{"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_count": 347, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00316714", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00316714.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 1 of 347\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nIN RE THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES,\nINC. SECURITIES, DERIVATIVE, AND ERISA\nLITIGATION\nThis Document Relates To:\nSecurities Action, 08-Civ-2793 (RWS)\nECEIV\nFED 27 2009\nU.S.D.C. S.D. N.Y.\nMaster File 1963 S\n: 08 M.D.L. No.\n: CLASS ACTION\n: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\n: ECF CASE\nx\nCONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT\nFOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS\nEFTA00316714\n", "char_count": 488}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 2 of 347\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nGLOSSARY OF DEFINED TERMS....\nviii\nI.\nNATURE AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION..\n...2\nII.\nJURISDICTION AND VENUE.\n.5\nIII.\nPARTIES\n.6\nA.\nLead Plaintiff\n.6\nB.\nBear Stearns Defendants.....\n..7\n1.\nThe Bear Stearns Companies Inc.\n..7\n2.\nOfficer Defendants......\n.7\nC.\nAuditor Defendant\nIV.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS\nA. Bear Stearns' Storied Past...\nB.\nThe Boom in Debt Securitization\n.11\nC.\nBear Stearns Securitization Business.\n.13\n1.\nBear Stearns' Mortgage Origination and Purchasing Business ................14\n2.\nBear Stearns' RMBS Business..\n.17\n3.\nBear Stearns' CDO Business.\n.17\nD.\nBear Stearns' Business Practices Amplify its Risk Exposure\n.18\n1.\nBear Stearns' Concentration in Mortgage-Backed Debt\n.18\n2.\nBear Stearns' Leveraging Practices\n.19\n3.\nBear Stearns' Backing of the Hedge Funds\n..20\nE.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Models and Inadequate Risk Management\n.23\n1.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Valuation and Risk Models.\n.23\na.\nThe Importance of Valuation Models..\n.24\ni\nEFTA00316715\n", "char_count": 1086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 3 of 347\nb.\nBear Stearns' Valuation Models Were Misleading\n.25\nC.\nThe Importance of Value at Risk Models.\n.27\nd.\nBear Stearns' Value at Risk Models Were Misleading...............30\n2.\nBear Stearns' Impoverished Risk Management Program.....................31\nF.\nBear Stearns Hides its Mounting Exposure to Loss\n.33\n1.\nEarly Warnings\n.33\n2.\nBear Stearns' Deception Begins\n.36\nG.\nThe Implosion of the Hedge Funds...........\n.45\nH.\nRepercussions of the Hedge Funds' Implosion...\n.52\nI.\nBear Stearns Catastrophic Collapse\n.61\nJ.\nPost Class Period Events......\n.69\nK.\nDefendants' Fraudulent Statements Adversely Impacted Current and\nFormer Company Employees\n.71\n1.\nThe RSU Plan\n.71\n2.\nThe CAP Plan\n.72\n3.\nDefendants' Fraud Harmed Holders of RSU and CAP Plan Units..........72\nL.\nThe SEC Comment Letters........\n.73\nM.\nBear Stearns' Practices Violated Accounting Standards.\n.76\n1.\nGAAP Overview.........\n.76\n2.\nFraud Risk Factors Present at Bear Stearns\n.79\na.\nFraud Risk Factors Applicable to Depository and\nLending Institutions.\n.79\nb.\nRisk Factors Applicable to Brokers and Dealers in\nSecurities....\n.81\n3.\nAudit Risk Alerts\n.82\n4.\nBear Stearns Falsely Represented that its Internal Controls Over\nFinancial Reporting Were Effective\n.84\nii\nEFTA00316716\n", "char_count": 1304}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 4 of 347\na.\nRisk Management\n.88\nb. Pricing Models and VaR Systems.\n.89\n5.\nGAAP Violations Relating to the Company's Financial Statements......90\na. Bear Stearns Misstated Its Exposure to Loss from the\nFailed Hedge Funds.........\n.90\nb.\nBear Stearns' Financial Statements Misrepresented its\nExposure to Decline in the Value of RIS......\n.94\nC.\nGAAP Violations Related to Failure to Appropriately\nDetermine the Fair Value of Financial Instruments\n.99\nd.\nBear Stearns Failed to Provide Adequate Disclosure\nAbout Risk and Uncertainties\n....104\ne.\nBear Stearns Failed to Provide Reliable Disclosures to\nInvestors in Accordance with SEC Regulations ......106\nN.\nBear Stearns' Practices Violated Banking Regulations.\n.107\n1.\nOverview of Capital Requirements.....\n.107\n2.\nBear Stearns Failed to Take Timely and Adequate Capital Charges....109\n3.\nInflation of Capital By Using Incorrect Marks\n.110\n4.\nMisrepresentations to Regulators Relating to VaR..\n_\n.111\nV.\nDEFENDANTS' SCIENTER...\n.112\nA.\nJames E. Cayne...\n.112\nB.\nAlan D. Schwartz.\n115\nC.\nSamuel L. Molinaro, Jr.\n.116\nD.\nWarren J. Spector\n120\nE.\nAlan C. Greenberg.\n.121\nF.\nMichael J. Alix.............\n....123\nG.\nJeffrey M. Farber\n124\nH.\nCorporate Scienter\n125\niii\nEFTA00316717\n", "char_count": 1281}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 5 of 347\nVI. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING THE OFFICER\nDEFENDANTS' SCIENTER..\n.126\nA.\nGeneral Allegations of Scienter\n126\nB.\nAbnormal Profit Taking..........\n129\nVII.\nDELOITTE'S DEFICIENT AUDITS OF BEAR STEARNS\nFINANCIAL STATEMENTS.......\n133\nA.\nOverview of Allegations Against Deloitte...........\n.133\nB.\nDeloitte's Certifications.\n.134\nC.\nOverview of GAAS...\n.135\nD.\nGAAS Required Deloitte to Consider Risk Factors as Part of Audit\nPlanning........\n.136\n1.\nFraud Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns. .136\n2.\nAudit Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns...........137\n3.\nDeloitte's Experience Auditing the Hedge Funds\n138\nE.\nRed Flags Recklessly or Deliberately Disregarded by Deloitte ......... 139\n1.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Fair Value Measurements\n.139\n2.\nBear Stearns' Failures to Disclose Risks Inherent In Its Financial\nStatements..\n142\n3.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Accounting Treatment of the Hedge\nFund Bailout.......\n.143\n4.\nBear Stearns' Failure to Disclose Critical Information Relating to\nthe Company's Valuation of Its Financial Instruments\n.144\n5.\nBear Stearns' Inadequate Internal Controls.\n.146\n6.\nBear Stearns' Deficient Internal Audit Function\n.152\nVIII. DEFENDANTS' MATERIALLY FALSE AND MISLEADING\nSTATEMENTS....\n.154\nA.\nStatements Relating to Fiscal Year 2006 and Fourth Quarter 2006\n.154\n1.\nDecember 14, 2006 Press Release\n.154\niv\nEFTA00316718\n", "char_count": 1465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 6 of 347\na.\nDecember 14, 2006 Press Release Statements\nRegarding the Company's Fourth Quarter 2006\nResults.....\n.155\nb.\nPress Release Regarding Fiscal 2006 Results..\n.156\n2.\nFourth Quarter 2006 Earnings Conference Call\n.156\n3.\nForm 10-K for Fiscal Year 2006.....\n158\na.\nThe Company's Financial Results and Assets\n.159\nb.\nThe Company's Risk Management Practices.\n159\nC.\nThe Company's Exposure to Market Risk...\n162\nd.\nThe Company's Compliance With Banking\nRegulations.....\n.162\ne.\nThe Company's Internal Controls..\n.163\nf.\nDeloitte's Certification.......\n.164\nB.\nStatements Relating to Fiscal Year 2007 Results.\n.164\n1. First Quarter 2007 Results......\n.164\na.\nFirst Quarter 2007 Press Release.\n.164\nb.\nFirst Quarter 2007 Conference Call\n.166\nC. First Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q.\n.168\n2.\nSecond Quarter 2007 Results\n.172\na. Second Quarter 2007 Press Release....\n.172\nb.\nSecond Quarter 2007 Conference Call\n.173\nc.\nJune 22, 2007 Press Release\n.174\nd.\nSecond Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q....\n.175\n3.\nAugust 3, 2007 Press Release and Conference Call.\n.180\n4.\nThird Quarter 2007 Results......\n.182\na.\nThird Quarter 2007 Press Release .......\n.182\nEFTA00316719\n", "char_count": 1201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 7 of 347\nb.\nThird Quarter 2007 Conference Call\n.184\n5.\nC. Third Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q...\n.185\nNovember 14, 2007 Write Downs.....\n.189\n6.\nFourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2007........\n.190\na.\nPress Release..\n.190\nb.\nFourth Quarter 2007 Conference Call...\n.192\n7.\nFiscal Year 2007 Form 10-K.\n.193\na.\nThe Company's Financial Results .......\n.194\nb.\nThe Company's Risk Management Practices.\n.195\nC.\nThe Company's Exposure to the Market Risk.....197\nd.\nCompliance With Banking Regulations..\n.198\ne.\nThe Company's Internal Controls\n.199\nf.\nDeloitte's Certification.........\n.200\nC.\nAdditional False and Misleading Statements in Calendar Year 2008 .........200\nIX.\nLOSS CAUSATION...\n.204\nX.\nCLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS.\n..206\nXI.\nPRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE\n..209\nXII.\nINAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR\n..211\nCLAIMS FOR RELIEF.\n.211\nCOUNT I For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5\nPromulgated thereunder (Against All Defendants)........\n.211\nCOUNT II For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against the Officer\nDefendants)......\n.214\nCOUNT III For Violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act (Against Defendants\nCayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, and Farber)....\n..215\nvi\nEFTA00316720\n", "char_count": 1285}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 8 of 347\nPRAYER FOR RELIEF.\nDEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\nvii\n.216\n.218\nEFTA00316721\n", "char_count": 133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 9 of 347\nGLOSSARY OF DEFINED TERMS\n2008 OIG Report: A report entitled \"SEC's Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The\nConsolidated Supervised Entity Program.\"\nAAG: AICPA Industry Audit and Accounting Guides.\nAAM: AICPA's annual Audit and Accounting Manual.\nABS: Asset-backed securities.\nABS CDOS: Asset-backed collateralized debt obligations-related investments.\nABX: An index that tracked synthesized subprime mortgage performance, refinancing\nopportunities, and housing price data into efficient market valuation of subprime RMBS\ntranches.\nAdvisers Act: U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940.\nAICPA: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.\nAlix: Michael J. Alix, who served as the Company's Chief Risk Officer from February 3, 2006\nuntil the Company's demise in 2008.\nAlt-A Mortgages: Mortgages made to borrowers who are considered less than prime because\nthey are unable to document their income and assets, have high debt-to-income ratios, and/or\nhave troubled credit histories.\nAPB: Accounting Principles Board Opinions.\nARAS: Audit Risk Alerts.\nARB: AICPA Accounting Research Bulletins.\nAS: Auditing Standard.\nAU §: Sections of the Statements of Auditing Standards, which are codified by the American\nInstitute of Certified Public Accountants.\nBasel II: Recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued in June 2004 by the Basel\nCommittee on Banking Supervision, an institution created by the central bank governors of the\nGroup of Ten Nations.\nBasel II Guidelines: Basel II.\nBasel Committee: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international banking group that\nadvises national regulators, such as the SEC.\nviii\nEFTA00316722\n", "char_count": 1723}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 10 of 347\nB&D AAG: AAG that was applicable to Brokers and Dealers in Securities.\nBear Stearns: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., and Bear Stearns\nAsset Management.\nBear Stearns Defendants: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.; James E. Cayne; Alan D. Schwartz;\nWarren Spector; Samuel Molinaro; Alan C. Greenberg; Michael Alix and Jeffrey Farber.\nBEARRES: Bear Stearns Residential Mortgage Corporation.\nBroker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program: A program requiring broker dealers that are part of a\nholding company structure with at least $20 million in capital to file with the SEC certain\ndisaggregated information about their finances.\nBSAM: Bear Stearns Asset Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Bear Stearns\nCompanies Inc.\nCAP: Capital Accumulation Program.\nCaptive Originations: mortgages originated by BEARRES and ECC that were sent directly into\nthe securitization process at Bear Stearns.\nCAQ: Center for Audit Quality.\nCayne: James E. Cayne, a director, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Bear\nStearns during the Class Period.\nCioffi: Ralph Cioffi, the Bear Stearns trader who started and managed the High Grade Fund, a\nManaging Director of BSAM and a Director of BSC.\nCDOS: Collateralized debt obligations.\nCDO Report: Report issued by an employee of BSAM, on April 19, 2007, showing that the\nCDOs in the Funds were worth substantially less than previously thought.\nCDO Squared: A CDO backed by other CDO notes.\nCES: Closed end second lien loans.\nCF Division: SEC Division of Corporation Finance, charged with ensuring that investors are\nprovided with material information in order to make informed investment decisions.\nCFO: Chief Financial Officer.\nThe Class: All persons and entities which, between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008,\ninclusive, purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock or other equity\nsecurities, or call options of or guaranteed by Bear Stear\n... [truncated, 2245 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/9 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=9]", "char_count": 2245}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 11 of 347\nPlan Units and Restricted Stock Plan Units that had fully vested, entitling them to an equivalent\nnumber of shares of Bear Steams Stock upon settlement at the end of a deferral period, as a part\nof their compensation as an employee with the Company and participation in its RSU Plan and\nthe CAP Plan.\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008, inclusive.\nCompany: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.\nCOMS (or Offering Memoranda): Confidential Offering Memoranda.\nCOO: Chief Operating Officer.\nCOSO: Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.\nCSE: Consolidated Supervised Entity.\nDeloitte: Deloitte & Touche LLP, the external auditor for Bear Stearns during the Class Period.\nDimon: JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon.\nD&L AAG: The AAG for Depository and Lending Institutions.\nDomestic Funds: The High Grade Domestic Fund and the High Grade Enhanced Domestic Fund.\nECC: Encore Credit Corporation, which the Company purchased in early 2007.\nEMC: EMC Mortgage Corporation, a Bear Stearns subsidiary.\nEPD: Early Payment Default, which is the failure of a borrower to make their first three\npayments on a mortgage.\nEquity Tranche: The most dangerous segment of a CDO which bears the first risk of loss.\nExchange Act: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as 15 U.S.C. §78(a).\nFarber: Defendant Jeffrey M. Farber, a Senior Vice President, and the Controller and Principal\nAccountant for the Company during the Class Period.\nFAS: Statements of Financial Accounting Standards.\nFASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board.\nFASCON: FASB Concept Statements.\nFIN: FASB Interpretations.\nFPD: First Payment Default, the failure of a borrower to make even their first payment on a\nmortgage.\nX\nEFTA00316724\n", "char_count": 1776}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 12 of 347\nFSP: FASB Staff Opinions.\nGAAP: U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.\nGAAS: Generally Accepted Auditing Standards.\nGoldman: Goldman Sachs & Co.\nGreenberg: Defendant Alan C. \"Ace\" Greenberg, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Bear\nStearns during the Class Period.\nHedge Funds: The High Grade Fund and the High Grade Enhanced Fund.\nHELOCS: Home-equity lines of credits.\nHigh Grade Fund: a hedge fund managed by BSAM under the supervision of defendant Spector.\nThe High Grade Master Fund included two entities. Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit\nStrategies Fund, L.P. was a Delaware partnership responsible for raising money from U.S.\ninvestors to be placed in the High Grade Master Fund. Bear Stearns High Grade Structured\nCredit Strategies (Overseas) Ltd. was a Cayman Island corporation responsible for raising money\nfrom foreign investors to be placed in the High Grade Master Fund.\nHigh Grade Enhanced Fund: A hedge fund managed by BSAM under the supervision of\ndefendant Spector. The High Grade Enhanced Fund was structured similarly to the High Grade\nFund, but allowed for a much greater amount of leverage, thereby increasing potential returns.\nIPO: Initial public offering.\nJPMorgan: JPMorgan Chase & Co.\nLead Plaintiff: The State Treasurer of the State of Michigan, Custodian of the Michigan Public\nSchool Employees Retirement System, State Employees' Retirement System, Michigan State\nPolice Retirement System, and Michigan Judges Retirement System.\nLevel 1: Assets that are valued using the Mark-to-Market valuation technique.\nLevel 2: Assets that are valued using the Mark-to-Model valuation technique.\nLevel 3: Assets that are thinly traded or not traded at all and are given values based on valuation\ntechniques that require inputs that are both unobservable and significant to the overall fair value\nmeasurement. The techniques are developed by management.\nLeverage: The use of borrowed money secured \n... [truncated, 2294 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/11 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=11]", "char_count": 2294}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 13 of 347\nMargin Call: When a lender demands more collateral or a return of part or all of the money\nloaned in response to declining collateral values.\nMark-to-Market: The valuation method for assets traded in an active market, classified as Level\n1 assets.\nMark-to-Model: The valuation method for assets whose values are based on quoted prices in\ninactive markets, or whose values are based on models using either directly or indirectly\nobservable inputs over the full term, or most of the term, of the asset or liability, classified as\nLevel 2 assets.\nMBS: Mortgage Backed Securities.\nMD&A: Management's Discussion & Analysis section of SEC filings.\nMezzanine Tranche: Lower rated tranche of a CDO which bears the greater risk of loss than the\ntranches above it.\nMolinaro: Defendant Samuel J. Molinaro, Jr., Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice\nPresident of Bear Stearns. On August 5, 2007, he was also appointed COO.\nNAR: National Association of Realtors.\nNet Capital Rule: Rule 15c3-1 of the Exchange Act.\nNo-Doc Loans: Loans that required no documentation to corroborate the borrowers' and brokers'\nrepresentations about the borrowers' income and assets.\nNonprime Mortgages: Subprime and Alt-A mortgages.\nNo-Ratio Loans: Loans that required less (or no) documentation to corroborate the borrowers'\nand brokers' representations about the borrowers' income and assets.\nOCIE: SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations.\nOfficer Defendants: Individual Defendants Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, Alix\nand Farber.\nOIG: Office of the Inspector General of the Securities Exchange Commission.\nPCAOB: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.\nPPP: Preliminary Performance Profiles.\nPunk Ziegel: Punk Ziegel & Co.\nRatings Agencies: U.S. commercial credit rating agencies Standard & Poor's, Moody's and\nFitch.\nxii\nEFTA00316726\n", "char_count": 1909}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 14 of 347\nRMBS: Residential Mortgage Backed Securities.\nRepo: Repurchase agreement. A repo allows a borrower to use a financial security as collateral\nfor a cash loan at a fixed rate of interest. In a repo, the borrower agrees to immediately sell a\nsecurity to a lender and also agrees to buy the same security from the lender at a fixed price at\nsome later date.\nRetained Interests: Especially risky tranches of RMBS kept by Bear Stearns as a result of the\nsecuritization process.\nRSU: Restricted Stock Units.\nSarbanes-Oxley Act: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.\nSchwartz: Defendant Alan D. Schwartz, Co-President and Co-Chief Operating Officer of Bear\nStearns. He became sole President on August 5, 2007.\nScratch and Dent Loans: Risky mortgages that were already in default that were purchased by\nBear Stearns in the hopes of bringing the borrower back into compliance and securitizing the\nloan.\nSEC: The Securities and Exchange Commission.\nSecurities Act: Securities Act of 1933, codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 and 770.\nSFAS 5: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies,\nissued in March 1975 by the FASB.\nSFAS 115: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, Accounting for Certain\nInvestments in Debt and Equity, issued in December 1993 by the FASB.\nSFAS 140: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and\nServicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities.\nSFAS 157: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements,\nissued by the FASB in September 2006.\nSMRS: The State of Michigan Retirement Systems (consisting of the Michigan Public School\nEmployees Retirement System, State Employees' Retirement System, Michigan State Police\nRetirement System, and Michigan Judges Retirement System).\nSOP: AICPA Statements of Position.\nSOP 94-6: AICPA's Statement of Position 94-6, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and\nUn\n... [truncated, 2103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/13 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=13]", "char_count": 2103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 15 of 347\nSpector: Defendant Warren J. Spector, Co-President, Co-COO, and a director of Bear Stearns.\nOn August 5, 2007, Spector resigned those positions.\nStated Income Loans: Loans that required less documentation to corroborate the borrowers' and\nbrokers' representations about the borrowers' income and assets.\nSubprime Mortgages: Especially risky mortgages made to borrowers who have a heightened risk\nof default, such as those who have a history of loan delinquency or default, those with a recorded\nbankruptcy or those with limited debt experience.\nSynthetic CDOS: A synthetic security that mimics or references a CDO.\nSynthetic Securities: A type of derivative, namely insurance contracts where the party buying\nthe insurance paid a premium equivalent to the cash flow of an underlying RMBS which it was\ncopying, and the counterparty insured against a decline or default in the underlying RMBS\nsecurity.\nTABX: An index that tracked synthesized subprime mortgage performance, refinancing\nopportunities, and housing price data into efficient market valuation of Mezzanine CDO\ntranches.\nTannin: Matthew M. Tannin, Chief Operating Officer of the Hedge Funds, a Managing Director\nof BSAM and a Director of BSC.\nTM: The SEC's Division of Trading and Markets.\nVaR: Value at Risk.\nxiv\nEFTA00316728\n", "char_count": 1353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102\nFiled 02/27/09 Page 16 of 347\nCourt-appointed Lead Plaintiff, The State Treasurer of the State of Michigan, Custodian\nof the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System, State Employees' Retirement\nSystem, Michigan State Police Retirement System, and Michigan Judges Retirement System\n(collectively, the \"Lead Plaintiff\" or \"SMRS\"), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly\nsituated persons and entities, by its undersigned counsel, for its Consolidated Class Action\nComplaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws asserting claims against The Bear\nStearns Companies Inc. (\"Bear Stearns\" or the \"Company\") and the other Defendants named\nherein, allege the following upon personal knowledge as to itself and its own acts, and upon\ninformation and belief as to all other matters.\"\nLead Plaintiff's information and belief as to allegations concerning matters other than\nitself and its own acts is based upon an investigation by its counsel which included, among other\nthings: (i) review and analysis of documents filed publicly by Bear Stearns with the Securities\nand Exchange Commission (the \"SEC\"); (ii) review and analysis of press releases, news articles,\nand other public statements issued by or concerning Bear Stearns and other Defendants named\nherein; (iii) review and analysis of research reports issued by financial analysts concerning Bear\nStearns' securities and business; (iv) the September 25, 2008 Report of the Office of Inspector\nGeneral of the SEC entitled \"SEC's Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The\nConsolidated Supervised Entity Program\" and \"SEC's Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related\nEntities: Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program\"; (v) interviews of numerous former Bear\nStearns executives and employees; (vi) review and analysis of news articles, media reports and\nother publications concerning the mortgage banking and lending industries; and (vii) review and\nA glossary of certain defined terms in \n... [truncated, 2155 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/15 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=15]", "char_count": 2155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 17 of 347\nanalysis of certain pleadings filed in other pending litigation naming Bear Stearns as a defendant\nor nominal defendant. Lead Plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary support for\nthe allegations herein exists and will continue to be revealed after plaintiffs have a reasonable\nopportunity for discovery.\nI.\nNATURE AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION\n1. As more fully set forth in paragraph 803 below, Lead Plaintiff brings this federal\nsecurities class action on behalf of itself and on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and\nentities that, between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008, inclusive (the \"Class Period”),\npurchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock or other equity securities, or\ncall options of or guaranteed by Bear Stearns, or sold Bear Stearns put options and were\ndamaged thereby (the \"Class\" or \"Plaintiffs\").\n2. Since its founding in 1923, Bear Stearns was widely regarded as one of the\npreeminent investment banks of the world and as a shrewd manager of risk.\n3.\nBeginning early in this decade, however, Bear Stearns embarked on a business\nplan that left it extraordinarily vulnerable to volatility in the housing market. It purchased and\noriginated enormous numbers of unusually risky mortgages to securitize and sell, and maintained\nbillions of dollars of these assets on its own books. The Company used the assets on its books as\ncollateral to purchase even larger quantities of debt, and to finance the ballooning costs of its\ndaily operations. The future of the highly-leveraged Company had come to depend on the\naccuracy of its assessments of the value of these securities and the risk that their value might\ndecline.\n4.\nThe investing public was unaware that even before the Class Period began, the\nCompany had secretly abandoned any meaningful effort to manage the huge risks it faced. In\n2\nEFTA00316730\n", "char_count": 1937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 18 of 347\n2005 and again in 2006 the SEC privately warned the Company of crucial deficiencies in models\nit used to value mortgage-backed securities and to assess risk, both critical tools for managing\nthe Company's exposure to market declines. The SEC regulators told the Company that the\nmortgage valuation models it used failed to incorporate data about risk of default, and that its\nvalue at risk models did not account for key factors such as changes in housing prices.\n5.\nInstead of revising its models to accurately reflect a rapidly accelerating downturn\nin the housing market, the Company bolstered the value of its stock by persisting in using its\nmisleading mortgage valuation and value at risk models in an effort to conceal the extent of its\nexposure to loss. Indeed, throughout the Class Period, the Company reported value at risk\nfigures to investors that were far lower and more stable than its peers.\n6.\nAt the same time, Bear Stearns falsely represented to the public that it regularly\nreviewed and updated its valuation and risk models to ensure their accuracy. Analysts,\nimpressed by the strength of the Company's revenues and the apparent conservatism reflected in\nits risk management practices, recommended Bear Stearns to investors as a sound investment.\n7.\nThe collapse of two massive hedge funds overseen by the Company in the Spring\nof 2007 dramatically increased Bear Stearns' exposure to the growing housing crisis. When\nBear Stearns bailed out one of the funds, the Company effectively took onto its own books\nnearly two billion dollars of the hedge funds' subprime-backed assets that were worthless within\nweeks. Instead of revealing its losses on this collateral at the time of the bailout, the Company\nhid the extent of the declines, and continued to offer false and misleading asset valuations and\nvalue at risk numbers to the public, further inflating the price of its stock. The Company falsely\nstressed that a\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/17 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=17]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 19 of 347\n8.\nBy the late fall of 2007, the Company's losses had become too big to conceal and\nit began to write down billions of dollars of its devalued assets. Surprised investors and analysts\nbecame concerned that they had not been given an accurate picture of the Company's exposure\nto losses. The Company's lenders, fearing that Bear Stearns might not be creditworthy, became\nunwilling to lend it the vast sums necessary for its daily operations.\n9.\nIn its public statements in December of 2007 and January of 2008, the Company\ncontinued to hide its steep slide, offering the public misleading accounts of its earnings and asset\nvalues. However, Bear Stearns' trading partners grew increasingly suspicious that the Company\nwas in precarious straits.\n10.\nOn Wednesday, March 10, 2008, rumors began to circulate on Wall Street that\nBear Stearns was facing a liquidity problem. The Company issued a press release denying the\nrumors and stated that its \"balance sheet, liquidity and capital remain strong.\" On March 12,\n2008, Bear Stearns' CEO Alan Schwartz appeared on CNBC to reassure investors that Bear\nStearns had ample liquidity and that he was \"comfortable\" that Bear Stearns would turn a profit\nin its fiscal first quarter and that there was no threat to the Company's liquidity. By the next\nevening, Thursday, March 13, 2008, Schwartz was making frantic phone calls to the Federal\nReserve and to JPMorgan-Chase & Co. (\"JPMorgan\") hoping for a last minute rescue to avoid\nbankruptcy the next day.\n11. On the morning of Friday, March 14, 2008, it was revealed that JPMorgan would\nprovide short-term funding to Bear Stearns while the Company worked on alternative forms of\nfinancing. Bear Stearns' stock plummeted on the news, falling from $57 per share to $30 per\nshare, a 47% one-day drop.\nEFTA00316732\n", "char_count": 1867}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 20 of 347\n12.\nOver the weekend of March 15 and 16, JPMorgan bankers scoured Bear Stearns'\nbooks and, with multi-billion dollar backing from the Federal Reserve, agreed to purchase Bear\nStearns for $2 per share. JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon told investors on a conference call on\nSunday evening, March 16, 2008, that, after examining Bear Stearns' books, it had found that the\nCompany faced $40 billion in credit exposure, including mortgage liabilities, and a $2 per share\noffer price was necessary to protect JPMorgan. JPMorgan's offer was particularly stunning in\nlight of the fact that the Company's Manhattan headquarters alone was worth $8 per share.\nIndeed, Dimon later stated that, without the Federal Reserve's provision of $30\nbillion in funding, the deal \"would have been very hard to do. Without the Fed to help mitigate\nthe risk, to protect us from an over concentration in some risky assets, I'm not sure it was doable\nat all.\"\n13.\n14.\nOn March 17, 2008, upon the revelation of the Company's full exposure to loss,\nBear Stearns' stock was in a free fall, closing at below $5 ($4.81) per share, an 84% drop from\nits previous close. While JPMorgan would eventually increase its bid to $10 per share, the\nCompany's investors had already suffered historic losses.\nII.\nJURISDICTION AND VENUE\n15. The claims asserted herein arise under Sections 10(b), 20(a) and 20A of the\nSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (the \"Exchange Act\"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) and 78t-1,\nand Rule 10b 5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b 5.\n16. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to\nSection 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).\nVenue is proper in this District pursuant to Section 22 of the Securities Act,\nSection 27 of the Exchange Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c). Many of the acts and\n17.\n5\nEFTA00316733\n", "char_count": 1952}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 21 of 347\nomissions charged herein, including the preparation and dissemination to the public of materially\nfalse and misleading information, occurred in substantial part in the Southern District of New\nYork. Bear Stearns maintained its corporate headquarters and principal executive offices in this\nDistrict throughout the Class Period.\n18. In connection with the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendants, directly or\nindirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including but not limited\nto the United States mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of national\nsecurities exchanges and markets.\nIII.\nPARTIES\nA.\nLead Plaintiff\n19.\nLead Plaintiff SMRS serves the working and retired public servants of four SMRS\nsystems: the Public School Employees Retirement System; the State Employees' Retirement\nSystem; the State Police Retirement System; and the Judges Retirement System. The\nbeneficiaries of the SMRS include 563,576 people and include one out of every eighteen\nMichigan citizens. Within these systems, four defined benefit pension plans and two defined\ncontribution pension plans are administered with combined assets of nearly $64 billion, making\nthe SMRS the fourteenth largest public pension system in the U.S., the twentieth-largest pension\nsystem in the U.S., and the thirty-ninth largest pension system in the world. In 2006, the SMRS\npaid out $4.6 billion in pension and health benefits.\n20.\nAs set forth in the amended certification annexed hereto as Exhibit A, Lead\nPlaintiff SMRS purchased Bear Stearns common stock on the open market during the Class\nPeriod and suffered damages as a result of the misconduct alleged herein.\n6\nEFTA00316734\n", "char_count": 1769}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 22 of 347\nB.\nBear Stearns Defendants\n21.\n1. The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.\nDefendant The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. is and at all relevant times was\norganized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of\nbusiness at 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York. At all relevant times Bear Stearns,\nthrough its various subsidiaries, provided a broad range of financial services to clients and\ncustomers worldwide. Bear Stearns held itself out as a leading financial services firm with core\nbusiness lines including institutional equities, fixed income, investment banking, global clearing\nservices, asset management, and private client services.\n22.\nOn May 30, 2008, a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. merged\nwith, and into, Defendant Bear Stearns Companies, with Bear Stearns Companies continuing as\nthe surviving corporation and as a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan & Chase Co.\n2.\nOfficer Defendants\n23.\nDefendant James E. Cayne (\"Cayne\") was at all relevant times a director,\nChairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer of Bear Stearns. Although Cayne resigned\nfrom his position as CEO on January 8, 2008, he continued to serve as Chairman of the\nCompany's Board of Directors throughout the Class Period. During the Class Period, when the\nprice of Bear Stearns' shares was artificially inflated, Cayne sold 219,036 shares for a total\nrealized value of $23,010,474.\n24. Defendant Alan D. Schwartz (\"Schwartz\") was Co-President and Co-Chief\nOperating Officer (\"COO\") of Bear Stearns from June of 2001 to August of 2007. He became\nsole President on August 5, 2007, and remained in that position until January 5, 2008, when he\nwas named CEO of the Company. Schwartz served on the Company's Board of Directors\n7\nEFTA00316735\n", "char_count": 1837}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 23 of 347\n25.\nthroughout the Class Period. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares\nwas artificially inflated, Schwartz sold 91,233 shares for a total realized value of $9,867,001.\nDefendant Warren J. Spector (\"Spector\") was Co-President, Co-COO of the\nCompany from June of 2001 to August of 2007, and served as a director of Bear Stearns from\n1990 until August of 2007. On August 5, 2007 Spector resigned those positions. However, he\nremained an employee of the Company with the title Senior Managing Director until December\n28, 2007. During his tenure as Co-President and Co-COO, all divisions of the Company save\ninvestment banking reported to Spector, including the two large hedge funds that were heavily\ninvested in mortgage-backed securities. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear\nStearns' shares was artificially inflated, Spector sold 116,255 shares for a total realized value of\n$19,066,373.\n26. Defendant Alan C. Greenberg (\"Greenberg\") was Chairman of the Executive\nCommittee of Bear Stearns during the Class Period. During the Class Period, when the price of\nBear Stearns' shares was artificially inflated, Greenberg sold 371,986 shares for a total realized\nvalue of $34,594,027.\n27.\nDefendant Samuel L. Molinaro Jr. (\"Molinaro\") was, at all relevant times, Chief\nFinancial Officer (\"CFO\") and Executive Vice President of Bear Stearns. On August 5, 2007, he\nwas also appointed COO. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares was\nartificially inflated, Molinaro sold 38,552 shares for a total realized value of $4,230,828.\n28.\nDefendant Michael Alix (\"Alix\") was the Senior Managing Director and Global\nHead of Credit Risk Management for the Company during the Class Period.\n29. Defendant Jeffrey M. Farber (\"Farber\") was a Senior Vice President, Controller\nand Principal Accountant for the Company during the Class Period.\n8\nEFTA00316736\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 24 of 347\n30.\nCayne, Schwartz, Spector, Greenberg, Molinaro, Alix and Farber are collectively\nreferred to as the \"Officer Defendants.\" The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. and the Officer\nDefendants are collectively referred to as the \"Bear Stearns Defendants.\"\n31. The Officer Defendants, because of their positions with the Company, possessed\nthe power and authority to control the contents of Bear Stearns' quarterly reports, press releases,\nand presentations to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, and institutional\ninvestors. They were provided with copies of the Company's reports and press releases alleged\nherein to be misleading prior to or shortly after their issuance.\nC.\nAuditor Defendant\n32.\nDeloitte & Touche LLP (\"Deloitte\") was, at all relevant times, the independent\noutside auditor for Bear Stearns. Deloitte provided audit, audit-related, tax and other services to\nBear Stearns during the Class Period, which included the issuance of unqualified opinions on the\nCompany's financial statements for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and management's assessments\nof internal controls for the same years. Deloitte consented to the incorporation by reference of\nits unqualified opinions on the Company's financial statements and management's assessment of\ninternal controls for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.\nIV.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS\nA.\nBear Stearns' Storied Past\n33.\nBear Stearns was the fifth largest investment bank in the world before its stunning\ncollapse in March 2008. For decades, Bear Stearns had been known as one of the most\nconservative of the Wall Street firms due to the perception that it took a cautious approach to\nrisk. In fact, the Company survived the Great Depression without laying off any of its\nemployees and, until December 2007, had never posted a loss.\n9\nEFTA00316737\n", "char_count": 1891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102\nFiled 02/27/09 Page 25 of 347\n34.\nAs a registered broker-dealer, Bear Stearns was subject to a regulatory scheme\ncalled the \"Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program.\" The program was created in 1990, when\nSection 17(h) of the Exchange Act was amended to require broker dealers that are part of a\nholding company structure with at least $20 million in capital to file with the SEC certain\ndisaggregated information about their finances.\n35.\nThe Broker Dealer Risk Assessment Program called for staff in the SEC's\ndivision of Trading and Markets (\"TM\") to monitor events that might threaten broker-dealers,\ncustomers, and the financial markets. Although TM officially tracked the filing status of 146\nbroker-dealers in the program, during the Class Period it only reviewed in detail the filings of the\nseven most prominent firms, including Bear Stearns, that elected to participate in the SEC's\nConsolidated Supervised Entity (\"CSE\") program. The CSE program allowed the SEC to\nsupervise participating broker-dealer holding companies on a consolidated basis.\n36. While Bear Stearns was among the smallest of the CSE firms, it experienced rapid\ngrowth through the 1990s. By 1992, the Company's earnings had doubled to over $295 million,\nthe best year in its history to date. During the same year, the Company managed more than $13\nbillion in initial public offerings (\"IPOS\") for a variety of U.S. and foreign corporations.\nMoreover, the Company had become a leader in clearing trades for other brokers and brokerages.\n37. In 1993 Defendant Cayne succeeded Defendant Greenberg as CEO, but\nGreenberg stayed on as Chairman of the Board, and then as Chairman of the Company's\nExecutive Committee starting in 2001. While Bear Stearns under Cayne became a larger and\nmore profitable firm, its business model was essentially unchanged. Its time-tested businesses-\ntrading, mortgage underwriting, prime brokerage, and private client services-still received the\nbulk of the Com\n... [truncated, 2057 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/24 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=24]", "char_count": 2057}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 26 of 347\n38.\nAt the beginning of the new century, with the economy weakening, Bear Stearns\nwas in an increasingly precarious position. By mid-2000, Bear Stearns' stock price was in a two-\nyear slump. As one of Wall Street's last independent financial services firms, the Company\nstruggled to keep up with competitors.\nB.\nThe Boom in Debt Securitization\n39.\nSoon after the turn of the new century, the Company's fortunes began to change.\nIn the first years of this decade, persistently low interest rates and technical innovations lead to a\nboom in debt issuance to back mortgages, credit card receivables, or leveraged buyouts. As a\nresult, the Company experienced explosive growth in one area of business-debt securitization.\n40. Debt securitization involves pooling and repackaging of cash flow-producing\nfinancial assets into securities that are sold to investors. The securities that are the outcome of\nthis process are termed asset-backed securities (\"ABS\"). When mortgages are packaged together\nfor securitization, they are referred to as Mortgage Backed Securities (\"MBS\"), and when the\nmortgages are residential, those securities are referred to as Residential Mortgage Backed\nSecurities (\"RMBS\").\n41.\nRMBS are, in turn, divided into layers based on the credit ratings of the\nunderlying assets. The typical structuring of an RMBS is set out in the chart below.\n11\nEFTA00316739\n", "char_count": 1442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 27 of 347\nCollateral Qualifying\nfor Securitization\nDeal-\nConforming\nSubprime\nLoans\nCredit Tranching\nStructuring\nAAA/Aaa\nSenior\nTranche\nAA/Aa\nMezzanine\nA/A\nTranches\nBBB/Baa\nBB/Ba\nB-Pieces\nB/B\nEquity Tranche\nFirst-Loss Piece\n42.\nThe credit quality of asset-backed securities such as RMBS can be more volatile\nthan general corporate debt. If the value of the underlying assets declines, the affected securities\ncan experience dramatic credit deterioration and loss.\n43. The \"B-Pieces\" of an RMBS, that is, its riskier parts, can be pooled together to\nform a kind of asset-backed security called a collateralized debt obligation (\"CDO\"). CDOS are\nthen once again divided by the CDO issuer into different tranches, or layers, based on gradations\nin credit quality.\n44.\nWhile the top tranche of a CDO may be rated \"AAA,\" CDOs are generally\nformed from RMBS that are rated BBB or lower. Accordingly, even the best tranches of a CDO\nare a very risky form of security. Lower-rated tranches of CDOs, such as the \"mezzanine\"\ntranches, bear even greater risk of loss. The most dangerous segment of a CDO is termed the\n\"equity\" tranche, and bears the first risk of loss.\n45. Through the first part of this decade, mezzanine CDOs offered for sale\nproliferated, making up more than 75% of the total CDO market by April of 2007. The\n12\nEFTA00316740\n", "char_count": 1389}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 28 of 347\nmezzanine CDOs were stuffed with cash flows from especially risky types of residential\nmortgage loans, termed \"subprime\" or \"Alt-A.\"\n46. Subprime loans are made to borrowers who have a heightened risk of default,\nsuch as those who have a history of loan delinquency or default, those with a recorded\nbankruptcy, or those with limited debt experience.\n47.\nAlt-A loans, although considered less risky than subprime loans, are still more\nrisky than prime loans. Alt-A loans are typically made to borrowers with problems including\nlack of documentation of income and assets, high debt-to-income ratios, and troubled credit\nhistories. Subprime and Alt-A mortgages are collectively referred to herein as “nonprime\"\nmortgages.\n48.\nBetween 2003 and 2007, the total proportion of risky nonprime loans wrapped\ninto the majority of all mezzanine CDOs increased dramatically marketwide, as set out in the\nchart below.\nMezzanine CDOs: Average Collateral Composition\nCDO\nVintage\n% Assets\nSubprime\n% Assets\n% Assets\nAlt-A\nCES\n% Assets\nOther CDOs\nTotal\nNonprime\n2003\n33.7%\n7.6%\n1.8%\n7.0%\n50.1%\n2004\n43.2%\n10.1%\n2.7%\n5.9%\n61.9%\n2005\n55.1%\n9.3%\n2.2%\n5.9%\n72.5%\n2006\n64.2%\n6.9%\n2.1%\n5.5%\n78.7%\n2007\n62.9%\n5.8%\n0.8%\n6.9%\n76.4%\nSource: Standard & Poor's\nC.\n49.\nBear Stearns' Securitization Business\nBear Stearns was in an ideal position to benefit from the market for CDOs backed\nby higher-risk nonprime mortgages, in that it was vertically integrated in that business—it\n13\nEFTA00316741\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 29 of 347\noriginated and purchased risky home loans, packaged them into RMBS, collected these RMBS to\nform CDOs, then sold CDOs to investors. As a result of this process, it also acquired a large\nexposure to declines in the housing and credit markets.\n50.\n1. Bear Stearns' Mortgage Origination and Purchasing Business\nThrough its subsidiaries, Bear Stearns originated and purchased vast numbers of\nrisky residential mortgage loans during the Class Period.\n51. The Company originated loans through two wholly-owned subsidiaries, the Bear\nStearns Residential Mortgage Corporation (\"BEARRES\") and later through Encore Credit\nCorporation (\"ECC\"), which the Company purchased in early 2007. ECC was strictly a\n\"subprime\" lender; it specialized in providing loans to borrowers with compromised credit.\nBEARRES had several products available to subprime borrowers, but also made\nAlt-A loans to borrowers with somewhat better, but still compromised credit. ECC began\noperating under the BEARRES name in October of 2007, but still retained distinct product lines.\n52.\n53.\nMany of the mortgages originated by BEARRES and ECC were \"stated income,\"\n\"no ratio,\" and \"no-doc\" loans that required less (or no) documentation to corroborate the\nborrowers' and brokers' representations about the borrowers' income and assets.\n54.\nMoreover, the Company actively encouraged its loan originator subsidiaries to\noffer loans even to borrowers with poor credit scores and troubled credit histories. According to\nConfidential Witness Number 1 (\"CW 1\"), an Area Sales Manager who began work for ECC in\nJanuary of 2006 and continued working at BEARRES until February of 2008, CW 1's office was\nunder great pressure to \"dig deeper\" and originate riskier loans that \"cut corners\" with respect to\ncredit scores or loan to value (\"LTV\") ratios.\n14\nEFTA00316742\n", "char_count": 1886}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 30 of 347\n55.\nAs a result of these lax standards, the Company approved the great majority of all\nloan applications it received. While the national rejection rate was 29% in 2006, BEARRES\nrejected only 13% of applications in the same period.\n56. In 2006 alone, using these questionable lending practices, BEARRES and ECC\noriginated 19,715 mortgages worth $4.37 billion. Because these were \"captive\" originations, the\nmortgages originated by BEARRES and ECC were sent directly into the securitization process at\nBear Stearns.\n58.\n57. As a result of Bear Stearns' hunger for loans to securitize, it also purchased huge\nnumbers of risky loans originated by other companies through its EMC Mortgage Corporation\n(\"EMC\") subsidiary. From 1990 until 2007, EMC purchased over $200 billion in mortgages.\nThe loans the Company purchased by this means were often as suspect as the\nloans it originated. Confidential Witness Number 2 (\"CW 2\"), a Quality Control and Reporting\nAnalyst at EMC from April 2006 through August 2007, reviewed and examined loan origination\nand loan portfolio statistics on subprime loans purchased by EMC, and also created reports for\nupper management at EMC. CW 2 confirmed that EMC would buy almost everything, including\nextremely risky loans where the borrower's income and ability to pay could not be verified.\n59. According to Confidential Witness Number 3 (\"CW 3\"), a former Collateral\nAnalyst with the Company who worked for Bear Stearns in the first half of 2007, the Company\nunderstood that the loans it was purchasing through EMC were unusually risky. CW 3 reported\nthat during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 EMC was “buying everything\"\nwithout regard for the riskiness of the loan. CW 3 explained that because of the potential for\nprofits from securitizing these loans Bear Stearns managers looked the other way and did not\nenforce basic underwriting standards.\n15\nEFTA00316743\n", "char_count": 1977}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 31 of 347\n60.\nConfidential Witness Number 4 (\"CW 4\"), an Underwriting Supervisor and\nCompliance Analyst for EMC from September 2004 until February 2007, reported that the Bear\nStearns traders responsible for buying the loans were fully aware of the weakness of the\nunderlying loans. According to CW 4, the traders ignored CW 4's due diligence findings that\nborrowers would be unable to pay.\n61.\nBear Stearns also began funding and purchasing even riskier closed-end second-\nlien (\"CES\") loans and home-equity lines of credit (\"HELOCS\"). Most of these loans were made\nto borrowers with poor credit. Moreover, they were secured by secondary liens on the home,\nmeaning that, should the home go into foreclosure, Bear Stearns would only be paid after the\nfirst mortgage was satisfied and was more likely not to be paid in full if the value of the home\ndropped. By the end of 2006, EMC had purchased $1.2 billion of HELOC and $6.7 billion of\nsecond-lien loans. Once these loans were purchased, they would go directly into the\nsecuritization process.\n62.\nFinally, through EMC, Bear Stearns aggressively purchased exceptionally risky\nmortgages that were already in default in the hopes of bringing the borrower back into\ncompliance and securitizing the loan along with other acquired and originated mortgages-so-\ncalled \"scratch and dent\" loans. A special desk at Bear Stearns was designated to securitize the\n\"scratch and dent\" loans and sell them to investors.\n63.\nGiven the Company's poor underwriting standards and devil-may-care attitude\ntowards purchasing mortgages originated by other companies, the loans that it purchased to\npackage into RMBS and CDOS were especially vulnerable to declines in housing prices.\n16\nEFTA00316744\n", "char_count": 1784}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 32 of 347\n2.\nBear Stearns' RMBS Business\n64.\nAfter Bear Stearns acquired a sufficiently large pool of risky mortgages to\nsecuritize, it took the individual nonprime home loans and wrapped them into an RMBS. Some\nRMBS it sold to investors, and others it packaged into CDOS.\n65.\nEspecially risky tranches of RMBS were kept on the Company's books as\n\"Retained Interests.\" Throughout the Class Period, the amount of these especially risky RMBS\nthat the Company kept as retained interests steadily grew, from $5.6 billion as of November 30,\n2006 to $9.6 billion by August 31, 2007.\n3.\nBear Stearns' CDO Business\n66.\nIn order for the Company to assemble RMBS into CDOS, a further step was\nrequired. Each CDO was set up as a new entity, typically an offshore limited liability entity,\nwith its own assets and liabilities. Further, the CDOS produced by Bear Stearns incorporated\ncash flows from pools of risky subprime and \"Alt-A\" home mortgage loans.\n67.\nNearly all of the CDOs Bear Stearns structured during the Class Period were\nbacked, in addition to RMBS, by derivatives or \"synthetic securities,\" which were, in effect,\ninsurance contracts where the party buying the insurance paid a premium equivalent to the cash\nflow of an underlying RMBS which it was copying, and the counterparty insured against a\ndecline or default in the underlying RMBS security. In other words, a synthetic security is akin\nto a \"side bet\" on the performance of certain assets. Such CDOs are called \"Synthetic CDOS.\"\nA CDO backed by other CDO notes is called a \"CDO squared.\"\n68.\nOne of Bear Stearns' primary functions as a CDO underwriter was determining\nthe marketable size of each CDO. This determination was based on three things: the supply of\ncollateral that would make up the assets of the CDO, the market demand for the securities issued\n17\nEFTA00316745\n", "char_count": 1892}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102\nFiled 02/27/09 Page 33 of 347\nby the CDO, and the risk-taking ability of the Company-that is, Bear Stearns' ability to retain\nunsold CDO securities and to insure the CDO against losses.\n69.\nIn order to sell CDOs that were as large as possible, the Company retained\nincreasing amounts of the CDOs it packaged on its books. By August of 2007, this figure had\nreached $2.072 billion.\nD.\n70.\nBear Stearns' Business Practices Amplify its Risk Exposure\nDuring the Class Period, the Company's growing accumulation of subprime-\nbacked RMBS and CDOs, combined with its leveraging practices, left it extraordinarily\nvulnerable to declines in the housing market. This vulnerability was only exacerbated by the\nCompany's management and implicit backing of two enormous hedge funds holding subprime-\nbacked securities.\n71.\n1. Bear Stearns' Concentration in Mortgage-Backed Debt\nAccording to documents privately submitted to the SEC, even before the Class\nPeriod began, on multiple occasions the amount of mortgage securities held by the Company\nexceeded its own internal limits on concentration.\n72. Shortly after Bear Stearns' March 2008 collapse, Senator Charles Grassley,\nRanking Member of the United States Senate Committee on Finance, issued a request that the\nSEC's Office of the Inspector General (\"OIG\") analyze the SEC's oversight of the CSE firms,\nwith a special emphasis on Bear Stearns.\n73.\nTo assist in this audit, the OIG retained Professor Albert Kyle of the University of\nMaryland, an acclaimed expert on capital markets. Professor Kyle analyzed TM's oversight of\nBear Stearns, and from information submitted to the SEC, analyzed Bear Stearns' capital,\nliquidity, and leverage ratios. Professor Kyle also examined the Company's access to secured\nand unsecured financing, and its compliance with industry and worldwide banking guidelines.\n18\nEFTA00316746\n", "char_count": 1893}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 34 of 347\n74.\nTo prepare the report, the SEC relied on an extensive collection of internal\nmemoranda and other documents relating to TM's oversight of Bear Stearns, including non-\npublic correspondence between TM and the Company's top executives.\n75. The OIG issued its conclusions in a September 25, 2008 Report, titled \"SEC's\nOversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program\"\n(the \"2008 OIG Report\").\n76.\nIn the report, the OIG stated that \"[b]y November of 2005 the Company's ARM\nbusiness was operating in excess of allocated limits, reaching new highs with respect to the net\nmarket value of its positions.\" Such a large concentration of business in this area left the\nCompany very exposed to declines in the riskiest part of the housing market.\n2.\nBear Stearns' Leveraging Practices\n77.\nThe Company's exposure to declines in the value of the loans backing its assets\nwas vastly magnified by its leveraging practices. In leveraging, a company takes out a loan\nsecured by assets in order to invest in assets with a greater rate of return than the cost of interest\nfor the loan. Leverage allows greater potential returns to the investor than otherwise would have\nbeen available, but the potential for loss is also greater because if the investment becomes\nworthless, the loan principal and all accrued interest on the loan still need to be repaid.\n78.\nIndeed, as a company's leverage ratio increases, its exposure to loss increases\ndramatically. As set out in the chart below, a leverage ratio of four to one increases losses by\nabout 15%, while a leverage ratio of 35 to one magnifies losses by more than 100%.\n19\nEFTA00316747\n", "char_count": 1728}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 35 of 347\nLeverage Ratios at 1% Loss\n0.00%\nOtol 1to1 401 12:01 25 to 1 35 to 1\nוויי\n-20.00%\n-40.00%\n-60.00%\n-80.00%\n-100.00%\n-120.00%\n79.\nDuring the Class Period, the Company used the assets on its books as collateral\nfor purchases costing many times the equity it possessed. In 2005, the Company was leveraged\nby a ratio of approximately 26.5 to 1. By November of 2007, the Company had leveraged its net\nequity position of $11.8 billion to purchase $395 billion in assets—a ratio of nearly 33 to 1. As a\nconsequence, even a small decline in the value of its assets it held could have catastrophic effects\non the Company's finances. For example, a 3% decline in asset values would wipe out 100% of\nequity.\n80. Because of the interest charges the Company had to pay to support its soaring\nleverage ratio, the amount of cash the Company needed to finance its daily operations increased\ndramatically during the Class Period. By the close of the Class Period, Bear Stearns' daily\nborrowing needs exceeded $50 billion.\n81.\n3. Bear Stearns' Backing of the Hedge Funds\nAnother key source of the Company's exposure to the subprime market came\nthrough its relationship with two large hedge funds that it managed and that bore its name.\n20\n20\nEFTA00316748\n", "char_count": 1302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 36 of 347\n82.\nIn October of 2003, the Company staked a young trader named Ralph Cioffi\n(\"Cioffi\") to start the High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, LP (the \"High Grade Fund\")\nwhich was housed in Bear Stearns Asset Management. The High Grade Fund, which was under\nthe supervision of defendant Spector, consisted of two separate entities. The Bear Stearns High\nGrade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, L.P., a Delaware partnership, was responsible for\nraising money from U.S. investors to be placed in the High Grade Master Fund. Bear Stearns\nHigh Grade Structured Credit Strategies (Overseas) Ltd., a Cayman Island corporation, was\nresponsible for raising money from foreign investors to be placed in the High Grade Master\nFund.\n83.\nIn August of 2006 Cioffi created the High Grade Structured Credit Strategies\nEnhanced Leverage Fund, LP (\"the High Grade Enhanced Fund\") (the High Grade Master Fund\nand the High Grade Enhanced Fund are collectively referred to as the \"Hedge Funds\"). The\nHigh Grade Enhanced Fund was structured similarly to the High Grade Fund, but allowed for a\nmuch greater amount of leverage, thereby increasing potential returns.\n84.\nAn important selling point for investors in the Hedge Funds was the funds'\nrelationship with Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns was known as a leader in CDOs and other exotic\nsecurities. The Hedge Funds were marketed as safe investments because of Bear Stearns'\nexpertise and the use of the Company's proprietary systems to identify and manage risk.\n85. Moreover, Bear Stearns was involved in virtually every part of the Hedge Funds'\nbusiness. Bear, Stearns Securities Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company,\nserved as the prime broker for the Hedge Funds, and PFPC Inc., another Bear Stearns subsidiary,\nwas the Hedge Funds' administrator. BSAM was the investment manager for the Hedge Funds.\nDefendant Spector himself was ultimately responsible for the business of both of \n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/35 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=35]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 37 of 347\n86.\nThe Hedge Funds invested according to a strategy developed by BSAM. The\nHedge Funds' objective was to provide current income and capital appreciation in excess of\nLIBOR by investing primarily in High Grade structured financed securities, with an emphasis on\nlong positions in triple-A and double-A rated asset backed securities, such as CDOs. The High\nGrade Fund increased its returns through the use of leverage: taking the CDOs it had purchased\nand borrowing against them, cheaply, through repurchase or \"repo\" agreements with\ncounterparties.\n87. In a repo, a borrower agrees to immediately sell a security to a lender and also\nagrees to buy the same security back from the lender at a fixed price at some later date. Because\ncash obtained through a repurchase agreement is secured by the collateral provided, it is a\ncheaper source of financing than unsecured loans with higher interest rates.\n88.\nThe loan proceeds from the repurchase agreements were used to buy additional\nCDOs, and the proceeds (in the form of interest payments) from those investments would finance\nadditional borrowing.\n89.\nFortunately for the Hedge Funds, because of BSAM's role as an asset manager,\nthey had in Bear Stearns a lender willing to extend large amounts of cash in exchange for\ncollateral drawn from the Hedge Funds' risky CDO assets. In fact, Bear Stearns was one of the\nfew repurchase lenders willing to take the Hedge Funds' CDOs as collateral for short term\nlending facilities.\n90.\nThe Hedge Funds, through BSAM, entered into many repurchase agreements on\nfavorable terms with Bear Stearns as the counterparty. When, in the summer of 2006, Bear\nStearns entered into a temporary moratorium on repurchase agreements between the Hedge\nFunds and the Company, it briefly deprived the Hedge Funds of an important source of\n22\n22\nEFTA00316750\n", "char_count": 1898}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 38 of 347\nfinancing. In an e-mail from Cioffi to Tannin in September, 2006, Cioffi underscored the\nimportance of Bear Stearns' role as a lender willing to take on the Hedge Funds' risky subprime-\nbacked collateral:\n91.\nDo we have an official mandate to terminate our relationship with\nBear? This hurts our investors as it eliminates a repurchase\ncounterparty (reducing liquidity) and eliminates a source of trading\nsecondary CDOs. Bear is among the best (reducing liquidity) and\nfurther eliminates a source for assets.\nAs a result of the Company's willingness to support the Hedge Funds by offering\ncash in exchange for subprime mortgage-backed CDOs of questionable value, Bear Stearns'\nexposure to declines in the subprime market skyrocketed.\nE.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Models and Inadequate Risk Management\n92.\nThe Company's assumption of vast amounts of risk and aggressive leveraging\npractices was especially reckless given that, even before the Class Period began, the Company\nknew there were grave deficiencies in the models it used in valuing mortgage-backed assets and\nassessing its exposure to loss. It had twice been informed by the SEC that these models failed to\nincorporate key indicators of a declining housing market. Moreover, the Company failed to take\nbasic steps to ensure that its risk management department functioned independently and\neffectively.\n1.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Valuation and Risk Models\n93.\nThe 2008 OIG Report identified crucial deficiencies in models that the Company\nused for valuation and risk management purposes.\n23\nEFTA00316751\n", "char_count": 1629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 39 of 347\na.