.E. #57). For the following reasons said \n3 \nEFTA00723238\n", "char_count": 594}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 4 of 22 \nMotion is granted in part and denied in part as follows. \nIn this case, which has been consolidated for purposes of discovery, Plaintiffs are \nformer under-age girls who allege they were sexually assaulted by Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein (\"Epstein\"), at his Palm Beach mansion home. The scheme is alleged to have \ntaken place over the course of several years in or around 2004-2005, when the girls in \nquestion were approximately 16 years of age. As part of this scheme, Epstein, with the \nhelp of his assistant \nallegedly lured economically disadvantaged minor girls \nto his homes in Palm beach, New York and St. Thomas, with the promise of money in \nexchange for a massage. Epstein purportedly transformed the massage into a sexual \nassault. \nThe three-count Complaint alleges sexual assault and battery (Count I), \nintentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), and, coercion and enticement to sexual \nactivity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422 (Count Ill). \nIn 2008, Epstein entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States \nAttorney General's Office for the Federal Southem District of Florida and the State \nAttorney's Office for Palm Beach County. Under the terms of the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement, any criminal prosecution against Epstein is deferred as long as he abides by \nthe certain terms and conditions contained therein. If at any time the United States \nAttorney's Office has reason to believe Epstein is in breach of the Agreement, it need only \nprovide Epstein's counsel with notice of the breach and then move forward with Epstein's \nprosecution. Accordingly, the undersigned would agree with Epstein's statement at page \n4 of its Response, that the fact there exists a Non-Prosecution Agreement does not mean \nthat Epstein is free from future criminal prosecution, and that in fact, \"the threat of \nprosecution is real, substantial, and present.\" Id. \n4 \nEFTA00723239\n", "char_count": 1994}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 5 of 22 \nBy this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel answers to certain interrogatories and \nrequests for production that were propounded December 9, 2008. Defendant has \nresponded by asserting several objections, the primary one of which is an assertion of his \nFifth Amendment privilege. \nThe Fifth Amendment serves as a guarantee against testimonial compulsion and \nprovides, in relevant part, that InJo person...shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be \na witness against himself.\" Id. In practice, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-\nincrimination \"permits a person not to answer official questions put to him in any other \nproceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him \nin future criminal proceedings? Edwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 669 (11th Cir. 1985)(citing \nLefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). \nThe privilege is accorded \"liberal \nconstruction in favor of the right it was intended to secure,\" Hoffman v. United States, 341 \nU.S. 479, 486 (1951), and extends not only to answers that would in themselves support \na criminal conviction, but extends also to those answers which would furnish a link in the \nchain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a crime. Id.; Blau v. United States, \n340 U.S. 159 (1950). Thus, information is protected by the privilege not only if it would \nsupport a criminal conviction, but also in those instances where \"the responses would \nmerely `provide a lead or clue' to evidence having a tendency to incriminate.\" United States \nv. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). \nThe Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination comes into play only in \nthose instances where the witness has \"reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a \ndirect answer.\" Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (citing Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 \n(1917)). \"The claimant must be 'confronte\n... [truncated, 2070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/22 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=22]", "char_count": 2070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 6 of 22 \nor imaginary, hazards of incrimination.\" United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 \n(1980). \nWhen the Fifth Amendment privilege is raised as a bar to discovery, a blanket \nrefusal to answer questions or to produce documents is improper. Anglada v. Sprague, 822 \nF.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1987). Instead, the privilege must be asserted in response to \na particular question, and in each instance the burden is on the claimant to justify \ninvocation of the privilege. Id. Once a particularized showing has been made, \"[i]t is for the \ncourt to decide whether a witness' silence is justified and to require him to answer if it \nclearly appears to the court that the witness asserting the privilege is mistaken as to its \nvalidity.\" In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 166-67 (6th Cir. 1983). In making this \ndetermination the judge is instructed to view the facts and evidence presented on a case-\nby-case basis, and \"must be governed as much by his perception of the peculiarities of the \ncase, as by the facts actually in evidence.\" Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 487. \nThe law is well established that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not apply to \nspecific documents \"even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or belief, \nbecause the creation of those documents was not 'compelled' within the meaning of the \nprivilege.\" United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000). However, in certain \ninstances, \"'the act of production' itself may implicitly communicate 'statements of fact.'\" \nId. For this reason the Fifth Amendment privilege also encompasses the circumstance \nwhere the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena or production request \nhas a compelled testimonial aspect Id. Thus, in those instances where the existence \nand/or location of the requested documents are unknown, or where production would \n\"implicitly authenticate\" the requested documents, the act of producing respons\n... [truncated, 2021 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/23 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=23]", "char_count": 2021}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 7 of 22 \ndocuments is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. In re Grand \nJury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. \n391, 410 (1976)(issue expressed as whether compliance with a document request or \nsubpoena \"tacitly conceded\" the item's authenticity, existence or possession by the \ndefendant). \nThe Court begins with an analysis of the Fifth Amendment privilege as applied to \neach request. In the event the Court determines that a certain request does not infringe \nupon Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege, Epstein's additional objections to that request \nshall be addressed. Where appropriate, the Court looks to Epstein's Response \nMemorandum for more particularized objections, rather than relying solely on Epstein's \nobjections as initially stated, which in some cases were less specific in nature. The Court \nalso notes Plaintiff's concession, stated at pages 3 and 5 of her Motion, that the act of \nproducing items in response to Production Request Nos. 9, 12-13 and responding to \nInterrogatory No. 9, may implicate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court approves \nEpstein's decision not to provide a detailed privileged log, in that it is reasonable under the \ncircumstances to believe that in compelling production of same, the Court would in \nessence be compelling testimony to which Epstein's constitutional protections might apply. \nAs such, the Court agrees with Epstein that it makes judicial sense to decide the \nconstitutional issues first, before deciding the additional discovery request objections. \nINTERROGATORIES \nEpstein's assertion of the Fifth Amendment as It relates to Interrogatories 3, 4, 5, \n6, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 is sustained and Plaintiff's Motion in this regard is denied. \nInterrogatories 3-6 ask Epstein to identify anyone who gave or were asked to give him \n7 \nEFTA00723242\n", "char_count": 1965}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 8 of 22 \nmassages. Epstein argues, and this Court agrees, that any answer to these questions \ninvolve compelled statements that could reasonably furnish a link in the chain of evidence \nneeded to prosecute Epstein in future criminal proceedings or even support a criminal \nconviction. Interrogatory No. 15 seeks information relating to alleged sexual abuse or \nmisconduct on a minor. On its face, this interrogatory seeks incriminating evidence which \nEpstein is entitled to protect by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self \nincrimination. Interrogatory No. 16 is a contention interrogatory seeking the facts upon \nwhich Epstein relies to support each of his pleading allegation denials and for each \naffirmative defense. As Epstein correctly observes, forcing him to answer this interrogatory \nunconstitutionally places him in the position of being compelled to testify as to his version \nof the facts, and, in asserting affirmative defenses, being compelled to admit to Plaintiffs \nversion of the facts. \nInterrogatories 13, 14 and 17 ask Epstein to identify any persons or witnesses who \nhave knowledge of the events in question, or who are in possession or control of any \nphotos, videos, written statements, etc. pertaining to the events in question. Clearly these \ninterrogatories, all of which relate to claims of sexual abuse and exploitation of a minor, \nimplicate the Fifth Amendment, in that by requiring Epstein to list such persons or \nwitnesses, Epstein is being forced to incriminate himself in the commission of crimes. \nEpstein's assertion of the Fifth Amendment as it relates to Interrogatories 1, 2, 9 and \n12, is likewise sustained and Plaintiff's Motion in this regard denied. While these \ninterrogatories ask for general, identification-type information, which on their face may not \nappear to infringe upon or otherwise implicate Epstein's rights under the Fifth Amendment, \nbased on the\n... [truncated, 2089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/25 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=25]", "char_count": 2089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 9 of 22 \nfacts alleged in the Complaints, and the undersigned's knowledge of the cases, it is dear \nthey involve compelled statements that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence \nneeded to convict him of a crime, allowing Epstein to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. \nInterrogatory No. 1 asks Epstein to identify all employees who performed work or \nservices inside his Palm Beach residence and Interrogatory No. 2 asks Epstein to identify \nall employees not identified in Interrogatory No. 1 who at any time came to Defendant's \nPalm Beach residence. \nInterrogatories 9 and 12 are similar in nature requesting \ninformation regarding the identity of persons providing transport services (Interrogatory 9), \nand a list of Epstein's employee's telephone numbers (Interrogatory 12). \nEpstein raises the same general objections to each of these interrogatories, \nreferring to the allegations in the Complaints of sexual abuse, exploitation and battery, \nalong with the alleged scheme of recruiting girls to come to his Palm Beach mansion to \ngive him \"massages,\" and then states that requiring him to identify his employees, his \ndrivers, and his employee's telephone numbers, \"would be a link in the chain of evidence \nneeded to convict him of a crime.