{"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_count": 12, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00657039", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00657039.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09)27.2011 Page 1 of 12 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marrallohnson \nJANE DOES #1 AND #2, \nPetitioners, \nv. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nRespondent. \nUNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL \nBRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE OF \nROY BLACK, MARTIN WEINBERG, AND JAY LEFKOWITZ (DE941 \nThe United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States \nAttorney, hereby files this Response to the Supplemental Briefing of Attorneys Roy Black, Martin \nWeinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz (DE94). The Court asked the United States to address the Intervenor \nAttorneys' argument that special concerns or rules should apply to the disclosure and use of \ndocuments prepared and exchanged during plea negotiations between the Intervenors (on behalf of \nJeffrey Epstein) and the U.S. Attorney's Office. The Intervenor Attorneys seek to preclude the \nunsealing of certain documents already filed with the Court as well as the use of their contents, and \nthe discovery and use of additional plea negotiation documents and information. \nFor the reasons set forth herein, the United States agrees that the Petitioners are attempting \nto use plea negotiations \"against\" Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and \nthat the work product privilege is not automatically waived by disclosure in the context of \nconfidential plea negotiations. Thus, the Court must determine, on a document-by-document basis, \nwhether a document contains attorney work product and, if so, whether that work product privilege \nEFTA00657039\n", "char_count": 1659}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 2 of 12 \nhas been waived. The United States further agrees that, in light of the Supreme Court's guidance \non the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, the protections provided to civil mediation proceedings \nshould extend to confidential plea negotiations where a non-party seeks to use statements made \nduring those negotiations against either party. \nBACKGROUND \nThe Court is very familiar with this matter, having handled the civil suits filed against Jeffrey \nEpstein pursuant to the Non-Prosecution Agreement and this actions filed by Jane Does #1 and #2 \nagainst the United States. For purposes of this Supplemental Briefing, the relevant facts are that, \nthrough the civil litigation between the Jane Does and Jeffrey Epstein, the Jane Does obtained \nportions of correspondence and draft agreements between counsel for Jeffrey Epstein and counsel \nfor the United States that were exchanged during the course of confidential' plea negotiations. To \nthe knowledge of the government, the Jane Does have only received the portions of the \ncorrespondence written by government attorneys — all of the writings of Mr. Epstein's attorneys, \nexcepts for a few short portions by Jack Goldberger— have been redacted. The Intervenor Attorneys \nask that the Court order that the Jane Does cannot use the unredacted portions and deny their motion \nto use those documents in support of their claims.'- The Intervenor Attorneys further ask that the \nJane Does be barred from delving further into the confidential plea negotiations. \nAt the hearing on August 12, 2011, the Court heard oral argument from Attorney Black, who \n'The United States uses the term \"confidential\" plea negotiations as a term of art. By \ndefinition, all plea negotiations are confidential and, pursuant to Rule 11, are not to be made part of \nthe Court record until a final agreement is reached and a guilty plea is entered. \n2Pursuant to S.D. Fla. Local Rule 5.\n... [truncated, 2255 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/1 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=1]", "char_count": 2255}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 3 of 12 \nsuggested that the ban on discovering and using plea negotiations was broader than what is simply \nstated in Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal \nProcedure. The Court ordered supplemental briefing, and the Intervenor Attorneys have raised a \nnumber of arguments in their supplemental briefing: (1) that the plea negotiations may not be used \nagainst Mr. Epstein pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(0; (2) that because the \nJane Does are seeking inadmissible evidence, they bear a burden of showing a proper basis for \ndiscovery; (3) that the plea negotiations are irrelevant because the Jane Does are not entitled to \ninvalidate the Non-Prosecution Agreement; and (4) that the documents and information should be \nprivileged under a common law plea negotiations privilege. In addition, in their initial briefing and \nat oral argument, the Intervenors argued that the communications were governed by the attorney \nwork-product privilege. \nARGUMENT \nA. \nThe Petitioners Appear to Be Seeking to Use the Plea Negotiation \nDocuments Against Jeffrey Epstein; However, This Argument Is \nPremature. \nWith regard to the Intervenors' first argument, the United States agrees that the Jane Does \nhave made clear that their ultimate goal is to have the Non-Prosecution Agreement set aside and to \nhave Jeffrey Epstein prosecuted. Thus, although the United States is the named Respondent, the \nPetitioners have made clear that their true target is Jeffrey Epstein: \"The victims very specifically \nadvised Epstein more than one year ago that they would be filing U.S. Attorney correspondence in \nthis case in an effort to invalidate his non-prosecution-agreement.