\nThe Importance of Valuation Models\n94. The valuation of assets is governed by Statement of Financial Accounting\nStandards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (\"SFAS 157\"). Although SFAS 157 took effect on\nNovember 15, 2007, Bear Stearns opted to comply with the standard beginning January of 2007.²\n95.\nSFAS 157 required that Bear Stearns classify its reported assets into one of three\nlevels depending on the degree of certainty about the asset's underlying value. Assets that were\neasy to value because traded in an active market, such as shareholder's equity, were classified as\nLevel 1 (\"mark-to-market\").\n96.\nLevel 2 (\"mark-to-model\") assets consisted of financial assets whose values are\nbased on quoted prices in inactive markets, or whose values are based on models - but the inputs\nto those models are observable either directly or indirectly for substantially the full term of the\nasset or liability.\n97.\nLevel 3 assets, because they are thinly traded or not traded at all, have values\nbased on valuation techniques that require inputs that are both unobservable and significant to\nthe overall fair value measurement.\n98.\nTo value opaque Level 3 assets, companies rely on models developed by\nmanagement. With respect to valuing mortgage-related securities, these models should\nincorporate assumptions critical to determining fair value such as the (i) interest rate\nenvironment (including term structure or \"yield curve\" and volatility), (ii) market liquidity\nlevels, (iii) credit exposure and (iv) the economic environment including housing prices and\ndefault rates.\n115.\n2\nPrior to the Company's adoption of SFAS 157, it was subject to similar provisions under SFAS\n24\nEFTA00316752\n", "char_count": 1760}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 40 of 347\n99.\nThe information supplied by valuation models is incorporated into other models\nused to assess risk and hedge investments, such as the models measuring Value at Risk (\"VaR\"),\ndescribed at paragraphs 115 to 117 below.\nb.\nBear Stearns' Valuation Models Were Misleading\n100. Even before the Class Period began, the Company knew that declining housing\nprices and rising default rates were not reflected in the mortgage valuation models that were\ncritical to the valuation of its Level 3 assets.\n101. In its 2008 Report, the OIG stated that, prior to the Company's approval as a CSE\nin November of 2005, \"Bear Stearns used outdated models that were more than ten years old to\nvalue mortgage derivatives and had limited documentation on how the models worked.\"\n102. As a result, during the 2005 CSE application process, TM told Bear Stearns that\n\"[w]e believe that it would be highly desirable for independent Model Review to carry out\ndetailed reviews of models in the mortgage area.\"\n103. According to the 2008 OIG Report, these concerns were again communicated to\nthe Company in a December 2, 2005 memorandum from the SEC Office of Compliance\nInspections and Examinations (\"OCIE\") to defendant Farber, then a Senior Managing Director\nand the Company's Controller and Principal Accounting Officer. Farber reported to defendant\nMolinaro, CFO and Executive Vice President.\n104. TM documents cited in the 2008 OIG Report reflect that nearly a year after its\nadmission to the CSE program, on September 20, 2006, Bear Stearns' risk management\npersonnel gave a presentation to the TM division regarding the models that Bear Stearns used to\nprice and hedge various financial instruments. The 2008 OIG Report stated that as a result of the\npresentation, TM concluded, among other things, that Bear Stearns\" \"model review process\nlacked coverage of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities\" and that \"the sensitivities\n25\n25\nEFTA003167\n... [truncated, 2003 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/39 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=39]", "char_count": 2003}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 41 of 347\nto various risks implied by the models did not reflect risk sensitivities consistent with price\nfluctuations in the market.\"\n105. The 2008 OIG Report also revealed that TM's discussions with risk managers in\n2005 and 2006 indicated that Bear Stearns' pricing models for mortgages \"focused heavily on\nprepayment risks\" but that TM documents did not reflect \"how the Company dealt with default\nrisks.\"\n106. Defendant Cayne, the CEO of the Company, and defendant Molinaro, the CFO of\nthe Company, were aware of the SEC's concerns about Bear Stearns risk management program.\nAccording to a February 8, 2008 presentation by defendant Molinaro at a Credit Suisse Financial\nServices Forum, the Company's risk management structure \"reports directly to the CFO.\"\nMoreover, it stated that the Company's \"CEO is intimately engaged in the risk management\nprocess.\"\n107. Despite its awareness of TM's concerns, the Company made no effort to revise its\nmortgage valuation models to reflect declines in the housing market. In fact, according to\nConfidential Witness 5 (\"CW 5\"), a former employee of the model validation department at Bear\nStearns during the latter half of the Class Period, Tom Marano, the head of the Company's\nmortgage trading desk, was \"vehemently opposed\" to the updating of the Company's mortgage\nvaluation models.\n108. This witness' statement is consistent with the findings in the 2008 OIG Report,\nwhich concluded that the Company did not begin to make any effort to incorporate measures\nreflecting declines in housing prices into its mortgage models until \"towards the end of 2007\"-\nlong after the Company had acquired a huge hoard of highly illiquid mortgage-backed assets.\n109. In fact, the OIG concluded,\n26\nEFTA00316754\n", "char_count": 1800}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 42 of 347\nthe reviews of mortgage models that should have taken place\nbefore the subprime crisis erupted in February of 2007\nappears to have never occurred, in the sense that it was still a\nwork in progress when Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008.\n110. As the housing market plummeted throughout 2007 and into 2008, Bear Stearns\ncontinued to rely on its flawed valuation models which exacerbated the spread between the true\nvalue of their assets and the value Bear Stearns was publicly reporting. Level 3 assets, including\nretained interests in RMBS and the equity tranches of CDOs, made up 6-8% of the Company's\ntotal assets at fair market value in 2005, and increased to 20-29% of total assets between the\nfourth quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008.\n111. According to the Company's Form 10-K for the period ending November 30,\n2007, the majority of the growth in the Company's Level 3 assets in 2007 came from \"mortgages\nand mortgage-related securities\"-the very assets that the Company was valuing using its\nmisleading models. Indeed, as of August 31, 2007, the Company carried $5.8 billion in Level 3\nassets backed by residential mortgages, a figure that grew close to $7.5 billion by November 30,\n2007.\n112.\nc. The Importance of Value at Risk Models\nThe SEC's second criticism of the Company's models related to Bear Stearns'\nassessment of risk.\n113. Broadly, risk is defined as the degree of uncertainty about future net returns, and\nis commonly classified into four types. Credit risk relates to the potential loss due to the\ninability of a counterpart to meet its obligations. Operational risk takes into account the errors\nthat can be made in instructing payments or settling transactions, and includes the risk of fraud\nand regulatory risks. Liquidity risk is caused by an unexpected large and stressful negative cash\nflow over a short period. If a firm has highly illiquid assets and suddenly needs some liquidity, it\n27\n\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/41 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=41]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 43 of 347\nmay be forced to sell some of its assets at a discount. Finally, market risk estimates the\nuncertainty of future values, due to the changing market conditions.\n114. The most prominent of these risks for investment bankers is market risk, since it\nreflects the potential economic loss caused by the decrease in the market value of a portfolio.\nBecause of the crucial role that market losses can play in the financial health of investment\nbanks, they are required to set aside capital to cover market risk.\n115. Value at Risk (\"VaR\") is one method of quantifying market risk. It is defined as\nthe maximum potential loss in value of a portfolio of financial instruments with a given\nprobability over a certain horizon. For example, a one-day 5% VaR of negative $1 million\nimplies the portfolio has a 5% chance of losing $1 million or more over the next day.\n116. Companies measure VaR using models that are intended to capture different\nvariables that may lead to loss. One input to the VaR models is the data supplied by valuation\nmodels, such as models used to value mortgages and mortgage backed assets.\n117. VaR models are used by investment banks to ensure that a company is\nmaintaining sufficient capital to cover risks associated with potential market decline. If the\ncompany's VaR is high, it must increase the amount of capital it sets aside in order to mitigate\npotential losses or reduce its exposure to high risk positions.\n118. When the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international banking\ngroup that advises national regulators, decided that investors and regulators needed more\naccurate ways to gauge the amount of capital that firms needed to hold in order to cover risks,\nBear Stearns, together with other Wall Street firms, successfully lobbied the Basel Group to\nallow them to use their internal VaR numbers for this purpose.\n28\nEFTA00316756\n", "char_count": 1936}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 44 of 347\n119.\nIn an August 5, 2003 letter to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve\nSystem (\"August 5, 2003 letter\"), defendant Michael Alix, the Company's Head of Global Risk\nManagement and the Chairman of the Risk Management Committee of the Securities Industry\nAssociation, described then-current capital requirements as \"excessive.\" He advocated for the\nadoption of a new \"flexible capital regime that relates regulatory requirements to observable\nrisk,\" one that would turn on the use of VaR models. He explained:\nInvestment banks typically value risk assets, including loans, on a\nmark-to-market basis, and estimate risk to that market using\nvarious tools, including robust VaR models. Risk models are\ncontinuously enhanced to incorporate new products and markets,\nand may be used by investment banks to measure the risk of\nactivities that are considered under Basel II as part of the banking\nbook.\n120. Defendant Alix recommended in his August 5, 2003 letter that regulators rely on\nVaR \"[t]o the extent that an institution can produce reliable mark-to-market values and robust\nVaR base-based estimates.\"\n121. This use of VaR was incorporated into the requirements for CSE program\nparticipants when the CSE program was launched in 2004. Companies participating in the\nprogram were required to regularly supply their VaR numbers to federal regulators and to the\npublic.\n122. During Alix's June 22, 2004 testimony before the House Financial Services\nSubcommittee, Alix touted the benefits of the CSE program's adoption of VaR as a measure of\nassessing the \"true risks\" faced by investment banks. He stated that:\nthe framework will permit securities firms registered under it to\ndetermine the regulatory capital for their broker-dealers by means\nof approved Value at Risk (\"VaR\") models. This will better align\ncapital requirements with the true risks of the securities business,\nwith the added benefit of harmonizing the SEC's capi\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/43 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=43]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 45 of 347\nd.\nBear Stearns' Value at Risk\nModels Were Misleading\n123. According to the 2008 OIG Report, the Company knew before the Class Period\nbegan that its VaR models would not reflect declines in the housing market, the heart of Bear\nStearns' business and its principal source of risk. The 2008 OIG Report stated that in November\nof 2005, the OCIE \"found that Bear Stearns did not periodically evaluate its VaR models, nor did\nit timely update inputs to its VaR models.\"\n124. Bear Stearns was warned of these deficiencies in a December 2, 2005\nmemorandum from OCIE to defendant Farber, the Company's Controller and Principal\nAccountant.\n125.\nThe OIG also found that:\nBear Stearns' VaR models did not capture risks associated with\ncredit spread widening.... These fundamental factors include\nhousing price appreciation, consumer credit scores, patterns of\ndelinquency rates, and potentially other data. These fundamental\nfactors do not seem to have been incorporated into Bear Stearns'\nmodels at the time Bear Stearns became a CSE.\n126. The 2008 OIG Report stated that in September of 2006, TM concluded after a\nmeeting with Company risk managers that the Company still had failed to improve the accuracy\nof the models it used to hedge against risk. In fact, according to the 2008 OIG Report, it was not\nuntil \"towards the end of 2007\" that Bear Stearns “developed a housing led recession scenario\nwhich it could incorporate into risk management and use for hedging purposes.\"\n127. Moreover, the OIG found that the mortgage-backed asset valuation inputs to the\nVaR models employed by the Company were never updated during the Class Period, and were\nstill a \"work in progress\" at the time of the Company's March 2008 collapse.\n30\nEFTA00316758\n", "char_count": 1801}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 46 of 347\n128.\nAs the housing crisis spread during the Class Period, the Company knew that\nfundamental indicators of housing market decline, including falling housing prices and rising\ndelinquency rates, were not reflected in the VaR figures it disclosed to the public.\n129.\n2.\nBear Stearns' Impoverished Risk Management Program\nIn its 2008 Report, the OIG was also highly critical of the minimal role that risk\nmanagement played in Bear Stearns' overall business. The 2008 OIG Report concluded that in\n2006, as the Company's business was becoming increasingly concentrated in mortgage\nsecurities, the expertise of its risk managers was in \"exotic derivatives\" and in validating models\nfor those derivatives. Accordingly, the managers were ill-equipped to offer reliable assessments\nof risk associated with the mortgage securities that had come to be the largest and riskiest part of\nthe Company's business.\n130. Moreover, the OIG saw ample evidence that during the Class Period Bear\nStearns' trading desks had gained ascendancy over the Company's risk managers. TM found\nthat model review at Bear was less formalized than at other CSE firms and had devolved into a\nsupport function. Indeed, the OIG concluded that \"each of Bear Stearns' trading desks evaluated\nprofits and risk individually, as opposed to relying on one overall firm-wide approach.\"\n131. As a result, the OIG investigators concluded that Bear Stearns reported different\nVaR numbers to OIG regulators than its traders used for their own internal hedging purposes.\n132. The OIG's conclusion is confirmed by Confidential Witness 6 (\"CW 6\") who\nreported that during his work as a model valuator at Bear, traders were able to override risk\nmanager marks and enter their own, more generous, marks for some assets directly into the\nmodels used for valuation and risk management. Traders did this by manipulating inputs into\nBear Stearns WITS system, which was the repository for raw \n... [truncated, 2139 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/45 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=45]", "char_count": 2139}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 47 of 347\nforeclosure history. Traders did so to alter the value of pools of loans to enhance their profit and\nloss positions at the end of the day.\n133. The OIG's expert also pointed out that the Company's risk managers sat at the\nsame desks as the traders, an arrangement that reduces and potentially eliminates the\nindependence of the risk management function. This finding is consistent with the statements of\nCW 6, who asserted that that when there was a dispute regarding the value of assets traded, Phil\nLombardo, the head of Bear Stearns' fixed income trading desk, would prevail over risk\nmanagers because of his close relationship with upper management.\n134. The 2008 OIG Report reveals other ways in which risk management\nresponsibilities at Bear Stearns had been co-opted by the traders. TM memoranda reflected that\nthe risk management department was persistently understaffed, and that the head of the\nCompany's model review program \"had difficulty communicating with senior managers in a\nproductive manner.\" The OIG viewed this as an indicator that the Company's risk managers\nwere telling its traders something they did not want to hear-that they were taking on too much\nrisk.\n135. The 2008 OIG Report asserts that the reins on the Company's trading desks were\nloosened even further in March of 2007 with the resignation of the beleaguered head of model\nreview at the Company. According to the 2008 OIG Report, this vacuum in risk management\ngave trading desks more power over risk managers. The Inspector General found that by the\ntime a new risk manager arrived in the summer of 2007, the department was in a shambles, and\nrisk managers were operating in \"crisis mode.\"\n22\n32\nEFTA00316760\n", "char_count": 1762}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 48 of 347\n136. Indeed, according to CW 5, by October of 2007, just five months before the\nCompany's collapse, \"the entire model valuation team had evaporated, except for one remaining\nanalyst.\"\nF.\nBear Stearns Hides its Mounting Exposure to Loss\n137. The Company's huge exposure to loss in the housing market, combined with its\nmisleading valuation and risk models, were to have terrible consequences for investors. During\nthe Class Period, as the housing market underlying the bulk of the Company's business began a\ntitanic decline, the Company used its misleading models to inflate asset values and revenues and\nto offer the public artificially low calculations of its Value at Risk.\n1.\nEarly Warnings\n138. The collapse in the housing market in late 2006 and 2007 did not come as a\nsurprise to Bear Stearns.\n139. Beginning in early 2006, record numbers of subprime loans began to go bad as\nborrowers failed to make even their first payment (\"First Payment Default\" or \"FPD\"), or failed\nto make their first three payments (\"Early Payment Default\" or \"EPD\"). These defaults were not\ncaused by higher resetting rates, which were still one to three years off, but instead indicated\nborrower inability to pay even the initial, low teaser rates.\n140. During 2005, only one in every 10,000 subprime loans experienced an FPD.\nDuring the first half of 2006, the FPD rate had risen by a multiple of 31; nationwide, about 31.5\nout of every 10,000 subprime loans originated between January and June 2006 had a delinquency\non its first monthly payment, according to Loan Performance, a subsidiary of First American\nReal Estate Solutions.\n33\nEFTA00316761\n", "char_count": 1699}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 49 of 347\n141. Bear Stearns was well aware of the growth in EPDs. In April of 2006, Bear\nStearns' EMC Mortgage, reputed to be a primary EPD enforcer, sued subprime originator\nMortgage IT over approximately $70 million in EPD buyback demands.\n142. Just a month later, in May of 2006, the California Association of Realtors lowered\nexpectations for California home sales from a 2% decline (2006 sales vs. 2005 sales) to a 16.8%\ndecline.\n143. In the same period, disasters in a U.K. subsidiary brought home to the Company\nthe threat posed by lax underwriting standards to the values of its mortgages and mortgage-\nbacked assets. Between April and June of 2006, the Company faced repeated crises in its United\nKingdom subsidiary as a result of poor performance of U.K. loans due to weak underwriting\nstandards. As a result, the Company was left holding some $1.5 billion in unsecuritized whole\nloans and commitments from this subsidiary. According to Confidential Witness 7 (\"CW 7\"), a\nformer head of model valuation at Bear Stearns at the time, top management at Bear Stearns\nwere deeply concerned about the U.K. developments and defendant Spector personally made\ncalls to investigate the crisis.\n144. Given the lax underwriting practices for the loans it packaged into CDOs and its\ncareless standards for purchasing loans from other originators, there was every reason for\nCompany management to believe that similar catastrophes awaited it in the United States.\nHowever, as the 2008 OIG Report points out, the Company did not \"use this experience to add a\nmeltdown of the subprime market to its risk scenarios.\"\n145. In May of 2006, after recent data demonstrated dramatically slowing sales, the\nhighest inventory of unsold homes in decades, and stagnant home prices, the chief economist for\n34\n=4\nEFTA00316762\n", "char_count": 1865}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 50 of 347\nthe National Association of Realtors (\"NAR\") - a long-time advocate of the \"soft landing\"\nschool - admitted that “hard landings\" in certain markets were probable.\n146. The monthly year-over-year data provided by the NAR showed that by August\n2006, year-over-year home prices had in fact declined - for the first time in 11 years. In fact,\nsales of existing homes were down 12.6% in August from a year earlier, and the median price of\nhomes sold dropped 1.7% over that period. Sales of new homes were down 17.4% in August of\n2006.\n147.\nAs 2006 progressed, evidence of the deflation of the housing bubble was\neverywhere. Data aggregated in the NAR's monthly statistical reports on home sales activity,\nhome sales prices, and home sales inventory revealed (1) accelerating declines in the numbers of\nhomes sold during 2006, which continued and deepened throughout 2007; (2) steadily decreasing\nyear-over-year price appreciation in early 2006, no year-over-year price appreciation by June\n2006, and nationwide year-over-year price declines beginning in August 2006 and continuing\nthereafter; and (3) steadily rising amounts of unsold home \"inventory,\" expressed in the form of\nthe number of months it would take to sell off that inventory, rising 50% by August of 2006 and\ndoubling by late 2007.\n148. By the end of 2006, EPD rates for 2006 subprime mortgages had risen to ten\ntimes the mid-2006 FPD rate; 3% of all 2006 subprime mortgages were going bad immediately.\nThe 2006 subprime mortgages from First Franklin Financial, Long Beach Savings, Option One\nMortgage Corporation and Countrywide Financial had EPD rates of approximately 2%; those\noriginated by Ameriquest, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, New Century and WMC\nMortgage had EPD rates of 3-4%; and those originated by Fremont General had EPD rates\n35\n55\nEFTA00316763\n", "char_count": 1891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 51 of 347\nhigher than 5%. See Moody's Investors Service, 2006 Review and 2007 Outlook: Home Equity\nABS, January 22, 2007, p. 12 at Figure 14.\n2.\nBear Stearns' Deception Begins\n149. Despite this inescapable evidence of a rapid decline in housing prices, by the time\nof its September 2006 presentation to TM personnel, Bear Stearns had still failed to revise the\nvaluation and risk models that it knew to be outmoded and inaccurate. This was not an\noversight.\n150. On December 14, 2006, Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its fourth\nquarter and fiscal year end results for 2006, which closed on November 30, 2006.³ The release\nreported diluted earnings per share of $4.00 for the fourth quarter ended November 30, 2006, up\n38% from $2.90 per share for the fourth quarter of 2005, ending November 30, 2005. It also\nstated that its net income for the fourth quarter of 2006 was $563 million, up 38% from $407\nmillion for the fourth quarter of 2005.\n151. The Company was only able to achieve these results by using valuation models\nthat ignored declining housing prices and rising default rates. By using these inaccurate models\nthe Company avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets, increasing its revenues and earnings per\nshare and falsely inflating the value of its stock.\n152. During a press conference on December 14, 2006, defendant Molinaro fielded\nquestions from analysts about the Company's exposure to the growing subprime crisis. Jeff\nHarte, an analyst at Sandler O'Neill, asked Molinaro whether the increased defaults threatened to\nmake the securitization of those mortgages, which were increasingly being originated by Bear\nStearns, a risky business. Molinaro responded \"Well, I don't - no, it doesn't. Because\n3\nThe Company's fiscal year ran from December 1 to November 30.\n36\nEFTA00316764\n", "char_count": 1869}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 52 of 347\nessentially we're originating and securitizing.\" Molinaro's statement was false, in that the\nCompany faced dangerous exposure through both the retained CDO tranches it kept on its books\nand the agreements it maintained with counterparties and CDOS.\n153. As a result of the Company's artificially inflated results and the false assurances\nby Molinaro, the Company's stock rose by $4.07, closing at $159.96.\n154. As the mortgage crisis worsened, the scope of the problems with subprime\nmortgages was reflected in two indices that closely tracked the markets for nonprime mortgages.\nThe ABX index, launched in January of 2006, and the TABX index, introduced in February of\n2007, synthesized subprime mortgage performance, refinancing opportunities, and housing price\ndata into efficient market valuation of CDOs' primary assets - subprime RMBS tranches, via the\nABX - and of Mezzanine CDO tranches, via the TABX. These indices provided observable\nmarket indicators of CDO value.\n155. In fact, The Bank of International Settlements has observed that \"ABX price\ninformation also seems to have been widely used by banks and other investors as a tool for\nhedging and trading as well as for gauging valuation effects on subprime mortgage portfolios\nmore generally.\"\n156. In February of 2007, the ABX index, which tracks CDOs on certain risky\nsubprime loans (those rated BBB), materially declined. According to Market Watch, in early\nFebruary, the ABX Index was above 90. Then, the index had declined from 72.71 on\nFebruary 22, 2007, to 69.39 on February 23, 2007. An ABS strategist at RBS Greenwich Capital\ncommented in a Market Watch article dated February 23, 2007 stated that \"ABX needs\nprotection sellers badly... Real (not perceived) problems in select mortgage pools and in the\n37\nEFTA00316765\n", "char_count": 1858}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 53 of 347\nsubprime mortgage lending industry do not make for an ideal fundamental opportunity at this\ntime.\"\n157.\nFurther, immediately upon launch TABX tranches materially declined, indicating\nthat the value of many CDOs had plunged. As depicted in the chart below, the Senior TABX\nTranche dropped from a price of nearly 100 in mid-February 2007, to around 85 by the end of\nFebruary 2007. Indeed, the TABX continued to fall significantly in the months after February\n2007, also as shown in the chart below reflecting historical TABX data from Markit Group of\nLondon.\n100\n90\n80\n80\n70\n60\n50\n40\n30\n20\n10\nTABX HE.BBB-07-1 06-20-5\nTABX HE BBB-07-1 06-25-10\nTABX.HE.BBB-07-1 06-2 10-15\nTABX HE.BBB-07-1 06-2 15-25\nTABX.HE.BBB-07-1 06-225-40\nTABX.HE.BBB-07-1 06-240-100\n0\n! ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀ ⠀\n158.\nBear Stearns was aware of these declines because it was one of the 16 licensed\nmarket makers for the ABX and TABX. The changes indicated that the exceptionally risky\ntranches of CDOs that the Company kept on its books as retained interests were rapidly losing\nvalue. Because these assets were highly leveraged, their loss in value had serious repercussions\nfor the Company.\n38\nEFTA00316766\n", "char_count": 1272}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 54 of 347\n159.\nEven as the indices tracking subprime performance began to crater, the Company\nembarked on an aggressive expansion of its subprime business. On February 12, 2007, the\nCompany completed its acquisition of ECC, a major originator of subprime loans.\n160. Bear Stearns knew that investors would flee if they found out that the Company\nwas failing to undertake any meaningful assessment of its exposure to risk while it aggressively\nexpanded its exposure to subprime losses.\n161. Accordingly, in its Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, filed February 13, 2007, the\nCompany reported reassuringly low VaR numbers, including an aggregate risk of just $28.8\nmillion - far lower than its peers. This statement was wildly misleading, in that the Company\nknew that its VaR modeling failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices and rising\ndefault rates.\n162. Bear Stearns also asserted, \"The Company regularly evaluates and enhances such\nVaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.\" In fact, the Company had\nundertaken no such review, and had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that its\nVaR models were inaccurate and out of date.\n163. The Company also asserted that it marked all positions to market on a daily basis\nand independently verified its inventory pricing. It assessed the value of its Level 3 assets as\n$12.1 billion.\n164. These statements were materially misleading, in that the Company knew that the\nmodels it used to value its Level 3 mortgage-backed assets were badly out of date and did not\nreflect crucial data about housing prices and default rates. It also knew that its hamstrung risk\nmanagers had little power to provide any independent review of these figures.\n39\nEFTA00316767\n", "char_count": 1802}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 55 of 347\n165. Because the Company was failing to take appropriate losses on its Level 3 assets,\nthe revenues and earnings per share it reported in its 2006 Form 10-K were false and misleading,\nartificially inflating the value of its stock.\n166. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro executed a certification of these statements,\nannexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing, stating that they had put in place disclosure\ncontrols and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the Company's filings, and that they had:\nDesigned such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such\ndisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our\nsupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the\nregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known\nto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period\nin which this report is being prepared.\n167. Accordingly, at the time the Company filed its Form 10-K for 2006, Defendants\nCayne and Molinaro had taken care to inform themselves of the Company's improper risk\nmanagement and valuation practices, and knew the harmful consequences this deception would\nhave on investors. Moreover, the SEC had reported its findings regarding the Company's\ndeficient models to Molinaro's immediate subordinate, Farber.\n168. The Company's artificially low VaR numbers stood in sharp contrast to the risk\nexposures that many of its peers were reporting during the housing crisis. For the first half of\n2007, as other investment banks with substantial subprime holdings saw their VaR figures\nincrease dramatically in tandem with rising problems in the housing market, Bear Stearns'\nreported VaR remained virtually unchanged and much lower than peers.\n40\n40\nEFTA00316768\n", "char_count": 1787}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "USD (millions)\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 56 of 347\n400\n350\n300\n250\n200\n150\n100\n50\n0\nOct-06\nJan-07\nAverage Daily Value-at-Risk\nApr-07\nAug-07\nNov-07\nCitiGroup\nGoldman Sachs\nLehman Brothers\nBear Stearns\nSources: Company 10-K's and 10-Q's. The reported quarterly average of daily value-at-risk amounts is used.\nFeb-08\n169. Bear Stearns' deception about its risk exposure had the desired effect, as analysts\ncovering the Company took note of its remarkably low VaR numbers. In a February 9, 2007 pre-\nfiling comment, Credit Suisse analysts Susan Roth Katzke and Ross Seiden stated that Bear\nStearns “[m]anagement will continue to invest to grow revenues via new products and new\ngeographies, rather than increasing VaR (the latter has been the most stable amongst peers).\"\n(Emphasis added.)\n170.\nIn a February 14, 2007 report, the same analysts were again struck by the\nCompany's apparently rising revenues and low exposure to risk, observing:\nVaR and Revenue Growth; RoE and Book Value... Tying these\nelements together with valuation leads us to the conclusion that\nBear ought to be a lower risk play in the brokerage group. From a\nbusiness perspective, note that Bear's revenue growth has kept\npace with peers, with far less VaR.\n41\nEFTA00316769\n", "char_count": 1273}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 57 of 347\n171.\nAs a result of the Company's continuing misrepresentations about its 2006 results\nand its VaR exposure, its stock rose $5.71 on February 14, 2007, to close at $165.81.\n172. Three weeks later the Credit Suisse analysts were still touting the Company's\nstrong revenue growth and unusually low VaR numbers. In a March 5, 2007 report on the\nCompany, they reported that:\nNot only has revenue growth been equal to or better than peers, the\nvolatility of the revenue stream has been lower. This lower level\nof revenue (and earnings) volatility is consistent with Bear\nStearns' less aggressive principal/proprietary trading posture-\nless VaR and lower loss rates.\nWhat's driven above-average equities revenue growth for Bear\nStearns? Best we can tell, it's the combination of hedge fund\nclient focus, personnel upgrades, and a somewhat increased capital\ncommitment. How much capital? Judging by the relatively low\nlevel of VaR committed to the business, we think Bear's\nwillingness to use capital is still quite limited.\n173. Less than two weeks later, on March 15, 2007, the Company issued a press\nrelease touting its results for the first quarter of 2007. The press release provided, in relevant\npart, the following:\nThe Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported\nearnings per share (diluted) of $3.82 for the first quarter ended\nFebruary 28, 2007, up 8% from $3.54 per share for the first quarter\nof 2006. Net income for the first quarter of 2007 was $554\nmillion, up 8% from $514 million for the first quarter of 2006. Net\nrevenues were $2.5 billion for the 2007 first quarter, up 14% from\n$2.2 billion in the 2006 first quarter.\n174. The Company knew these results were false and misleading because the\nencouraging revenue growth and earnings per share it reported were made possible by the fact\nthat Bear Stearns relied on misleading valuation models. These models failed to reflect the\ndeclining value of its highly ill\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/56 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=56]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 58 of 347\n175.\nThe Company followed up the release with an even more deceptive conference\ncall. On March 15, 2007, Bear Stearns held its first quarter 2007 earnings conference call,\nconducted by the Company's CFO, defendant Molinaro. When Molinaro was asked by a caller\nwhether he saw any trends in the Company's Value at Risk, Molinaro stated that there would be\n\"No real change. Should be about the same.\" Molinaro, as CFO of the Company, knew at the\ntime that the Company had been repeatedly warned by the SEC that its VaR numbers did not\nreflect omnipresent indicators of a rapidly declining housing market.\n176. Molinaro had to parry more questions during the March 15, 2007 call from\nanalysts regarding the Company's subprime exposure. An analyst asked, \"[D]id you take any\nwrite downs during the quarter and do you expect to as conditions have worsened?\" Molinaro\nresponded that the subprime market was a small part of Bear Stearns' overall business, and the\nCompany had reduced the number of subprime mortgages it was purchasing and securitizing.\nMolinaro failed to explain that the Company was avoiding writing down its illiquid subprime-\nbacked assets only by using inaccurate models to value them.\n177. Molinaro also stated in the March 15, 2007 call that the Company was well-\nhedged in the market for subprime-backed securities. Because Molinaro understood that the\nVaR numbers the Company relied upon to calculate hedging ratios did not take housing market\ndeterioration into account, he knew that these assurances were misleading.\n178. In fact, Molinaro actually boasted that the worsening outlook for housing would\nonly increase the number of subprime-backed CDOs the Company would acquire.\nI think that the more likely scenario is there is going to be in\ndislocations like this, there's likely to be large bulk sales of assets,\nand certainly given the trouble that many companies have faced\nwith their sub prime portfolios, the\n... [truncated, 2132 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/57 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=57]", "char_count": 2132}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 59 of 347\n179.\nAs a result of these deceptions the Company's quarterly results sent its stock up\nby $2.10, to close at $148.50.\n180.\nOn April 9, 2007, Bear Stearns filed its Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended\nFebruary 28, 2007. In it, Defendants made various representations concerning Bear Stearns' risk\nmanagement and mortgage-related operations. The Company asserted, inter alia, that it valued\nits Level 3 assets using \"internally developed models or methodologies utilizing significant\ninputs that are generally less readily observable from objective sources.\"\n181. However, the Company did not disclose that it knew that the models it was using\nfor this valuation were outdated and inaccurate, and that it made no effort to review and update\nits valuation models.\n182. The Company claimed that it engaged in an \"ongoing internal review of its\nvaluations\" and that \"senior management from the Risk Management and Controllers\nDepartments\" are responsible for \"ensuring that the approaches used to independently validate\nthe Company's valuations are robust, comprehensive and effective.\" In fact, the Company's risk\nmanagement department was in chaos, and its chief of model review had quit the Company less\nthan a month earlier. It also knew that no substantive review of its mortgage valuation or value\nat risk models had even been undertaken-indeed, its mortgage-backed asset valuation models\nwere more than a decade out of date.\n183. In the same filing, the Company continued to offer materially false and\nmisleading Value at Risk numbers to investors, stating that, in the midst of the worst housing\ndownturn in decades, its Value at Risk numbers had declined since the Company's last filing, to\nan aggregate level of $27.9 million, using a one-day interval and a 95% confidence level.\n44\nEFTA00316772\n", "char_count": 1872}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 60 of 347\n184.\nThe Company hastened to allay any skepticism about this strange result, insisting\nthat \"[t]he Company regularly evaluates and enhances such VaR models in an effort to more\naccurately measure risk of loss.\" It also stated that \"[t]he Company utilizes a wide variety of\nmarket risk management methods, including trading limits; marking all positions to market on a\ndaily basis; daily profit and loss statements; position reports; daily risk highlight reports; aged\ninventory position reports; and independent verification of inventory pricing.\"\n185. These statements were false and misleading, in that the Company had been\nrepeatedly informed by the SEC that its VaR modeling did not reflect key market risks.\nMoreover, the Company knew that it had made no effort to review or update these defective\nmodels, and that its risk managers had no power to constrain the Company's trading desk.\n186. The first quarter 2007 10-Q also stated that the Company's net revenues for\nCapital Markets increased 15.4% to $1.97 billion for the 2007 quarter and that its total assets at\nFebruary 28, 2007 increased to $394.5 billion from $350.4 billion at November 30, 2006. These\nstatements were false and misleading, because the Company only avoided taking losses on its\nLevel 3 assets by using improper valuation models. This avoidance of loss permitted the\nCompany to increase its revenues and asset values, inflating the value of its stock.\n187. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro once again certified these statements, stating that\nthey had made efforts to ensure the accuracy of the Company's reporting and the reliability of its\ninternal controls. Unbeknownst to Bear Stearns' investors, the scale of the Company's deception\nwas about to get much larger.\nG.\nThe Implosion of the Hedge Funds\n188. The rapid decline in the subprime mortgage market in early 2007 had devastating\nconsequences for the Hedge Funds, which were heavily laden with subpri\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/59 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=59]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102\nFiled 02/27/09 Page 61 of 347\nimplosion of the Hedge Funds contributed directly to the even larger crisis that would befall Bear\nStearns just months later.\n189. As subprime mortgage risks materialized and subprime mortgage performance\ndeteriorated during late 2006 and early 2007, the prices fetched by subprime loans on the\nsecondary market (i.e., the prices obtained by securitizers such as Bear Stearns) fell. The end\nresult was that by March of 2007 subprime origination had almost entirely collapsed.\n190. On February 8, 2007, HSBC, the largest originator of subprime loans during\n2006, raised its subprime loan loss reserves to $10.6 billion to cover anticipated losses from its\nsubprime lending. During a February 8, 2007 conference call, HSBC officials explained that\nARM resets were set to explode, and that subprime borrowers likely would not be able to make\ntheir payments when their rates rise. Not surprisingly, HSBC also announced plans to cut back\non further subprime lending and to eliminate all stated income lending.\n191. HSBC's February 2007 announcement proved to be a turning point in the\nindustry. The announcement made the scale of subprime risks widely apparent, and precipitated\nfurther and severe contraction in subprime origination. Moreover, it caused indices tracking the\nsecurities backed by subprime mortgages to fall precipitously.\n192. As the indices fell, capital rapidly receded from the subprime industry. With that\nwithdrawal of capital, securitizers such as Bear Stearns found themselves increasingly unable to\nsell the subprime mortgages they repackaged to investors. The decreased demand for RMBS and\nCDOs created a chain reaction. Because the demand for RMBS and CDOs was decreasing,\nsecuritizer demand for subprime mortgages (to turn into RMBS) and for subprime RMBS (to\nturn into CDOS) was decreasing. Because securitizer demand for subprime mortgages was\ndecreasing, subprime mortgage origination itself decreased.\n46\nEF\n... [truncated, 2011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/60 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=60]", "char_count": 2011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 62 of 347\n193.\nRather than explain these difficult market conditions to investors, BSAM\nmisrepresented the Hedge Funds' subprime exposure to hedge fund investors in \"Preliminary\nPerformance Profiles\" (\"PPP\"). For example, in monthly PPPs, BSAM represented that only 6-\n8% of the Hedge Funds' assets were invested in subprime RMBS. However, unknown to the\nHedge Funds' investors and the market, BSAM was only disclosing the Hedge Funds' direct\nsubprime RMBS holdings. In fact, the Hedge Funds held tremendous amounts of subprime\nRMBS indirectly through the CDOs it had purchased.\n194. The Hedge Funds' large and undisclosed exposure to subprime assets placed\nenormous stress on the Hedge Funds as the subprime mortgage crisis accelerated. Returns in the\nsubprime CDOs, and CDOs backed by slices of other CDOs, termed CDO-squares, diminished,\nthus creating diminishing yield spreads, leading to accelerating losses for the Hedge Funds. As a\nresult, the High Grade Enhanced Fund experienced its first negative return in February 2007.\n195. In an email dated March 1, 2007, Cioffi told BSAM managers not to \"talk about\n[the February results] to anyone or I'll shoot you...I can't believe anything has been this bad.\"\n196. Declines in the High Grade Hedge Fund soon followed, resulting in its first\nnegative return in March of 2007.\n197. Because Bear Stearns had effectively bankrolled the Hedge Funds by giving them\nhuge sums of cash in exchange for their subprime-backed collateral, the Hedge Funds' crisis had\nserious implications for the Company. Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant Spector, Bear\nStearns' Co-President, directly oversaw the Hedge Funds and understood the gravity of their\nsituation, his CFO Molinaro denied the existence of any trouble.\n198. On a March 15, 2007 conference call with analysts, Molinaro was asked “[c]an\nyou give any insight about whether you've seen or had issues with margin calls or any kind of\n47\nEFTA0031\n... [truncated, 2005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/61 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=61]", "char_count": 2005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 63 of 347\ndifficulties in hedgefund-land given how volatile the Markets have been the last few weeks?” In\nresponse, Molinaro said that Bear Stearns' hedge funds were having no issues with margin calls:\n\"We haven't seen any difficulties. I would say it's been, obviously there's a lot of market\nvolatility but we've had no difficulties there.\"\n199. In making this statement, Molinaro not only misrepresented the crisis facing the\nHedge Funds, but failed to disclose Bear Stearns' exposure to the declining value of the\nsubprime-backed Hedge Fund assets it held as collateral on its own books.\n200. The Hedge Funds' situation continued to deteriorate throughout the Spring of\n2007. On April 19, 2007, Matthew M. Tannin, Chief Operating Officer of the Hedge Funds,\nreviewed a credit model that showed increasing losses on subprime linked assets. Tannin agreed\nwith the model's assessment and, in a April 22, 2007 e-mail stated:\nIF we believe the runs [the analyst] has been doing are\nANYWHERE CLOSE to accurate I think we should close the\nFunds now. The reason for this is that if [the runs] are correct then\nthe entire subprime market is toast... If AAA bonds are\nsystematically downgraded then there is simply no way for us to\nmake money-ever.\"\n201. Tannin concluded that \"caution would lead us to conclude the [CDO report] is\nright and we're in bad shape.\" On May 13, 2007, Tannin reiterated to another BSAM manager\nthat \"I think [the Enhanced Leverage Hedge Fund] has to be liquidated.\"\n202. Bear Stearns had much to fear in a liquidation of the Hedge Funds. A forced \"fire\nsale\" of the thinly traded CDOs held by the Hedge Funds could compel the Company to\nacknowledge the huge declines in value in the subprime-backed assets it already held as\ncollateral and as retained interests, and would also reveal the fact that the Company had been\ngrossly overvaluing its Level 3 assets. To avoid this, the Company became involved in an\nintense effor\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/62 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=62]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 64 of 347\n203. Defendant Spector, Bear Stearns' Co-President, personally made the decision to\nextend a line of credit to the High Grade Hedge Fund. He decided to let the High Grade\nEnhanced Fund fail, because its high leverage ratios left it virtually unsalvageable. The purpose\nof the facility was to allow the High Grade Hedge Fund to liquidate in an orderly way by\ngradually selling assets into the market without having other assets seized by repurchase\nagreements counterparties, who would mark the assets to their true value.\n204. In the midst of this turmoil, on June 14, 2007, Bear Stearns issued a press release\nregarding its second quarter 2007 results. In it, the Company continued to hide its mounting\nlosses on Level 3 assets, permitting it to misrepresent its revenues and earnings per share.\n205. On June 22, 2007, Bear Stearns announced that it was entering into a $3.2 billion\nsecuritized financing agreement with the High Grade Hedge Fund in the form of a collateralized\nrepurchase agreement. In exchange for lending the funds, Bear Stearns received as collateral\nCDOs backed by subprime mortgages allegedly worth between $1.7 to $2 billion. Pursuant to\nthe agreement, Bear Stearns gave up the right to collect all of the upside in the event that the\ncollateral saw a miraculous increase in value.\n206. During a Friday, June 22, 2007 conference call arranged to explain the bailout,\nDefendant Molinaro, the CFO of Bear Stearns, took pains to explain that the Hedge Funds'\nproblems with their subprime-backed assets did not extend to the securities that Bear Stearns\nitself held. Molinaro failed to disclose that even prior to the bailout, Bear Stearns held large\namounts of the Hedge Funds' toxic debt as collateral. Moreover, by virtue of the bailout, Bear\nStearns had just taken on an enormous amount more of the same illiquid and devalued securities.\n207. During the June 22, 2007 conference call, Molinaro was asked \"To wh\n... [truncated, 2123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/63 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=63]", "char_count": 2123}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 65 of 347\nare such a big player in the mortgage market? I mean you have had the subprime problem for\nmore than three months now. Are there other trigger events we should pay attention to over the\nnext year?\" Molinaro responded with the following:\nWell [] I don't know that it's causing us to have any different point\nof view on the activities in our mortgage business. Our mortgage\nbusiness has basically been not affected by this and has not really\nbeen a part of this situation. So our mortgage business continues\nto operate in a very effective way. Albeit in a more in a lower\nvolume environment and a more difficult operating environment\ngiven the macro picture in the marketplace.\nAs it relates to our Asset Management division, we feel that we\nhave adequate controls in place. Obviously if you have a problem\nlike this, you are going to reassess those controls and look to\nstrengthen them. But I think the simple point in this Fund is that or\nthese two Funds, they are invested in an asset class that went\nthrough a period of severe distress.\n208. During the same June 22, 2007 conference call, an analyst asked Molinaro for his\ncurrent sense of the broader impact of the losses being experienced by the BSAM funds.\nMolinaro stated:\nWell, I think clearly when you have a situation like this; it puts a\nlot of pressure on asset values and spreads in the marketplace.\nThat's undoubtedly happening. I'm not expecting any material\nimpact from that, at least as it relates to ourselves, can't speak to\nthe broader market. We're not seeing any material difficulties in\nrepo lines or in counterparties who are having difficulty away\nfrom this meeting margin requirements. So, I would say, at least\nfrom our perspective, at the moment it appears to be relatively\ncontained.\n(Emphasis added.)\n209. During the June 22, 2007 call, Mike Mayo, an analyst at Deutsche Bank, asked\nhow Bear Stearns valued the collateral that it had received from the Hed\n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/64 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=64]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 66 of 347\nwe're seeing from our street counterparties.\" In fact, the market for such securities had become\nhighly illiquid, providing no basis for Molinaro's statements.\n210. On June 25, 2007, market reaction to the news of Bear Stearns' bailout of the\nHigh Grade Fund was sharply negative. Investors, fearing that the collapse of the Hedge Funds\nreflected on the Company's own exposure, sent Bear Stearns' stock down by $4.65, to close at\n$139.10.\n211. The next day, June 26, 2007, defendant Cayne assured investors that \"we see no\nmaterial change in our risk profile or counterparty exposure as a result of the reaction in the\nmarketplace regarding the situation surrounding these hedge funds.\" The Company's share\nprices increased as a result. Cayne's statement was materially false and misleading, in that the\nCompany had effectively taken onto its books billions of dollars of worthless subprime-backed\ncollateral, causing its risk exposure to grow enormously.\n212. According to Bear Stearns, by the end of June 2007, asset sales had reduced the\nloan balance to $1.345 billion, but the estimated value of the collateral securing the loan, the\nHigh Grade Hedge Fund's compromised CDOs, had deteriorated by nearly $350 million—that\nis, to approximately the value of the loan Bear Stearns had given the High Grade Hedge Fund.\nBecause the High Grade Hedge Fund had no other assets, any further declines in the value of the\nassets that Bear Stearns held as collateral would be borne directly by Bear Stearns.\n213. The 2008 OIG Report concluded that, given these circumstances, the Company\nshould have taken this collateral onto its own books and taken an immediate charge against net\ncapital. Instead of immediately reflecting its assumption of the declining collateral onto its\nbooks, the Company delayed for months. By doing so, the OIG stated, Bear Stearns was able \"to\ndelay taking a huge hit to capital.\"\n51\nEFTA00316779\n", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 67 of 347\n214. On July 18, 2007, Bear Stearns informed investors in the Hedge Funds that they\nwould get little money back after \"unprecedented declines\" in the value of AAA rated securities\nused to bet on subprime mortgages. According to the Company, estimates showed there was\n\"effectively no value left\" in the High Grade Enhanced Fund and \"very little value left\" in the\nHigh Grade Fund, Bear Stearns said in a two-page letter.\n215. Accordingly, the more than $1.3 billion in collateral drawn from the Hedge Funds\nsubprime-backed assets that the Company had effectively taken onto its books by assuming the\nassets as collateral just a month earlier was nearly worthless as well. Despite this fact, the\nCompany did not reveal the enormous losses that it was absorbing.\n216. According to internal credit memoranda reviewed by the OIG, Bear Stearns\nultimately did take much of the High Grade Fund's remaining collateral onto its books--but did\nnot make the actual book entries until some time in the fall of 2007, months after the losses were\nactually incurred by the Company. As set out below, the Company ultimately only wrote off a\nfraction of the worthless collateral it held that it had valued at $1.3 billion.\nH.\nRepercussions of the Hedge Funds' Implosion\n217. The implosion of the two Hedge Funds reverberated through both the financial\nmarkets and the Company's senior management.\n218. In the wake of Bear Stearns' assumption of billions of dollars of Hedge Fund\ncollateral through the bailout, Bear Stearns' lenders increasingly questioned the true extent of the\nCompany's exposure to loss. As a result, they became unwilling to supply the Company the vast\namounts of cash it needed to finance its daily operations and interest payments. The 2008 OIG\nReport explained that the market no longer perceived the Company \"to be sufficiently capitalized\nto justify extensive unsecured lending. In this sense, Bear Stearns was not adequately\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/66 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=66]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 68 of 347\n219.\nAs set out in the 2008 OIG Report, Bear Stearns' declining ability to obtain\nunsecured financing meant that the Company had a strong incentive to lower capital costs by\nraising new equity capital, making the Company a safer bet for lenders offering unsecured\nfinancing. However, instead of raising new capital, the Company steadily shifted its funding\nmodel from unsecured to secured financing, using its mortgage-backed assets as collateral. In\nMay of 2007, Bear Stearns' short term borrowing was 60% secured. Just four months later, in\nSeptember of 2007, it was 74% secured. By March of 2008 it was 83% secured.\n220. Bear Stearns' principal source of secured financing was the market for repurchase\nor \"repo\" agreements. By the end of the Class Period, Bear Stearns was funding its $50 billion\ndaily needs by using 71% of its risky mortgage-backed assets as collateral for repo agreements.\n221. Given that the Company's mortgage-backed assets were serving to prop up the\ncash needs of the entire Company, Bear Stearns literally could not afford to reveal that they were\nrapidly losing value.\n222. Even financing through repo agreements was becoming difficult for the Company\nto secure. Bear Stearns' repo agreement counterparties were increasingly suspicious that they\nwere being duped about the value of the CDOs that the Company was using as collateral. As a\nresult, the 2008 OIG Report states that mark disputes between Bear Stearns and its counterparties\nbecame more common beginning in the summer of 2007.\n223. A mark dispute can occur when two parties to a repo agreement disagree about\nthe value of the collateral. If a lender believes that the collateral posted in a repo agreement has\nlost value, it can make a \"margin call\" on the borrower, demanding more collateral or a return of\npart or all of the money loaned.\n53\nEFTA00316781\n", "char_count": 1914}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 69 of 347\n224.\nThe 2008 OIG Report revealed that, during July of 2007, shortly after the Hedge\nFund bailout, Bear Stearns told the SEC that there were two large dealers with whom it had mark\ndisputes that were in excess of $100 million each.\n225. Because Bear Stearns knew that its assets were overvalued, it was frequently\nobliged to settle these disputes by paying money to its repo counterparties. However, the\nCompany could not afford to reveal that its mortgage-backed collateral was rapidly declining in\nvalue. Accordingly, Bear Stearns continued to carry the assets on its books at full value even\nwhile conceding to its counterparties that the value of the collateral had declined.\n226. The 2008 OIG Report states that \"[t]here are indications in the TM memoranda\nthat Bear Stearns tended to use the traders' more generous marks for profit and loss purposes,\neven when Bear Stearns conceded to the counterparty for collateral valuation purposes.\" By\nfailing to record the assets at the lower compromise price, the Company was able to perpetuate\nits scheme to hide from investors the extent of its losses on the value of its mortgage-backed\nassets.\n227.\nDoubts about the Company's true exposure were slowly making their way to the\nmarket. On July 31, 2007, Standard & Poor's analysts downgraded the Company's stock\nbecause, among other things, \"widening credit spreads and increasing risk aversion may cause a\nslowdown in its investment banking operation.\" The Company's stock fell $6.03 as a result,\nclosing at $121.22.\n228. On August 3, 2007, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised its\noutlook on Bear Stearns from stable to negative. Notwithstanding the Company's denials, the\nratings firm explained that \"Bear Stearns has material exposure to holdings of mortgages and\nmortgage-backed securities (MBS), the valuations of which remain under severe pressure. It\n54\n=4\nEFTA00316782\n", "char_count": 1962}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 70 of 347\nalso has exposure to debt it has taken up as a result of unsuccessful leveraged finance\nunderwritings, and it has significant further underwriting commitments.\"\n229. That same day, Bear Stearns issued a press release responding to the S&P\ndowngrade:\nThe Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE: BSC) said today that it\nis disappointed with S&P's decision to change its outlook on Bear\nStearns. Most of the themes highlighted in its report are common\nto the industry and are not likely to have a disproportional impact\non Bear Stearns. S&P's specific concerns over issues relating to\ncertain hedge funds managed by BSAM are unwarranted as these\nwere isolated incidences and are by no means an indication of\nbroader issues at Bear Stearns.\n230. On the same day, Cayne and his top lieutenants arranged a conference call with\ninvestors and analysts to try to calm concerns. They did this by touting the Company's illusory\nrisk management program.\n231. After prefatory remarks by defendants Cayne and Molinaro, defendant Michael\nAlix, the Company's Chief Risk Officer, stated that \"our fixed income franchises, particularly\nour mortgage and securitization businesses, have long focused on the origination, transformation\nand redistribution of risk. We've always managed the risk in this process by adjusting the intake,\nthe origination of risk, to the demand for the end products.\" He added that \"we run risk analytics\nto demonstrate that the Firm is well protected against further deterioration in both the subprime\nand Alt-A sectors across both whole loans and all securitization tranches.\"\n232.\nIn fact, at the time of the August 3, 2007 conference call, Alix and the Company\nhad already been informed that Bear Stearns' \"risk analytics\" did not take into account crucial\ninformation on risk of default and volatility in housing prices. Moreover, as a result of the\nHedge Fund bailout, Bear Stearns had just assumed as collateral more than a \n... [truncated, 2118 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/69 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=69]", "char_count": 2118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 71 of 347\napproximately $11 billion in highly-leveraged net equity at the time, this was a very significant\nnew exposure.\n233. On August 5, 2007, in an effort to restore investor confidence in the Company's\nmanagement and to distance itself from the collapse of the hedge funds, Bear Stearns announced\na management shake-up that included the ouster of Defendant Spector. He was replaced by\nDefendant Schwartz as the Company's sole president. Defendant Molinaro became the\nCompany's Chief Operating Officer in addition to his continuing role as CFO.\n234. On September 20, 2007, Bear Stearns posted its results for the third quarter,\nending August 31, 2007 (closing stock price $108.66). It reported net income for the quarter of\n$171.3 million, or $1.16 a share, down from $438 million, or $3.02 a share, in the period a year\nearlier. Net revenue for the Company, or total revenue minus interest costs, fell 37% to $1.33\nbillion, while net revenue at the fixed-income division dropped 88%, to $118 million from $945\nmillion in the third quarter of 2006. Return on equity stood at 5.3%, compared with 16% a year\nearlier.\n235. During a conference call with analysts and investors, Molinaro said that, despite\nadverse impacts from \"losses incurred from the failure of the [in-house funds], ... our\ncounterparty exposures have been dramatically reduced and we've hedged remaining assets.\"\nWhen asked about \"collateral damage that you might have suffered on the [BSAM] business\n[following the in-house hedge funds' collapse]\", Molinaro responded that the damage \"was\nrelatively limited and we saw very few situations where clients moved their entire business ... I\nthink the crisis passed in mid-August things have returned to kind of a normal state... the worst\nis behind us there and business is normalizing and returning.\"\n56\nEFTA00316784\n", "char_count": 1892}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 72 of 347\n236.\nBear Stearns' third quarter results and Molinaro's statements were false and\nmisleading, in that they were achieved only by avoiding losses through the use of valuation\nmethods that artificially boosted the values of the Company's growing hoard of Level 3 assets.\n237. The Company explained that its declining profits were the result of diminished\nfixed-income revenue coupled with a $200 million loss from its June Hedge Fund failures. Of\nthis figure, the Company stated that only $100 million represented decline in value of the\ncollateral that the Company held as a result of the Hedge Fund bailout.\n238. This $100 million figure was a far cry from the Company's true losses due to the\nHedge Fund collapse, which had left more than a billion dollars of worthless subprime CDOs on\nthe Company's balance sheet. The Company did not disclose the full amount of its losses on the\ncollateral for fear that its lenders and counterparties would realize that it had been consistently\novervaluing its assets.\n239. The small size of the write down falsely reassured the markets about the\nCompany's exposure. In a September 20, 2007 conference call with investors, an analyst asked\n\"And - and then on the - on the $200 million writedown of the High Grade funds. That\neffectively a writedown what was last reported a $1.3 billion balance?\" Company management\nresponded:\nIt basically - Roger, two big pieces to that. About $100 million -\nit is almost split evenly. About $100 million of that is the write-off\nof our investment in the fund and the write-off of receivables that\nwe had from the funds related to predominantly related to\nmanagement and performance fees that related to 2006. And the\nbalance of that was the mark on the inventory when we closed out\nthe position.