\" Then, in his Response Brief, Epstein goes further and \nmakes a particularized showing for each of the subject interrogatories identified above \nexplaining how answering these interrogatories present a real and substantial danger of \nself incrimination. See Epstein's Resp. Brief, pp. 18-20. \nAs noted previously, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination is \naccorded \"liberal construction,\" Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, and extends not only to answers \nthat would in themselves support a criminal conviction, but extends also to those answers \nwhich would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for \na crime. Id. Thu\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/26 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=26]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 10 of 22 \nto support a criminal conviction; it is enough if the response merely provides a lead or clue \nto evidence having a tendency to incriminate. Neff, 615 F.2d at 1239. In asserting his Fifth \nAmendment privilege, Epstein expresses a concern that employees who either worked at \nhis Palm Beach residence or visited his Palm Beach residence during the relevant time \nperiod, or drivers who drove himself or others to or from his Palm Beach residence would \nbe privy to evidence that would implicate Epstein in a crime. Given the allegations raised \nin the Complaints and the elements required to convict Epstein of a crime, and considering \nthe background facts underlying the case, these concerns are reasonable, real and not \nunjustified. As such, the subject requests, which essentially ask Epstein to identify potential \nwitnesses against him, are subject to Epstein's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege \nagainst self incrimination. \nIn sustaining Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court has considered the \nfacts alleged in the Complaints, the elements needed to convict Epstein of a crime, the \nparticularized showing made in Epstein's Response Brief, and drawn upon the Court's \nknowledge of the cases at issue. On this basis the Court finds the privilege raised as to \nthese interrogatories valid, and asserted by Epstein only with reference to \"genuinely \nthreatening questions.\" United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980). The \ndanger Epstein faces by being forced to testify in this instance is \"substantial and real, and \nnot merely trifling or imaginary\" as required. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 128. Accordingly, \nfinding the above-mentioned interrogatories involve compelled statements that would \nfurnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict Epstein of a crime, the Court finds \nEpstein's Fifth Amendment privilege claim validly asserted. \nWhen one considers the natu\n... [truncated, 2070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/27 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=27]", "char_count": 2070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 11 of 22 \nsexual misconduct carried out at Epstein's various residences, and that at least one of \nEpstein's employees \nis alleged to have aided Epstein in his alleged sexual \nexploitation, then it is entirely reasonable for Epstein to assert that forcing him to testify as \nto anyone who came or went to his Palm Beach mansion or was employed at his Palm \nBeach mansion (Interrogatories 1-2), the identity of persons providing transport services \n(Interrogatory No. 9), and his employee's telephone numbers (Interrogatory 12), may \nprovide a lead or clue to evidence tending to incriminate him. Not only would such \ncompelled testimony self-incriminate him on the elements required to establish a criminal \nviolation, and thus serve as a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute Epstein for \na crime, but in some cases serve to incriminate him by asking Epstein to identify potential \nwitnesses against him. Accordingly, Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege as it relates to \nInterrogatories 1, 2, 9 and 12 is sustained and Plaintiff's Motion in this regard is rejected. \nThe same objections raised above with respect to Interrogatories 1, 2, 9 and 12 \nhave been raised by Epstein to justify his refusal to answer Interrogatories 7 (dates of \nFlorida travel), 8 (identification of health care providers), and 11 (identification of Epstein's \ntelephone numbers). These Interrogatories ask for general, identification-type information, \nwhich neither on their face nor by implication implicate Epstein's rights under the Fifth \nAmendment. In this regard, the Court is left with only Epstein's blanket assertion of the \nprivilege in which he claims that requiring him to identify his heath care providers, his \nvarious telephone numbers and his dates of Florida travel, \"would be a link in the chain of \nevidence needed to convict him of a crime.\" See Epstein's Resp. Brief, pp. 18-20. \nUnfortunately for Epstein, this \n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/28 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=28]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 12 of 22 \nof the privilege is asserted, the Court is required to make a \"particularized inquiry,\" and \nsustain only those privileges asserted as to \"genuinely threatening questions.\" United \nStates v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980). \nHere, Epstein's objections fall well short of the showing required of demonstrating \nthat requiring him to answer these interrogatories would realistically and necessarily furnish \na link in the chain of evidence needed to prove a crime against him. Discovery requests \nthat seek background information on events and experiences of the witness for which he \ncannot realistically or genuinely be expected to be charged with a crime are not subject to \nFifth Amendment protection. See Krause v. Rhodes, 390 F.Supp. 1070, 1071-72 (N.D. \nOhio 1974). In summary, Epstein has failed to sustain his burden of making a \nparticularized showing to support his claim that forcing him merely to identify his health \ncare providers, his dates of travel and his telephone numbers, would present a substantial \nand real threat of criminal prosecution. \nAs for Epstein's non-privileged based objections, such as relevance, over breadth, \nover burdensomeness, and alleged HIPAA protection, said objections are also rejected. \nRule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows any party to serve on any \nother party written interrogatories concerning matters within the scope of Federal \nRule Civil Procedure 26(b). The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is broad: \n\"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant \nto the claim or defense of any party involved in the pending action: Id. Relevant \ninformation need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably \ncalculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.\" Id.; see also Hickman \n12 \nEFTA00723247\n", "char_count": 1930}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 13 of 22 \nv. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-508 (1947); Farnsworth v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 758 \nF.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985)(the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure \"strongly favor \nfull discovery whenever possible\"); Canal Authority v. Froehlke, 81 F.R.D. 609, 611 \n(M.D. Fla. 1979). \nThus, under Rule 26, relevancy is \"construed broadly to encompass any \nmatter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to another matter that could bear \non any issue that is or may be in the case.\" Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 \nU.S. 340, 352 (1978). Discovery is not limited to the issues raised by the pleadings \nbecause 'discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the Issues.\" Id. at 352. \nIn short, information can be relevant and therefore discoverable, even if not \nadmissible at trial, so long as the information is reasonably calculated to lead to the \ndiscovery of admissible evidence. Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. \n1974). \nUnder Fed. R. Civ. P., 26(b)(1) a court may limit discovery of relevant material \nif it determines that the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicitive, \nor obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or \nless expensive, or the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the \nlikely benefit. Id. The party resisting discovery has a heavy burden of showing why \nthe requested discovery should not be permitted. Rossbach v. Rundle, 128 \nF.Supp.2d 1348, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (\"The onus is on the party resisting discovery \nto demonstrate specifically how the objected-to information is unnecessary, \n13 \nEFTA00723248\n", "char_count": 1712}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 14 of 22 \nunreasonable or otherwise unduly burdensome.\"); Dunkin Donuts, Inc. v. Mary's \nDonuts, Inc., 2001 WL 34079319 (S.D. Fla. 2001)(\"the burden of showing that the \nrequested information is not relevant to the issues in the case is on the party \nresisting discovery\")(citation omitted); Gober v. City of Leesberq, 197 F.R.D. 519, \n521 (M.D. Fla. 2000)(\"The party resisting production of information bears the burden \nof establishing lack of relevancy or undue burden in supplying the requested \ninformation\"). \nTo meet this burden, the party resisting discovery must demonstrate \nspecifically how the objected-to request is unreasonable or otherwise unduly \nburdensome. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, \n762 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985); Rossbach, 128 F.Supp.2d at 1353. Thus, \nto even merit consideration, \"an objection must show specifically how a discovery \nrequest is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive, by submitting evidence or \noffering evidence which reveals the nature of the burden.\" Coker v. Duke & Co., \n1777 F.R.D. 682, 686 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Once the resisting party meets its burden, \nthe burden shifts to the moving party to show the information is relevant and \nnecessary. Gober, 197 F.R.D. at 521; see also Hunter's Ridge Golf Co. Inc. v. \nGeorgia-Pacific Corp., 233 F.R.D. 678, 680 (MD. Fla. 2006). \nHere, the information requested concerns Epstein's dates of travel, health \ncare provider identification, and list of phone numbers. This information is relevant \nin that it may lead to evidence to support Plaintiff's claims that Epstein lured her to \n14 \nEFTA00723249\n", "char_count": 1708}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 15 of 22 \nhis mansion for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Substantively, the interrogatories \nare narrowly tailored to discover only information that is directly relevant to Plaintiffs \nclaims and/or Epstein's defenses. Epstein's HIPAA objections are unfounded as the \nrequest seeks only the identification of Epstein's health care providers.' \nFinally, the requested ten-year time frame is not overly broad considering the \nallegation that Epstein has a psychosexual condition, which, if true, could very well \nhave existed most, if not all, of his adult life. The Court agrees with Epstein, \nhowever, that Plaintiff's allegation of child abuse, does not alone provide Plaintiff with \ncarte blanche access to a list of ALL of Defendant's medical providers. Instead, the \nundersigned limits the interrogatory to a request for \"identification, by name, title and \naddress and/or telephone number, of all of Epstein's psychologists, psychiatrists, \ntherapists, or mental health counselors for the last ten years.\" Accordingly, except \nas mentioned above with respect to health care professionals, the Court finds Epstein's \nobjections to Interrogatories 7, 8 and 12 unfounded and orders Epstein to provide \nresponses to same in accordance with the afore-stated terms, within ten (10) days from \nthe date hereof. \nPRODUCTION REQUESTS \nAs noted previously, the Fifth Amendment privilege may not apply to specific \n' In addressing Interrogatory 8, both parties refer to the need for the Court to \nhold an in camera inspection of the documents to determine, as to each document, \nwhether Fla. Stat. §39.204 is applicable. The request at issue, however, is an \nINTERROGATORY request, not a document request, and therefore these concerns are \ninapplicable. \n15 \nEFTA00723250\n", "char_count": 1846}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 16 of 22 \ndocuments \"even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or belief, because \nthe creation of those documents was not 'compelled' within the meaning of the privilege? \nHubbell, 530 U.S. at 35-36. Accordingly, a party cannot avoid discovery merely because \ndemanded documents contain incriminating evidence, \"whether written by others or \nvoluntarily prepared by himself.