\" (Pets.' Resp. to Epstein Mot' n \nfor Limited Intervention, DE96 at 1.) As such, the Intervenors correctly note that \"any statement \nmade in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the\n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/2 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=2]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 4 of 12 \nFed. R. Evid. 410(4). \nOn today's date, September 26, 2011, the Court granted in part the Petitioners' Motion \nseeking a finding of violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), but deferred ruling on \nthe merits pending completion of discovery and denied the Petitioners' Motion to Have Their Facts \nAccepted as True. (See DE99 at 13-14.) Accordingly, it is premature to speculate as to how the \nPetitioners will try to \"use\" the information currently within their possession. The United States \nsuggests, for the reasons set forth below, that the parties enter into a Protective Order governing the \nuse and filing of such material until such time as the matter is ripe. \nB. \nThe Intervenors' Objection to Discovery Before Any Has Been Served \nIs Premature. \nThe Intervenors' second argument also is premature. In it, they argue that because they \nanticipate that the Jane Does will seek the discovery of inadmissible plea negotiations, the Court \nshould made some sort of ruling requiring the Jane Does to make a showing of a proper basis for the \ndiscovery. As noted above, today the Court issued an Order wherein it allowed the Petitioners \nlimited discovery via document requests and requests for admissions from the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice. (DE99 at 11.) Rather than impose a preliminary restriction, the United States recommends \nthat the Court require Petitioners to serve a copy of all discovery requests on the Intervenors so that \nthey may interpose any objections and have those objections ruled upon prior to the United States \nserving any of its responses. \n4 \nEFTA00657042\n", "char_count": 1682}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 5 of 12 \nC. \nThe \nAttorney \nWork-Product \nPrivilege \nApplies \nto These \nCommunications' \nIn a federal criminal case, the parties are prohibited from obtaining via discovery \"reports, \nmemoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or \nother government agent in connection with investigation or prosecuting the case,\" and \"reports, \nmemoranda, or other documents made by the defendant, or the defendant's attorney or agent, during \nthe case's investigation or defense[.]\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2)(A). In a federal civil case, \nthe parties are prohibited from obtaining via discovery documents and tangible things that were \nprepared in preparation for litigation (including previous litigation), especially \"mental impressions, \nconclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the \nlitigation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B). Thus, the Federal Rules have codified the common law \nprotections for attorney work product. \nHere, the Jane Does are seeking to use and to gain additional access to: (1) correspondence \nbetween counsel for Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding plea negotiations; \n(2) internal communications between attorneys at the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Justice \nDepartment and among the prosecution team; and (3) internal communications among attorneys for \nJeffrey Epstein and among the defense team. Internal communications have unquestionably retained \ntheir attorney-client and work-product privileges, which will be asserted in response to document \n3The Intervenors also argue that the Court should find that the documents and information \nare irrelevant because the Petitioners are not entitled to invalidate the Non-Prosecution Agreement. \nIn the Court's Order of September 26, 2011, granting in part the Petitioners' Motion for finding \nviolations of the CVRA, the Court did n\n... [truncated, 2446 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/4 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=4]", "char_count": 2446}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 6 of 12 \nrequests. \nThe issue here relates to communications between a criminal defendant and a prosecuting \nauthority in the context of plea negotiations.° In such a context, obviously there is no attorney-client \nrelationship and, thus, no attorney-client privilege. But, in the context of a defendant's attempts to \npersuade a prosecutor that he did not commit a federal offense or that a prosecutor should exercise \nprosecutorial discretion in a particular way, both parties will engage in a free and frank discussion \nthat necessarily requires, in order to be fruitful, a disclosure of mental impressions, charging \nstrategy, and documents and things prepared in anticipation of litigation —in other words, documents \nand information covered by the attorney work product privilege. Obviously the disclosure of those \ndocuments and information will waive that privilege as to those documents and information for the \npurposes of the plea discussions and as to the two parties to the plea discussions — the question \npresented here is whether the disclosure waives the privilege as to the rest of the world? A variety \nof constitutional provisions, Rules, and cases suggest that the disclosure does not. \nFirst and foremost, as reiterated by the Supreme Court last term, the Supreme Court has \n°The documents that have been lodged with the Court and that are cited in the Petitioners' \nredacted pleading consist primarily of drafts of plea agreements and criminal Informations \ncorresponding to the draft plea agreements and non-prosecution agreements, along with \ncorrespondence related to those drafts as well as the performance of the final agreement. The \ndocuments contain only the text of communications by government attorneys, but they were not \nobtained from the U.S. Attorney's Office or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, they were \nobtained from counsel for Jeffrey Epstein pursuant to Jane Doe # 1 's ci\n... [truncated, 2697 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/5 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=5]", "char_count": 2697}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 7 of 12 \n\"long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes \nof the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.