{"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_count": 277, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00230494", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00230494.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Memorandum \nSubject \nJane Does Nos. 1 and 2.'. United States, \nCase No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA (S.D.Fla.) \nDaft \nApril 26, 2011 \nTo \nFrom \nAssistant Counsel \nOffice of Professional Responsibility \nU.S. Department of Justice \nVIA FEDERAL EXPRESS \n99 N.E. 4th Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \nAttached please fmd a CD-ROM containing the victims' Motion for Finding of \nViolations of the Crime Victims Rights Act and Request for a Hearing on Appropriate Remedies \n(unredacted), and a complete set of exhibits, including the e-mails in Exhibit A. The e-mails in \nExhibit A are between Epstein's defense attorney and AUSA Villafaba. They were produced in \ncivil litigation between Epstein and some of his victims. Epstein's attorneys redacted their side \nof the e-mail transmission. I will attempt to obtain a complete set, which includes the \ntransmission from Epstein's attorneys. \nIf you have any questions, please call me \nThank you. \nEnclosure \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000670 \nEFTA00230494\n", "char_count": 978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-8073§-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 42 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-CW-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 \nI. \nUNITED STATES \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF \nTHE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON \nAPPROPRIATE REMEDIES \nCOME NOW Jane Doe HI and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as \"the victims\"), by and \nthrough undersigned counsel, to move for a finding from this Court that the victims' rights under \nthe Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, have been violated by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office, and to request a hearing on the appropriate remedies for these violations. \nThe victims have proffered a series of facts to the Government, which they have ailed to \ncontest. Proceeding on the basis of these facts,' it is clear that the U.S. Attorney's Office has \nrepeatedly violated the victims' protected CVRA rights, including their right to confer with \nprosecutors generally about the case and specifically about a non-prosecution agreement the \nOffice signed with the defendant, as well as their right to fair treatment. \nSee 18 U.S.C. \n3771(8)(5) & (8). \nIt is now beyond dispute, for example, that in September 2007, the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice formally signed a non-prosecution agreement with Jeffrey Epstein that barred his \nI The victims are contemporaneously filing a motion to have their facts accepted by the \nCourt \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000671 \nEFTA00230495\n", "char_count": 1536}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "1 \n,••• •Sle7 \n- - \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 42 \nprosecution for numerous federal sex offenses he committed against the victims (as well as \nagainst many other minor girls). Rather than confer with the victims about this non-prosecution \nagreement, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office and Jeffrey Epstein agreed to a \"confidentiality\" \nprovision in the agreement barring its disclosure to anyone — including the victims. For the next \nnine months, as Epstein was well aware, the U.S, Attorney's Office assiduously concealed from \nthe victims the existence of this signed non-prosecution agreement indeed, the Office went so \nfar as to send (in January 2008) a false victim notification letter to the victims informing them • \nthat the \"case is currently under investigation.\" In fact, the U.S. Attorney's Office had already \nresolved the case three months earlier by signing the non-prosecution agreement. Again on May \n30, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent yet another victim notification letter to a recognized \nvictim informing her that the \"case is currently under investigation\" and that it \"can be a lengthy \nprocess and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation.\" \nThen in June 2008, on the eve of consummating Epstein's state guilty plea that was part of the \nnon-prosecution agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office asked legal counsel for the victims to \nsend a letter expressing the victims' views on why federal charges should be filed — not \ndisclosing to the victims' legal counsel that this was a pointless exercise because the non-\nprosecution agreement had already been signed some nine months earlier. \nThese actions and many more like them constitute clear violations of Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe #2's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act, including the right to confer with \nprosecutors and the right to fair treament. The only argument that the U.S. Attorney's Office \nadvances is tha\n... [truncated, 2220 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/2 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=2]", "char_count": 2220}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "1 \n, . \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 42 \n3771(e)(I) (Justice Department agencies involved in the \"detection\" and \"investigation\" of \nfederal crimes covered by CVRA), and with persuasive case law, see, e.g.i ih ; Dean, 5 \nF.3d \n391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (victims should have been notified before pre-indictrnifirrs ea reached). \nMoreover, the U.S. Attorney's Office itself was fully aware of its obligations to notify the \nvictims in this case, as e-mails from the Office and other evidence make perfectly clear. The \nonly reason that the Office concealed the existence of the non-prosecution agreement ftom the \nvictims was not to comply with some legal restriction, but rather to avoid a firestorm of public \ncontroversy that would have erupted if the sweetheart plea deal with a politically-connected \nbillionaire had been revealed. \nThe Court should accordingly find that the U.S. Attorney's Office — in coordination with \nJeffrey Epstein — has violated the Act and set a briefing schedule and hearing on the proper \nremedy for those violations. \nSTATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 offer the following statement of undisputed material facts. \nIf the Government disputes any of these facts, the victims request an evidentiary hearing to prove \neach and every one of them:2\n1. Between about 2001 and 2007, defendant Jeffrey Epstein (a billionaire with significant \npolitical connections) sexually abused more than 30 minor girls at his mansion in West Palm \n2 The Court should accept all these facts as true for reasons the victims explain in their \ncontemporaneously-filed Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion to Have Their Facts Accepted \nBecause of the Government's Failure to Contest Any of The Facts. The Court should also direct \nthe Government to produce all evidence that it possesses supporting these facts, for reasons the \nvictims explain in their contemporaneously-filed Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Mot\n... [truncated, 2131 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/3 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=3]", "char_count": 2131}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "I \nr• ->\":::::;;,:fir \n- \nrff-PA5-' \nCase 9:O8-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 42 \nBeach, Florida, and elsewhere. Among the girls he sexually abused were Jane Doe #1 and Jane \nDoe #2. Epstein performed repeated lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts on them, including (but \nnot limited to) masturbation, touching of their sexual organs, using vibrators or sexual toys on \nthem, coercing them into sexual acts, and digitally penetrating them. Because Epstein used a \nmeans of interstate cotnmerce and knowingly traveled in interstate commerce to engage in abuse \nof Jane Doc NI and Jane Doe #2 (and the other victims), he committed violations of federal law, \nincluding repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. See. e.g., Complaint, E.W.i. Epstein, Case \nNo. 50 2008 CA 028058 XXXXMB AB (l5th Cir. Palm Beach County, Florida); Complaint, \nL.M.I. Epstein, Case No 50 2008 CA 028051 =ma AB (15th Cir. Palm Beach Count, \nFlorida). \n2. Jeffrey Epstein flew at least one underage girl on his private jet for the purpose of \nforcing her to have sex with him and others. Epstein forced this underage girl to be sexually \nexploited by his adult male peers, including royalty, politicians, businessmen, and professional \nand personal acquaintances. Complaint, Jane Doe No. 102 I. Epstein, No. 9:09-CV-80656-\nKAM (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2009). \n3. In 2006, at the request of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Federal Bureau of \nInvestigation opened an investigation into allegations that Jeffrey Epstein and his personal \nassistants had used facilities of interstate commerce to induce young girls between the ages of \nthirteen and seventeen to engage in prostitution, among other offenses. The case was presented \nto the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, which accepted the \ncase for investigation. The Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office was also investigating \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000674 \nEFTA00230498\n", "char_count": 1969}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "rannrenr—\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 42 \nthe case. See generally U.S. Attorney's Correspondence, Exhibit \"A\" to this filing (hereinafter \ncited as \"U.S. Attorney's Correspondence\" and referenced by Bates page number stamp). \n4. The FBI soon determined that both Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were victims of \nsexual assaults by Epstein while they were minors beginning when they were approximately \nfourteen years of age and approximately thirteen years of age respectively. Jane Doe #1, for \nexample, provided detailed information about her abuse (and the abuse of Jane Doe #2) to the \nFBI on August 7,2007. Exhibit \"B.\" \n5. More generally, the FBI through diligent investigation established that Epstein \noperated a large criminal enterprise that used paid employees and underlings to repeatedly find \nand bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert as part of the enterprise with others, \nincluding Ghislane Maxwell and Jean Luc Brunel, to obtain minor girls not only for his own \nsexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others. The FBI determined that \nEpstein had committed dozens and dozens of federal sex crimes against dozens of minor girls \nbetween 2001 and 2007. They presented information to the U.S. Attorney's Office for criminal \nprosecution, See Exhibit \"B\"; U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 47-55. \n6. On about June 7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #1 a standard CVRA \nvictim notification letter. The notification promised that the Justice Department would makes its \n\"best efforts\" to protect Jane Doe #1's rights, including \"(IN, reasonable right to confer with the \nattorney for the United States in the case\" and \"to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding \nin the district court involving . . . plea \n.\" The notification further explained that \"(a)t this \ntime, your case is under investigation.\" That notification meant that the FBI had identified Jane \nDoe #1 as a victim of a\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/5 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=5]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Doeurneet 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 42 \nrelied on these representations and believed that the Justice Department would protect these \nrights and keep her informed about the progress of her case. See Exhibit \"C.\" \n7. On about August 11, 2007, Jane Doe #2 received a standard CVRA victim notification \nletter. The notification promised that the Justice Department would makes its \"best efforts\" to \nprotect Jane Doe #2's rights, including \"Mlle reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nUnited States in the case\" and \"to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district \ncourt involving .. . plea ... .\" The notification further explained that \"felt this time, your case is \nunder investigation.\" That notification meant that the FBI had identified Jane Doe #2 as a victim \nof a federal offense and as someone protected by the CVRA. Jane Doe #2 relied on these \nrepresentations and believed that the Justice Department would protect these rights and keep her \ninformed about the progress of her case. See Exhibit \"D.