\" Id. In certain instances, however, \"'the act of production' \nitself may implicitly communicate 'statements of fact.-  Id. For this reason the Fifth \nAmendment privilege also encompasses the circumstance where the act of producing \ndocuments in response to a subpoena or production request has a compelled testimonial \naspect Id. Thus, in those instances where the existence and/or location of the requested \ndocuments are unknown, or where production would \"implicitly authenticate\" the requested \ndocuments, the act of producing responsive documents is considered testimonial and is \nprotected by the Fifth Amendment. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 93. \nIn response to Plaintiff's Requests for Production, Epstein has asserted an identical \n\"blanket\" objection to each of the 24 requests, stating essentially that while he initially \nintended to produce all responsive relevant documents, he has been advised by his \nattorneys to assert his 'federal constitutional rights under the fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth \nAmendments\" and refuse to produce them. In his Response Brief Epstein went further and \nexplained that as to each of the production requests at issue, \"the act of production itself \ninvolves a testimonial compulsion\" in that, \"[i]n responding to each request, Epstein would \nbe compelled to admit that such documents existed, admit that the documents were in his \npossession or control, and were authentic. In other words, the very act of production of the \ncategory of documents requested would implicitly communicat\n... [truncated, 2132 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/33 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=33]", "char_count": 2132}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 17 of 22 \nprovide evidence to support a conviction, but also a link in the chain of evidence for \nprosecution. Such compulsion to produce is the same as being compelled to testify.\" Id. \nThe documents requested fall into several different categories consisting of \nagreements with the U.S. Attorney and State Attorney, and documents exchanged \nbetween the Defendant and the U.S. Attorney (Requests 1-4), telephone records \n(Requests 5-6), videos and photos of Epstein's Palm Beach residence (Request 7), \ndocuments relating to Plaintiff Jane Doe (Request 8), air travel records (Request 10), \ndocuments relating to model agencies (Request 11), correspondence with other witnesses \n(Request 14-17, 19), social networking documents (Request 18), gifts to minor females \n(Request 20), personal calendars and diaries (Requests 21-22), and, prescription \nmedicines (Request 23).2\nDefendant's Motion as it relates to Production Requests 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 14, 15, 16, \n17 and 20 is denied. The very act of producing documents in response to these requests \nis testimonial in nature, in that by production, Epstein would be implicitly communicating \n\"statements of fact,\" to which the Fifth Amendment privilege may be validly asserted. \nHubbell, 530 U.S. at 35-36. Not only do the subject requests implicitly involve \"statements \nof fact,\" given the nature of the allegations against Epstein, they could also serve as links \nin the chain of evidence needed for prosecution. As such, Epstein's Fifth Amendment \nprivilege assertion as it relates to these requests is sustained. \n2 On page 5, footnote 6 of Plaintiff's Reply Brief, Plaintiff concedes that the act of \nproducing items in response to Request 9, concerning witness statements, and \nRequests 12-13, concerning photographs or images of females, may implicate the Fifth \nAmendment. As such, Epstein's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege as it relates \nto these request\n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/34 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=34]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 18 of 22 \nIn sustaining Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court has considered the \nparticular requests at issue, the facts alleged in the Complaints, the elements needed to \nconvict Epstein of a crime, and has drawn upon the Court's knowledge concerning the \ncases at issue. On this basis, the Court finds the privilege raised as to these requests \nvalid, and asserted by Epstein only with reference to \"genuinely threatening questions.\" \nGoodwin 625 F.2d at 701. Accordingly, finding the above-mentioned requests involve \ncompelled statements that could furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict \nEpstein of a crime, the Court finds Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege claim as applied \nto these requests validly asserted. \nThe Court notes that in making this determination it is cognizant that except in those \ninstances where it is apparent from the face of the subject requests that the act of \nproducing responsive items would be protected under the Fifth Amendment, it is the \nDefendant's burden to demonstrate that the act of producing any particular responsive \ndocuments would entail testimonial self-incrimination. U.S. v. Wulkowski, 929 F.2d 981, \n984 (4th Cir. 1991). In the instant case, it is evident from the requests themselves, the \nallegations in the various Complaints, and the facts and circumstances surrounding these \ncases, that to demand from Epstein a more particularized showing of danger, would require \nEpstein \"to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.\" \nHoffman, 341 U.S. at 479. As such, no more particularized showing than that offered by \nEpstein in his Response Brief is necessary. \nPlaintiffs Motion as it relates to Request 7 and 23 is granted. Request 7 seeks all \nsurveillance videos or photographs of the Palm Beach residence. Request 23 seeks all \ndocuments referring or relating to Epstein's purchase or consumption of pres\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/35 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=35]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 19 of 22 \nmedication. It is not evident from the face of these requests, even given the allegations \ncontained in the Complaints and the undersigned's knowledge of the facts and \ncircumstances surrounding the action, how production of these responsive documents can \nin any way be seen to implicitly communicate \"statements of fact.\" Nor is it evident from \nthe face of these requests how production of responsive documents may \"implicitly \nauthenticate\" items that are not themselves incriminating. It is therefore incumbent on \nEpstein to make a particularized showing, demonstrating how the act of producing \nresponses to these requests would entail testimonial incrimination. Wuikowski, 929 F.2d \nat 984 (4th Cir. 1991). Epstein has failed to sustain his burden in this regard. Accordingly, \nEpstein's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response \nto Requests 7 and 23 is denied, and Plaintiffs Motion as it relates to these requests is \ngranted. Defendant has ten (10) days from the date hereof in which to produce documents \nresponsive to these requests. \nPlaintiff's Motion as it relates to requests for air travel documents (Request 10), \nmodel agency documents (Request 11), social networking site documents and photos \n(Request 18), witness statements (Request 19), and personal calendars or schedules \n(Request 21), is granted in part and denied in part. It is not evident from the face of these \nrequests, even given the allegations contained in the Complaints and the undersigned's \nknowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the action, how production of \nresponsive documents can in any way be seen to implicitly communicate \"statements of \nfact.\" Nor is it evident from the face of the requests how production of responsive \ndocuments may \"implicitly authenticate\" items that are not themselves incriminating. It is \ntherefore incumbent on Epstein to make a part\n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/36 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=36]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 20 of 22 \nact of producing responses to these requests would entail testimonial incrimination. \nWilkowski 929 F.2d at 984 (4th Cir. 1991). Epstein has failed to sustain his burden in this \nregard. \nNonetheless, because the undersigned can imagine a scenario where production \nof documents responsive to these requests might constitute testimonial self incrimination, \nthe Court defers ruling on the issue until such time as Epstein supplements his Response \nBrief by making a particularized showing, by in camera submission or otherwise, \ndemonstrating how the Fifth Amendment may validly be asserted in response to these \nrequests. Epstein shall have fifteen (days) from the date hereof in which to accomplish this \ntask. Epstein has fifteen (15) days from the date hereof in which to produce documents \nresponsive to any requests he elects not to address in the forthcoming supplementation. \nPlaintiff's Motion as it relates to Request 5, seeking \"all telephone records and other \ndocuments reflecting telephone calls made by or to Defendant\", is denied as overly-broad \nand unduly burdensome. Plaintiff has failed to satisfactorily explain the relevance of this \ninformation to this litigation. Given the tremendous burden of producing the requested \ninformation, coupled with its tenuous connection to the issues in this case, the Court \ndeclines to compel a response to this request. See, e.q., World Triathlon Corp. v. SRS \nSports Centre SDN, BHD, Case No. 8:04-cv-1594-T-24TBM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15412, \nat *2 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2005)(\"the court may limit discovery upon the determination that \nthe discovery sought is unreasonably burdensome or expensive or the expense of the \nproposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, \nthe amount in controversy, the parties' resources, and the importance of the proposed \ndiscovery in resolving issues.\"); Priest v. Rotary, 98\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/37 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=37]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 21 of 22 \n1983)(1A/hen a discovery request lajpproaches the outer bounds of relevance and the \ninformation requested may only marginally enhance the objectives of providing information \nto the parties or narrowing the issues, the Court must then weigh that request with the \nhardship to the party from whom the discovery is sought.'\")(quoting Carlson Cos., Inc. v. \nSperry& Hutchinson Co., 374 F.Supp. 1080, 1088 (D.Minn. 1974)); 10 Federal Procedure, \nLawyer's Edition § 26:70 (1994 & Supp. 2005)(\"the district courts should not neglect their \npower to restrict discovery where justice requires protection for a party ... from undue \nburden or expense?). \nFinally, to the extent Epstein asks the Court to forbid the drawing of an adverse \ninference against Epstein for his failure to respond to discovery, said request is denied at \nthis time, without prejudice and with leave to renew at a later date, as the request at this \nearly juncture of the proceedings is premature. \nIn accordance with the above and foregoing, it is hereby \nORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Answers to \nInterrogatories and Production of Documents (D.E. #57) is GRANTED IN PART AND \nDENIED IN PART in accordance with the terms of the within Order. In accordance \nherewith, Plaintiff's Motion as it relates to Interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, \n16 and 17 and Production Requests 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 20 is denied, \nand Plaintiff's Motion as it relates to Interrogatories 7, 8 and 11, and Production Requests \n17 and 23 is granted. A ruling on Plaintiff's Motion as it relates to Production Requests 10, \n11, 18, 19, and 21 is deferred until Epstein files his Supplementary Response Brief, due \nfifteen (15) days from the date hereof, in which Epstein is required to make a particularized \n21 \nEFTA00723256\n", "char_count": 1916}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 242 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/04/2009 Page 22 of 22 \nshowing, by in camera submission or otherwise, demonstrating how the Fifth Amendment \nmay validly be asserted in response to these requests. Any of the above-mentioned \nrequests (Requests 10, 11, 18, 19 and 21) not addressed in the forthcoming supplement \nare deemed by the Court to be outside a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege and must \nbe responded to within fifteen (15) days from the date hereof. \nDONE AND ORDERED this August 4, 2009, in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, \nFlorida. \nLINNEA R. JOHIJ2UN \nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE \nCC: \nThe Honorable Kenneth A. Marra \nAll Counsel of Record \n22 \nEFTA00723257\n", "char_count": 707}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 1 of 8 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-CIV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nRelated cases: \n08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994, \n08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469, \n09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092 \nOMNIBUS ORDER \nTHIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and/or \nRequest for Rule 4 Review and Appeal of Portions of the Magistrate's Order (D.E. #282) \nand Defendant's Supplementary Brief pursuant to Magistrate's Order Requesting a More \nParticularized Showing Re: Fifth Amendment (D.E. #283). \nIn this case, which has been consolidated for purposes of discovery, Plaintiffs are \nformer under-age girls who allege they were sexually assaulted by Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein (\"Epstein\"), at his Palm Beach mansion home. The scheme is alleged to have \n1 \nDEFENDANT'S \nEXHIBIT \nC \nEFTA00723258\n", "char_count": 1005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 2 of 8 \ntaken place over the course of several years in or around 2004-2005, when the girls in \nquestion were approximately 16 years of age. As part of this scheme, Epstein, with the \nhelp of his assistant, \nallegedly lured economically disadvantaged minor girls \nto his homes in Palm beach, New York and St. Thomas, with the promise of money in \nexchange for a massage. Epstein purportedly transformed the massage into a sexual \nassault. \nThe three-count Complaint alleges sexual assault and battery (Count I), \nintentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), and, coercion and enticement to sexual \nactivity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422 (Count III). \nIn 2008, Epstein entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States \nAttorney General's Office for the Federal Southem District of Florida and the State \nAttorney's Office for Palm Beach County. Under the terms of the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement, any criminal prosecution against Epstein is deferred as long as he abides by \nthe certain terms and conditions contained therein. If at any time the United States \nAttorney's Office has reason to believe Epstein is in breach of the Agreement, it need only \nprovide Epstein's counsel with notice of the breach and then move forward with Epstein's \nprosecution. Accordingly, the undersigned would agree with Epstein's statement at page \n4 of its Response, that the fact there exists a Non-Prosecution Agreement does not mean \nthat Epstein is free from future criminal prosecution, and that in fact, \"the threat of \nprosecution is real, substantial, and present.' Id. \nOn August 4, 2009, the undersigned entered an Order on Plaintiff's Motion to \nCompel as to certain requests to which Defendant Epstein was asserting a Fifth \nAmendment privilege. By the two motions referred to above Epstein is seeking \nreconsideration of a portion of the Order as it relates to Interrogatory numbers 7 and 11 \n2 \nEFTA0\n... [truncated, 2008 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/41 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=41]", "char_count": 2008}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 3 of 8 \n(D.E. #282) and pursuant to the Court's directive has submitted a more particularized \nshowing as to why Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege as to Request for Production \nNumbers 10, 11, 19 and 21 should be sustained (D.E. #283). \nThe Fifth Amendment serves as a guarantee against testimonial compulsion and \nprovides, in relevant part, that \"frilo person...shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be \na witness against himself.\" Id. In practice, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-\nincrimination \"permits a person not to answer official questions put to him in any other \nproceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him \nin future criminal proceedings.\" Edwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 669 (11th Cir. 1985)(citing \nLefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). The privilege is accorded \"liberal construction \nin favor of the right it was intended to secure,\" Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, \n486 (1951), and extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a criminal \nconviction, but extends also to those answers which would fumish a link in the chain of \nevidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a crime. Id.; Blau v. United States, 340 \nU.S. 159 (1950). Thus, information is protected by the privilege not only if it would support \na criminal conviction, but also in those instances where \"the responses would merely \n'provide a lead or clue' to evidence having a tendency to incriminate.\" United States v. Neff, \n615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). \nThe Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination comes into play only in \nthose instances where the witness has \"reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a \ndirect answer.\" Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (citing Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 \n(1917)). \"The claimant must be 'confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifl\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/42 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=42]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 4 of 8 \n(1980). \nWhen applied to documentary production, the law is well established that the Fifth \nAmendment privilege may not apply to specific documents \"even though they contain \nincriminating assertions of fact or belief, because the creation of those documents was not \n'compelled' within the meaning of the privilege.\" United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-\n36 (2000). However, in certain instances, \"'the act of production' itself may implicitly \ncommunicate 'statements of fact.'\" Id. For this reason the Fifth Amendment privilege also \nencompasses the circumstance where the act of producing documents in response to a \nsubpoena or production request has a compelled testimonial aspect Id. Thus, in those \ninstances where the existence and/or location of the requested documents are unknown, \nor where production would \"implicitly authenticate\" the requested documents, the act of \nproducing responsive documents is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth \nAmendment. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fisher v. \nUnited States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)(issue expressed as whether compliance with a \ndocument request or subpoena \"tacitly conceded\" the item's authenticity, existence or \npossession by the defendant). \nMOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR APPEAL (D.E. #282) \nInterrogatory Number 7 requests all time periods during which Epstein was present \nin the State of Florida, including for each the date he arrived and the date he departed. \nInterrogatory Number 11 requests all telephone numbers used by Epstein, including \ncellular phones and land lines in any of his residences, by stating the complete phone \nnumber and name of the provider. In the August 4, 2009 Order the undersigned rejected \nEpstein's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as applied to these requests finding \n4 \nEFTA00723261\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 5 of 8 \nthe objection 'so general and sweeping in nature\" that they aamount[ed] to a blanket \nassertion of the privilege: Id. p.11. \nIn the instant Motion for Reconsideration, Epstein has set forth additional facts and \ndetailed reasoning successfully demonstrating how forcing him to answer these requests \nwould realistically and necessarily furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prove \na crime against him and would require him to provide self-incriminating evidence relative \nto this case and to the other related cases that could result in a specific hazard of self-\nincrimination. In light of the additional information provided, the Court is now persuaded \nthat Epstein's whereabouts and telephone numbers are crucial Issues in this case and \nother related cases and that if he is forced to reveal this information, these testimonial \ndisclosures could subsequently be used to incriminate him and/or prosecute him for a \ncriminal offense. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); United States \nv. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000). \nAs such, the Court hereby vacates that portion of the August 4, 2009 Order which \ngrants Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as it relates to Interrogatory Numbers 7 and 11 and \ninstead denies Plaintiff's Motion in this limited respect. Accordingly, Epstein's assertion of \nhis Fifth Amendment privilege as it relates to Interrogatory Numbers 7 and 11 is sustained \nand he need not provide answers to these questions. \nMORE PARTICULARIZED SHOWING (D.E. #283) \nIn the August 4, 2009 Order Epstein was ordered to provide a more particularized \nshowing with respect to Production Requests 10, 11, 19 and 21, so as to demonstrate why \nhis Fifth Amendment privilege as applied to these requests should be sustained. Epstein \nhas sustained his burden in this regard by his showing that the contested requests for \n5 \nEFTA00723262\n", "char_count": 1958}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 6 of 8 \nproduction seeking detailed information relating to Epstein's air travel, aircraft used and \nflight manifests, all communications with female models, MC2 models or Jean Luc Brunel \nrelating or referring to females coming into the United States from other countries and his \npersonal calendars and schedules, could reveal the availability to him and/or use by him \nof interstate facilities and thus would constitute a link in the chain of evidence that could \npotentially expose him to the dangers of self-incrimination. \nIn this and the other civil actions, Plaintiffs allege that Epstein violated certain \nfederal and state criminal statutes in an attempt to make claims against Epstein ranging \nfrom sexual battery to intentional infliction of emotional distress. The lynchpin for the \nexercise of federal criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), which figures in some \nof the Complaints filed, is \"the use of any facility or means of interstate or foreign \ncommerce\" and the analogous essential element of 18 U.S.C. §2423((b), which also \nfigures in some of the Complaints, is \"travel[s] in interstate commerce or travels into the \nUnited States or \ntravels in foreign commerce.