\" Padilla v. Kentucky, \nU.S. \n130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citation omitted). This includes the \"critical obligation of counsel to \nadvise the client of `the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.\"' Id. at 1484 (citation \nomitted). In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the Supreme Court first expressed how \nthe work product privilege coincided with the Sixth Amendment: \nAlthough the work-product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery \nin civil litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice \nsystem is even more vital. The interests of society and accused in obtaining a fair \nand accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate \nsafeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case. \nId. at 238. The Court also noted that the work-product doctrine applied both to the files of the \ndefense counsel and to the prosecution. Id. fn. 12. \nIn Nobles, the Court noted that, even in criminal cases, the work-product privilege was not \nabsolute, but, when it is deemed waived, especially when the waiver impinges upon a defendant's \nSixth Amendment right to counsel, it should be \"quite limited in scope\" to minimize the effect upon \nthat constitutional right.' See id. at 24041. \nThe central concern in determining whether disclosure to a nonparty (governmental \nor otherwise) waiver work product protection was summed up concisely by In re \nDoe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981): \"to effect a forfeiture of work product \nprotection by waiver, disclosure must occur in circumstances in which the attorney \ncannot reasonably expect to limit the future use of the otherwise protected material.\" \nDoe thus esta\n... [truncated, 2499 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/6 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=6]", "char_count": 2499}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 8 of 12 \nE.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 2010 WL 1489966, *5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, \n2010); see also Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 464 (D. Md. 1998) (same). \nObviously by disclosing the information to the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Intervenor Attorneys \nintended that they use the information in considering whether or not to resolve the matter by a pre-\nindictment plea, and vice-versa. The issue here, though, is whether it was reasonable for the \nIntervenor-Attorneys, and the U.S. Attorney's Office, to assume that their communications would \nremain confidential as between themselves. In light of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) \nand Federal Rule of Evidence 410 as well as the general confidentiality surrounding plea \nnegotiations and grand jury proceedings, it was reasonable for both parties to assume that their \ncommunications would remain confidential. \nAlthough the undersigned has not found any Eleventh Circuit cases that address this issue, \nthe other Circuits that have addressed the issue have done so inconsistently. The First Circuit has \nheld that a company may maintain even its attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege in \nmaterials that it discloses to the U.S. Attorney's Office during pre-indictment presentations and \nongoing plea negotiations. See In re Keeper of the Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to \nXYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 16, 27-28 (P` Cir. 2003). In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the \nPhilippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit decided that Westinghouse's disclosure \nof work product materials to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department \nduring their investigations of Westinghouse \"waived the work-product doctrine as against all other \nadversaries.\" Id. at 1429. \nIn the Westinghouse decision, there was no discussion of the Sixth Amendment. Nor was \nthere a\n... [truncated, 2215 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/7 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=7]", "char_count": 2215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 9 of 12 \nproposed plea agreement to mandatory life imprisonment was not admissible by the defense during \nthe penalty phase of a death penalty case: \nThe Court's decision to exclude evidence concerning the plea negotiations also finds \nstrong support on policy grounds. The Court is mindful of the danger that the \nadmission of plea negotiations can discourage settlement efforts. \"The disposition \nof criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, \nsometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the \nadministration of justice.\" Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S. Ct. 495, \n30 L.Ed. 2d 427 (1971). The Supreme Court has declared that plea bargaining \"is \nto be encouraged.