{"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_count": 30, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00583952", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00583952.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH \nJUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR \nPALM BEACH COUNTY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nNo. 50 2009 CA 040800XXXXMBAG \nPlaintiff/Counter-Defendant, JUDGE HAFELE \nv. \nBRADLEY J. EDWARDS, et al., \nDefendant/Counter-Plaintiffs. \nPLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MOTION FOR \nSUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF BRADLEY \nEDWAFtDS'S FOURTH AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, REOUEST FOR ORAL \nARGUMENT AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW \nPlaintiff/Counter-Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\"), by and through his undersigned \ncounsel and pursuant to Rule 1.510 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby files this \nMotion for Summary Judgment on the sole remaining count of Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff \nBradley Edwards's (\"Edwards\") Fourth Amended Counterclaim, Malicious Prosecution. \nIn order to prevail on this count, Edwards must prove that there was an absence of \nprobable cause at the time that Epstein filed suit against Edwards. The threshold of facts \nsufficient to establish probable cause that will defeat Edwards' claim for malicious prosecution is \n\"extremely low and easily satisfied.\" Gill v. Kostroff, 82 F.Supp. 2d 1354, 1364. The specific \nfacts cited herein, independently verifiable from news reports and publicly available criminal and \ncivil case filings, are indisputable. They far exceed that minimal threshold, and establish as a \nmatter of law that probable cause for Epstein's suit against Edwards existed at the time Epstein \nfiled suit. Edwards' assertions of Epstein's guilt and Edwards' innocence have absolutely no \n1 \nEFTA00583952\n", "char_count": 1605}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "bearing whatsoever on the material facts giving rise to probable cause. Consequently, Summary \nJudgment must be granted in Epstein's favor and against Edwards. \nThis Court deferred oral argument on the issue of probable cause, focusing on the \napplicability of the litigation privilege to Edwards' claim for malicious prosecution. In order to \navoid the needless waste of time and judicial resources on a pointless and lengthy trial in this \nmatter, oral argument is respectfully requested on any assertions that Edwards might make with \nrespect to the critical issue of probable cause. \nSTATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS' \nIn November 2009, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Florida Sun-\nSentinal and other media outlets reported that Scott Rothstein, the partner of plaintiff Brad \nEdwards, had fled to Morocco to evade criminal prosecution for using their law firm, Rothstein, \nRosenfeldt, Adler (\"RRA\"), to perpetrate a massive Ponzi scheme. It was widely reported that \nRRA, Rothstein, Rothstein's partners and other co-conspirators whose identities had not yet been \ndetermined defrauded investors into purchasing fake settlements of fabricated cases purportedly \nbeing litigated at RRA. [PROVIDE CITATION FROM NYT ARTICLE, WSJ ARTICLE, SUN-\nSENTICAL ARTICLE AND EPSTEIN AFFIDAVIT 2]; Amended Complaint in Razorback \n1 The following facts are well documented by media reports, criminal case files from the \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, civil case filings from the \nFlorida circuit courts and the pleadings and discovery in the instant case. \n2 Although Epstein's subjective beliefs regarding probable cause are not relevant to this \nCourt's determination of whether probable cause existed to file suit against Edwards, [cite pages \nin the motion below], Epstein's Affidavit attached as Exhibit \nhereto (\"Epstein's Affidavit\") \nclearly establishes that at the time Epstein commenced suit against Edwards, Epstein was aware \nof the multitude of me\n... [truncated, 2089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/1 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=1]", "char_count": 2089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Funding, LLC, et aL v. Scott W. Rothstein, et at, Case No. 09-062943(19); see Deposition \nTranscript of Bradley Edwards dated March 23, 2010; Deposition Transcripts of Scott W. \nRothstein in In re: Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, PA; 09-34791-RBR and Razorback Funding, \nLLC, et aL v. Scott W. Rothstein, et aL, Case No. 09-062943(19); Deposition Transcript of \nJeffrey Epstein. 502008CA028058XXXXMB AB; and Jane Doe v. Jeffrey Epstein, 08-80893-\nCIV Marra/Johnson. \nRothstein returned to South Florida in November 2009 to face federal \ncriminal charges and civil claims by private investors arising out of what was reported to be a \n$1.2 Billion Ponzi scheme, the largest in Florida history (the \"Ponzi Scheme\"). See [Epstein \nAffidavit — Provide Cite]; Information Charging Scott W. Rothstein in United States of America \nv. Scott W. Rothstein, 09-60331-CR-COHN; Epstein's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to \nEdwards's Fourth Amended Counterclaim; Deposition Transcripts of Scott W. Rothstein in In \nre: Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, PA; 09-34791-RBR and Razorback Funding, LLC, et at v. Scott \nW. Rothstein, et aL, Case No. 09-062943(19). \nOn December 1, 2009, the Federal Government filed a 36 page Information against \nRothstein charging that RRA was a racketeering \"Enterprise\" and that Rothstein, his partners at \nRRA, as well as other unidentified co-conspirators used RRA to defraud investors out of $1.2 \nBillion by inducing them to invest in bogus settlements of fictitious RRA cases (the \"Rothstein \nInformation\").3 See [Epstein Affidavit — Provide Cite]; Information Charging Scott W. Rothstein \nDistrict of Florida and civil case filings against Rothstein and RRA detailing rampant fraud at \nRRA, and specifically claiming that the same process Epstein alleged that Edwards abused in the \nEpstein Cases was fraudulently used to perpetrate the Ponzi Scheme. [cite affidavit; attach as \nexhibit] \n3 It was alleged in the Rothstein Information that Rothstein, his partners at RRA and his \nyet un\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/2 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=2]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "in United States of America v. Scott W. Rothstein, 09-60331-CR-COHN \nNews outlets also reported at that time that Rothstein had been disbarred and the Florida \nBar had begun actively investigating dozens of attorneys employed by RRA in connection with \nthe Ponzi Scheme. [Cite Epstein Affidavit]; Miami Herald, Scott Rothstein Scandal: Scott \nRothstein Partners Probed (January 14, 2010)(\"The Florida Bar is investigating at least 35 \nformer senior lawyers in the now-bankrupt Fort Lauderdale law firm headed by Scott Rothstein, \nwho was disbarred before he was criminally charged last month with using the firm to run a $1.2 \nbillion investment racket.