\" Accordingly, requiring Epstein to provide \nresponses to the subject production requests would in essence be compelling him to \nprovide assertions of fact, thereby admitting that such documents existed and further \nadmitting that the documents in his possession or control were authentic. In re Grand Jury \nSubpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993)(noting that in those instances where the existence \nand/or location of the requested documents are unknown, or where production would \n\"implicitly authenticate' the requested documents, the act of producing responsive \ndocuments is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment). \nIn summary, the Court finds that the danger Epstein faces by being forced to \nrespon\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00723218/45 or ?id=EFTA00723218&page=45]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 7 of 8 \nsubstantial and real and therefore the assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege relative \nto these requests Is sustained and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as it relates to these \nrequests is denied. \nIn accordance with the above and foregoing, it is hereby \nORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: \n(1) \nDefendant's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Request for Rule 4 Review \nand Appeal of Portions of the Magistrate's Order (D.E. #282) is GRANTED. The \nundesigned has reconsidered the August 4, 2009 relative to Interrogatory Numbers 7 and \n11 and finds Epstein's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege as to these requests \nvalid. Accordingly, that portion of the August 4, 2009 Order which grants Plaintiffs Motion \nto Compel as it relates to Interrogatory Numbers 7 and 11 is hereby VACATED. Instead, \nPlaintiff's Motion to Compel as it relates to Interrogatory Numbers 7 and 11 is denied. \nAccordingly, Epstein's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege as it relates to these \ninterrogatories is sustained and he need not provide answers to these questions; and \n(2) \nDefendant's Supplementary Brief pursuant to Magistrate's Order Requesting \na More Particularized Showing Re: Fifth Amendment (D.E. #283) is GRANTED. Because \nthe Court finds the danger Epstein faces by being forced to respond and produce \ndocuments relative to Production Requests 10, 11, 19 and 21 is substantial and real, his \nassertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege relative to these requests is sustained and \nPlaintiffs Motion to Compel as it relates to these requests is denied. \nDONE AND ORDERED this September 9, 2009, in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, \n7 \nEFTA00723264\n", "char_count": 1738}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 293 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/10/2009 Page 8 of 8 \nFlorida. \n\"Inacen.--,\nLINNEA R. JO MESON \nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE \nCC: \nThe Honorable Kenneth A. Marra \nAll Counsel of Record \n8 \nEFTA00723265\n", "char_count": 233}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE \n15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND \nFOR PALM BEACH COUNTY \nFLORIDA \nCASE NO: \nS02008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nPlaintiffs, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendants. \nAMENDED COMPLAINT \nPlaintiff, JANE DOE \nbrings this Complaint against Defendants, JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN, and states as follows: \nParties, Jurisdiction and Venue \n1. \nbrings this Complaint under a fictitious name to protect her identity, because the \nComplaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse that she suffered while a \nminor. \n2. \nII. is a citizen and resident of the State of Florida. She is currently over the age of \n18 and otherwise :tit furls. \n3. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is currently incarcerated in Palm Beach County, is a \ncitizen and resident of Palm Beach County, Florida, has MI intent to stay in Palm Beach County \nafter his incarceration and is otherwise suijuris. \n4. \nDefendant, \nMil is a citizen and resident of the State of New York and \notherwise sui juris. \nEFTA00723266\n", "char_count": 989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "5. \nThis is an action for damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (815,000), \nexclusive of interest and costs. \n6. \nVenue is proper in this Court under section 47.011, Florida Statutes, because the \ncauses of action brought herein accrued in Palm Beach County, Florida, and one or more \nDefendants reside in Palm Beach County, Florida. \nFactual Allegations \n7. \nAt all relevant times, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, was an adult male. Mr. Epstein is a \nfinancier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to billionaires. He is a \nman of tremendous wealth, power and influence. Before confinement, he maintained homes in \nNew York, New Mexico, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Palm Beach, Florida. The \nallegations herein concern Mr. Epstein's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. \n8. \nUpon information and belief, Mr. Epstein has a sexual preference and obsession for \nminor girls. He engaged in a plan, scheme, and/or enterprise wherein he gained access to \nprimarily economically disadvantaged minor girls in his Palm Beach home and sexually \nassaulted the girls, or coerced or attempted to coerce the girls to engage in prostitution, and then \ngave them money. \n9. \nIn or about 2005, It \nthen 15 years old, fell victim to Mr. Epstein's trap described \nabove, at Mr. Epstein's Palm Beach estate. \n10. \nUpon information and belief, Mr. Epstein carried out this scheme/enterprise and \nassaulted girls in Florida, New York and on his private island, known as Little St. James, in St. \nThomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. \n11. \nIntegral conspirators in Mr. Epstein's Florida scheme/enterprise were Defendant; \nMIMI \nan assistant of Mr. Epstein from New York City, New York; an\n a \nPage 2 of 7 \nEFTA00723267\n", "char_count": 1739}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "and other Jane Does. Ms. \nNM Ms \nand other Jane Does recruited girls ostensibly to give a wealthy man a \nplatonic massage for monetary compensation in his Palm Beach mansion. Under Mr. Epstein's \nplan/enterprise, Ms. rwas \ncontacted shortly before or soon after Mr. Epstein was at his \nPalm Beach residence. Mr. Epstein, or Ms. i \nor someone on their behalf, directed Ms. \nNMand others to bring one or more underage girls to Mr. Epstein's residence. Upon \ninformation and belief, economically-disadvantaged, underage girls from Loxahatchee and \nsurrounding areas were specifically targeted because they were easier to entice by the money \nbeing offered (generally $200 to $300 per \"massage\" session) and these girls were perceived as \nless likely to complain to authorities or have credibility if allegations of improper conduct were \nmade. This was pivitol to Mr. Epstein's plan/enterprise. \n12. \nMr. Epstein's plan, scheme, and/or enterprise had a particular pattern and method. \nUpon arrival at Mr. Epstein's mansion, the underage girls would be introduced to Ms. ME \nwho in turn gathered the victim's personal information, including her name and telephone \nnumber. The girls would then be brought up a flight of stairs to a bedroom that contained, \namong other furnishings, a massage table. Photographs of nude women lined the stairway hall \nand bedroom. Ms. \nwould then leave the girl alone in this room, whereupon Mr. Epstein \nwould enter wearing only a toweL Mr. Epstein would then remove his towel, lay down naked on \nthe massage table, and direct the girl to remove her clothes. He then would perform one or more \nlewd, lascivious and sexual acts, including masturbation, touching the girl's vagina with a \nvibrator, or digitally penetrating the girl's vagina, and coerce or attempt to coerce the girl to \nengage in lewd acts and/or prostitution. \nPage 3 of 7 \nEFTA00723268\n", "char_count": 1883}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Facts Specific tea. \n13. \nConsistent with the foregoing plan, scheme, and/or enterprise..., then 15 years of \nage, was recruited to give Mr. Epstein a massage for monetary compensation. Int. was brought \nby taxi with another girl 15 years of age to Mr. Epstein's mansion in Palm Beach. S. and the \nother girl were brought into the kitchen of the home and led up the flight of stairs to a large \nbathroom containing a massage table. Upon arriving in the bathroom, a young woman, on \ninformation and belief, Ms...4 \nexited a sauna wearing only a towel, placed a tube of lotion \non the counter and stated, \"I guess you will need this more than I will.\" \n14. \nSeveral minutes later, Mr. Epstein came into the bathroom and shut the door behind \nhim, told both girls to remove their clothes and undressed himself. Mr. Epstein then placed a \nsmall washcloth over his genitals and asked both girls to rub lotion on his naked body. At some \npoint Mrs  stein told the\n 15 year old girl to leave the room, leaving.. alone with Mr.\n11stein.  Mr. Epstein then began to masturbate while.. was massaging him. \n15. \nAt this point, Mr. Epstein specifically asked s. \nher age, to which.. honestly \nadvised she was 15 years old. \n16. \nMr. Epstein took his free hand and began to touch \nbetween her legs and in her \ngenitals while simultaneously masturbating himself. s.\n told Mr. Epstein to stop, but he \ncontinued to rub.. between her legs in her genital area. Mr. Epstein then ejactulated and told\ns\n. she could get dressed. \n17. \ns.\n was then allowed to get dressed, leave the room and go back down the stairs and \ninto the kitchen. Mr. Epstein gave the other 15 year old girl money and told s.\n that this girl \n\"had her money\" and then left. 5.  was given $200 by the other 15 year old girl. \nPage 4 of 7 \nEFTA00723269\n", "char_count": 1804}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "18. \nAs a result of this encounter with Mr. Epstein, the 15 year old.. \nexperienced \nconfusion, shame, humiliation and embarrassment, and the assault sent her life into a downward \nspiral. \nCOUNT I \nSexual Battery against Defendant Epstein \n19. \nPlaintiff.. repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 18 above. \n20. \nThis is a count for sexual battery against Defendant, Mr. Epstein. \n21. \nMr. Epstein sexually battered.. at a time when she was 15 years old. \n22. \nDuring this incident Epstein exploited his natural authority and trust as an adult with a \nminor. \n23. \nPlaintiff..., because of her age at the time of this incident, did not have the legal \nability to consent to the sexual acts as described above. \n24. \nMr. Epstein's actions amounted to a harmful, unapproved and intentional touching of \n25. \nEpstein inflicted harmful or offensive contact on \nwith the intent to cause such \ncontact, alternatively,.. had the apprehension that such contact was imminent. \n26. \nPlaintiff is in need of therapy and counseling, so that she can deal with the shame \nassociated with this incident. \n27. \nAs a direct and proximate result of Mr. Epstein's assault on.., she has suffered and \nwill continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological \nand emotional damages. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff,.., demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for \ncompensatory damages, costs, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and \nproper. \nPage 5 of 7 \nEFTA00723270\n", "char_count": 1518}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "COUNT II \nIntentional and/or Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress against \nDefendants Epstein \n28. \nPlaintiff \nrepeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 18 above. \n29. \nThis is a count for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant, Mr. \nEpstein. \n30. \nThe conduct of Defendant Mr. Epstein in subjecting \nto Mr. Epstein's actions as \ndescribed above was intentional or reckless. \n31. \nThe conduct of Defendant, Mr. Epstein in subjecting \nto Mr. Epstein's conduct \n• described above was outrageous, going beyond all bounds of decency. \n32. \nThe conduct of Defendant Mr. Epstein, in subjecting \nto Mr. Epstein's conduct \ndescribed above, caused ■ \nsevere emotional distress. Defendant knew or had reason to how \nthat their intentional and outrageous conduct would cause emotional trauma and damage to 5 \n33. \nAs a direct and proximate result of Defendant's intentional and/or reckless conduct, \nsuffered and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and pain. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff 5 \ndemands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for \ncompensatory damages, costs, attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as this Court \ndeems just and proper. Further, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to add a \nclaim for punitive damages pursuant to Florida Law. \nJURY TRIAL DEMAND \nPlaintiff demands a jury trial in this action. \nPage 6 of 7 \nEFTA00723271\n", "char_count": 1407}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "CER111.1CATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished by U. S. \nMail, postage prepaid, this \nday of April, 2009 to Jack A. Goldberger, Esq./Bruce E. Reinhart, \nEsq., 250 Australian Ave, Ste 1400, WPB, FL 334101; Robert D. Critton, Jr., Michael J. Pike, 515 \nNorth Flagler Drive, Suite 400, West Palm Beach, FL 33401. \nLEOPOLD-KUV1N, PA. \n2925 PGA Boulevard \nSuite 200 \nens, FL 33410 \nBY: \nSPENCER T. KUVIN, Esq. \nFlorida Bar No.: 089737 \nPage 7 of 7 \nEFTA00723272\n", "char_count": 512}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH \nJUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR \nPALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 502008CA037319XWMB AB \nPlaintiff, \n• \nCQ1~ \nIkt.friCt..