{"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_count": 38, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00590248", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00590248.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Filing # 27349731 E-Filed 05/15/2015 01:43:57 PM \nIN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE \nSEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT \nIN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: CACE 15-000072 \nBRADLEY J. EDWARDS and \nPAUL G. CASSELL, \nPlaintiffs / Counterclaim Defendants, \nv. \nALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, \nDefendant / Counterclaim Plaintiff. \nDEFENDANT / COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFF ALAN DERSHOWITZ'S \nMEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO NON-PARTY BOLES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER \nLLP'S MOTION TO OUASH OR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER \nDefendant / Counterclaim Plaintiff Alan Dershowitz (\"Dershowitz\") respectfully submits \nthis Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Quash or for Protective Order Regarding \nSubpoena (the \"Motion to Quash\") filed by non-party Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP (\"BSF'). \nDershowitz also refers the Court to his memorandum in opposition to Jane Doe No. 3's motion \nto quash the subpoena served on her for additional details about the nature of this case and why \nDershowitz is entitled to the discovery he seeks.' \nINTRODUCTION \nThe Court should deny the Motion to Quash because the subpoena duces tecum served on \nBSF by Dershowitz is entirely proper and seeks the production of relevant, non-privileged \nJane Doe No. 3 has no right to proceed anonymously as she has been identified publicly on \nseveral occasions and has made public statements to the media using her own name, as indicated \nby the exhibits that she submitted with her motion to quash. See Jane Doe No. 3's Motion to \nQuash, Exs. 1-4. Nonetheless, Dershowitz will refer to her as \"Jane Doe No. 3\" until the Court \norders otherwise. \nEFTA00590248\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "documents that are at the heart of this defamation lawsuit. BSF is representing Jane Doe No. 3 in \nconnection with this action. Jane Doe No. 3's credibility and the veracity, or lack thereof, of her \noutrageous allegations against Dershowitz have been placed directly in dispute by Plaintiffs \nBradley J. Edwards (\"Edwards\") and Paul G. Cassell (\"Cassell\") (together, \"Plaintiffs\"), the \nattorneys who are representing Jane Doe No. 3 in a separate but related litigation. Moreover, \nJane Doe No. 3 has waived any possible claims of privacy with regard to her sexual allegations \nagainst Dershowitz and others by voluntarily making statements to the media for publication in \ntabloids (likely being paid for doing so) and including them in pleadings and affidavits. She \ncannot use these sexual allegations as swords and then hide behind them as shields. Edwards, \nCassell, and BSF have all publicly proclaimed that they are representing Jane Doe No. 3 on a pro \nbono basis, apparently in an effort to lend credibility to her false allegations against Dershowitz. \nIn light of these public statements — which unquestionably waive any possible claim of privilege \nor confidentiality with regard to fee arrangements and retainers, and which Dershowitz does not \naccept as true — Dershowitz is entitled to the discovery he seeks from BSF, including with \nrespect to the specific terms of BSF's engagement with the Jane Doe No. 3 and the nature of \nJane Doe No. 3's contracts with publishers, media outlets, and entertainment producers \nFACTUAL BACKGROUND \nThis defamation action arises out of an underlying lawsuit that Edwards and Cassell filed \nagainst the United States (the \"Government\") in the United States District Court for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida (the \"Federal Action\") more than eight years ago. In the Federal Action, \nEdwards and Cassell represent certain alleged victims of Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\"), a client of \nDershowitz's, who contend that the Government violated their righ\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/1 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=1]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "and \"Jane Doe No. 2\" — assert that the Government violated their rights under the CVRA by \nfailing to consult with them before negotiating a non-prosecution agreement (the \"NPA\") with \nEpstein, who allegedly subjected them to various sexual crimes when they were minors. \nOn December 30, 2014 — more than eight years after the Federal Action began — Edwards \nand Cassell filed a motion to allow a third alleged victim, Jane Doe No. 3, to join in the suit as an \nadditional plaintiff (the \"Joinder Motion\"). See Counterclaim, at 12. The Joinder Motion alleges \nthat Jane Doe No. 3 first met Epstein in 1999 and that Epstein \"kept Jane Doe #3 as his sex slave \nfrom about 1999 through 2002, when she managed to escape to a foreign country.\" Id. The \nJoinder Motion alleges that \"Epstein also sexually trafficked the then-minor Jane Doe [No. 3], \nmaking her available for sex to politically-connected and financially-power people.\" Id. ADD. \nAlthough none of these allegations have ever been validated by any law enforcement authorities \nor other objective investigators, and cannot be presumed to be true, Edwards and Cassell filed \nthe Joinder Motion on the public docket in the Federal Action, without any accompanying \nmotion to seal. \nIn response to the false and outrageous allegations asserted against him in the Federal \nAction on behalf of Jane Doe No. 3 and the subsequent media coverage of those allegations, \nDershowitz made a number of public statements defending his previously unblemished personal \nand professional reputations. Edwards and Cassell used their personal credibility as lawyers, \nand, in Cassell's case, as a law professor and former judge, to enhance the credibility of Jane \nDoe No. 3's allegations. Dershowitz had the right to respond by challenging their credibility, as \nwell as Jane Doe No. 3's credibility, in the court of public opinion. Edwards and Cassell then \nfiled this action, alleging that Dershowitz defamed them by \"initiat[ing] a massive public media \nassa\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/2 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=2]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "lying in their filing, of having leveled knowingly false accusations against [Dershowitz] without \never conducting any investigation of the credibility of the accusations and of having acted \nunethically to the extent that their willful misconduct warranted and required disbarment\" — even \nthough Dershowitz \"knew [the Joinder Motion] to be an entirely proper and well-founded \npleading.