\"). \nOn November 20, 2009, the law firm of Conrad Scherer filed a complaint, Razorback \nFunding, LLC, et aL v. Scott W. Rothstein, et aL, Case No. 09-062943(19) (hereinafter \nreferenced as the \"Razorback Complaint\"), against Scott Rothstein and others alleging a \nfraudulent scheme perpetrated at RRA involving, among other deceptive practices, fraudulent \nconspiracy, mail and wire fraud conspiracy, and wire fraud, and more specifically that (a) \npotential investors were fraudulently advised by Rothstein and other co-conspirators that \nconfidential settlement agreements were available for purchase (in what were wholly-fabricated \ncases); (b) these fictitious settlements were allegedly available in amounts ranging from \nhundreds of thousands of dollars to millions of dollars and could purportedly be purchased at a \ndiscount and repaid to the investors at face value over time; (c) Rothstein and other co-\nconspirators utilized the offices of RRA to convince potential investors of the legitimacy of these \nfabricated settlements and the success of the law firm, which enhanced the apparent credibility of \nthe purported investment opportunities in the Ponzi Scheme; (d) Rothstein and other co-\nconspirators utilized funds obtained through the fraudulent Ponzi Scheme to supplement and \nsupport the operation and activities of RRA, to expa\n... [truncated, 2768 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/3 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=3]", "char_count": 2768}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "discovery and pleadings in active RRA cases Edwards was litigating against Epstein (the \n\"Epstein Cases\").4 It was specifically alleged in the Razorback Complaint that such fraudulent \ndiscovery and pleadings in the Epstein Cases were being used at RRA to overinflate the \nmonetary value of the Epstein Cases and legitimize false claims to potential investors that \nEpstein was willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in settlements (to additional fictional \nplaintiffs in fabricated RRA cases) to avoid devastating publicity about Epstein and the world \nfamous celebrities, politicians and other dignitaries associated with him.5 \n[Cite Epstein \n4 While the Ponzi Scheme was ongoing, RRA was prosecuting three civil cases against \nEpstein (the \"Epstein Cases\"). See pleadings in LM v. Jeffrey Epstein, \n502008CA028051XXXXMB AB; EW v. Jeffrey Epstein, 502008CA028058XXXXMB AB; and \nJane Doe v. Jeffrey Epstein, 08-80893-CIV Marra/Johnson; Deposition Transcript of Jeffrey \nEpstein, p. 23; line 4-p. 38; line 22. \n5 Among the allegations in the Razorback Complaint regarding the fraudulent conduct in \nthe Epstein Cases in connection with the Ponzi Scheme are that \npurported settlements, albeit fraudulent, were based on actual cases being handled by RRA. For example, \none of the settlements involved herein was based upon facts surrounding Jeffrey Epstein, the infamous \nbillionaire financier... Representatives of D3 were offered 'the opportunity' to invest in a pre-suit \n$30,000,000.00 court settlement against Epstein involving a different underage female plaintiff. \nThe female described in the Razorback Complaint was not an actual client of RRA and there \nwas, in fact, no such \"pre-suit $30,000,000 court settlement.\" It was further alleged in the \nRazorback Complaint that \nTo augment his concocted story, Rothstein invited D3 to his office to view the thirteen banker's boxes of \nactual case files in Jane Doe in order to demonstrate that the claims against Epstein were legitimate\n... [truncated, 2841 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/4 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=4]", "char_count": 2841}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Affidavit]. According to the defrauded investors in the Razorback Complaint, the fraudulent \npleadings and discovery on behalf of Edwards' three clients in the Epstein Cases were \ndeliberately crafted to present a salacious, sexually charged tale of explosive facts to justify the \nfraudulent pitch to investors that \"Epstein had allegedly offered $200,000,000.00 for settlement \nof the claims held by various young women who were his victims.\" [Cite Razorback Complaint] \nThe fraudulent discovery alleged in the Razorback Complaint to have been conducted in \nthe Epstein Cases to further the Ponzi Scheme at RRA did indeed take place in the Epstein \nCases. Moreover, it was conducted by and under the direct supervision of Edwards, Rothstein's \npartner at RRA, who was the lead attorney in charge of the Epstein cases. 6 Edwards, himself, \ndid in fact pursue discovery in the Epstein Cases to identify the celebrities, politicians and \ndignitaries associated with Epstein who flew on Epstein's private plane, and Edwards, himself, \ndid in fact notice the depositions of famous dignitaries and celebrities such as Bill Clinton and \nDavid Copperfield, even though the claims of Edwards' clients in the Epstein Cases allegedly \ninvolved exclusively local conduct in Epstein's home in Palm Beach County, had no connection \nwhatsoever to any conduct on Epstein's plane and made absolutely no allegations implicating \nscheme,\" including discovery to obtain information and documentation of famous individuals \nwho flew on Epstein's plane and noticing the depositions of celebrities that had no involvement \nwhatsoever in the specific claims of Edwards' clients. In fact, none of the alleged conduct for \nwhich Edwards' three clients in the Epstein Cases sought recovery took place on or otherwise \ninvolved Epstein's aircraft or a single celebrity, politician or dignitary associated with Epstein. \n(Ex. *** 2 at 2-3; R. 810-11). The victims of RRA's fraudulent scheme described in the \nRazorback Complain\n... [truncated, 2591 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/5 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=5]", "char_count": 2591}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "any celebrities, politicians or dignitaries. See letter dated July 22, 2009 from Edwards, attached \nas Exhibit 3 to his deposition of March 23, 2010; dockets and pleadings in LM v. Jeffrey Epstein, \n502008CA028051XYXXMB AB; EW v. Jeffrey Epstein, 502008CA028058DOCAMB AB; LM v. \nJeffrey Epstein, 09-81092 Marra/Johnson and Jane Doe v. Jefrey Epstein, 08-80893-C1V \nMarra/Johnson; copies of subpoenas; Deposition Transcript of Jeffrey Epstein, p. 23; line 4-p. \n38; line 22; Initial Complaint filed by Epstein dated December 9, 2009, pages 13-20; Razorback \nAmended Complaint; pp. 16-17; ¶¶ 48, 49. \nIn addition, on July 24, 2009, while he was a partner at RRA, without any purported \njustification Edwards filed a duplicative 234-page, 156-count federal complaint against Epstein \non behalf of a plaintiff in the Epstein Cases, LM, arising out of the very same facts alleged in the \nstate court complaint that Edwards already had been prosecuting against Epstein on behalf of that \nsame plaintiff for the better part of a year.? See LM v. Jeffrey Epstein, 09-81092 Marra/Johnson; \n7 The highly charged vitriolic allegations against Epstein in the federal complaint signed \nby Edwards on behalf of LM (as well as those in the Epstein Case in which LM is a plaintiff) are \ncontradicted in their entirety by sworn statements made two years earlier in April 2007 by LM \nabout Epstein to the federal government after securing immunity from criminal prosecution. \nAccording to a pleading recently filed by the federal government in a case which Edwards is \nlitigating against the government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of \nFlorida under the Crime Victims Rights Act: \nWhen asked whether Epstein \"pulled you closer to him in a sexual way,\" [LM] replied: \nA. I wish. No, no, never, ever, ever, no, never. Jeffrey is an awesome man, no. \nAt the end of her interview, [LM] was asked if she had any questions for the agents or \nAUSA Villafana. [LM] responded: \nA. No, but I hop\n... [truncated, 2230 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/6 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=6]", "char_count": 2230}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Deposition Transcript of Jeffrey Epstein, p. 23; line 4-p. 38; line 22. The federal complaint, \nsigned by Edwards, himself, was filed in federal court, but was never served on Epstein and \nnever prosecuted, leading to the unavoidable conclusion that it was deliberately crafted and \nfraudulently filed to enhance the case files shown at the offices of RRA to lure investors in the \nPonzi Scheme. The need to enhance the case files in the Epstein Cases was urgent at that time \nbecause, according to the reports in the media and the allegations in the Razorback Complaint, \nthe Ponzi Scheme was beginning to unravel and new investor money was needed to keep it \nafloat. 