(ve:O ift.\"21 \nit..!14C.4 \nv. \n74.4! I 7:* \nJEFF \nY E \nEIN, \nSlIm1O,4 n. SOCK \nLER \nC\nCUrr \nDefendants. \nIR\nEPSTEIN'S OBJECTIONS TOM REQUEST FOR ENTRY UPON LAND, MOTION \nFOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW \nDefendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN (\"Epstein\"), objects to Plaintiffs, S. (s\"), \nRequest for Entry Upon Land (\"Request\") (attached as Exhibit A), moves for a \nprotective order pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c), and states: \nI. \nIntroduction \n1. \nOn August 13, 2009, served her Request seeking to: \nInspect the entire property located at [358 El Brillo Way], \nincluding but not limited to the driveway, the interior of the \nhouse, each and every room in the house, the massage \ntable, the backyard, the swimming area and all other areas \nlocated on said property. \n2. \nasserts the inspection will take approximately 4 hours: She also states \nthe inspection will be attended by an unspecified number of lawyers, a videographer, \nmembers of the \"video team,\" a photographer, members of the \"photography team\" and \nvarious \"other persons to assist in the process\" (i.e. a \"cast of thousands\" a/k/a Cecil B. \nDeVille). See Request ¶3. \nEFTA00723273\n", "char_count": 1319}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "I\nI\n \nv. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA0371CXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 2 of 22 \n3. \nEpstein objects to the Request on the following grounds: \na. Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth \nAmendments in that this Court is being asked to authorize a \ngeneral search and seizure by a private party of the entirety of the \nEpstein's private residence, including an intrusive 4 — hour \nvideotaping (i.e. it is being asked to authorize a search and seizure \nby private parties that it could not authorize if requested by the \nGovernment), all in violation of Epstein's right to privacy and due \nprocess; \nb. Risks compromising the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to the \nextent that the video — or testimony about the view — was provided, \nvoluntarily or via subpoena to any state or federal law enforcement \nor prosecutorial authority \nc. Violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-\nincrimination; \nd. Not relevant, material or reasonably calculated to lead to the \ndiscovery of admissible evidence; further, has the capacity to \ncompromise the accuracy of the memories of El and any other \nwitness who is permitted to attend or view the photo/video results of \nthe inspection and is therefore in conflict with the parties interest in \na trustworthy fact-finding process; \nEFTA00723274\n", "char_count": 1368}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA03a12XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to= Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 3 of 22 \ne. Overbroad; \nf. Unduly burdensome; \ng. Violation of constitutional right of privacy; \nh. Harassing; \n4. \nReading \nRequest, one would think \nintention is to shoot a reality \ntelevision show. But this is not reality TV; this is a lawsuit. The scope of \nRequest \nis absolutely absurd and the Court should prohibit the requested inspection or, in the \nalternative, substantially limit the inspection, order that it only occur after El and all \nother witnesses have been deposed, and subject any photographs or video to a \nprotective order precluding any dissemination to any third parties. \nII. \nPermitting the Requested Inspection Would Be Akin to an Illegal Search \nand Seizure Prohibited by the Fourth Amendment \nessentially asks the Court to order a warrantless search and seizure of \nEpstein's residence. The inspection is analogous to a search as IN seeks to enter \nEpstein's residence, inspect (i.e. search) the residence without limit, photograph (i.e. \nseize) images of the residence, all because El claims she was sexually abused by \nEpstein. \n6. \nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: \nThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, \npapers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and \nseizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, \nbut upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, \nand particularly describing the place to be searched, and the \npersons or things to be seized. \nEFTA00723275\n", "char_count": 1599}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "lg. \nv. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA0Vals9XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections lee Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 4 of 22 \n7. \nFurther, the Florida Constitution, Article I, § 12 provides in pertinent part: \nThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, \npapers and effects against unreasonable searches and \nseizures, and against the unreasonable interception of \nprivate communications by any means, shall not be violated. \nNo warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, \nsupported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or \nplaces to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things \nto be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the \nnature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be \nconstrued in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the \nUnited States Constitution, as interpreted by the United \nStates Supreme Court. \n8. \nThe overriding purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal \nprivacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state, values which are basic to \na free society. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). \n9. \nThe Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, \nunlawful government action. See Steaciald, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). \n10. \nIf the government wished to inspect Epstein's residence, it would first have \nto obtain a warrant based on probable cause, and the warrant would have to particularly \ndescribe the thing to be seized and the place to be searched. See Dalia v. U.S., 441 \nU.S. 238 (1979). \n11. \nContrary to the foregoing restrictions imposed on the government, \nseeks a non-particularized and limitless search of Epstein's \"entire property.\" See \nExhibit A. (Emphasis in original). Not only does \nask to search the home, she wants \nto photograph and videotape (i.e. seize) its contents. \nEFTA00723276\n", "char_count": 1832}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "gi. v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to BB's Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 5 of 22 \n12. \nThe government would likely not be able to conduct the search requested \nbye: \"the entire property located at [358 El Brillo Way] including but not limited to \nthe driveway, the interior of the house, each and every room in the house, the massage \ntable, the backyard, the swimming area and all other areas located on said \nproperty.\" See Exhibit A. Such an overbroad and vague search would certainly not \npass muster under the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. \n13. \nAdditionally, \nhas no probable cause to reasonable believe that any \nrelevant evidence will be obtained from the search. See Section IV., infra., arguing that \nel Request is not relevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of \nadmissible evidence. \n14. \nEpstein's Fourth Amendment concerns are not unwarranted. In a federal \ncompanion case, \nJane Doe \nNo. 2 \nv. Epstein, \nCase \nNo. \n08-CIV-80119 \nMARRPJJOHNSON, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of \nFlorida, United States Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson found, \"[i]n 2008, Epstein \nentered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States Attorney General's \nOffice for the Federal Southern District of Florida and the State Attorney's Office for \nPalm Beach County. Under the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, any criminal \nprosecution against Epstein is deferred as long as he abides by the certain terms and \nconditions contained therein. If at any time the United State's Attorney's Office has \nreason to believe Epstein is in breach of the Agreement, it need only provide Epstein's \ncounsel with notice of the breach and then move forward with Epstein's prosecution. \nEFTA00723277\n", "char_count": 1824}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "in \nase No. 502008CA031i1XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 6 of 22 \nAccordingly, the undersigned would agree with Epstein ... that the fact there exists a \nNon-Prosecution Agreement does not mean that Epstein is free from future criminal \nprosecution, and that in fact, 'the threat of prosecution is real, substantial and present.'\" \nSee August 4, 2009 Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories \nand Production of Documents at 4 (attached as Exhibit B) and September 9, 2009 \nOmnibus Order at 2 (attached as Exhibit C). \n15. \nPermitting \nattorneys, photographers, videographers and various \nothers to scour Epstein's residence and photograph and videotape its contents runs \nafoul of the limits set forth in the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, nothing would prevent \ncounsel, or anyone on its photography or videography production teams, or any of \nthe various \"others,\" from sharing/providing their photographs and/or videotapes with \nthe United States Attorney's Office (\"USAO\"). \n16. \nMoreover, it is certainly possible that someone in the 'cast of thousands\" \nrequests to be present at the inspection could be a Government informant. \n17. \nEven if the Court entered a protective order limiting the persons entitled to \nview the photographs/video, it would likely be ineffective against a subpoena from the \nUSAO or a Federal Grand Jury. \n18. \nThus, the USAO would potentially be provided with a rare glimpse into \nEpstein home, which it could not otherwise obtain absent a warrant based on probable \ncause particularly describing the place to be searched. Under these circumstances, the \nEFTA00723278\n", "char_count": 1669}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "V. EoStein \nCase No. 502008CA03;11,2pXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to =Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 7 of 22 \nUSAO could circumvent the warrant and probable cause requirements by relying on \ncounsel and photography/videography team to perform the search for them. \n19. \nAssuming arguendo that a court order permitting a civil party rather than a \nlaw enforcement officer is not strictly subject to the Fourth Amendment, as certain cases \nhave held, the policies, principles, and overriding purpose of the Amendment — to \nprovide and protect the citizen's expectation of privacy, particularly in a \"man's castle\" \n(i.e. his residence) — should provide the context for the Court's determination of the \nreasonableness of the request for what at its essence is a court ordered search and \nseizure. \n20. \nFor this reason and the reasons set forth herein, the Court should deny \nRequest and preclude any inspection of Epstein's property. \nIll. \nThe Inspection Could Violate Epstein's Fifth Amendment Rights Against \nSelf — Incrimination \n21. \nThe Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination \"permits a person \nnot to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, \nformal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future proceedings.\" \nSee Edwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 669 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 \nU.S. 70, 77 (1973)). The privilege is accorded liberal construction in favor of the right \nand extends not only to answers that would support a criminal conviction, but extends \nalso to those answers which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to \nprosecute the claimant for a crime. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 \n(1951). Information is protected by the privilege not only if it would support a criminal \nEFTA00723279\n", "char_count": 1845}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "R\niidaggin \ne No. 502008CA0371IXXXM8 AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 8 of 22 \nconviction, but also in those instances where \"the responses would merely 'provide a \nlead or clue' to evidence having a tendency to incriminate.' See United States v. Neff, \n315 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cent denied 447 U.S. 925 (1980). \n22. \nMoreover, the act of production itself may implicitly communicate \nstatement and, for this reason, the Fifth Amendment privilege also encompasses the \ncircumstances where the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena or \nproduction request has a compelled testimonial aspect. See United States v. Hubbell, \n530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000). Thus, where the existence or location of the requested \ndocuments are unknown, or where production would \"implicitly authenticate\" the \nrequested documents, the act of producing responsive documents is considered \ntestimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, \n1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993). \n23. \nIn the instant case, ■ \nrequests, for example, to inspect the massage \ntable. See Exhibit A. Any compelled 'production\" by Epstein of \"the massage table\" for \nthe inspection would violate his Fifth Amendment rights in that he is implicitly being \nasked to authenticate it. To the extent \ncounsel requests Epstein to identify the \nroom where the alleged acts occurred, such also violates the Fifth Amendment for the \nsame reason. \n24. \nPhotographing and videotaping the massage table and the room where \nthe acts allegedly occurred could potentially provide a 'lead or clue' to evidence having \na tendency to incriminate but more important, any expectation that Epstein would, as a \nEFTA00723280\n", "char_count": 1743}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037=XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to'. Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 9 of 22 \nresult of the motion or any court order, be required to facilitate the inspection by \nidentifying the residence, any part of the residence, any object, or to be ordered to do \nanything other than to passively acquiesce to a court order would threaten to invade his \nprivilege against being required to produce and/or testify. \n25. \nIn \nJane \nDoe \nNo. \n2 \nv. \nEpstein, \nCase \nNo. \n0B-CIV-80119 \nMARRA/JOHNSON, the Court sustained Epstein's Fifth Amendment objections to \ninterrogatories: asking Epstein to identify all employees who performed work inside his \nPalm Beach residence and all other employees who came to the residence \n(Interrogatory Nos. 1 — 2), asking Epstein to identify any who gave or were asked to \ngive him. massages (Interrogatories Nos. 3 - 6), requesting information regarding the \nidentity of persons who provided transportation services (Interrogatory No. 9), seeking a \nlist of Epstein's employees' telephone numbers (Interrogatory No. 12), asking Epstein to \nindentify any persons or witnesses who have knowledge or are in possession of \nphysical evidence pertaining to the events in question (Interrogatories Nos. 13, 14 and \n17), seeking information related to alleged sexual abuse or misconduct on a minor \n(Interrogatory No. 15), and seeking the facts on upon which Epstein relies to support \npleading denials and affirmative defenses (Interrogatory No. 16). See August 4, 2009 \nOrder on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Production of \nDocuments. \n26. \nIf the Fifth Amendment protects Epstein from disclosing the identity of any \nperson who has knowledge or are in possession of physical evidence (i.e. photographs, \nEFTA00723281\n", "char_count": 1811}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "B,B. v, Eosteiq \nCase No. 502008CA03 \nXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 10 of 22 \nvideos, written statements, etc.) pertaining the events in question (Interrogatory Nos. \n13, 14 and 17 supra), it follows that Epstein's production of the massage table and \nmassage room to be photographed and videotaped would also violate his Fifth \nAmendment rights. \nStated differently, if Epstein can properly invoke his Fifth \nAmendment right to not identify a person who may have a photograph of, for example, \nthe massage table, how can Epstein be required to produce the massage table for ■ \nto inspect, photograph and videotape? \n27. \nTo the extent \nrequests Epstein produce the massage table or \nauthenticate anything in his residence (i.e. the massage room, the kitchen where \nalleged conversations occurred, etc.), Epstein invokes his rights under the Fifth \nAmendment. \nIV. \nThe Court Should Prohibit an Inspection of Epstein's Residence as \nEpstein's Home is Irrelevant and Not Reasonable Calculated to Lead to the \nDiscovery of Admissible Evidence \n28. \nRule 1.350(a)(3), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: \nAny party may request any other party to permit entry upon \ndesignated land or other property in the possession or \ncontrol of the party upon whom the request is served for the \npurpose \nof \ninspection \nand \nmeasuring, \nsurveying, \nphotographing, testing, or sampling the property or any \ndesignated object or operation on it within the scope of \nrule 1.280(b). \n(Emphasis added). \n29. \nRule 1.280(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent part, \n\"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to \nEFTA00723282\n", "char_count": 1728}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "s  v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA03 \nXXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nRequest and Motion for ProtectWe Order \nPage 11 of 22 \nthe subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of \nthe party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party....\" (Emphasis \nadded). \n30. \n\"Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material \nfact.\" See Fla. Stat. §90.401. \n31. \nIn the instant case, there are no allegations in \ncomplaint that would \nbe proven or disproven by evidence obtained from the inspection, and the inspection \nwill not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. \n32. \n■ \nasserts causes of action for negligence, coercion into prostitution, \nbattery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Second Am. Compl. The \nonly allegations in \n11-page, 4-count complaint regarding Epstein's residence are: \na. Epstein had a residence located at 358 El Brillo Way. Id. ¶4; \nb. Epstein plans to reside permanently at 358 El Brillo Way. Id. ¶5; \nc. II was brought to Epstein's residence and was left alone in a room \nat Epstein's \"mansion.\" Id. ¶9; \nd. Epstein has a \"lavish home.\" Id. ¶11; \ne. The alleged acts took place at Epstein's residence. Id. ¶14; and \nf. Epstein used his house for the purpose of lewdness or prostitution. \nId. ¶20D.; \nEFTA00723283\n", "char_count": 1334}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "IL\nv. Epstein \nNo. 502008CA037319XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to IIERequest end Motion for Protective Order \nPage 12 of 22 \n33. \nWhat relevant evidence (i.e. tending to prove or disprove a material fact) \nwill be obtained from inspecting Epstein's back yard, the attic, the garage, the cabinets, \ndrawers, storage closets or any other area of the house? The answer is simple: none.\n34. \nMoreover, the room where the alleged acts occurred and massage table \nwere not instrumentalities of the claims alleged in the complaint. The massage table \nhas absolutely no relevance to \nclaims, save for the fact that the massage table \nitself existed. \nNothing about the massage table's dimensions, construction or \nappearance proves or disproves any material facts. The same rationale applies to the \nmassage room. There are no allegations that put the massage room at issue such that \na video or photograph will provide relevant evidence or lead to the discovery of \nadmissible evidence. \n35. \nThis is not a case where ■ \nfell off the massage table and broke her leg. \nNor is this a case where ■ \nslipped and fell in the massage room because of a defect in \nthe floor. Both of those scenarios might provide some justification for an inspection of \nthe massage table and massage room, respectively, because the inspection could lead \nto the discovery of admissible evidence. See Welzel v. Bernstein, 233 F.R.D. 185, 186 \n(D.C. 2005) (noting that in cases in which a site inspection has been allowed, the \nrationale has been because the specific location relates to the cause of action). \n36. \nNevertheless, the house has been remodeled and thus its appearance is \nsubstantially different than when the alleged acts occurred. \nEFTA00723284\n", "char_count": 1732}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "faLfain \nCase No. 502008CA037=XXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to =Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 13 of 22 \n37. \nThe following cases addressing entry onto land for inspection illustrate the \ncircumstances under which an inspection may or may not be appropriate: \na. Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 669 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) \ninvolved a dispute between former plastic surgeon partners related \nto compensation. \nPlaintiff requested to inspect defendant's \ncomputer for billing and collection information. The court permitted \nlimited access to defendant's computer systems only to search for \nfinancial information that had allegedly been deleted. Id. at 1145; \nb. Hauser v. Volusia County Dept. of Corrections, 872 So. 2d 987 \n(Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (permitting defendant to inspect plaintiffs' \nresidences to collect air samples and observe ventilation systems \nwhere plaintiffs claimed they were injured due to exposure to toxic \nmold at their place of employment); \nc. Menke v. Broward County School Bd., 916 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA \n2005) (denying unfettered access to defendant's computers in case \ninvolving disciplinary proceedings brought against teacher for \nexchanging sexually explicit emails with students); \nd. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey 359 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st \nDCA 1978) (quashing order permitting inspection of tire plant \nbecause plaintiff did not demonstrate that tires made at the plant \nwere substantially similar to the tire involved in the subject accident, \nEFTA00723285\n", "char_count": 1516}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "V. Epstein \nase No. 50200BCA037319XXXXIMB AS \nEpstein's Objections to MRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 14 of 22 \nnoting that plaintiff presented no evidence to support the need for \nan inspection); \ne. Murphy v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.  , 2008 WL 3926715 (N.D. Fla. \n2008) (denying request to inspect defendants tire plant since the \ntire at issue was no longer manufactured at the plant and since the \nplant had been changed and did not reflect the manufacturing \nconditions that existed when the subject tire was made; the court \nnoted that the current condition of the plant was \"only marginally \nrelevant-at best.\"); and \nf. Marcort v. Goodwill Industries- Manasota, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 377 \n(M.D. Fla. 2003) (involving alleged violations of the Americans with \nDisabilities Act, plaintiff requested a wholesale inspection of \ndefendant's property for ADA compliance. \nThe court limited \ninspection of defendant's premises to \"the specific barriers to \naccess Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint.\"). \n38. \nThe instant case is unlike Yalamachi, where plaintiff sought to inspect \ndefendant's computers for financial information directly relevant to his breach of contract \nclaim; and it is unlike Hauser where the plaintiffs put the quality of the air in their homes \nat issue by suing their employer for exposure to toxic mold. \nEFTA00723286\n", "char_count": 1360}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "It.\n v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CAOILUMOCXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections tW \nRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 15 of 22 \n39. \nThis case is more analogous to Murphy and Gooey, where the court \nprohibited inspection because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate the how the \ninspection would be relevant to their respective cases. \n40. \nMoreover, federal courts have recognized that \"entry upon a party's \npremises may entail greater burdens and risks than mere production of documents\" and \n\"the degree to which the proposed inspection will aid in the search for truth must be \nbalanced against the burdens and dangers created by inspection.