\" \n8. Early in the investigation, the FBI agents and an Assistant U.S. Attorney had several \nmeetings with Jane Doe #1. Jane Doe #2 was represented by counsel that was paid for by the \ncriminal target Epstein and, accordingly, all contact was made through that attorney. \n9. In and around September 2007, plea discussions took place between Jeffrey Epstein, \nrepresented by numerous attorneys (including lead criminal defense counsel Jay Lefkowitz), and \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, represented by Assistant U.S. \nAttorney A. Marie Villafana and others. The plea discussions generally began from the premise \nthat Epstein would plead guilty to at least one federal felony offense surrounding his sexual \nassaults of more than 30 minor girls. From there, the numerous defense attorneys progressively \nnegotiated more favorable terms so that Epstein would ultimately plead to only t\n... [truncated, 2059 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/6 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=6]", "char_count": 2059}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 42 \nfelony offenses and would serve only county jail time. Many of the negotiations are reflected in \ne-mails between Leflcowitz and the U.S. Attorney's Office. See generally Exhibit \"A.\" \n10. \nThe evidence supporting these \ncharges was overwhelming, including the interlocking consistent testimony of several dozen \nminor girls, all made automatically admissible in a federal criminal sexual assault prosecution by \noperation of Fed. R. Evid. 414. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 4. \n12. The correspondence also shows that the U.S. Attorney's Office was interested in \nfinding a place to conclude a plea bargain that would effectively keep the victims from learning \nwhat was happening through the press. The Office wrote in an e-mail to defense counsel: am \nThe \n7 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000677 \nEFTA00230501\n", "char_count": 889}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Office was aware that most of the victims of Epstein, including Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe 42, resided well outside the Miami area in the West Palm Beach area. The Office was \nalso aware that the chances of press coverage of a case filed in Miami would be significantly less \nlikely to reach th&Palm Beach area. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 29. \n13. On about September 24, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Jay \nLefkowitz, criminal defense counsel for Epstein, regarding the agreement. The e-mail stated that \nthe Government and Epstein's counsel \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 153 (emphases added). \n14. On about September 25, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Leflcowitz \nstatingSeallISS \nSS \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 156. \n15. On about September 26, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz \nin which she stated• \nB \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000678 \nEFTA00230502\n", "char_count": 1031}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 42 \nRIM \nApparently the '\ngreed to between the Government and Epstein's \ndefense counsel was that no mention would be made of the non-prosecution agreement between \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office and Epstein, as no subsequent mention was made to the victims of the \nnon-prosecution agreement and a confidentiality provision was made part of that agreement (as \ndiscussed below). U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 359. \n16. On about September 25, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter to Jay Jeflcowitt \nin which it suggested that the victims should be represented in civil cases against Epstein by \nsomeone who was not an experienced \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 157. The U.S. Attorney's Office continued to \npush a different attorney in part because it would reduce publicity, explaining that \nId. \n17. On about September 24, 2007, Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office formally \nreached an agreement whereby the United States would defer federal prosecution in favor of \nprosecution by the State of Florida. Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office accordingly entered \ninto a \"Non-Prosecution Agreement\" (NPA) reflecting their agreement. Most significantly, the \nNPA gave Epstein a promise that he would not be prosecuted for a series of federal felony \noffenses involving his sexual abuse of more than 30 minor girls. The NPA instead allowed \nEpstein to plead guilty to two state felony offenses for solicitation of prostitution and \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000679 \nEFTA00230503\n", "char_count": 1570}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "1 \n,:.7Y.Cel \n, re\n-37.7:7\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 42 \nprocurement of minors for prostitution. The NPA also set up a procedure whereby a victim of \nEpstein's sexual abuse could obtain an attorney to proceed with a civil claim against Epstein, \nprovided that the victim agreed to limit damages sought from Epstein. To obtain an attorney \npaid for by Epstein, the victim would have to agree to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § \n2255 (i.e., under a law that provided presumed damages of $150,000 against Epstein — an \namount that Epstein argued later was limited to $50,000). The agreement was signed by Epstein \nand his legal counsel, as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office, on about September 24, 2007. Non-\nProsecution Agreement, Exhibit \"E.\" \nIS. Epstein insisted on, and the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed to, a provision in the non-\nprosecution agreement that made the agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: \"The \nparties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United \nStates receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding \nthe disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making the disclosure.\" \nBy entering into such a confidentiality agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office put itself in a \nposition that conferring with the crime victims (including Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) about \nthe non-prosecution agreement would violate terms of the agreement — specifically the \nconfidentiality provision. Indeed, even notifying the victims about the agreement would \npresumably have violated the provision. Accordingly, from September 24, 2007 through at least \nJune 2008 — a period of more than nine months \nthe U.S Attorney's Office did not notify any of \nthe victims of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement. Epstein was well aware of this \nfailure to notify the victims and, indeed, arranged for this failure\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/10 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=10]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "---- \n%.\"\"•\"..9 \nCase 9:O8-cv-8O736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 11 of 42 \nAttorney's Correspondence at 270; Transcript of Hearing in this case on July 11, 2008, at 4-6, \n18-19, 22-23, 28-29 (hereinafter cited as wfr, July 11, 2008\"). \n19. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the U.S. Attorney's Office — pushed \nby Epstein — wanted the non-prosecution agreement kept from public view because of the intense \npublic criticism that would have resulted from allowing a politically-connected billionaire who \nhad sexually abused more than 30 minor girls to escape from federal prosecution with only a \ncounty court jail sentence. Another reasonable inference is that the Office wanted the agreement \nconcealed at this time because of the possibility that the victims could have objected to the \nagreement in court and perhaps convinced the judge reviewing the agreement not to accept it. \n20. The Non-Prosecution Agreement that had been entered into between the U.S. \nAttorney's Office and Epstein was subsequently modified by an October 2007 Addendum and a \nDecember 19, 2007, letter from the U.S. Attorney to Attorney Lilly Ann Sanchez. The US. \nAttorney's Office did not confer with any of the victims about these modifiCations of the \nagreement (or even notify them of the existence of these modifications) through at least June \n2008 — a period of more than six months. See Supplemental Declaration of A. Marie Villafafla \n(doe. #35, at 1); U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 234-37; Tr. July 11, 2008, 18-19, 22-23, 28-\n29.3\n21. In October 2007, shortly after the initial plea agreement was signed, FBI agents \ncontacted Jane Doe 01. On October 26, 2007, Special Agents B. Nesbitt Kuyrkendall and Jason \nRichards met in person with Jane Doe #1. The Special Agents explained that Epstein would \n3 On about August 14, 2008, Epstein's defense counsel told the U.S. Attorney's Office \nthat they did not consider the December 19, 2007, letter to be operative. \n11 \n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/11 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=11]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Par 12 of 42 \nplead guilty to state charges involving another victim, he would be required to register as a sex \noffender for life, and he had made certain concessions related to the payment of damages to the \nvictims, including Jane Doe #1. During this meeting, the Special Agents did not explain that an \nagreement had already been signed that precluded any prosecution of Epstein for federal charges \nagainst Jane Doe #1. The agents could not have revealed this part of the non-prosecution \nagreement without violating the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. Whether the agents \nthemselves had been informed of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office is not certain. Because the plea agreement had already been reached with \nEpstein, the agents made no attempt to secure Jane Doe #1's view on the proposed resolution of \nthe case. Exhibit \"E,\" Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23. \n22. Jane Doe #1's (quite reasonable) understanding of the Special Agent's explanation \nwas that only the State part of the Epstein investigation had been resolved, and that the federal \ninvestigation would continue, possibly leading to a federal prosecution. Jane Doe #1 also \nunderstood her own case was move forward towards possible prosecution. Tr. July 11, 2008, at \n4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 28-29. \n23. On about November 27, 2007, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeff Sloman sent an e-mail to \nJay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein. The e-mail stated that the U.S. Attorney's Office \nhad an obligation to notify the victims \n12 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000682 \nEFTA00230506\n", "char_count": 1664}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "7.7 \n. \n. \n...•\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 13 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 (emphasis rearranged). \n24. On about November 29, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a draft of a crime victim \nnotification letter to Jay Lefkowirz, defense counsel for Jeffrey Epstein. The notification letter \nwould have explained: \nThe :etter \nwo..ild have gone un to explain \nthat Epstein would \nThe \nletter would not have explained that, as part of the agreement with Epstein, the Justice \nDepartment had previously agreed not to prosecute Epstein for any of the numerous federal \noffenses that had been committed. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 256-59. \n25. Because of concerns from Epstein's attorneys, the U.S. Attorney's Office never sent \nthe proposed victim notification letter discussed in the previous paragraph to the victims. \nInstead, a misleading letter stating that the case was \"currently under investigation\" (described \nbelow) was sent in January 2008 and May 2008. At no time before reaching the non-prosecution \nagreement did the Justice Department notify any victims, including for example Jane Doe NI, \nabout the non-prosecution agreement. The victims were therefore prevented from exercising \ntheir CVRA right to confer with prosecutors about the case and about the agreement. Epstein \n13 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000683 \nEFTA00230507\n", "char_count": 1402}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "f'\"'\",%7 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 14 of 42 \nwas aware of these violations of the CVRA and, indeed, pressured the U.S. Attorney's Office to \ncommit those violations. Tr. July 11, 2008, at 9. \n26. On about December 6, 2007, Jeffrey H. Sloman, First Assistant U.S. Attorney sent a \nletter to Jay Lefkowitz, noting the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims \ninformed of th \nThe letter stated: \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added). \n27. Despite this recognition of its obligation to keep victims \nabout the non-prosecution agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office did not follow through and \ninform the victims of the non-prosecution agreement. To the contrary, as discussed below, it \ncontinued to tell the victims that the case was \"under investigation.