\" CompIli 17. \nAfter the filing of this action, Dershowitz's counsel reached out to Plaintiffs to ask \nwhether they would accept service of a subpoena on behalf of Jane Doe No. 3. Plaintiffs refused \nand referred Dershowitz to BSF, which is representing Jane Doe No. 3 for purposes of this \naction. BSF likewise refused to accept service on behalf of Jane Doe No. 3, which forced \nDershowitz to use the commission process to serve Jane Doe No. 3 in Colorado with a subpoena \nfor deposition testimony and documents. On March 31, 2015, Dershowitz served a separate \nsubpoena for the production of documents on BSF. See Motion to Quash, Comp. Ex. 1. The \nsubpoena seeks, among other things: (1) documents concerning any actual or potential book, \ntelevision or movie contracts or deals concerning Jane Doe No. 3's allegations about being a \n\"sex slave\"; (2) drafts of any of Jane Doe No. 3's declarations referencing Dershowitz by name; \n(3) documents supporting Jane Doe No. 3's allegations about Dershowitz in the Federal Action; \n(4) statements provided by, and notes from interviews given by, Jane Doe No. 3 referencing \nDershowitz by name; and (5) documents concerning BSF's retention by Jane Doe #3, including \nbut not limited to the signed retainer letter and any reference to fees for the retention. In short, \nDershowitz seeks documents and information from BSF that are directly relevant to the issues in \ndispute in this case. \n4 \nEFTA00590251\n", "char_count": 1840}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "On April 9, 2015, BSF served objections to the subpoena duces tecitm and filed a motion \nto quash the subpoena in its entirety or, in the alternative, for a protective order limiting the \nscope of the documents it is required to produce. \nOn April 7, 2015, Judge Marra issued an order in the Federal Action striking the portions \nof the Joinder Motion and Jane Doe No. 3's declarations referring to Dershowitz. See Ex. A. \nThe court concluded that the allegations against Dershowitz, including the \"lurid details\" \nincluded in the Joinder Motion by Plaintiffs on behalf of Jane Doe No. 3, are \"immaterial and \nimpertinent\" to the issues in dispute in the Federal Action, and were \"unnecessary\" to resolving \nthe Federal Action. He ruled that striking these allegations was \"sanction enough\" for Edwards \nand Cassell. Judge Marra also reminded the attorneys of their obligations under Rule 11 of the \nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits allegations made for an improper purpose. In \na supplemental order also issued on April 7, 2015, Judge Marra ordered that the filings \ncontaining the stricken materials be restricted from public access. See Ex. B. \nDuring the course of this litigation, BSF has made public statements to the media about \nthe terms of its representation of Jane Doe No. 3. For example, in an article published on April \n24, 2015, The American Lawyer cites the following statement by BSF to report as a fact that the \nfirm is representing Jane Doe No. 3 on a pro bono basis: \nThe firm's pro bono program focuses on meaningful cases including trying to \nassist women and children who are the victims of abuse. Boies Schiller & \nFlexner LLP took on Ms. \n' representation because she was a victim of \nabuse when she was a minor child. \nSee Ex. C. Plaintiffs' counsel likewise represented to this Court at the hearing of April 10, 2015, \nthat Edwards and Cassell are representing Jane Doe No. 3 in the Federal Action on a pro bono \nbasis. See Ex. D, at 20, Ins. 6-7. As set\n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/4 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=4]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "related fee agreements entered into between Jane Doe No. 3 and her lawyers. Dershowitz is \nentitled to test in discovery whether, while purportedly representing Jane Doe No. 3 on a pro \nbono basis in this case, BSF and/or Plaintiffs have other financial arrangements seeking to cash \nin with Jane Doe No. 3 by way of book or movie deals or otherwise. Those are fair topics for \ndiscovery, and Jane Doe No. 3 and BSF assuredly have waived any privilege on the subject \nmatter of BSF's retention by seeking to benefit from statements made to a national publication \non the subject matter. \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW \nI. \nThe documents sought by the subpoena are directly relevant to this defamation \naction. \nMuch like the motion to quash filed by Jane Doe No. 3, BSF's motion asserts that the \ninformation Dershowitz seeks in the subpoena served on the firm is not relevant to Plaintiffs' \ndefamation claim. This argument ignores both the broad scope of discovery permitted under the \nFlorida Rules of Civil Procedure and how Plaintiffs themselves have framed the issues — \nsquarely placing in dispute whether Dershowitz in fact \"knew\" that Jane Doe No. 3's accusations \nagainst him were \"proper and well-founded,\" i.e., true. \nUnder Rule 1.280, \"[p)arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged. \nthat is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or \ndefense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party.\" Put \ndifferently, information is discoverable so long as it relates \"to the issues involved in the \nlitigation, as framed in all pleadings.\" Diaz-Verson v. Walbridge Aldinger Co., 54 So. 3d 1007, \n1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); see also Richard Mulholland & Assocs. v. Polverari, 698 So. 2d 1269, \n1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (explaining that a protective order is required only \"when the \n6 \nEFTA00590253\n", "char_count": 1886}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "pleadings indicate that the documents requested are not related to any pending claim or \ndefense\"). \nBSF contends that the subpoena should be quashed because Dershowitz is seeking \ninformation that is relevant to the Federal Action and is wholly unconnected to this suit. Motion \nto Quash, at 6-7. This argument ignores that the Federal Action, as it relates to Dershowitz, is \nnow over. More significantly, it ignores the basis for Plaintiffs' defamation claim and the nature \nof Dershowitz's affirmative defenses. The complaint in this action expressly alleges that \nDershowitz committed the tort of defamation by accusing Edwards and Cassell of having acted \nimproperly by filing the Joinder Motion, even though Dershowitz \"knew [the Joinder Motion] to \nbe an entirely proper and well-founded pleading.\" Compl. 1 17. Thus, the face of the complaint \nestablishes that this case does directly involve the veracity of the allegations that Jane Doe No. 3 \nasserted against Dershowitz in the Federal Action. \nIndeed, although Jane Doe No. 3 is not a \nparty to this case, she is the accuser making allegations of criminal misconduct, which Plaintiffs \ncontend are true and which Dershowitz contends are complete fabrications. \nThe relevance of the documents sought by the subpoena issued to BSF becomes even \nmore apparent after considering what Plaintiffs must prove to prevail on their defamation claim \nand defeat Dershowitz's affirmative defenses. Under Florida law and the First Amendment, a \ndefamation plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor \nmust act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public \nofficial, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and \n(5) statement must be defamatory. Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. \n2008). Because Plaintiffs are public figures or limited public figures, they must also prove that \n7 \nEFTA00590254\n... [truncated, 2001 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/6 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=6]", "char_count": 2001}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Dershowitz acted with actual malice in making his statements, i.e., that Dershowitz \"knew [the \nJoinder Motion] to be an entirely proper and well-founded pleading.\" Compl. 1 17. \nTesting this allegation requires discovery into the credibility of Jane Doe No. 3's \naccusations against Dershowitz. The subpoena served on BSF is intended to accomplish \nprecisely that goal. For example, the subpoena seeks \"[a]ll documents that reference by name, \nAlan M. Dershowitz, which support and/or confirm the allegations set forth in\" Jane Doe No. 3's \ndeclarations submitted in the Federal Action, as well as \"[a]ny documents and information that \nsupport and/or confirm [Jane Doe No. 3's] presence at the various locations named in [Jane Doe \nNo. 3's declaration] on the particular dates and times when [Dershowitz] was also present.