\n240. In fact, even by the Company's own estimations regarding the writedowns\nassociated with the Hedge Fund, this statement was false and misleading. The 2008 OIG R\n... [truncated, 2123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/71 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=71]", "char_count": 2123}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 73 of 347\ndown in connection with the bailout some time in the fall of 2007. The Company never\ndisclosed this additional write down to investors, for fear that it would telegraph to the market\nthe decline in the value of the other subprime-backed assets it carried on its books.\n241. On October 10, 2007, Bear Stearns filed its Form 10-Q for the quarterly period\nended August 31, 2007, which included the same misleading financial results it reported on\nSeptember 20, 2007.\n242. In addition, Defendants made various representations concerning Bear Stearns'\nrisk management. The Company stated that \"I[n] recognition of the importance the Company\nplaces on the accuracy of its valuation of financial instruments as described in the three\ncategories above, the Company engages in an ongoing internal review of its valuations.\"\n243. In fact, at the time this statement was made, the Company had been repeatedly\nwarned that its mortgage valuation models were outdated and inaccurate, but had refused to\nrevise them.\n244. The Company also stated that it \"regularly evaluates and enhances [its] VaR\nmodels in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss,\" and that its aggregate VaR was still\nonly $35 million, well below its competitors.\n245. This statements were false and misleading, in that the Company understood that\nits VaR models did not reflect key data showing declines in the housing market, and had made\nno effort to revise them.\n246. On November 14, 2007, defendant Molinaro announced that Bear Stearns would\nwrite down $1.2 billion of its assets in the fourth quarter. However, Molinaro attempted to\nreassure nervous investors by claiming that, in spite of the fact that Bear Stearns still bore more\nthan a billion dollars of subprime exposure in the form of the collateral it had received from the\n58\nEFTA00316786\n", "char_count": 1884}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 74 of 347\nfailed High Grade Fund, Bear Stearns had reduced its CDO holdings to $884 million as of\nNovember 9, down from $2.07 billion at the end of August. Molinaro claimed that during the\nperiod between August 31, 2007 and November 9, 2007, the Company significantly increased its\nshort subprime exposures—that is, its insurance against declines in the subprime market-\nreducing its reported August 31, 2007 net exposure of approximately $1 billion to a negative $52\nmillion net exposure as of November 9, 2007.\n247. During an analyst conference call held on November 14, 2007, Molinaro was\nasked what Bear Stearns was doing to \"fight back\" against \"the impact of the unprecedented\ntimes in the mortgage market compounded by fallout from the firm's mortgage hedge funds this\nsummer.\" Molinaro responded that:\nthe liquidity crisis [with the hedge funds] that did ensure during\nJuly and August did have some effect on the business.... we did\nsee some balance migration, but importantly we're seeing balance\nis coming back.... where we look at balances, currently they\nhave been basically steady from where we closed the third\nquarter at, and the business, I would say, is continuing to show\nimprovement from where we the quarter at, and we think getting\nback on track for what should be a very strong 2008.\n(Emphasis added.)\n248. Peter Goldman of Chicago Asset Management was relieved, stating that \"[w]e\ndidn't have a clear picture of their exposures. Now we do, and it's much smaller than that of its\npeers.\" Bear Stearns shares rose $2.58, or 2.6 percent, to $103.45 in New York Stock Exchange\ncomposite trading.\n249. Investors and analysts did not realize that the extent of Bear Stearns' exposure\nwas in fact far from clear. The Company still had more than a billion dollars in subprime backed\ncollateral from its Hedge Fund bailout to write down, and the Company's hedging efforts were\n59\nEFTA00316787\n", "char_count": 1963}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 75 of 347\ndoomed by its failure to use accurate models to assess risk. These secrets were becoming\nincreasingly difficult for the Company to hide.\n250. On December 20, 2007, Bear Stearns announced that it would take the first\nquarterly loss in the Company's 84-year history (quarter closing on November 30, 2007 at\n$99.70 per share). It reported that its fiscal fourth-quarter loss after paying preferred dividends\nwas $859 million, or $6.90 per share, compared to a profit of $558 million, or $4 per share, a\nyear earlier. The Company had negative net revenue of $379 million, compared to revenue of\n$2.41 billion a year earlier.\n251. These figures were false and misleading, because reported losses would have been\nfar greater but for the Company's use of misleading valuation models to inflate asset values and\nrevenues.\n252. Notwithstanding Molinaro's assurance just weeks before that the Company's\nhedging efforts had resulted in a net negative exposure to subprime assets, the Company also\nannounced on December 20, 2007 that it would write down $1.9 billion of its holdings in\nmortgages and mortgage-based securities - more than $700 million more than it had announced\non November 14, 2007.\n253. The lack of any schedule giving details regarding the nature of the write downs\nleft investors with little information about the nature of the Company's true exposure. Write\ndowns by other companies in the same period provided far more information, including the\nsource of exposure (retained interest, derivatives, commitment to provide liquidity and/or credit\nsupport, or warehoused loans and mortgage-backed securities), the type of CDOs to which they\nwere exposed (high grade, mezzanine, CDO-squared, etc.) and vintage of the subprime\nmortgages that underlie their CDO exposures.\n60\n60\nEFTA00316788\n", "char_count": 1861}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 76 of 347\n254.\nIn their write downs, Bear Stearns' peers also provided other information with a\nbearing on the creditworthiness of the exposure and the extent of write-downs taken against par\nvalue, including the amount that was hedged and how it was hedged, how the exposures were\nvalued, and the main drivers of value. The fact that Bear Stearns was withholding such key\ninformation from investors began to fuel a consensus that the Company's risk was far greater\nthan had been assumed and fanned investor anxieties about the Company.\n255. Major shareholders begin questioning Cayne's leadership. On January 8, 2008,\nthe Company announced that Cayne would step down as chief executive. However, he would\ncontinue reporting for work at Bear Stearns' headquarters, attempting to get the Company badly\nneeded funding. Cayne was replaced as CEO by defendant Schwartz.\n256. Analysts such as Punk Ziegel & Co. (\"Punk Ziegel\") saw Cayne's departure as an\nindictment of the Company's failed risk management policies.\n257. Cayne's departure only raised investors' anxiety about the Company's exposure,\nand its stock dropped nearly 7%, to close at $71.17.\nI.\nBear Stearns' Catastrophic Collapse\n258. In the weeks following Cayne's departure, Bear Stearns continued to try to\nreassure its shareholders. On February 8, 2008, the Company asserted that it had increased its\nshort subprime position from $600 million in November 2007 to $1 billion in an effort to hedge\nits trading positions in subprime mortgages. Explaining the increase, Molinaro was quoted in a\nBloomberg article as stating that one of the Company's biggest mistakes had been \"not being\nconservative enough and bearish enough on the subprime market.\" The firm has reversed \"long\"\nsubprime trades that stood at $1 billion at the end of August, Molinaro said.\n259. The market was struck by the dissonance between Molinaro's statements and the\nCompany's previous assurances that it dealt in\n... [truncated, 2059 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/75 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=75]", "char_count": 2059}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 77 of 347\nexposed to the subprime market. Punk Ziegel's Richard X. Bove (\"Bove\") was openly skeptical.\nIn a report dated February 8, 2008 he stated that:\nthe firm is marking down the value of its more questionable\nsecurities. Bear has actually gone to a net short position in its\nCDO/subprime portfolio. This latter condition is somewhat of a\nsurprise since the company has argued, for almost ever, that it does\nnot play the markets; it claims to be an agency-only company. (So\nmuch for that concept.)\n260. Bove's chagrin was shared by the Company's lenders. On March 6, 2008,\nRabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it wouldn't\nrenew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. That meant Rabobank Group was\nunlikely to renew an additional $2 billion credit agreement set to expire the following week.\n261. Moreover, analyst reports released the same day predicted that the Company's\nquarterly results would be dogged with problems stemming from its fixed income business,\nsending the Company's stock tumbling by more than $5, to close at $69.90.\n262. As a result, on Friday, March 7, 2008, the cost of credit default swaps on Bear\nStearns' debt surged.\n263. Bear Stearns again tried to stanch the market's loss of confidence with\nannouncements by senior management. In a March 10, 2008 press release the Company said that\n\"[t]here is absolutely no truth to the rumors of liquidity problems that circulated today in the\nmarket\" and suggested that the Company had some $17 billion in cash. The same day,\nDefendant Greenberg claimed during an interview with CNBC that the Company had no\nliquidity problems, calling such an assertion \"ridiculous, totally ridiculous.\"\n264. This assertion did little to quell fear, because investors knew that Bear Stearns had\n$11.1 billion in tangible equity capital supporting $395 billion in assets, a leverage ratio of more\nthan 35 to 1. Almost daily, Bear Stearns ha\n... [truncated, 2069 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/76 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=76]", "char_count": 2069}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 78 of 347\nworth of open repurchase agreements - or short term loans from Wall Street dealers - or make up\nthe difference out of its cash position.\n265. Interpreting Greenberg's announcement as a tacit admission that the Company\nfaced liquidity problems, on March 10, 2008 investors sent the Company's stock down another\n$7, to close at $62.30.\n266. The morning of March 11, 2008 saw still another blow, when Goldman Sachs'\n(\"Goldman\") credit derivatives group sent its hedge fund clients an e-mail announcement about\nBear Stearns. In previous weeks, banks such as Goldman had done a brisk business agreeing to\nstand in for nervous institutions that feared Bear Stearns could not meet its obligations on an\ninterest rate swap. But in the March 11, 2008 email, Goldman told clients that, at least\ntemporarily, it would not step in for them on Bear Stearns derivatives deals.\n267. Kyle Bass (\"Bass\") of Hayman Capital reported that he had a colleague call\nGoldman to see if it was a mistake. \"It wasn't,\" said Bass, himself a former Bear Stearns\nsalesman. \"Goldman told Wall Street that they were done with Bear, that there was [effectively]\ntoo much risk. That was the end for them.\"\n268. Hedge funds flooded Credit Suisse Group's brokerage unit with requests to take\nover trades opposite Bear Stearns. In a mass email sent out that afternoon, Credit Suisse stock\nand bond traders were told that all such \"novation\" requests involving Bear Stearns and any\nother \"exceptions\" to normal business required the approval of credit-risk managers.\n269. Bear Stearns' counterparties began to back away from the Company. Early in the\nmorning on Tuesday, March 11, 2008, ING Groep NV informed Bear Stearns that it was pulling\nabout $500 million in financing. Staffers at the Dutch bank told Bear Stearns that ING's\nmanagement \"wanted to keep their distance until the dust settled.\"\n83\n63\nEFTA00316791\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 79 of 347\n270.\nThe same day, analysts at Punk Ziegel suggested that Bear Stearns' future profits\nwere likely to be squeezed by its exposure to \"esoteric securities.\" The Company's stock\ndropped $3.75 as a result, closing at $62.97.\n271. The crisis of confidence accelerated rapidly. Bear Stearns' cost of insuring $10\nmillion of debt via credit default swaps, which had hovered near $350,000 in the month before,\nshot past $1 million. By the end of March 11, 2008, the rate was irrelevant. Banks simply\nrefused to issue any further credit protection on the Company's debt.\n272. These developments had a devastating effect on the Company's liquidity.\nLiquidity is simply the measure of an organization's ability to meet its current financial\nobligations. In banking, adequate liquidity means being able to meet the needs of depositors\nwanting to withdraw funds and borrowers wanting to be assured that their credit or cash needs\nwill be met.\n273. According to a March 20, 2008 letter from SEC Chairman Cox to the Chairman\nof the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation, on March 11, 2008, the Company's liquidity\npool stood at $15.8 billion, \"adjusted for the customer protection rule.\" By March 13, 2008,\naccording to the letter, the pool stood at $2 billion-a loss of more than $13 billion over the\ncourse of March 12, 2008.\n274. On March 12, 2008 Defendant Schwartz, Bear Stearns' CEO appeared on CNBC\nand said that the Company's liquidity position and balance sheet had not weakened at all. \"We\nfinished the year, and we reported that we had $17 billion of cash sitting at the bank's parent\ncompany as a liquidity cushion,\" he said. \"As the year has gone on, that liquidity cushion has\nbeen virtually unchanged.\" Schwartz added that \"We don't see any pressure on our liquidity, let\nalone a liquidity crisis.\"\n64\n44\nEFTA00316792\n", "char_count": 1885}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 80 of 347\n275. Schwartz's statement was false, in that the day before his assertion that the\nCompany's liquidity position was unchanged Bear Stearns' liquidity pool already had fallen to\nan adjusted level of $15.8 billion. Moreover, as Schwartz spoke on March 12, 2008, some $13\nbillion of the Company's cash was evaporating.\n276. Moreover, Schwartz specifically denied that the Company's risk had scared away\nany counterparties:\nCNBC:\nSCHWARTZ:\nCNBC:\nSCHWARTZ:\nLet me start off with this broad idea that's been in the\nmarket now for a few days and pressuring your stock.\nNamely, that counterparty risk is something - new\ncounterparty risk is something that a number of firms on\nWall Street no longer want to take in terms of dealing with\nBear Stearns. Is that true?\nNo, it's not true. We are there's a been a lot of volatility\nin the market, a lot of disruption in the market, and that's\ncausing some pressure administratively on getting some\ntrades settled up, but we're workin' hard gettin' that done.\nWe're in a constant dialogue with all of the major dealers\nand the counterparties in the Street, and we're not being\nmade aware of anybody who is not taking our credit as a\ncounterparty.\nAll right, so when I'm told by a hedge fund that I know\nwell, that last night they tried to close out a mortgage - a\ncredit protection mortgage position with Goldman Sachs\nthat they had bought a year ago, Bear was the low bid, and\nI'm told that Goldman would not accept the counterparty\nrisk of Bear Stearns. You're saying you're not aware that\nthat would be the case.\nI'm not aware that, you know, on a specific trade from one\ncounterparty to another and where you're a third-party, we\nhave direct dealings with all of these institutions, and we\nhave active markets going with each one, and our\ncounterparty risk has not been a problem.\n277. At the time he made this statement, Schwartz, as the Company's CEO, was only\ntoo well aware that ING had pull\n... [truncated, 2081 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/79 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=79]", "char_count": 2081}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 81 of 347\nonce a principal source of cash for the Company, had at least temporarily halted covering any\nmore Bear Stearns risk.\n278. Moreover, according to the 2008 OIG report, the Company informed TM on\nMarch 12, 2008, the same day as Schwartz's statement, that \"Bear Stearns paid out $1.1 billion\nin disputes to numerous counterparties in order to squelch rumors that Bear Stearns could not\nmeet its margin calls.\"\n279. Investors were cheered by Schwartz' false optimism and the decline in the\nCompany's stock value slowed, dropping only $1.39 for the day, closing at $61.58.\n280.\nIn fact, the Company's liquidity was plummeting, falling to just $2 billion on\nMarch 13, 2008.\n281. On March 13, Renaissance Technologies Corp., a major hedge fund and trading\nclient of the Company, said it was shifting more than $5 billion to Bear Stearns' competitors.\n282. On the evening of March 13, 2008 a desperate Schwartz telephoned JPMorgan\nCEO Jamie Dimon (\"Dimon\") in an effort to negotiate a rescue package.\n283. Dimon thought it was too risky for Morgan Stanley to lend the Company the $30\nbillion it needed to get through the following day, Friday. Schwartz and Dimon determined that\nBear Stearns had to be given access to the Federal Reserve's \"window,\" a credit facility available\nto the nation's commercial banks, but not to investment banks. The only way for the Federal\nReserve to give the Company access to the window was to lend JPMorgan the money, allowing\nthe bank to act as a bridge across which the Federal Reserve cash could stream into Bear Stearns.\n284. JPMorgan and Bear Stearns contemplated that the Company could get the facility\nthough JPMorgan as part of a deal in which JPMorgan bought Bear Stearns.\n66\n66\nEFTA00316794\n", "char_count": 1792}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 82 of 347\n285. On March 14, 2008 at 9 A.M., Bear Stearns announced $30 billion in funding\nprovided by JPMorgan and backstopped by the federal government.\n286. As a result, Bear Stearns' stock dropped nearly 40% in the first half-hour of\ntrading, closing at $78.47.\n287. JPMorgan dispatched 16 teams of accountants, ultimately numbering more than\n300 people, to Bear Stearns to meet with top management and assess the Company's books. On\nSaturday night, March 15, after the reports from these due diligence teams began to make their\nway back to JPMorgan management, JPMorgan's Steve Black and Doug Braunstein called\ndefendant Schwartz. They told him that, given the state of the Company's exposure, JPMorgan's\nbid for the Company's stock would be low.\n288. During the call, Black stated that “[t]he fact you're at 32 doesn't mean much at\nthis point.\" Black suggested that a JPMorgan bid might be in the range of $8 to $12 a share.\n289. By the next morning, many JPMorgan executives were getting cold feet. The\nmore they studied the securities Bear Stearns owned, the worse the Company looked. For\ninstance, Bear Stearns had initially estimated it had $120 billion in so-called risk-weighted\nassets, those that might go bad. By Sunday morning, JPMorgan executives felt the actual\nnumber was closer to $220 billion.\n290. By Sunday, March 16, JPMorgan had concluded that the deal was too risky, and\nhad informed Schwartz that they were unwilling to undertake the purchase.\n291. JPMorgan relented only upon obtaining a promise from federal officials that\ntaxpayers would foot the bill in the event that Bear Stearns defaulted on its securities. Late in the\n67\nEFTA00316795\n", "char_count": 1724}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 83 of 347\nafternoon on Sunday, it told Bear Stearns that it would purchase the Company's shares for $2 per\nshare.4\n292. The same afternoon, JPMorgan held a conference call addressing questions about\nthe offer. Analyst Guy Moszlowski of Merrill Lynch asked, \"is there some reconciliation that\nyou could give us in broad terms from the book value per share, which of course is a reported\nnumber of around $84 at last reporting, and the $2, other than the transaction related costs of $6\nbillion\"?\n293.\nMike Cavanaugh, the CFO of JPMorgan, responded:\nYes, Guy, I think that the - all I can tell you is we did extensive\nwork over a short period of time to get comfortable with putting\ntogether a transaction that made sense all around. But obviously\nlooking at our duties to JPMorgan shareholders and so the deal\nwe've lined out - laid out, didn't result in the ability to pay more\nthan the modest amount that was paid over to the Bear Stearns\nshareholders.\n294. The next day, Monday, March 17, Bear Stearns share prices tumbled to $4.81 as\nthe market learned the true state of the Company's finances, a drop of 84%.\n295. On March 24, 2008, one week after announcing its takeover deal with Bear\nStearns, JPMorgan raised its takeover offer for Bear Stearns to $10 per share, or about $2.1\nbillion, and agreed to take on the first $1 billion of Bear Stearns' losses while the Federal\nReserve guaranteed $29 billion in losses. The updated agreement also included a provision\nallowing JPMorgan to purchase 95 million newly issued shares of Bear Stearns common stock,\nor 39.5% of the Company, ahead of a shareholder vote on the acquisition deal.\n4 J.C. Flowers & Co., a leverage-buyout company, had also reviewed Bear Stearns books the same\nweekend, and made an unsuccessful proposal to buy 90% of the Company at a price between $2.00 and\n$2.60 per share.\n88\n68\nEFTA00316796\n", "char_count": 1922}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 84 of 347\n296.\nThe higher offer price reflected JPMorgan's efforts to quell shareholder\nopposition to the deal and discourage competitors. Moreover, JPMorgan had been forced to\nrenegotiate the price after it discovered that a mistake in the language of its guaranty agreement\nwith Bear Stearns obligated JPMorgan to guarantee Bear Stearns' trades even if the Company's\nshareholders voted down the acquisition deal.\nJ.\nPost Class Period Events\n297. On April 3, 2008, the United States Senate Banking Committee, chaired by\nSenator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, held hearings to discuss Bear Stearns' collapse.\nSenator Dodd disclosed that weeks before Bear Stearns' collapse he discussed with Schwartz\nwhether Bear Stearns should have access to the Federal Reserve's \"discount window\" which\nallows commercial banks (but not investment banks like Bear Stearns) access to low interest\nloans to maintain liquidity. Senator Dodd's disclosure indicated that Bear Stearns insiders,\nincluding Schwartz, were aware, weeks before investors, that Bear Stearns' liquidity was\nthreatened by its deteriorating asset values.\n298. Shareholders approved the sale to JPMorgan on May 29, 2008. Just prior to the\nvote approving the merger, Cayne apologized to shareholders for Bear Stearns' collapse. Under\nthe terms of the merger, shareholders received about $10 worth of JPMorgan shares for every\nBear Stearns share they held as of the date of the merger.\n299. After the approval of the merger, JPMorgan moved aggressively to reorganize\nBear Stearns, dismantling some of the subsidiaries most implicated in the Company's collapse.\nJPMorgan first closed down BSAM, the subsidiary responsible for the mismanagement of the\nHedge Funds and for hiding true value of the Hedge Funds' assets from investors while, in the\nprocess, soliciting additional investments. JPMorgan also did not acquire Bear Stearns\nmerchant banking unit, which was spun off into an independen\n... [truncated, 2029 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/83 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=83]", "char_count": 2029}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 85 of 347\n300. In June of 2008 the Department of Justice, through the U.S. Attorney for the\nEastern District of New York, indicted Cioffi and Tannin, both Senior Managing Directors of\nBSAM and members of BSC's Board of Directors. The indictment charged that Cioffi and\nTannin misled investors regarding the value of MBS and CDOs containing MBS owned by the\nHedge Funds.\n301. The indictment further charged that Cioffi's and Tannin's fraud caused $1.8\nbillion in losses to investors. Cioffi and Tannin were formally arrested on June 19, 2008. On the\nsame day, the SEC filed a civil complaint against Cioffi and Tannin. The allegations in the\nSEC's civil suit were similar, but also focused on Cioffi's and Tannin's attempts to solicit\nadditional contributions to the Hedge Funds when they knew the funds were failing. Both the\nindictment and the SEC complaint allege that key documents, including Cioffi's calendar and\npersonal notes that could contain incriminating evidence, were destroyed by Cioffi and Tannin\nbefore the investigation began.\n302. As of July 3, 2008 the assets of Maiden Lane, the entity holding the $30 billion in\nBear Stearns assets, had already decreased in value to $28.9 billion-almost $1.1 billion less\nthan the value given to them by Bear Stearns just several weeks earlier. By October 22, 2008,\nthe value of the assets had dropped another $2.1 billion, to $26.8 billion. All told, the assets held\nby Maiden Lane were actually worth 10.6% less than the value provided by Bear Stearns,\nanother indication that Bear Stearns' valuation methods were deeply flawed.\n303. On September 27, 2008, the SEC Inspector General's Office released a report\ndetailing Bear Stearns' misleading VaR and mortgage valuation models, as well as Bear Stearns\nmanipulation of asset values. As alleged above, the practices discovered by the SEC's Inspector\nGeneral had the effect of misleading investors about the value of the assets held on Be\n... [truncated, 2030 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/84 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=84]", "char_count": 2030}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 86 of 347\nbooks, the Bear Stearns' daily VaR and the risk involved with Bear Stearns' securitization\nbusiness model, all of which fraudulently inflated Bear Stearns' share price.\nK.\nDefendants' Fraudulent Statements Adversely\nImpacted Current and Former Company Employees\n304. Defendants' materially false and misleading statements during the Class Period,\nas described at paragraphs 589 to 794 below, defrauded certain Class Members who are or were\ncurrent and former employees of Bear Stearns, and whose compensation, in part, was in the form\nof restricted stock units (\"Restricted Stock Units\") and/or Capital Accumulation Plan units\n(\"CAP Units\") issued pursuant to the Company's Restricted Stock Unit Plan (the \"RSU Plan\")\nand Capital Accumulation Plan (the \"CAP Plan\"). The Class includes only those holders of\nRestricted Stock Units and CAP Units whose rights to either Restricted Stock Units and/or CAP\nUnits were vested, providing them a present entitlement to be paid and/or credited an equivalent\nnumber of shares of Bear Stearns common stock upon settlement at the end of a deferral period.\nThe RSU Plan\n1.\n305. Since at least 2000, the Company offered certain employees shares of its common\nstock through a Restricted Stock Unit Plan. In April of 2007 the Company explained that the\npurpose of its Restricted Stock Unit Plan was to provide stock ownership to certain employees as\nan incentive for superior performance.\n306. The Company stated in April of 2007 that Restricted Stock Units could be granted\nto or for the benefit of any employee who held the position of a managing director or below.\nEmployees who held the position of senior managing director or above were not eligible to be\ngranted awards of restricted stock under the Plan.\n307. Each Restricted Stock Unit represented a right for one share of Common Stock to\nbe delivered upon settlement at the end of a defined Deferral Period. The Company established\n71\nEFTA003\n... [truncated, 2006 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/85 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=85]", "char_count": 2006}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 87 of 347\nand maintained an account for the participant to record Restricted Stock Units and transactions\nand events affecting such units.\n2.\nThe CAP Plan\n308. Since at least 2000, the Company offered certain employees compensation\nthrough its CAP Plan that was tied to the value of the Company's common stock. In April of\n2007 the Company described the purpose of the CAP Plan as follows:\nto promote the interests of the Company and its stockholders by\nproviding long-term incentives for the benefit of certain key\nexecutives of the Company, Bear Stearns and any of the\nCompany's subsidiaries who contribute significantly to the long-\nterm performance and growth of the Company.\n309. Employees eligible for participation in the CAP Plan included any individual\nemployed by Bear Stearns or any of its subsidiaries and affiliates as a Senior Managing Director\nor an equivalent title. Under the Plan, Bear Stearns credited to each Plan participant, as of the\nlast day of such Plan Year, a certain number of CAP Units. Each CAP unit corresponded to a\nsingle share of the Company's stock. The Company determined the number of units to award by\ndividing (i) an amount determined by the Board Committee with respect to such Participant, by\n(ii) the Fair Market Value of Bear Stearns' common stock on the date of the grant action by the\nBoard Committee granting the Award.\n310. The Company purchased shares of Common Stock in the open market or in\nprivate transactions during the term of the Plan for issuance to Participants in accordance with\nthe terms of the Plan.\n3.\nDefendants' Fraud Harmed Holders of RSU and CAP Plan Units\n311. Class Members with compensation packages including eligibility for Restricted\nStock and or CAP Units took these packages on the understanding that any stock received under\nthe Plans accurately reflected the true value of the Company's shares. Such Class Members were\n72\nEFTA00316800\n", "char_count": 1967}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 88 of 347\nunaware when they took Units under these Plans that the value of the Company's stock had been\nartificially inflated by the Company's materially false and misleading statements and omissions.\nWhen the disclosure of the Company's fraud described at paragraphs 589 to 794 below caused\nBear Stearns' share values to plummet, the RSU and CAP Plan Unit holders suffered enormous\nlosses.\nL. The SEC Comment Letters\n312. An exchange of letters between Bear Stearns and the SEC's Division of Corporate\nFinance (\"CF Division\") offers ample evidence that the Company's public filings for fiscal years\n2006 and 2007 failed to disclose material information about the Company's risk management\npractices and exposure to risk in the subprime market.\n313. The SEC's CF Division selectively reviews filings made under the Securities Act\nof 1933 (\"Securities Act\") and the Exchange Act to monitor compliance with those statutes'\ndisclosure and accounting requirements. In general, the SEC only selects for review a filing that\n\"at least on its face, seems to conflict significantly with generally accepted accounting principles\nor Commission rules, or to be materially deficient in explanation or clarity.\"\n314. In September of 2007, amidst what appeared to be a substantial increase in\nmortgage defaults and the deteriorating value of assets linked to mortgages (such as RMBS and\nCDOs containing RMBS), the SEC reviewed Bear Stearns' Form 10-K for 2006. As a result of\nits review, in September 2007, SEC Accounting Branch Chief John Cash sent a comment letter\nto Defendant Molinaro requesting that Bear Stearns provide the SEC with certain \"material\nMarch 20, 2002 Testimony by Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman of the U.S. Securities Exchange\nCommission, before the House Committee on Financial Services, at\nhttp://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032002tshlp.htm# P124_30878.\n73\nEFTA00316801\n", "char_count": 1928}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 89 of 347\ninformation\" not disclosed in the 2006 Form 10-K filing, including \"a comprehensive analysis of\nyour exposure to subprime loans\" (\"2006 Form 10-K comment letter\").\n315. Specifically, the SEC asked Bear Stearns to:\n-Quantify your portfolio of subprime residential mortgages. If\npracticable, please breakout the portfolio to show the underlying\nreason for subprime definition, in other words, subject to payment\nincrease, high LTV ratio, interest only, negative amortizing, and so\non.\n-Quantify the following regarding subprime residential mortgages.\nExplain how you define each category;\n-Non-performing loans;\n-Non-accrual loans;\n-The allowance for loan losses, and;\n-The most recent provision for loan losses.\n316. In the 2006 Form 10-K comment letter, the SEC also requested information\nregarding Bear Stearns' investments in subprime-backed securities that the Company had not\nmade available in its public filings. The SEC requested that Bear Stearns:\n-Quantify the principal amount and nature of any retained\nsecuritized interests in subprime residential mortgages.\n-Quantify your investments in any securities backed by subprime\nmortgages.\n-Quantify the current delinquencies in retained securitized\nsubprime residential mortgages.\n-Quantify any write-offs/impairments related to retained interests\nin subprime residential mortgages.\n317. In the same letter, the SEC asked that Bear Stearns supply it with previously\nundisclosed information regarding its exposure to the special purpose entities that it created to\npurchase subprime loans and issue securities, as well as its exposure related to warehouse lines\nand reverse repurchase agreements involving subprime loans.\n74\nEFTA00316802\n", "char_count": 1759}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 90 of 347\n318. Finally, the SEC asked that Bear Stearns \"[p]rovide us with your risk\nmanagement philosophy as it specifically relates to subprime loans.\" The SEC requested\ninformation regarding, inter alia:\n-Your origination policies;\n-The purchase, securitization and retained interests in loans;\n-Investments in subprime mortgage-backed securities; and\n-Loans, commitments, and investments to/in subprime lenders.\n319. Pursuant to CF Rules, Bear Stearns was obliged to reply to these requests within\nten days of its receipt of the letter. Thus, Bear Stearns' reply was due on October 12, 2007. As\nset out in the 2008 OIG Report, Bear Stearns obtained an extension to early November to file its\nresponse. However, Bear Stearns, without explanation, did not file its promised response until\nJanuary 31, 2008 after it filed its 10-K for fiscal year 2007. Despite the fact that Bear Stearns\nhad been put on notice by the SEC that disclosures regarding its subprime exposure and risk\nmanagement policies were material to investors, the Company failed to incorporate any of the\nadditional information sought by the SEC into its 2007 Form 10-K.\n320. Despite the fact that the Company was delaying any response to the SEC's\npending questions, the Company falsely asserted in its Form 10-K filed January 29, 2008 that\nthere were no \"unresolved staff comments\" in connection with its financial disclosures.\n321. The reasons for the Company's long delay in responding were apparent in the\nCompany's response on January 31, 2008, less than three months before its collapse. In reply to\nthe 2006 10-K comment letter, Bear Stearns for the first time quantified its non-performing\nloans, non-accrual loans, allowances for loan losses and its most recent provision for loan losses.\nBear Stearns also, for the first time, disclosed to the SEC its retained interests in subprime\n75\nEFTA00316803\n", "char_count": 1935}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 91 of 347\nmortgages and losses due to payment delinquencies and defaults in mortgages contained in its\nretained interest in the securitizations.\n322. Unfortunately for investors, the version of the Company's January 31, 2008\nresponse that was released to the public redacted all relevant figures. Moreover, by the time the\nSEC completed its review of the Company's response on April 2, 2008, Bear Stearns had\nimploded.\n323. In the 2008 OIG Report, the Inspector General concluded that the information\nregarding subprime exposure and risk management philosophy that the Company had omitted\nfrom its 2006 and 2007 Forms 10-K was \"material information\" that investors could have used\n\"to make well-informed investment decisions.\"\nM.\nBear Stearns' Practices Violated Accounting Standards\n324. During the housing market declines of the Class Period, the Company's enormous\nexposure to losses on mortgage-backed securities made it especially critical that Bear Stearns\nensure the accuracy of its reported results. The Company failed to do so. In fact, despite its\npublic statements to the contrary, throughout the Class Period the Company suffered from a\npervasive weakness in its internal controls, and repeatedly and systematically violated Generally\nAccepted Accounting Principles (\"GAAP\").\n1.\nGAAP Overview\n325. SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4 01(a)(1), provides that financial\nstatements filed with the SEC that are not presented in conformity with GAAP will be presumed\nto be misleading, despite footnotes or other disclosures.\n326. GAAP constitutes those standards recognized by the accounting profession as the\nconventions, rules and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practices at a\nparticular time. The SEC has the statutory authority for the promulgation of GAAP for public\n76\nEFTA00316804\n", "char_count": 1873}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 92 of 347\ncompanies and has delegated that authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the\n\"FASB\") and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (\"AICPA\").\n327. GAAP consists of a hierarchy of authoritative literature. The highest authority is\nthe FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS), followed by FASB\nInterpretations (FIN), FASB Staff Positions (FSP), Accounting Principles Board Opinions\n(APB), AICPA Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB), AICPA Statements of Position (SOP),\nand AICPA Industry Audit and Accounting Guides (AAG). GAAP provides other authoritative\npronouncements including, among others, the FASB Concept Statements (FASCON).\n328. The AICPA issues industry specific Audit & Accounting Guides (\"AAG\") to\nprovide guidance in preparing financial statements in accordance with GAAP. The AAG for\nDepository and Lending Institutions (\"D&L AAG\") was applicable to Bear Stearns with respect\nto its mortgage banking activities, including mortgage originations, securitizations, and holdings\nof investments in debt securities (e.g., Ch.4, Industry Overview - Mortgage Companies). The\nD&L AAG interpreted GAAP pronouncements on the proper methods to assess fair value for\nfinancial instruments and RIs.\n329. In addition, there was an AAG that was applicable to Brokers and Dealers in\nSecurities (\"B&D AAG\"). Among other applications, the B&D AAG provided guidance on\nGAAP related to Bear Stearns' trading of financial instruments.\n330. Bear Stearns was also expected to adhere to fundamental accounting principles\nthat state a Company's financial statements should be presented in a manner which, among other\nthings, should:\n77\nEFTA00316805\n", "char_count": 1746}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 93 of 347\n(a) Provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and\ncreditors and other users in making rational investment, credit and similar\ndecisions. (FASCON 1 [[34);\n(b) Provide information about an enterprise's economic resources,\nobligations, and owners' equity. That information helps investors,\ncreditors, and others identify the enterprise's financial strengths and\nweaknesses and assess its liquidity and solvency. (FASCON 1 ¶[40);\nProvide information about an enterprise's financial performance during a\nperiod. \"Investors and creditors often use information about the past to\n(c)\n(d)\n(e)\nhelp in assessing the prospects of an enterprise. Thus, although\ninvestment and credit decisions reflect investors' and creditors'\nexpectations about future enterprise performance, those expectations are\ncommonly based at least partly on evaluations of past enterprise\nperformance.\" (FASCON 1 [42);\nInclude explanations and interpretations to help users understand financial\ninformation because management knows more about the enterprise and its\naffairs than investors, creditors, or other \"outsiders\" and can often increase\nthe usefulness of financial information by identifying certain transactions,\nother events, and circumstances that affect the enterprise and explaining\ntheir financial impact on it. (FASCON 1 ¶[54);\nBe reliable in that it represents what it purports to represent. That\ninformation should be reliable as well as relevant is a notion that is central\nto accounting. (FASCON 2 [58-59);\n18\n78\nEFTA00316806\n", "char_count": 1603}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 94 of 347\n(f)\n(g)\nBe complete, which means that nothing material is left out of the\ninformation that may be necessary to ensure that it validly represents\nunderlying events and conditions. (FASCON 2 [[79);\nBe verifiable in that it provides a significant degree of assurance that\naccounting measures represent what they purport to represent. (FASCON\n2 [81); and\n(h)\nReflect that conservatism be used as a prudent reaction to uncertainty to\n2.\ntry to ensure that uncertainties and risks inherent in business situations are\nadequately considered. (FASCON 2 ¶¶95, 97).\nFraud Risk Factors Present at Bear Stearns\na.\nFraud Risk Factors Applicable to\nDepository and Lending Institutions\n331. Because of Bear Stearns' role in the mortgage origination market, it was subject\nto risks associated with depository and lending institutions. One such risk factor identified by\nthe AICPA in the applicable AAG in the section was \"significant declines in customer demand\nand increasing business failures in either the industry or overall economy,\" including\n\"deteriorating economic conditions...within industries or geographic regions in which the\ninstitution has significant credit concentrations.\" (Ch. 5, Audit Considerations and Certain\nFinancial Reporting Matters, Ex. 5-1, Fraud Risk Factors). Given the widespread evidence of\nhousing declines set out in paragraphs 138 to 148 above, this risk factor assumed particular\ngravity as the Class Period wore on.\n332. Another AICPA risk factor set forth in the AAG specific to depository and\nlending institutions is “Unrealistically aggressive loan goals and lucrative incentive programs for\n12\n79\nEFTA00316807\n", "char_count": 1701}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 95 of 347\nloan originations\", as shown by, among other things, \"relaxation of credit standards\", and\n\"excessive concentration of lending.\"\n333. Given the lax underwriting and loan origination standards described in paragraphs\n53 to 63 above, Bear Stearns' financial disclosures were deeply susceptible to this form of risk.\nFor example, Bear Stearns' 2006 Form 10-K disclosed that \"Mortgage-backed securities\nrevenues increased during fiscal 2006 when compared with fiscal 2005 on higher origination\nvolumes from asset-backed securities, adjustable rate mortgage (\"ARM\") securities...\"\n334. Bear Stearns did not disclose this critical information until January of 2008\npursuant to the SEC's efforts to seek expanded disclosure from the Company. As described\nbelow at paragraphs 346 to 347 and 579, these \"2/28 ARMs\" carried a particularly high degree\nof risk of misstatement, and constituted the types of risk highlighted by the D&L AAG. In fact,\nBear Stearns delayed efforts to adopt stricter underwriting standards related to non-agency loan\noriginations until the quarter ended August 31, 2007.\n335. The AICPA identifies another source of industry-specific risk as occurring when\nan institution has \"assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that\ninvolve subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate (Significant\nestimates generally include...fair value determinations)\" and when \"material amounts of\ncomplex financial instruments and derivatives held by the institution that are difficult to value.\"\nBecause such a large proportion of the Company's assets were Level 3 instruments valued using\nBear Stearns' proprietary valuation models that required significant judgments by management,\nthe Company faced significant risk of exposure to misstatement.\n336. The AAG identifies another risk factor for lenders as occurring when \"[v]acant\nstaff positions remain unfulfilled for extend\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/94 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=94]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 96 of 347\nof duties\", and when there exists an \"[u]nderstaffed accounting or information technology\ndepartment, inexperienced or ineffective accounting or information technology personnel, or\nhigh turnover.\" As set out above at paragraphs 129 to 136, during the Class Period the\nCompany's risk management desk virtually evaporated, leaving a single analyst in October of\n2007, as the housing crisis reached a crescendo.\nb.\nRisk Factors Applicable to Brokers and Dealers in Securities\n337. Due to Bear Stearns' role in trading financial instruments, the Company was\nsubject to special risk factors applicable to brokers and dealers in securities, including those\ndescribed in Ch.5, Appendix A, 5.195, Part 1 Fraudulent Financial Reporting.\n338. Among the risk factors the AICPA identifies for brokers and dealers are\n\"concentration in a particular type of financial instrument\" and \"a failure by management and\nthose charged with governance to set parameters (for example, trading limits, credit limits, and\naggregate market risk limits) and to continuously monitor trading activities against those\nparameters.\" As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, Bear Stearns repeatedly exceeded its own\ninternal limits on concentration in mortgage-backed securities, invoking this risk.\n339. The AICPA identifies a further risk factor for broker dealers as being \"A failure\nby management to have an adequate understanding of the entity's trading and investment\nstrategies as conducted by the entity's traders, including the types, characteristics, and risks\nassociated with the financial products purchased and sold by the entity.\" As set out at\nparagraphs 137 to 187 above, throughout the Class Period the Company persisted in using\nvaluation and VaR models it knew to be faulty in an effort to avoid disclosing its losses to the\npublic. Accordingly, Bear Stearns' management was deliberately \"flying blind\" with respect to\nthe enormous risks the Company face\n... [truncated, 2019 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/95 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=95]", "char_count": 2019}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 97 of 347\n340. Several specific conclusions of the 2008 OIG Report are also implicated by the\nAAG. As set out above at paragraphs 134 to 135, the OIG concluded that during much of the\nClass Period the Company's risk management department was virtually deserted, preventing the\ndepartment from functioning effectively.\n341. Moreover, the Company's efforts to delay taking a huge charge against capital, as\ndescribed at paragraphs 212 to 213 above, invoked the B&D AAG's assessment of risk\nassociated with \"Intercompany transactions designed to improperly manage earnings.\"\n342. Finally, in that the B&D AAG warned accountants regarding the \"[u]se of\ndifferent valuations of same product in two related companies\", the Company's accountants\nshould have been especially wary of its practice of booking assets at full value even after making\nprice concessions to counterparties in mark disputes and its knowledge that similar holdings of\nits hedge funds were worthless, as set out at paragraphs 222 to 226 above. This risk was\nobserved by the 2008 OIG Report to be present at Bear Stearns (e.g., \"...each of Bear Stearns'\ntrading desks evaluated profits and risks individually, as opposed to relying on one overall firm-\nwide approach.\").\n3.\nAudit Risk Alerts\n343. The AICPA issues Audit Risk Alerts (\"ARAS\") that are particularized by\nindustry, including for the financial industry in which Bear Stearns participated. The ARAS are\nused by industry participants, such as Bear Stearns and its auditor, Deloitte, to address areas of\nconcern and identify the significant business risks that may result in the material misstatement of\nthe financial statements. The factors highlighted in the ARAS are most often summaries of\nexisting industry-specific considerations such as those provided by, for example, the Office of\nthe Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, or the National Association of Realtors.\n82\n62\nEFTA00316810\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 98 of 347\n344.\nIt was also typical practice for the audit quality departments of major accounting\nfirms such as Deloitte to integrate the ARAS into firm memoranda for purposes of disseminating\nthat information to applicable clients and firm professionals. The ARAS are included in the\nAICPA's annual Audit and Accounting Manual (\"AAM\").\n345. In particular, Farber, Bear Stearns' Senior Vice President-Finance and Controller,\nhad previously been a partner with Deloitte. Accordingly, Farber should have had familiarity\nwith the existence and application of the ARAS.\n346. The 2006 ARA observed the following risk factors that were relevant to Bear\nStearns' financial statements:\n(a)\n\"Customers holding adjustable rate mortgages may not be able to make\npayments if interest rates rise significantly.\" The ARA continued to say \"Upon foreclosure,\nthese financial institutions may not be able to liquidate underlying assets without absorbing\nsignificant losses...\" (2006 ARA 8050.37).\n(b)\nAny increase in originations of risky loan products, such as ARMs and\nPay Option ARMs posed particular risks for entities that had not \"developed appropriate risk\nmanagement policies....\" (2006 AAM 8050.35)\n(c) Of significant relevance to Bear Stearns, the 2006 ARA heightened\nawareness that the value of these non-conforming products was often predicated on an\nassumption that home prices would continue to rise, which it observed was an assumption\nunlikely to be sustainable: \"[S]ome of these [ARM] products assume a continued rise in home\nprices that may not continue.\" (2006 AAM 8050.35)\n347. The 2007 ARA reiterated the factors observed in the 2006 ARA and expanded on\nthe following risk factors:\n86\n83\nEFTA00316811\n", "char_count": 1761}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 99 of 347\n(a) It observed \"This quarter's foreclosure starts rate is the highest in the\nhistory of the survey, with the previous high being last quarter's rate.\" (2007 AAM 8050.27)\n(b)\nThat the \"American Banker recently reported that home resales hit a 4-\nyear low due to continued price decline. Many in the housing industry believe the decline in\nresales signifies a protracted housing slump. Another issue contributing to sluggish home sales\nis the rising number of foreclosures of properties financed with subprime debt.\" (2007 AAM\n8050.30)\n(c)\nThat \"On June 29, 2007, the federal financial regulatory agencies (Board\nof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC, NCUA, 0CC, and OTS) issued the\nStatement on Subprime Mortgage Lending to address issues related, to ARMs. ... The agencies\nprimary concern is the possibility of 'rate or payment shock' to the borrower that may result\nfrom the expiration of a fixed introductory rate to an adjustable variable rate for the duration of\nthe loan.\" (2007 AAM 8050.48)\n348. These risk factors were relevant for Bear Stearns to consider in the establishment\nof its internal controls and ultimately the preparation of its financial statements. Moreover, these\nrisk factors were generally observable to industry participants. And so, Bear Stearns, with its\naccess to material inside information regarding its specific high-risk environment, had an\nobligation to ensure that its certifications regarding the effectiveness of its internal control over\nfinancial reporting as well as the assertions it made in its financial statements, reflected\nappropriate consideration of these issues.\n4. Bear Stearns Falsely Represented that its Internal\nControls Over Financial Reporting Were Effective\n349. Throughout the Class Period, Bear Stearns falsely asserted in its public filings that\nit maintained effective internal controls over financial reporting in clear violation of SEC rules.\n84\nEFTA00316812\n", "char_count": 1999}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 100 of 347\nThe lack of effective internal controls at Bear Stearns facilitated its efforts to mislead investors\nbecause without those controls it was able to represent that:\n(a)\nassets it possessed;\nIt was exposed to significantly less risk than was truly inherent in the\n(b) Its risk management personnel and procedures were effective and reliable,\nwhen Bear Stearns knew they were not;\n(c)\nIt had properly recorded reserves for, and made adequate and complete\ndisclosures about its failed hedge funds;\n(d) It was able to make reasonable estimates of the fair value of its financial\ninstruments, when it knew at least its mortgage-related models were deficient;\n(e) The write-downs of the fair value of the Company's financial instruments\nand other securitization-related assets were adequate; and\ninflated.\n350.\n(f) Its reported revenue, earnings, and earnings-per-share were artificially\nBear Stearns' 2007 Form 10-K filing asserted management's responsibility over\ninternal controls:\nManagement...is responsible for establishing and maintaining\nadequate internal control over financial reporting for the Company.\n... In making its assessment of internal control over financial\nreporting, management [claimed to] use[] the criteria established\nin 'Internal Control-Integrated Framework' issued by the\nCommittee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway\nCommission (COSO).\n351. COSO defines \"internal controls\" in Chapter 1 of its Framework as follows:\nInternal control is a process, effected by an entity's board of\ndirectors, management and other personnel, designed to provide\nreasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in\nthe following categories: (i) Effectiveness and efficiency of\n85\nEFTA00316813\n", "char_count": 1782}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 101 of 347\noperations; (ii) Reliability of financial reporting; (iii) Compliance\nwith applicable laws and regulations.\n352. Moreover, COSO emphasizes the importance of a strong control environment,\nwhich sets a positive \"tone at the top\" and then flows down through the Company. The COSO\nFramework Executive Summary identifies the pervasive influence that the control environment\nhas on the Company, as follows:\nThe control environment sets the tone of an organization,\ninfluencing the control consciousness of its people. It is the\nfoundation for all other components of internal control, providing\ndiscipline and structure. Control environment factors include the\nintegrity, ethical values and competence of the entity's people;\nmanagement's philosophy and operating style; the way\nmanagement assigns authority and responsibility, and organizes\nand develops its people; and the attention and direction provided\nby the board of directors.\n353. In addition, the COSO Framework, Ch. 2, establishes that management's\nphilosophy and operating style directly affects the manner in which the company is managed, the\namount of risk that the company accepts and ultimately the success of the company. Chapter 2\nof the COSO Framework states:\nManagement's philosophy and operating style affect the way the\nenterprise is managed, including the kinds of business risks\naccepted...Other elements of management's philosophy and\noperating style include attitudes toward financial reporting,\nconservative or aggressive selection from available alternative\naccounting principles, conscientiousness and conservatism with\nwhich accounting estimates are developed, and attitudes toward\ndata processing and accounting functions and personnel. ... The\nimpact of an ineffective control environment could be far\nreaching, possibly resulting in a financial loss, a tarnished public\nimage or a business failure.\n354. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (\"the \n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/100 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=100]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 102 of 347\ncontext of a top-down risk assessment, which requires management to base both the scope of its\nassessment and the evidence gathered on risk. Management's conclusion of its assessment of the\neffectiveness of the Company's internal control must be included in the Company's annual\nreport. Moreover, it was crucial for Bear Stearns to regularly monitor those controls to verify\ntheir operating effectiveness.\n355. Further, SEC rules require management to report publicly all material weaknesses\nin the Company's internal controls.\n356. Beginning in 2002, the Officer Defendants were required under Rule 302 of the\nSarbanes-Oxley Act to provide assurances relating to the Company's \"internal control over\nfinancial reporting.\" Rule 302 states as follows:\n[E]ach annual report... [should] contain an internal control report,\nwhich shall: (1) state the responsibility of management for\nestablishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure\nand procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an\nassessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the\nissuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and\nprocedures of the issuer for financial reporting.\n357. In connection with the Company's 2006 Form 10-K, Defendants Cayne and\nMolinaro executed the applicable Rule 302 certification.\n358. Defendants Schwartz and Molinaro filed identical certifications with respect to\nthe Company's 2007 Form 10-K.\n359. As explained above and in the Company's regulatory filings, in doing so the\nOfficer Defendants represented to the marketplace that their assessment of internal controls over\nfinancial reporting was based upon the framework established by COSO. Also, the Officer\nDefendants represented in the Company's Form 10-K filings that \"management concluded that\nthe Company's internal control over financial reporting was effective as of\" the years ended\nNovember 30, 2006 and November 30, 2007. These s\n... [truncated, 2058 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/101 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=101]", "char_count": 2058}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 103 of 347\nconcealed its lax risk management efforts which enabled vastly increased exposure to securities\ninextricably linked to subprime risk. Furthermore, the lax risk management permitted\nincomplete and deficient pricing models, which was a material weakness that ultimately resulted\nin the overstatement of the fair value of its financial instruments as well as reported revenues and\nearnings. As a result, management's reports on internal control over financial reporting, required\nby Rule 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were materially false and misleading because Bear\nStearns' internal controls were ineffective. The Officer Defendants' statements were false and\nmisleading because Bear Stearns' internal controls were significantly deficient and ineffective to\nprevent or detect errors or misstatements in its operations, underwriting practices or financial\nreporting.\n360. Management's assessment of internal control over financial reporting was a\ncritical metric for investors because it provided assurance that the Company's financial\nstatements were reliable and in compliance with applicable laws. However, during the Class\nPeriod, as alleged herein, Bear Stearns did not properly assess its internal controls over financial\nreporting, thus it violated the \"Internal Control-Integrated Framework\" issued by COSO and\nvarious other requirements found in the SEC regulations and Sarbanes-Oxley Act.\n361.\na. Risk Management\nIn light of the 2008 OIG Report's specific criticisms of Bear Stearns' risk\nmanagement program, the Company's assertion that it maintained effective internal controls was\nmaterially false and misleading.\n362. In the midst of the housing crisis in 2007, the Company's risk management\ndepartment had virtually disappeared. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report,\n[t]here was also turnover of Bear Stearns' risk management\npersonnel at critical times. Bear Stearns' head of model\nvalidation resigned around March 2007\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/102 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=102]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 104 of 347\nsubprime crisis was beginning to hit and the first large writedowns\nwere being taken.\"\n363. Moreover, the 2008 OIG Report explains that:\nthere are indications...that the risk manager who left had difficulty\ncommunicating with senior managers in a productive manner. In\nthe opinion of the OIG expert, difficulties in communication are\na potential red flag indicating that a risk manager could be telling\nthe traders to take on less risk that they would otherwise choose to\ndo (i.e., information that the traders presumably would not want to\nhear).\"\n364. Even before 2007, the few risk management analysts the Company did have were\nill-suited to assess the risks facing Bear Stearns. According to the 2008 OIG Report,\nIn 2006...Bear Stearns' business was becoming increasingly\nconcentrated in mortgage securities, an area in which its model\nreview still needed much work. The OIG expert concluded that, at\nthis time, the risk managers at Bear Stearns did not have the skill\nsets that best matched Bear Stearns' business model.\" See also,\nId., \"Given the risk managers' lack of expertise in mortgages, it\nwould have been difficult for risk managers at Bear Stearns to\nadvocate a bigger focus on default risk in its mortgage models.\n365. The Company had little interest in addressing the chaos in the risk management\ndepartment, as it understood that effective risk management might reveal the actual extent of its\nexposure to the housing declines.\n366. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report,\n367.\nthe OIG expert concluded that the reviews of the mortgage models\nthat should have taken place before the subprime crisis erupted in\nFebruary 2007 appear to have never occurred, in the sense that it\nwas still a work in progress when Bear Stearns collapsed in March\n2008.\nb. Pricing Models and VaR Systems\nThe Company's assertion that it maintained effective internal controls was also\nmaterially false and misleading in light of the\n... [truncated, 2161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/103 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=103]", "char_count": 2161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 105 of 347\n368.\nAs set out in the 2008 OIG Report,\nTM concluded that Bear Stearns model review process lacked\ncoverage of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities, in\npart because the models were not used for pricing and in part\nbecause the sensitivities to various risks implied by the models did\nnot reflect risk sensitivities consistent with price fluctuations in the\nmarket.\n369. The 2008 OIG Report stated that \"Bear Stearns VaR models did not capture risks\nassociated with credit spread widening... These fundamental factors include housing price\nappreciation, consumer credit scores, patterns of delinquency rates, and potentially other data.\nThese fundamental factors do not seem to have been incorporated into Bear Stearns' models at\nthe time Bear Stearns became a CSE.\"\n370. Because Bear Stearns did not update its VaR models on a timely basis, it was not\npossible for Bear Stearns to have effective internal controls over financial reporting, despite its\ncertifications otherwise.\n5.\nGAAP Violations Relating to the Company's Financial Statements\na.\nBear Stearns Misstated Its Exposure to Loss\nfrom the Failed Hedge Funds\n371.\nAs described above, in June of 2007, Bear Stearns loaned $1.6 billion to the\nBSAM \"High Grade\" fund in a last-ditch attempt to salvage the entity. At that time, despite their\n6 The failures described herein apply to Bear Stearns' annual and interim financial statements. APB\nNo. 28, Interim Financial Reporting (\"APB 28\"), states \"Interim financial information is essential to\nprovide investors and others with timely information as to the progress of the enterprise.\" (APB 28 [9)\nIn addition, in interim periods \"Contingencies and other uncertainties that could be expected to affect the\nfairness of presentation of financial data at an interim date should be disclosed in interim reports in the\nsame manner required for annual reports. Such disclosures should be repeated in interim and annual\nr\n... [truncated, 2248 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/104 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=104]", "char_count": 2248}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 106 of 347\ninternal concerns otherwise, Bear Stearns' representatives claimed to the SEC that those loans\nwere purportedly sufficiently collateralized by $1.7 to 2.0 billion of the fund's assets.