\" Id. This means that the Court should take care to avoid \nadmitting evidence that would deter plea bargaining. Admitting the proposed plea \nagreement in this case would clearly discourage plea bargaining. DOJ policy \nrequires local prosecutors to forward any proposed plea agreement to the Attorney \nGeneral for approval. Thus, whenever a United States Attorney recommends \nleniency in a capital case there is the possibility that his or her recommendation will \nbe overruled by the Attorney General. \nUnited States Attorneys would be \ndiscouraged from proposed plea deals if the defense could show any rejected plea \nagreements to the jury. \"Must as the accused may be dissuaded from trying to make \na deal by the prospect that failure will be costly, so might the prosecutor be less \nwilling to bargain for the same reason.\" Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. \nKirkpatrick, 2 Federal Evidence 149 (2d ed. 2004). \nUnited States v. Fell, 372 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (D. Vt. 2005), affd 531 F.3d 197, 219-220 (2d Cir. \n2008) (\"the draft agreement's inclusion of the unadopted statements of the prosecutors lacked \nevidentiary value and ... it would distract the jury from an independent ass\n... [truncated, 2775 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/8 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=8]", "char_count": 2775}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 10 of 12 \nthat such work product will be used against his client in the future by another adversary. The \nattorney knows that his disclosure to the prosecutor will not be used directly against his client during \nthe prosecution. Likewise, the prosecutor, in his or her efforts to convince the target to enter a guilty \nplea, should be entitled to make disclosures to the target that will not be forever after considered part \nof the public realm. A ruling to the contrary would chill plea negotiations. \nD. \nThe Reasoning Underlying the Common Law Mediation Privilege \nApplies With Greater Force to Plea Negotiations \nIn their Supplemental Briefing, the Attorney Intervenors discuss a series of common law \nprivileges, including a \"mediation privilege\" that has been recognized by the Second Circuit, the \nCentral District of California, and the Western District of Pennsylvania, relying on a decision of \nJudge Marcus. As quoted by the Intervenors, mediation \"afford[s] to litigants an opportunity to \narticulate their position[s] and to hear, first hand, both their opponent's version of the matters in \ndispute and a neutral assessment of the relative strengths of the opposing positions.\" Sheldon v. \nPennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513 (W.D. Pa. 2000). In other words, the \nparties are allowed to disclose documents and information normally covered by the attorney work \nproduct privilege without fear of waiver. \nThe reasons set forth in the cases for a \"mediation privilege\" apply with even more force to \nplea negotiations, which have constitutional ramifications that do not appear in civil suits. Unlike \ndisputes that are subject to civil mediation, criminal cases involve decisions regarding a defendant's \nlife and liberty. In plea negotiations, the need for \"counsel to discuss matters in an uninhibited \nfashion\" is even more important. See Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, In\n... [truncated, 2131 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00657039/9 or ?id=EFTA00657039&page=9]", "char_count": 2131}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/27/2011 Page 11 of 12 \ngreater \"need for confidentiality and trust between participants in a [plea negotiation] proceeding.\" \nFolb v. Motion Picture Inc. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1998). \nRespectfully submitted, \nWIFREDO A. FERRER \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nBy: \ns/A. Marie Villafaiia \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nAssistant United States Attorney \nFlorida Bar No. 0018255 \n500 South Australian Ave, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nTelephone: 561-820-8711 \nFacsimile: 561-820-8777 \nann.marie.c.villafana@usdoj.gov \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 27, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing \ndocument with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. According to the Court's website, counsel \nfor all parties are able to receive notice via the CM/ECF system. \ns/A. Marie Villafaiia \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nAssistant United States Attorney \nII \nEFTA00657049\n", "char_count": 970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00657039", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 100 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09'27:2011 Page 12 of 12 \nSERVICE LIST \nJane Does 1 and 2 v. United States, \nCase No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nBrad Edwards, Esq., \nThe Law Offices of Brad Edwards & Associates, LLC \n2028 Harrison Street, Suite 202 \nHollywood, Florida 33020 \n(954) 414-8033 \nFax: (954) 924-1530 \nPaul G. Cassell \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, Utah 84112 \n(801) 585-5202 \nFax: (801) 585-6833 \nE-mail: casselp@law.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 \nRoy Black, Esq. \nJackie Perczek, Esq. \nBlack, Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A. \n201 South Biscayne Boulevard \nSuite 1300 \nMiami, FL 33131 \n(305) 371-06421 \nFax (305) 358-2006 \nE-mail: RBlack@royblack.com \nAttorneys for Intervenors Jeffrey Epstein, Roy Black, Martin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz \n12 \nEFTA00657050\n", "char_count": 944}]}