\" \nMotion to Quash, Comp. Ex. 1. Similarly, the subpoena seeks Jane Doe No. 3's diaries, cell \nphone records, and travel records during the time she asserts she was kept as Epstein's \"sex \nslave,\" i.e., 1999 to 2002 — all of which could contain information that undermines or contradicts \nher allegations about when and where she allegedly had sex with Dershowitz (and that likewise \ndisproves Plaintiffs' allegation that Dershowitz knew the Joinder Motion was a \"well-founded \npleading\").2 Id. \nThe subpoena also requests documents that go to Jane Doe No. 3's general credibility \nregarding her alleged experiences as a \"sex slave\" for Epstein — an issue that is directly relevant \nto the truth of Jane Doe No. 3's allegations against Dershowitz, whether Dershowitz knew the \nJoinder Motion to be \"well-founded,\" and what type of investigation (if any) Plaintiffs conducted \ninto Jane Doe No. 3's allegations. For example, Jane Doe No. 3 has made statements to the \n2 Of course, if Plaintiffs or Jane Doe No. 3 were to identify and disclose the specific dates of the \npurported six instances when Jane Doe No. 3 purportedly had sex with Dershowitz, the scope of \nthe requeste\n... [truncated, 2206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/7 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=7]", "char_count": 2206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "media about meeting former President Clinton and former Vice President Gore on Epstein's \nprivate island in the Caribbean. Dershowitz is entitled to explore the veracity of Jane Doe No. \n3's accounts of these meetings, because any inconsistencies are obviously relevant to Jane Doe \nNo. 3's credibility as a witness regarding her alleged experiences as a \"sex slave\" for Epstein, as \nwell as to the sufficiency of any investigation undertaken by Plaintiffs prior to filing the Joinder \nMotion. Dershowitz expects the evidence to show that Jane Doe No. 3's public accounts of her \nalleged interactions with President Clinton and Vice President Gore are complete fabrications, \njust like her allegations against Dershowitz. \nSimilarly, Dershowitz has a right to explore Jane Doe No. 3's potential book, movie, and \ntelevision deals as a means of establishing her bias, as well as the potential bias by Edwards and \nCassell (i.e., whether the lawyers had a fmancial incentive to help sensationalize Jane Doe No. \n3's story by identifying Dershowitz by name in a public pleading). See Steinger, Iscoe & \nGreene, P.A. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 103 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (discovery \naimed at obtaining evidence of a witness's bias is permissible). \nContrary to BSF's assertions, the subpoena is not an unbounded fishing expedition. \nRather, Dershowitz is seeking information that goes to the essence of Plaintiffs' claim against \nhim in this lawsuit and his affirmative defenses to that claim. \nII. \nBSF has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the documents requested \nby Dershowitz are \"entirely privileged.\" \nBSF conclusorily asserts that the subpoena served by Dershowitz should be quashed in its \nentirety because it \"seeks entirely privileged documents from a non-party law firm of \ncommunications with a non-party client that are not subject to production.\" Motion to Quash, at \nI. BSF has utterly failed to meet its burden of establishing that all of the documents that \nDersh\n... [truncated, 2077 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/8 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=8]", "char_count": 2077}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "\"The burden of establishing the attorney-client privilege rests on the party claiming it.\" \nRC/PB, Inc. v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 132 So. 3d 325, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting S. Bell \nTeL & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So.2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994)). A blanket assertion of privilege, \nwithout supporting evidence, is insufficient to meet this burden. See Maple Wood Partners, L.P. \nv. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 584 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (applying Florida law) \n(collecting cases). \nHere, all BSF has done is make a blanket, unsupported assertion that all of the documents \nsought by the subpoena are protected from disclosure because \"communications between BSF \nand its client were in the course of rendering legal advice and are privileged.\" Motion to Quash, \nat 3. This argument — which is not supported by any attempt to establish that the elements of the \nattorney-client privilege have been satisfied here with respect to any particular communication — \nignores that the subpoena seeks categories of documents that are much broader than \ncommunications between BSF and Jane Doe No. 3. For example, Jane Doe No. 3's diaries and \ntravel records are not protected by the attorney-client privilege merely because she has provided \nBSF with a copy of those documents. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395, \n(1981) (the attorney-client privilege protects only disclosures of communications between the \nclient and the attorney made in confidence; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts \nrevealed which were communicated to the attorney). Moreover, portions of Jane Doe No. 3's \ndiary has been published in the tabloids, thereby waiving any possible privilege or claim of \nprivacy \nBSF also asserted a privilege objection to the portion of the subpoena seeking documents \nconcerning its retention by Jane Doe No. 3, including but not limited to the signed retainer letter \nand any explanation of the fee agreement between the firm and Jane Doe No. 3. Cont\n... [truncated, 2026 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/9 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=9]", "char_count": 2026}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "BSF's unsupported assertions, a retainer letter between a client and her attorney generally is not \nprotected by the attorney-client privilege, nor is other information relating to the financial \narrangements between the attorney and the client. See, e.g., Lawfinders Assocs., Inc. v. Legal \nResearch Ctr., Inc., 193 F.3d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1999) (\"[T]he attorney-client privilege does not \nprotect the type of information contained in the retainer letters.\"); United States v. Davis, 636 \nF.2d 1028, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that \"Minancial transactions between the \nattorney and client, including the compensation paid by or on behalf of the client\" generally are \nnot protected by the attorney-client privilege). These principles are particularly apt here, given \nthat BSF has publicly announced that it is representing Jane Doe No. 3 on a pro bono basis given \nher alleged abuse as a minor. Dershowitz does not accept that statement as true and is entitled to \ntest the veracity of BSF's public assertion, which put the terms of BSF's retention (which BSF \nhas already put at issue) even more directly at issue. \nMoreover, BSF's public announcement — which was presumably made with the \npermission of its client — waives any possible claim of privilege with respect to the fee \nagreements and retainers entered into between BSF and Jane Doe No. 3. It is hornbook law that \nthe voluntary public disclosure of facts that might otherwise be privileged waives privilege as to \nthe entire subject matter. E.g., First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Whitener, 715 So. 2d 979, 984 \n(Fla. 481 DCA 1998) (voluntary production of privileged information results in a waiver of \nprivilege for all information on that same specific subject). BSF sought sympathy for Jane Doe \nNo. 3 and good press for itself by claiming to represent Jane Doe No. 3 on a pro bono basis. \nDershowitz is entitled to test whether, when all financial arrangements between Jane Doe No. 3 \nand BSF are considered, that public \n... [truncated, 2102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/10 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=10]", "char_count": 2102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "BSF's related assertions of \"confidentiality\" are also unavailing. As set forth in detail in \nDershowitz's opposition to Jane Doe No. 3's motion to quash, Jane Doe No. 3 has made several \ndetailed, public statements about her interactions with Epstein, as well as her purported \nencounters with Dershowitz during her self-described time as Epstein's \"sex slave.