8\nIn another of the Epstein Cases alleged in the Razorback Complaint to have been \nfraudulently touted to investors in the Ponzi Scheme, while Edwards was a partner at RRA, \nEdwards filed a legally unsupportable motion in which Edwards requested that the court order \nnothing. \nBy her conduct, [LM] plainly demonstrated that she did not view herself as a victim and \ndid not seek to be treated as such, and she made clear her desire for the investigation to \nbe resolved without charges being filed against Epstein. \n[Cite Government Opposition (citations omitted)] Thus, it was not until after LM was \nrepresented by Edwards that her sworn statements about Epstein given only after she obtained \nimmunity from criminal prosecution mysteriously changed from glowing praises to the damning \naccusations contained in Edwards' pleadings. \n8 Although the federal complaint on behalf of LM, filed on July 23, 2009, was never \nserved on Epstein and never prosecuted, two months letter, on September 18, 2009, while the \nneed for new investor money in the Ponzi Scheme was becoming dire, Edwards instructed his \nassistant at RRA to review and prepare for filing a \"complaint in Federal Court similar to the one \nwe did for LM.\" See email dated September 18, 2009 from Brad Edwards to Beth Williamson. \nThis complaint was to be filed on be\n... [truncated, 2435 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/7 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=7]", "char_count": 2435}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Epstein to post a fifteen million dollar bond. \nSee Jane Doe v. Jeffrey Epstein, 08-80893-CIV \nMarra/Johnson; See Razorback Funding, LLC, et aL v. Scott W. Rothstein, et aL, Case No. 09-\n062943(19). In connection with this motion, Edwards discussed, at length, Epstein's net worth \nand filed supplemental papers listing in great detail Epstein's vehicles, planes and other items of \nsubstantial value, all at the time when the Epstein Cases were the centerpiece of the fraudulent \nplan to raise new investor money desperately needed to keep the Ponzi Scheme from unraveling. \n[Cite Razorback and media reports]; Depositions taken of Scott W. Rothstein in In re: Rothstein \nRosenfeldt Adler, PA; 09-34791-RBR. The court confirmed that there was no legitimate basis for \nfiling Edwards' motion, calling it \"devoid of evidence.\" See Order in Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein \nDated November 5, 2009, 08-cv-80119. \nThe Razorback Complaint's allegations of fraud in the Epstein Cases, based on discovery \nwhich was entirely unrelated to the specific claims for which Edwards' clients sought recovery in \nthe Epstein Cases, viewed together with duplicative federal pleadings against Epstein filed by \nEdwards without any purported justification and Edwards' motion practice which the federal \ncourt itself ruled was legally unsupportable, created ample reason to believe that Edwards had \nfraudulently abused process in the Epstein Cases. It provided ample reason to conclude that \nEdwards did so to assist with the widely reported Ponzi Scheme at RRA for which Edwards' \npartner at RRA, Scott Rothstein, had been indicted and other unidentified partners at RRA were \nunder investigation by the federal government as well as the Florida Bar. \nThat the alleged \nfraudulent activity in the Epstein Cases only occurred after Edwards joined RRA, the firm that \n9 \nEFTA00583960\n", "char_count": 1860}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "was operating the Ponzi Scheme, made that conclusion inevitable.* Epstein incurred significant \nfees, costs and expenses in defending against the allegedly fraudulent discovery, pleadings and \nmotion practice in the Epstein Cases prosecuted by Edwards while he was a partner at RRA. \nBased on the foregoing facts and developments, on December \n2009, Epstein filed \nsuit against Rothstein, as the front man of the Ponzi Scheme, and against Edwards, one of \nRothstein's partners at RRA, and the lead attorney responsible for what investors in the \nRazorback Complaint confirmed was fraudulent activity in the Epstein Cases used to perpetuate \nthe Ponzi Scheme. Epstein revised his claims against Edwards, and by order dated October 4, \n2011, the factual allegations contained in Epstein's second amended complaint were held by \nJudge Crow as sufficient to withstand Edwards's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of \naction.10 [Cite Judge Crow's Order on Motion to Dismiss] The undisputed facts set forth herein \nwere the same facts alleged in Epstein's second amended complaint, were determined by the \nCourt to have stated a cause of action for abuse of process, and survived Edwards' motion to \n9 Edwards admitted in his March 23, 2010 deposition that there were between $300,000 \nand $500,000 in litigation and investigation related expenditures on the Epstein Cases during the \nshort period of time during which he was a partner at RRA, as compared to the expenditures on \nthe Epstein Cases during the preceding eight months, when the cases were not being prosecuted \nat RRA, which Edwards admitted may not have even exceeded $25,000. (App.* at 6; [USE * R. \n813-14)]. The drastic increase in spending on allegedly fraudulent discovery, pleadings and \nmotion practice by Edwards only after Edwards joined RRA, a criminal enterprise which was \nthen seeking to raise tens of millions of dollars to avoid discovery of a $1.2 Billion Ponzi \nScheme, provides compelling reason to conclude tha\n... [truncated, 2604 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/9 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=9]", "char_count": 2604}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "dismiss. \" \nPROCEDURAL HISTORY \nIn its May 19, 2014 order granting Epstein's motion for summary judgment, this Court \nrecounted the following procedural history with respect to Epstein's suit: \n[Epstein] filed suit against [Edwards]. Edwards then filed a counter-claim against \nEpstein. Epstein subsequently dismissed his Complaint without prejudice. The counter-\nclaim proceeded, undergoing several amendments. As it now stands, the Fourth Amended \nCounterclaim has two causes of action: abuse of process and malicious prosecution. \nEpstein moved for summary judgment arguing that the litigation privilege applies to both \nthe abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims. \n(App. 1). In addition to arguing the application of the litigation privilege, in Epstein's motion for \nsummary judgment he asserted that the suit he filed against Edwards, which is the basis of \nEdwards' malicious prosecution action, was supported by probable cause. \nAt the outset of the hearing held January 27, 2014 on Epstein's motion for summary \njudgment, the Court orally denied summary judgment as to probable cause, and directed the \nparties to address the litigation privilege issue.12 The Court entered its written order granting \n11 The Court is familiar with the allegations in Epstein's original and amended \ncomplaints. The second amended complaint named Edwards in a cause of action for abuse of \nprocess, arising out of a fraudulent Ponzi scheme perpetrated by attorneys and staff of RRA, \nwhere Edwards was the partner who prosecuted the Epstein Cases against Epstein, which were \nmarketed to investors with the promise of multi-million dollar recoveries. Epstein's allegations \nincluded harassing investigations, vexatious and irrelevant discovery, legally unsupportable \nmotion practice, and the filing of