\" Tr. July I I, 2008, at 4.5, \n18-19, 22-29. \n28. On December 13, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter to Jay Lefkowitz, \ndefense counsel for Epstein, rebutting allegations that had apparently been made aguinst the \n14 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000684 \nEFTA00230508\n", "char_count": 1110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 15 of 42 \nAUSA handling the cave by the Epstein defense team. (The Justice Department concluded the \nallegations were meritless.) The letter stated that a federal indictment against Epstein a t\nThe letter also recounted \nthat \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 269. \n29. The December 13, 2007, letter also reveals that the Justice Department stopped \nmaking victim notifications because of \nU.S. Attorney's Conespondence at 270 (emphasis added). It was a \ndeviation from the Justice Department's standard practice to negotiate with defense counsel \nabout the extent of crime victim notifications. \n30. The December 13, 2007, letter also demonstrates that the Justice Department was well \naware of who the victims of Epstein's sexual offenses were. The Justice Department was \nprepared to make notifications to the victims, but suspended those notifications only because \nobjections from defense counsel. Id \n31. The December 13, 2007, letter reveals it would have been possible to confer with the \nvictims about the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The U.S. Attorney's Office was fully able to \n15 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000685 \nEFTA00230509\n", "char_count": 1207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 16, "text_content": ". Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21'2011 Page 16 of 42 \nconfer with Epstein's counsel about the parameters of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but \nrefused to confer with Epstein's victims about the Agreement. Id \n32. Following the signing of the Agreement and the modifications thereto, Epetein's \nperformance was delayed while he sought higher level review within the Department oflustice. \nSee U.S. Attorney's Correspondence passim. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that \nEpstein used his significant political and social connections to lobby the Justice Department to \navoid significant federal prosecution. The Justice Department has in its possession internal \ndocuments (i.e., phone logs, ernails, etc.) that would reveal the event of those lobbying efforts. \nThe Justice Department, however, has refused to make these materials available to the victims. \n33. On January 10, 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 received letters from the FBI \nadvising them that \"ftlids case is currently under• investigation. This can be a lengthy process \nand we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation.\" Exhibits \n\"F\" & \"G.\" The statement in the notification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. The case \nwas not currently \"under investigation.\" To the contrary, the federal cases involving Jane Doe \n#1 and Jane Doe #2 had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement entered into by Epstein \nand the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Moreover, the FBI did not notify Jane Doe \n• #1 or Jane Doe #2 that a plea agreement had been reached previously, and that part of the \nagreement was a non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida. Exhibit \"E.\" Whether the FBI was aware of this fact at this time is unclear. \nIn any event, the FBI was acting at the direction of the U.S. Attorney's Office, which clearly did \nnot confer with Jane Doe 41 and Jane Doe #2 about the \n... [truncated, 2181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/16 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=16]", "char_count": 2181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "• \n. \n.1 \n•:•••,•/./..\".•.•.• • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 17 of 42 \nthese actions of the U.S. Attorney's Office and, indeed, solicited these actions of the U.S. \nAttorney's Office. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92, 270. \n34. Jane Doe it and Jane Doe #2 relied on the representations of the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice to their detriment Had they known the true facts of the case — i.e., that Epstein had \nnegotiated a non-prosecution agreement — they would have taken steps to object to that \nagreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19,28-29. \n35. Undersigned counsel believes that the FBI was lead to believe that their investigation \nof Epstein was going to lead to a federal criminal prosecution and that the FBI was also mislead \nby the U.S. Attorney's office about the status of the case. \n36. In early 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 believed that criminal prosecution of \nEpstein was extremely important. They also desired to be consulted by the FBI and/or other \nrepresentatives of the federal government about the pt isecution of Epstein. In light of the letters \nthat they had received around January 10, they believed that a criminal investigation of Epstein \nwas on-going — including investigation into Epstein's crimes against them -• and that they would \nbe contacted before the federal government reached any final resolution of that investigation. Tr. \nJuly 11,2008, at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 28-29. \n37. On January 31, 2008, Jane Doe #1 met with FBI Agents and AUSA's from the U.S. \nAttorney's Office. She provided additional details of Epstein's sexual abuse of her. The \nAUSA's did not disclose to Jane Doe #1 at this meeting (or any other meeting) that they had \nalready negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Exhibit \"H.\" \n38. On about February 25, 2008, Assistant U.S. Attorney Sloman sent an e-mail to Jay \nLefkowitz, Epstein's criminal defense counsel, explaining that the Justice Department's Child \n17 \n08-807\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/17 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=17]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "3 \n2.7971\"..r.w/ \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 18 of 42 \nExploitation Obscenity Section (CEOS) had agreed to review Epstein's objections to the \nproposed plea agreement that had been reached with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida. The letter indicated that, should CEOS reject Epstein's objections to the \nagreement, then \nU.S. Attorneys Correspondence at 290-91. \n39. On May 30, 2008, another of Mr. Edwards's clients who was recognized as an Epstein \nvictim by the U.S. Attorney's Office, received a letter from the FBI advising her that \"Mk case \nis currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued \npatience while wo conduct a thorough investigation.\" Exhibit \"1.\" The statement in the \nnotification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. \nThe case was not currently \"under \ninvestigation.\" To the contrary, the case had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement \nentered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Exhibit t.\" \n40. In mid-June 2008, Mr. Edwards contacted the AUSA handling the case to inform her \nthat he represented Jane Doe #1 and, later, Jane Doe #2. Mr. Edwards asked to meet to provide \ninformation about the federal crimes committed by Epstein against these victims, hoping to \nsecure a significant federal indictment against Epstein. The AUSA and Mr. Edwards discussed \nthe possibility of federal charges being filed. At the end of the call, the AUSA asked Mr. \nEdwards to send any information that he wanted considered by the U.S. Attorney's Office in \ndetermining whether to file federal charges. Because of the confidentiality provision that existed \nin the plea agreement, Mr. Edwards was not informed that previously, in September 2007, the \nU.S. Attorney's Office had reached an agreement not to file federal charges. Mr. Edwards was \n18 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000688 \nEFTA00230512\n", "char_count": 1969}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nifiC\neisr• • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 19 of 42 \nalso not informed that resolution of the criminal matter was imminent. This concealment \nprevented Edwards from (among other things) exercising his client's CVRA right to confer with \nthe prosecutors about the case. Epstein was aware of this concealment — and, indeed, sought this \nconcealment. Tr. July 11.2008, at 4-6, 13.19, 22-23, 28-29. \n41. On Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15 p.m., the U.S. Attorney's Office \nreceived a copy of Epstein's proposed state plea agreement and learned that the plea was \nscheduled for 8:30 a.m., on Monday, June 30, 2008. The U.S. Attorney's Office and the Palm \nBeach Police Department attempted to provide notification to victims in the short time that \nEpstein's counsel had provided. The U.S. Attorney's Office called attorney Edwards to provide \nnotice to his clients regarding the hearing. The notice, however, was only that Epstein was \npleading guilty to state solicitation of prostitution charges involving another victim. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office did not tell Edwards that the guilty pleas in state court would bring an end to.\nthe possibility of federal prosecution pursuant to the plea agreement. Thus, there was no reason \nfor attorney Edwards to believe that the guilty pleas in state court had any bearing on the cases of \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2. As a result, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 did not attend the plea \nhearing, as they did not think that it was pertinent to their particular cases. Had they known that \nthe plea agreement made it impossible to prosecute Epstein federally for• his crimes against them, \nthey would have objected to this resolution. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 thus detrimentally \nrelied on the inaccurate representations of the U.S. Attorney's Office that their cases were still \nunder investigation. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23. \n42. On June 30, 2008, the U.S. Attorney'\n... [truncated, 2180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/19 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=19]", "char_count": 2180}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "7:\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 20 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 321. \n43. On July 3, 2008, as requested, Mr. Edwards sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office a letter. \nIn the letter, Mr. Edwards indicated his client's desire that federal charges be filed against \ndefendant Epstein. In particular, he wrote on behalf of his clients: \"We urge the Attorney \nGeneral and our United States Attorney to consider the fundamental import of the vigorous \nenforcement of our Federal laws. We urge you to move forward with the traditional indictments \nand criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has committed, and we \nfurther urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our children from this very dangerous \nsexual predator.\" See Exhibit \"J.\" \n44. When Mr. Edwards wrote his July 3, 2008 letter, he was still unaware that a non-\nprosecution agreement had been reached with Epstein — a fact that continued to be concealed \nfrom him (and the victims) by the U.S. Attorney's Office. Mr. Edwards first saw a reference to \nthe NM on or after July 9, 2008, when the Government filed its responsive pleading to Jane \nDoe's emergency petition. That pleading was the first public mention of the non-prosecution \nagreement and the first disclosure to Mr. Edwards (and thus to Jane Due #1 and Jane Doe #2) of \nthe possible existence of a non-prosecution agreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, \n28-29. \n45. Mr. Edwards detrimentally relied on the misleading representations made by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office that the case was still under investigation when he was writing this letter. He \nwould not have wasted his time undertaking a pointless exercise had he known that the U.S. \n20 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000690 \nEFTA00230514\n", "char_count": 1797}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "•. \nr\"vdrArre \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 21 of 42 \nAttorney's Office had previously negotiated a non-prosecution agreement See Exhibits \"E\" & \n46. On July 7, 2008, Jane Doe #1 filed a petition for enforcement of her rights under the \nCVRA. At the time, Jane Doe #1 was not aware of the non-prosecution agreement, so she \nsought a court order directing the Justice Department to confer with her before reaching any such \nagreement. Epstein quickly became aware of this petition. Doc. #1 at 1-2. \n47. On July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a victim notification to Jane Doe #1 \nvia her attorney, Bradley Edwards. That notification contains a written explanation of some of \nthe terms of the agreement between Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office. A full copy of the \nterms was not provided. A notification was not provided to Jane Doe 42 because the agreement \nlimited Epstein's liability to victims whom the United States was prepared to name in an \nindictment. As a result, Jane Doe #2 never received a notification letter about the agreement \nThe notification did not mention the non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office. \nExhibits \"E\" & \"IC\" \n48. The notification that the U.S. Attorney's Office sent to Jane Doe #1 and other victims \ncontained false and inaccurate information about the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. \n'rho false information was specifically approved by Epstein's attorneys. \nSupplemental \nDeclaration of A. Marie Villafana, Dec. 22, 2008, doc. #35 at 2-3. \n49. On July 11, 2008, the Court held a hearing on Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's \nEmergency Petition for Enforcement of Rights. During the hearing, the Government conceded \nthat Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were \"victims\" within the meaning of the Crime Victim's \n21 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000691 \nEFTA00230515\n", "char_count": 1870}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "' •• \n-\n77:TC\" ---------\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 22 of 42 \nRights Act. Epstein was aware of these and subsequent proceedings involving the CVRA. Tr. \nJuly 11 , 2008, at 14-15. \n50. During the July I I, 2008 hearing, the Government conceded that its agreement had \nbeen conoluded months before the victims were notified about it. See id et 12 C'. . . the \nagreement was consummated by the parties in December of 2007.