\n372. During June of 2007, the loan balance was reduced to $1.345 billion through the\nfunds sale of certain assets for repayment purposes. However, in the same period, the value of\nthe collateral had been reduced to an amount approximately equal to the size of the then-\noutstanding loan.\n373. This predicament implied that the collateral assets had lost at least $100 to $400\nmillion of purported value in less than one month.\n374. In actuality, as a result of its inside knowledge of the asset composition\ncomprising the collateral and the rapid loss of value of those assets even in June of 2007, Bear\nStearns knew that the collateral of the assets provided by the hedge funds was clearly insufficient\nto guarantee the value of the loans it had extended. Moreover, Bear Stearns knew that the hedge\nfunds were otherwise incapable of repaying those loans.\n375. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for\nContingencies (\"SFAS 5\") was issued in March 1975 by the FASB. The principles described in\nSFAS 5 set forth the standards of financial accounting and reporting for loss contingencies.\nSFAS 5 sets forth the standards Bear Stearns was required to adhere to in order to properly\naccount for loss contingencies.\n376. SFAS 5 provides in paragraph 8:\nAn estimated loss for loss contingency... shall be accrued by a\ncharge to income if both of the following conditions are met:\nа.\nInformation available prior to issuance of the financial\nstatements indicates that it is probable that an asset had been\nimpaired or a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial\nstatements. It is implicit in this condition that it must be probable\nthat one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the\nloss.\n91\nEFTA003\n... [truncated, 2006 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/105 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=105]", "char_count": 2006}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 107 of 347\nb.\nThe amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.\n377. As described above, on July 18, 2007, Bear Stearns informed Hedge Fund\ninvestors that \"unprecedented declines\" in the value of the investments had been sustained. The\nletters to the investors also disclosed that there was \"effectively no value left\" in the High Grade\nEnhanced Fund and \"very little value left\" in the High Grade Fund. As a result, in accordance\nwith SFAS 5, Bear Stearns should have taken an immediate loss on the remaining value of the\nloan of $1.345 billion in the quarter ended August 31, 2007.\n378. Instead of recording a loss of $1.345 billion, Bear Stearns recorded a mere $200\nmillion in the quarter ended August 31, 2007 without providing any explanation for the\ndetermination of the amount of the loss or its justification for maintaining the remaining $1.1\nbillion of the loan value in its reported financial statements. In fact, Bear Stearns' disclosures\nwere vague as to whether the write-down was attributable to the loan or to the accrued income\nfrom management fees of the fund. Specifically, it disclosed, \"Included in the 2007 quarter\nresults are losses of approximately $200 million representing the write-off of the Company's\ninvestment and fees receivable from the Funds, losses from the closure of the $1.6 billion\nsecured financing agreement provided to the High Grade Fund and other directly related\nexpenses.\"\n379. These issues concerning the rapid de-valuation of the collateral should also have\nraised alarm bells that any similar assets maintained by Bear Stearns needed to be subjected to\nsimilar fair value write-downs. Bear Stearns permitted one trading desk, its hedge funds, to\nrecognize valuation losses related to CDOs at the same time other trading desks, such as those in\nits prime brokerage business, used alternative valuation methods on similar assets to avoid such\nwrite-downs.\n92\n92\nEFTA00316820\n", "char_count": 1977}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 108 of 347\n380.\nBear Stearns provided no further public disclosure about the losses it incurred\nrelated to its loans to the hedge funds.\n381. As more fully set forth below, Deloitte knew or should have known of an\nadditional auditing red flag in the Company's related party transactions.\n382. The primary literature for related party transactions is FAS 57, Related Party\nDisclosures. Related party transactions include transactions between affiliates, which are\ndefined as \"a party that, directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is\ncontrolled by, or is under common control with an enterprise\" (FAS 57 [ 1).\n383. FAS 57 paragraph 3 states:\nTransactions involving related parties cannot be presumed to be\ncarried out on an arm's-length basis, as the requisite conditions of\ncompetitive, freemarket dealings may not exist. Representations\nabout transactions with related parties, if made, shall not imply that\nthe related party transactions were consummated on terms\nequivalent to those that prevail in arm's-length transactions unless\nsuch representations can be substantiated.\"\n384. Under FAS 57, Deloitte was obliged to evaluate related party transactions with a\nhigh degree of professional skepticism. If the parties to the transaction are related, it cannot be\nassumed that the recorded amounts properly reflect the true economic substance of the\ntransaction.\n385. Indeed, GAAP provides detailed guidance as to specific disclosure requirements\nand audit procedures in SAS 45 and AU section 334, entitled Related Parties, that must be\nfollowed in order to provide the market with a better understanding of the transaction.\n386. Bear Stearns' related party transactions included the loans it provided to its failing\nHigh Grade Hedge Funds. Accordingly, with respect to that transaction, Bear Stearns was\nrequired to disclose (FAS 57 [ 2):\n(a)\nThe nature of the relationship(s) involved,\n93\nEFTA00316821\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 109 of 347\n(b)\nA description of the transactions for each of the periods for which income\nstatements were presented, and such other information deemed necessary to an understanding of\nthe effects of the transactions on the financial statements,\n(c)\nThe dollar amounts of transactions for each of the periods for which\nincome statements are presented and the effects of any change in the method of establishing the\nterms from that used in the preceding period, and\n(d)\nAmounts due from or to related parties as of the date of each balance sheet\npresented and, if not otherwise apparent, the terms and manner of settlement.\n387. Furthermore, Bear Stearns should have provided specific disclosure concerning\nthe outcome of the write-downs to the loans provided to the hedge-funds. This obligation to\ndisclose to investors did not expire at the time when, or if, Bear Stearns assumed the collateral\nonto its consolidated financial statements.\n388. As described above, however, the 2008 OIG Report observed that Bear Stearns\neventually wrote down the value of collateral it acquired by at least $500 million in the fall of\n2007. Thus, it is clear that Bear Stearns failed to disclose at least $300 million of write-downs.\nMoreover, notwithstanding the fact that the Company should have written off the entire value of\nthe loan in the quarter ended August 31, 2007, Bear Stearns' financial statements failed to\ncomply with GAAP because investors were inappropriately left in the dark about how the losses\non the remaining $845 million exposure were ultimately recorded, or if those losses were in fact\never recognized prior to its collapse.\nb.\nBear Stearns' Financial Statements\nMisrepresented its Exposure to Decline in the Value of RIS\n389. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers\nand Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities (\"SFAS 140\"), was issued in\n94\n+4\nEFTA00316822\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 110 of 347\nSeptember 2000 by the FASB. The principles described in SFAS 140 set forth \"the standards for\naccounting for securitizations and other transfers of financial assets and collateral.\" In particular,\nSFAS 140 sets forth the standards to properly assess the fair value for RIs. For purposes of Bear\nStearns' financial statements, RIs were components of the revenue line item Principal\nTransactions and reported on the balance sheet as a component of financial instruments at fair\nvalue.\n390. Once RIs were initially recorded, Bear Stearns was required to determine the fair\nvalue of the RIs in each subsequent quarter. For purposes of its 2006 financial statements, the\nmethods prescribed by SFAS 140 for measuring the fair value of financial assets and liabilities\nwere similar to those in SFAS 157, which required that the valuation assumptions be consistent\nwith those that market participants would use in their estimates of values, including assumptions\nabout interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. (FAS 140, 68-70) SFAS 157 defined\nthe fair value requirements for purposes of the 2007 financial statements. In all periods from the\nquarter ended February 28, 2007 to February 29, 2008, Bear Stearns reported with respect to RIS\n\"The assumptions used for pricing variables are based on observable transactions in similar\nsecurities and are further verified by external pricing sources, when available.\" This disclosure\nindicates that RIs were classified by Bear Stearns as Level 2 assets (see further discussion\nbelow).\n391. As the issuer of many securitizations, Bear Stearns often maintained the riskiest\ntranche (the one in the first loss position) on its books as RIS. RIs provided Bear Stearns with an\nopportunity to receive additional cash flows if specific loan performance criteria were met. Bear\nStearns' valuation of its RI from securitizations was a critical metric for investors because it\n95\n55\nEFTA0031682\n... [truncated, 2002 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/109 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=109]", "char_count": 2002}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 111 of 347\nindicated the financial health of the Company, given that the valuation of its RI was directly\nlinked to Principal Transactions revenue and, ultimately, net income.\n392. In the fall of 2006, Bear Stearns represented to the SEC that it was (i) \"moving\naway from holding residuals in its portfolio; (ii) attempting to sell aging residuals, and (iii) aware\nthat its residuals on second lien mortgage securitizations were very risky.\" Nevertheless, Bear\nStearns' holdings of RIs continued to increase during this period, rising from $5.6 billion as of\nNovember 30, 2006 to $7.1 billion as of February 28, 2007. This trend indicated either an\nincreasing difficulty in selling RIs or that Bear Stearns' representations to the regulators were\nunreliable.\n393. By February of 2007, Bear Stearns had been forced to write-down nearly 30% of\na portion of its RIs that were worth $300 million. In the following quarter, losses on RIs rose to\na total of $168 million on second lien inventory and $240 million on RMBS and structured\nproducts. The 2008 OIG Report observed that Bear Stearns had been unable to predict these\nlosses. Bear Stearns' inability to predict such losses was in all probability attributable to its\ndeficient pricing models. Bear Stearns failed to make any disclosure of these losses in its Form\n10-Q for the quarter ended May 31, 2007 or any other SEC filing.\n394. In fact, in its May 2007 Form 10-Q, Bear Stearns continued to tell users of its\nfinancial statements \"Actual credit losses on retained interests have not been significant,\" which\nwas entirely misleading. Bear Stearns repeated this disclosure through the time of its collapse.\n395. Despite these escalating losses, Bear Stearns holdings of RIs continued to grow in\nboth the quarter ended May 31, 2007 and August 31, 2007, ultimately reaching $9.6 billion -\nnearly two times the levels at which it had reported to the SEC that it was planning to take the\nopposi\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/110 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=110]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 112 of 347\n396. One of the important disclosures made by Bear Stearns concerning its RIs was\nthat it quickly divested the related risks to the market. For example, it disclosed that the\nweighted average holding period for RIs was 150 days as of November 30, 2006. Accordingly,\nit is important to put the losses Bear Stearns was incurring in the context of the brief reported\nholding period.\n397. Specifically, if Bear Stearns had incurred total losses on RIs in excess of $400\nmillion by May 31, 2007 even though its holding periods were only 150 days, Bear Stearns\nshould have given appropriate consideration to the loss implications of potentially longer holding\nperiods. The reality confronting Bear Stearns at that moment in time was that the market\nliquidity for RIs was evaporating. For example, in the quarter ended February 28, 2007, Bear\nStearns reported that the new issue volume had decreased 11.9% compared to the prior year.\nAlthough Bear Stearns did not measure the decline in volume in the May 2007 quarter, it\nobserved revenues from its mortgage-related business \"decline significantly.\"\n398. Moreover, as an originator of the mortgages underlying the RIs, Bear Stearns\nknew that valuation of the RIs was at serious risk because it was contingent on the assumption of\nhome prices staying level or in any event not decreasing. Specifically, because of the risk of\npayment shock at the time of the initial interest rate reset (e.g., the risk described in both the\nARA and broadly by the federal financial regulatory agencies), it was well-understood that\nborrowers would need to be able to refinance, which would at a minimum avoid principal losses\nto RI holders. The ability to refinance rested on the continued availability of nonprime financing\nor an accumulation of equity in the home. Even in early 2007, neither of these conditions was\nevident.\n97\n97\nEFTA00316825\n", "char_count": 1940}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 113 of 347\n399. In fact, as described above, Bear Stearns knew that (1) losses would rise higher\ninto the RMBS tranche structures than initially expected; (2) RMBS (and CDO) credit ratings\nwere no longer valid, because each tranche was not as far removed from real loss as its\noriginally-assigned ratings indicated; and (3) the consequences would actually be most drastic\nfor RIs (i.e., the aspect of the structured financing closest to encroaching mortgage losses).\n400. The market for residential mortgage-related securities in these periods was in\nsystematic decline by February of 2007. This decline suggested that Bear Stearns' holdings of\nRIS were already illiquid. Moreover, at least until the quarter ended May 31, 2007, Bear Stearns\ncontinued to originate risky non-agency related mortgages pursuant to its relaxed lending\nstandards. Accordingly, when the balance of RIs grew from November of 2006 through May of\n2007, the resulting RIs generated were of the highest risk of loss.\n401. In addition to the general economically adverse valuation factors for RIs, Bear\nStearns' pricing models for mortgage securities, which would have included RIs, were not\nreliable, and yielded overstated valuations. In particular, its \"Non-Investment Grade\" RIs, which\nincluded those RIs with credit ratings below BBB-, were overstated (i.e., amounts of at least $1.3\nbillion in all periods from February 28, 2007 onwards). As an example of the faulty credit\nratings, Bear Stearns reported in February of 2008 that it held $2.0 billion of retained interest in\nsubprime ARM loans. Nevertheless, the Non-Investment Grade RIs totaled only $1.3 billion.\nTherefore, even assuming that all of the subprime ARM loans were Non-Investment Grade, Bear\nStearns attributed Investment Grade or higher credit ratings to at least $700 million of subprime\nRIS.\n98\nEFTA00316826\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 114 of 347\n402.\nC.\nGAAP Violations Related to Failure to Appropriately\nDetermine the Fair Value of Financial Instruments\nIn December of 1993, the FASB issued SFAS No. 115 Accounting for Certain\nInvestments in Debt and Equity (\"SFAS 115\"). SFAS 115 addresses the accounting and\nreporting for all investments in debt securities. Those investments are to be classified in three\ncategories: (1) trading, (2) available-for-sale, and (3) held for investment (SFAS 115¶6). The\naccounting treatment for the specific investments depended upon its classification.\n403. Bear Stearns treated its financial instruments as trading securities. As a result,\nBear Stearns was required to report its financial instruments at fair value and included all\nunrealized gains and losses in earnings (SFAS 115 ¶ 12). Bear Stearns reported the periodic\nfluctuations in the fair value of its financial instruments in its income statements within the\nrevenue line-item Principal Transactions. In the MD&A portion of its SEC filings, Bear Stearns\nfurther stratified revenue from Principal Transactions into (a) Fixed Income and (b) Equities.\nBear Stearns reported revenue from mortgage securitizations as well as the unrealized gains and\nlosses from the fluctuations in the fair value of its financial instruments in the Fixed Income\ncomponent of Principal Transactions.\n404. When the fair value of an investment is not readily available, there are several\nmethods available to financial statement preparers to determine the fair value, including the use\nof pricing models (FASB Staff Implementation Guide for SFAS 115, Question 59). In these\ninstances, GAAP observes that it is important for a preparer to use the best information available\nin the circumstances to determine fair value.\n405. As a basis for its conclusions, SFAS 115 observed \"Measuring investments at fair\nvalue is relevant and useful to present and potential investors, creditors, and others in making\nra\n... [truncated, 2116 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/113 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=113]", "char_count": 2116}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 115 of 347\ndiscussed in FAS Con No.1, Objectives of Financial Reporting in Business Enterprises.\" (SFAS\n115 [39) Moreover, SFAS 115 noted \"...some depository institutions have failed, or\nexperienced impairment of earnings or capital, because of speculative securities activities and\nthat other institutions have experienced an erosion of the liquidity of their securities portfolios as\na result of decreases in the market value of those securities. In a liquidity shortage, the fair value\nof investments, rather than their amortized cost, is the amount available to cover an enterprise's\nobligations.\" (SFAS 11541) This characterization of the need to reliably determine and report\nfair value was consistent with the predicament of Bear Stearns. In other words, market\nparticipants knew that Bear Stearns held speculative securities. And, once the market began to\ndoubt the legitimacy of Bear Stearns' valuation claims, its liquidity evaporated.\n406. In September of 2006, the FASB issued SFAS No. 157, \"Fair Value\nMeasurements\" (\"SFAS 157\"), which became effective for financial statements issued for fiscal\nyears beginning after November 15, 2007. However, early adoption was permitted if the entity\nhad not yet issued financial statements for that fiscal year. In its 2006 Form 10-K, Bear Stearns\ndisclosed that it would adopt SFAS 157 early in the first quarter of fiscal 2007.\n407. SFAS 157 established a definition of fair value within GAAP as \"the price that\nwould be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between\nmarket participants at the measurement date.\" (SFAS 1575) This standard also clarified that a\nfair value measurement assumes that the asset or liability is exchanged in an orderly transaction\nbetween market participants to sell the asset or transfer the liability at the measurement date. An\norderly transaction is a transaction that assumes exposure to the market for a period\n... [truncated, 2224 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/114 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=114]", "char_count": 2224}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 116 of 347\nthis definition of fair value was not conceptually different than the definition found in previous\naccounting literature in that it remained focused on the assumptions marketplace participants\nwould use in pricing the asset or liability.\n408. This standard also established a framework for measuring fair value and required\nenhanced disclosures about fair value measurements. It also requires companies to disclose the\nfair value of its financial instruments according to a fair value hierarchy. The fair value\nhierarchy ranks the quality and reliability of the information used to determine fair values.\nFinancial instruments carried at fair value are required to be classified and disclosed in one of the\nthree categories of the hierarchy (SFAS 15722-30):\n(a)\nLevel 1: Quoted market prices for identical assets or liabilities in active\nmarkets.\n(b)\nLevel 2: Observable market-based inputs or unobservable inputs that are\ncorroborated by market data.\n(c) Level 3: Unobservable inputs that are not corroborated by market.\n409. Companies such as Bear Stearns that reported Level 3 assets or liabilities were\nrequired to provide enhanced disclosure regarding the activities of those financial instruments.\n410. In its 2006 Form 10-K, Bear Stearns disclosed that it did not expect the adoption\nof SFAS 157 to have a material impact on the consolidated financial statements of the Company.\nIn part, this particular disclosure was likely attributable to the fact that Bear Stearns had\npreviously reported in its SEC filings that it aggregated its financial instruments in three broad\ncategories, each of which resembled the stratifications subsequently required by SFAS 157.\nBear Stearns had also provided specific disclosure of the aggregate dollar value of financial\ninstruments aggregated into the third category (i.e., \"Financial Instruments Whose Fair Value Is\n101\nEFTA00316829\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 117 of 347\nEstimated Based on Internally Developed Models or Methodologies Utilizing Significant\nAssumptions or Other Data That Are Generally Less Readily Observable from Objective\nSources\").\n411.\nIn October 2007, the Center for Audit Quality (\"CAQ\"), which is associated with\nthe AICPA, published an audit alert (\"whitepaper\") entitled \"Measurements of Fair Value in\nIlliquid (Or Less Liquid) Markets.\" This whitepaper similarly observed that the implementation\nof SFAS 157 was likely to have only a minimal effect on most entities.\n412. Throughout the Class Period, “Financial instruments owned, at fair value\" was the\nlargest balance sheet line item in Bear Stearns' financial statements, typically comprising one\nthird of the Company's total assets. \"Mortgages, mortgage- and asset-backed\" securities, in turn,\nwere the largest component of Financial instruments owned, making up at least thirty percent of\nthe Company's financial instruments from the first quarter of 2005 onwards. This proportion\npeaked at 39.1% of Bear Stearns' total financial instruments, or about $57.5 billion, as of\nFebruary 28, 2007.\n413. Bear Stearns' leverage caused its fair value measurements to have significant\nimplications to its financial instruments. Specifically, even minor adverse changes in its fair\nvalue assumptions had potentially devastating consequences for Bear Stearns' reported revenues.\nAs an example, during all periods from the first quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2007,\nBear Stearns' revenue from Principal Transactions ranged from $1.1 billion to $1.5 billion.\nThese amounts were critically important to Bear Stearns' reported revenues during these periods,\ntypically one-third of amounts reported. However, if the fair value of only its mortgage-related\nfinancial instruments was reduced by an amount of even 3%, all of its reported Principal\nTransactions revenue would have been wiped out. Any adverse adjustment to the fair v\n... [truncated, 2025 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/116 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=116]", "char_count": 2025}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 118 of 347\nmortgage-related securities in excess of 3% would have caused reported revenue from Principal\nTransactions to turn negative.\n414. As described further below, starting at least by November of 2004, Bear Stearns\nconsistently disclosed the dollar value of certain assets whose value had been established using\ninternally-developed models (consistent with Level 3 in SFAS 157 vernacular). As a percentage\nof total financial instruments, the Company's total Level 3 assets grew rapidly from 11% of its\ntotal financial instruments in the fourth quarter of 2006 to 29% of its total financial instruments\nby the first quarter of 2008. Accordingly, throughout the Class Period, Bear Stearns was valuing\nat least 11%, and up to 29%, of its financial instruments using valuation models devised by the\nCompany and dependent upon significant assumptions established by management.\n415. Bear Stearns revealed for the first time in its quarterly results for the fourth\nquarter of 2007 that mortgage securities, valued using the Company's mortgage valuation\nmodels, comprised approximately 70% of all its Level 3 financial instruments. Level 3\nresidential mortgage-related assets totaled at least $5.8 billion and $7.5 billion as of August 31,\n2007 and November 30, 2007, respectively.\n416. In addition, in all periods from at least the first quarter of 2007 through its\ncollapse in March of 2008, Bear Stearns reported that Level 2 assets were in excess of $60\nbillion and comprised at least 50% of reported financial instruments owned. Bear Stearns\ndisclosed that Level 2 assets consisted of \"financial instruments for which the Company does not\nreceive quoted prices; therefore, models or other methodologies are utilized to value these\nfinancial instruments.\" Since the reported fair value of Level 2 assets was also significantly\ndependent on valuation models, any flaws in those models had potentially devastating ripple\n103\nEFTA00316831\n", "char_count": 1995}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 119 of 347\neffects. As of November 30, 2007, Bear Stearns reported that it held $28.9 billion of Level 2\nmortgage-related securities.\n417.\nAs described above, the SEC determined that Bear Stearns' mortgage valuation\nmodels, among other things, failed to incorporate indicators of declines in the house market. In\nlight of these defects and the downturn of the housing market during the Class Period, it was\nvirtually inevitable that an overstatement of these assets, especially those Level 3 assets, would\noccur.\n418.\nd.\nBear Stearns Failed to Provide Adequate\nDisclosure About Risk and Uncertainties\nBear Stearns was also required to provide disclosure about risk and uncertainties\nrelated to its financial statements. These disclosures were guided in part by the AICPA's\nStatement of Position 94-6, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties (\"SOP 94-\n6\"). In particular, Bear Stearns was required to disclose any vulnerability or risk inherent to its\nfinancial statements as a result of concentrations of risk. (SOP 94-620) The concentrations\nhighlighted include “revenue from particular products, services, or fund-raising events. The\npotential for the severe impact can result, for example, from volume or price changes or the loss\nof patent protection for the particular source of revenue.\" (SOP 94-622)\n419. These concentration disclosures are related precisely to the issues constituted by\nBear Stearns' holdings of mortgage-related securities, and specifically subprime and CDO-\nrelated securities. During 2007, Bear Stearns' periodic SEC filings contain only fleeting\nreferences to its concentration of exposure to subprime investments. For example, in the first\nquarter of 2007, Bear Stearns reported that it subprime activities \"have historically represented\nonly a small portion of the Company's mortgage activities.\"\n104\nEFTA00316832\n", "char_count": 1919}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 120 of 347\n420. The 2006 Form 10-K stated that Bear Stearns\" \"Maximum Exposure to Loss\" to\nCDOs was $211.1 million. In its Form 10-Q for the first quarter of 2007, Bear Stearns reported\nthat its maximum exposure to CDOs had been reduced to $174.2 million. And, at the end of the\nsecond quarter of 2007, the Company's Form 10-Q still only quantified $270.6 million of\nexposure to CDOS.\n421. By the third quarter of 2007, however, simultaneous to the initial public\ndisclosure of its valuation markdowns, Bear Stearns stated that its maximum exposure to loss on\nCDOs had risen to $631 million. This exposure was present even after $700 million of\nmarkdowns to mortgage-related assets had been recorded in the quarter ended August 2007.\nBear Stearns' exposure to CDOs was growing at a time when its risk management function when\nprudent risk management should have been reducing CDO exposure.\n422. In contrast to its quantifications of reported maximum exposure, the Company\nrecorded writedowns of $2.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007, of which CDOs were a \"large\ncomponent.\" Even assuming that 50% of the markdowns were a “large component,\" the\nimplication is that Bear Stearns understated its disclosed exposure to CDOs by a factor of two\n(i.e., $631 million maximum exposure at August 31, 2007 and a $1.2 billion write-down). After\nthose write-downs, Bear Stearns reported that its maximum remaining exposure to CDOS as of\nNovember 30, 2007 was $409 million. Yet, once again, in the first quarter, Bear Stearns\nrecorded $600 million of valuation markdowns although the Company's disclosure of the\nspecific assets subject to the markdowns was ambiguous.\n423. Bear Stearns' failure to provide meaningful disclosures of the concentrations of\nrisk it had to the subprime and CDO market were particularly glaring in light of the failures of its\nhedge funds, which as described above, focused on CDO and CDO-related investments. Thus, it\n105\nEF\n... [truncated, 2011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/119 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=119]", "char_count": 2011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 121 of 347\nis logical that the SEC pursued more detailed disclosure from Bear Stearns via its comment letter\nrelated to its financial filings shortly after the failure of those hedge funds. In all likelihood, the\nSEC sought to ensure that public investors, unlike the hedge fund investors, were aware of risk\nconcentrations present in the Company's financial statements. Indeed, this finding was presented\nin the 2008 OIG Report.\ne.\nBear Stearns Failed to Provide Reliable Disclosures\nto Investors in Accordance with SEC Regulations\n424. In addition to the financial statement disclosures described above, Bear Stearns\nwas also required to provide certain additional information in the Management's Discussion &\nAnalysis (\"MD&A\") section of its SEC filings. (Regulation S-K $229.303(a)) The SEC\nrequired, among other considerations that \"The registrant's discussion and analysis shall be of\nthe financial statements and of other statistical data that the registrant believes will enhance a\nreader's understanding of its financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of\noperations.\" (Instruction 1) The SEC also required \"The purpose of the discussion and analysis\nshall be to provide to investors and other users information relevant to an assessment of the\nfinancial condition and results of operations of the registrant. (Instruction 2) \"\n425. MD&A is also required to \"focus specifically on material events and uncertainties\nknown to management that would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily\nindicative of future operating results or of future financial condition.\"\n426. As described above, Bear Stearns' MD&A included disclosures of the amounts it\nreported as VaR as well as certain accompanying details, which as described above was among\nthe most closely watched performance indicators by users of its financial statements. As\nreported, Bear Stearns' VaR was lower than that of its peers, which su\n... [truncated, 2140 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/120 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=120]", "char_count": 2140}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 122 of 347\nmanagement reported as VaR were materially misleading because its VaR models were\ndefective. Thus, Bear Stearns' VaR failed to comply with SEC Regulations.\nN.\nBear Stearns' Practices Violated Banking Regulations\n427. In its Forms 10-K filed for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Bear Stearns stated that\n\"the Company is in compliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements.\" This statement was\nmaterially false and misleading.\n428. In fact, during the Class Period, while Bear Stearns offered regulators data\nshowing that it apparently met the CSE program's 10% minimum net capital requirements, the\nCompany was only able to achieve this result by repeatedly violating regulatory requirements\nrelating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, the\nCompany violated these rules by (i) failing to take appropriate capital charges related to its\ncollapsed hedge funds; (ii) inflating its profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets\nsubject to mark disputes; and (iii) falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading VaR\nmodels to calculate capital requirements.\n1.\nOverview of Capital Requirements\n429. Net capital, the value of a firm's assets less the value of its liabilities, is at the\ncore of any bank's operations. The more net capital a firm has, the better equipped it is to cover\nany unexpected losses.\n430. Capital requirements are one way of ensuring that banks hold sufficient net capital\nat all times to meet unexpected losses. The principal sources of loss are market risks, credit risks\nand operational risks. Capital requirements provide that a certain amount be set aside to cover\npotential risk for each kind of loss. These amounts, taken together with adjustments for hedging\nor diversification, are called capital charges. If the total capital charge is greater than the firm's\n107\nEFTA00316835\n", "char_count": 1934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 123 of 347\nminimum required net capital, the firm needs either to raise more capital or reduce some of its\nrisk.\n431. Registered broker-dealers are subject to the Net Capital Rule (Rule 15c3-1) (the\n\"Net Capital Rule\") under the Exchange Act. The Net Capital Rule, which specifies minimum\nnet capital requirements for registered broker-dealers, was designed to measure the general\nfinancial integrity and liquidity of broker-dealers and requires that at least a minimal portion of a\nbroker-dealer's assets be kept in relatively liquid form.\n432.\nUnder the Net Capital Rule, Bear Stearns was required to maintain a minimum net\ncapital ratio of 10% - that is, Bear Stearns was required to maintain at least ten percent of its\nassets in cash or in securities that could be easily converted to cash. If the overall value the\nassets Bear Stearns maintained on its books went up, then its net capital requirements went up as\nwell.\n433. Upon Bear Stearns' approval as a CSE on December 1, 2005, the SEC permitted\nBear Stearns to use a specified alternative method for calculating net capital in exchange for\nBear Stearns' compliance with requirements of the CSE program.\n434. According to the SEC's Release No. 34-49830 \"[u]nder the alternative method,\nfirms with strong internal risk management practices may utilize mathematical modeling\nmethods already used to manage their own business risk, including value-at-risk (\"VaR\") models\nand scenario analysis, for regulatory purposes,\" The release explains that the purpose of the\nalternative method of computing net capital is \"to permit regulated companies to align their\nsupervisory risk management practices and regulatory capital requirements more closely.\"\n435. The conditions of Bear Stearns' participation in the program and the alternative\nmanner in which it was permitted to calculate net capital is set out in Appendices E and G to the\n108\nEFTA00316836\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 124 of 347\nNet Capital Rule. Appendices E and G permit the calculation of capital charges for market risk\nand derivative-related credit risk based on mathematical models, in a manner \"consistent with the\nstandards ('Basel Standards') adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (*Basel\nCommittee')\".\n2.\nBear Stearns Failed to Take Timely and Adequate Capital Charges\n436. As the 2008 OIG Report points out, Bear Stearns' treatment of its hedge fund\nbailout ran afoul of the Basel II standards relating to capital charges. In light of Appendix E's\nadoption of this standard, the Company's treatment of the hedge fund bailout violated the SEC's\nNet Capital Rule 1 as well.\n437. Basel II requires that “[w]hen a bank has been found to provide implicit support\nto a securitization, it will be required to hold capital against all of the underlying exposures\nassociated with the structure as if they had not been securitized.\"\n438. The 2008 OIG Report pointed out that the High Yield Fund was financially\ndistressed, and that the terms of the bailout repo agreement had resulted in the Company's\nassumption of all of the risk, and none of the possible upside, relating to the collateral it had\nreceived in the transaction. Accordingly, the 2008 OIG Report concluded, \"Bear Stearns\nfinancing of the BSAM funds is conceptually similar to implicit support.\"\n439. The OIG explained that:\nSince Bear Stearns bore all of the downside risks, sound risk\nmanagement (consistent with Basel II) requires that the impact on\nBear Stearns' capital associated with these reports should have\n7 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an institution created by the central bank\nGovernors of the Group of Ten nations. It was created in 1974 and meets regularly four times a year.\nThe Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking\nsupervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key superv\n... [truncated, 2115 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/123 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=123]", "char_count": 2115}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 125 of 347\nbeen at least as great as the impact Bear Stearns would incur if it\nheld that assets in its own trading book at the end of June 2007.\n440. Bear Stearns failed to take an appropriate charge against capital when it provided\nthe credit facility to the High Grade Fund. The 2008 OIG Report states \"TM memoranda\nsummarizing discussions with Bear Stearns' risk managers suggest that the capital charge\nincurred by Bear Stearns at the end of June 2007 was far less than the capital charge consistent\nwith sound risk management.\"\n441. That is to say, by failing to include the Hedge Fund collateral on its books, Bear\nStearns was able to avoid having to increase the amount of net capital it needed to maintain in\norder to meet the CSE's program's 10% ratio.\n3.\nInflation of Capital By Using Incorrect Marks\n442. The 2008 OIG Report also explains that Bear Stearns' accounting treatment of\ncertain assets subject to mark disputes resulted in violations of capital rules.\n443. As the 2008 OIG Report explains, fair values of positions relating to derivative\ntransactions are used in estimating the capital charges and capital requirements corresponding to\nthe transactions.\n444.\nAs set out in paragraphs 222 to 226 above, in the summer of 2007, mark disputes\nbetween Bear Stearns and its repo counterparties became more and more common. As a result of\nthese disputes, the Company made repeated concessions to its counterparties regarding the value\nof assets it offered as collateral. These amounts were sometimes very large, as in Company's\nMarch 12, 2008 payment of $1.1 billion to its counterparties detailed in paragraph 278 above.\n445. The 2008 OIG Report explains that \"there are indications in the TM memoranda\nthat Bear Stearns tended to use the traders' more generous marks for profit and loss purposes,\neven when Bear Stearns conceded to the counterparty for collateral valuation purposes.\" This\n110\nEFTA00316838\n", "char_count": 1980}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 126 of 347\npermitted Bear Stearns to record a gain on its books even while it conceded a loss in the dispute\nwith the counterparty.\n446. The OIG states that \"it is inconsistent with the spirit of Basel II for two firms to\nuse a mark dispute as an occasion to increase their combined capital, as would occur when both\nparties to a trade book profit at the expense of the other simply because they each mark positions\nfavorably for themselves.\" In such a circumstance neither party would be acknowledging the\nreduction in the value of the disputed asset.\n447. As a result of its inflation of the value of the disputed assets, Bear Stearns was\nable to overstate its capital for the purposes of calculating its net capital requirement.\nMisrepresentations to Regulators Relating to VaR\n448.\n4.\nBecause net capital turns on an accurate assessment of the risks facing a company,\nthe reliability of models used to estimate risk, such as VaR, are crucial to determining\nappropriate capital charges and the calculation of net capital.\n449. Appendix E to the Net Capital Rule required Bear Stearns to submit to the SEC,\non a monthly basis, \"[a] graph reflecting, for each business line, the daily intra-month VaR.\"\n450. Moreover, under Appendix E of the Net Capital Rule, Bear Stearns was obliged to\nreview its VaR models both periodically and annually. The periodic review could be conducted\nby the broker's or dealer's internal audit staff, but the annual review had to be conducted by a\nregistered public accounting firm.\n451. As described in paragraphs 100 to 105 above, the SEC repeatedly warned Bear\nStearns that the VaR models it used to calculate net capital did not consider fundamental factors\nincluding changes in housing prices, consumer credit scores, patterns of delinquency rates, and\nother key data. Accordingly, throughout the Class Period the net capital the Company reported\nto the regulators was misleading and inaccurate.\n111\nEFTA0031\n... [truncated, 2005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/125 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=125]", "char_count": 2005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 127 of 347\n452.\nMoreover, neither the Company nor its auditor, Deloitte, performed adequate\nreviews of key inputs into VaR during the Class Period. Indeed, according to the OIG, \"reviews\nof mortgage models that should have taken place before the subprime crisis erupted in February\nof 2007 appear to have never occurred.\"\nV.\nDEFENDANTS' SCIENTER\nA.\nJames E. Cayne\n453. As Chief Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board, and director, Defendant\nCayne participated in the issuance of, signed and certified Bear Stearns' materially false and\nmisleading SEC filings, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, issued during the Class Period through\nJanuary 8, 2008, when he was forced to resign as CEO.\n454. Specifically, in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007, Cayne\ncertified that he had put in place disclosure controls and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the\nCompany's filings, and that he had:\nhe had:\n455.\nDesigned such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such\ndisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our\nsupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the\nregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known\nto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period\nin which this report is being prepared.\nAlso in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007, Cayne certified that\nDesigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial\nstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally\naccepted accounting principles[.]\n112\nEFTA00316840\n", "char_count": 1795}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 128 of 347\n456. These disclosure controls, together with his position as the Company's CEO,\nmeant that Cayne was aware that the Company had been warned by the SEC in 2005 and 2006\nthat its mortgage valuation and VaR modeling failed to reflect key indicators in the housing\nmarket.\n457. Indeed, according to a February 8, 2008 presentation by Defendant Molinaro to a\nCredit Suisse Financial Services Forum, the Company's CEO was \"intimately engaged in the\nrisk management process.\"\n458. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Cayne also made a number of materially\nfalse and misleading statements regarding Bear Stearns' ABS exposure as well as the\neffectiveness of its risk monitoring procedures.\n459. Bear Stearns' acquisition and aggressive trading of risky ABS assets was fostered\nby Cayne who implemented a business strategy that required Bear Stearns to become an industry\nleader in the origination and securitization of ABS, including MBS. It was Cayne who guided\nBear Stearns' entrance into debt securitization. However, as Bear Stearns was increasing its\nexposure to risk, Cayne knew it was doing so without effective policies and controls to ensure\nthat Bear Stearns' exposure to risk was accurately communicated to its investors in direct\ncontrast to its public statements. Cayne was aware, or recklessly disregarded, the weaknesses in\nBear Stearns' reporting and risk management processes.\n460. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Stearns' growth and\nconcomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Cayne\nknew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns' risk control models were severely\nflawed and not up-to-date. Moreover, Cayne knew, or was reckless in not knowing that,\naccording to the SEC Inspector General, Bear Stearns' own risk managers did not have an\n113\nEFTA00316841\n", "char_count": 1916}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 129 of 347\nexpertise in the very assets upon which Bear Stearns had focused its investment strategy.\nFurther, Cayne knew, or was reckless in disregarding, the fact that Bear Stearns publicly\ndisclosed VaR was far below the industry average, even as Bear Stearns' concentration of risky\nABS was the highest in the investment banking community.\n461. Cayne was aware of the Company's $1.3 billion bailout of the High Grade Fund.\nCayne knew of the toxic assets housed in the High Grade Fund and knew, or recklessly\ndisregarded, that the Company should have taken an immediate charge against net capital after it\ntook the High Grade Fund's collateral onto its own books. As alleged in paragraph 216, instead\nof immediately reflecting its assumption of the declining collateral onto its books, the Company\nwaited months. By doing so, the SEC Inspector General stated, Bear Stearns was able \"to delay\ntaking a huge hit to capital.\"\n462. Cayne also knew of Bear Stearns' stated reliance on GAAP accounting, and\nbanking standards such as the Basel II Standards, but either ignored them or recklessly\ndisregarded them. For example, Cayne was aware of the FAS 157 requirement to accurately\nmark values to their market prices, and was further aware that Bear Stearns was not in\ncompliance, because it either had no way of doing so, or had flawed models which rendered its\nfinancial statements false and misleading. Likewise, although Bear Stearns maintained a capital\ncushion which was barely compliant with SEC guidelines, Cayne was aware that this cushion\nwas the bare minimum required and, due to Bear Stearns' tremendous leverage, would not\nprotect Bear Stearns in the event that creditors made margin calls caused by declining asset\nvalues.\n8\nSchwartz testified to Congress that their capital cushion was, at times, well above the SEC\nrequirement.\n114\nEFTA00316842\n", "char_count": 1914}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 130 of 347\n463. Cayne was so involved in the Company's failed business strategy - a business\nstrategy that he knew, but failed to disclose to the market, was flawed - that when his resignation\nwas announced, Bear Stearns share price plunged nearly 7%.\nB.\n464.\nAlan D. Schwartz\nAs Chief Executive Officer, Co-President, Co-Chief Operating Officer, and\ndirector of Bear Stearns, Defendant Schwartz participated in the issuance of, and signed and\ncertified as accurate and complete as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, Bear Stearns' materially false\nand misleading SEC filings issued during the Class Period. Schwartz became sole President on\nAugust 5, 2007, and remained in that position until January of 2008, when he replaced Cayne as\nCEO. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Schwartz signed the Company's materially false\nand misleading Forms 10-K for the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years.\n465. According to a February 8, 2008 presentation by Defendant Molinaro to a Credit\nSuisse Financial Services Forum, Schwartz, the Company's CEO, was \"intimately engaged in\nthe risk management process.\" Accordingly, Schwartz was aware that the Company had twice\nbeen warned by the SEC that its mortgage valuation and risk modeling failed to reflect key\nindicators in the housing market. Despite this knowledge, Schwartz signed SEC filings setting\nout, among other things, the value of level three assets and the Company's VaR, as described in\nparagraphs 589 to 790 below.\n466. Moreover, as alleged in [274 to 278 above, Schwartz offered false reassurances\nto the public while the Company's liquidity plummeted the week of March 10, 2008. On March\n10, 2008, the Company's liquidity pool had stood at $18.1 billion. By the close of March 11,\n2008, it had declined to $11.5 billion - a one-day loss of more than $6 billion.\n467. Feeling pressure to dupe the market into that Bear Stearns did not have a liquidity\nproblem, Schwartz appeared on CNBC the morning of Ma\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/129 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=129]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 131 of 347\nparagraph 274, Schwartz stated, \"We finished the year, and we reported that we had $17 billion\nof cash sitting at the bank's parent company as a liquidity cushion. As the year has gone on, that\nliquidity cushion has been virtually unchanged.\" Schwartz added, \"We don't see any pressure on\nour liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis.\"\n468. The next day, the Company's liquidity stood at about $2 billion. Accordingly,\nwhile Schwartz was speaking, nearly ten billion dollars of liquidity was evaporating from Bear\nStearns.\n469. Moreover, Schwartz also knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear\nStearns' counterparties were deserting the Company. As alleged in paragraphs 266, 269, and\n271, ING Groep NV informed Bear Stearns that it was pulling about $500 million in financing;\nbanks were refusing to issue any further credit protection on the Company's debt; and Goldman\nSachs, once a principal source of cash for the Company, had at least temporarily halted covering\nany more Bear Stearns risk. This in turn lead other Bear Stearns counterparties to refuse to lend\nto the Company.\n470.\nMoreover, as the Company's CEO, Schwartz knew or was reckless in not\nknowing that on March 6, 2008, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told\nthe brokerage that it wouldn't renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week.\nC.\nSamuel L. Molinaro, Jr.\n471. As Chief Financial Officer during the Class Period, and as of August 5, 2007\nChief Operating Officer of Bear Stearns, Defendant Molinaro participated in the issuance of,\nsigned and certified as accurate and complete as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Bear\nStearns' materially false and misleading SEC filings issued during the Class Period.\n116\nEFTA00316844\n", "char_count": 1799}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 132 of 347\n472. Specifically, in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007, Molinaro\ncertified that he had put in place disclosure controls and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the\nCompany's filings, and that he had:\n473.\nthat he had:\nDesigned such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such\ndisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our\nsupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the\nregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known\nto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period\nin which this report is being prepared.\nAlso in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007 Molinaro certified\nDesigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial\nstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally\naccepted accounting principles[.]\n474. Moreover, according to a February, 2008 presentation given by Molinaro himself\nto Credit Suisse analysts, the Company's risk management structure reported directly to him.\n475. As alleged above in paragraphs 106,167 and 175, Molinaro knew, or recklessly\ndisregarded, that Bear Stearns' internal controls were virtually non-existent with respect to risk\nmanagement over MBS valuation and VaR. As CFO of the Company and the head of its risk\nmanagement structure, Molinaro knew about, or recklessly disregarded the existence of, the\nSEC's warnings about serious deficiencies in the Company's mortgage valuation and VaR\nmodels. As alleged in paragraph 102, during the CSE application process, the SEC told Principal\nAccounting Officer Jeffrey Farber - Molinaro's direct report that \"[w]e believe that it would\nbe highly desirable for independent Model Review to carry out detailed reviews of \n... [truncated, 2206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/131 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=131]", "char_count": 2206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 133 of 347\nto Defendant Farber, who reported directly to Molinaro. The disclosure controls and procedures\nthat Molinaro purportedly put in place should have informed him that the SEC found the\nCompany's risk management metrics deficient.\n476. The degree to which the SEC Inspector General found Bear Stearns' internal\ncontrols to be deficient raises the strong inference that Molinaro could not have believed, or\nrecklessly disregarded the truth of, his Sarbanes-Oxley Act certification of the Company's\ninternal controls.\n477. As Bear Stearns' CFO, and COO starting August 5, 2007, Defendant Molinaro\nparticipated in the issuance of, signed and certified Bear Stearns' materially false and misleading\nSEC filings as accurate and complete, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley. During the Class Period,\nMolinaro signed and certified Bear Stearns' Form 10-Qs and Form 10-Ks filed with the SEC,\nand throughout the Class Period, Molinaro conducted quarterly earnings conference calls with\nshareholders and investors and made a number of materially false and misleading statements\nregarding Bear Stearns' ABS exposure as well as its risk-monitoring infrastructure.\n478. As Bear Stearns' CFO, Molinaro was responsible for monitoring Bear Stearns\ninternal controls and reporting the Company's risks. In an investment bank such as Bear Stearns,\na CFO must be fully aware of the bank's own securities because the CFO is responsible for\nobtaining the financing to purchase them. Therefore, Molinaro could not have been ignorant\nabout the existence, size and nature of Bear Stearns risky positions without having been reckless\nin his ignorance. As the CFO of a major investment bank, Molinaro was acutely aware of the\nFair Value reporting requirements and had purportedly implemented them at Bear Stearns.\nDuring the Class Period, Molinaro knowingly and recklessly caused Bear Stearns to issue and\nfile financial statements and reports with the SEC that stated \n... [truncated, 2051 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/132 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=132]", "char_count": 2051}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 134 of 347\naccounting standards in line with GAAP requirements when, in fact, Bear Stearns was not\ncomplying with GAAP through its failure to accurately value the MBS and CDOs it carried on\nits books.\n479. Thus, while Molinaro was assuring analysts and the market that Bear Stearns had\nnot suffered from any adverse marks in the mortgage area and its hedging activities, he knew or\nwas reckless in not knowing that Bear Stearns was heavily exposed to deteriorating market\nconditions.\n480. Subsequent to the Hedge Funds' collapse, on November 14, 2007, Molinaro\nstated that Bear Stearns would write down $1.2 billion of its subprime holdings in the fourth\nquarter. However, Molinaro attempted to reassure investors by claiming that, in spite of the fact\nthat Bear Stearns still bore more than a billion dollars of subprime exposure in the form of the\ncollateral it had received from the failed High Grade Fund, Bear Stearns had reduced its CDO\nholdings to $884 million as of November 9, 2007 from $2.07 billion at the end of August 2007.\nMolinaro claimed that during the period between August 31, 2007 and November 9, 2007, the\nCompany significantly increased its short subprime exposure. However, Molinaro knew, or was\nreckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns' valuation models could not accurately value the CDO\nand subprime exposure which he was allegedly \"disclosing\" to the market. It became further\napparent to Molinaro that the figures disclosed to the market were inaccurate when,\nnotwithstanding Molinaro's assurance just weeks before that the Company's hedging efforts had\nresulted in a net negative exposure to subprime assets, on December 20, 2007, the Company\nwrote down $1.9 billion of its holdings in mortgages and mortgage-based securities - over $700\nmillion more than it had announced on November 14, 2007. On November 14, 2007, Molinaro\nknew this additional write down was necessary, or was reckless in not knowing.\n119\nEFTA\n... [truncated, 2009 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/133 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=133]", "char_count": 2009}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 135 of 347\n481. As CFO, Molinaro also knew of Bear Stearns' stated reliance on GAAP\naccounting and banking standards such as the Basel II Standards but either ignored them or\nrecklessly disregarded them. For example, Molinaro was aware of the SFAS 157 requirement to\naccurately mark values to their market prices, but was aware that Bear Stearns had flawed\nmodels for doing so which necessarily rendered its financial statements false and misleading.\nWarren J. Spector\nD.\n482. As Co-President and Co-Chief Operating Officer and a director of Bear Stearns,\nDefendant Spector participated in the issuance of, signed and certified as accurate and complete\nas required by Sarbanes-Oxley, Bear Stearns' materially false and misleading SEC filings issued\nduring the Class Period. Spector, due to his active involvement in the collapse of the Hedge\nFunds, resigned his position on August 5, 2007 but remained a Bear Stearns employee and held\nthe title of Senior Managing Director. During his tenure as Co-President and co-COO, all\ndivisions of the firm save investment banking reported to Spector, including the Hedge Funds.\nThroughout the Class Period, Defendant Spector made a number of materially false and\nmisleading statements regarding Bear Stearns' ABS exposure as well as the effectiveness of its\nrisk monitoring procedures.\n483. Spector, due to his position as co-COO overseeing the Company's vertically-\nintegrated mortgage business, was in a unique position to understand the subprime mortgage\nmarket. As alleged in paragraph 143, disasters in a U.K. mortgage subsidiary brought home to\nthe Company the threat posed by lax underwriting standards to the values of its mortgages and\nmortgage-backed assets. Between April and June of 2006, the Company faced repeated crises in\nits United Kingdom subsidiary as a result of poor performance of U.K. loans due to weak\nunderwriting standards. As a result, the Company was left holding some $1.5 bi\n... [truncated, 2118 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/134 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=134]", "char_count": 2118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 136 of 347\nhead of model valuation at Bear Stearns at the time, top management at Bear Stearns were\ndeeply concerned about the U.K. developments and defendant Spector personally made calls to\ninvestigate the crisis.\n484. As the co-COO, Spector oversaw BSAM, the subsidiary of Bear Stearns that\nmanaged the Hedge Funds. Spector was fully aware of the serious problems at the Hedge Funds\nbeing concealed from both the Hedge Funds' investors and Bear Stearns' investors.\n485. As set out in paragraph 203 above, Spector personally made the decision to allow\nthe High Grade Enhanced Fund to fail, while extending a $1.3 billion loan, in the form of a\nrepurchase agreement, to the High Grade Hedge Fund. Spector knew at the time Bear Stearns\nentered into the facility that the CDOs it had received as collateral were actually worth far less,\nin that he had already become aware of serious flaws in Bear Stearns' valuation methodologies.\n486. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Stearns' growth and\nconcomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Spector\nknew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns' risk control models were severely\nflawed and not up-to-date. The Fixed Income division dealt with ABS and MBS. The head of\nthe Fixed Income division reported directly to Spector. Spector knew, or was reckless in not\nknowing that Bear Stearns' own risk managers did not have an expertise in the very assets -\nABS and MBS - upon which Bear Stearns had focused its investment strategy. Further, Spector\nknew or was reckless in disregarding the fact that Bear Stearns' VaR was far below the industry\naverage, even as Bear Stearns' concentration of risky ABS was the highest in the investment\nbanking community.\nE.\nAlan C. Greenberg\n487. As a director and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Bear Stearns,\nDefendant Greenberg participated in the issuance of Bear Stearns' materia\n... [truncated, 2031 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/135 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=135]", "char_count": 2031}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 137 of 347\nmisleading SEC filings issued during the Class Period. The Executive Committee was\nresponsible for running the day-to-day operations of Bear Stearns.\n488. Greenberg also participated in weekly meetings with the Company's risk\nmanagers during the Class Period, and knew or should have known that the Company had twice\nbeen criticized by the SEC for failing to review and update its inaccurate models.\n489. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Greenberg made a number of materially\nfalse and misleading statements regarding the effectiveness of Bear Stearns' risk monitoring\nprocedures, as stated in the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007 that he signed.\n490. On March 10, 2008, Greenberg, responding to the price liquidity rumors which\ncaused shares of Bear Stearns to drop 10 percent in early trading, told CNBC that the liquidity\nrumors surrounding the Company are \"totally ridiculous.\" Greenberg had been informed,\nimmediately before his announcement, that \"[a]ll of Bear Stearns'] institutions are calling us, and\nwe're in trouble.\"\n491. Bear Stearns shares responded and initially jumped on the news, only to lose more\nground later in the day.\n492. Greenberg's statement that rumors of liquidity problems at Bear Stearns were\n\"totally ridiculous\" was made without any basis in fact, and with the motive to prop up the\nfalling price of Bear Stearns' stock. Indeed, while on March 10, 2008, the Company's liquidity\npool had stood at $18.1 billion, by the close of March 11, 2008, it had declined to $11.5 billion -\na one-day loss of more than $6 billion.\n493. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Stearns' growth and\nconcomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices,\n122\nEFTA00316850\n", "char_count": 1808}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 138 of 347\nGreenberg knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns' risk control models had\nbeen failed to reflect downturns in the housing industry.\n494. Moreover, Greenberg knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns'\nown risk managers did not have an expertise in the very assets upon which Bear had based its\ninvestment strategy. Further, Greenberg knew or was reckless in disregarding the fact that Bear\nStearns' VaR was far below the industry average, even as Bear Stearns' concentration of risky\nABS was the highest in the investment banking community.\nF.\nMichael J. Alix\n495. As Chief Risk Officer of Bear Stearns during the Class Period, Defendant Alix\nhad an intimate understanding of the risk management tools and processes in place at the\nCompany. Alix was global head of credit risk management from 1996 until February 2006,\nwhen he became Chief Risk Officer. Alix made materially false and misleading statements\nduring about Bear Stearns' risk management on an August 3, 2007 conference call.\n496. As Chief Risk Officer, Alix was ultimately responsible for the Company's VaR\ncalculations. Indeed, as alleged in paragraph 122, in 2004 Alix touted the benefits of the CSE\nprogram's adoption of VaR as a measure of assessing the \"true risks\" faced by investment banks.