duplicative, fraudulent federal pleadings that were never served \non or prosecuted against Epstein. \n12 The entirety of the Court's oral ruling on probable cause was the following: \"But I just \n\n... [truncated, 2346 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/10 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=10]", "char_count": 2346}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "summary judgment in favor of Epstein upon application of the litigation privilege based upon the \nthen binding precedent of Wolfe v. Foreman, 128 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Final judgment \nwas thereafter entered in favor of Epstein. \nEdwards appealed the judgment as it pertained to his malicious prosecution action, during \nwhich time the Fourth District issued Fischer v. Debrincat, 169 So. 3d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA \n2015), holding that the litigation privilege did not apply to a malicious prosecution action and \ncertifying to the Supreme Court of Florida conflict with Wolfe. In Edwards' appeal, the Fourth \nDistrict reversed based upon Fischer, and again certified conflict. Edwards v. Epstein, 178 So. \n3d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Epstein filed for review in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court \nresolved the conflict in Debrincat v. Fischer, No. SC15-1477, 2017 WL 526508 (Fla. Feb. 9, \n2017), holding that the litigation privilege does not bar a malicious prosecution action. Based \nupon Debrincat, the Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Fourth District in this \ncase. [Cite June 9, 2017 Florida Supreme Court order] \nEpstein renews his motion for summary judgment on the ground that the material \nundisputed facts in this case and applicable law demonstrate that the issue of probable cause does \nindeed present a question of law for determination by the Court that must be resolved in \nEpstein's favor. \nSUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE GRANTED WHERE IT CANNOT BE SHOWN \nTHAT THERE WAS AN ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE WHEN EPSTEIN FILED \nSUIT AGAINST EDWARDS \nSummary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the \nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond \n12 \nEFTA00583963\n", "char_count": 1775}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Beach, 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000); Smith v. Shelton, 970 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA \n2007). It is mandated when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, \naffidavits, and other materials in evidence on file show that there are no genuine issues as to any \nmaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FLA. R.CIV. P. \nI.510(c). \nWhen an appellate court enters a reversal of summary judgment and remands the case for \nfurther proceedings, it is proper for trial court to again consider a motion for summary judgment \nif such should be presented. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tunon, 179 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA \n1965). See also B & B Coast. Co. of Ohio, Inc. v. Rinker Materials Corp., 294 So. 2d 131 (Fla. \n4th DCA 1974) (filing of further motions for summary judgment are permissible if it could be \nclearly demonstrated there was no genuine issues of fact remaining.). It is also preferred if, as is \ntrue in this case, consideration of a renewed motion for summary judgment would be in the best \ninterests of the parties and the public, inasmuch as it would avoid needless expense and conserve \nprecious judicial resources. Walker v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 121 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st \nDCA 1960). As explained below, the undisputed and incontrovertible material facts in this case \nestablish that Edwards simply cannot prove that there was an absence of probable cause for Epstein \nto file suit against Edwards, which is an essential element of Edwards' cause of action for Malicious \nProsecution against Epstein, and Summary Judgment against Edwards is therefore mandated. \nIn Florida, \"an action for malicious prosecution is a serious matter.\" Cent. Fla. Mach. \nCo., Inc. v. Williams, 424 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Malicious prosecution actions \nare \"not generally favored\" in Florida. Id. at 202. \nThere are six elements that must be established in order to prove malicious prosecution: \n13 \nEFTA00583964\n... [truncated, 2001 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/12 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=12]", "char_count": 2001}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "I) the commencement of a judicial proceeding; 2) its legal causation by the present defendant \nagainst the plaintiff; 3) its bona fide termination in favor of the plaintiff; 4) the absence of \nprobable cause for the prosecution; 5) malice; 6) damages. Duval Jewelry Co. v. Smith, 102 Fla. \n717, 136 So. 878, 880 (1931). The fourth element, the absence of probable cause, is at issue here. \nIn Goldstein v. Sabella, 88 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1956), the Supreme Court of Florida \nexplained the meaning of probable cause in the context of a malicious prosecution action as \nfollows: \nProbable cause is defined as \"A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by \ncircumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief \nthat the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.\" Dunnavant v. \nState, Fla., 46 So. 2d 871, 874 [(Fla. 1950)]. This, as well as other acceptable definitions \nof the term, indicates that one need not be certain of the outcome of a criminal or civil \nproceeding to have probable cause for instituting such an action. \nId. at 910. \n\"Probable cause in the context of a civil suit is measured by a lesser standard than in a \ncriminal suit.\" Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1166 (Fla.5th DCA 1984). \"The standard for \nestablishing probable cause in a civil action is extremely low and easily satisfied.\" Gill v. \nKostroff, 82 F.Supp. 2d 1354, 1364. Even in the criminal context, such as when analyzing \nprobable cause to support a search warrant, probable cause can be inferred from the facts. See \nState v. Powers, 388 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). \nUnder the higher standard for probable cause in the criminal context, it is well settled that \nprobable cause must be judged by the facts that existed at the time of the defendant's arrest, not \nevidence subsequently learned or provided to the prosecution. Madly v. Jenne, 867 So. 2d 1250, \n1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (\"Probable cause is judged by the facts and legal state of a\n... [truncated, 2030 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/13 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=13]", "char_count": 2030}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "existed at the time of the arrest.\"); Fla. Game & Freshwater Fish Comm 'n v. Dockery, 676 So.2d \n471, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (\"Hindsight should not be used to determine whether a prior arrest \nor search was made with probable cause. Events that occur subsequent to the arrest cannot \nremove the probable cause that existed at the time of the arrest.\") (citations omitted) (emphasis \nadded); McCoy v. State, 565 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (holding that hindsight should \nnot be used to determine whether a prior arrest or search was made with probable cause); Dodds \nv. State, 434 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (holding that events that occur subsequent to \nthe arrest cannot remove the probable cause that existed at the time of the arrest). \nThe same principles of probable cause apply in a malicious prosecution case, see, e.g., \nGill v. Kostroff, 82 F.Supp. 2d 1354, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2000)(\"A determination of whether \nprobable cause exists is based on the facts known by the defendant in the malicious prosecution \naction at the time the underlying action was initiated, not some later point in time.