\" Edwards \nand Cassell have also submitted numerous unsealed pleadings and declarations on behalf of Jane \nDoe No. 3 in the Federal Action that were available to the public (until Judge Marra \nappropriately struck those filings from the record as being lurid and impertinent). Jane Doe No. \n3 has given statements and provided documents to the tabloids for publication, and she arranged, \nwith the help of her lawyers, to be interviewed about the alleged details of her sex life by ABC \nTelevision. Jane Doe No. 3 made all of these voluntary statements as an adult, many years after \nshe allegedly \"escaped\" from Epstein. BSF cannot argue that such matters are so \"personal\" or \n\"private\" as to warrant an order from the Court that precludes Dershowitz from obtaining any \ndiscovery relating to Jane Doe No. 3. Accordingly, Dershowitz's right to discovery outweighs \nany purported privacy interests held and now waived by Jane Doe No. 3. See Westco, Inc. v. \nScott Lewis' Gardening & Trimming, Inc., 26 So.3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (explaining \nthat \"[w]hen confidential information is sought from a non-party, the trial court must determine \nwhether the requesting party establishes a need for the information that outweighs the privacy \nrights of the non-party\"). \nFinally, and in all events, Jane Doe No. 3 has waived any claim of privacy with regard to \nsubject matters that she has voluntarily made public. A party is not permitted to make selective \ndisclosure as to a subject matter and then to assert an exemption from discovery as to other \naspects of the same subject matter. See Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla\n... [truncated, 2124 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/11 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=11]", "char_count": 2124}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "with a reasonable expectation of privacy\" results in a waiver of privacy rights). A person may \nnot publicly disclose otherwise private information publicly, thereby damaging other people's \nreputations, and then claim privacy as a shield to protect against an adversarial challenge to those \nsame public allegations. \nIn sum, BSF's blanket, conclusory assertions of privilege and confidentiality are not a \nvalid basis for finding that the subpoena issued by Dershowitz is either \"unreasonable\" or \n\"oppressive.\" \nIII. \nThe subpoena served on BSF is not wholly duplicative of the subpoena served on \nJane Doe No. 3. \nBSF also argues that the subpoena served by Dershowitz should be quashed because it is \nmerely duplicative of the subpoena that Dershowitz served upon its client, Jane Doe No. 3. This \nargument likewise fails. \nThe subpoena that Dershowitz served on Jane Doe No. 3 required the production of \ncertain specified items \"now in your custody or control.\" See Motion to Quash, Comp. Ex. 1, at \n1. Dershowitz agrees with the proposition that has been advanced by Plaintiffs in this litigation \nthat the term \"control\" generally means \"the legal right to obtain the document.\" 8B Wright & \nMiller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2210 (3d ed.). Dershowitz therefore submits that Jane Doe No. \n3 has an obligation, pursuant to the subpoena served on her, to produce responsive documents \nthat are in the hands of her attorneys (i.e., BSF and Plaintiffs) because such documents are under \nher \"control.\" Out of an abundance of caution, however, Dershowitz also served a subpoena on \nBSF to circumvent any (baseless) argument by Jane Doe No. 3 that she is unable to produce \ndocuments that are stored at the offices of her attorneys. \nMoreover, to the extent that BSF has documents that are responsive to the subpoena but \nare not subject to Jane Doe No. 3's control, BSF has an obligation to produce those documents. \n13 \nEFTA00590260\n", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "For example, internal BSF documents that describe the terms of the firm's engagement with Jane \nDoe No. 3 or BSF's efforts to market Jane Doe No. 3's story may not belong to Jane Doe No. 3 \nor otherwise be subject to her control, but nonetheless are responsive to Request No. 22 in the \nsubpoena (and, as discussed above, are relevant to this action and are not subject to the attorney-\nclient privilege). Accordingly, BSF's complaints of duplication are without merit. \nCONCLUSION \nThe Court should deny BSF's motion to quash because (1) the documents that \nDershowitz seeks are relevant to this litigation; (2) BSF has failed to meet its burden of \nestablishing that all of the documents sought are protected by the attorney-client privilege; and \n(3) the subpoena is not wholly duplicative of the subpoena issued to Jane Doe No. 3. The Court \nshould likewise deny BSF's request for a protective order that limits the scope of its document \nproduction, as well as its request for fees and costs in connection with the subpoena. \n14 \nEFTA00590261\n", "char_count": 1048}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Dated: May 15, 2015 \nRespectfully Submitted, \ns/ Thomas E. Scott \nThomas E. Scott \nFlorida Barts\n0 \nSteven R. Safra \nFlorida Bar No. 0570. \nCOLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. \nDadeland Centre II, 14th Floor \n9150 South Dadeland Boulevard \nMiami, Florida 33156 \nPhone: \nFax: \nRichard A. Simpson \nadmitted ro hac vice \nMary E. Borja \nadmitted ro hac vice \nAshley E. Eiler \nadmitted ro hac vice) \nWILEY REIN LLP \n1776 K Street NW \nWashin ton D 2 \n6 \nPhone: \nFax: \nCounsel for Alan M. Dershowirz \n15 \nEFTA00590262\n", "char_count": 503}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nWE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via E-\nmail on May 15, 2015 to: Jack Scarola, Esquire, Searcy Denny et al \nand \ncounsel for Plaintiffs, and to Sigrid McCawley, Esquire, Boies Schiller & \nFlexner, counsel for Jane Doe No. 3, at \nCOLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. \nAttorneys for Defendant \n9150 S. Dadeland Blvd. \nSuite 1400 \nMiami Florida 33156 \nPhone: \nFax: \nBy: \ns/ Thomas E. Scott \nTHOMAS E. SCOTT \nFBN: 149100 \nSTEVEN R. SAFRA \nFBN: 057028 \n16 \nEFTA00590263\n", "char_count": 520}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "EXHIBIT A \nEFTA00590264\n", "char_count": 24}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 1 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.:08-CV-80736-ICAM \nJANE DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2, \nPetitioners, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nRespondent. \nORDER DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO JOIN UNDER RULE 21 AND \nMOTION TO AMEND UNDER RULE 15 \nThis cause is before the Court on Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4's Corrected Motion \nPursuant to Rule 21 for Joinder in Action (\"Rule 21 