\nHe stated that:\nthe framework will permit securities firms registered under it to\ndetermine the regulatory capital for their broker-dealers by means\nof approved Value at Risk (\"VaR\") models. This will better align\ncapital requirements with the true risks of the securities business,\nwith the added benefit of harmonizing the SEC's capital rules with\nglobal standards as represented by Basel II.\n497. As alleged in paragraph 101, prior to Bear Stearns' approval as a CSE in\nNovember 2005, OCIE found that Bear Stearns did not periodically evaluate its VaR models, nor\ndid it timely update inputs to its VaR models.\n123\nEFTA00316851\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 139 of 347\n498. As alleged in paragraph 104, after Alix became Chief Risk Officer, the SEC's TM\ndivision met with the Company's risk managers in September 2006 and concluded that the\nCompany still had failed to improve the accuracy of the models it used to hedge against risk. In\nfact, it was not until the end of 2007 that Bear Stearns developed a housing led recession\nscenario which it could incorporate into risk management and use for hedging purposes.\nMoreover, the SEC's Inspector General found that the mortgage-backed asset valuation\ncomponent of the VaR models employed by the Company were not updated at any time before\nthe Company's collapse.\n499. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Stearns' growth and\nconcomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Alix\nknew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns' risk control models were seriously\nflawed and not up-to-date. Moreover, Alix knew, or was reckless in not knowing that, according\nto the SEC Inspector General, Bear Stearns' own risk managers did not have an expertise in the\nvery assets upon which Bear Stearns had focused its investment strategy. Further, Alix knew or\nwas reckless in disregarding the fact that Bear Stearns' VaR was outdated, and far below the\nindustry average, even as Bear Stearns' concentration of risky ABS was the highest in the\ninvestment banking community.\nG. Jeffrey M. Farber\n500. As Senior Vice President of Finance and Principal Accounting Officer since\nFebruary 2007, and Controller of the Company since January 2004, Defendant Farber\nparticipated in the issuance of, and signed and certified as accurate and complete as required by\nSarbanes-Oxley, Bear Stearns' materially false and misleading SEC filings issued during the\nClass Period, including all Forms 10-Q and 10-K.\n124\nEFTA00316852\n", "char_count": 1916}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 140 of 347\n501. The quarterly and annual reports signed by Farber repeatedly touted the\nCompany's risk management, including its use of internally-developed models to derive the fair\nvalue of the Company's financial instruments.\n502. As alleged in paragraphs 102 to 103, during the CSE application process, the SEC\ntold Farber that \"[w]e believe that it would be highly desirable for independent Model Review to\ncarry out detailed reviews of models in the mortgage area.\" These concerns were again\ncommunicated to the Farber in a December 2, 2005 memorandum from the SEC Office of\nCompliance Inspections and Examinations. Farber therefore knew that the valuation models\nused to determine fair value of MBS were deficient.\n503. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Stearns' growth and\nconcomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Farber\nknew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns' risk control models were severely\nflawed and not up-to-date. Moreover, Farber knew, or was reckless in not knowing that,\naccording to the SEC Inspector General, Bear Stearns' own risk managers did not have an\nexpertise in the very assets upon which Bear Stearns had focused its investment strategy.\nFurther, Farber knew, or was reckless in disregarding, the fact that Bear Stearns' VaR was far\nbelow the industry average and failed to rise in tandem with the VaR reported by the Company's\npeers, even as Bear Stearns' concentration of risky ABS was the highest in the investment\nbanking community.\nH.\nCorporate Scienter\n504. Bear Stearns' knowledge need not be possessed by a single officer or agent;\nrather, the cumulative knowledge of all its agents is imputed to it.\n505. The facts alleged herein create a strong inference that one or more officers of the\nCompany acted knowingly or recklessly in violating the securities laws.\n125\nEFTA00316853\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 141 of 347\n506. Among other things, (1) although Defendant Farber was personally told by the\nSEC that Bear Stearns' mortgage valuation and Value at Risk models failed to reflect declines in\nthe housing industry, he signed the Company's Forms 10-K for financial years 2006 and 2007\nthat set out artificially low VaR numbers and inflated asset values; (2) although Defendant Cayne\nwas \"intimately engaged\" in the Company's risk management process and consequently was\napprised of the SEC's criticism of Bear Stearns VaR and mortgage valuation models, he signed\nquarterly and annual financial statements that misrepresented the Company's Value at Risk and\nasset values; (3) although Defendant Alix was the global head of the Company's risk\nmanagement department and consequently was aware that the Company had failed to review or\nrevise its VaR and mortgage valuation models at any time before its collapse, he represented to\nthe public in an August 3, 2007 conference call that \"we run risk analytics to demonstrate that\n[Bear Stearns] is well protected against further deterioration in both the subprime and Alt-A\nsectors across both whole loans and all securitization tranches;\"; and (4) although Defendant\nMolinaro was told by the SEC that its public disclosures of its subprime mortgage exposure\nomitted material information to investors, he failed to disclose this information in the Form 10-K\nfiled for fiscal year 2007.\nVI.\nADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING\nTHE OFFICER DEFENDANTS' SCIENTER\nA.\nGeneral Allegations of Scienter\n507. The Officer Defendants were active participants in the fraudulent scheme alleged\nherein, in that:\n(a)\neach was privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Bear\nStearns by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the improper and fraudulent conduct\ndescribed above and/or their failure to review information they had a duty to monitor;\n126\nEFTA00316854\n", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 142 of 347\nstatements.\n(b)\neach actually issued materially false and misleading statements; or\neach had control over the Company's materially false and misleading\n(c)\n508. The nature of Bear Stearns' business - and the importance to it of mortgages,\nmortgage-backed securities, and CDOs composed of mortgage-backed securities - strongly\nsupports the inference that the Officer Defendants knew of or recklessly disregarded the\nCompany's sorely deficient risk management over the valuation of mortgage-backed securities.\nBear Stearns' mortgage-related business was vertically integrated, allowing it a uniquely detailed\nperspective into the entire process from mortgage origination (of subprime, Alt-A, and prime\nloans) through securitization.\n509. The fact that Bear Stearns suffered the first pains of the subprime mortgage\nmeltdown - through the collapse of the Hedge Funds and the Company's subsequent assumption\nof the High Grade Fund's toxic assets - also raises a strong inference that the Officer Defendants\nknew of the need to scrutinize MBS and mortgage risk management, but knowingly or recklessly\ndisregarded that function at the Company.\n510. Moreover, the Officer Defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded, that Bear\nStearns had billions of dollars of exposure to subprime mortgage defaults as a result of the CDOs\nthat Bear Stearns carried on its own books. The Officer Defendants became aware that Bear\nStearns CDO modeling was inaccurate in June of 2007 when the Hedge Funds collapsed and\nBear Stearns entered into a $1.3 billion repurchase agreement with the High Grade Hedge Fund,\nwhich required Bear Stearns to take title to assets that turned out to be worth substantially less\nthan the amount of the loan. Defendant Spector was directly responsible for the decision to\nextend the repurchase agreement to the High Grade Hedge Fund and was aware of the weakness\n127\nEFTA00316855\n", "char_count": 1954}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 143 of 347\nof the High Grade Fund's assets, which were almost identical to those assets held on Bear\nStearns' books at the time.\n511. Each of these Officer Defendants was keenly aware of the deteriorating\nconditions in the U.S. subprime mortgage market and the effect of these conditions on the value\nof securities linked to these mortgages and other asset backed securities. As a consequence of\nBear Stearns' prominence and large market share of ABS, including securities originated by Bear\nStearns subsidiaries BEARRES and ECC and purchased and serviced by Bear Stearns subsidiary\nEMC and securitized by Bear Stearns, the Officer Defendants knew that Bear Stearns' exposure\nto drops in the value of ABS, including MBS and CDOs containing ABS and MBS, was far\ngreater than otherwise disclosed.\n512. Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector, Alix and Farber also\nknew or recklessly disregarded that the materially false and misleading statements and omissions\ncontained in Bear Stearns' public statements would adversely affect the integrity of the market\nfor Bear Stearns' common stock and would cause the price of Bear Stearns' common stock to be\nartificially inflated. Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector, Alix and\nFarber acted knowingly or in such a reckless manner as to constitute a fraud and deceit upon\nLead Plaintiff and other members of the Class.\n513. Moreover, as noted below, Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector, Alix\nand Farber were all aware that Bear Stearns was unable to accurately value these assets due to\nweaknesses in its modeling and risk management systems. In fact, the Officer Defendants made\nmaterial misstatements and omissions when asked direct questions by analysts about risk\nmanagement and ABS exposure.\n128\nEFTA00316856\n", "char_count": 1856}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 144 of 347\n514. Each of the Officer Defendants either knew, or recklessly disregarded, the fact\nthat the Company's disclosures relating to ABS were wholly misleading; there were billions of\ndollars in ABS exposure on Bear Stearns' balance sheets that were unaccounted for due to Bear\nStearns' inability to accurately value asset backed securities. Moreover, the Officer Defendants\neither knew that Bear Stearns' VaR was inaccurate because it was not reacting to the\ndeteriorating conditions in the U.S. mortgage market or recklessly disregarded evidence that this\nwas the case.\n515. The knowledge and/or recklessness of the Officer Defendants is also evident from\nthe rapid firings and/or resignations following the disclosure to shareholders of Bear Stearns\nexposure to declining ABS and CDO values. For example, on August 5, 2007, less than 60 days\nafter the Hedge Funds collapsed, due in large part to their investment in CDOs containing\nsubprime RMBS, Bear Stearns fired Defendant Spector, who oversaw the failed Hedge Funds as\nhead of BSAM. Likewise, on January 8, 2008, Cayne was forced to resign as CEO, in part\nbecause of Bear Stearns' potentially large exposure to risky ABS.\nB.\nAbnormal Profit Taking\n516. The Class Period sales of Bear Stearns stock by Defendants Cayne, Greenberg,\nMolinaro, Schwartz, Spector and Farber were highly unusual, and therefore suspicious, as\nmeasured by (1) the amount and percentage of shares sold, (2) comparison with these\nDefendants' own prior trading history and that of other insiders, and (3) the timing of the sales.\nSuch sales therefore provide strong evidence of scienter.\n517. To evaluate the selling activity of Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro,\nSchwartz, Spector and Farber, Lead Plaintiff used publicly available trading data required to be\nreported to the SEC on Form 4. Lead Plaintiff analyzed the trading by insiders that occurred\nduring the Class Period and during the equal-length\n... [truncated, 2057 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/143 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=143]", "char_count": 2057}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 145 of 347\nPeriod, beginning September 13, 2005 and ending December 13, 2006 (the \"Control Period”).\nThe Bear Stearns' Form 4s filed during the Class Period and Control Period are hereby\nincorporated herein by reference, and the transactions reported therein are set forth in Exhibit B,\nannexed hereto.\n518. The following methodologies were used to analyze these Defendants' sales. First,\nLead Plaintiff calculated total sales by each of the Individual Defendants, together with the cash\nproceeds from such sales, during the Control and Class Periods. To calculate the amounts and\npercentages of shares sold, Lead Plaintiff then calculated holdings at the end of the Class Period\nby referencing Bear Stearns' Class Period annual proxy statements on Schedule 14A, which set\nforth shares owned and stock options exercisable by the Individual Defendants during the Class\nPeriod. Such data were then adjusted to the Class Period end date using the purchase and sale\ndata set forth in Bear Stearns' Form 4s. \"Holdings\" were deemed to include both shares held and\nstock options that were vested but not yet exercised. Class Period sales were then calculated as a\npercentage of total shares available for sale during the Class Period, i.e., the sum of Class Period\nsales plus end-of-Class-Period holdings. To compare Class Period sales with prior trading\nhistory, Lead Plaintiff compared sales by the these Defendants during the Class Period with their\nsales during the Control Period. Lead Plaintiff also compared these Defendants' sales across the\nControl and Class Periods with those of lower-level (non-Defendant) reporting persons.\n519. Lead Plaintiff then determined whether the Class Period sales by Defendants\nCayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector and Farber generated abnormal (that is, above-\nnormal) profits. Abnormal profits were evaluated using an event study methodology called the\n\"market-adjusted method,\" which computes cumula\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/144 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=144]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 146 of 347\nprice from $100 to $120 (20%), and the benchmark index increases from 1000 to 1010 (1%)\nduring the same period, then the abnormal profit would be 19%. Under the same analysis, if a\ncompany's stock price declines subsequent to a sale by a greater amount than the relevant\nbenchmark index, then the sale enabled the insider to generate an abnormal profit by avoiding\nthe decline. For example, if an insider sells a share of stock which then declines from $100 to\n$80 (20%) while the relevant benchmark decreases from 1000 to 990 (1%), then the abnormal\nprofit would again be 19%. This methodology has been used extensively in the academic\nliterature studying the profitability of insider trading. In a typical study, abnormal profits are\ncalculated using a 250 trading day period following the day of trade, measured against a value-\nweighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for 2000-2008. Due to Bear Stearns'\ncollapse in March of 2008, the abnormal profits were calculated using a 125 trading day period\nfollowing the day of trade.\n520. After calculating abnormal profits for the these Defendants' Class Period sales,\nLead Plaintiff then calculated the probability that such abnormal profits resulted from random\nchance. This probability was calculated by computing the trade-dollar-weighted residuals from\nthe market-adjusted model for 125 trading days before and 125 trading days after the day of\ntrade, and averaging these residuals across event days for each insider. This data was then used\nto compute a \"t-statistic\" (a statistical tool) to infer the probability that the observed cumulative\nabnormal profits were due to random chance.\n521. By each analysis, each of these Defendants' Class Period sales was extremely\nlarge and highly unusual. For one, the amount and percentage of shares sold during the class\nperiod was extraordinary. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares was\nartificially inf\n... [truncated, 2100 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/145 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=145]", "char_count": 2100}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 147 of 347\nthe Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares was artificially inflated, Greenberg sold\n371,986 shares for a total realized value of $34,594,027. Greenberg sold 40.89% of his Bear\nStearns shares during the two year Class Period as compared to 11.91% of his Bear Stearns\nshares during the Control Period. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns'\nshares was artificially inflated, Molinaro sold 38,552 shares for a total realized value of\n$4,230,828. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares was artificially\ninflated, Schwartz sold 91,233 shares for a total realized value of $9,867,001. During the Class\nPeriod, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares was artificially inflated, Spector sold 116,255\nshares for a total realized value of $19,066,373. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear\nStearns' shares was artificially inflated, Farber sold 3,324 shares for a total realized value of\n$362,000.\n522. Second, Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector and Farber\ngenerated enormous abnormal profits on their sales of Bear Stearns stock. In all, by avoiding the\ndeclines associated with Bear Stearns' falling share value and by capitalizing on the false\ninformation when it was greatest, these Defendants recognized abnormal profits of\napproximately 86.3%, on average. Molinaro, Farber, Cayne and Schwartz more then doubled\ntheir money by timing their sales either to days when inflation was highest or when the market\ndeclines were least. Molinaro's were an astounding 173% higher than they otherwise would\nhave been if the shares were not falsely inflated. Farber's abnormal profit was 158%, Cayne's\nwas 132% and Schwartz's was 115%. In addition, Greenberg's abnormal profit was 73%, while\nSpector's profits were 35%. These abnormal profits on the part of insiders who sold stock\nduring a period of inflation of their own making is further evidence of sciente\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/146 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=146]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 148 of 347\nVII. DELOITTE'S DEFICIENT AUDITS OF\nBEAR STEARNS' FINANCIAL STATEMENTS\nA.\nOverview of Allegations Against Deloitte\n523. As more fully set forth below, during the Class Period, Deloitte's audits of the\nCompany's financial statements were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all, were\nan egregious refusal to see the obvious or investigate the doubtful, and/or disregarded specific\n\"red flags\" that would have placed a reasonable auditor on notice that the Company was engaged\nin wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors. Although auditing guidelines required that\nDeloitte give especially close scrutiny to the Company's fair value measurements, Deloitte\ndeliberately or recklessly disregarded several red flags with respect to valuation, including the\nfact that the Company had persisted in using mortgage valuation models that the SEC had\nrepeatedly criticized as inaccurate and outmoded.\n524. Similarly, although Deloitte was obliged to evaluate the statements of VaR set out\nin the MD&A section of the Company's regulatory filings, Deloitte deliberately or recklessly\ndisregarded the fact that by at least November of 2005 the Company had been warned by the\nSEC that its VaR models failed to reflect key indicators in the housing market.\n525.\nMoreover, despite the fact that Deloitte was obliged to be especially skeptical of\nrelated party transactions such as the High Grade fund bailout, Deloitte deliberately or recklessly\ndisregarded the fact that the collateral the Company had received as a result of the bailout was\nfar less than the value of the loan Bear Stearns had offered to the High Grade Fund.\n526. Finally, in spite of multiple risk alerts that related to the Company's internal\ncontrols, internal audits, and disclosures, Deloitte deliberately or recklessly disregarded\nsignificant red flags in these areas as well.\n133\nEFTA00316861\n", "char_count": 1939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 149 of 347\nB.\nDeloitte's Certifications\n527. Deloitte issued a \"clean opinion\" pursuant to each of its audits of Bear Stearns'\nfinancial statements for the fiscal years ended November 30, 2006 and November 30, 2007, and\nissued similar certifications for each of the Company's quarterly statements during the Class\nPeriod. In connection with the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006 Deloitte stated:\nWe have audited the consolidated financial statements of The Bear\nStearns Companies Inc. and subsidiaries (the \"Company\") as of\nNovember 30, 2006 and 2005, and for each of the three years in\nthe period ended November 30, 2006, management's assessment of\nthe effectiveness of the Company's internal control over financial\nreporting as of November 30, 2006, and the effectiveness of the\nCompany's internal control over financial reporting as of\nNovember 30, 2006, and have issued our reports thereon dated\nFebruary 12, 2007; such consolidated financial statements and\nreports are included in your 2006 Annual Report to Stockholders\nand are incorporated herein by reference. Our audits also included\nthe financial statement schedule (Schedule I) of The Bear Stearns\nCompanies Inc. (Parent Company Only), listed in Item 15. This\nconsolidated financial statement schedule is the responsibility of\nthe Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an\nopinion based on our audits. In our opinion, such consolidated\nfinancial statement schedule, when considered in relation to\nthe basic consolidated financial statements taken as a whole,\npresents fairly, in all material respects, the information set\nforth therein.\n528. In connection with the Company Form 10-K for fiscal year 2007, Deloitte stated:\nWe have audited the consolidated financial statements of The Bear\nStearns Companies Inc. and subsidiaries (the \"Company\") as of\nNovember 30, 2007 and 2006, and for each of the three years in\nthe period ended November 30, 2007, and the Com\n... [truncated, 2664 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/148 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=148]", "char_count": 2664}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 150 of 347\nC.\nalso included the financial statement schedule (Schedule I) of The\nBear Stearns Companies Inc. (Parent Company Only), listed in\nItem 15. This financial statement schedule is the responsibility of\nthe Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an\nopinion based on our audits. In our opinion, such financial\nstatement schedule, when considered in relation to the basic\nconsolidated financial statements taken as a whole, presents\nfairly, in all material respects, the information set forth\ntherein.\nOverview of GAAS\n529. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (\"PCAOB\"), established by\nthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, is responsible for the development of auditing and related\nprofessional practice standards that are required to be followed by registered public accounting\nfirms. On April 16, 2003, the PCAOB adopted as its interim standards GAAS as described by\nthe AICPA Auditing Standards Board's SAS No. 95, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards,\nand related interpretations in existence on that date. Accordingly, an auditor's reference to \"the\nstandards of the Public Accounting Oversight Board (United States)\" includes a reference to\nGAAS in existence as of April 16, 2003. For simplicity, all references to GAAS hereinafter\ninclude the standards of the PCAOB.\n530. GAAS is comprised of ten basic standards that establish the quality of an\nauditor's performance and the overall objectives to be achieved in a financial statement audit.\nAuditors are required to follow those standards in each and every audit they conduct.\n531. The GAAS standards fall into three basic categories: General Standards;\nFieldwork Standards; and Reporting Standards. The General Standards require, among other\nthings, provide guidance planning and conducting an audit, and require that the auditor exercise\nprofessional skepticism. The Field Work Standards require, among other things, that an auditor\nobtain a sufficient unde\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/149 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=149]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 151 of 347\nexpress an opinion on the financial statements of a company taken as a whole, or an assertion to\nthe extent that an opinion cannot be expressed.\nD.\nGAAS Required Deloitte to Consider Risk Factors as Part of Audit Planning\n532. For purposes of planning and conducting its audits of Bear Stearns, Deloitte was\nrequired to give special consideration to risk factors identified in \"Fraud Risk Alerts\" and \"Audit\nRisk Alerts\" that may have resulted in material misstatements of the Company's financial\nstatements (AU 316.14). Fraud risk factors may be relevant to economic circumstances in\ngeneral, an industry, or to a particular entity. An understanding of applicable fraud risk factors is\nimportant for an auditor to be able to appropriately determine the nature, extent, and timing of\naudit procedures performed (AU 316.15). Moreover, because Deloitte audited the books of the\nHedge Funds and knew that BSAM had valued the Hedge Funds' assets, it should have been\nespecially skeptical of the valuations that the Company provided for its own assets.\n1.\nFraud Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns\n533. The fraud risk factors described above at paragraphs 331 to 348 relating to Bear\nStearns' financial statements were also relevant to Deloitte's considerations of the nature, timing,\nand extent of its audit procedures.\n534. In addition, due to its role as the Company's independent auditor, there were\nsupplemental fraud risk factors that should have been considered by Deloitte. These included:\n(a) The estimation of the fair value of investments (AU 316.39). As described\nabove, Bear Stearns' use of leverage caused these estimations to have material implications on\nreported Principal Transactions Revenue;\n(b)\nThe risk of transactions with related parties that do not have the substance\nor the financial strength to support a transaction without assistance from the entity under audit\n136\nEFTA00316864\n", "char_count": 1991}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 152 of 347\n(AU 316.67). Accordingly, transactions that Bear Stearns may have entered into with its hedge\nfunds, for example, warranted scrutiny by Deloitte;\n(c)\nThe ever-present risk of management overriding internal controls (AU\n316.08, 42, and 57-65). For purposes of its audits of Bear Stearns, this risk should have caused\nDeloitte to perform specific procedures to address the internal controls related to the models used\nto determine the reported valuation of financial instruments; and\n(d) The risk that new regulatory requirements, such as the recently\nimplemented CSE structure, may cause an incentive or pressure of fraudulent financial reporting\n(AU 316.85, A.2.a). In this regard, Deloitte should have been familiar with nature of Bear\nStearns' relationship with the TM and conducted certain procedures to understand the\ncommunications between those parties.\n535.\n2.\nAudit Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns\nThe ARAS also addressed specific risk factors for Deloitte to consider in its audits\nof Bear Stearns. The ARAS were released annually, typically in mid-summer, which enabled\nthem to be considered for purposes of Deloitte's annual audits of Bear Stearns. The SEC\nrecognized the import of the ARAS and the need to consider the presented risks in the\npreparation and audits of financial statements. The risks in the ARAS that were incrementally\nrelevant to Deloitte for purposes of its audits of Bear Stearns included the following:\n(a) 2005 ARA stated \"...the auditor needs to be aware of any changes in the\ninstitution's loan profile (for example, prime vs. subprime, secured vs. unsecured, direct lending\nvs. indirect lending) and understand the institution's ability to identify, manage, and control the\nattendant risk for those credit profiles\" (2005 AAM 8050.28).\n(b)\nThe 2006 ARA warned auditors to \"Examine specific collateral\nsurrounding the client investment portfolio and evaluate potential imp\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/151 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=151]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 152, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 153 of 347\n8050.17) The potential for impairment was particularly relevant for \"products [that] assume a\ncontinued rise in home prices that may not continue.\" (AAM 8050.35) As a result, Deloitte\nshould have been aware of the risk factors related to the valuation of Bear Stearns' financial\ninstruments such as CDOS.\n(c)\nThe 2007 ARA cautioned auditors to \"Consider the pressures financial\ninstitutions are facing when planning and performing the audit engagement.\" (2007 AAM\n8050.16) In addition, it apprised auditors of the need to \"Consider the current real estate climate\nwhen conducting an audit of a mortgage company.\" (2007 AAM 8050.30) Thus, Deloitte\nshould have been attuned to the risks associated with home price depreciation and the pressures\non management to avoid the negative adjustments to liquidity and capital caused by reductions in\nthe reported value of financial instruments.\n3.\nDeloitte's Experience Auditing the Hedge Funds\n536. In addition to its audits of Bear Stearns, Deloitte was also responsible for the\naudits of the Hedge Funds. Based on knowledge gained during those audits, Deloitte knew that\nvery large percentages of the hedge funds' holdings were valued by BSAM itself, with Bear\nStearns' oversight. In fact, in 2006, Deloitte issued audit opinions on the hedge funds stating that\nit was relying upon BSAM's representations of the fair market value of the vast majority of the\nfunds' assets.\n537. Deloitte also knew that Bear Stearns was the source of the majority of the assets\nheld by the hedge funds. The notes to the financial statements of the High Grade Fund for the\nyear ended December 31, 2006 stated: \"[t]he Master Fund may invest in securities issued by\nBear, Stearns & Co., Inc. or an affiliate. At December 31, 2006, $751,840,048 (approximately\n81.96% of net assets) is invested in such securities.\"\n138\nEFTA00316866\n", "char_count": 1920}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 154 of 347\n538. The notes to the financial statements of the High Grade Enhanced Fund for\nAugust 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 similarly stated: \"[t]he Master Fund may invest in\nsecurities issued by Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. or an affiliate. At December 31, 2006,\n$473,302,969 (approximately 71.54% of net assets) is invested in such securities.\"\n539. Because Bear Stearns retained large amounts of the CDOs it sold on its own\nbooks, the collapse of the Hedge Funds should have put Deloitte on notice that Bear Stearns'\nbooks were vulnerable to the same extraordinary declines.\nE.\nRed Flags Recklessly or Deliberately Disregarded by Deloitte\n540. Deloitte was required to performed an integrated audit of Bear Stearns in\naccordance with PCAOB Auditing Standards. Specifically, Deloitte was charged with\nevaluating the Company's fair value measurements, internal controls, internal audits, and\nfinancial disclosures. In each area Deloitte's accounting audit practices were so deficient that it\nwas deliberately or recklessly ignored significant red flags.\n1.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Fair Value Measurements\n541. The most significant dollar-value asset on Bear Stearns' balance sheet was\n\"Financial Instruments Owned, at Fair Value.\" Accordingly, it was exceedingly important that\nthe Company accurately determine the fair value of these assets.\n542. For purposes of both its 2006 and 2007 audits, GAAS required Deloitte to apply\nauditing procedures to Bear Stearns' financial instruments (GAAS including AU 328, \"Auditing\nFair Value Measurements and Disclosures\" and AU 332, \"Auditing Derivative Instruments,\nHedging Activities, and Investments in Securities\"). Among other things, GAAS required\n9 An integrated audit is a reference to the fact that the independent auditor opines on both the\neffectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the consistency of the financial statements\nwith GAAP.\n139\nEFTA00316867\n", "char_count": 1988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 155 of 347\nDeloitte to evaluate management assumptions used in determining fair value and controls over\nthe consistency, timeliness, and reliability of the data used in valuation models.\n543. GAAS also required Deloitte to test Bear Stearns' processes for preparing fair\nvalue measurements and the reasonableness, relevance, and timeliness of the information,\nassumptions, inputs and models (AU 328.23-.24). Deloitte's audit testing should have included\nan evaluation of whether the fair value measurements were consistent with market information,\nwere determined using an appropriate model, and included relevant information that was\nreasonably available at the time (AU 328.26).\n544. Deloitte's duties also included identification of those assumptions that had high\nsensitivities on valuation (AU 328.34).10 This duty should have focused Deloitte on Bear\nStearns' stress testing or other sensitivity analysis as well as caused Deloitte to assess whether\nany sensitive assumptions had been excluded from the valuation process (AU 328.35).\n545. In addition, to the extent that the inputs and assumptions employed in Bear\nStearns valuation models were dependent upon historical data, GAAS required Deloitte to test\nwhether reliance on historical financial information in the development of assumptions was\njustified (AU 328.37).\"\n546. Standard audit procedure also required that Deloitte focus on testing the\nCompany's pricing models to compute the reported fair value of Level 2 and Level 3 financial\n10\nAU 328.34, \"The auditor considers the sensitivity of the valuation to changes in significant\nassumptions, including market conditions that may affect the value. Where applicable, the auditor\nencourages management to use techniques such as sensitivity analysis to help identify particularly\nsensitive assumptions. If management has not identified particularly sensitive assumptions, the auditor\nconsiders whether to employ techniques to iden\n... [truncated, 2400 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/154 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=154]", "char_count": 2400}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 156 of 347\ninstruments, which included both mortgage-related securities and RIs. Deloitte also should have\ntested the Company's method of classification of financial instruments as either Level 2 and\nLevel 3 since that information was material to users of the Company's financial statements.\n547. For these assets, GAAS recognize that \"an entity may use its own assumptions as\nlong as there are no contrary data indicating that marketplace participants would use different\nassumptions.\" (AU 328.06) Accordingly, Deloitte was required to assess whether Bear Stearns\nassumptions were reasonable and reflected market-based information.\n548. Moreover, for purposes of Deloitte's 2007 audit of Bear Stearns, it was no longer\npossible for the auditors to ignore the fact that the housing market downturn was in full force and\nthat the market for mortgage-related securities was illiquid. At that time, it was widely\nunderstood that particular scrutiny should be applied by independent auditors to pricing models\nused to determine the valuation of financial instruments. For example, in October 2007, the\nCenter for Audit Quality (\"CAQ\"), which is associated with the AICPA, published an audit alert\nentitled \"Measurements of Fair Value in Illiquid (Or Less Liquid) Markets.\"\n549. This alert observed in pertinent part,\nThe level of defaults has, in many cases, exceeded the model-based\nprojections originally used to structure and assign ratings to\nsecurities backed by subprime mortgage loans...and holders of\nexisting loans and mortgage-backed securities have experienced\nsharp declines in their value.\n550. Thus, in advance of Deloitte's 2007 audit, Deloitte should have been alert that (1)\nBear Stearns' mortgage-related valuation models may not have anticipated the rising level of\ndefaults associated with the housing market downturn, and (2) the resultant fair value of related\nfinancial instruments should reflect appropriately increased cons\n... [truncated, 2206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/155 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=155]", "char_count": 2206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 157 of 347\n2008 OIG Report, during the Class Period Bear Stearns failed to include crucial factors in its\nvaluation models including, for example, inadequate consideration of default risk and scenarios\nof home price depreciation. These missing assumptions would have been known to, and\nemployed by, market participants, who were the focal audience for fair value measurements in\naccordance with GAAP.\n552. Moreover, as set out at paragraphs 124 to 126 above, in November of 2005 and\nagain in December of 2006, Bear Stearns had been informed by the SEC that its models were\ncritically deficient. In conducting its audit, Deloitte either deliberately or recklessly disregarded\nthe fact that the SEC had already warned the Company of these problems.\n2.\nBear Stearns' Failures to Disclose Risks\nInherent In Its Financial Statements\n553. Deloitte also had a professional obligation to assess whether other disclosures in\ndocuments containing the financial statements were materially inconsistent with the financial\nstatements (AU 550, Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements\n¶ 4).\n554. Bear Stearns disclosed its VaR in the MD&A section of its regulatory filings with\nthe SEC.\n555.\nAs set out above at paragraphs 123 to 124, the Company had been warned by the\nSEC as early as November of 2005 that its VaR models failed to take into account critical inputs\nreflecting risk in the housing market.\n556. As set out in paragraphs 124 to 128 above, despite this warning, the Company did\nnot complete any review of key inputs to its VaR models during the Class Period.\n142\nEFTA00316870\n", "char_count": 1662}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 158 of 347\n557. In light of the significant deficiencies in Bear Stearns' VaR models that should\nhave been identified during its testing of internal controls over financial reporting, Deloitte knew\nor should have known that the amounts reported as VaR were inaccurate and unreliable.\n3.\nBear Stearns' Misleading Accounting\nTreatment of the Hedge Fund Bailout\n558. As a result of its bailout of the High Grade Fund that it managed, Bear Stearns\nhad effectively assumed onto its books more than $1.3 billion in the Fund's subprime-backed\ncollateral. As set out above at paragraphs 214 to 216, less than a month later, the Company\ninformed the Fund's investors that the Fund was virtually worthless. Deloitte deliberately or\nrecklessly disregarded the fact that the Company carried this worthless collateral on its books for\nmonths without taking an appropriate write down.\n559. Deloitte should have approached its testing of any related-party transactions with\nparticular caution if they exhibited traits identified within GAAS to be of higher risk including\n(AU 334.06):\n(a)\n\"An urgent desire for a continued favorable earnings record in the hope of\nsupporting the price of the company's stock.\"\n(b)\n\"Dependence on a single or relatively few products, customers, or\ntransactions for the continuing success of the venture.\"\n(c)\n\"A declining industry characterized by a large number of business\nfailures.\"\n560.\nFor purposes of its 2007 audit, Deloitte knew or should have known that on June\n22, 2007 Bear Stearns had provided loans, in the form of a repo agreement, to the failing High\nGrade Hedge Fund. As a result, Deloitte was required to obtain an understanding of the business\npurpose of the transactions and obtain satisfaction concerning the value of any related collateral\n143\nEFTA00316871\n", "char_count": 1851}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 159 of 347\n(AU 334.09). Further, Deloitte was required to obtain information about the financial capability\nof the High Grade Hedge Fund (AU 334.10).\n561. In this case, Deloitte knew or should have known that the collateral provided by\nthe High Grade Funds was clearly insufficient to guarantee the value of the loans extended by\nBear Stearns. The Company had informed the High Grade Fund investors in July of 2007 that\nthe High Grade Fund \"had very little value left.\"\n562.\nMoreover, Deloitte knew or should have known that the hedge funds were\notherwise incapable of repaying those loans. Indeed, as noted at paragraphs 211 to 213 above,\nthe 2008 OIG Report noted that the hedge funds lacked the capability to repay the loans.\n563. As a result, Deloitte also should have considered that both GAAP and GAAS\nrecognize the \"importance of reporting transactions and events in accordance with their\nsubstance\" and \"whether the substance of transactions or events differs materially from their\nform.\" (AU 411, \"The Meaning of 'Present Fairly in Conformity with GAAP\" (6).\nAccordingly, the substance of these transactions was that Bear Stearns had guaranteed the High\nGrade Fund by absorbing its worthless assets. Deloitte should also have ensured that the loan\nvalue and related implications on reported capital were appropriately incorporated into Bear\nStearns' financial statements. Finally, Deloitte should have ensured that appropriate disclosure\nwas provided to inform investors of the substance of Bear Stearns' related party transactions with\nthe hedge funds (AU 334.02).\n4.\nBear Stearns' Failure to Disclose Critical Information Relating\nto the Company's Valuation of Its Financial Instruments\n564. GAAS requires the presentation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP\nincludes adequate disclosure of material matters. (AU 431, Adequacy of Disclosure in Financial\n144\nEFTA00316872\n", "char_count": 1950}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 159, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 160 of 347\nStatements) This particular standard is specifically referenced in AU 328 because fair value\ninformation is significant to users of financial statements.\"\n12\n565. GAAS further state \"If an item contains a high degree of measurement\nuncertainty, the auditor assesses whether the disclosures are sufficient to inform users of such\nuncertainty.\" (AU 328.45)\n566. Nevertheless, in light of the SEC's repeated warnings to the Company, Deloitte\nknew or should have known that Bear Stearns, in violation of GAAP, failed to disclose in its\nfinancial statements that:\n(a)\nIts pricing models failed to consider inputs that were critical to the\ndetermination of the fair value of material holdings of mortgage-related financial instruments\nsuch as default rates and liquidity risk;\n(b)\nPrograms to review mortgage pricing models were not put into place prior\nto the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008;\n(c)\nThere were questions as to the independence of risk management\npersonnel and that risk management personnel lacked experience in valuing mortgage-related\nassets, which represented the most significant component of Bear Stearns' financial instruments;\nand\n(d) The Company did not implement stress-testing scenarios that addressed\nnegative house pricing appreciation (HPA) assumptions and shocked credit spreads for certain\nmortgage-back securities.\n12 AU 328.43, \"Disclosure of fair value information is an important aspect of financial statements.\nOften, fair value disclosure is required because of the relevance to users in the evaluation of an entity's\nperformance and financial position.\"\n145\nEFTA00316873\n", "char_count": 1676}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 160, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 161 of 347\n567. A further red flag came in September of 2007, when the SEC informed Bear\nStearns that it was required to provide more information about its exposure to subprime\ninvestments.1¹³ By virtue of its position as Bear Stearns' auditors, Deloitte would have been\nknowledgeable about the receipt and contents of the SEC's comment letter.\n568. While the resolution of the SEC Comment Letter pertained to the 2006 Form 10-\nK, Deloitte had been put on notice of the value of such disclosure in subsequent SEC filings.\nAccordingly, Deloitte's opinion that the 2007 financial statements were materially consistent\nwith GAAP represented a significant shortcoming of due professional care because by then it\nwas undeniable that at a minimum Bear Stearns' fair value related disclosures were inadequate.\n569. Indeed, Deloitte knew that Bear Stearns not only failed to provide users of its\nfinancial statements with any of this meaningful information, it further failed to acknowledge\neven the existence of the Unresolved SEC Comments.14\n5.\nBear Stearns' Inadequate Internal Controls\n570. For purposes of its 2006 audit, Auditing Standard (\"AS\") No. 2, An Audit of\nInternal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of the\nFinancial Statements was applicable to Deloitte. AS 24 states that \"[m]aintaining effective\ninternal control over financial reporting means that no material weaknesses exist; therefore, the\nobjective of the audit of internal control over financial reporting is to obtain reasonable assurance\nthat no material weaknesses exist as of the date specified in management's assessment.\" A\n13 The 2008 OIG Report Stated that \"[i]nvestors would have benefited from enhanced disclosures\nregarding [Bear Stearns] involvement in the subprime mortgage market and their potential exposures in\nthis market.\"\n14 Part I, Item 1B of the 2007 Form 10-K entitled \"Unresolved Staff Comments\" reported that there\nwe\n... [truncated, 2230 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/160 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=160]", "char_count": 2230}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 161, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 162 of 347\nmaterial weakness is a significant deficiency that \"results in more than a remote likelihood that a\nmaterial misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or\ndetected.\"15 (AS 210)\n571. For purposes of its 2007 audit of Bear Stearns, AS No. 5, An Audit of Internal\nControl Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, was\napplicable to Deloitte. AS 5 2 reflected substantially similar provisions as AS 2 [4.\n572. AS 2,27 (No. 5, [7; No. 5, [62) describes components of internal controls and\nexplains how an independent auditor should obtain a sufficient understanding of the internal\ncontrols for the purpose of assessing the risk of material misstatement and identifying\ndeficiencies in internal control. AS 227 (No. 5, 17; No. 5, 162) states as follows:\nIn an audit of internal control over financial reporting, the auditor\nmust obtain sufficient competent evidence about the design and\noperating effectiveness of controls over all relevant financial\nstatement assertions related to all significant accounts and\ndisclosures in the financial statements. The auditor must plan and\nperform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that deficiencies\nthat, individually or in the aggregate, would represent material\nweaknesses are identified.\n573. AS 252 required Deloitte to test \"Company-level controls\" (AS 5 ¶ 22 refers to\nthese controls as \"Entity-level controls\"). Company-level controls include management's risk\nassessment processes, controls to monitor the results of operations, controls to monitor other\ncontrols, including activities of the internal audit function, the audit committee, self-assessment\n(... continued)\nSEC's inquiry on subprime accounting issues extended over ten pages, which reflected the materiality of\nthat information.\n15 AS 29 defines a significant deficiency as \"is a control deficiency, or combination of control\ndeficiencies, \n... [truncated, 2401 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/161 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=161]", "char_count": 2401}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 162, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 163 of 347\nprograms, the period-end financial reporting process, and Board-approved policies that address\nsignificant business control and risk management practices (AS 253, AS 5 | 23). Accordingly,\nDeloitte was required to include testing of Bear Stearns' risk management processes in its audit\nof internal controls over financial reporting.\n574. Moreover, AS 2 108 precluded Deloitte from delegating the authority to\nperform procedures to assess the operating effectiveness of Bear Stearns' risk management\npersonnel. While AS 5 19 modified this standard slightly for purposes of the 2007 audit, the\nsignificance of the control risk addressed by the risk management function at Bear Stearns called\nfor Deloitte to continue to perform procedures to assess the effectiveness of the internal controls\nconstituted by risk management. Deloitte was required to consider its understanding of Bear\nStearns' internal controls gained in prior periods for purposes of its 2007 audit.16\n575. AS 260 (AS 5 [28) required Deloitte to perform targeted procedures to assess\nthe internal controls over financial reporting related to the financial statement assertions of\nsignificant accounts. Bear Stearns' reported balance of financial instruments met the criteria of a\nsignificant account, which included the size and composition of the account, susceptibility of\nloss due to errors or fraud, accounting and reporting complexities associated with the account,\nand exposure to losses represented by the account (AS 2 ¶ 65, AS 5 | 29). Accordingly, Deloitte\nwas required to consider, among other factors, whether effective internal controls existed to\n16 AU 319.26, \"The nature, timing, and extent of procedures the auditor chooses to perform to obtain\nthe understanding will vary depending on the size and complexity of the entity, previous experience with\nthe entity, the nature of the specific controls used by the entity including the entity's use of IT, t\n... [truncated, 2161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/162 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=162]", "char_count": 2161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 163, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 164 of 347\nensure that the reported valuation of Bear Stearns' financial instruments was appropriate (AS 2\n17\n68, AS 528).\"\n576.\nGAAS recognized audit risk stems in part from the \"business risk that the\ninstitution does not properly understand the terms and economic substance of a significant\ncomplex investment. Such misunderstandings could result in the incorrect pricing of a\ntransaction and improper accounting for the investment or related income.\" (D&L AAG 7.107)\nAs implementation guidance, the D&L AAG notes that relevant control activities include:\n(a)\nProcedures exist to identify and monitor credit risk, prepayment risk, and\nimpairment.\n(b)\nCurrent fair value of securities are obtained and reviewed on a timely\nbasis.\n(c)\nSecurities are monitored on an ongoing basis and factors affecting income\nrecognition and the carrying amount of the securities are analyzed periodically to determine\nwhether adjustments are necessary.\n577. The D&L AAG also provides guidance for independent accountants when testing\ninternal controls. It states (Ch. 7 Investments in Debt & Equity Securities [111):\nControl activities that would contribute to internal controls over\nfinancial reporting in this area include the maintenance of\nmanagement policies, adopted by the board of directors or its\ninvestment committee, that establish authority and responsibility\nfor investments in securities.\n578. When reviewing such management policies, GAAS observes \"...the independent\naccountant should be alert to potential abuses and override of policies and procedures when such\ncircumstances exist.\" (D&L AAG 7.113)\n17 AU326.07, Valuation or allocation assertions address whether balances and transactions presented\n(continued...)\n149\nEFTA00316877\n", "char_count": 1791}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 164, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 165 of 347\n579. Deloitte's internal controls testing should have addressed Bear Stearns' mortgage-\nunderwriting and securitization practices.18 In doing so, Deloitte was on notice that it should\ntake special care, as Bear Stearns was increasingly relying on non-conforming loans (i.e., the\n2/28 Hybrid ARMs) (D&L AAG Ch. 8, Loans). 19 This pattern was reflected in the growth of\nBear Stearns' assets that were subject to management's subjective estimates. These were the\nvery types of investments explicitly identified in the ARAS as possessing higher degrees of\ninherent risk (2006 AAM 8050.35). Moreover, Deloitte should have been attuned to material\nindustry and Bear Stearns specific risks such as: 20\n(a) The June 2006 meltdown of the Bear Stearns U.K. subsidiary that\nspecialized in subprime originations;\n(b) The observations of the housing market downturn by the National\nAssociation of Realtors beginning in May 2006 described above; and\n(... continued)\nwithin the financial statements have been reflected using the appropriate amount.\n18 AU 319.49, \"The auditor should obtain sufficient knowledge of the information system relevant to\nfinancial reporting to understand - The procedures, both automated and manual, by which transactions\nare initiated, recorded, processed, and reported from their occurrence to their inclusion in the financial\nstatements.\"\n19 2006 D&L AAG 8.06, \"Internal factors such as an institution's underwriting practices, credit\npractices, training, risk management techniques, familiarity and experience with its loan products and\ncustomers, the relative mix and geographic concentration of its loan portfolio and the strength of its\ninternal control-also have a significant effect on an institution's ability to control and monitor its credit\nexposure.\" (emphasis added) See also 8.07, which notes that concentrations of particular type of product\nincreases credit risk. Ch.8 in conjunction with AU 319 requir\n... [truncated, 2344 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/164 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=164]", "char_count": 2344}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 165, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 166 of 347\n(c) The FDIC reiteration that \"Bankers and bank regulators need to\nremember that rapid expansion in loan volumes often leads, over time, to declining credit\nquality.\"21\n580. A close scrutiny of the Company's internal controls relating to its securitization\nbusiness should have placed Deloitte on notice that Bear Stearns was engaged in wrongdoing to\nthe detriment of its investors. The OIG identified a:\nLack of expertise by risk managers in mortgage-backed securities\nat various times; lack of timely formal review of mortgage models;\npersistent understaffing; a proximity of risk managers to traders\nsuggesting lack of independence; turnover of key personnel during\ntimes of crisis; and an inability or unwillingness to update models\nquickly enough to keep up with changing circumstances.\n581. In addition, the 2008 OIG Report found \"Bear Stearns' concentration of mortgage\nsecurities was increasing for several years and was beyond its internal limits, and that a portion\nof Bear Stearns' mortgage securities (i.e., adjustable rate mortgages) represented a significant\nconcentration of market risk...\". Accordingly, Deloitte should have been aware of the red flag\nassociated with the fact that Bear Stearns' holdings of MBS-related securities were in excess of\nits internal policy limits.\n582. In addition to the above, Deloitte should have taken notice of the varying risk\nmanagement and pricing approaches taken by Bear Stearns' trading desks described at\nparagraphs 130 to 131 above. The B&D AAG observed that this practice constitutes a fraud risk\nfactor, which for purposes of Deloitte's audits of Bear Stearns should have become a red-flag.²²\n22\n21 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06072.html\n22 Ch. 5, Auditing Considerations, Fraud Risk Factors, Appendix A, ¶ 5.195, Part 1 Fraudulent\nFinancial Reporting, B.2.i, \"Use of different valuations of same product in two related companies.\"\n151\nEFTA00316879\n", "char_count": 1991}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 166, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 167 of 347\n6. Bear Stearns' Deficient Internal Audit Function\n583. GAAS recognize that the internal audit function serves an important role in\nmonitoring the performance of an entity's controls (AU 322, The Auditor's Consideration of the\nInternal Audit Function in an Audit of Financial Statements, ¶[4). Accordingly, GAAS states\n\"the auditor should obtain an understanding of the internal audit function sufficient to identify\nthose internal audit activities that are relevant to planning the audit.\" (AU 322.04)\n584. Deloitte was subject to professional standards to evaluate the work performed by\nBear Stearns' internal auditors. Specifically, when the work of internal auditors is used, the\nindependent auditor is required to evaluate:\n(a)\n(b)\nThe competence of those internal auditors (AU 322.09);\nThe procedures performed by internal audit to develop an understanding\nof relevant internal controls (AU 322.13).\n585. GAAS further specify that when there is a high risk of misstatement, such as with\nthe valuation of assets, the external auditor is required to conduct its own testing.23 The auditor\nis similarly responsible for critical judgments such as inherent and control risks, and the\nmateriality of misstatements.2\n24\n586. In addition to the material weaknesses it observed with respect to Bear Stearns'\nrisk management function, the SEC concluded that there were significant deficiencies of the\n23 AU 322.21, \"However, for such assertions, the consideration of internal auditors' work cannot\nalone reduce audit risk to an acceptable level to eliminate the necessity to perform tests of those assertions\ndirectly by the auditor. Assertions about the valuation of assets and liabilities involving significant\naccounting estimates, and about the existence and disclosure of related-party transactions, contingencies,\nuncertainties, and subsequent events, are examples of assertions that might have a high risk of material\nmisstatement\n... [truncated, 2308 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/166 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=166]", "char_count": 2308}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 167, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 168 of 347\nCompany's internal audit function. These deficiencies were observed relative to Bear Stearns\nInternal Audit's assessment of risk management controls. Importantly, this conclusion was\nreached on a contemporaneous basis as set forth in the 2008 OIG Report:\nTM's own memorandum dated November 2006 noted significant\ndeficiencies in Bear Stearns internal auditors' work as follows:\nThe audits for Market Risk Management, Credit Risk Management\nand Funding/Liquidity Risk Management are completed and the\nreports are in draft form. At this point it can be noted the [sic]\nthere appears to be significant deficiencies in the coverage for\nthe review of liquidity and funding risk management which will\nbe a focal point of our discussions of scope expansion in the 2007\nCSE audits. (emphasis added)\n587. Given applicable professional standards, Deloitte should have similarly identified\nand addressed the red-flags constituted by the deficiencies in Bear Stearns' Internal Audit\nfunction. Deloitte should have been particularly sensitive to its review of the internal audit\nreports regarding Bear Stearns' risk management because Sarbanes-Oxley as originally drafted\nrequired the external auditor rather than internal auditors to perform this work. In other words,\napplicable standards anticipated that greater levels of independence and expertise were likely to\nbe necessary in the assessment of risk management than could be provided by internal audit\npersonnel.\n588. Risk control at Bear Stearns was inextricably linked to the effectiveness of risk\nmanagement and internal audit personnel as well as the procedures those functions carried out.\nIn consideration of the significant deficiencies identified by the SEC, Deloitte should have\nknown that Bear Stearns' internal audit function did not mitigate any of the shortcomings of the\nCompany's risk management function. Critically, the ineffectiveness of Bear Stearns' oversight\n(... cont\n... [truncated, 2216 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/167 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=167]", "char_count": 2216}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 168, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 169 of 347\nfunctions raised red-flags about the Company's internal controls and commitment to the effective\nrisk management operations it was reporting to users of its financial statements.\nVIII. DEFENDANTS' MATERIALLY FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS\nA.\nStatements Relating to Fiscal Year 2006 and Fourth Quarter 2006\n589. The Company's deception of its investors began on December 14, 2006, with a\nseries of false statements regarding its 2006 results made in a press release and press conference.\nIt continued to misrepresent its results in the Form 10-K it filed with the SEC covering fiscal\nyear 2006.\n1.\nDecember 14, 2006 Press Release\n590. On December 14, 2006, Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its fourth\nquarter and fiscal year end results for 2006. The Company stated:\nThe Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported\nearnings per share (diluted) of $4.00 for the fourth quarter ended\nNovember 30, 2006, up 38% from $2.90 per share for the fourth\nquarter of 2005. Net income for the fourth quarter of 2006 was\n$563 million, up 38% from $407 million for the fourth quarter of\n2005. Net revenues for the 2006 fourth quarter were $2.4 billion,\nup 28% from $1.9 billion for the 2005 fourth quarter. The\nannualized return on common stockholders' equity for the fourth\nquarter of 2006 was 20.5%.\nFor the fiscal year ended November 30, 2006, earnings per share\n(diluted) were a record $14.27, up 38% from $10.31 for fiscal\n2005. Net income for the fiscal year 2006 was $2.1 billion, up\n40% from the $1.5 billion earned in the twelve-month period\nended November 30, 2005. Net revenues for fiscal year 2006 were\n$9.2 billion, an increase of 25% from $7.4 billion in the prior fiscal\nyear. The after-tax return on common stockholders' equity was\n19.1% for fiscal 2006.\n***\nNet revenues in Capital Markets, which includes Institutional\nEquities, Fixed Income and Investment Banking, were $1.8 billion\nfor the fourth quarter \n... [truncated, 2026 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/168 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=168]", "char_count": 2026}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 169, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 170 of 347\n***\nFixed income net revenues were $1.1 billion, up 25% from $839\nmillion in the fourth quarter of 2005.\n591. As a result, on December 14, 2006, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $159.96 per\nshare, up from a close of $155.89 per share the day before. The following day, December 15,\n2006, Bear Stearns' shares closed at $163.68.\na.\nDecember 14, 2006 Press Release Statements Regarding\nthe Company's Fourth Quarter 2006 Results\n592. In the press release, Bear Stearns misstated its earnings per share, net income, and\nnet revenues. Revenues from Capital Markets, specifically within the Fixed Income area, were\nalso falsely inflated.\n593. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these\nresults by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value significant portions of its Level\n3 assets, as described above at paragraphs 100 to 111.\n594. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 11% of\nthe Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $12.1 billion. Because these\nassets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out\nin paragraphs 77 to 80 above.\n595. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value\nmortgage-backed securities, the lion's share of these assets, did not reflect key factors relating to\nthe downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at paragraphs\n139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in the second\nhalf of 2006.\n155\nEFTA00316883\n", "char_count": 1649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 170, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 171 of 347\n596. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was\nsignificantly higher than they should have been, violating GAAP as set out at paragraphs 324 to\n423 above.\n597.