\")(applying \nFlorida law), see, also, Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A., 379 So. 2d at 418 (\"[W]e find the facts within \nMr. Parker's knowledge at the time suit was filed sufficient to constitute probable cause for the \ncommencement of the malpractice action.\"), and Fla. Std. Jury Instruction 406.4 (\"Probable \ncause means that at the time of [instituting] [or] [continuing] a [criminal] [civil] proceeding \nagainst another, the facts and circumstances known to [ (defendant) [ (other person) ] were \nsufficiently strong to support a reasonable belief that (claimant) [had committed a criminal \noffense] [the [claim] [proceeding] was supported by existing facts].\"), but with even greater \ndeference to the decision to seek redress through the filing of a civil lawsuit because, as noted, \nthe standard for satisfying probable cause is lower than that applicable to a criminal case. Wright\n... [truncated, 2028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/14 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=14]", "char_count": 2028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Once the movant for summary judgment tenders competent evidence to support his \nmotion, the opposing party must come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a \ngenuine issue of material fact. Glasspoole v. Konover Constr. Corp. South, 787 So. 2d 937, 938 \n(Fla. 4th DCA 2001). A failure of proof of any essential element of a party's cause of action \nnecessarily renders all other facts offered by the non-moving party immaterial. See Celotex Corp. \nv. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). \n\"Just because conflicting evidence exists does not mean probable cause is a jury \nquestion.\" C.A. Hansen Corp. v. Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Tutan, O'Hara, McCoy, Graham & \nLane, P.A., 613 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (emphasis supplied); see also Rivernider v. \nMeyer, 174 So. 3d 602, 604-05 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (trial court properly entered summary \njudgment against malicious prosecution claimant where underlying proceeding was commenced \nwith probable cause); Northwest Florida Home Health Agency v. Merrill, 469 So. 2d 893 (Fla. \n1st DCA 1985)(in a malicious prosecution suit for reporting the termination of a nurse to the \nBoard of Nursing, whether the defendant had probable cause to report the nurse was a question \nof law even though the nurse's testimony denied the truth of the charges leading to the \ntermination); Dorf v. Usher, 514 So.2d 68, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (\"Although some of the facts \nmay be in dispute, the trial court correctly found that there was no dispute with respect to the \nmaterial facts on those elements. Probable cause then became a question of law for the court.\"). \n\"Probable cause only becomes a question for the jury when material facts are disputed.\" \nEndacott v. Int'l Hospitality, Inc., 910 So. 2d 915, 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). \"When the facts \nrelied upon to show probable cause are undisputed, `the existence or nonexistence of probable \ncause is a pure question of law to be determined by the court under the facts and circumstances \n16 \nEFTA00583967\n", "char_count": 2000}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "of each case.'\" Id. (citations omitted) (citing City of Pensacola v. Owens, 369 So.2d 328 \n(Fla.1979)). \nUNDISPUTED GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT \nThe reasonable suspicion that gives rise to probable cause for Epstein's suit against \nEdwards (an extremely low and easily satisfied threshold) is well established by the abundance \nof media reports, the federal criminal cases files against Scott Rothstein available on public \ndocket in the Southern District of Florida, as well as Florida state civil case files, all detailing a \nmassive fraud at RRA involving a $1.2 Billion Ponzi Scheme facilitated through the use of \nfraudulent litigation in the Epstein Cases. Undoubtedly, reliance on third party reports and court \npapers for probable cause is proper. \"[A]n identification or a report from a single credible victim \nor eyewitness can provide the basis for probable cause ....\" City of St. Petersburg v. Austrino, \n898 So.2d 955, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphasis added).13 See, also, e.g., EMI Sun Village, \nInc. v. Catledge, No. 13-cv-21594, 2013 WL 5435780 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (dismissing malicious \nprosecution action where \"ample probable cause to bring the underlying litigation based on the \nevidence of a fraudulent scheme\" was shown by court records). Id. at *4. \nBased on an abundance of widely distributed media reports14 and criminal and civil case \n13 Paragraph 20 of Epstein's original complaint demonstrates his reliance upon such a \nreport from a single credible victim or eyewitness sufficient to demonstrate for probable cause: \n\"Ft. Lauderdale attorney William Scherer represents multiple Rothstein related investors. He \nindicated in an article that RRA/Rothstein had used \"the Epstein ploy ... as a showpiece as bait. \nThat's the way he raised the money. He would use ... cases as bait for luring investors into \nfictional cases. All the cases he allegedly structured were fictional. I don't believe there was a \nreal on in there.\" \n14 In fact, one could not read a newspaper or \n... [truncated, 2063 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/16 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=16]", "char_count": 2063}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "filings, it was a matter of public knowledge that RRA was operating a Ponzi Scheme in which \nreal RRA cases were being used to defraud investors into purchasing bogus legal settlements of \nfictitious cases. The federal government charged that RRA was a criminal enterprise and that \nRBA's head partner, Scott Rothstein, other partners at RRA and other co-conspirators were \nengaged in that criminal enterprise. Rothstein was disbarred and the Florida Bar was reportedly \ninvestigating dozens of the attorneys at RRA in connection with that criminal enterprise. \nInvestors defrauded in that criminal enterprise at RRA filed court papers specifically \nclaiming that fraudulent pleadings and discovery in the Epstein Cases prosecuted by RRA \nattorneys were used to perpetrate the Ponzi Scheme. In fact, the fraudulent pleadings and \ndiscovery detailed in those court papers actually occurred in the Epstein Cases, even though they \nwere completely unrelated to the specific misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs in the Epstein \nCases. One of Rothstein's partners at RRA, Brad Edwards, was the lead attorney in the Epstein \nCases responsible for filing the fraudulent pleadings and conducting the fraudulent discovery \ndetailed in the Razorback Complaint. While at RRA, Edwards also filed without any purported \njustification a duplicative 234-page, 156-count sexually charged federal complaint against \nEpstein on behalf of the very same plaintiff for whom Edwards was already prosecuting one of \nthe Epstein Cases at RRA and arising out of the identical allegations made in that Epstein Case. \nAlthough Edwards made sure to add that highly sensationalized pleading to the publicly \navailable court file, he neither served nor prosecuted it against Epstein. At the same time, in \nanother Epstein Case, Edwards filed what the court