Motion\") (DE 280), and Jane Doe 1 and Jane \nDoe 2's Protective Motion Pursuant to Rule 15 to Amend Their Pleadings to Conform to \nExisting Evidence and to Add Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 as Petitioners (\"Rule 15 Motion\") (DE \n311). Both motions are ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that they \nshould be denied. \nI. Background \nThis is an action by two unnamed petitioners, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, seeking to \nprosecute a claim under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. (DE I). \nGenerally, they allege that the respondent Government violated their rights under the CVRA by \nfailing to consult with them before negotiating a non-prosecution agreement with Jeffrey Epstein, \nwho subjected them to various sexual crimes while they were minors. (Id.). Petitioners initiated \nthis action in July 2008. (Id.). \nEFTA00590265\n", "char_count": 1351}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 2 of 10 \nOn December 30, 2014, two other unnamed victims, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4, moved \nto join as petitioners in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. (DE 280). \nPetitioners (Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2) support the Rule 21 Motion. (a at 11). Jane Doe 3 and \nJane Doe 4 argue that they \"have suffered the same violations of their rights under the [CVRA] \nas the\" Petitioners, and they \"desire to join in this action to vindicate their rights as well.\" (a at \nI). The Government vehemently opposes joinder under Rule 21. (DE 290). The Government \nargues that Rule 15 is the proper procedural device for adding parties to an action, not Rule 21. \n(a at 1). \n\"[O]ut of an abundance of caution,\" Petitioners filed a motion to amend their petition \nunder Rule 15, conforming the petition to the evidence and adding Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 as \npetitioners. (DE 311 at 2). The Government opposes the Rule 15 Motion as well. (DE 314). \nAmong other things, the Government argues that amending the petition to include Jane Doe 3 \nand Jane Doe 4 should be denied because of their undue delay in seeking to join the proceedings, \nand the undue prejudice that amendment will cause. (a.). \nAfter considering the parties' submissions and the proposed amended petition, the Court \nfinds that justice does not require amendment in this instance and exercises its discretion to deny \nthe amendment. \nIL Discussion \n\"The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is within the sole discretion of \nthe district court.\" Laurie v. Ala. Ct. Crim. Apps. 256 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001). \"The \ncourt should freely give leave when justice so requires.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Justice does \nnot require amendment in several instances, \"includ[ing] undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive \n2 \nEFTA00590266\n", "char_count": 1899}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 3 of 10 \non the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the \namendment, [and] futility of amendment.'\" Laurie, 256 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Foman v. Davis, \n371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). In addition to considering the effect of amendment on the parties, the \ncourt must consider \"the importance of the amendment on the proper determination of the merits \nof a dispute.\" 6 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Fed. P. § 1488, p. 814 (3d ed. 2010). Justice does \nnot require amendment where the addition of parties with duplicative claims will not materially \nadvance the resolution of the litigation on the merits. See Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 \nF.2d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1989). \nA. \nRule 21 Motion \nJane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4's first attempt to join in this proceeding was brought under \nRule 21. (DE 280). \"If parties seek to add a party under Rule 21, courts generally use the \nstandard of Rule 15, governing amendments to pleadings, to determine whether to allow the \naddition.\" 12 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Fed. P., p. 432 (3d ed. 2013)• see also Galustian v. \nPeter, 591 F.3d 724, 729-30 (4th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases and noting that Rule 15(a) applies \nto amendments seeking to add parties); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. \n1993) (\"A motion to add a party is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) ....\"). \nRule 21, \"Misjoinder and Non-joinder of Parties,\" provides the court with a tool for \ncorrecting the \"misjoinder\" of parties that would otherwise result in dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. \n21. Insofar as Rule 21 \"relates to the addition of parties, it is intended to permit the bringing in \nof a person, who through inadvertence, mistake or for some other reason, had not been made a \nparty and whose presence as a party is later found necessary or desirable.\" United States v. Com. \nBank of N. Am., 31 F.R.D. 133, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (intern\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/19 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=19]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 4 of 10 \nIn their Rule 21 Motion, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 do not claim that they were omitted \nfrom this proceeding due to any \"inadvertence\" or \"mistake\" by Petitioners; rather, they seek to \njoin this proceeding as parties that could have been permissively joined in the original petition \nunder Rule 20 (\"Permissive Joinder of Parties\"). As courts generally use the standards of Rule \n15 to evaluate such circumstances, the Court will consider the joinder issue as presented in the \nRule 15 Motion.' The Court will consider the arguments presented in the Rule 21 Motion as if \nthey are set forth in the Rule 15 Motion as well. Because the arguments are presented in the Rule \n15 Motion (and because the Court is denying the Rule 15 Motion on its merits, as discussed \nbelow), the Rule 21 Motion will be denied. \nThe Court also concludes that portions of the Rule 21 Motion and related \nfilings should be stricken from the record. Pending for this Court's consideration is a Motion \nfor Limited Intervention filed by Alan M. Dershowitz, who seeks to intervene to \"strike the \noutrageous and impertinent allegations made against him and [to] request[] a show cause order to \nthe attorneys that have made them.\" (DE 282 at 1). The Court has considered Mr. Dershowitz's \narguments, but it finds that his intervention is unnecessary as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n12(f) empowers the Court \"on its own\" to \"strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any \nredundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(0. \nPetitioners' Rule 21 Motion consists of relatively little argumentation regarding why the \nCourt should permit them to join in this action: they argue that (1) they were sexually abused by \nThe Court notes that, regardless of which motion it considers, the same standard \ngoverns the addition of parties under Rule 21 and Rule 15. See Goston v. Potter, No. 08-cv-478 \nFJS ATB, \n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/20 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=20]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 5 of 10 \nJeffrey Epstein, and (2) the Government violated their CVRA rights by concealing the non-\nprosecution agreement with them. (DE 280 at 3; see id. at 7-8). However, the bulk of the Rule \n21 Motion consists of copious factual details that Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 \"would prove\" \"[i]f \nallowed to join this action.