\"). \n51. At all times material to this statement of facts, it would have been practical and \nfeasible for the federal government to inform Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 of the details of the \nproposed non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, including in particular the fact that the \nagreement barred any federal criminal prosecution. See U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at I 91-\n92. \n52. One of the senior prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office joined Epstein's payroll \nshortly after important decisions were made limiting Epstein's criminal liability — and \nimproperly represented people close to Epstein. During the federal investigation of Epstein, \nBruce Reinhart was a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the \nSouthern District of Florida. WitiCgapthlui_afte,r_to imn-prosecution agreemenc-was-signed, \nReinhart left the Office and immediately went into private practice as a \"white collar\" criminal \ndefense attorney. \nHis office coincidentally happened to be not only in the same building (and \non the same floor) as Epstein's lead criminal defense counsel, Jack Goldberger, but it was \nactually located right next door to the Florida Science Foundation — an Epstein-owned and -run \ncompany where Epstein spent his \"work release.\" See http://www.brucereinhartlaw.com. \n53. While working in this Office adjacent to Epstein's, Reinhart undertook the \nrepresentation of numerous Epstein employees and pilots during the civil cases filed against \n22 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000692 \nEFTA00230516\n", "char_count": 1991}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "I\n• \n-r•r•5:\"\" \n• \n• 1 (W•Tris- - \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 23 of 42 \nEpstein by the victims — cases the involved the exact same crimes and same evidence being \nreviewed by the U.S. Attorney's office when he was employed there. Specifically, he \nrepresented Sarah Kellen (Epstein's number one co-conspirator who was actually named as such \nin the WA), his housekeeper (Louel la Ruboyo), his pilots Larry Morrison, Larry Visoski, David \nRogers, William Hammond and Robert Roxburgh, (Hammond and Roxburgh were not deposed, \nbut the others were.) See depositions of these individuals in various Epstein civil cases. On \ninformation and belief, Reinhart's representation of these individuals was paid, directly cr \nindirectly, by Epstein. \nSuch representations are in contravention of Justice Department \nregulations and Florida bar rules. Such representations also give, at least, the improper \nappearance that Reinhart may have attempted to curry with Epstein and then reap his reward \nthrough favorable employment. \nLEGAL MEMORANDUM \nThe victims have previously briefed the issues of why they are entitled to entry of an \norder by this Court finding that the U.S. Attorney's Office violated their rights under the CVRA. \nSee doc. #1; doc #9 at 3-11; doc. #19 at 3-9, 14. The victims specifically incorporate those \npleadings by reference here. In short, as explained in the victims' earlier pleadings, the Office \nviolated  the victims' right to confer beforsueanhing the_mmprosecutionwament and also \nfailed to use its best efforts to comply with the CVRA. The victims now provide additional \nbriefing on two issues: (1) the CVRA applies to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 even though no \nindictment was filed in their case; and (2) the Court should find that the government has clearly \nviolated the CVRA in this case and set up a briefing schedule and hearing on the appropriate \nremedy. \n23 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000693 \nEFTA00230517\n", "char_count": 1981}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "• \n\"<\"..z?<:.\"'' \nr''\"\"tr' \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 24 of 42 \nI. \nTHE CVRA PROTECTS JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2 EVEN THOUGH \nTHIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY A NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nRATHER TTIAN INDICTMENT. \nIn this litigation, the Government is apparently taking the position that the Crime \nVictims' Rights Act does not extend tights to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 because no \nindictment was ever filed in federal court and thus no federal court proceedings were ever held. \nThis crabbed litigation position about thehreadth of the CVRA cannot be sustained. Indeed, \nneither the FBI nor the U.S. Attorney's Office itself took this position during the Epstein \ninvestigation — until the victims in this case filed their petition requesting enforcement of their \nrights. Instead, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office recognized that because the U.S. \nAttorney's Office was negotiating a non-prosecution agreement that affected the rights of \nspecifically identified victims, the CVRA was applicable. \nThe Court should reject the \nGovernment's newly-contrived position. \nA. \nThe Plain Language of the CVRA Makes Clear that Victims Have Rights \nBefore an Indictment is Filed. \nThe CVRA promises crime victims that they will have various rights, including Itlhe \nreasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government  in the case,\" 18 U.S.C. § \n377I(aX5) (emphasis added), and \"the right to be treated with fairness,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).. \nIn earlier pleadings filed in this action, the Government has tried to narrowly construe the CVRA \nso that it applies only to a \"court proceeding.\" See Gov't Response to Victim's Emergency \nPetition (doe. #13) at 1-2. \nThe Government's position contravenes the plain language of the CVRA. The CVRA \nguarantees to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 the right to confer with prosecutors \"in the case,\" \n24 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000694 \nEFTA00230518\n", "char_count": 1944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "I\n--- \"r\"--\nCase 0:08-Cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 25 of 42 \nnot in a \"court proceeding.\" And the CVRA broadly extends a right to them \"to be treated with \nfairness\" a right that is not circumscribed to just court proceedings. Indeed, the fact that (as the \nGovernment notes) the drafters of the CVRA used the term \"court proceeding\" elsewhere in the \nstatute (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 377 l(a)(2) (victim's right to notice \"of any public court proceeding\")) \nmakes it obvious that they intended to give victims a  right to confer that extended beyond simple \ncourt proceedings — that is, the right to confer about \"the case\" — as well as a broad right to be \ntreated fairly throughout the process. \nMoreover, it is patently obvious that a criminal \"case\" against Epstein had been going on \nfor months before the victims learned about the non-proseoution agreement. As recounted in the \nstatement of facts above, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of \nFlorida had opened a \"case\" involving Epstein's sexual abuse of the victims well before they \nentered into plea negotiations with Epstein. Indeed, as early as June 7, 2007 — more than three \nmonths before they concluded the NM with Epstein — the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a notice to \nJane Doe NI stating \"your care is under investigation.\" See Exhibit \"C\" (emphasis added). •The \nnotice went on to tell Jane Doe #1 that \"as a victim and/or witness of a federal offense, you have \na number of rights.\" Id. at 1. Among the rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself told Jane \nDoe that she possessed was \"[t]he right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the \ncase.\" Of course, she would not have had those rights if she was not covered by the CVRA. \nInterestingly, the letter also advised Jane Doe #1 that \"if you believe that the rights set forth \nabove [e.g.. the right to confer and other CVRA rights] are being violated, you have the right to \npetition the Cour\n... [truncated, 2068 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/25 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=25]", "char_count": 2068}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736•KAtvl Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011' Page 26 of 42 \nThe plain language of the CVRA makes clear that crime victims have righeeven before \nA \nthe filing of any indictment. The CVRA's instnictsthat crime victims who seeks to assert rights \nin pre-indictment situations should proceed in the court where the crime was committed: wile \nrights described in subsection (a) [of the CVRA] shall be asserted in the district in which a \ndefendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, V no prosecution is underway, in the district court \nin the district in which the crime occurred.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). The \nvictims have relied on this language through their pleadings, but the Government has not offered \nany response. \nThe CVRA also directs that \"[Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and \nother departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, Investigation, or \nprosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that erimastictimmare notified  of, and \naccorded, the rights described in [the CVRAJ.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1) (emphasis added). Of \ncourse, there would be no reason to direct that agencies involved in the \"detection\" and \n\"investigation\" of crime have CVRA obligations if the Government's construction of the Act \nwere correct. \nPlainly, Congress envisioned the victims' rights law applying during the \n\"detection\" and \"investigation\" phases of criminal cases. \nFor all these reasons, the Court need look no further than the language of the CVRA to \nconclude that the victims in this case had protected rights under the Act. \nB. \nOther Courts Have Recognized That Crime Victims Have Rights Before An \nIndictment is Filed. \nIn its briefing to date, the Government has yet to cite a single case that has accepted its \nsweeping position that the CVRA only extends rights to victims after the formal filing of an \n26 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000696 \nEFTA00230520\n", "char_count": 1963}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 27 of 42 \nindictment. This is because the case law all cuts the opposite way and recognizes that the CVRA \ndoes protect victims during the investigation of federal criminal cases. \nIn a case remarkably similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit has held that victims have a \nright to confer with federal prosecutors even before any charges are filed. In In re Dean, 527 \nP.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008), a wealthy corporate defendant reached a generous plea deal with \nthe Government — a deal that the Government concluded and filed for approval with the district \ncourt without conferring with the victims. When challenged on a mandamus petition by the \nvictims, the Fifth Circuit held: \nThe district court acknowledged that \"Where are clearly rights \nunder the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.\" \nBP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at '11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LOGS \n12893, at 836. Logically, this includes die CVRA's establishment \nof victims' \"reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nGovernment.