held was a legally unsupportable bond \nmotion against Epstein detailing at length all of Epstein's most expensive assets. None of these \nRRA and the Ponzi Scheme for several\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/17 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=17]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "fraudulent pleadings, motions or discovery occurred until after Edwards joined as a partner what \nthe federal government identified as a criminal enterprise operating the largest Ponzi Scheme in \nFlorida history. And all of this all took place at a time during which, according to the investors \nin the Razorback Complaint, the Epstein Cases were the centerpiece of the fraudulent plan to \nraise new investor money desperately needed to keep that Ponzi Scheme from unraveling. Had \nEdwards not engaged in the discovery, pleading and motion practice which defrauded investors \nclaimed were fraudulently used to lure them into the Ponzi Scheme, Epstein would not have \nincurred the fees, costs and expenses paid to defend against it. \nUnder the circumstances, there was clearly a reasonable ground of suspicion that: (I) \nthere was fraudulent litigation in the Epstein Cases the purpose of which was to further the Ponzi \nScheme perpetrated by the criminal enterprise at RRA; and (2) Brad Edwards, as the lead partner \nat RRA on the Epstein Cases who engaged in that fraudulent litigation, was liable for Epstein's \ndamages resulting from that abuse of process. The facts giving rise to that reasonable ground of \nsuspicion well exceed the \"extremely low and easily satisfied\" threshold of probable cause for \nEpstein's suit as a matter of law. That inevitable conclusion is only further strengthened by \nJudge Crow's ruling that the allegations in Epstein's second amended complaint, based on these \nsame undisputed facts and circumstances, stated a cause of action for abuse of process that \nsurvived Edwards's motion to dismiss. Where probable cause existed for Epstein's suit as a \nmatter of law, the claim for malicious prosecution must fail and summary judgment must be \ngranted. \n19 \nEFTA00583970\n", "char_count": 1802}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "EDWARDS DOES NOT DISPUTE EPSTEIN'S MATERIAL FACTS \nAlthough Edwards has made statements generally denying the existence of probable \ncause for Epstein's underlying suit against Edwards, nowhere in Edwards's Response in \nOpposition to Epstein's original motion for summary judgment (\"Edwards's Opposition\") does \nEdwards actually dispute any specific material fact cited by Epstein as grounds for probable \ncause. Instead, Edwards claims that the asserted facts, as strung together by Epstein, constitute \n\"impermissible inferences.\" [Cite in Edwards Opposition] \nHowever, Edwards's claim is \nnonsensical because the reasonable \"suspicion\" on which probable cause is based is nothing \nmore than an inference of guilt founded on facts and circumstances. Even under the more \ndemanding standard in a criminal context, such as when analyzing probable cause to support a \nsearch warrant, \"interpretation of the facts in a \"commonsense and realistic fashion,\" may result \nin an inference of probable cause to believe that criminal objects are located in a particular place \nto which they have not been tied by direct evidence.\" State v. Powers 388 So. 2d 1050, 1051 \n(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) \nEdwards further claims that the facts cited by Epstein are immaterial, and posits a series \nof conclusory arguments relating to Epstein's alleged guilt of sexual misconduct, Edwards's \ninnocence of wrongdoing and Epstein's state of mind and motivations to support Edwards claim \nof immateriality. [Cite Edwards's Opposition] Edwards further argues that Epstein had no \nprobable cause because he had no and would be unable to prove any damages. [Cite Edwards's \nOpposition] Finally Edwards insists that Epstein should be precluded from summary judgment \nas a result of adverse inferences to which Edwards is entitled based on Epstein's invocation of \nhis Fifth Amendment rights at Epstein's deposition. [Cite Edwards's Opposition] The entirety of \n20 \nEFTA00583971\n", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Edward's ineffectual attempts to dispute the existence of probable cause is encapsulated by the \nfollowing paragraph from Edward's Opposition: \nEpstein knew that he had in fact molested each of the minors represented by Brad \nEdwards. He also knew that each litigation decision by Brad Edwards was grounded in \nproper litigation judgment about the need to pursue effective discovery against Epstein, \nparticularly in the face of Epstein's stonewalling tactics. Epstein also knew that he \nsuffered no legally cognizable injury proximately caused by the falsely alleged \nwrongdoing on the part of Edwards. Moreover, Epstein had no intention of waiving his \nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid providing relevant \nand material discovery that Epstein would need in the course of prosecuting his claims \nand to which Edwards was entitled in defending those claims. . . Epstein was motivated \nby a single ulterior motive to attempt to intimidate Edwards and his clients and others \ninto abandoning or settling their legitimate claims for less than their just and reasonable \nvalue. . . to require Edwards to expend time, energy and resources on his own defense, to \nembarrass Edwards and impugn his integrity and deter others with legitimate claims \nagainst Epstein from pursuing those claims. \nEdwards's Opposition, p. 2. However, as explained below, none of these arguments has any \nbearing on the issue of whether, based on the facts cited by Epstein, probable cause existed for \nEpstein's claims at the time he filed suit. \nEDWARDS'S ARGUMENTS DO NOT REFUTE PROBABLE CAUSE \nIn order to succeed in opposing Epstein's renewed motion for summary judgment, \nEdwards must come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue of \nmaterial fact that might enable him to affirmatively prove the absence of probable cause at trial. \nGlasspoole v. Konover Constr. Corp. South, 787 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). \nHowever, Edwards's legal and factual ar\n... [truncated, 2295 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/20 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=20]", "char_count": 2295}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Edwards's claims that Epstein was guilty of the sexual misconduct alleged by the \nplaintiffs in the Epstein Cases and that Edwards legitimately initiated those cases are entirely \nirrelevant. Separate and apart from the underlying merits or defects in the Epstein cases, \nEpstein's suit was based upon the fraudulent Ponzi Scheme advanced by RRA, and third party \nallegations of fraudulent litigation in the Epstein cases in furtherance of the Ponzi Scheme as \ncorroborated by Edwards' actual pleadings, motions and discovery in the Epstein Cases. The \nmedia reports, criminal and civil case files and Edwards' pleadings, motions and discovery in the \nEpstein Cases cited by Epstein are more than sufficient to support an objectively reasonable \nsuspicion against Edwards for abuse of process, regardless of the underlying merits of the \nEpstein Cases. \nAs Edwards, himself, acknowledged in Edwards' Opposition: \nAn abuse of process claim requires pleading and proof of the following three elements: 1) \nthat the defendant made an illegal, improper or perverted use of process; 2) that the \ndefendant had ulterior motives or purposes in exercising such illegal, improper, or \nperverted use of process; and 3) that, as a result of such action on the part of the \ndefendant, the plaintiff suffered damage. \nEdwards's Opposition, p. 9. A claim for abuse of process will lie so long as there is an