\" (Li. at 3, 7). Specifically, Jane Doe 3 proffers that she could prove \nthe circumstances under which a non-party introduced her to Mr. Epstein, and how Mr. Epstein \nsexually trafficked her to several high-profile non-party individuals, \"including numerous \nprominent American politicians, powerful business executives, foreign presidents, a well-known \nPrime Minister, and other world leaders.\" (Id. at 3-6). She names several individuals, and she \noffers details about the type of sex acts performed and where they took place. \nid. at 5).2\nAt this juncture in the proceedings, these lurid details are unnecessary to the \ndetermination of whether Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 should be permitted to join Petitioners' \nclaim that the Government violated their rights under the CVRA. The factual details regarding \nwith whom and where the Jane Does engaged in sexual activities are immaterial and impertinent \nto this central claim (i.e., that they were known victims of Mr. Epstein and the Government owed \nthem CVRA duties), especially considering that these details involve non-parties who are not \nrelated to the respondent Government. These unnecessary details shall be stricken. \nThe original Rule 21 Motion (DE 279) shall be stricken in its entirety, as it is wholly \nsuperseded by the \"corrected\" version of the Rule 21 Motion (DE 280). From the corrected Rule \n21 Motion, the Court shall strike all factual details regarding Jane Doe 3 between the following \nsentences: \"The Government then concealed from Jane Doe #3 the existence of its NPA from \nJane Doe 4's proffer is limited to sexual acts bet\n... [truncated, 2067 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/21 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=21]", "char_count": 2067}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 6 of 10 \nJane Doe #3, in violation of her rights under the CVRA\" (id. at 3); and \"The Government was \nwell aware of Jane Doe #3 when it was negotiating the NPA, as it listed her as a victim in the \nattachment to the NPA\" (iij at 6). As none of Jane Doe 4's factual details relate to non-parties, \nthe Court finds it unnecessary to strike the portion of the Rule 21 Motion related to her \ncircumstances. Regarding the Declaration in support of Petitioners' response to Mr. \nDershowitz's motion to intervene (DE 291-1), the Court shall strike paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, \n15, 19 through 53, and 59, as they contain impertinent details regarding non-parties. Regarding \nthe Declaration of Jane Doe 3 in support of the Rule 21 Motion (DE 310-1), the Court shall strike \nparagraphs 7 through 12, 16, 39, and 49, as they contain impertinent details regarding non-\nparties. Jane Doe 3 is free to reassert these factual details through proper evidentiary proof, \nshould Petitioners demonstrate a good faith basis for believing that such details are pertinent to a \nmatter presented for the Court's consideration. \nAs mentioned, Mr. Dershowitz moves to intervene \"for the limited purposes of moving to \nstrike the outrageous and impertinent allegations made against him and requesting a show cause \norder to the attorneys that have made them.\" (DE 282 at 1). As the Court has taken it upon itself \nto strike the impertinent factual details from the Rule 21 Motion and related filings, the Court \nconcludes that Mr. Derschowitz's intervention in this case is unnecessary. Accordingly, his \nmotion to intervene will be denied as moot.3 Regarding whether a show cause order should \n3 This also moots Mr. Dershowitz's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Reply in \nSupport of Motion for Limited Intervention. (DE 317). Denying Mr. Dershowitz's motion to \nintervene also renders moot Petitioners' motion (DE 292) to file a sealed document\n... [truncated, 2178 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/22 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=22]", "char_count": 2178}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 7 of 10 \nissue, the Court finds that its action of striking the lurid details from Petitioners' submissions is \nsanction enough. However, the Court cautions that all counsel are subject to Rule 11's mandate \nthat all submissions be presented for a proper purpose and factual contentions have evidentiary \nsupport, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) and (3), and that the Court may, on its own, strike from any \npleading \"any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). \nB. \nRule 15 Motion \nBetween their two motions (the Rule 21 Motion and Rule 15 Motion), Jane Doe 3 and \nJane Doe 4 assert that \"they desire to join in this action to vindicate their rights [under the \nCVRAJ as well.\" (DE 280 at 1). Although Petitioners already seek the invalidation of Mr. \nEpstein's non-prosecution agreement on behalf of all \"other similarly-situated victims\" (DE 189 \nat 1; DE 311 at 2, 12, 15, 18-19), Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 argue that they should be fellow \ntravelers in this pursuit, lest they \"be forced to file a separate suit raising their claims\" resulting \nin \"duplicative litigation\" (DE 280 at 11). The Court finds that justice does not require adding \nnew parties this late in the proceedings who will raise claims that are admittedly \"duplicative\" of \nthe claims already presented by Petitioners. \nThe Does' submissions demonstrate that it is entirely unnecessary for Jane Doe 3 and \nJane Doe 4 to proceed as parties in this action, rather than as fact witnesses available to offer \nrelevant, admissible, and non-cumulative testimony. (See, e.g., DE 280 at 2 (Jane Doe 3 and \nJane Doe 4 \"are in many respects similarly situated to the current victims\"), 9 (\"The new victims \nwill establish at trial that the Government violated their CVRA rights in the same way as it \nviolated the rights of the other victims.\"), 10 (Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 \"will simply join in \nmotions that the current vi\n... [truncated, 2089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/23 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=23]", "char_count": 2089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 8 of 10 \nJane Doe 4's claims would be \"duplicative\"); DE 298 at 1 n.1 (\"As promised ... Jane Doe No. 3 \nand Jane Doe No. 4 do not seek to expand the number of pleadings filed in this case. If allowed \nto join this action, they would simply support the pleadings already being filed by Jane Doe No. 1 \nand Jane Doe No. 2.\"); DE 311 at 5 n.3 (\"[A]ll four victims (represented by the same legal \ncounsel) intend to coordinate efforts and avoid duplicative pleadings.\"), 15 (Jane Doe 3 and Jane \nDoe 4 \"challenge the same secret agreement \ni.e., the NPA that the Government executed with \nEpstein and then concealed from the victims. This is made clear by the proposed amendment \nitself, in which all four victims simply allege the same general facts.\")). As the Does argue at \nlength in their Rule 15 Motion, Jane Doe l's original petition \"specifically allege[s] that the \nGovernment was violating not only her rights but the rights of other similarly-situated victims.\" \n(DE 311 at 2). The Court fails to see why the addition of \"other similarly-situated victims\" is \nnow necessary to \"vindicate their rights as well.\" (DE 280 at 1). \nOf course, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 can participate in this litigated effort to vindicate \nthe rights of similarly situated victims there is no requirement that the evidentiary proof \nsubmitted in this case come only from the named parties. Petitioners point out as much, noting \nthat, regardless of whether this Court grants the Rule 15 Motion, \"they will call Jane Doe No. 3 \nas a witness at any trial.