\" See Belcher v. \nBassett Furniture Industries, Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir. 1978) (also known as \n\"The Belcher Test\"). \n41. \nAn inquiry into when to compel an inspection goes beyond mere relevance \nand must balance the need presented by the moving party against the burdens and \ndangers created by the inspection. See Johnson v. Mundy Industrial Contractors. Inc., \n2002 WL 31464984 *3 (E.D .N.C. 2002) (quotations omitted). \n42. \nAs noted by professors Wright & Miller: \n[lit is clear that the right to discovery is a qualified right that \ndoes \nnot \nextend \nto \nmaking \nunnecessary \nand \nunwarranted excursions onto the property of another \nunder the guise of supportable litigative need. Public \npolicy supports reasonable and necessary demands for \ninformation in the hands of the adversary, in order that the \ncase may be well and truly tried. But any such invasion of a \nperson's property rights must, in the language of our \nSupreme Court, 'be judged with care .... Properly to balance \nthese competing interests is a delicate and difficult task.' \nSee Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, §2040 at 286-87 (1970 ed.) \n(Emphasis added). \nEFTA00723287\n", "char_count": 1821}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA037319XXXXIM AB \nEpstein's Objections to BB's Request end Motion for Protective Order \nPage 16 of 22 \n43. \nMoreover, an inspection of Epstein's residence would violate his \nconstitutional right to privacy. See Fla. Const., Art I. §23. The constitutional right of \nprivacy in the Florida Constitution is broader than the protection provided in the United \nStates Constitution. See Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), \nciting Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood. Serv., Inc. 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987). \nOrders compelling discovery constitute state action that may impinge on the \nconstitutional right of privacy. See Berkeley, 699 So. 2d at 790. The court must \nbalance the competing interests, privacy versus the need for discovery, that would be \nserved by granting or denying discovery. Id. at 791. \n44. \nThe fact ■ \nwants to photograph and videotape the residence amplifies \nthe invasion of privacy. \n45. \nAgain, the Fourth Amendment is implicated. The physical entry of the \nhome is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed and a principal \nprotection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant \nrequirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. \n740 (1984). \n46. \nAs set forth herein, Epstein's residence is, at best, only marginally \nrelevant to the instant case. On the other hand, the right of privacy in one's home is \nsacred. \n47. \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny \nRequest and enter \na protective order, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c), prohibiting such discovery as it is \nEFTA00723288\n", "char_count": 1646}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "R\nv. Epstein \ne No. 502008CA03.1XXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 17 of 22 \nharassing, not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible \nevidence and violates Epstein's constitutional right to privacy. \nV. \nAlternatively, if the Court Permits Inspection, it Should be Strictly Limited \n48. \nIf the Court finds the home inspection will somehow yield relevant \nevidence and outweighs Epstein's right of privacy, the inspection should be limited to \nthe following: \na. One photographer, accompanied by one attorney; \nb. To take five (5) still photographs (no video) of the room in which \nthe alleged acts occurred', \nc. To be supervised by Epstein's security guard and his attorney; \nd. To be completed in 30 minutes or less; and \ne. Ill be required to produce copies of all photographs to Epstein's \ncounsel. \n49. \nRequest to inspect the \"entire property\" for four hours with an \nentourage of attorneys, videographers, photographers, and their respective teams and \n\"various others to assist in the process\" is grossly overbroad. There are no allegations \nplacing, for example, the back yard at issue. In only alleges that certain acts took \nplace in a particular room. Thus, the inspection should be limited to said room. \n50. \nJust as the Government, constrained by the Fourth Amendment, would \nfirst have to obtain a warrant based on probable cause, and the warrant would have to \n1 For the reasons s\nloyees \nin Section III., supra, neither Epstein nor his counsel nor any of his \nwill identify or show \ncounsel or photographers the room where the alleged acts occurred. \nshould \nerg\nhave no problem providing her counsel with sufficient information to identify the room. \nEFTA00723289\n", "char_count": 1763}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "B.B. v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA03 \nXXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to \nRequest and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 18 of 22 \nparticularly describe the thing to be seized and the place to be searched (see Dalia v. \nU.S. 441 U.S. 238 (1979)), so should this Court require s \nto justify her Request (i.e. \nshow probable cause). That is, SI should be required to demonstrate to the Court the \nrelevant evidence she intends to discover and where said evidence is reasonably \nbelieved to be. If, and only if, ■ \npresents sufficient evidence to justify the inspection, \nthe Court's order should particularly describe the place to be searched based on the \nevidence put forth by \n(i.e. the room in which the alleged acts occurred). \n51. \nIn addition, having teams of photographers, videographers, attorneys and \n\"others\" present at a four-hour inspection is unduly burdensome for Epstein to endure in \nhis own home. It is also harassing. \n52. \nMoreover, such a scenario is ripe for misconduct. With a large group of \npeople trouncing around Epstein's house, it is not beyond the bounds of reasonable \npossibility that something would be stolen or broken. And given the amount of publicity \nsurrounding this case and its contentious nature, it would not be difficult for a member of \nthe \"photography team,\" for example, to sneak off and photograph irrelevant portions of \nthe home and either publish or sell the photos. \n53. \nIn Wetzel v. Bernstein, plaintiff brought an action against her former \nemployer alleging discrimination and retaliation. 233 F.R.D. 185. Plaintiff asserted the \noffice configuration exacerbated her mistreatment by defendant. The court noted that \nplaintiff could argue she suffered heightened emotional distress because other \nemployees were aware of how she was being treated by virtue of the glass walls in her \nEFTA00723290\n", "char_count": 1851}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "v, Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA03 \nXXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to\n Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 19 of 22 \noffice. Id. at 187. In permitting the inspection, the court limited it to one-hour and to the \nsuite of offices at issue. \n54. \nWhile \nhas not and cannot demonstrate a need for inspection like the \nplaintiff in Welzel (i.e. that the configuration of the office itself exacerbated her emotional \ndistress), if the Court permits an inspection of Epstein's residence, it should enter a \nprotective order limiting the scope to the room in which the alleged acts occurred and \nlimiting the time to one half hour. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c) (permitting the court to \nlimit the scope of discovery). \n55. \nAdditionally, any photographs should be subject to a confidentiality order. \nThe photographs should be strictly limited for use in this litigation, not shown to anyone \nexcept counsel and experts, and returned to Epstein after the conclusion of this \nlitigation. Any expert permitted to view the photographs should be required to sign an \nassurance providing that he or she agrees to abide by the terms of a confidentiality \norder. Due to the substantial due process and privacy concerns articulated herein, the \nCourt should further order that a violation of the confidentiality order be punishable by \ncontempt of court. \nattorneys have not been shy about contacting the press. \nVI. \nAny Inspection Should Occur After \nDeposition and Just Prior to Trial \n56. \nIf the Court permits an inspection, it should take place shortly before trial, \nbut after■ has been deposed to avoid any attempt by her to tailor her testimony to the \ninformation obtained from the inspection. \nThe integrity of \nmemory will be \ncompromised if she is permitted to view images from inside the residence. An analogy \nEFTA00723291\n", "char_count": 1831}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "v. Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA0 \nXXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to\n Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 20 of 22 \ncan be made to cases involving impermissibly suggestive showups.2 See e.g. Neil v. \nBiggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). In Neil, the United States Supreme Court, addressing \nsuggestive showups, noted that \"the primary evil to be avoided is a very substantial \nlikelihood of irreparable misidentification.\" Id. at 198. (Internal quotations omitted). It \nwent on to state that suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase \nthe likelihood of misidentification, which would violate a defendant's due process rights. \nId. \n57. \nJust like a victim's propensity to misidentify a criminal suspect in a \nsuggestive showup, there is a strong likelihood that El will tailor her recollection and \ntestimony to the photographs/video taken at the inspection. There would be no way to \ntest whether her testimony was a result of independent recollection of the alleged \nevents or from viewing the photographs. This would, of course, violate Epstein's due \nprocess rights. \n58. \nOn the other hand, \nwill not be prejudiced by postponing the inspection \nuntil after her deposition. \n59. \nErgo, if the Court permits \nto inspect Epstein's residence, Epstein \nrequests the inspection be conducted after \ndeposition and just prior to trial. \nWHEREFORE, Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, respectfully requests the Court \nsustain his objections to E.W.'s Request for Entry Upon Land, enter a protective order \nprecluding entry on Epstein's property or, in the alternative, enter a protective order \nZ A „showup\" is a pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is confronted with a witness to or the \nvictim of a crime. Unlike a lineup, a showup is a one-on-one confrontation. See Black's Law Dictionary \n(8th ed. 2004). \nEFTA00723292\n", "char_count": 1851}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "1.3 .,EaLeti \nCase No. 502008CA0UIWYJO(XMB AB \nEpstein's Objections t\n Request and Motion (or Protective Order \nPage 21 of 22 \nlimiting the inspection as follows: (a) one photographer, accompanied by one attorney; \n(b) to take five (5) still photographs (no video) of the room in which the alleged acts \noccurred; (c) to be supervised by Epstein's security guard and Epstein's attorney; (d) to \nbe completed in 30 minutes or less; (e) to occur after le deposition; and (f) any \nphotographs be subject to a confidentiality order proscribing dissemination to anyone \nexcept \ncounsel and experts, a violation of which would be punishable by contempt \nof court, and to grant any additional relief the Court deems just and proper. \nCertificate of Service \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was sent by fax and U.S. \nMail to the following addressees on this 14th day of September, 2009: \nTheodore J. Leopold, Esq. \nSpencer T. Kuvin, Esq. \nLeo \nJack Goldberger, Esq. \nss, P.A. \nFax: \nCo-counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER \n& COLEMAN, LLP \n303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400 \nFL 33401 \nBy: \nF \nRobert . Critton, Jr. \nFlorid \nar #224162 \nMichael J. Pike \nFlorida Bar #617296 \nEFTA00723293\n", "char_count": 1219}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00723218", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "v, Epstein \nCase No. 502008CA0 \nXXXXMB AB \nEpstein's Objections to.. Request and Motion for Protective Order \nPage 22 of 22 \n(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) \nEFTA00723294\n", "char_count": 179}]}