illegal, \nimproper or perverted use of process, regardless of the legitimacy of the underlying claim in \nwhich process is abused. The propriety of the underlying claim is simply not at issue. [cite case \nlaw]. \nBecause the validity of the underlying claim is not at issue in an abuse of process case, \nprocess may be abused even where the underlying claim is valid. [cite]. Thus, Epstein's \nknowledge of his own guilt and the legitimacy of plaintiffs' underlying claims in the Epstein \nCases would not free Edwards from suspicion of abusing process based on the facts and \n22 \nEFTA00583973\n", "char_count": 1984}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "circumstances in existence at the time Epstein filed suit. 1S\nSecond, Edwards attempt to refute probable cause with his claim that Epstein's suit \nagainst Edwards \"was motivated by a single ulterior motive to attempt to intimidate Edwards and \nhis clients and others into abandoning or settling their legitimate claims for less than their just \nand reasonable value\", [cite opposition], is also totally irrelevant. Although such conclusory \nallegations, if able to be proven, may ultimately bear on whether Epstein behaved with malice \nagainst Edwards, they have absolutely no relation to an evaluation of whether probable cause \nexisted at the time Epstein filed suit against Edwards. It may be true that malice may be inferred \nfrom the absence of probable cause, but the case law is clear that under no circumstances may \nthe absence of probable cause be inferred from malice. [Cite] \nThird, Edwards's assertion of his own innocence is equally unavailing. In Edwards's \nOpposition, Edwards's claims that Epstein could not have had probable cause for abuse of \nprocess based on third party claims of Edwards's abusive litigation practices because Edwards's \nlitigation practices had a \"sound legal basis\". (Edwards' Opp. at 6). Edwards' argument, while a \npotential defense on the merits to Epstein's suit against Edwards, is not relevant to the \ndetermination of whether there was probable cause at the time Epstein filed suit based upon an \nobjectively reasonable suspicion of fraudulent litigation by Edwards to facilitate RRA's Ponzi \nScheme. Gill, 82 F.Supp. 2d at 1364 (\"A determination of whether probable cause exists is based \n15 Edwards's attempt to fabricate a probable cause dispute based upon Epstein's filing the \nSecond Amended Complaint against Edwards after Epstein settled the Epstein Cases is equally \nirrelevant. The argument that Epstein's settlement of the Epstein Cases is evidence that the cases \nwere validly initiated says nothing about whether in fact pleadings, motions \n... [truncated, 2163 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/22 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=22]", "char_count": 2163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "on the facts known by the defendant in the malicious prosecution action at the time the \nunderlying action was initiated, not some later point in time.\") (applying Florida law). \nEdwards further claims that Epstein could not rely on the third party claims in Razorback \nComplaint because Epstein knew that Edwards's litigation practices were proper: \nAs discussed above, the evidence warrants the finding that Epstein knew that Edwards \nwas legitimately pursing the claims on behalf of his clients which included the effort to \nsecure testimony from Epstein's close confidants. Therefore, Epstein cannot rely upon the \nreferenced public documents to support his claims against Edwards given he knows that \ninformation to be untrue ...\" \n(Edwards' Opp. at 11-12) (exhibit reference omitted). \nPutting aside the unsubstantiated, wholly conclusory nature of Edwards' allegations, the \npossibility that there was an alternate explanation for Edwards's litigation practices and that \nEdwards was properly pursuing his clients' interests by conducting some of the process in \nquestion does not preclude a determination of probable cause as a matter of law based on the \nfacts cited by Epstein. \"[O]ne need not be certain of the outcome of a criminal or civil \nproceeding to have probable cause for instituting such an action.\" Goldstein v. Sabella, 88 So. \n2d 910 (Fla. 1956) at 910. \"Just because conflicting evidence exists does not mean probable \ncause is a jury question.\" C.A. Hansen Corp. v. Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Tutan, O'Hara, \nMcCoy, Graham & Lane, P.A., 613 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); see, also, Northwest \nFlorida Home Health Agency v. Merrill, 469 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA I 985)(in a malicious \nprosecution suit for reporting the termination of a nurse to the Board of Nursing, whether the \ndefendant had probable cause to report the nurse was a question of law even though the nurse's \ntestimony denied the truth of the charges leading to the termination). All that is required are \n\n... [truncated, 2107 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/23 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=23]", "char_count": 2107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "For example, at the time Epstein filed suit against Edwards, Edwards neither disputed nor \nprovided any explanation for filing the duplicative federal lawsuit against Epstein on behalf LM, \nof one of the clients for whom Edwards had already been prosecuting one of the Epstein Cases \nfor almost a year. This 234-page, 156-count federal complaint, signed by Edwards, himself, \narising out of the identical facts alleged in one of the Epstein Cases was filed against Epstein (but \nnever served on him and never prosecuted) at the same time during which the Ponzi Scheme was \nreportedly unraveling. Consistent with the allegations in the Razorback Complaint, a logical \nconclusion regarding the purpose for filing this superfluous, highly charged, federal complaint at \nthe time the Ponzi Scheme was unraveling and new investor money was urgently needed was \nthat it was filed to increase investor interest in RRA cases against Epstein to bring additional \nmoney into the Ponzi Scheme. By itself, the federal complaint provided reasonable grounds of \nsuspicion against Edwards, and when combined with other litigation by Edwards that had no \ndirect relation to the specific claims made by Edwards's clients, or were determined by Judge \nCrow to have been \"devoid of evidence,\" provided more than ample basis for suspicion that \nEdwards's conduct was more than merely zealous advocacy. \nMoreover, Edwards' speculations about Epstein's subjective beliefs, even if true (which \nthey are not), are irrelevant. So, too, are Edwards's claims about Epstein's ulterior motives in \npursuing suit against Edwards. Probable cause to act is not measured by the subjective belief of \nthe actor, even under the more stringent standard of probable cause applicable to criminal cases. \n\"[T]he concept of probable cause is grounded upon a standard of objective reasonableness.\" \nHawxhurst v. State, 159 So. 3d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).\"The existence of probable cause \nis measured by an objective standard, not base\n... [truncated, 2068 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00583952/24 or ?id=EFTA00583952&page=24]", "char_count": 2068}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "motivation.\" Hernandez v. State, 784 So.2d at 1128 (quoting State v. T.P., 588 So. 2d 286, 287 \n(Fla. 3d DCA 1991)). \nAccordingly, \"[t]he principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or \nprobable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the \ndecision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable \npolice officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause\". Ornelas v. United States, \n517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). \"Therefore, a police officer's subjective belief regarding the existence \nor non-existence of probable cause for a warrantless arrest is neither dispositive of, nor generally \nrelevant to, this issue.