\" (DE 311 at 17 n.7). The necessary \"participation\" of Jane Doe 3 and \nJane Doe 4 in this case can be satisfied by offering their properly supported and relevant, \nadmissible, and non-cumulative testimony as needed, whether through testimony at trial \nsee DE 280 at 9) or affidavits submitted to support the relevancy of discovery requests' (see \nThe non-party lane Does clearly underst\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/24 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=24]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 9 of 10 \nid. at 10). Petitioners do not contend that Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4's \"participation in this \ncase\" can only be achieved by listing them as parties. \nAs it stands under the original petition, the merits of this case will be decided based on a \ndetermination of whether the Government violated the rights of Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and all \n\"other similarly situated victims\" under the CVRA. Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 may offer \nrelevant admissible, and non-cumulative evidence that advances that determination, but their \nparticipation as listed parties is not necessary in that regard. See Herring, 894 F.2d at 1024 \n(District court did not abuse its discretion by denying amendment where \"addition of more \nplaintiffs . . . would not have affected the issues underlying the grant of summary judgment.\"); cf. \nArthur v. Stem, 2008 WL 2620116, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (Under Rule 15, \"courts have held \nthat leave to amend to assert a claim already at issue in [another lawsuit] should not be granted if \nthe same parties are involved, the same substantive claim is raised, and the same relief is \nsought.\").5 And, as to Jane Doe 4 at least, adding her as a party raises unnecessary questions \nabout whether she is a proper party to this action.' \nPetitioners also admit that amending the petition to conform to the evidence by \nincluding references to the non-prosecution agreement itself is \"unnecessary\" as the \"existing \npetition is broad enough to cover the developing evidence in this case.\" (DE 311). The Court \nThe Court expresses no opinion at this time whether any of the attestations made by \nJane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 in support of their motion will be relevant, admissible, and non-\ncumulative.\n6 The Govemment contends that Jane Doe 4 is not a true \"victim\" in this case because \nshe was not known at the time the Government negotiated the non-prosecution agreement, and \naccordingly she was not entit\n... [truncated, 2235 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/25 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=25]", "char_count": 2235}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 324 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 10 of 10 \nagrees, and it concludes that justice does not require amending the petition this late in the \nproceedings. \nIII. Conclusion \nAccordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: the Rule 21 Motion \n(DE 280) is DENIED; the Rule 15 Motion (DE 311) is DENIED; Intervenor Dershowitz's \nMotion for Limited Intervention (DE 282) and Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Reply in \nSupport of Motion for Limited Intervention (DE 317) are DENIED AS MOOT; Petitioners' \nMotion to Seal (DE 292) is DENIED AS MOOT; the following materials are hereby \nSTRICKEN from the record: \nDE 279, in its entirety. \nDE 280, all sentences between the following sentences: \n\"The Government then concealed from Jane Doe #3 the \nexistence of its NPA from Jane Doe #3, in violation of her \nrights under the CVRA\" (DE 280 at 3); and \"The \nGovernment was well aware of Jane Doe #3 when it was \nnegotiating the NPA, as it listed her as a victim in the \nattachment to the NPA\" (DE 280 at 6). \nDE 291-1, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19 through 53, \nand 59. \nDE 310-1, paragraphs 7 through 12, 16, 39, and 49. \nDE 293, in its entirety. \nDONE AND ORDERED in chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, \nFlorida, this 6ih day of April, 2015. \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \n10 \nEFTA00590274\n", "char_count": 1371}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "EXHIBIT B \nEFTA00590275\n", "char_count": 24}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 325 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2015 Page 1 of 1 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.:08-CV-80736-ICAM \nJANE DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2, \nPetitioners, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nRespondent. \nSUPPLEMENTAL ORDER \nThis cause is before the Court on its Order Denying Petitioners' Motion to Join Under \nRule 21 and Motion to Amend Under Rule 15. (DE 324). In accordance with the portion of that \nOrder striking materials from the record \nid. at 10), the Court informs the parties of the \nfollowing: The affected docket entries (DEs 279, 280, 291-1, 293, and 310-1) shall be restricted \nfrom public access on the docket in their entities. Docket entries 279 and 293, which were \nstricken in their entirety, shall remain so restricted. Regarding the docket entries of which \nportions were stricken (DEs 280, 291-1, and 310-1), Petitioners may re-file those documents \nomitting the stricken portions. The re-filed documents must conform to the originally filed \ndocuments in all respects, but with the stricken portions omitted. \nDONE AND ORDERED in chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, \nFlorida, this 7i' day of April, 2015. \n/e\nr n \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Court \nEFTA00590276\n", "char_count": 1265}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "EXHIBIT C \nEFTA00590277\n", "char_count": 24}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Boies Takes on Dershowitz in Sex Case I The American Lawyer \nAMERICAN LAWYER \nNOT FOR REPRINT \ne  Click to Print or Select 'Print' in your browser menu to print this document. \nPage printed from: The American Lawyer \nBoies Takes on Dershowitz in Sex Case \nVivia Chen, The Careerist \nApril 23, 2015 \nI've been worried that the Alan Dershowitz Show is coming to a dose. After writing a bunch of \nposts about the allegations that Dershowitz had sex with an underage girl I fear the story is \ngetting stale. I mean, how many times can you invoke the image of the septuagenarian Harvard \nlaw professor romping naked on some private island? (In March, the judge threw out those \n\"lurid\" sex charges against Dershowitz.) \nThank goodness a striking new character has emerged to give the story a second wind. And a \nbold face name to boot: David Boies, reports Reuters. \nBoies and his firm are representing \n(also known as Jane Doe 3), who alleges \nthat Dershowitz, Prince Andrew and other luminaries had sex with her when sail \nteenager at the behest of billionaire Jeffrey Epstein, a convicted sex offender. \nis also \nbeing represented by Brad Edwards and Paul Cassell—see interview with Cassell—whom \nDershowitz has countersued for defamation.) \nAccording to a statement by Boies, Schiller & Flexner, the firm is representing \non a pro \nbono basis: \nThe firm's pro bono program focuses on meaningful cases including trying to assist women \nand\n who are the victims of abuse. Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP took on Ms. \n' representation because she was a victim of abuse when she was a minor child. \nWhile Dershowitz has been less than flattering about Edwards and Cassell. Robert's other \nlawyers he's had cordial relations with Boies. \"I wrote him a nice congratulatory note when he \ndid the case of gay rights,\" says Dershowitz. \nThat was back then. Now, the two legal giants are locking horns. Beside the soured personal \nrelationship, Dershowitz makes a much more serious charge: Boies Schiller has a con\n... [truncated, 2540 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00590248/30 or ?id=EFTA00590248&page=30]", "char_count": 2540}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Boies Takes on Dershowitz in Sex Case I The American Lawyer \nmaterial.\" \nDershowitz says he asked Boies Schiller to recuse itself: \"They answered no.\" He says, \"They \nare arrogant; they think they're above the law.\" He adds, \"they have a long sordid history with \nconflicts,\" citing the firm's most recent sanction in Boies Schiller & Flexner v. Host Hotels & \nResorts, in which the Second Circuit noted that the firm \"willfully refused to recognize the \nobvious conflict\" in taking on a client. (Boies Schiller has not responded to our questions.) \nMeanwhile, Dershowitz seems a bit offended that Boies is ignoring him. \"I'm willing to talk to \nhim, but he won't talk to me.\" \nSo will the legal drama/soap opera keep on going? Oh, yeah, says Dershowitz. \"There's more \ncoming.\" \nvchen@alm.com \nCopyright 2015. ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. \nhttp://www.amer icanlawyer.comiprinterfrierdlytth 1202724439959 \n2/2 \nEFTA00590279\n", "char_count": 943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "EXHIBIT D \nEFTA00590280\n", "char_count": 24}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "PROCEEDINGS \nEDWARDS vs. DERSHOWITZ \nApril 10, 2015 \n1 \nIN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH \nJUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR \nBROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA \nCIVIL DIVISION \nBRADLEY J. EDWARDS and PAUL G. CASSELL, \nPlaintiffs, \nvs. \nALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, \nDefendant. \nCASE No.: \nCACE 15-000072 \nPROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE \nHONORABLE JUDGE THOMAS M. LYNCH, IV \nFriday, April 10, 2015 \n9:05 - 9:55 o'clock a.m. \nBroward County Courthouse \n201 Southeast 6th Street \nRoom 950 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nJERROLD Wm. SEGAL, Court Reporter \nC) \nESQUIRE \n800.211.DEPO (3376) \nEsquireSolutions.com \nEFTA00590281\n", "char_count": 596}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "2 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nPROCEEDINGS \nEDWARDS vs. DERSHOWITZ \nAPPEARANCES OF COUNSEL \nOn behalf of the Plaintiff: \nJACK SCAROLA, ESQ. \nSEARCY, DENNY, SCAROLA, BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A. \n2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33409 \nOn behalf of the Defendant: \nTHOMAS E. SCOTT, ESQ. \nSTEVEN R. SAFRA, ESQ. (via speakerphone) \nof the Law Offices of \nCOLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. \nDadeland Centre II \nSuite 1400 \n9150 South Dadeland Boulevard \nMiami Florida 33156 \nFax \nCo-counsel: Defense \nMARY E. BORJA, ESQ. \nof the Law Offices of \nWILEY REIN, LLP \n1776 K STREET NW \nWashin ton DC 20006 \nApril 10, 2015 \n2 \nESQUIRE \nSOL uT IONS \n800.211.DEPO (3376) \nEsquireSolutions. corn \nEFTA00590282\n", "char_count": 747}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "1 \n2 \n3 \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nPROCEEDINGS \nEDWARDS vs. DERSHOWITZ \nApril 10, 2015 \n18 \njust shows you that it's the right thing to do in \nthis case, to have Mr. Cassell and to have the \naccuser, his client, Jane Doe 3, be deposed before \nmy client, Mr. Dershowitz, is deposed. Thank you, \nYour Honor. \nTHE COURT: Thank you, very much, counsel. \nMR. SCAROLA: Your Honor, let me begin first by \nacknowledging that the Court has discretion to order \ndiscovery. \nMR. SCAROLA: There is no question about the \nfact that whatever ruling Your Honor were to decide \nwas appropriate with regard to the ordering of the \ndiscovery is not going to be disturbed except under \nextraordinary circumstances, by any appellate court \nand I would assure Your Honor, that that's not a \nmatter that we would consider subject to an appeal. \nThere are very good reasons why the order of \ndiscovery here should be the order in which the \ndiscovery has been noticed. Although Mr. Scott has \nrepeatedly paraphrased Rule 1.1.310 as prohibiting \nthe noticing of a deposition within thirty days of \nthe service of a Complaint, that's simply not what \nthe rule says. I will quote directly. \"Leave of \nCourt granted with or without notice, must be \nobtained only if the Plaintiff seeks to take a \nOESQUIRE \n800.211.DEPO (3376) \nEsquireSolutions.com \nEFTA00590283\n", "char_count": 1392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "1 \n2 \n3 \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nPROCEEDINGS \nEDWARDS vs. DERSHOWITZ \nApril 10, 2015 \n19 \ndeposition within thirty days after service of the \nprocess.\" \nSo Your Honora, a deposition cannot be taken \nwithin thirty days. A deposition may be noticed \nprior to thirty days, but it may not be taken under \nthe terms of the rules, within thirty days, Your \nHonor. Service was obtained by consent on January \n7. The earliest, under the rule, that we would have \nbeen able to take Professor Dershowitz's deposition \nwould have been February 6. \nWe sent a Notice of Deposition to depose Mr. \nDershowitz well outside the thirty day period of \ntime, on February 25, and accompanying that notice \nwas a letter. And that letter is, in fact, attached \nto the pleadings that Your Honor has already seen. \nAnd what that letter said was, \"If this date is \nnot convenient, we are willing to move it to a more \nconvenient time. We move it up or we'll move it \nback.\" And in light of Mr. Dershowitz's repeated \npublic proclamations that he's extremely anxious to \nbe able to be deposed to be able to vindicate \nhimself, we will do it as early as you want to do \nit.\" \nNow, during this period of time Mr. Dershowitz \nwas taking every opportunity that he possibly could \nOESQUIRE \n800.211.DEPO (3376) \nEsquireSolutions.com \nEFTA00590284\n", "char_count": 1373}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00590248", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "1 \n2 \n3 \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nPROCEEDINGS \nEDWARDS vs. DERSHOWITZ \nApril 10, 2015 \n20 \nto appear before every audience that would have him, \nYour Honor, to defame Mr. Bradley Edwards and Mr. \nPaul Cassell. And I want to be sure than Your Honor \nis really focused on what this defamation case is \nreally all about. \nThis defamation case is about two lawyers who \nare working, pro bono, to vindicate the rights of \nmore than forty women who were sexually abused and \ntrafficked by Mr, Jeffrey Epstein over an extended \nperiod of time. And Mr. Jeffrey Epstein, through \nthe work of Alan Dershowitz, had obtained an \nextraordinary agreement from the federal government. \nThat extraordinary agreement said, that, \"If you \nplead guilty to one state court claim and serve, \nbasically, one year on house arrest, we will grant \nyou immunity from any federal prosecution and we \nwill grant all of your co-conspirators immunity from \nany federal prosecution, as well.\" \nYour Honor, that deal, if entered into, without \nthe consultation nor with an opportunity to be heard \nby any of the victims of Jeffrey Epstein, in spite \nof federal law provisions that expressly state that \nthose victims must be consulted and they must have \nan opportunity to inform the Court as to their own \nposition with regard to a plea bargain. \n°ESQUIRE \n800.211.DEPO (3376) \nEsquireSolutions.com \nEFTA00590285\n", "char_count": 1439}]}