\nb. Press Release Regarding Fiscal 2006 Results\nBear Stearns also announced its fiscal year 2006 results in the December 14, 2006\npress release. For the 2006 fiscal year, Bear Stearns reported that it earnings per share (diluted)\nwere a record $14.27, its net income was $2.1 billion and its net revenues for fiscal year 2006\nwere $9.2 billion. These figures were false and misleading for the same reasons set out in\nparagraphs 593 to 596 above.\n598.\n2.\nFourth Quarter 2006 Earnings Conference Call\nOn December 14, 2006, Bear Stearns held its fourth quarter 2006 earnings\nconference call, conducted by defendant Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call,\nMolinaro repeated the financial results set out in paragraphs 590 above. These statements were\nfalse and misleading for the reasons set out above at paragraphs 593 to 596.\n599. During the call, an analyst asked Molinaro:\nThere's obviously been a lot of worry in the investment\ncommunity about slowing originations, the sub prime scare we've\nseen. What's your overall take on that? And if there's any way\nyou can in some way scale the origination platform vis-à-vis the\ntrading component and the other asset classes within MBS would\nbe helpful.\n600. Molinaro responded that:\n[T]he sub prime sector does represent a relatively small piece of\nthe overall mortgage market and the composition of the sub prime\nclass representing an even smaller component of the overall\nmarket. While there's clearly been some issues in sub prime, as\nwe have seen, the issue has really been more of a vintage issue\nas we've got some of the production that was originated maybe\nof what now looks like the top of the cycle with underwriting\nstandards diminishing, experiencing some difficulties. But I\n15\n... [truncated, 2015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/170 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=170]", "char_count": 2015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 171, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 172 of 347\nthink that is and has been relatively well contained and not\nreally spilling over into the broader market. In fact, I would\nsay the broader market continues to be quite healthy and\ninvestor demand for the product continues to be quite robust.\nI think a lot of the attention does appear to be somewhat\noverblown, certainly there are some issues in the sub prime\nsegment, but I would say the broader market is - maybe we've\nseen the worst of it and I think it feels pretty good right now.\n601. The statements above were materially false and misleading when made because\nthe Company understood that the unusually risky loans it was continuing to purchase through its\nEMC subsidiary were not limited to any particular \"vintage\". As noted above in paragraph 59,\nCW 3 reported that during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 EMC would \"buying\neverything\" without regard for the known riskiness of the loan. Moreover, the Company\nunderstood that its own loan origination practices had resulted in \"cutting corners\" on standard\nunderwriting practices, as set out above at paragraphs 53 to 63.\n602. An analyst at Sandler O'Neill, Jeff Harte, asked Molinaro about the Company's\nexposure to increased defaults on subprime mortgages:\nAs we see some default rises in subprime land, and as we also see\nyou originating more of the mortgages that you're actually\nsecuritizing and sending out, does the risk of defaulting mortgages\ncoming back to you rise, or how do you look at that?\n603. Molinaro responded by vastly understating Bear Stearns' exposure to increasing\ndefaults in the subprime market:\nWell, I don't - no, it doesn't. Because essentially we're\noriginating and securitizing. But I think the point we should\nmake about what's happening in the subprime sector - in other\nwords, the vintage class that seems to be experiencing the most\ndifficulty certainly coming at the end at what appears to be the\nheights of the cycle wh\n... [truncated, 2364 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/171 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=171]", "char_count": 2364}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 172, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 173 of 347\ntheir livelihood was focused on volume. So what we saw in 2006,\nour activity in the subprime sector declined dramatically,\nlargely because our standards was higher and our pricing was\nnot at the Level that would generate a lot of business. I think\nthe good news in the subprime sector, as the business is moving\ninto the hands of much stronger players in an environment where\nthe underwriting standards are being tightened and the business\nshould improve.\n604. The statements above in paragraph 603 were materially false and misleading\nwhen made because Bear Stearns did far more than originate and securitize subprime loans-it\nretained on its books large amounts of the riskiest tranches of RMBS and CDOs it produced.\nIndeed, as set out at paragraph 65 above, by November of 2006, the Company held $5.6 billion\nof the riskiest tranches of subprime-backed RMBS on its books.\n605. Moreover, Bear Stearns' own underwriting standards were not higher in 2006\nthan in previous years, and the Company understood that the loans it was continuing to purchase\nthrough its EMC subsidiary during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 that were\nunusually risky, and in fact EMC was not tightening its underwriting standards.\n3.\nForm 10-K for Fiscal Year 2006\n606.\nOn February 13, 2007, Bear Stearns filed its Form 10-K for the annual and\nquarterly period ended November 30, 2006. The 10-K was signed by, among others, defendants\nGreenberg, Cayne, Schwartz, Spector and Farber. The Form 10-K made misrepresentations\nregarding the Company's financial results, risk management practices, exposure to market risk,\ncompliance with banking capital requirements, and internal controls. Finally, the 2006 Form 10-\nK contained false and misleading statements by the Company's auditor, Deloitte, relating to its\nreview and certification of the Company's reported financial results.\n158\nEFTA00316886\n", "char_count": 1956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 173, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 174 of 347\n607.\nAs a result, on February 13, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $160.10 per\nshare, up from a close of $157.30 per share the day before. The following day, February 14,\n2007, Bear Stearns' shares closed at $165.81.\na.\nThe Company's Financial Results and Assets\n608.\nThe financial results, including revenues, earnings, and earnings per share\nreported by the Company in the Form 10-K for 2006 were misleading for the same reasons set\nout in paragraphs 593 to 596 above, relating to the Company's announced results for fiscal year\n2006.\n609. Moreover, in the 2006 Form 10-K the Company was materially false and\nmisleading in its assertions about the value of assets corresponding to Level 3. The Company\nstated that:\nat November 30, 2006 and 2005, the total value of all financial\ninstruments whose fair value is estimated based on internally\ndeveloped models or methodologies utilizing significant\nassumptions or other data that are generally less readily observable\nfrom objective sources (primarily fixed income cash positions)\naggregated approximately $12.1 billion and $7.1 billion,\nrespectively, in \"Financial Instruments Owned[.]\n610. As set out in paragraphs 100 to 111 above, by the date of this statement, the\nCompany's Principal Accountant and Controller had already been informed that the models the\nCompany used to value the mortgage-backed securities in this asset category failed to reflect\ndramatic declines in the housing market.\n611.\nb.\nThe Company's Risk Management Practices\nBear Stearns' 2006 Form 10-K misled investors with respect to the Company's\nuse of its VaR models and the accuracy and of its valuation models for assets linked to subprime\nmortgages. The 2006 Form 10-K stated that:\n159\nEFTA00316887\n", "char_count": 1798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 174, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 175 of 347\nmembers of the Controllers and Risk Management Departments\nperform analysis of internal valuations, typically on a monthly\nbasis but often on an intra-month basis as well. These departments\nare independent of the trading areas responsible for valuing the\npositions. Results of the monthly validation process are reported\nto the MTM Committee, which is composed of senior management\nfrom the Risk Management and Controllers Departments. The\nMTM Committee is responsible for ensuring that the\napproaches used to independently validate the Company's\nvaluations are robust, comprehensive and effective. Typical\napproaches include valuation comparisons with external sources,\ncomparisons with observed trading, independent comparisons of\nkey model valuation inputs, independent trade modeling and a\nvariety of other techniques.\n612. In addition, the Company specifically asserted that:\nThe Company regularly evaluates and enhances such VaR models\nin an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.\n613. These statements were false and misleading when made because, as set out at\nparagraphs 123 to 127 above, by the time of this statement the SEC had repeatedly warned the\nCompany that the models it used to assess risk, including its VaR and mortgage valuation\nmodels, failed to reflect key indicators of market declines. According to the 2008 OIG Report,\nBear Stearns' VaR models failed to include critical variables such as \"housing price appreciation,\nconsumer credit scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data.\" It was precisely\nthese indicators that would have reflected the rapidly declining housing market.\n614. Moreover, according to the 2008 OIG Report, reviews of the Company's risk\nmanagement models which should have taken place before the subprime market cratered were\nnever completed at any time before the Company's collapse.\n615. Bear Stearns' 2006 Annual Report to Stockholders, attached as an Exhi\n... [truncated, 2208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/174 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=174]", "char_count": 2208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 175, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 176 of 347\nexposure to market and credit risk for high yield positions and establish limits and concentrations\nof risk by individual issuer.\"\n616.\nIn fact, Bear Stearns lacked risk management personnel and was unable to\nappropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Stearns had the correct personnel in place, the\n2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with\nthe traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk\nmanagers that had experience or were capable of valuing the MBS which were central to Bear\nStearns' business models.\n617. Bear Stearns' 2006 Form 10-K also misled investors with respect to Bear Stearns'\nrisk management procedures when it stated that \"comprehensive risk management procedures\nhave been established to identify, monitor and control [its] major risks.\"\n618. In fact, this statement was false and misleading when made because, according\nthe 2008 OIG Report and verified independently by confidential witnesses, Bear Stearns did not\nhave risk management personnel at the time capable of accurately valuing MBS.\n619. Bear Stearns' 2006 Form 10-K also stated that \"The Treasurer's Department is\nindependent of trading units and is responsible for the Company's funding and liquidity risk\nmanagement... [m]any of the independent units are actively involved in ensuring the integrity\nand clarity of the daily profit and loss statements,\" and that:\nThe Risk Management Department is independent of all trading\nareas and reports to the chief risk officer... [t]he department\nsupplements the communication between trading managers and\nsenior management by providing its independent perspective on\nthe Company's market risk profile.\"\n620. In fact, as set out at paragraphs 129 to 136 above, in this period Bear Stearns' risk\nmanagers had little independence from its trading desk, and no ability to reign in the Company's\naccumulation of r\n... [truncated, 2022 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/175 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=175]", "char_count": 2022}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 176, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 177 of 347\nThe Company's Exposure to Market Risk\n621. As reflected in the exchange of letters between the SEC and the Company\ndescribed above at paragraphs 312 to 323, the Company's 2006 Form 10-K was also false and\nmisleading in that it failed to disclose the Company's true exposure to the subprime market. The\nSEC concluded in the 2008 OIG Report that, as a result, investors were deprived of \"material\ninformation\" that they could have used \"to make well-informed investment decisions.\"\n622. Bear Stearns' 2006 Form 10-K also misled investors with respect to its exposure\nto \"market risk.\" In its 2006 Form 10-K the Company stated that it:\nmitigates its exposure to market risk by entering into hedging\ntransactions, which may include over-the-counter derivative\ncontracts or the purchase or sale of interest-bearing securities,\nequity securities, financial futures and forward contracts. In this\nregard, the utilization of derivative instruments is designed to\nreduce or mitigate market risks associated with holding dealer\ninventories or in connection with arbitrage-related trading\nactivities.\n623. These statements were false when made because Bear Stearns managers were\naware that it was impossible to effectively hedge against declines in assets in light of deficiencies\nin its VaR and mortgage valuation models, as discussed above at paragraphs 100 to 111 and 123\nto 128.\n624.\nFurthermore, because of the deficiencies in its VaR models, the Company's\nrepresentation in its 2006 Form 10-K that it had an aggregate VaR of just $28.8 million, which\nwas far lower than its peers, was materially false and misleading. In fact, the Company knew\nthat its VaR numbers failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.\nd. The Company's Compliance With Banking Regulations\n625. In its 2006 Form 10-K Bear Stearns stated that \"the Company is in compliance\nwith CSE regulatory capital requirements.\" This statement was materially false\n... [truncated, 2033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/176 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=176]", "char_count": 2033}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 177, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 178 of 347\nwhen made because, as set forth at paragraphs 427 to 452 above, the Company had misled\nregulators into believing that it was meeting capital requirements only by repeatedly violating\nbanking regulations relating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set forth in the 2008\nOIG Report, the Company violated CSE rules by (i) inflating its profit and its capital by using\ninflated marks on assets subject to mark disputes; and (ii) falsely inflating its net capital by using\nmisleading methods to calculate VaR.\ne. The Company's Internal Controls\n626. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when\nthey executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing.\nThis certification stated that the 10-K report \"does not contain any untrue statement of a material\nfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the\ncircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period\ncovered by this report\" and \"the financial statements, and other financial information included in\nthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition.\"\n627. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:\n[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial\nstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally\naccepted accounting principles.\"\n628. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings\nfrom the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of\nthe Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the\nencouraging revenue growth and earn\n... [truncated, 2169 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/177 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=177]", "char_count": 2169}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 178, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 179 of 347\nrelying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of its highly\nilliquid Level 3 assets.\n629.\nf.\nDeloitte's Certification\nAs the Company's auditor Deloitte certified Bear Stearns' 2006 Form 10-K, as\nrequired by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly offered a materially\nmisleading opinion as to the financial statements' accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs\n523 to 588 above, Deloitte knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications\nwere materially false and misleading when made, perpetrating a fraud on the Company's\ninvestors.\nB.\nStatements Relating to Fiscal Year 2007 Results\n630. In press releases, conference calls and SEC filings, Bear Stearns deceived\ninvestors with respect to its 2007 financial results.\n1.\nFirst Quarter 2007 Results\n631.\n2007 results.\na. First Quarter 2007 Press Release\nOn March 15, 2007, Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its first quarter\nNEW YORK, NY - March 15, 2007 - The Bear Stearns\nCompanies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported earnings per share\n(diluted) of $3.82 for the first quarter ended February 28, 2007, up\n8% from $3.54 per share for the first quarter of 2006. Net income\nfor the first quarter of 2007 was $554 million, up 8% from $514\nmillion for the first quarter of 2006. Net revenues were $2.5\nbillion for the 2007 first quarter, up 14% from $2.2 billion in the\n2006 first quarter. The annualized return on common\nstockholders' equity was 18.3%.\n\"We are pleased with this excellent performance, revenues for the\nfirst quarter were up for every business segment,\" said James E.\nCayne, chairman and chief executive officer of The Bear Stearns\nCompanies Inc. \"Growing the company remains a core focus as we\n164\nEFTA00316892\n", "char_count": 1832}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 179, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 180 of 347\ncontinue to invest in the clearing, mortgage, international and asset\nmanagement franchises with successful results.\"\n***\nCapital Markets net revenues for the first quarter of 2007 were\n$2.0 billion, up 15% from $1.7 billion\n***\nFixed Income net revenues were $1.1 billion, up 27% from $907\nmillion in the year-ago quarter.\n632. As a result, on March 15, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $148.50 per share,\nup from a close of $145.29 per share the day before. The following day, March 16, 2007, Bear\nStearns' shares closed at $145.48.\n633. In the press release, Bear Stearns misstated its earnings per share, net income, and\nnet revenues. Bear Stearns' financial results for Capital Markets, specifically Fixed Income,\nwere also falsely inflated.\n634. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these\nresults by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as described\nabove at paragraphs 100 to 111.\n635. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 11.64%\nof the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $15 billion. Because these\nassets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out\nin paragraphs 77 to 80 above.\n636. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value\nmortgage-backed securities, a large share of these assets, did not reflect key factors relating to\nthe downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at paragraphs\n165\nEFTA00316893\n", "char_count": 1632}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 180, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 181 of 347\n139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in the second\nhalf of 2006 and into the first quarter of 2007.\n637. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this group of assets was\nsignificantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP as set out at\nparagraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its books,\nits revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated.\nb.\nFirst Quarter 2007 Conference Call\n638. On March 15, 2007 Bear Stearns held its first quarter 2007 earnings conference\ncall, conducted by defendant Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call, Molinaro repeated\nthe financial results described in paragraph 631. For the reasons set out in 633 to 637 above,\nthese statements were false and misleading.\n639. In the same call, Molinaro stated that Bear Stearns' internal origination platform:\nallows us to control the performance of the loans and it puts the\nservicing at very strong stable hands and historically in periods of\ndislocation like this, the opportunities to buy pools of defaulted\nloans or semi-performing loans, have been there and that\nservicing capacity has been a key asset in our ability to\ngenerate return from those assets.\"\n640. These statements were false and misleading because the Company understood that\nthe loans it was continuing to purchase through its EMC subsidiary were being bought with little\ndue diligence. As noted above in paragraph 59, CW 3 reported that during the latter part of 2006\nand the beginning of 2007 EMC was “buying everything\" without regard for the risk of the loan.\nMoreover, as noted above at paragraphs 54 and 58 to 60, additional confidential witnesses have\ntestified that Bear Stearns' own origination platforms were seriously flawed and were not\naccurately measuring the risk of the loans issued. Additional Confidential Witnesses have\n166\nEFTA00316894\n", "char_count": 1999}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 181, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 182 of 347\nconfirmed that Bear Stearns' internal origination platforms were not using prudent lending\nstandards (paragraphs 54 and 58 to 60 above).\n641. In the same call, Molinaro also made false and misleading statements regarding\nthe Company's exposure to risk connected with the Hedge Funds. An unidentified analyst on the\ncall asked, \"Can you give any insight about whether you've seen or had issues with margin calls\nor any kind of difficulties in hedge fundland given how volatile the Markets have been the last\nfew weeks?\"\n642. Molinaro responded that \"[w]e haven't seen any difficulties. I would say it's\nbeen, obviously there's a lot of market volatility but we've had no difficulties there.\" Barely two\nweeks earlier, Cioffi, a Senior Managing Director of BSAM and a member of Bear Stearns\nBoard of Directors, had written of the Funds' February results that \"I can't believe anything has\nbeen this bad.\"\n643. In fact, as described at paragraphs 193 to 196 above, the Hedge Funds were in the\nmidst of a disastrous collapse in the value of their assets. The managers of these Hedge Funds\nreported directly to defendant Spector, the Co-President of the Company at the time.\n644. When asked to give details regarding Bear Stearns' exposure to subprime CDOS,\nMolinaro refused, saying \"I think that we feel like we've got the situation in hand. We think it's\nwell hedged.\"\n645. This statement was false and misleading, in that Molinaro was aware that the VaR\nand valuation models, essential to meaningful hedging of risk, failed to reflect key data about\nhousing declines.\n167\nEFTA00316895\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 182, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 183 of 347\nFirst Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q\n646. In its report for the first quarter of 2007, signed by defendant Farber, the\nCompany materially misrepresented its financial results, its exposure to risk, its internal controls,\nand its compliance with regulatory capital requirements.\n647.\n(i) Financial Results\nIn the Form 10-Q it filed on April 9, 2008, the Company stated that:\nNet revenues for Capital Markets increased 15.4% to $1.97 billion\nfor the 2007 quarter compared with $1.70 billion for the 2006\nquarter. Pre-tax income for Capital Markets increased 12.9% to\n$736.3 million for the 2007 quarter from $652.3 million for the\ncomparable prior year quarter. Pre-tax profit margin was 37.5%\nfor the 2007 quarter compared with 38.3% for the 2006 quarter.\n648.\nFixed income net revenues increased 26.7% to $1.15 billion for the\n2007 quarter from $907.1 million for the comparable prior year\nquarter.\nThese statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs\n100 to 111 above, Bear Stearns was able to achieve these results only by avoiding taking losses\non its Level 3 assets. It did this by using misleading valuation models that did not accurately\nreflect declines in the housing market. This avoidance of loss permitted the Company to increase\nits revenues and asset values, inflating the value of its stock.\n649. Because the Level 3 assets the Company reported for the period stood at $15.64\nbillion, the Company's knowing use of materially deficient models to value those assets had\ngrave repercussions for accuracy of the Company's financial reporting. These effects were\nmagnified by the Company's leveraging practices.\n168\nEFTA00316896\n", "char_count": 1723}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 183, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 184 of 347\n650. Moreover, the Company's assertion that its Level 3 assets stood at $15.64 billion\nwas materially false and misleading, given that it was a product of a valuation model that did not\nreflect key declines in the market.\n(ii) Exposure to Risk\n651. Bear Stearns' first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to\nits assessment of risk exposure. In the filing, Bear Stearns asserted that \"The Company regularly\nevaluates and enhances such VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.\"\n652. In fact, the Company had undertaken no such review, and its Controller and\nPrincipal Accountant, Farber, had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that the\nCompany's VaR models were inaccurate and out of date. According to the 2008 OIG Report, at\nno time before the Company collapsed in 2008 did Bear Stearns complete a review of its risk\nmanagement models.\n653. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report, in this period Bear Stearns' VaR\nmodels failed to include critical variables such as “housing price appreciation, consumer credit\nscores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data.\" Because these indicators would\nhave reflected the ongoing collapse of the housing market, the Company's decision to omit them\nfrom its VaR calculations was materially misleading.\n654. In the Form 10-Q Bear Stearns reported the reassuringly low VaR numbers it had\ncalculated for the first quarter of 2007, including an aggregate risk of just $27.9 million - far\nlower than its peers. This statement was wildly misleading, in that the Company knew that its\nVaR modeling failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.\n655. The first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to Bear\nStearns' risk control philosophy when it stated that \"the Company's Risk Management\n169\nEFTA00316897\n", "char_count": 1919}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 184, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 185 of 347\nDepartment and senior trading managers monitor exposure to market and credit risk for high\nyield positions and establish limits and concentrations of risk by individual issuer.\"\n656. In fact, Bear Stearns lacked risk management personnel and was unable to\nappropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Stearns had the correct personnel in place, the\n2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with\nthe traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk\nmanagers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear\nStearns' business models.\n657.\n(iii)\nCompliance With Banking Regulations\nIn its first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Stearns stated that \"the Company is in\ncompliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements.\" This statement was materially false and\nmisleading when made because Bear Stearns was only able to meet the CSE program's minimum\ncapital requirements by repeatedly violating CSE rules relating to the appropriate calculation of\nnet capital. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, the Company violated CSE rules by (i) inflating\nits profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets subject to mark disputes; and\n(ii) falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading methods to calculate VaR.\n(iv) Sarbanes-Oxley Certifications\n658.\nDefendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when\nthey executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q filing\nfor the first quarter of 2007. This certification stated that stated that the 10-Q report “does not\ncontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make\nthe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not\nmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report\" and \"the financial statements, and\n\n... [truncated, 2017 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/184 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=184]", "char_count": 2017}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 185, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 186 of 347\nother financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the\nfinancial condition.\"\n659. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:\n660.\n[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial\nstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally\naccepted accounting principles.\"\nThese statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings\nfrom the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of\nthe Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the\nencouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Stearns reported in its certified\nstatements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking\nlosses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of\nits highly illiquid Level 3 assets.\n(v) Deloitte's Certification\n661. As the Company's auditor Deloitte certified Bear Stearns' first quarter 2007 Form\n10-Q, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered\nan opinion as to the financial statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588\nabove, Deloitte knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were\nmaterially false and misleading when made, and perpetrated a fraud on Bear Stearns investors as\na result.\n171\nEFTA00316899\n", "char_count": 1731}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 186, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 187 of 347\n2.\nSecond Quarter 2007 Results\na.\nSecond Quarter 2007 Press Release\n662.\n2007 results.\nOn June 14, 2007, Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its second quarter\nNEW YORK - June 14, 2007 - The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.\n(NYSE:BSC) today reported earnings per share (diluted), after a\nnon-cash charge, of $2.52 for the second quarter ended May 31,\n2007, down 32% from $3.72 per share for the second quarter of\n2006... Net income for the second quarter of 2007, after the non-\ncash charge, was $362 million. Net income excluding the non-\ncash charge would have been $486 million, down 10% from $539\nmillion for the second quarter of 2006. Net revenues for the 2007\nsecond quarter were a record $2.512 billion, up from the previous\nrecord of $2.499 billion reported for the 2006 second quarter. The\nannualized return on common stockholders' equity for the second\nquarter of 2007 was 11.6%, and 16.4% for the trailing 12-month\nperiod ended May 31, 2007.\n***\nCapital Markets net revenues for the second quarter of 2007 were\n$1.9 billion.\n***\nFixed Income net revenues were $962 million for the 2007 second\nquarter.\n663. As a result, on June 14, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $149.60 per share, up\nfrom a close of $149.49 per share the day before. The following day, June 15, 2007, Bear\nStearns' shares closed at $150.09.\n664. In the press release, Bear Stearns misrepresented its earnings per share, net\nincome, and net revenues - specifically its financial results for Capital Markets.\n665. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these\nresults by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as described\nabove at paragraphs 100 to 111.\n172\nEFTA00316900\n", "char_count": 1793}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 187, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 188 of 347\n666.\nAt the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 10.55%\nof the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $14.39 billion. Because\nthese assets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as\nset out in paragraphs 77 to 80 above.\n667. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value\nmortgage-backed securities, the lion's share of these assets, did not reflect key factors relating to\nthe downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at paragraphs\n139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in the second\nhalf of 2006 and into the second quarter of 2007.\n668. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was\nsignificantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP provisions as set out\nat paragraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its\nbooks, its revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated.\n669.\nb. Second Quarter 2007 Conference Call\nOn June 14, 2007, Bear Stearns held its second quarter 2007 earnings conference\ncall, conducted by defendant Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call, Molinaro repeated\nthe financial results described at paragraph 662 above. These statements were false and\nmisleading for the reasons set out at paragraphs 664 to 668 above.\n670. During the June 14, 2007 conference call, Molinaro also stated that the:\nDuring the quarter we adopted tighter underwriting standards in\nthe origination of sub prime and Alt-A mortgages which served to\ndramatically reduce the volume of 100% CLTV lending as well as\nstated income lending above 90% LTV, both important segments\nof the sub prime and Alt-A market.\n671. These statements were false and misleading because the Company understood that\nthe loans it was continuing to\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/187 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=187]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 188, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 189 of 347\nnoted above in paragraph 59, CW 3 reported that during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning\nof 2007 EMC was “buying everything\" without regard for the risk of the loan. Moreover, as\nnoted above, additional Confidential Witnesses have testified that Bear Stearns' own origination\nplatforms were seriously flawed and were not accurately measuring the risk of the loans issued.\nAdditional Confidential Witnesses have confirmed that Bear Stearns' internal origination\nplatforms were not using prudent lending standards.\nc. June 22, 2007 Press Release\n672. According to a June 22, 2007 press release announcing the Company's bailout of\nthe High Grade Fund, Bear Stearns had provided the High Grade Hedge fund with a $1.6 billion\ncredit line, secured by collateral worth more than $1.6 billion. Bear Stearns reported that asset\nsales had reduced the loan balance to $1.345 billion. This statement was false and misleading.\n673. As set out at paragraphs 212 to 213 above, according to the 2008 OIG Report, by\nthe time of this statement the estimated value of the collateral securing the loan had deteriorated\nby nearly $350 million—that is, to approximately the value of the loan Bear Stearns had given\nthe High Grade Fund. Moreover, the High Grade Hedge fund had no assets other than the\ncollateral Bear Stearns already held.\n674. Bear Stearns further misled investors during a June 22, 2007 conference call held\nto discuss the liquidity difficulties experienced by BSAM's in-house hedge funds. During this\nconference call, Molinaro was asked \"[t] what extent has this event caused you to relook at some\nof your practices overall for Bear Stearns since you are such a big player in the mortgage\nmarket? I mean you have had the sub-prime problem for more than three months now. Are\nthere other trigger events we should pay attention to over the next year?\" Molinaro responded\nwith the following:\n174\nEFTA00316902\n", "char_count": 1978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 189, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 190 of 347\nWell [] I don't know that it's causing us to have any different point\nof view on the activities in our mortgage business. Our mortgage\nbusiness has basically been not affected by this and has not really\nbeen a part of this situation. So our mortgage business continues\nto operate in a very effective way. Albeit in a more in a lower\nvolume environment and a more difficult operating environment\ngiven the macro picture in the marketplace.\nAs it relates to our Asset Management division, we feel that we\nhave adequate controls in place. Obviously if you have a problem\nlike this, you are going to reassess those controls and look to\nstrengthen them. But I think the simple point in this Fund is that or\nthese two Funds, they are invested in an asset class that went\nthrough a period of severe distress.\n675. In fact, as set out above at paragraphs 139 to 148, by June of 2007 capital was\nebbing from the subprime securitization market, reducing demand for the origination of\nsubprime loans.\nd. Second Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q\n676. In its report for the second quarter of 2007, signed by defendant Farber, the\nCompany materially misrepresented its financial results, its exposure to risk, its compliance with\nregulatory capital requirements, its internal controls, and the effects of its bailout of the High\nGrade Fund. Deloitte also filed a materially false and misleading certification in connection with\nthe Form 10-Q.\n677. As a result, on July 10, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $137.96 per share,\ndown from a close of $143.89 per share the day before. The following day, July 11, 2007, Bear\nStearns' shares closed at $138.03.\n678.\n(i)\nFinancial Results\nIn the Form 10-Q it filed on July 10, 2007, the Company stated that:\nNet revenues for Capital Markets decreased 9.7% to $1.86 billion\nfor the 200 quarter compared with $2.06 billion for the 2006\nquarter.\n175\nEFTA00316903\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 190, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 191 of 347\n***\nFixed income net revenues decreased 21.3% to $962.3 million for\nthe 2007 quarter from $1.22 billion for the comparable prior year\nquarter primarily due to a decrease in mortgage-related revenues.\nSecondary trading revenues decreased in the 2007 quarter\ncompared with the 2006 quarter, particularly non-agency fixed rate\nwhole loans and Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (\"ARMs\"), reflecting\nthe challenges associated with the subprime mortgage sector.\nPartially offsetting these decreases were increases in primary\nrevenues from commercial mortgage-backed securities and non-\nagency fixed rate whole loans.\n679. These statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs\n100 to 111 above, in this period Bear Stearns avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets by using\nmisleading mortgage valuation models, which did not accurately value its Level 3 assets. This\navoidance of loss permitted the Company to increase its revenues and asset values, inflating the\nvalue of its stock.\n680.\nAt the time, the Level 3 assets the Company reported for the period stood at\n$14.38 billion. Moreover, just four months later, the residential mortgage component of the\nCompany's Level 3 assets stood at $5.8 billion.\n681. The Company's knowing use of materially deficient models to value its\nmortgage-backed assets had grave repercussions for accuracy of the Company's financial\nreporting. These effects were magnified by the Company's leveraging practices.\n682. Moreover, the Company's assertion that its Level 3 assets stood at $14.38 billion\nwas itself materially false and misleading, given that it was a product of a valuation model that\ndid not reflect key declines in the market.\n176\nEFTA00316904\n", "char_count": 1773}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 191, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 192 of 347\n(ii)\nExposure to Risk\n683.\nBear Stearns' second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q misled investors with respect to its\nassessment of risk exposure. In the filing, Bear Stearns asserted that \"The Company regularly\nevaluates and enhances [its] VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.\"\n684.\nIn fact, the Company had undertaken no such review, and its Controller and\nPrincipal Accountant, Farber, had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that the\nCompany's VaR models were inaccurate and out of date. According to the 2008 OIG Report, at\nno time before the Company collapsed in 2008 did Bear Stearns complete a review of critical\ninputs into its risk management models.\n685. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report, in this period Bear Stearns' VaR\nmodels failed to include critical variables such as “housing price appreciation, consumer credit\nscores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data.\" Because these indicators would\nhave reflected the ongoing collapse of the housing market described at paragraphs 139 to 148\nabove, the Company's decision to omit these key variables from its VaR calculations was\nmaterially misleading.\n686. In the Form 10-Q Bear Stearns reported the reassuringly low VaR numbers it had\ncalculated for the second quarter of 2007, including an aggregate risk of just $28.7 million - far\nlower than its peers. This statement was materially misleading, in that the Company knew that\nits VaR modeling failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.\n687. The second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to Bear\nStearns' risk control philosophy when it stated that \"the Company's Risk Management\nDepartment and senior trading managers monitor exposure to market and credit risk for high\nyield positions and establish limits and concentrations of risk by individual issuer.\"\n177\nEFTA00316905\n", "char_count": 1955}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 192, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 193 of 347\n688.\nIn fact, Bear Stearns lacked risk management personnel and was unable to\nappropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Stearns had the correct personnel in place, the\n2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with\nthe traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk\nmanagers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear\nStearns' business models.\n(iii)\nCompliance With Banking Regulations\n689. In its second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Stearns stated that \"the Company is in\ncompliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements.\" This statement was materially false and\nmisleading when made because Bear Stearns met the CSE program's minimum capital\nrequirements only by repeatedly violating CSE requirements relating to the appropriate\ncalculation of net capital. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report and at paragraphs 427 to 452\nabove, the Company violated CSE rules by failing to take appropriate capital charges related to\nits collapsed hedge funds; by inflating its profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets\nsubject to mark disputes; and, by falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading methods to\ncalculate VaR.\n690.\n(iv) The Company's Internal Controls\nDefendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when\nthey executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q filing\nfor the second quarter of 2007. This certification stated that stated that the Form 10-Q report\n\"does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact\nnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such\nstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report\" and \"the\n178\nEFTA00316906\n", "char_count": 1931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 193, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 194 of 347\nfinancial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all\nmaterial respects the financial condition.\"\n691. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:\n[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial\nstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally\naccepted accounting principles.\"\n692. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings\nfrom the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of\nthe Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the\nencouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Stearns reported in its certified\nstatements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking\nlosses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of\nits highly illiquid Level 3 assets.\n(v)\nThe High Grade Fund Bailout\n693. The second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also contained false and misleading\ninformation about the financial impact of Bear Stearns' support of the High Grade Hedge Fund.\nThe second quarter 2007 10-Q advised investors that Bear Stearns had entered into a $1.6 billion\nsecured financing agreement with the High Grade Hedge Fund \"in the form of collateralized\nrepurchase agreements, enabled the High Grade Fund to replace existing secured financing,\nthereby improving the High Grade Fund's liquidity and allowing an orderly de-leveraging of the\nHigh Grade Fund in the marketplace. Currently, we believe the High Grade Fund has sufficient\nassets available to fully collateralize the Facility.\"\n179\nEFTA00316907\n", "char_count": 1968}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 194, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 195 of 347\n694.\nThe statements in the above paragraph were materially false and misleading\nbecause Bear Stearns' management knew that the High Grade Fund did not have sufficient assets\navailable to fully collateralize the facility. The fact that the High Grade Fund did not have\nsufficient assets to collateralize the Facility was known to Bear Stearns management because the\ncollateral that Bear Stearns took in the repurchase agreement were the same CDOs that had lost\nso much value, causing other lenders to make the margin calls that severally threatened the hedge\nfund's liquidity.\n(vi) Deloitte's Certification\n695. As the Company's auditor Deloitte certified Bear Stearns' second quarter 2006\n10-Q, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered an opinion as to the financial\nstatement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588 above, Deloitte knew or\nrecklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were materially false and\nmisleading when made.\n696.\n3.\nAugust 3, 2007 Press Release and Conference Call\nOn August 3, 2007, Standard & Poor's cut Bear Stearns' credit rating outlook to\nnegative. In an effort to limit damage to its share price, Bear Stearns issued a press release\nwhich contained misleading statements with regard to Bear Stearns' liquidity and its risk\ncontrols. The Company also hosted a conference call with analysts making similar\nmisstatements.\n697.\nIn the press release, the Company stated:\nThe Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE: BSC) said today that it\nis disappointed with S&P's decision to change its outlook on Bear\nStearns. Most of the themes highlighted in its report are common\nto the industry and are not likely to have a disproportional impact\non Bear Stearns. S&P's specific concerns over issues relating to\ncertain hedge funds managed by BSAM are unwarranted as these\n180\nEFTA00316908\n", "char_count": 1926}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 195, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 196 of 347\nwere isolated incidences and are by no means an indication of\nbroader issues at Bear Stearns.\n***\nour balance sheet is strong and liquid...With respect to operating\nperformance and financial condition, the Company has been\nsolidly profitable in the first two months of the quarter, while the\nbalance sheet, capital base and liquidity profile have never been\nstronger. Bear Stearns' risk exposures to high profile sectors are\nmoderate and well-controlled. The risk management infrastructure\nand processes remain conservative and consistent with past\npractices.\n698. These statements were false and misleading when made for at least two reasons.\nFirst, because the Company knowingly used VaR models that would vastly underrepresent the\nrisk the Company faced as a result of the declining housing market, it was reckless to assert that\nits liquidity and capital were sufficient to cover potential losses.\n699. Moreover, the Company's \"solid\" profits in fact resulted from the Company's use\nof misleading valuation models to avoid taking losses, resulting in an overstatement of earnings,\nas set out at paragraphs 100 to 111 above.\n700. On the conference call held on the same day, Company executives responded to\nanalysts' concerns regarding the downgrade. During the conference call, Defendant Alix, Bear\nStearns' Chief Risk Officer, stated \"we have long focused on the origination, transformation and\nredistribution of risk. We've always managed the risk in this process by adjusting the intake, the\norigination of risk, to the demand for the end products.\"\n701. These statements were false and misleading because, as the head of the\nCompany's Global Risk Management division, Alix knew that the VaR models the company\nemployed to assess risk and hedge purchases did not reflect the reality of the collapsing real\nestate market. Moreover, Alix knew that the Company had made no attempt to revise or update\nthese defective models in ye\n... [truncated, 2022 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/195 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=195]", "char_count": 2022}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 196, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 197 of 347\n702. During the same conference call, Molinaro made false and misleading statements\nregarding the collateral that Bear Stearns took in the repurchase agreement with the High Grade\nFund, stating that \"the market value of the inventory approximately reflects what the repo\nbalance was.\"\n703.\nHowever, as noted above, Bear Stearns did not have accurate valuation models to\nvalue the Hedge Funds' subprime-backed collateral, and therefore, was at least reckless in\noffering any opinion on the market value of the highly illiquid collateral it had received from the\nFund. Moreover, given that barely two weeks earlier the Company had informed the High Grade\nFund investors that the fund was worth almost nothing, the hedge fund collateral that the\nCompany held on its books was worth closer to zero.\n4.\nThird Quarter 2007 Results\na.\nThird Quarter 2007 Press Release\n704. On September 20, 2007, Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its third\nquarter 2007 results.\nNEW YORK, NY - September 20, 2007 - The Bear Stearns\nCompanies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported earnings per share\n(diluted) of $1.16 for the third quarter ended August 31, 2007,\ndown 62% from $3.02 per share for the third quarter of 2006. Net\nincome for the third quarter of 2007 was $171.3 million, down\n61% from $438 million for the third quarter of 2006. Net revenues\nwere $1.3 billion for the third quarter, down 38% from $2.1 billion\nfor the third quarter of 2006. The annualized return on common\nstockholders' equity for the third quarter of 2007 was 5.3%, and\n13.7% for the 12-month period ended August 31, 2007. Third\nquarter results include approximately $200 million in losses and\nexpenses related to the BSAM High Grade hedge...\nNet revenues for the Capital Markets segment were $1.0 billion for\nthe quarter ended August 31, 2007.\n***\n182\nEFTA00316910\n", "char_count": 1896}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 197, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 198 of 347\nFixed Income net revenues were $118 million for the 2007 third\nquarter.\n705. In light of statements made in connection with these disappointing results, Bear\nStearns' stock closed at $115.46 per share, down just eighteen cents from its close of $115.64 per\nshare the day before. Indeed, the following day, September 21, 2007, Bear Stearns' shares\nclosed up, at $117.32.\n706. In the press release, Bear Stearns falsely stated that, for the first quarter, its\nearnings per share were $1.16, net income was $171.3 million, and net revenues were $1.3\nbillion. Financial results for Capital Markets, specifically Fixed Income, were also false and\nmisleading.\n707. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these\nresults by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as described\nabove at paragraphs 100 to 111.\n708. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 13%\npercent of the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $16.6 billion.\nAccording to a February 8, 2008 presentation by defendant Molinaro to Credit Suisse analysts,\n$5.8 billion of that figure was residential mortgage-backed securities. Because these assets were\nhighly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out in\nparagraphs 77 to 80 above.\n709. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value\nmortgage-backed securities, more than a quarter of these assets, did not reflect key factors\nrelating to the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at\nparagraphs 139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in\nthe second half of 2006 and into the third quarter of 2007.\n183\nEFTA00316911\n", "char_count": 1862}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 198, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 199 of 347\n710. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was\nsignificantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP as set out at\nparagraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its books,\nits revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated as well.\nb.\nThird Quarter 2007 Conference Call\n711. On September 20, 2007 Bear Stearns also held its third quarter 2007 earnings\nconference call, conducted by Sam Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call, Molinaro\nrepeated the financial results set out in paragraph 704 above. These results were false and\nmisleading for the reasons set out in paragraphs 706 to 710 above.\n712. Also during the call, Molinaro made false and misleading statements regarding\nBear Stearns valuation methodology when he stated:\nAt Bear Stearns we mark our inventory to market Levels that we\ncan observe in the marketplace. We've taken the view that the\nstress markets are the markets and that inventory should be marked\nat Levels that transactions are occurring. Of course we do have\ninventory that does not actively trade in the market. In those cases,\nwe rely on valuation models that utilized observable market inputs\nin determining fair value. These valuations can typically be\nbenchmarked against transactions in similar products or assets\ntaking place in the market.\"\n713. This statement was false and misleading because it disregarded the material fact,\nas noted in the 2008 OIG Report that Bear Stearns' valuation methodology did not take into\naccount key market inputs and were more than ten years out of date.\n714. In the same call, Molinaro stated that Bear Stearns would take \"$200 million of\nlosses associated with the failure of the high-grade funds, representing the write-off of our\ninvestment and fees receivable, losses from the liquidation of the $1.6 billion repo facility.\"\n715. An analyst asked \"and\n... [truncated, 2172 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/198 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=198]", "char_count": 2172}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 199, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 200 of 347\n716. Molinaro responded that \"about $100 million of that is the write-off of our\ninvestment in the fund and the write-off of receivables that we had from the funds related to\npredominantly related to management and performance fees that related to 2006.\"\n717. As set out above at paragraphs 212 to 216, this $100 million figure was $1.2\nbillion short of the Company's true losses due to the Hedge Fund collapse. The Company did\nnot disclose the full amount of its losses on the collateral for fear that its lenders and\ncounterparties would realize that it had been consistently overvaluing its assets.\n718. In fact, even by the Company's own estimations regarding the write downs\nassociated with the Hedge Fund, the numbers revealed to investors in September 2007 were\nmisleading. The 2008 OIG Report states that the Company's internal documents reflect that it\nultimately took a $500 million write down in connection with the bailout in the fall of 2007.\nHowever, the Company never disclosed this additional write down to investors.\nc.\nThird Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q\n719.\nIn its report for the third quarter of 2007, signed by defendant Farber, the\nCompany materially misrepresented its financial results, its exposure to risk, its internal controls,\nand its compliance with regulatory capital requirements. In addition, Deloitte made materially\nfalse statements to investors in certifying the Company's results for the quarter.\n720.\n(i) Financial Results\nIn the Form 10-Q it filed on October 10, 2007, the Company stated that:\nNet revenues for Capital Markets decreased 36.4% to $1.05 billion\nfor the 2007 quarter compared with $1.65 billion for the 2006\nquarter.\n***\nFixed income net revenues decreased 87.6% to $117.6 million for\nthe 2007 quarter from $945.0 million for the comparable prior year\nquarter. The Company recognized approximately $700 million in\n185\nEFTA00316913\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 200, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 201 of 347\nnet inventory markdowns during the 2007 quarter related to losses\nin the residential mortgage and leveraged finance areas.\n721. These statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs\n100 to 111 above, in this period Bear Stearns avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets by using\nmisleading valuation models, which did not accurately value its Level 3 assets. This avoidance\nof loss permitted the Company to increase its revenues and asset values, inflating the value of its\nstock.\n722.\nBecause the Level 3 assets the Company reported for the period stood at $16.6\nbillion, the Company's knowing use of materially deficient models to value those assets had\ngrave repercussions for accuracy of the Company's financial reporting. These effects were\nmagnified by the Company's leveraging practices.\n723. Moreover, the Company's assertion that its Level 3 assets stood at $16.6 billion\nwas itself materially false and misleading, given that it was a product of a valuation model that\ndid not reflect key declines in the market.\n724. Bear Stearns' revelation that it recognized \"approximately $700 million in net\ninventory markdowns during the 2007 quarter primarily related to losses experienced in the\nmortgage-related and leveraged finance areas\" was false and misleading when made because it\ngrossly underrepresented the Company's true losses, including its losses on the worthless\ncollateral it had received under the repurchase agreement with the High Grade Fund and the\ndevalued and illiquid retained interests that it continued to carry on its books, as set out at\nparagraphs 212 to 216 above.\n186\nEFTA00316914\n", "char_count": 1707}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 201, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 202 of 347\n(ii) Exposure to Risk\n725. Bear Stearns' third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to\nits assessment of risk exposure. In the filing, Bear Stearns asserted that \"The Company regularly\nevaluates and enhances such VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.\"\n726. In fact, the Company had undertaken no such review, and its Controller and\nPrincipal Accountant, Farber, had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that the\nCompany's VaR models were inaccurate and out of date. According to the 2008 OIG Report, at\nno time before the Company collapsed in 2008 did Bear Stearns complete a review of its risk\nmanagement models.\n727. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report, in this period Bear Stearns' VaR\nmodels failed to include critical variables such as \"housing price appreciation, consumer credit\nscores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data.\" Because these indicators would\nhave reflected the ongoing collapse of the housing market, the Company's decision to omit them\nfrom its VaR calculations was materially misleading.\n728. In the Third Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Stearns reported the reassuringly low\nVaR numbers it had calculated for the third quarter of 2007, including an aggregate risk of just\n$35 million - far lower than its peers. This statement was materially misleading, in that the\nCompany knew that its VaR modeling failed to reflect its accelerating exposure to declining\nhousing prices.\n729. The third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also mislead investors with respect to Bear\nStearns' risk control philosophy when it stated that \"the Company's Risk Management\nDepartment and senior trading managers monitor exposure to market and credit risk for high\nyield positions and establish limits and concentrations of risk by individual issuer.\"\n187\nEFTA00316915\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 202, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 203 of 347\n730.\nIn fact, Bear Stearns lacked risk management personnel and was unable to\nappropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Stearns had the correct personnel in place, the\n2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with\nthe traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk\nmanagers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear\nStearns' business models.\n(iii)\nCompliance With Banking Regulations\n731. In its third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Stearns stated that \"the Company is in\ncompliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements.\" This statement was materially false and\nmisleading when made because Bear Stearns only CSE program's minimum capital requirements\nby violating CSE rules relating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set out in the\n2008 OIG Report and at paragraphs 427 to 452 above, the Company violated CSE rules by\n(i) failing to take appropriate capital charges related to its collapsed hedge funds; (ii) inflating its\nprofit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets subject to mark disputes; and (iii) falsely\ninflating its net capital by using misleading methods to calculate VaR.\n(iv) Internal Controls\n732.\nDefendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when\nthey executed Sarbanes Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q filing\nfor the third quarter of 2007. This certification stated that stated that the Form 10-Q report \"does\nnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to\nmake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,\nnot misleading with respect to the period covered by this report\" and \"the financial statements,\nand other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects t\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/202 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=202]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 203, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 204 of 347\n733. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:\n[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial\nstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally\naccepted accounting principles.\"\n734. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings\nfrom the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of\nthe Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the\nencouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Stearns reported in its certified\nstatements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking\nlosses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of\nits highly illiquid Level 3 assets.\n(v)\nDeloitte's Certification\n735. As an auditor Deloitte also certified Bear Stearns' third quarter 2006 Form 10-Q,\nas required by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered an\nopinion as to the financial statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588\nabove, Deloitte knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were\nmaterially false and misleading when made.\n5.\nNovember 14, 2007 Write Downs\n736. On November 14, 2007, Defendant Molinaro announced that Bear Stearns would\nwrite down $1.2 billion of its assets in the fourth quarter. However, Molinaro misleadingly\nattempted to reassure investors by claiming that Bear Stearns had reduced its CDO holdings to\n$884 million as of November 9, down from $2.07 billion at the end of August. In fact, the\n189\nEFTA00316917\n", "char_count": 1932}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 204, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 205 of 347\nCompany claimed that it now had a net negative exposure to the subprime market—that is, it\nwould profit if the subprime market continued to decline.