\" Hawxhurst, 159 So. 3d at 1014. See also State v. Jennings, 968 So. 2d \n694, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (\"The officers in this case had probable cause to search the \noccupants of the vehicle once they smelled the marijuana. That they may have articulated a \nsubjective intent to search for officer safety did not change the fact that the smell of marijuana \nsmoke provided an objectively reasonable basis for the search.\"). Edwards' contention that \nEpstein's subjective beliefs and motivation are relevant to this Court's evaluation of whether as a \nmatter of law probable cause existed must be rejected. \nEdwards also argues that Epstein would not have been able to prove damages in his case \nagainst Edwards because (1) Epstein was not an investor in the Ponzi Scheme, (2) Edwards did \nnot speak to any investors in the Ponzi Scheme so he could not have pumped up the Epstein \nCases as alleged in Epstein's complaint, and (3) Edwards was otherwise innocent of the \nallegations made against him in Epstein's complaint. [Pull all Cites \nfrom \nthe \nOpposition](Edwards' Opp. at 5). None of these arguments has any merit. \nThe fact that Epstein was not an investor in the Ponzi Scheme is simply irrelevant to \n26 \nEFTA00583977\n", "char_count": 1948}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Epstein's claims against Edwards. Epstein did not allege that the Ponzi Scheme damaged him; he \nalleged that irrelevant discovery, legally unsupportable motions and duplicative and unjustified \npleadings that were reportedly fraudulently used in the Epstein Cases to further the Ponzi \nScheme caused the damage, and that Edwards was responsible for and personally conducted the \nfraudulent litigation at issue. So long as there was probable cause to assert that the fraudulent \nlitigation was an abuse of process, any fees, costs and expenses paid by Epstein to defend against \nthat litigation would have been recoverable as damages from Edwards as the attorney who \nconducted and was responsible for the litigation. \nEdwards' claim that he never spoke to investors in the Ponzi Scheme is yet another red \nherring. Epstein did not claim that Edwards spoke to investors in the Ponzi Scheme. He claimed \nthat fraudulent litigation conducted by and under the supervision of Edwards was used to further \nthe Ponzi Scheme and, as such, was an abuse of process. There is no necessity for Edwards to \nhave spoken to investors to have furthered the Ponzi Scheme or abused process in the Epstein \nCases. Consequently, this issue has no bearing whatsoever on Epstein's claim for damages. \nAs noted, whether Epstein would have ultimately prevailed on the merits of his lawsuit is \nirrelevant to the determination of whether there was probable cause at the time Epstein filed it. \nSee Goldstein v. Sabella, 88 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1956) at 910. All that was required was a \nreasonable ground of suspicion of abuse of process by Edwards which, if ultimately proven, \nwould have resulted in Epstein recovering damages for the fees, costs and expenses Epstein \nincurred to defend against such abusive process. \nFinally, Edwards attempts to negate the probable cause that existed at the time Epstein \nfiled suit based upon adverse inferences to be drawn from Epstein's subsequent invocations of \n27 \nEFTA00583978\n", "char_count": 1993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "his Fifth Amendment privilege. This attempt must also be flatly rejected for several reasons. \nFirst, the Fifth Amendment invocations took place after Epstein filed his complaint and are \ntherefore irrelevant to the determination of whether probable cause existed at the time the lawsuit \nwas filed. Gill, supra. \nSecond, Epstein's abuse of process claim against Edwards was based on misconduct by \nRRA, Rothstein, Edwards and others, demonstrable from media reports, criminal and civil case \nfiles and other extrinsic evidence, and was not based on anything Epstein said or did. So, \nEpstein's testimony was not needed to establish such misconduct or to defend against the \nallegations of misconduct. Third, as noted above, Epstein's subjective beliefs about the legality \nof Edwards' conduct are simply irrelevant to an objective evaluation of whether probable cause \nexisted at the time Epstein filed his complaint. [Cite Page in Brief]. Thus, detailed testimony \nfrom Epstein regarding Edwards' abuse of process alleged in Epstein's complaint would not be \nrequired to prove Epstein's case, and would certainly not be required to demonstrate the \nexistence of probable cause in defending against Edwards' malicious prosecution action. \nMoreover, deposition questions asking Epstein to identify specific conduct by Edwards which \nEpstein believed was illegal would have required Epstein to render legal opinions which in any \nevent would not be proper subjects for an adverse inference. [Find Cite] \nIn addition, to the extent that any adverse inference might have been permissible, \nEpstein's invocation of the Fifth Amendment would have only entitled a jury to make an adverse \ninference, if the jury desired to do so. [Cite] It would not have required an adverse inference \nfrom the jury, particularly if other extrinsic evidence were available to demonstrate Edwards's \nguilt of the offenses claimed by Epstein and the existence of probable cause to assert those \n28 \nEFTA00583979\n", "char_count": 1988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "claims. [Cite] Inasmuch as no inference would be required, even if it were true that Epstein \nintended to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights when he filed his claims, such invocation would \nnot have precluded Epstein's recovery for Edwards' abuse of process and in no way diminishes \nthe probable cause that existed to file suit against Edwards. \nCONCLUSION \nThe undisputed facts delineated above clearly establish that there was probable cause as a \nmatter of law at the time Epstein filed his complaint. Edwards's purported factual disputes have \nno bearing on an objective evaluation of whether probable cause existed at the time Epstein filed \nsuit and should not deter this Court from evaluating whether probable cause existed as a matter \nof law and finding a failure of this essential element of Edwards malicious prosecution claim \nagainst Epstein. \nWHEREFORE, Epstein respectfully asks this Court to grant his motion for summary \njudgment, and an opportunity for the parties to be heard at oral argument regarding any \nassertions by Edwards attempting to refute the existence of probable cause. \nTONJA ET AL. \nSERVICE LIST \nJack Scarola, Es . \nSearcy Denney Scarola et al. \n2139 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd. \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33409 \nJack Goldber er, Es . \nAtterbury, Goldberger, & Weiss, PA \n29 \nEFTA00583980\n", "char_count": 1314}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00583952", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "250 Australian Ave. South \nSuite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nMarc Nurik, Esq. \n1 East Broward Blvd. \nSuite 700 \nFort Lauderdale, FL 33301 \nBra\n. \n..\na\nlwards E\n. \nFarmer Jaffe Weissing Edwards Fistos Lehrman \n425 N Andrews Avenue \nSuite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nFred Haddad, Es . \n1 Financial Plaza \nSuite 2612 \nFort Lauderdale, FL 33301 \nToria Haddad Coleman, Es uire \nLaw Offices of Tonja Haddad, \n315 SE 7th Street, Suite 301 \nFort Lauderdale, FL 33301 \nAttorneys for Jeffrey Epstein \n30 \nEFTA00583981\n", "char_count": 520}]}