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5). At least in the posture of \nthis case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other \nsituations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable \nway to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and \nto ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea \nbargain. \nId. \nAs we understand the Government's attempt to distinguish Dean, it asks this Court to \ndecline to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding ancl... \ntea split of \n_ILority on_ibis important \nissue. See Gov't Response to Emergency Pen. at 2-3. Instead, the Government would have this \nCourt deviate from the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion because the Circuit's \"discussion of \nthe scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the court ultimately declined to issue \nmandamus relief.\" Gov't Response at 2 (citing Dean, 527 F.3d at 395). This is simply untrue. \nThe Fifth Circ\n... [truncated, 2128 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/27 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=27]", "char_count": 2128}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "- 7,-\n1\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAKI Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 28 of 42 \nCourt to reject a proposed \"binding\" plea agreement negotiated under Fed. R. Crim. P. \n11(c)(IXC) (i.e., a plea agreement obligating the judge to impose a specific sentence). The \nvictims asked for that relief because of the Government's failure to confer with them before the \ncharges and accompanying plea agreement were filed. The Fifth Circuit held that the victims' \nrights had been violated in the passages quoted above. It then went on to remand the matter to \ndistrict court for further consideration of the effect of the violations of the victims' rights: \nWe are confident, however, that the conscientious district court will tbily consider \nthe victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement \nshould be accepted. \nThe decision whether to giant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude that \nthe better course is to deny relief, confident that the district court will take heed \nthat the victims have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA and will \ncarefully consider their objections and briefs as this matter proceeds. \nIn re Dean, 527 F.3d at 396. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit could not have instructed the District \nCourt to \"take heed\" of the violations of victims' rights unless it has specifically held, as a matter \nof law, that the victims' rights had been violated. \nThe Government's next effort to deflect the force of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that the \nCircuit did not directly quote three words found in the CVRA'a right to confer — the words \"in \nthe case.\" See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2. But the Fifth Circuit had received \nbriefs totaling close to 100 pages in that case and was obviously well aware of the statute at \nhand. Indeed, in the very paragraph the Government claims is troublesome, the Filth Circuit \ncited to the district court opinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. \nSee United\n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/28 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=28]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "\"<\",tv • : \nI \ni11;;;;;;;:-\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 29 of 42 \nThe Government finally notes that the Fifth Circuit stated that its ruling about the \nGovernment violating the right to confer applied \"in the posture of this case.\" In re Dean, 527 \nF.3d at 394. But the posture of the case involving Epstein here — at least in its relevant aspects — \nis virtually identical to the posture there. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government had an \nobligation to confer with the victims before charges were filed and before a final plea \narrangement was reached. Without giving the victims a chance to confer before hand, the plea \nagreement might be fatally flawed because it did not consider the concerns of the victims. Thus, \nthe Fifth Circuit emphasized the need to confer with victims before any disposition was finally \ndecided: \"The victims do have reason to believe that their impact on the eventual sentence is \nsubstantially less where, as here, their input is received after the parties have reached a tentative \ndeal. As we have explained, that is why we conclude that these victims should have been heard \nat an earlier stage.\" Id at 395. The posture in this case is exactly the same — the Government \nshould have conferred before the parties \"reached a tentative deal.\" The fact that the deal \nreached here is slightly different than the deal reached in the Dean case (a non-prosecution \nagreement versus a plea agreement) is truly a distinction without a difference. If anything, the \nfacts here cry out for conferral even more than in that case. At least the defendant there agreed \nto plead guilty to a federal felony. Here, the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal \npunishment— a plea deal that Jane Doe 01 and Jane Doe 02 would have strenuously objected to . \nif the Government had given them the chance. \nThe Fifth Circuit's decision in Dean has been cited favorably in two recent District Court \ndecisions, which provides further\n... [truncated, 2198 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/29 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=29]", "char_count": 2198}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 30, "text_content": ",\n,\n,\n,\n,\n,\n,\n \n•\n \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 30 of 42 \nthe CVRA. After citing Dean, the District Court agreed that the rights were expansive and could \napply before indictment, but subject to the outer limit that the Government be at least \n\"contemplating\" charges: \nQuite understandably, movants perceive their victimization as having begun long \nbefott the government got around to filing the superseding indictment. They also \nbelieve their rights under the CVRA ripened at the moment of actual \nvictimization, or at least at the point when they first contacted the government. \nMovants rely on a decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that \nCVRA rights apply prior to any prosecution. In United States\" BP Products \nNorth America, Inc., the district court reasoned that because § 3771(dX3) \nprovided for the assertion of CVRA rights \"in the district court in which a \ndefendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in \nthe district court in the district in which the crime occurred,\" the CVRA clearly \nprovided for \"rights ... that apply before any prosecution is underway.\" (United \nStates I. BP Products North America, Inc., Criminal No. H-07434, 2008 WI. \n501321 at *11 (S.D.Tex. Feb.21, 2008) (emphasis in original), mandamus denied \nin part, In re Dean, No. 08-20125, 2008 WL 1960245 (5th Cir. May 7, 2008). \nBut, assuming that it was within the contemplation end intendment of the CVRA \nto guarantee certain victim's rights prior to formal commencement of a criminal \nproceeding, the universe of such rights clearly has its logical limits. For example, \nthe realm of cases in which the CVRA might apply despite no prosecution being \n\"underway,\" cannot be read to include the victims of uncharged crimes that the \ngovernment has not even contemplatechit is impossible to expect the government, \nmuch less a court, to notify crime victims of their rights if the government has not \nverified\n... [truncated, 2837 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/30 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=30]", "char_count": 2837}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 31 of 42 \nrights under the CVRA even before prosecution. See In re Dean, 527 F3d 391, 394 (5th \nCir.2008). This view is supported by the statutory language, which gives the victims rights \nbefore the accepting of plea agreements and, therefore, before adjudication of guilt. See 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771(aX4).\" 2009 WL 790042 at •2 (W.Va. 2009). \nAccordingly, rather than create a split of authority, this Court should follow the Fifth \nCircuit's holding in Dean (and the view of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of \nNew York and the Eastern District of Virginia) and conclude that the CVRA extends rights to \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 under the facts of this case. \nC. \nThe U.S. Attorney's OfficeHas Previously Recognized that Jane Doe til and \nJane Doe #2 Have Rights tinder the CVRA. \nA final reason for concluding that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe *2 are protected by the \nCVRA is that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself reached that conclusion — well before the victims \nfiled this petition. The U.S. Attorney's Office arranged to have the FBI send a notice to, for \nexample, Jane Doe #1 informing her that she had lights under the CVRA. Later, in discussions \nwith defendant Epstein, the Office explained to Epstein their obligations to the victims under the \nCVRA. Indeed, it was only after Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 filed a petition with this Court \nseeking protection of their rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office reversed its position. The Court \nshould reject this remarkable about-face. \nAs recounted in more detail above, the U.S. Attorney's Office made clear to both the \nvictims and to Epstein that the victims had rights under the CVRA. For example, on about June \n7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to June Doe Ul a standard CVRA victim notification letter, \npromising that the Justice Department would makes its \"best efforts\" to protect Jane Doe #1's \n31 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000701 \nEFTA00230525\n", "char_count": 2000}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "foyinl::._' --- -\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 32 of 42 \nrights, including \"Nile reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the \ncase\" and \"to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving \nplea . . . .\" Exhibit \"C.\" Similarly, on about November 27, 2007, then First Assistant U.S. \nAttorney Jeff Sloman sent an e-mail to Jay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein stating: la \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 \n(emphasis rearranged). \nApparently, this assertion produced some sort of objection from \ndefendant Epstein. The U.S. Attorney's Office, however, rejected those objections In a letter \non about December 6, 2007, Jeffrey H. Sloman, First Assistant U.S. Attorney again sent a letter \nto Jay Lefkowitz, reiterating the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims \ninformed of the status of \nThe letter stated: \n32 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000702 \nEFTA00230526\n", "char_count": 986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 33 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added). What this correspondence shows \nis that the U.S. Attorney's Office quite clearly took the position with defendant Epstein that the \nCVRA extended rights to Epstein's victims. Yet when the victims in this case filed a petition in \nthis Court asking those rights to be respected, the Government simply reversed course. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office had it right the first time — the CVRA does extend rights to Jane Dot #1 and \nJane Doe #2 in this case. \nD. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office Is Estopped From Arguing that the CVRA Does \nNot Apply in this Case. \nFor all the reasons just explained, it is clear that the CVRA applies to this case and the \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 had rights under the Act. In addition, however, the Government is \nsimply stopped from arguing otherwise. The Government told the victims that they had rights \nunder the CVRA and would keep them informed about the progress of the case. Exhibits \"Cr \n\"D,\" \"F,\" & \"G.\" Having made those representations to the victims — and having induced \nreliance by the victims—the Government is stopped from taking a different position now. \nAs explained by the Eleventh Circuit, to make out a claim of estoppel against the \nGovernment, a party must adduce evidence of the following: \n(I) words, conduct, or acquiescence that induces reliance; \n(2) willfulness or negligence with regard to the acts, conduct, or acquiescence; \n(3) detrimental reliance; and \n(4) affirmative misconduct by the Government. \nUnited States I. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292 (III  Cir. 2003). Each of these four factors is easily \nmet here. \n33 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000703 \nEFTA00230527\n", "char_count": 1757}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "ttlt>1:44./1./.. \n7\"--\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 34 of 42 \nFirst, the Government made statements to the victims that induced reliance. The victims \nreceived an official notice on Justice Department letterhead that they were crime victims in the \nEpstein case and that the Justice Department would use its \"best efforts\" to protect their rights. \nSecond, these statements were obviously not accidental —to the contrary, the Government \nspecifically and deliberately sent these notices to the victims. \nThird, the victims detrimentally relied on these statements. As explained at greater \nlength in the victims proposed facts, the victims were lead to believe that their case was \"under \ninvestigation.