\n737. Molinaro's November 14, 2007 statements were false and misleading because he\ndid not disclose the true extent of Bear Stearns' exposure from the repurchase collateral taken\nfrom the High Grade Fund. Beyond the a $100 million write down in the hedge fund collateral\nin the quarter ending August 31, 2007, the Company disclosed no further writedowns of the $1.2\nbillion of toxic hedge fund assets it still held on its books.\n738. Moreover, these statements were materially false and misleading because the\nwrite downs the Company reported were far less than would have been required if the Company\nhad been valuing its Level 3 mortgage-related assets using models that actually reflected the\ncarnage in the housing market.\n739. Finally, Molinaro's statements were false and misleading in that the Company's\nfaulty VaR models could not permit it to effective hedge against risk in the subprime market.\nThis fact is confirmed by the Company's announcement barely a month later that it would in fact\nhave to take an additional $700 million writedown on its mortgage-backed assets.\n6.\nFourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2007\na.\nPress Release\n740.\nOn December 21, 2007 Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its fourth\nquarter and fiscal year end results for 2007.\nNEW YORK, NY - December 20, 2007 - The Bear Stearns\nCompanies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) reported results today for the fiscal\nyear and the fourth quarter ended November 30, 2007. For the\nfiscal year the company reported $1.52 earnings per share\n(diluted), compared with $14.27 for fiscal 2006. Net income for\nthe fiscal year was $233 million compared with $2.1 billion earned\nin fiscal year ended November 30, 2006. Net revenues for the\n2007 fiscal year were $5.9 billion, compared with $9.2 billion in\nthe prior fiscal year... \n... [truncated, 2047 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/204 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=204]", "char_count": 2047}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 205, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 206 of 347\nannounced that it anticipated write-downs of approximately $1.2\nbillion in mortgage inventory net of hedges. At November 30,\ntotal net inventory write-downs were $1.9 billion.\n***\nNet revenues in Capital Markets, which includes Institutional\nEquities, Fixed Income and Investment Banking, were a loss of\n$956 million in the fourth quarter of 2007\n***\nFixed Income net revenues were a loss of $1.5 billion, down from\nnet revenues of $1.1 billion in the fourth quarter of 2006.\n741. On December 21, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $89.95 per share, down\nlittle from a close of $91.42 per share the day before.\n742. In the press release, Bear Stearns misrepresented its earnings per share, net\nincome, and net revenues. The Company's Losses in the Capital Market, specifically Fixed\nIncome, were also understated.\n743. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these\nreported results by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as\ndescribed above at paragraphs 100 to 111.\n744. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 19.9% of\nthe Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $24.41 billion. Moreover,\naccording to the Company's February 8, 2008 presentation to Credit Suisse analysts, $7.5 billion\nof this amount represented residential mortgages. Because these assets were highly leveraged,\neven a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out in paragraphs 77 to 80 above.\n745. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value\nmortgages and mortgage-backed securities, a quarter of its Level 3 assets, did not reflect key\nfactors relating to the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out\n191\nEFTA00316919\n", "char_count": 1861}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 206, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 207 of 347\nabove at paragraphs 139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen\ndramatically in the second half of 2006 and into the fourth quarter of 2007.\n746. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was\nsignificantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP as set out at\nparagraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its books,\nits revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated as well.\n747. In addition, these statements were false and misleading because the Company still\nfailed to disclose the true extent of Bear Stearns' exposure from the repurchase collateral taken\nfrom the High Grade Fund. Beyond the $100 million write down in the hedge fund collateral in\nthe quarter ending August 31, 2007, the Company had disclosed no further writedowns of the\n$1.2 billion of toxic hedge fund assets it still held on its books.\n748. Finally, these statements were materially false and misleading because the write\ndowns the Company reported were far less than would have been required if the Company had\nbeen valuing its Level 3 mortgage-related assets using models that actually reflected the carnage\nin the housing market.\nb.\nFourth Quarter 2007 Conference Call\n749.\nBear Stearns announced its fourth quarter 2007 results in a conference call on\nDecember 20, 2007. During the call, Molinaro repeated the financial results described at\nparagraph 740. These statements were false and misleading for the same reasons set out in\nparagraphs 742 to 748 above.\n750. Molinaro also made false and misleading statements when he stated that:\nOn November 14, we announced we would take a $1.2 billion\nwrite-down on our mortgage securities inventories as a result of\ncontinuing deterioration and market conditions through the end of\nOctober. During the month of November, market conditions\n192\nEFTA00316920\n", "char_count": 1978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 207, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 208 of 347\ncontinued to deteriorate, which resulted additional write-downs,\nbringing total mortgage related losses to $1.9 billion.\n751. Further, Molinaro stated: \"we believe our mortgage positions have been\nconservatively valued in light of current market conditions and expected levels of defaults and\ncumulative loss estimates.\" (Emphasis added.) Molinaro further stated \"Overall this franchise is\nstrong; smaller and more focused on restructuring than origination going forward, but our top\ntalent is in place and we are confident in the underlying earnings potential of the mortgage\nbusiness.\"\n752.\nThese statements were false and misleading because they failed to disclose the\nCompany's undisclosed losses from the worthless hedge fund collateral that it bore on its books.\n753. These statements were also false and misleading because the losses were\nminimized by the fact that Bear Stearns was relying on misleading valuation models that failed\nto reflect the declining value of its highly illiquid Level 3 assets.\n754. Moreover, the lack of any schedule giving details regarding the nature of the write\ndowns left investors with no information about the nature of the Company's true exposure and\ncompounded the false and misleading statements by such omissions. Write downs by other\ncompanies in the same period provided far more information, including the source of exposure\n(retained interest, derivatives, commitment to provide liquidity and/or credit support, or\nwarehoused loans and mortgage-backed securities), the type of CDOs to which they were\nexposed (high grade, mezzanine, CDO-squared, etc.) and vintage of the subprime mortgages that\nunderlie their CDO exposures.\n7.\nFiscal Year 2007 Form 10-K\n755. On January 29, 2008, Bear Stearns filed its Form 10-K for the annual and\nquarterly period ended November 30, 2007. The Form 10-K was signed by, among others,\n193\nEFTA00316921\n", "char_count": 1951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 208, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 209 of 347\ndefendants Greenberg, Cayne, Schwartz, Farber and Molinaro. The Form 10-K made\nmisrepresentations regarding the Company's financial results, risk management practices,\nexposure to market risk, compliance with banking capital requirements, and internal controls.\nFinally, the 2007 Form 10-K contained false and misleading statements by the Company's\nauditor, Deloitte, relating to its review and certification of the Company's reported financial\nresults.\n756.\na. The Company's Financial Results\nIn the Form 10-K it filed on January 29, 2008, the Company stated that:\nFiscal 2007 versus Fiscal 2006 Net revenues for Capital Markets\ndecreased 46% to $3.92 billion for fiscal 2007, compared with\n$7.32 billion for fiscal 2006.\nFixed income net revenues decreased 84% to $685 million for\nfiscal 2007 from $4.19 billion for fiscal 2006. Results for fiscal\n2007 were heavily impacted by the severe market conditions\nacross the fixed income sector. The repricing of credit led to\nsignificantly lower net revenue levels due to illiquidity in the\nmarkets as trading levels deteriorated across the spectrum of fixed\nincome products. Mortgage-backed securities revenues decreased\nsignificantly during fiscal 2007 when compared with fiscal 2006\ndue to weaker U.S. mortgage markets and challenges associated\nwith the subprime mortgage sector. Significant spread widening in\nthe second half of fiscal 2007 served to reduce inventory values\nand activity levels. Mortgage-related revenues reflect\napproximately $2.3 billion in net inventory write downs in the\nsecond half of fiscal 2007. A large component of these write-\ndowns were related to ABS CDOs and the unwinding of ABS\nCDO warehouse facilities. As of November 30, 2007, all ABS\nCDO warehouse positions have been unwound. The remaining\nwrite-downs were experienced across our U.S. and international\nresidential and commercial inventories.\n757. As a result, on January 29, 2008, Bear Stearns' \n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/208 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=208]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 209, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 210 of 347\n758.\nThese statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs\n100 to 111 above, in this period Bear Stearns avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets by using\nmisleading valuation models, which did not accurately value its Level 3 assets. This avoidance\nof loss permitted the Company to increase its revenues and asset values and, for the fourth\nquarter and fiscal 2007, avoid additional losses, inflating the value of its stock.\n759. Moreover, in the 2007 Form 10-K the Company was materially false and\nmisleading in its assertions about the value of assets corresponding to Level 3. The Company\nstated that, as of November 30, 2006, it held $24.4 billion in Level 3 assets. This statement was\nfalse and misleading because, by January of 2008, the Company had been informed that the\nmodels it used to value the more than $7.5 billion in mortgage-backed securities in this asset\ncategory failed to reflect dramatic declines in the housing market.\n760.\nb.\nThe Company's Risk Management Practices\nBear Stearns 2007 Form 10-K mislead investors with respect to the models it\nused to value mortgage-backed assets and assess risk. The 2007 Form 10-K stated that:\nMembers of the Controllers and Risk Management Departments\nperform analysis of internal valuations, typically on a monthly\nbasis but often on an intra-month basis as well. These departments\nare independent of the trading areas responsible for valuing the\npositions. Results of the monthly validation process are reported\nto the Mark-to-Market Committee (\"MTMC\"), which is composed\nof senior management from the Risk Management and Controllers\nDepartments. The MTMC is responsible for ensuring that the\napproaches used to independently validate the Company's\nvaluations are robust, comprehensive and effective. Typical\napproaches include valuation comparisons with external sources,\ncomparisons with observed trading, independent comparisons of\nkey mode\n... [truncated, 2259 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/209 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=209]", "char_count": 2259}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 210, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 211 of 347\n762.\nThese statements were false and misleading when made because, as set out at\nparagraphs 124 to 126 above, by the time of this statement the SEC had repeatedly warned the\nCompany that the models it used to assess risk, including its VaR and mortgage valuation\nmodels, failed to reflect key indicators of market declines. According to the 2008 OIG Report,\nBear Stearns' VaR models failed to include critical variables such as \"housing price appreciation,\nconsumer credit scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data.\" It was precisely\nthese indicators that would have reflected the rapidly declining housing market.\n763. Moreover, according to the 2008 OIG Report, reviews of the Company's risk\nmanagement models which should have taken place before the subprime market cratered were\nnever completed at any time before the Company's collapse.\n764. Bear Stearns' 2007 Annual Report to Stockholders, attached as an Exhibit to the\nForm 10-K, misled investors with respect to Bear Stearns' risk control philosophy when it stated\nthat \"the Company's Risk Management Department and senior trading managers monitor\nexposure to market and credit risk for high yield positions and establish limits and concentrations\nof risk by individual issuer.\"\n765. In fact, Bear Stearns lacked risk management personnel and was unable to\nappropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Stearns had the correct personnel in place, the\n2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with\nthe traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk\nmanagers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear\nStearns' business models.\n196\nEFTA00316924\n", "char_count": 1815}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 211, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 212 of 347\n766.\nBear Stearns' 2007 Form 10-K also misled investors with respect to Bear Stearns'\nrisk management procedures when it stated that \"Comprehensive risk management procedures\nhave been established to identify, monitor and control each of [the] major risks.\"\n767. In fact, this statement was false and misleading when made because, according\nthe 2008 OIG Report and verified independently by confidential witnesses, Bear Stearns did not\nhave risk management personnel at the time capable of accurately valuing MBS.\n768. Bear Stearns' 2007 Form 10-K also stated that \"The Treasurer's Department is\nindependent of trading units and is responsible for the Company's funding and liquidity risk\nmanagement... [m]any of the independent units are actively involved in ensuring the integrity\nand clarity of the daily profit and loss statements.\"\n769. Moreover, the Form 10-K stated that the:\nThe Risk Management Department is independent of all trading\nareas and reports to the chief risk officer... [t]he department\nsupplements the communication between trading managers and\nsenior management by providing its independent perspective on\nthe Company's market risk profile.\"\n770. In fact, as set out at paragraphs 129 to 136 above, during 2007 Bear Stearns' risk\nmanagers had little independence from its trading desk, and no ability to reign in the Company's\naccumulation of risk.\n771. Furthermore, despite the crucial deficiencies in the models Bear Stearns used to\nvalue the Company's Level 3 assets, the Company stated in its Form 10-K that it was \"marking\nall positions to market on a daily basis\" and that it had \"independent verification of inventory\npricing.\"\nc. The Company's Exposure to the Market Risk\n772. The Company's 2007 Form 10-K was also false and misleading in that it failed to\ndisclose the Company's true exposure to the subprime market by relying on valuation models\n197\nEFTA00316925\n", "char_count": 1963}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 212, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 213 of 347\nand VaR models that did not accurately reflect the current state of the subprime market. The\nSEC concluded in the 2008 OIG Report that, as a result, investors were deprived of \"material\ninformation\" that they could have used \"to make well-informed investment decisions.\"\n773. Bear Stearns' 2007 Form 10-K also mislead investors with respect to its exposure\nto \"market risk.\" In its 2007 Form 10-K the Company stated that it:\nmitigates its exposure to market risk by entering into offsetting\ntransactions, which may include over-the-counter derivative\ncontracts or the purchase or sale of interest-bearing securities,\nequity securities, financial futures and forward contracts. In this\nregard, the utilization of derivative instruments is designed to\nreduce or mitigate market risks associated with holding dealer\ninventories or in connection with arbitrage-related trading\nactivities.\n774. These statements were false when made because Bear Stearns managers were\naware that it was impossible to effectively hedge against declines in assets in light of deficiencies\nin its VaR and mortgage valuation models, as discussed above at paragraphs 100 to 111 and 123\nto 128.\n775. Furthermore, because of the deficiencies in it VaR models, the Company was\nfalse and misleading in its representation in its 2007 Form 10-K that it had an aggregate VaR of\njust $69.3 million-still far lower than its peers. In fact, the Company knew that its VaR\nnumbers failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.\nd. Compliance With Banking Regulations\n776. In its 2007 Form 10-K Bear Stearns stated that \"the Company is in compliance\nwith CSE regulatory capital requirements.\" This statement was materially false and misleading\nwhen made because, as set forth at paragraphs 427 to 452 above, the Company had misled\nregulators into believing that it was meeting capital requirements only by repeatedly violating\nregulatory requirements relating \n... [truncated, 2084 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/212 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=212]", "char_count": 2084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 213, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 214 of 347\n2008 OIG Report, the Company violated CSE rules by failing to take appropriate capital charges\nrelated to its collapsed hedge funds; by inflating its profit and its capital by using inflated marks\non assets subject to mark disputes; and by falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading\nmethods to calculate VaR.\n777.\ne. The Company's Internal Controls\nDefendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when\nthey executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing.\nThis certification stated that stated that the Form 10-K report \"does not contain any untrue\nstatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements\nmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with\nrespect to the period covered by this report\" and \"the financial statements, and other financial\ninformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition.\"\n778. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro made false and misleading statements when they\nexecuted their Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing,\nin stating that the Form 10-K report \"does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or\nomit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances\nunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by\nthis report\" and \"the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report,\nfairly present in all material respects the financial condition.\"\n779. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:\n[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused\nsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under\nour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the\nreliability of financ\n... [truncated, 2159 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/213 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=213]", "char_count": 2159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 214, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 215 of 347\n780. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings\nfrom the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of\nthe Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the\nencouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Stearns reported in its certified\nstatements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking\nlosses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of\nits highly illiquid Level 3 assets.\n781.\nf. Deloitte's Certification\nAs an auditor Deloitte also certified Bear Stearns' 2007 Form 10-K, as required\nby Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered an opinion as to\nthe financial statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588 above, Deloitte\nknew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were materially false and\nmisleading when made.\nC.\nAdditional False and Misleading Statements in Calendar Year 2008\n782. Bear Stearns made additional false and misleading statements immediately before\nit collapsed in a desperate effort to dupe investors into holding on to their shares in Company\nstock.\n783. On January 31, 2008, Bear Stearns published a letter it had written to John Cash,\nAccounting Branch Chief of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, in response to certain\nconcerns the SEC raised about Bear Stearns' exposure to subprime loans in its fiscal year 2006\nForm 10-K. The Company described its use of econometric models:\nOur objective is to securitize all originated and purchased loans.\nAll securitized retained interests from our subprime originations\nare recorded as financial instruments owned, at fair value, along\nwith any other investments in subprime securities purchased\n200\nEFTA00316928\n", "char_count": 1956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 215, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 216 of 347\nthrough our trading operations. Fair value is determined based on\nthe net present value of a future stream of cash flows.\nEconometric models are used by the trading desk and risk\nmanagement to generate these expected cash flows. Such models\nare primarily industry standard models that consider various\nassumptions, including time value, yield curve, volatility factors,\nprepayment speeds, default rates, loss severity, as well as other\nrelevant economic factors. A degree of subjectivity is required to\ndetermine the appropriate models or methodologies as well as the\nappropriate underlying assumptions.\nOur models are estimated on a data sample of over [***] loans\nwith performance history extending more than ten years. To better\ncapture the impact of risk layers in mortgage loans, these models\nare estimated and implemented at the loan level. The underlying\nstructure of the model is a competing hazards model with the\nprepayment and charge-off as the two possible terminal states for a\nmortgage. The model parameters are recalibrated on a regular\nbasis to reflect the most recent data.\n784. The statements in paragraph 783 above are materially false and misleading\nbecause the Company had actually subordinated its risk management function to the activities of\nits trading desks. Specifically, these statements failed to disclose that the pricing of MBS at Bear\nStearns' trading desks was based more on trading levels in the market than on models. These\nstatements did not disclose that the risk management models that Bear Stearns employed were\nnot used by traders for pricing, and were insensitive to price fluctuations in the housing market, a\nfactor critical to assessing the risk associated with these securities. Its statements failed to\ndisclose that the Company did not periodically evaluate its VaR models, and failed to timely\nupdate inputs to these models.\n785. In a March 10, 2008 press release the Company said that\n... [truncated, 2184 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/215 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=215]", "char_count": 2184}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 216, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 217 of 347\n786. The same day, Defendant Greenberg claimed during an interview with CNBC that\nthe Company had no liquidity problems, calling such an assertion \"ridiculous, totally ridiculous.\"\n787. According to figures released by former Chairman Cox of the SEC in a March 20,\n2008 letter to the Basel Group, the Company's liquidity pool on March 11, 2008, even adjusting\nfor the customer protection rule, stood at $15.8 billion.\n788. On March 12, 2008, Defendant Schwartz, Bear Stearns' CEO, appeared on CNBC\nand said that the Company's liquidity position and balance sheet had not weakened at all. \"We\nfinished the year, and we reported that we had $17 billion of cash sitting at the bank's parent\nCompany as a liquidity cushion,\" he said. \"As the year has gone on, that liquidity cushion has\nbeen virtually unchanged.\" Schwartz added that \"We don't see any pressure on our liquidity, let\nalone a liquidity crisis.\"\n789. These statements were materially false and misleading. Chairman Cox concluded\nin his letter that the Company's liquidity pool actually stood at $12.4 billion the same day-a\ndrop of more than $3 billion from the Company's position barely fifteen hours earlier. Its\nliquidity pool stood at nearly $5 billion less than it had on Monday, March 10, 2008. A day after\nSchwartz' CNBC appearance on March 13, the Company's liquidity pool, according to\nChairman Cox, stood at $2 billion.\n790. As Schwartz was assuring investors on March 12 that the Company was\nexperiencing no threats to its liquidity, $10 billion in cash was evaporating.\n791. Moreover, Schwartz specifically denied on March 12 that the Company's risk had\nscared away any counterparties:\nCNBC: Let me start off with this broad idea that's been in the\nmarket now for a few days and pressuring your stock. Namely,\nthat counterparty risk is something - new counterparty risk is\n202\nEFTA00316930\n", "char_count": 1929}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 217, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 218 of 347\nsomething that a number of firms on Wall Street no longer want to\ntake in terms of dealing with Bear Stearns. Is that true?\nSCHWARTZ: No, it's not true. We are - there's a been a lot of\nvolatility in the market, a lot of disruption in the market, and that's\ncausing some pressure administratively on getting some trades\nsettled up, but we're workin' hard gettin' that done. We're in a\nconstant dialogue with all of the major dealers and the\ncounterparties in the Street, and we're not being made aware of\nanybody who is not taking our credit as a counterparty.\nCNBC: All right, so when I'm told by a hedge fund that I know\nwell, that last night they tried to close out a mortgage - a credit\nprotection mortgage position with Goldman Sachs that they had\nbought a year ago, Bear Stearns was the low bid, and I'm told that\nGoldman would not accept the counterparty risk of Bear Stearns.\nYou're saying you're not aware that that would be the case.\nSCHWARTZ: I'm not aware that, you know, on a specific trade\nfrom one counterparty to another and where you're a third-party,\nwe have direct dealings with all of these institutions, and we have\nactive markets going with each one, and our counterparty risk has\nnot been a problem.\n792. At the time he made this statement, Schwartz, as the Company's CEO, was aware\nthat on March 6, 2008, more than a week earlier, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns\nEuropean lenders, told the brokerage that it would not renew a $500 million loan coming due\nlater that week. He also knew that ING had just pulled nearly half a billion in financing and that\nGoldman Sachs, once a principal source of cash for the Company, had at least temporarily halted\ncovering any more Bear Stearns risk.\n793. Furthermore, according to the 2008 OIG Report, the Company informed TM on\nMarch 12, 2008, the same day as Schwartz's statement, that \"Bear Stearns paid out $1.1 billion\nin disputes to numerous counterparties in or\n... [truncated, 2091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/217 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=217]", "char_count": 2091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 218, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 219 of 347\n794. On March 12, 2008 Bear Stearns' stock closed at $61.58 per share, down from a\nclose of $62.97 per share the day before. The following trading day, March 13, 2008, Bear\nStearns' shares closed at $57.\nIX. LOSS CAUSATION\n795. Defendants' wrongful conduct, as alleged herein, directly and proximately caused\nthe economic loss suffered by Lead Plaintiff and the Class. Throughout the Class Period, the\nmarket prices of Bear Stearns securities were artificially inflated as a direct result of Defendants'\nmaterially false and misleading statements and omissions. When the truth became known, the\nprices of Bear Stearns securities declined precipitously as the artificial inflation was removed\nfrom the prices of these securities, causing substantial damage to Lead Plaintiff and members of\nthe Class. The chart below shows the fluctuation of the price of Bear Stearns common stock\nleading up to and during the Class Period:\nBear Stearns Share Price\nDecember 1, 2005 - May 30, 2008\n$200\n$180\n$160\n$140\n$120\n$100\n$80\n$60\n$40\n$20\n$0\n12/1/2005\n2/1/2006\n4/1/2006\n6/1/2006\n8/1/2006\n10/1/2006\n12/1/2006\n2/1/2007\n4/1/2007\n6/1/2007\n8/1/2007\n10/1/2007\n12/1/2007\n2/1/2008\n796. During the Class Period, Bear Stearns' common stock traded as high as $171.57\nper share as recently as January 12, 2007.\n204\n4/1/2008\nEFTA00316932\n", "char_count": 1379}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 219, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 220 of 347\n797. By early March 2008, Bear Stearns common stock was trading at above $60 per\nshare and its management was vigorously denying rumors that Bear Stearns had any liquidity\nproblems. On March 10, 2008, Bear Stearns common stock fell $7.78, or 11%, to close the day\nat $62.30 on trading volume of 23 million shares. Despite the Company's attempts to reassure\nthe market, Bear Stearns stock price continued to fall by $5.30, or 8.5%, during the week as the\nrumors continued to intensify, eventually closing at $57.00 per share on March 13, 2008 on\nhigher than normal volume.\n798. On March 14, 2008, Bear Stearns announced that its liquidity position had\nsignificantly deteriorated requiring the Company to seek financing via a secured loan facility\nfrom JPMorgan. In response to this news, Bear Stearns' common stock price fell $27, or 47.3%,\nto close at $30.00 per share on particularly heavy trading volume of approximately 187 million\nshares (about eight times its three month average trading volume of 23 million shares). On\nMarch 17, 2008, Bear Stearns' stock price fell an additional $25.19, or 84%, to close at $4.81 on\nparticularly heavy trading volume of about 166 million shares following Bear Stearns'\nannouncement on Sunday, March 16, 2008 that the Company would be acquired by JPMorgan\nfor $2 per share.\n799. In all, as a consequence of the revelation of the truth concerning Bear Stearns\nduring the Class Period, Bear Stearns' common stock lost in excess of $19.8 billion in market\ncapitalization.\n800. Specific dates of adverse disclosure, and corresponding declines in the price of\nBear Stearns' common and preferred stock, are set forth in Section IV above.\n801. Moreover, the adverse consequences of Bear Stearns' disclosures relating to its\nexposure to declines in the housing market, and the adverse impact of those circumstances on the\n205\nEFTA00316933\n", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 220, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 221 of 347\nCompany's business going forward, were entirely foreseeable to Defendants at all relevant times.\nDefendants' conduct, as alleged herein, proximately caused foreseeable losses and damages to\nLead Plaintiff and members of the Class.\n802. As set forth above, the Company's failure to maintain effective internal controls,\nits substantially lax risk management standards, and its failure to report its 2006-2007 financial\nstatements in accordance with GAAP not only were material, but also triggered foreseeable and\ngrave consequences for the Company. The financial reporting that was presented in violation of\nGAAP conveyed the impression that the Company was more profitable, better capitalized, and\nwould have better access to liquidity than was actually the case. The price of Bear Stearns'\nsecurities during the Class Period were affected by those omissions and false statements and\nwere inflated artificially as a result thereof. Thus, the precipitous declines in value of the\nsecurities purchased by the Class were a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of the\ncorrective disclosures of the truth with respect to Defendants' materially false and misleading\nstatements.\nX. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS\n803. Lead Plaintiff brings this action on its own behalf and as a class action pursuant to\nRules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of\nall persons and entities which, between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008, inclusive (the\n\"Class Period”), purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock or other\nequity securities, or call options of or guaranteed by Bear Stearns, or sold Bear Stearns put\noptions, either in the open market or pursuant or traceable to a registration statement, and were\ndamaged thereby (the \"Class\"). The Class shall also include all persons who received Bear\nStearns CAP Plan Units and Restricted Stock Plan Units that had fully ves\n... [truncated, 2040 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/220 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=220]", "char_count": 2040}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 221, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 222 of 347\nan equivalent number of shares of Bear Stearns Stock upon settlement at the end of a deferral\nperiod, as a part of their compensation as an employee with the Company and participation in its\nCAP and RSU Plans. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants; the members of the\nimmediate families of the Individual Defendants; the subsidiaries and affiliates of Defendants;\nany person who is an officer, director, partner or controlling person of Bear Stearns (including\nany of its subsidiaries or affiliates) or any other Defendant; any entity in which any Defendant\nhas a controlling interest; and the legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns of any such\nexcluded person or entity.\n804. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is\nimpracticable. As of March 14, 2008, Bear Stearns had approximately 136 million shares of\ncommon stock outstanding and actively trading on the NYSE with the ticker symbol \"BSC.\"\nWhile the exact number of Class members is unknown to Lead Plaintiff at this time and can only\nbe ascertained through appropriate discovery, Lead Plaintiff believes that the proposed Class\nnumbers in the thousands and is geographically widely dispersed. Record owners and other\nmembers of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Bear Stearns or its transfer\nagent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using a form of notice similar\nto that customarily used in securities class actions.\n805. Lead Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. All\nmembers of the Class were similarly affected by Defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in\nviolation of the Exchange Act as complained of herein.\n806. Lead Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of\nthe Class. Lead Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities\nlitigation.\n207\nEFTA00316935\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 222, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 223 of 347\n807. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and\npredominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. The questions\nof law and fact common to the Class include:\n(a)\nwhether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants' acts and\nomissions as alleged herein;\n(b)\nwhether the SEC filings, press releases and other public statements made\nto the investing public during the Class Period contained material misstatements or omitted to\nstate material information;\n(c)\nwhether and to what extent the Company's financial statements were not\npresented in conformity with GAAP during the Class Period;\n(d) whether and to what extent Deloitte's audits of the Company's financial\nstatements and management's assessments of internal controls during the Class Period were not\nconducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;\n(e) whether and to what extent the market prices of Bear Stearns' common\nstock and other publicly traded securities were artificially inflated during the Class Period\nbecause of the material misrepresentations and/or omissions complained of herein;\n(f)\nwhether, with respect to Lead Plaintiff's and the Class' claims for\nviolations of the Exchange Act, the Defendants named in those claims acted with the requisite\nlevel of scienter;\nwhether, with respect to Lead Plaintiff's and the Class' claims pursuant to\nSection 20(a) of the Exchange Act, the Defendants named in those claims were controlling\npersons of Bear Stearns;\n208\nEFTA00316936\n", "char_count": 1631}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 223, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 224 of 347\n(h)\nwhether reliance may be presumed pursuant to the fraud-on-the-market\ndoctrine; and\n(i)\nwhether the members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of\nthe conduct complained of herein and, if so, the proper measure of damages.\n808. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient\nadjudication of this controversy because, among other things, joinder of all members of the Class\nis impracticable. Furthermore, because the damages suffered by individual Class members may\nbe relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for\nmembers of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no\ndifficulty in the management of this action as a class action.\nXI.\nPRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE\n809. Lead Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance, because the\nclaims asserted herein against Defendants are predicated in part upon omissions of material fact\nof which there was a duty to disclose.\n810. Alternatively, Lead Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a presumption of\nreliance on Defendants' material misrepresentations and omissions pursuant to the fraud-on-the-\nmarket doctrine because:\n(a) Bear Stearns' common stock was actively traded in an efficient market on\nthe NYSE during the Class Period;\n(b)\nBear Stearns' common stock traded at high weekly volumes during the\nClass Period;\n(c)\nAs a regulated issuer, Bear Stearns filed periodic public reports with the\nSEC;\n209\nEFTA00316937\n", "char_count": 1581}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 224, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 225 of 347\n(d) Bear Stearns regularly communicated with public investors by means of\nestablished market communication mechanisms, including through regular dissemination of\npress releases on the major news wire services and through other wide-ranging public\ndisclosures, such as communications with the financial press, securities analysts and other\nsimilar reporting services;\n(e)\nThe market reacted promptly to public information disseminated by Bear\nStearns;\n(f) Bear Stearns' securities were covered by numerous securities analysts\nemployed by major brokerage firms who wrote reports that were distributed to the sales force\nand certain customers of their respective firms. Each of these reports was publicly available and\nentered the public marketplace;\nThe material misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein would tend\nto induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of Bear Stearns' securities; and\n(h) Without knowledge of the misrepresented or omitted material facts alleged\nherein, Lead Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased Bear Stearns securities between\nthe time Defendants misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts and the time the true facts\nwere disclosed.\n811. In addition to the foregoing, Lead Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a\npresumption of reliance because, as more fully alleged above, Defendants failed to disclose\nmaterial information regarding Bear Stearns' business, financial results and business prospects\nthroughout the Class Period.\n210\nEFTA00316938\n", "char_count": 1580}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 225, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 226 of 347\nXII. INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR\n812. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking statements under certain\ncircumstances does not apply to any of the materially false and misleading statements alleged in\nthis Complaint. The statements alleged to be false and misleading all relate to historical facts or\nexisting conditions and were not identified as forward-looking statements. To the extent any of\nthe false statements alleged herein may be characterized as forward-looking, they were not\nadequately identified as \"forward-looking\" statements when made, and were not accompanied by\nmeaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to\ndiffer materially from those in the purportedly \"forward-looking\" statements. Alternatively, to\nthe extent that the statutory safe harbor would otherwise apply to any statement pleaded herein,\nDefendants are liable for those materially false forward-looking statements because, at the time\neach of those forward-looking statements was made, the speaker knew the statement was false or\nthe statement was authorized or approved by an executive officer of Bear Stearns who knew that\nthose statements were false.\nCLAIMS FOR RELIEF\nCOUNT I\nFor Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and\nRule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder\n(Against All Defendants)\n813. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in the foregoing\nparagraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. This claim is asserted against Bear\nStearns, Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, Alix, Farber, and Deloitte (\"Rule 10b-\n5 Defendants\").\n211\nEFTA00316939\n", "char_count": 1724}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 226, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 227 of 347\n814. During the Class Period, the Rule 10b-5 Defendants: (a) knowingly and recklessly\ndeceived the investing public, including Plaintiffs, as alleged herein; (b) artificially inflated the\nmarket price of Bear Stearns' common stock; and (c) caused Lead Plaintiff and the Class to\npurchase or otherwise acquire Bear common stock at artificially-inflated prices.\n815. Each of the Rule 10b-5 Defendants, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange\nAct and Rule 10b-5(b), made untrue statements of material facts and/or omitted to state material\nfacts necessary to make the statements made by the Rule 10b-5 Defendants not misleading,\nand/or substantially participated in the creation of the alleged misrepresentation, which operated\nas a fraud and deceit upon Lead Plaintiff and the Class, in an effort to maintain the artificially-\ninflated price of Bear Stearns' common stock during the Class Period. The Rule 10b-5\nDefendants' false and misleading statements (and omissions of material facts) are set forth in\nparagraphs 589 to 794, supra.\n816. As a result of their making and/or substantially participating in the creation of\naffirmative statements to the investing public, the Rule 10b-5 Defendants had a duty to promptly\ndisseminate truthful information that would be material to investors in compliance with\napplicable laws and regulations.\n817. The Rule 10b-5 Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly,\nby the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, made or\nsubstantially participated in the creation/dissemination of, untrue statements of material fact as\nset forth herein, or with extreme recklessness failed to ascertain and disclose truthful facts, even\nthough such facts were available to them.\n818. The facts alleged herein give rise to a strong inference that each of the Rule 10b-5\nDefendants acted with scienter. Each of the Defendants knew or with extreme re\n... [truncated, 2028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/226 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=226]", "char_count": 2028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 227, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 228 of 347\ndisregarded that the Class Period statements set forth in Section VIII above were materially false\nand misleading for the reasons set forth herein.\n819. The Rule 10b-5 Defendants carried out a deliberate scheme to misrepresent the\neffectiveness of Bear Stearns' controls, the value of Bear Stearns' assets, and the risks to which\nthe Bear Stearns' investors were being exposed.\n820. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading information\nand failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above, the market price of Bear Stearns'\nsecurities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. Unaware that the market price of\nBear Stearns' common stock was artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the\nfalse and misleading statements made by the Rule 10b-5 Defendants, or upon the integrity of the\nmarkets in which Bear Stearns' common stock traded, and the truth of any representations made\nto appropriate agencies and to the investing public, at the times at which any statements were\nmade, and/or in the absence of material adverse information that was known, or with deliberate\nrecklessness disregarded, by the Defendants but not disclosed in their public statements,\nPlaintiffs purchased or acquired Bear Stearns' common stock at artificially-inflated prices.\n821. As a direct and proximate result of the Rule 10b-5 Defendants' wrongful conduct,\nLead Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their\nrespective purchases and sales of Bear Stearns' common stock during the Class Period, when the\ninflation in the price of Bear Stearns' common stock was gradually removed as the truth\nregarding the Rule 10b-5 Defendants' conduct was revealed causing the price of Bear Stearns'\ncommon stock to decline and thereby resulting in economic losses to Lead Plaintiff and the\nClass.\n213\nEFTA00316941\n", "char_count": 1955}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 228, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 229 of 347\n822. By reason of the foregoing, the Rule 10b-5 Defendants violated Section 10(b) of\nthe Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder, and are liable to Lead Plaintiff and\nthe Class for damages suffered in connection with their transactions in Bear Stearns' common\nstock during the Class Period.\nCOUNT II\nFor Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act\n(Against the Officer Defendants)\n823. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegations in the foregoing\nparagraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. This claim is asserted against Cayne,\nSchwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, Alix and Farber (\"the Officer Defendants\").\n824.\nthereunder.\nBear Stearns is a primary violator of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, promulgated\n825. The Officer Defendants acted as controlling persons of Bear Stearns within the\nmeaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, as alleged herein, by reason of their positions as\nofficers and/or directors of Bear Stearns, their ability to approve the issuance of statements, their\nownership of Bear Stearns securities and/or by contract. As such, the Officer Defendants had the\npower and authority to direct and control, and did direct and control, directly or indirectly, the\ndecision-making of Bear Stearns as set forth herein. The Officer Defendants were provided with\nor had unrestricted access to copies of the Bear Stearns' reports, press releases, public filings and\nother statements alleged by Lead Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these\nstatements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the\nstatements to be corrected. Each of the Officer Defendants had direct and supervisory\ninvolvement in the day-to-day operations of Bear Stearns and, therefore, is presumed to have had\nthe power to control or influence, and during the Class Period did exercise their power to control\n214\nEFTA00316942\n", "char_count": 1992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 229, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 230 of 347\nand influence, the conduct giving rise to the violations of the federal securities laws alleged\nherein. The Officer Defendants prepared, or were responsible for preparing, the Bear Stearns'\npress releases and SEC filings and made statements to the market in SEC filings, annual reports,\npress releases, news articles and conference calls. The Officer Defendants controlled Bear\nStearns and each of its employees.\n826. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons of Bear Stearns, and by reason\nof the conduct described in this Count, the Officer Defendants are liable pursuant to Section\n20(a) of the Exchange Act for controlling a primary violator of the federal securities laws.\n827. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants' wrongful conduct,\nLead Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their\npurchases of the Bear Stearns' common stock during the Class Period.\nCOUNT III\nFor Violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act\n(Against Defendants Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, and Farber)\n828. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth above as if fully set\nforth herein.\n829.\nThis Count is asserted pursuant to Section 20A of the Exchange Act against\nCayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg and Farber (the \"Section 20A Defendants\"), on\nbehalf of Lead Plaintiff and all members of the Class who purchased Bear Stearns stock\ncontemporaneously with any of these Defendants' sales of Bear Stearns stock during the Class\nPeriod.\n830.\nEach of the Section 20A Defendants sold substantial numbers of shares of Bear\nStearns stock during the Class Period while in possession of material, adverse, nonpublic\ninformation. This conduct violated Section 20A of the Exchange Act.\n215\nEFTA00316943\n", "char_count": 1858}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 230, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 231 of 347\n831.\nAs set forth in the annexed certifications of Lead Plaintiff and the annexed\nExhibit A, Lead Plaintiff purchased shares of Bear Stearns stock on the same day as or close in\ntime to sales of Bear Stearns stock made by the Section 20A Defendants while these defendants\nwere in possession of material, adverse, nonpublic information. These sales and purchases were\ncontemporaneous within the meaning of Section 20A of the Exchange Act.\n832. Numerous other Class members also purchased Bear Stearns stock\ncontemporaneously with the Section 20A Defendants' sales of stock during the Class Period.\n833. Accordingly, under Section 20A of the Exchange Act, the Section 20A\nDefendants named in this Count are each liable to Lead Plaintiff and the Class for all profits\ngained and losses avoided by them as a result of their stock sales.\n834. The Defendants named in this Count are required to account for all such stock\nsales and to disgorge their profits or ill-gotten gains.\nPRAYER FOR RELIEF\nWHEREFORE, Lead Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Class, respectfully prays for\njudgment as follows:\nA.\nDetermining that this action is a proper class action maintained under Rules 23(a)\nand (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying Lead Plaintiff as class\nrepresentative, and appointing Labaton Sucharow LLP and Berman DeValerio as class counsel\npursuant to Rule 23(g);\nB.\nDeclaring and determining that Defendants violated the Exchange Act by reason\nof the acts and omissions alleged herein;\nC.\nAwarding preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in favor of Lead Plaintiff\nand the Class against Defendants and their counsel, agents and all persons acting under, in\n216\nEFTA00316944\n", "char_count": 1766}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 231, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 232 of 347\nconcert with, or for them, including an accounting of and the imposition of a constructive trust\nand/or an asset freeze on Defendants' insider trading proceeds;\nD.\nOrdering an accounting of Defendants' insider trading proceeds;\nE.\nDisgorgement of Defendants' insider trading proceeds;\nRestitution of investors' monies of which they were defrauded;\nF.\nG. Awarding Lead Plaintiff and the Class compensatory damages against all\nDefendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial together with prejudgment\ninterest thereon;\nH. Awarding Lead Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses\nincurred in this action, including but not limited to attorney's fees and fees and costs incurred by\nconsulting and testifying expert witnesses; and\nI.\nGranting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n217\nEFTA00316945\n", "char_count": 927}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 232, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 233 of 347\ntriable.\nDEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\nLead Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Class, demands a trial by jury of all issues so\nDated: February 27, 2009\nRespectfully submitted,\nBERMAN DEVALERIO\nBy: Affery\nLABATON SUCHAROW LLP\nС. Blochg\nBy:\nплом\nJeffrey C. Block (JCB-0387)\nPatrick T. Egan\nJustin Saif\nOne Liberty Square\nBoston, Massachusetts 02109\nTelephone:\nFacsimile:\nJoseph J. Tabacco, Jr. (JJT-1994)\nJulie J. Bai\n425 California Street\nSuite 2100\nSan Francisco, California 94104\nTelephone:\nFacsimile:\nThomas A. Dubbs (TD-9868)\nJames W. Johnson (JJ-0123)\nJavier Bleichmar (JB-0435)\nMichael W. Stocker (MS-1309)\nAlan I. Ellman (AE-7347)\n140 Broadway\nNew York, New York 10005\nTelephone:\nFacsimile:\nLead Counsel for the Class and Attorneys for Lead Plaintiff\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\n218\nEFTA00316946\n", "char_count": 874}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 233, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 234 of 347\nExhibit A\nEFTA00316947\n", "char_count": 90}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 234, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 235 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006- March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\n92,183\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n1A. Pre-Class Period Holdings Sold Through End of Class Period\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n1,600\nSale\n12/15/2006\n$162.323\n1,600 $\n259,716.02\nS\n243,573.88\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n300\nSale\n12/19/2006\n$163.753\n300 S\n49,125.77\n0\n$\n46,099.12\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n900\nSale\n12/21/2006\n$163.646\n900 S\n147,281.82\n0\n$\n138,201.87\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n300\nSale\n06/15/2007\n$150.878\n300 S\n45,263.30\n0\nS\n42,236.65\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n2,600\nSale\n07/20/2007\n$135.051\n2,600 S\n351,132.68\n0\n$\n324,901.70\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n3,200\nSale\n09/21/2007 $117.088\n3,200 S\n374,682.26\nS\n342,397.98\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n200\nSale\n11/28/2007\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n2,300\nSale\n12/21/2007\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n200\nSale\n02/01/2008\n$99.448\n$91.013\n$90.390\n200 S\n2,300 S\n200 S\n19,889.69\n0\nS\n17,871.92\n209,329.68\n0\n$\n186,125.35\n18,077,90\n0\nS\n16,060.13\n1A. Total\n11,600\n11,600 $ 1,474,499.12\n0\nS 1,357,468.61\nPage 1 of 7\nEFTA00316948\n", "char_count": 1635}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 235, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 236 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stack\nClass Period: December 14, 2006- March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\n1B. Pre-Class Period Holdings Sold During \"Lookback Period\"\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n1B. Total\n80,583\n80,583\nShares\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nMaximum of Actual or Average Closing Price between 03/17/2008 and date of sale\nSale\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\n80,583 $\n846,539.25\n80,583 S\n846,539.25\nPage 2 of 7\n0\n$\n33,550,48\nS\n33,550.48\nEFTA00316949\n", "char_count": 978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 236, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 237 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period” Beginning\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nTransaction\nTrade\nTotal\nShares\nCost\nType\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nShares\nRetained\nProceeds @05/15/2008\nInto Class\nGain\nAbove\n(Loss)\n$10.0888\n1C. Pre-Class Period Holdings Held at End of \"Lookback Period\"\nPre-Class Period Holdings\nIC. Total\n0\n0\nPage 3 of 7\n0 S\n0\nEFTA00316950\n", "char_count": 808}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 237, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 238 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning:\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\n2A. Class Period Purchases Sold Prior to End of Class Period\nPurchase\n2A. Total\n0 S\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nTransaction\nTrade\nCost\nТуре\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nPage 4 of 7\n0 S\n0 S\n0 S\nEFTA00316951\n", "char_count": 798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 238, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 239 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n05/15/2008\nInto Class\nGain\nAbove\n(Loss)'\n$10.0888\n2B. Class Period Purchases Sold During \"Lookback Period\"\nPurchase\n03/16/2007 $147.066\n2,400 $\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\n07/18/2007 $137.993\n07/18/2007 $139.340\n07/18/2007 $137.963\n07/18/2007 $137.964\n07/18/2007 $137.964\n07/18/2007 $138.002\n79,429 $\n352,958.88\n10,960,653.94\nSale\nSale\n03/24/2008\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\n2,400 S\n25,212.44\n$10.505\n79,429 S\n834,416.27\n1,500 $\n209,009,99 Sale\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\n1,500 S\n15,757.78\n70,849 $\n9,774,576.01\nSale\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\n7,039 $\n134,761 $18,592,099.22\n115,239\n971,125.08 Sale\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\nSale\n$15,903,189.43\nSale\n03/25/2008\n03/25/2008\n$10.766\n$10.766\n70,849 $\n7,039 S\n134,761 S\n744,281.79\nMaximum of Actual or Average Closing Price between 03/17/2008 and date of sale\n73,945.99\n1,450,820.92\n115,239 $1,240,649.39\n(327,746.44)\nS (10,126,237.67)\n(193,252.21)\n$ (9,030,294.22)\n(897.179.09)\nS\n$ (17,141,278.30)\n$ (14,662,540.04)\n2B. Total\n411,217 S 56,763,612.55\n411,217 $ 4,385,084.57\n0 S (52,378,527.98) S\nPage 5 of 7\nEFTA00316952\n", "char_count": 1684}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 239, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 240 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n\"Lookback Period End:\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n5/15/2008\n60\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\n2C. Class Period Purchases Held At End of \"Lookback Period\"\nPurchase\n07/18/2007\n$138.002\n15,332 $ 2,115,843.60\nPurchase\n07/18/2007 $139.340\n1,900 $\n264,745.99\nPurchase\n07/18/2007 $139.340\n1,400 S\n195,075.99\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\n07/19/2007 $139.143\n07/19/2007 $139.143\n07/20/2007 $135.980\n10/11/2007 $126.330\n12/26/2007 $87.614\n9,722 $\n1,352,747.28\n10,561 $\n1,469,488.17\n44,068 S\n5,992,375.45\n200 S\n200 $\n25,266.00\n17,522.76\n2C. Total\n83,383 S 11,433,065.24\nPage 6 of 7\n15,332 $\n1,900 $\n1,400 $\n(1,961,161.55)\n(245,577.20)\n(180,951.62)\n9,722 S\n(1,254,663.60)\n10,561 $\n(1,362,939.96)\n44,068 S (5,547,780.57)\n200 S\n(23,248.23)\n200 S\n(15,504.99)\n83,383 S (10,591,827.72)\nEFTA00316953\n", "char_count": 1379}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 240, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 241 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nFirst-In First-Out (\"FIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning:\nClass Period End:\n“Lookback Period” Beginning:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTransaction\nTrade\nType\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nClass Period Purchase Total\n494,600 S 68,196,677.79\nGrand Total\n494,600 $ 68,196,677.79\n1 For Class Period Purchases held at end of Lookback Period, Gain (Loss) is based on holdings valued at $10.0888 per share\nPage 7 of 7\n411.217 S 4,385,084.57\n83,383 S (62,970,355.71)\n503,400 S 6,706,122.94\n83,383\nEFTA00316954\n", "char_count": 990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 241, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 242 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006- March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n92,183\n1A. Pre-Class Period Holdings Sold Through End of Class Period\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n1,600\nSale\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n300\nSale\nPre-Class Period Holdings\n900\nSale\n12/15/2006 $162.323\n12/19/2006 $163.753\n12/21/2006 $163.646\n1,600 S\n300 S\n259.716.02\n900 $\n49,125.77\n147,281.82\n000\nIA. Total\n2,800\n2,800 S\n456,123.61\nPage 1 of 7\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\n$\n243,573.88\nS\n46,099.12\nS\n138,201.87\n427,874.87\nEFTA00316955\n", "char_count": 1099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 242, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 243 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006- March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning:\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\n1B. Pre-Class Period Holdings Sold During \"Lookback Period\"\nPre-Class Period Holdings\nIB. Total\n6,000\n6,000\nShares\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nMaximum of Actual or Average Closing Price between 03/17/2008 and date of sale\nSale\n03/25/2008\n$10.766\nPage 2 of 7\n6,000 $\n64,595.29\n6,000 S\n64,595.29\n0\n4,062.26\n4,062.26\nEFTA00316956\n", "char_count": 966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 243, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 244 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006- March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\n1C. Pre-Class Period Holdings Held at End of \"Lookback Period\"\nPre-Class Period Holdings\nIC. Total\n83,383\n83,383\nPage 3 of 7\n83,383\n83,383\nEFTA00316957\n", "char_count": 825}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 244, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 245 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n\"Lookback Period End:\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n5/15/2008\n60\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\n2A. Class Period Purchases Sold Prior to End of Class Period\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@ 05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nPurchase\n03/16/2007 $147.066\nPurchase\n07/20/2007 $135.980\nPurchase\nPurchase\n07/20/2007 $135.980\n10/11/2007 $126.330\n300 $\n2,600 S\n3,200 S\n200 S\nPurchase\nPurchase\n07/20/2007 $135.980\n2,300 S\n12/26/2007 $87.614\n200 S\n44,119.86 Sale\n353,548.52 Sale\n435,136,64\n25,266.00 Sale\n312,754,46 Sale\n17,522.76 Sale\n06/15/2007\n07/20/2007\n$150.878\n$135.051\n300 $\n2,600 $\n45,263.30\n351,132.68\n0 $\n1,143.44\n0 S\n(2,415.84)\nSale\n09/21/2007\n$117.088\n3,200 $\n374,682.26\n0 $\n(60,454.38)\n11/28/2007\n$99,448\n200 S\n19,889.69\n0 $\n(5,376.31)\n12/21/2007\n$91.013\n2,300 S\n209,329.68\n0 $\n(103,424.78)\n02/01/2008\n$90.390\n200 S\n18,077.90\n0 $\n555.14\n2A. Total\n8,800 S 1,188,348.24\n8,800 $ 1,018,375.51\nOS\n(169,972.73) S\nPage 4 of 7\nEFTA00316958\n", "char_count": 1448}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 245, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 246 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning:\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\n2B. Class Period Purchases Sold During \"Lookback Period\"\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@05/15/2008\nInto Class\nGain\nAbove\n(Loss)\n$10.0888\nMaximum of Actual or Average Closing Price between 03/17/2008 and date of sale\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\n07/18/2007 $137.964\n07/18/2007 $138.002\n07/18/2007 $139.340\n07/18/2007 $139.340\n07/19/2007 $139.143\n07/19/2007 $139.143\n07/20/2007 $135.980\n51,678 $ 7,129,677.75 Sale\n130,571 $18,019,033,03 Sale\n1,900 S 264,745.99 Sale\n1,400 S\n195,075.99\nSale\n03/24/2008\n03/24/2008\n03/24/2008\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\n$10.505\n$10.505\n$10.505\n51,678 $ 542,886.90\n130,571 $1,371,672.39\n0 S\n(6,586,790.85)\n0S\n(16,647,360.64)\n1,900 $\n19,959.85\n0 S\n(244,786.14)\n1,400 $\n14,707.26\n0 S\n(180,368.73)\n9,722 $\n1,352,747,28\nSale\n03/24/2008\n10,561 $\n1,469,488.17 Sale\n03/24/2008\n35,968 S\n4,890,935.83\nSale\n03/24/2008\n$10.505\n$10.505\n$10.505\n9,722 $\n102,131 40\n0 $\n(1,250,615.88)\n10,561 $\n110,945 25\n0 S\n(1,358,542.92)\n35,968 $\n377,850.46\n0 $\n(4,513,085.37)\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\nPurchase\n03/16/2007 $147.066\n07/18/2007 $137.993\n07/18/2007 $139.340\n07/18/2007 $137.963\n07/18/2007 $137.964\n2,100 S\n308,839.02\nSale\n03/25/2008\n$10.766\n2,100 S\n22,608.35\n0 S\n(286,230.67)\n79,429 S\n10,960,653,94\nSale\n03/25/2008\n$10.766\n79,429 $\n855.123.18\n0S\n(10,105,530.76)\n1,500 S\n70,849 S 9,774,576.01\n209,009.99 Sale\nSale\n90,122 5 12,433,546.55 Sale\n03/25/2008\n03/2\n... [truncated, 2260 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/245 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=245]", "char_count": 2260}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 246, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nTransaction\nTrade\nТуре\nDate\nPrice\nFiled 02/27/09 Page 247 of 347\nClass Period Beginning\n12/14/2006\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n\"Lookback Period\" End:\n5/15/2008\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n60\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n$10.0888\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nTrade\nТуре\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n@ 05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\n2C. Class Period Purchases Held At End of \"Lookback Period\"\nPurchase\n2C. Total\n0 S\nPage 6 of 7\n0 $\n0 S\n0 $\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nEFTA00316960\n", "char_count": 796}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 247, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 248 of 347\nState of Michigan Retirement Systems\nLast-In First-Out (\"LIFO\") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis\nThe Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock\nClass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008\nClass Period Beginning:\nClass Period End:\n\"Lookback Period\" Beginning:\n\"Lookback Period\" End:\nDays in \"Lookback Period\":\n\"Lookback Period\" Average Closing Price:\n12/14/2006\n3/14/2008\n3/17/2008\n5/15/2008\n60\n$10.0888\nOffset for\nShares Sold\nTransaction\nТуре\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nCost\nTransaction\nType\nTrade\nDate\nPrice\nShares\nTotal\nProceeds\nShares\nRetained\n05/15/2008\nGain\n(Loss)\nInto Class\nAbove\n$10.0888\nClass Period Purchase Total\n494,600 $ 68,196,677.79\nGrand Total\n494,600 $ 68,196,677.79\n494,600 S 6,185,404.04\n0S (62,011,273.75)\n503,400 S 6,706,122.94\n83,383\n1 For Class Period Purchases held at end of Lookback Period, Gain (Loss) is based on holdings valued at $10.0888 per share\nTotal figures may differ from FIFO, as under LIFO, post-Class Period sales are first allocated to post-Class Period purchases, if any. These purchases and sales, if any, are not shown here,\nPage 7 of 7\nEFTA00316961\n", "char_count": 1173}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 248, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 249 of 347\nExhibit B\nEFTA00316962\n", "char_count": 90}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 249, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv0RPEDATES SECURES 250 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n12/19/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n2A.\n3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nDeemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s)\nExecution (Instr. 8)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nDate, if\n6.\nany\n(A)\nor\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n4)\n12/19/2005\n404213\nM (1)\nA so\n5856589.00\nD\n12/19/2005\n202000\nS\nD $115.95\n5654589.00\nD\n45669.00\nBy\nI\nSpouse\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, conver\n... [truncated, 3210 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/249 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=249]", "char_count": 3210}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 250, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 251 of 347\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nSignatures\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n/s/ Cayne, James E.\nSignature of Reporting Person\n12/20/2005\nDate\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316964\n", "char_count": 846}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 251, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 252 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2005\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warr\n... [truncated, 4115 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/251 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=251]", "char_count": 4115}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 252, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED STATES SECURITIES ANDHANGE 253 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(Zip)\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\n1/9/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\nXOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Trans. 2A\nDate\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n(A)\nor\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nBeneficial\nForm:\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\n1/9/2006\nG |V|2600 D $0\n5651989.00\nD\n45669.00\nI\nBy\nSpouse\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n2.\n3.\n3A.\n4.\nConversion Trans. D\n... [truncated, 2955 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/252 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=252]", "char_count": 2955}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 253, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 254 of 347\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316967\n", "char_count": 736}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 254, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVORIPED MATES SECURITIES AND CHANGge 255 MB4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nXOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n2/8/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if (Instr. 8)\nany\n5. Number of\n... [truncated, 3504 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/254 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=254]", "char_count": 3504}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 255, "text_content": "CAYNE JAMES E\nCase 1:08-cv-27 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 256 of 347\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nx\nner\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\nSignatures\n/s/ Cayne, James E.\n2/9/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316969\n", "char_count": 877}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 256, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED STATES SECURITIES ANDHAN 257 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nXOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n2/23/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Trans. 2A.\nDate\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nCode\n(A)\nor\nV Amount (D) Price\n2/23/2006\nM (1)\n25809\n「A「 sa 」\n2/23/2006\nS\n25809\nD $135.08\n5677798.00\n4)\nD\n5651989.00\nD\nBy\n45669.00\nI\nSpouse\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, opti\n... [truncated, 3222 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/256 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=256]", "char_count": 3222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 257, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 258 of 347\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nSignatures\n/s/ Cayne, James E.\nSignature of Reporting Person\n2/24/2006\nDate\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316971\n", "char_count": 845}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 258, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cvRIPED STATES SECURES 259 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [BSC]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nbelow)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n6/5/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nBeneficial\nForm:\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans. 2A\nDate\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n6/5/2006\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nGV 300 D $0\n5651689.00\n45669.00\n4)\nD\nI\nBy\nSpouse\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n2.\n3.\n3A.\n4.\nConversion Trans. Deemed Trans.\nor \n... [truncated, 2938 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/258 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=258]", "char_count": 2938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 259, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 260 of 347\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316973\n", "char_count": 736}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 260, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 261 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n11/15/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n(A)\n11/15/2006\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nFollowing\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nCode v\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nG\nV\n30,000 D\nA\n$0\n5,621,689\nD\n45,669\nI\nBy\nSpouse\nTable II - Deriv\n... [truncated, 3690 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/260 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=260]", "char_count": 3690}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 261, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 262 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/18/2006\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\nFollowing\n7. Nature\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\nReported\nCode V\nAmount or\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n12/18/\n... [truncated, 4055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/261 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=261]", "char_count": 4055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 262, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 263 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/20/2006\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\n3. Transaction\nDate\n3A. Deemed\nor Exercise (Month/Day/Year)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor Price\n(D)\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\n\n... [truncated, 4106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/262 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=262]", "char_count": 4106}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 263, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 2\nPage 264 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/08/2007\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n0.5\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(A)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nFollowing\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nCode v\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nCommon Stock\n01/08/2007\nG\nV\n145 D $0\n5,611,544\nD\nCommon Stock\n01/08/2007\nG\nV\n145 D $0\n5,611,399\nD\nCommon Stock\n01/08/2007\nG V\n145 D $0\n5,611,254\n\n... [truncated, 3584 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/263 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=263]", "char_count": 3584}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 264, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 2 of 2\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102\nFiled 02/27/09 Page 265 of 347\n/s/ Cayne, James E.\n**Signature of Reporting Person\n01/09/2007\nDate\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4 (b)(v).\n**Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.\nhttp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000004/xslF345X02/cay... 10/30/2008\nEFTA00316978\n", "char_count": 881}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 265, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 266 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n02/14/2007\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\n3. Transaction\nDate\n3A. Deemed\nor Exercise (Month/Day/Year)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date, Transaction\nif any\nCode (Instr.\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\n3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor Price\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\n\n... [truncated, 4427 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/265 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=265]", "char_count": 4427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 266, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 267 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n03/22/2007\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\n(Street)\nX\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\n3, 4 and 5)\nCode V\nAmount\n380\n(A)\nor Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n03/22/2007\nFollowing\nReported\n(Instr. 4)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n(1)\n3,118\nA\n$0\n5,612,922\nD\n45,669\nI\nBy\nSpouse\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (1)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or \n... [truncated, 3997 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/266 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=266]", "char_count": 3997}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 267, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 268 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\n0.5\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nChairman of the Bd., CEO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n6.\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount\n(A)\nor\n(D)\nReported\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n12/21/2007\n(1)\n172,621 A $0\n5,785,543\nD\n12/21/2007\nS\n172,621\nD $89.01\n5,612,922\nD\nBy\n45,669\nI\nSpouse\n1. \n... [truncated, 4024 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/267 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=267]", "char_count": 4024}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 268, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 269 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nCAYNE JAMES E\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX\nDirector\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nX\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/09/2008\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nChairman of the Board\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title o\n... [truncated, 4308 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/268 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=268]", "char_count": 4308}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 269, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVORIPED MATES SECURITIES AND HANGge 270 MB4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n12/19/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n2A.\n3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nDeemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s)\nExecution (Instr. 8)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nDate, if\n6.\nany\n(A)\nor\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n12/19/2005\nM (1)\n6244 A\n12/19/2005\nD\n3800\nD $116.22\n6993.00\n3193.00\n4)\nD\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConver\n... [truncated, 3184 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/269 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=269]", "char_count": 3184}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 270, "text_content": "NEW YORK, NY for 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 271 of 347\nSignatures\n/s/ Farber, Jeffrey M.\n12/20/2005\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316984\n", "char_count": 798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 271, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 272 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify)\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2005\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\n6.\n7. Nature\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of\n2.\nD\n... [truncated, 4099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/271 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=271]", "char_count": 4099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 272, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVRIPED SATES SECURE 273 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n2/8/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nPrice of\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if (Instr. 8)\nany\n5. Number of\nDerivative\nSecuritie\n... [truncated, 3448 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/272 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=272]", "char_count": 3448}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 273, "text_content": "ner\nCase 1:08-cv to Filed 02/27/09 Page 274 of 347\nFARBER JEFFREY M\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nController\nSignatures\n/s/ Farber, Jeffrey M.\n2/9/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316987\n", "char_count": 863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 274, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVORIPED MATES SECURITIES AND CHANGge 275 MB4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n2/23/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n3. Trans.\nCode\n2. Trans. 2A\nDate\nDeemed\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n(A)\nor\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\n2/23/2006\nM (1)\n382\nA $0\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n3575.00\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n4)\nD\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\n4.\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nD\n... [truncated, 3160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/274 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=274]", "char_count": 3160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 275, "text_content": "Signatures\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 276 of 347\n/s/ Farber, Jeffrey M.\nSignature of Reporting Person\n2/24/2006\nDate\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n* If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316989\n", "char_count": 785}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 276, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 277 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n07/28/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX\nDirector\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n0.5\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\n6.\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nTransaction\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(Instr. 4)\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount or\n389\n(A)\nPrice\n(D)\n(s) (Instr. 3\nand 4)\nS\n1,000 D $138.15\n2,575\nD\nCommon Stock\n07/28/2006\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants,\n... [truncated, 3645 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/276 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=276]", "char_count": 3645}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 277, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 278 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/18/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3,\n4 and 5)\nFollowing\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\nReported\n0) (Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n12/18/2006\n12/18/2006\n(1)\n2,078 A $0\n4,653\nD\nD\n881 D $164.68\n3,772\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Ben\n... [truncated, 3963 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/277 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=277]", "char_count": 3963}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 278, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 279 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/20/2006\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n1. Title of\n2.\nDe\n... [truncated, 4097 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/278 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=278]", "char_count": 4097}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 279, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 280 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n02/14/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\n6.\n7. Nature\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of\n2.\nDe\n... [truncated, 4356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/279 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=279]", "char_count": 4356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 280, "text_content": "Page 1 of 1\nSEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 281 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n03/22/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\n6.\n7. Nature\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nCode V\nAmount\n380\n(A)\n03/22/2007\nFollowing\nReported\n(Instr. 4)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n(1)\n139\nA\n$0\n3,911\nD\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (1)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nor Price Transaction(s)\nTable II \n... [truncated, 3951 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/280 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=280]", "char_count": 3951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 281, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 282 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\n0.5\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nx\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\nOwned\nFollowing\nCode v\nAmount\n(A)\nor\n(D)\nReported\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\n6.\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n12/21/2007\n12/21/2007\nM\n(1)\n2,443\nA $0\n6.354\nD\nS\n2,443\nD $89.01\n3,911\nD\nTable II - Deriva\n... [truncated, 4283 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/281 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=281]", "char_count": 4283}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 282, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 283 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nFARBER JEFFREY M\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nController\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/09/2008\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n8. Price of 9. Nu\n... [truncated, 4351 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/282 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=282]", "char_count": 4351}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 283, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHANG 284 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n9/14/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if\nany\n(Instr.\n8)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n5. Number\n... [truncated, 3701 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/283 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=283]", "char_count": 3701}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 284, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 285 of 347\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nSignatures\n/s/ Greenberg, Alan C.\n9/14/2005\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00316998\n", "char_count": 823}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 285, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHANGE 286 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n11/30/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n2A.\n3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nDeemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s)\nExecution (Instr. 8)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nDate, if\n6.\nany\n(A)\nor\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n11/30/2005\n103637\nM (1)\n11/30/2005\nJ (2)\n103637\nD $106.67\n118637.00\n15000.00\n4)\nD\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\nConversion Da\n... [truncated, 3603 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/285 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=285]", "char_count": 3603}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 286, "text_content": "fons\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RW Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 287 of 347\nReporting Owner Name / Address\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nDirector 10% Owner Officer Other\nx\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nSignatures\n/s/ Greenberg, Alan C.\n11/30/2005\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n** Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317000\n", "char_count": 940}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 287, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 288 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2005\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor Price\n(D)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nFollowing\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\n3. Transaction\nDate\n3A. Deemed\nor Exercise (Month/Day/Year)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nExecution Date,\nif any\n\n... [truncated, 4095 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/287 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=287]", "char_count": 4095}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 288, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED SATES SECURITIES ANDHANGE 289oB4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [BSC]\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n1/3/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Trans. 2A.\nDate\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nEmployee Stock\nBuy)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\n1/3/2006\nM (1)\n40000 A $64.00\n55000.00\n1/3/2006\nS\n40000\nD $114.49\n15000.00\n4)\nD\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\nPrice of\nDerivati\n... [truncated, 3037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/288 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=288]", "char_count": 3037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 289, "text_content": "NEW YORK, NY for 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 290 of 347\nSignatures\n/s/ Greenberg, Alan C.\n1/3/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317003\n", "char_count": 796}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 290, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVORIPED STATES SECURITIES ANDHAN 291 4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n2/8/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nPrice of\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if (Instr. 8)\nany\n5. Number of\nDerivative\nSecuritie\n... [truncated, 3463 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/290 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=290]", "char_count": 3463}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 291, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02793 Went 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 292 of 347\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nx\nSignatures\n/s/ Greenberg, Alan C.\n2/9/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317005\n", "char_count": 862}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 292, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cvRIPED STATES SECURE 293 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n2/23/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Trans. 2A.\nDate\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed of (D)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n(A)\nor\nCode\nV Amount (D)\nPrice\n2/23/2006\nM (1)\n6617\n「A「 sa」\n21617.00\n4)\nD\n2/23/2006\nS\n6617\nD $135.08\n15000.00\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\n... [truncated, 3135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/292 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=292]", "char_count": 3135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 293, "text_content": "NEW YORK, NY for 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 294 of 347\nSignatures\n/s/ Greenberg, Alan C.\n2/24/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317007\n", "char_count": 797}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 294, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHANGge 295 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n9/20/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if\nany\n(Instr.\n8)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n5. Numb\n... [truncated, 3791 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/294 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=294]", "char_count": 3791}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 295, "text_content": "GREENBERG ALA 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 296 of 347\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nΧ\nSignatures\n/s/ Greenberg, Alan C.\n9/20/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317009\n", "char_count": 863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 296, "text_content": "Page 1 of 1\nSEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 297 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n11/30/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nTransaction Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nCode (Instr. and 5)\n8)\n11/30/2006\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n7. Nature\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCode\nV\n(A)\nAmount or\n(D)\nReported\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n(1)\n21,295 A\n$0\n36,295\nD\n21,295 D $143.48\n15,000\nD\n11/30/2006\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficia\n... [truncated, 4519 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/296 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=296]", "char_count": 4519}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 297, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 298 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/18/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3,\n4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount\n380\n(A)\nReported\n) (Instr. 4)\nor\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n12/18/2006\n12/18/2006\n(1)\n5,768 A $0\n20,768\nD\nD\n5,768\nD $164.68\n15,000\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Benefic\n... [truncated, 3945 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/297 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=297]", "char_count": 3945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 298, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 299 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/20/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n1. Title of\n2.\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\nDerivative\nSe\n... [truncated, 4086 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/298 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=298]", "char_count": 4086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 299, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 300 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/03/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\n0.5\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Right to\nBuy)\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\nCode\nV\nAmount\n(A)\nor\nReported\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n01/03/2007\n(1)\n150,396 A $73\n... [truncated, 3830 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/299 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=299]", "char_count": 3830}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 300, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 301 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n02/14/2007\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\nPrice of\n3. Transaction\nDate\nor Exercise (Month/Day/Year)\n3A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nIf any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n4.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n5. Number 6. Date Exercisable and\nof\nExpir\n... [truncated, 4357 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/300 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=300]", "char_count": 4357}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 301, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 302 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n03/22/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3,\n4 and 5)\nFollowing\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\nReported\n0) (Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount or\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n03/22/2007\n03/22/2007\nM\n(1)\n1,818 A $0\n16,818\nD\n1,818\nD $151.26\n15,000\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially\n... [truncated, 3954 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/301 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=301]", "char_count": 3954}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 302, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 303 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nTransaction Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nCode (Instr. and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n12/21/2007\n(A)\nReported\nCode\nV\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n(1)\n99,293 A\n114,293\nD\n99.293\nD $89.01\n15,000\nD\n12/21/2007\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially\n... [truncated, 3989 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/302 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=302]", "char_count": 3989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 303, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 304 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nGREENBERG ALAN C\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/09/2008\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\nor Exercise\n3. Transaction\nDate\n3A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n4.\nTransaction\n(Month/Day/Year)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nIf any\nCode (Instr.\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n5.\nNumber\nof\n6. Date E\n... [truncated, 4341 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/303 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=303]", "char_count": 4341}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 304, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED STATES SECURITIES ANDHANGge 305 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO\n12/19/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Trans. 2A.\nDate\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nDeemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s)\nExecution (Instr. 8)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nDate, if\n6.\nany\n(A)\nor\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n4)\n12/19/2005\nCommon Stock\nM (1)\n56123 A\n66427.00\nD\n12/19/2005\nCommon Stock\nD\n41123\nD $116.22\n25304.00\nD\nCommon Stock\nBy ESOP\n1211.00\nI\nCommon Stock\n13956.00\nI\nJoint with\nwife\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, \n... [truncated, 3198 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/304 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=304]", "char_count": 3198}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 305, "text_content": "MOLINARO SAM18-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 306 of 347\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nEVP/CFO\nSignatures\n/s/ Molinaro Jr., Samuel L.\n12/20/2005\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317019\n", "char_count": 871}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 306, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 307 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2005\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\nCode V\nAmount\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n386\n(A)\nReported\nor Price\n(D)\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nJoint\n12/22/2005\nG\nV\n2,750\nD\n$0\n11,206\nI\nwith\nwife\n25,304\nD\n1,211\nI\nBy\nESOP\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acqui\n... [truncated, 4231 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/306 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=306]", "char_count": 4231}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 307, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVRIPED STATES SECURE 308 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nx\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO\n2/8/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nPrice of\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if (Instr. 8)\nany\n5. Number of\nDerivative\nSecuri\n... [truncated, 3466 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/307 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=307]", "char_count": 3466}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 308, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-02 Filed 02/27/09 Page 309 of 347\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nner\nEVP/CFO\nSignatures\n/s/ Molinaro Jr., Samuel L.\n2/9/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317022\n", "char_count": 869}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 309, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 310 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/18/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n7. Nature\nFollowing\n(A)\nReported\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount or\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\nCommon Stock\n12/18/2006\n22,062 A\n$0\n47,366\nD\n(1)\nCommon Stock\n12/18/2006\nD\n9,344\nD $164.68\n38,022\nD\nBy\nCommon Stock\n1,211\nI\nESOP\nJoint\nCommon Stock\n11,206\n\n... [truncated, 3987 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/309 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=309]", "char_count": 3987}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 310, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 311 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX\nDirector\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(A)\nCode v\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nFollowing\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nCommon Stock\n12/22/2006\nG\nV\n1,250 D $0\n36.772\nD\nCommon Stock\n12/22/2006\nG\nV\n1,248 D\n35,524\nD\nBy\nCommon Stock\n1,211\nI\nESOP\nJoint\nCommon Stock\n11,206\nI\nwith\nwi\n... [truncated, 3757 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/310 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=310]", "char_count": 3757}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 311, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 312 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n03/22/2007\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nDirector\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify)\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3,\n4 and 5)\nFollowing\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\nReported\n0) (Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\nCommon Stock\n03/22/2007\n(1)\n1,482 A $0\n37,006\nD\nCommon Stock\n03/22/2007\n$\n1,482\nD $151.26\n35,524\nD\nBy\nCommon Stock\n1,211\nI\nESOP\nJoint\nCommon Stock\n11,206\nI\n... [truncated, 4076 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/311 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=311]", "char_count": 4076}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 312, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 313 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2007\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX\nDirector\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO/COO\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nTransaction Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nCode (Instr. and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\n(A)\nReported\nCode\nV\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwned\nFollowing\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nJoint\nM\nCommon Stock\n12/21/2007\n(1)\n65,468\nA\nSO\n74,176\nI\nwith\nwife\nJoint\nCommon Stock\n12/21/2007\nS\n27,726\nD $89.01\n46,450\nI\nwith\nwife\nJoint\nCommon Stock\n\n... [truncated, 4071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/312 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=312]", "char_count": 4071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 313, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 314 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nMOLINARO SAMUEL L JR\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/09/2008\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX\nDirector\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nEVP/CFO/COO\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\n6.\n7. Nature\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n8. Price of \n... [truncated, 4355 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/313 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=313]", "char_count": 4355}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 314, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHAN 315 MPPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nbelow)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n12/19/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n2A.\n3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nDeemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s)\nExecution (Instr. 8)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nDate, if\n6.\nany\n(A)\nor\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n12/19/2005\n317266\nM (1)\nA\n12/19/2005\n250000\nD\nD $116.22\n4)\n1233331.00\nD\n983331.00\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\n3. Trans.\nConve\n... [truncated, 3201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/314 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=314]", "char_count": 3201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 315, "text_content": "NEW YORK, NY for 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 | Filed 02/27/09 Page 316 of 347\nSignatures\n/s/ Schwartz, Alan D.\n12/20/2005\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317029\n", "char_count": 799}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 316, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 317 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2005\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\n3. Transaction\nDate\n3A. Deemed\nor Exercise (Month/Day/Year)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\n6.\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor Price\n(D)\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indir\n... [truncated, 4107 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/316 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=316]", "char_count": 4107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 317, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 318 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/23/2005\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n0.5\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\n7. Nature\n(A)\nFollowing\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nCode v\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nG\nV\n15,000 D $0\n968,331\nD\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n12/23/2005\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warr\n... [truncated, 3649 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/317 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=317]", "char_count": 3649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 318, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv RIPED STATES SECURE 319 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n1/9/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans. 2A\nDate\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\nany\n(A)\nor\nCommon Stock\n1/9/2006\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nG |V|15000 D $0\n4)\n953331.00\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n2.\n3.\n4.\n3A.\nConversion Trans. Deemed Trans.\nor Exercise Date Execution Code\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n7. Title and Amount\n... [truncated, 2928 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/318 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=318]", "char_count": 2928}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 319, "text_content": "Reminder: Report of spala 2793RWcument 182 Filad 02/27/irect\nf8-cv-02783 E02/27/\nage 320 of 347\n*\n**\nFowned\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317033\n", "char_count": 634}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 320, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHAN 321 4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nbelow)\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n2/8/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExe\n... [truncated, 3486 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/320 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=320]", "char_count": 3486}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 321, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cv-27 102 02/27/09 Page 322 of 347\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nx\nner\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nSignatures\n/s/ Schwartz, Alan D.\n2/9/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317035\n", "char_count": 866}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 322, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVRIPED STATES SECURE 323 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n2/23/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Trans. 2A.\nDate\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n2/23/2006\nM (1)\n20257 A\n2/23/2006\nS\n6400\nD $135.08\n973588.00\n967188.00\n4)\nD\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable\n... [truncated, 3168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/322 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=322]", "char_count": 3168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 323, "text_content": "NEW YORK, NY for 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 | Filed 02/27/09 Page 324 of 347\nSignatures\n/s/ Schwartz, Alan D.\n2/24/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317037\n", "char_count": 798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 324, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHANGge 325 B4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx\nDirector\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n3/27/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\n2. Trans. 2A\nDate\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n4)\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n3/27/2006\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nG |V|13857 D $0\n953331.00\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n2.\n3.\n4.\n3A.\nConversion Trans. Deemed Trans.\nor Exercise Date Executio\n... [truncated, 2944 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/324 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=324]", "char_count": 2944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 325, "text_content": "Reminder: Report of play2793RWcument 182 Filad 02/27/irect\n*\n**\nas\nFowned\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n326 of 347\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317039\n", "char_count": 611}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 326, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 327 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n10/27/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n10/27/2006\n10/30/2006\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n(A)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nFollowing\nReported\nCode v\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nGV\n655 D $0\n952,676\nD\nG\nv 20,000 D $0\n932,676\nD\nTable II - De\n... [truncated, 3613 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/326 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=326]", "char_count": 3613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 327, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 328 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/18/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\n7. Nature\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nCode V\nAmount or\nM\n12/18/2006\n(1)\n43,666 A $0\n34\n(A)\nReported\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n976,342\nD\n21,833 D $164.72\n954,509\nD\n12/18/2006\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Dis\n... [truncated, 4012 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/327 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=327]", "char_count": 4012}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 328, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 329 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/20/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of,\n... [truncated, 4102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/328 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=328]", "char_count": 4102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 329, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 330 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\n7. Nature\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\n12/21/2006\n12/21/2006\nFollowing\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nG\nV\n20,000 D $0\n934,509\nD\nGV 1,815 D $0\n932,6\n... [truncated, 3743 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/329 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=329]", "char_count": 3743}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 330, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 331 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n02/14/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor Price\n(D)\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of\n\n... [truncated, 4376 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/330 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=330]", "char_count": 4376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 331, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 332 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX\nDirector\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n03/22/2007\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3,\n4 and 5)\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\nReported\n0) (Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount or\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n03/22/2007\n03/22/2007\nM\n(1)\n2,934 A $0\n934,418\nD\n1,500\nD $151.26\n932,918\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed \n... [truncated, 3972 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/331 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=331]", "char_count": 3972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 332, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 333 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nPresident\n0.5\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\nCode v\nAmount\n(A)\nor\n(D)\nReported\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n6.\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n12/21/2007\nM\n(1)\n161,662 A $0\n1,09\n... [truncated, 3972 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/332 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=332]", "char_count": 3972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 333, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 334 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSCHWARTZ ALAN D\n(Last)\n(First)\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/09/2008\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCEO, President\n(Street)\nNEW YORK\nNY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n8)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\nPrice Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D) or\nIndirect (I)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of\n2.\n\n... [truncated, 4302 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/333 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=333]", "char_count": 4302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 334, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CVRIPED SATES SECURE 335 MB47PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n12/19/2005\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\n4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\n(A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\nany\n(A)\nor\nCode V Amount (D) Price\n12/19/2005\n385592\nM (1)\n12/19/2005\n385592\nD\nD $116.22\n616398.00\n230806.00\n4)\nD\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nDerivati\n... [truncated, 3190 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/334 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=334]", "char_count": 3190}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 335, "text_content": "NEW YORK, NY for 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 | Filed 02/27/09 Page 336 of 347\nSignatures\n/s/ Spector, Warren J.\n12/20/2005\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\n**\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317049\n", "char_count": 800}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 336, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 337 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/22/2005\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of\n... [truncated, 4111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/336 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=336]", "char_count": 4111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 337, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 338 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/23/2005\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n0.5\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n(A)\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nCode v\nAmount\nor Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n80,806\nD\n12/23/2005\nGV 150,000 D $0\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warr\n... [truncated, 3650 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/337 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=337]", "char_count": 3650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 338, "text_content": "Case 1:08-CV ORIPED MATES SECURITIES ANDHANGE 339 MB4PPROVAL\nFORM 4\n[ ] Check this box if no\nlonger subject to Section 16.\nForm 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue.\nSee Instruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nOF SECURITIES\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,\nSection 17(a) of the Public\nUtility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the\nInvestment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\nOMB Number: 3235-0287\nExpires: January 31, 2008\nEstimated average burden\nhours per response... 0.5\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES\nINC [ BSC ]\n(Check all applicable)\nx Director\n10% Owner\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY)\nX\nOfficer (give title below)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n2/8/2006\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO.\nINC., 383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Street)\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\n(City) (State)\n(Zip)\n4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed\n(MM/DD/YYYY)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting Person\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1.Title of Security\n(Instr. 3)\n7. Nature\nOwnership of Indirect\nForm:\nBeneficial\nDirect (D) Ownership\nor Indirect (Instr. 4)\n(I) (Instr.\n2. Trans.\nDate\n2A.\n3. Trans.\nDeemed Code\nExecution (Instr. 8)\nDate, if\nany\n4. Securities\nAcquired (A) or\nDisposed of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned\nFollowing Reported Transaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\n6.\n(A)\nor\n4)\nCode\nV Amount (D) Price\nTable II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.g., puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)\n1. Title of Derivate\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nPrice of\n2.\n3. Trans. 3A.\n4.\nConversion Date\nor Exercise\nDeemed Trans.\nExecution Code\nDate, if (Instr. 8)\nany\n5. Number \n... [truncated, 3494 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/338 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=338]", "char_count": 3494}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 339, "text_content": "Case 1:08-cvent 102 02/27/09 Page 340 of 347\nSPECTOR WARREN J\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\nx\n383 MADISON AVENUE\nNEW YORK, NY 10179\nSignatures\n/s/ Spector, Warren J.\n2/9/2006\nDate\nSignature of Reporting Person\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\nReminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.\n*\n**\nIf the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).\nIntentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).\nNote: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.\nPersons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently\nvalid OMB control number.\nEFTA00317053\n", "char_count": 864}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 340, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 341 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/04/2006\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n0.5\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\n7. Nature\n(A)\nCode V\nFollowing\n38 A\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nD $0\n80,770\nD\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCommon Stock\n12/04/2006\nG\nV\n36\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, war\n... [truncated, 3640 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/340 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=340]", "char_count": 3640}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 341, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 342 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/18/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n12/18/2006\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nDisposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nand 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\n7. Nature\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nCode\nV\n(A)\nAmount or\n(D)\nReported\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n(1)\n44,096 A $0\n124,866\nD\n44,096\nP\nD $164.68\n80,770\nD\n12/18/2006\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Dispo\n... [truncated, 4007 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/341 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=341]", "char_count": 4007}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 342, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 343 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/20/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n1. Title of\n2.\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\nConversion\n3. Transaction\nDate\n3A. Deemed\nor Exercise (Month/Day/Year)\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date, Transaction\nif any\nCode (Instr.\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\n3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor Price\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indi\n... [truncated, 4104 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/342 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=342]", "char_count": 4104}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 343, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09\nPage 1 of 1\nPage 344 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n12/21/2006\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n12/21/2006\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year)\n4. Securities Acquired (A) or\nTransaction Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3, 4\nCode (Instr. and 5)\n8)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\nReported\n7. Nature\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCode\nV\n(A)\nAmount or\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n69,197\n(1)\n<\nA $38.75\n149,967\nD\n69,197\nD $164.12\n80,770\nD\n12/21/2006\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, D\n... [truncated, 4011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/343 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=343]", "char_count": 4011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 344, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 345 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCheck this box if no longer subject\nto Section 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nCOMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n01/11/2007\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\n3235-0287\nExpires:\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check\nApplicable Line)\nX Form filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year)\n3.\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired\n(A) or Disposed Of (D)\n(Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n(A)\nFollowing\nReported\n(I) (Instr. 4)\nCode v\nAmount or Price Transaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nG\nV\n5,900 D $0\n74,870\nD\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\n6.\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nCommon Stock\n01/11/2007\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n(e.g., puts, calls, warra\n... [truncated, 3647 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/344 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=344]", "char_count": 3647}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 345, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 346 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n(Last)\n(First)\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\n10% Owner\nOther (specify\nbelow)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n(Middle)\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n02/14/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\n1. Title of\nDerivative\nSecurity\n(Instr. 3)\n2.\nConversion\nor Exercise\nPrice of\nDerivative\nSecurity\nCo-Pres/Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n(Month/Day/Year)\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\nif any\n(Month/Day/Year) 8)\n3.\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nTransaction or Disposed Of (D) (Instr.\nCode (Instr. 3, 4 and 5)\n5. Amount of\n6.\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nFollowing\n(A)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\nPrice\nReported\nTransaction(s)\n(D)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nOwnership\nForm: Direct\n(D) or\nIndirect (1)\n(Instr. 4)\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of\n... [truncated, 4371 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/345 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=345]", "char_count": 4371}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00316714", "page_number": 346, "text_content": "SEC FORM 4\nPage 1 of 1\nCase 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 347 of 347\nSEC Form 4\nFORM 4\nCheck this box if no longer subject to\nSection 16. Form 4 or Form 5\nobligations may continue. See\nInstruction 1(b).\nUNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20549\nSTATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP\nFiled pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility\nHolding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940\n1. Name and Address of Reporting Person\nSPECTOR WARREN J\n2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol\nBEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC\n[BSC]\nOMB APPROVAL\nOMB Number:\nExpires:\n3235-0287\nFebruary 28,\n2011\nEstimated average burden\nhours per\nresponse\n0.5\n5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer\n(Check all applicable)\nX Director\n10% Owner\nX\nOfficer (give title\nbelow)\nOther (specify\nbelow)\n(Last)\n(First)\n(Middle)\nC/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.\n383 MADISON AVENUE\n3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Month/Day/Year)\n03/22/2007\n4. If Amendment, Date of Original Filed (Month/Day/Year)\n(Street)\nNEW YORK NY\n10179\n(City)\n(State)\n(Zip)\n1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)\nCommon Stock\nCommon Stock\nCo-Pres./Co-COO\n6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check Applicable\nLine)\nX\nForm filed by One Reporting Person\nForm filed by More than One Reporting\nPerson\nTable I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned\n2. Transaction\nDate\n2A. Deemed\nExecution Date,\n3.\n(Month/Day/Year) if any\n(Month/Day/Year)\nTransaction\nCode (Instr.\n8)\n4. Securities Acquired (A)\nor Disposed Of (D) (Instr. 3,\n4 and 5)\n6.\n(A)\nFollowing\nReported\n5. Amount of\nSecurities\nBeneficially\nOwned\nOwnership\nForm:\nDirect (D)\nor Indirect\n7. Nature\nof Indirect\nBeneficial\nOwnership\n(Instr. 4)\n0) (Instr. 4)\nCode V\nAmount\nor\n(D)\nPrice\nTransaction(s)\n(Instr. 3 and 4)\nM\n03/22/2007\n03/22/2007\n(1)\n2,962 A $0\n77,832\nD\n2,962\nD $151.26\n74,870\nD\nTable II - Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed o\n... [truncated, 3923 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00316714/346 or ?id=EFTA00316714&page=346]", "char_count": 3923}]}