\" As a result, they did not take steps to object to Epstein's plea agreement and, \nindeed, did not even attend the court hearing where Epstein pled guilty. Similarly, their attorney \n(Mr. Edwards) was induced to spend an afternoon writing a letter to the U.S Attorney's Office \nabout why Epstein should be federally prosecuted — time that was taken away from other matters \nat his busy law practice. This was a complete wild goose chase, as the U.S. Attorney's Office \nwas concealing front Mr. Edwards at the time that a federal non-prosecution agreement had \nalready been reached with Epstein. \nFourth, the U.S. Attorney's Office engaged in affirmative misconduct We do not make \nthis allegation lightly. But the facts recounted above demonstrate the following chain of events. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office first reached a non prosecution agreement with Epstein, in which it \nagreed not to prosecute him for numerous crimes (including, for example, sex offenses \ncommitted by Epstein against Jane Doe #1). As part of that agreement, the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice agreed to a \"confidentiality\" provision that forbade publicly disclosing the existence of \nthe agreement. As a result, the U.S. Attorney's Office (and FBI agents acting under its \n34 \n08-8073\n... [truncated, 2033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/34 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=34]", "char_count": 2033}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Of Gratte.•47.tie, \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 35 of 42 \ndirection4) kept the existence of the non-prosecution agreement secret from the victims and the \npublic. The reasonable inference from the evidence is that the U.S. Attorney's Office wanted to \nkeep the agreement a secret to avoid intense criticism that would have surely ensued had the \nvictims and the public learned that a billionaire sex offender with political connections had \narranged to avoid federal prosecution for numerous felony sex offenses against minor girls. \nAs part of this pattern of deception, the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed victim \nnotification with the defendant sex offender and, after he raised objections, stopped making \nnotifications. Then later in January 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office arranged for letters to be \nsent to the victims — including Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 — that falsely stated that to each that \nyour \"case is currently under investigation.\" This was untrue, as the U.S. Attorney's Office had \nalready resolved the federal case by signing a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Indeed, \nthe pattern of deception continued even after Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were represented by \nlegal counsel. In May 2008, the Office sent a similar letter stating \"your case is currently \ninvestigation\" to another victim (represented by attorney Bradley J. Edwards). As late as the \nmiddle of June 2008 — more than eight months after the non-prosecution agreement had been \nsigned — the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case told Edwards to send information that he \nwanted the Office to consider in determining whether to file federal charges. The Office \nconcealed from him that it had already made the determination not to file federal charges end \nthat the Office had in fact signed a non•prosecution agreement long ago. The Office also \nconcealed from him the fact that guilty pleas in state court were imminent. The Office disclosed \n4 it \n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/35 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=35]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 36 of 42 \nthe non-prosecution agreement only after Epstein had entered his guilty pleas in state court — in \nother words, only after the time for the victims to be able to object to the non-prosecution \nagreement during the plea process had come and gone. Even at that time, the Office did not \ndisclose the provisions in the agreement. In short, the victims never learned about the non-\nprosecution agreement barring federal prosecution of their oases because of a deliberate \ndecisions by the U.S. Attorney's Office, not mere \"negligence or inaction.\" McCorkle, 321 F.3d \nat 1297. Accordingly, the Government is stopped from arguing that the Crime Victims' Rights \nAct does not apply to this case. \nIL \nTHE COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS HAVE BEEN \nVIOLATED AND TEEN SET TIP A BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING ON \nTHE APPROPRIATE REMEDY. \nThis U.S. Attorney's Office's behavior in this case does not satisfy the Office's \nobligations under the CVRA to use its \"best efforts\" to insure that victims receive protection of \ntheir rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX'). In particular, the undeniable chain of events makes clear \nthat the victims wore not afforded their right \"to confer with the attorney for the Government in \nthe case.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5). Whatever else may be said about the deception, it also \nstarkly violates the victims' right \"to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's \ndignity . ...\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). The pattern also denied the victims of timely notice of \ncourt proceedings, 18 U.S.C. §3771(a)(3), including in particular the state court guilty plea. \nAs we understand the position of the Government, it does not truly contest that — if the \nCVRA applied — it managed to discharge its various obligations under the Act. Instead, the \nGovernment relies solely on a technical argument to reach the conclusion that it discharged its \nobligations — namely, the argument tha\n... [truncated, 2100 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/36 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=36]", "char_count": 2100}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 37 of 42 \nfiled. As just explained, however, that technical argument must be rejected as inconsistent with \nthe CVRA's plain language and interpretation by other courts. Accordingly, this Court should \nfind that the Government has violated its CVRA obligations. \nOnce the Court finds such a violation, the next issue becomes what remedy should apply. \nSince the earliest days of our nation, it has been settled law that \"where there is a legal right, \nthere is also a legal remedy . . ..\" \nMadison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (internal \nquotation omitted). Moreover, \"[i]f the right is created by a federal statute, the federal courts \nhave the power to fashion an appropriate remedy.\" Intracoastal Tranrp., Inc.' Decatur County, \nGeorgia 482 F.2d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 1973). As we understand the Government's position in this \ncase, however, they believe that this Sgprasowedess-to-do-anything to rorrect_tht_. palpable \nviolation of victims' rights documented in this case. \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 respectfhlly request that the Court set up a briefing \nschedule and a hearing on this important issue. The victims believe that they can establish that \nthe appropriate remedy for the clear violations of their rights is to invalidate the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement. While the victims request an opportunity to provide more extensive briefing on this \nsubject, they provide a few citations in support of their position here. \nWhen other plea arrangements have been negotiated in violation of federal law, they have \nbeen stricken by the courts. For example, United Stalest Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), \nheld that where a sentence on a new crime could not run concurrently with a probation \nrevocation the defendant was then serving — contrary to the assumption of the parties to the plea \nagreement — the defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement. The \nCourt explained that the case was on\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/37 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=37]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "•\nri le.\n- : ----\niffe-W•?3,v;:::--: \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 38 of 42 \n947. Here, of course, exactly the same is true: the non-prosecution agreement is vitiated by \nillegality — namely, the fad that it was negotiated in violation of the victims' rights. Other cases \nreach similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States' Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10°' Cir. 1995) \n(prosecutor agreed to recommend probation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal \nsentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); \nCraig'. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Cob. 1999) (because \"neither the prosecutor nor the trial \ncourt have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period,\" such \"is not a permissible \nsubject of plea negotiations,\" and thus, even if \"the trial court erroneously approves of such an \nillegal bargain\" such plea is \"invalid\" and thus will not be specifically enforced). Nor can the \ndefendant claim some right to specific performance of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. See \nState'. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement for 81 months sentence, \nbut court added 10-year conditional release term because, under facts of case, sentence without \nsuch release term \"plainly illegal,\" and thus remedy of specific performance not available); State \nI Wall, 348 N.C. 671, 502 8.13.2d 585, 588 (1998) (plea agreement was for sentence to be \nconcurrent with one not yet completed, but state statute mandates consecutive sentence on facts \nof this case; \"defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action \nwould violate the laws of this state\"); Rs parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. \n2006); (where \"the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become \nunenforceable due to circumstances beyond the control of [the parties], namely the fact that one \nof the enhancement paragraphs was mischaracterized in the \n... [truncated, 2270 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/38 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=38]", "char_count": 2270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 39 of 42 \npunishment that he deemed acceptable\"); State' Mazzone, ■ \nW.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891, 897 \n(2002) (where plea agreement was that defendant would plead guilty to 2 felony counts of felon \nin possession of firearm and prosecutor would dismiss remaining 6 counts re other offenses with \nprejudice, and all parties erroneously believed these 2 crimes were felonies, lower court \n\"correctly resolved this unfortunate predicament by holding that a plea agreement which cannot \nbe fulfilled based upon legal impossibility must be vacated in its entirety, and the parties must be \nplaced, as nearly as possible, in the positions they occupied prior to the entry of the plea \nagreement\"). \nThe Non-Prosecution Agreement that the Government entered into in this case was \nsimply illegal. The Government did not protect the congressionally-mandated rights of victims \nbefore it entered into this Agreement. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Agreement is so \nshockingly lenient — blocking prosecution for dozens and dozens of federal felony sex offenses \nagainst several dozen minor girls. But regardless of the leniency, the only issue for the Court is \nwhether the Agreement was lawftil. It was not, and so the Court invalidate it.3 The victims \nrespectfully ask for a full briefing schedule and a hearing on this important issue. \n3 Defendant Jeffrey Epstein was notified about this ease long ago, and was notified on \nAugust 26, 2010, that the victims would be filing correspondence in support of their motions.' \nHe has not chosen to intervene in this action, and so he should not be heard to complain about \nremedy the Court might impose. \nIn any event, there are no double jeopardy barriers to invalidating the plea. As explained \nin a leading criminal procedure treatise: \nThe review of defendant's sentence is also provided in federal cases upon \napplication of a victim. The Crime Victim's Rights Act allows a vi\n... [truncated, 2301 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/39 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=39]", "char_count": 2301}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 40 of 42 \nCERTIFICATE OP CONFERENCE \nAs recounted above, counsel for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have approached the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for more than two and a half years in an effort to reach stipulated facts. The \nU.S. Attorney's Office ultimately terminated those efforts on March 15, 2011, taking the position \nthat the facts of the case are irrelevant and that, on any set of facts, It did not violate the CVRA. \nCONCLUSION \nFor all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find the U.S. Attorney's Office violated \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act and then schedule an \nappropriate hearing on the remedy for these violations. The scope of the remedy that is \nappropriate may depend in part of the scope of the violations that the Court finds. For this \nreason, it makes sense for the Court to bifincate the process and determine, first, the extent of the \nviolations and then, second, the remedy appropriate for those violations. If the Court would \nprefer to see more immediate briefing on remedy issues, the victims stand prepared to provide \nthat briefing at the Court's direction. \ndifficulties if as the [DIFi&ancescoj Court explained .. . the defendant is 'charged \nwith knowledge of the statute and its \n. provisions, and has no expectation of \nfinality in his sentence until the [review by writ] is concluded .. ..\"' \nLAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL Procedure § 26.7(b) (Nov. 2010) (quoting United States \nDihancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 146 (1980)). \n40 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000710 \nEFTA00230534\n", "char_count": 1613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "• • \n. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/2 1/201 1 Page 41 of 42 \nDATED: Much 21.2011 \nRespectfully Submitted, \ns/ Bradley J. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSIN0, \nEDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Smite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nTelephone (954) 524-2820 \nFacsimile (954) 524-2822 \nFlorida Bar No.: 542075 \nE-mail: brad®pathtojustice.com \nand \nPaul G. Cassell \nPro MX Vice \nS.J. Quinnoy College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, UT 84112 \nTelephone: 801-585-5202 \nFacsimile: 801-585-6833 \nE-Mail: cassellAtaw.tibah.edtt\nAttorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe 42 \n41 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000711 \nEFTA00230535\n", "char_count": 719}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 42 of 42 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nThe foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's \nCM/ECF system: \nA. Marie Villefafla \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n(561)820-8711 \nFax: (561) 820-8777 \nE-mail: gartmarie.c.viltafana(gusdoj.gov \nAttorney for the Government \nJoseph L. Ackerman, Jr. \nJoseph Ackerman, Jr. \nFowler White Burnett PA \n777 S. Flagler Drive, West Tower, Suite 901 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nCriminal Defense Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein \n(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) \n42 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000712 \nEFTA00230536\n", "char_count": 705}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 6 \nJANE DOE NI AND JANE DOE /WS MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AN)) REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nEXHIBIT B \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000713 \nEFTA00230537\n", "char_count": 324}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 6 \nFD-302 (ar. 10-6.95) \n.1 -\nmath BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION \nDue of trancnPuon \n08/14/2007\nFlorida, rjligIll\neral investigation involving the sexual \na\nas interviewed in West Palm Beach,\nir \nexploitation of minors. After being advised of the identity of.the \ninterviewing agents and the nature of the interview, t \nprovided \nthe following information: \n' \nIn 2003 or 20D4 Warms introduced to JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nfor the purpose of providing im with personal massages. cg, was \napproached at a party by a female she believed was named \nISE. \nShe described the female as havin \nr \nhair and taller. The \nfemale was later identified as \n. SS \ntold \nWeilland la's friend, mils mos, that they could make money by \nproviding massages to EPSTEIN. gellIMSP told lam that she could \nprovide the massages with her clothes on or off. WS, who was \nfifteen years old, believed that she was close to turning sixteen \nwhen she first met EPSTEIN. However, during Wilpis first contact \nwith EPSTEIN, she told him that she had just turned eighteen. \nand Willi traveled to EPSTEIN's residence in Palm \nBeach by taxi. \nway_pregnant at the time. Once at the \nresidence, age took Willi,Upstairs. EPSTEIN entered the room \nwearin only a ro . Once EPSTEIN had removed the robe, both \nand WIlleprovided EPSTEIN with a massage. Both ANIMINP \nand Wiellhad removed their clothing and remained only in their \nunderwear. EPSTEIN asked ato \nleave. Once alone with Wilik \nEPSTEIN began to masturbate. WillIlwas uncomfortable. \nAfter \nEPSTEIN climaxed the massage was over. WOW believed that Sib \nhad mentioned EPSTEIN might masturbate during the massage but she \nwas still very surprised when he masturbated. EPSTEIN paid Wall \n$200.00. EPSTEIN did not touch'flduring that massage. WIMP \ndeparted EPSTEIN's residence with two men that worked for EPSTEIN. \nThey drove WIEMPto a Shell Cap Station located near Okeechobee \nBoulevard and the Florida Turnpik\n... [truncated, 2832 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/44 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=44]", "char_count": 2832}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "ettx4fOOOV4.. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 6 \n, \nFD-302. (Rn. IC-6.95) \n31E-n4-108062 \nCanon of FD•302 of \na\n 1. \n.on  08/07/2007 \n .Ptic  \n2 \nx. \n1 \ngirls she could bring; When EPSTEIN telephoned, he usually asked \nfor Pato \ncome over. According to WSW EPSTEIN's house \ntelephone number began with the di its 655. She would call \nsometimes and leave a message. WINIstated that when they \ntelephoned her they would inform her of when they would be coming \nback to town and if she might have anyone new. WIMMadid not \nbelieve that EPSTEIN ever really liked her. \nWfl traveled to the EPSTEIN's residence during 2003 and \n2004 over twenty five times. WAIllobelieved that she provided \nEPSTEIN with approximately 10-15 massages. EPSTEIN initially \nstarted out touching MEMO breasts but gradually the massages \nbecame more sexual. EPSTEIN would instruct WIMMOon how and what to \ndo during the massages. He would request WOMMOto rub his chest and \nnipples. WOMOOstated that on approximately two occasions, EPSTEIN \nasked that WS remove her underwear and provide the massage nude. \nWOMMOcomplied. WOMMIstated that EPSTEIN would make her feel that \nshe had the option to do what she wanted. \nDuring one massage. WOMOstated that she had been.givi1.g \nEPSTEIN a massage for approximately 30-40 minutes when instead of \nEPSTEIN turning over to masturbate, EPSTEIN brought another female \ninto the massage area. illOWdescribed the female as a beautiful \nblonde girl, a \"Cameron Diaz° type. 19 years of age, bright blue \neyes, and speaking with an accent. EPSTEIN had Wile straddle the \nfemale on the massage table. EPSTEIN wanted Walito touch the \nfemales breast. According to we, EPSTEIN \"pleasured\" the female \nwhile Wailawas straddled on top of the female. \nVi \nstated she \ncould hear what she believed to be a vibrator. WIllasaid for \nEPSTEIN it was all about pleasuring the female. After the female \nclimaxed, EPSTEIN patted I \non the shoulder and she r\n... [truncated, 2715 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/45 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=45]", "char_count": 2715}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 6 \nDIC2a ()Icy I 6.6-95) \n37.E-MM-208062 \nCownatation of FD-)02 or \n.On  08/07/2007 \n \"me  \n3 \nAlign clitoris. WillOwas uncomfortable and told him to stop. \nEPSTEIN complied. WOMOstated that the incident freaked her out. \n, \nwillpstated that EPSTEIN was upset because she was upset. Was \nnever return to the residence. Winistated that she did not deal \nwith EPSTEIN anymore after that incident. \nEPSTEIN gave both ampand MMOMOMPeach a book entitled \n\"Massage for Dummies\". \nThey received the books on the same visit. \nEPSTEIN also commented how strong Ins hands were when it came to \nher providing his massages. \nOn another occasion, WOMOOmentioned to EPSTEIN that she \nwas looking at a car, a Toyota Corolla. EPSTEIN provided V \n- with \n$600.00 - $700.00. NOMMstated that EPSTEIN gave her the money \nafter the incident with the other female. \nAccording to Willi EPSTEIN would ask her to bring him \nother girls. Imp who started dancing at strip clubs when she was \n16, brought girls from the club as well as from other sources. \nWILD stated she brought girls from fifteen years of age to twenty-\nfive years of age. l \nstated that EPSTEIN would get frustrated \nwith„her if she did not have new females for him. On one instance, \nEPSTEIN hung is on her because she could not provide him with \nanyone new. Willostated that EPSTEIN's preference was short, \nlittle, white girls. Willestated that EPSTEIN was upset when one \nof the other girls brought a black girl. WIMMOstated that EPSTEIN \ndid not want black girls or girls with tatoos. \nOilleatated that one of the girls she stayed with on \noccasion,\n also started providing EPSTEIN with \nmassages. A telephone number for awas \nminummomp. Holm \nsaid that her family resides in \n, Florida, possibly \nWIMMOalso stayed with \nduring this same \ntime period. However,\n never went to EPSTEIN's house or \nprovided him with massages. isillithas a Yacht Club address. \nAnother girl \n... [truncated, 2603 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/46 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=46]", "char_count": 2603}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 47, "text_content": ". \n7 -ire,: \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 6 \n. PD•Xr2a (Rev. 10-6-951 \n31E-MM-108062 \nCaminuabondRYX0of \na\n all \n.0n08/07/2007  .Par \n4 \none time attended \nHIGH SCHOOL. WIMMWalso \nbelieved that they had met through a group of friends while \nattending \n- a dropout prevention school. \nWOMIPmentioned another girl by the name of c_\nimps EPSTEIN distinguished the two warn, \nby referring to \nIMINIMPas \nalla \nworked at an ice cream \nshop. WAMOstated that she did not like I.110111 and that Jamminsr \nwas a storyteller and a bad liar. WIMMOstated that enever \nreally wanted to go to EPSTEIN's residence but she went anyway. \nWOOMPsaid that she had not taken a good look at EPSTEIN'S \npenis. wOOM0explained that it seemed like he would always try and \nhide his penis. Wis stated that EPSTEIN never asked her for sex. \nWOMMOstarted dancing when she was sixteen at \nimmOMMOM, The owner, OS \nlet her dance. WISMOhas also \nworked at fa \nlocated pr - \nNin Boynton \nBeach, Florida. \nWOMOlused illegal drugs during the years she provided \nEPSTEIN with massages. wegolosiAid that EPSTEIN tried to provide her \nwith advice regarding controlled substances. \n—stated that she met with EPSTEIN's attorneys, sow \nROMMMOMpand a unidentified female(UF), at the ALE HOUSE RESTAURANT. \nwillopmet with them after she contacted KELLEN, who confirmed that \nthey were really working for EPSTEIN. Willipstaced that KELLEN also \nbalked of her twin boys and stated that she was living in \nManhattan. WMOMPfound out that Sand \nthe OF are employed by \n \n \nThey asked a lot of questions. They \nspecifically asked about LIMO and a GlIMILNU. KMONereiterated \nher dislike for a \nWIIIMPalso informed the interviewing agents that she had \nspoken to Moshe \nbelieved before the fourth of July. M \ntold wilimpthat she had met with investigators and that they had \nvideoed her. \nnumbers: \nWelleconfirmed her association to the following telephone \nOld cellular number - (561) \nPossibly an\n... [truncated, 2110 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/47 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=47]", "char_count": 2110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "twerr \n--- 7 ' \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 6 \nFT). 302. (Rev 10-6-95) \n31E-MM-108062 \nCon0nnanon of PD-302 of \nC\nle-- \n.On  08/07/2007  .flw  \nS \n• \n• \nI \n• \n' \n• \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000718 \nEFTA00230542\n", "char_count": 261}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "4 \ncmuai \nCif/X4441, 4.1-..,% \n• \n--- 1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-3 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 3 \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 08-80736-av-Marra/Johtuon \nEXHIBIT C \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000719 \nEFTA00230543\n", "char_count": 361}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "07/09/2008 15:13 FAX 5818059848 \n115110 WPB CONFRM \nCase 8:08-Cv-80736-KAM •ument 48-3 \nEntered on FLSD Diie1 03/21/ \nU.S. Department of Justice \nUnited Slates Attorney \nSouthern District of Florida \nSOO South Australian Ave.. Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach. FL 3)401 \n(561)820-8711 \nFacsimile- (361)820-8777 \nJune 7, 2007 \nPELIVERI 8Y,$AND \nMiss eateal \nRe: \nCrime Victims' and Witnesses' jghts \nDear Miss WIN \nPursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004, as a victim and/or witness of a federal offense, \nyou have a number of rights. Those rights are: \n(I) \nThe right to be reasonably protected from the accused. \n(2) \nThe right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding \ninvolving the cnme or of any release or escape of the accused: \n(3) \nThe right not to be excluded from any public court proceeding, unless the court \ndetermines that your testimony may be materially altered if you are present for other \nportions of a proceeding. \n(4) \nThe right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court \ninvolving release, plea, or sentencing. \n(5) \nThe reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the case. \n(6) \nThe right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. \n(7) \nThe righi to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. \n(8) \nThe right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and \nprivacy \nli \n• \nMembers of the U.S. Department of Justice and other federal investigative agencies, \nincluding the Federal Bureau of Investigation, must use their best efforts to make sure that these \nrights are protected. If you have any concerns in this regard, please feel free to contact me at 561 \n209-1047, or Special Agent Nesbitt Kuyrkendall from•the Federal Bureau of Investigation at 561 \n822-5946. You a:so- can contact the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime in \nWashington, D.C. at 202-307-5983. That Office has a website at www.ovc.gov. \nYou can seek.che advice of an atto\n... [truncated, 2222 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/50 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=50]", "char_count": 2222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "07/09/2008 15:14 FAX 5618059846 \nUS40 WPB COMPRI \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM fitment 48-3 \nEntered on F LSD Dart 03/21/2011 Page 3 of.3 \nMess Stab \n_limn 7. 2007 \nPAGE 2 \nIn addition to these rights, you are entitled to counseling and medical services, and protection \nfrom intimidation and harassment. If the Court determines that you arc a victim, you also may be \nentitled to restitution from the perpetrator. A list of counseling and medical service providers can \nbe provided to you, if you so desire. If. you or your family is subjected to any intimidation or \nharassment, please contact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or myself immediately. It is possible that \nsomeone working on behalf of the targets of the investigation may contact you. Such cdntact does \nnot violas4e law?. However, if you are contacted, you have the choice of speaking to that person \nor refusing tett° do: If you refuse and feel that you arc being threatened or harassed, then please \n. . contact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or myself. \nYou also are entitled to notification of upcoming ease events. At this time, your case is under \ninvestigation) If anyone is charged in connection with the investigation, you will be notified. \nSincerely, \nR. Alexander Acosta \nUnited States Attorney \nBy: \ncc: \nSpecial Agent Nesbitt ICuydrendall, \nA. Marie Villafana \nAssistant United States Attorney \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000721 \nEFTA00230545\n", "char_count": 1399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "- \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-4 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 3 \nJANE DOE 01 AND JANE DOE NI MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nC4SE NO: 08-80736-Clv-Marra/Johnson \nEXHIBIT D \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000722 \nEFTA00230546\n", "char_count": 323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "-\n-\n•\n \n07/09/2008 15:14 FAX 5018059848 \nUSAO WPB CONFRN \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Viument 48-4 \nEntered on FLSD DOet 03/21/ \nU.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of Ronda \n500 South Australian Are., Suite 000 \nWest Palen Beach. FL 33401 \n(560 870-871 \nFacsimile: (561)820-8777 \nAugust 11, 2006 \nDELIVERY BY HAND \nMiss TOMS \nRe: \nCrime Victims' and Witnesses' Rights \nDear Miss Mats \nPursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004, as a victim and/or witness Ma federal offense, \nyou have a number of rights. Those rights are: \n(I) \nThe right to be reasonably protected from the accused. \n(2) \nThe right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding \ninvolving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused. \n(3) \nThe right not to be excluded from any public court proceeding, unless the court \ndetermines that your testimony may be materially altered if you arc present for other \nportions of a proceeding. \n(4) \nThe right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court \ninvolving release, plea, or sentencing. \n(5) \nThe reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the case. \n(6) \nThe right to fell and timely restitution as provided in law. \n(7) \nThe right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. \n(8) \nThe right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and \nprivacy. \nMembers of the U.S. DepartMent of Justice and other fedond investigative agencies, \nincluding the Federal Bureau of Investigation, must use their best efforts to make sure that these \nrights are protected. If you have any concerns in this regard, please feel free to contact me at 561 \n209-1047, or Special Agent Nesbitt Kuyrkcndall from the Federal Bureau of Investigation at 561 \n822-5946. \nYou also can contact the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime in \nWashington, D.C. at 202-307-5983. That Office has a website at www.ovc.gov. \nYou can seek the advice of an attor\n... [truncated, 2216 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/53 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=53]", "char_count": 2216}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "• \n07/09/2008 15:14 FAX 5618059846 \n119A0 WPB CONFRM \n025 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM fitment 484 Entered on FLSD Duet 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 3 \nMISS Men \nAUGUST 11, 2006 \nPAGE 2 \nIn addition to these nghts, you are entitled to counseling arid medical services, and pr of \n• \nfrom intimidation and harassment. If the Court determines that you arc a victim, you afiro t \n# \nentitled to restitution from the perpetrator. A list of counseling and medical service pm% ilk \nbe provided to you, if you so desire. If you or your family is subjected to any Ultimo: \n•\nharassment, please contact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or myself immediately. It is rier,•ri \nsomeone working on behalf of the targets of the investigation may contact you. Such cuill \n. \nnot violate the law. However, if you are contacted, you have the choice of speaking to dui tj \nor refusing to do so. If you refuse and feel that you are being threatened or harassed, the:; ri • \niontact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or myself. \nYou also are entitled to notification of upcoming case events. At this time, your c. .-\ninvestigation. If anyone is charged in connection with the investigation, you will he no', \nBy: \ncc: \nSpecial Agent Nesbitt Kuyrkendall, F.B.I. \nSincerely, \nR. Alexander Acosta \nUnited States Attorney \nA. Marie Villafafia \nAssistant United States Attorney \nf f \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000724 \nEFTA00230548\n", "char_count": 1371}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 15 \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE n'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 0840736CIv-Marra/Jobaien \nEXHIBIT E \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000725 \nEFTA00230549\n", "char_count": 319}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80,736-KAM Document 48-5 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 15 \n' \nIN RE: \nINVESTIGATION OF \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nI \nNON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nIT APPEARING that the City of Palm Beach Police Department and the State \nAttorney's Office for the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (tereinaRer, \nthe \"State Attorney's Office\") have conducted an investigation into the conduct of Jeffrey \nEpstein (hereinafter \"Epstein\"); \nIT APPEARING that the State Attorney's Of fice has charged Epstein by indictment \nwith solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section 796.07; \nIT APPEARING that the United States Attorney's Office and the Federal Bureau of \nInvestigation have conducted their own investigation into Epstein's background and any \noffenses that may have been committed by Epstein against the United States from in or \naround 2001 through in or around September 2007, including: \n(1) \nknowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to \ncommit an offense against the United States, that is, to use a facility or means \nof interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice \nminor females to engage in prostitution, in violation of Title IS, United States \nCode, Section 2422(b); all in violation ofTitle 18, United States Code, Section \n371; \n(2) \nknowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to travel \nin interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as \ndefined in IS U.S.C. § 2423(0, with minor females, in violation of Title 18, \nUnited States Code, Section 2423(b); all in violation of Title 18, United States \nCode, Section 2423(e); \n(3) \nusing a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly \npersuade, induce, or entice minor females to engage in prostitution; in \nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2; \n(4) \ntraveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual \nconduct, \n... [truncated, 2122 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/56 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=56]", "char_count": 2122}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "• . \n0;04 7 --- 7 --- \n----- . \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 15 \nof Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b); and \n(5) \nknowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruiting, \nenticing, and obtaining by any means a person, knowing that the person had \nnot attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a \ncommercial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(cXl); in violation of Title \n18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1) and 2; and \nIT APPEARING that Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state and federal criminal \nliability and Epstein understands and acknowledges that, in exchange for the benefits \nprovided by this agreement, he agrees to comply with its terms, including undertaking certain \nactions with the State Attorney's Office; \nIT APPEARING, after an investigation of the offenses and Epstein's background by \nboth State and Federal law enforcement agencies, and after due consultation with the State \nAttorney's Office, that the interests of the United States, the State of Florida, and the \nDefendant will be saved by the following procedure; \nTHEREFORE, on the authority of IL Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for \nthe Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be \ndeferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the \nfollowing conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth below, \nIf the United States Attorney should detennine, based on reliable evidence, that, \nduring the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions of this \nAgreement, then the United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days following the \nexpiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide Epstein with timely \nnotice specifying the condition(s) of the Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate its \nprosecution on any offense within sixty (60) d\n... [truncated, 2779 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/57 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=57]", "char_count": 2779}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 15 \nTerms of the Agreement \nt. \nEpstein shall plead guilty (not nob contendere) to the Indictment as \ncurrently pending against him in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for \nPalm Beach County (Case No. 2006-cf-009495A)OO(MB) charging \none (I) count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Fl. Stat. § \n796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty to an Information filed \nby the State Attorney's Office charging Epstein with an offense that \nrequires him to register as a sex offender, that is, the solicitation of \nminors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section \n796.03; \n2. \nEpstein shall make a binding recommendation that the Court impose a \nthirty (30) month sentence to be divided as follows; \n(a) \n(b) \nEpstein shall be sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve (12) \nmonths and six(6) months in county jail for all charges, without \nany opportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing, and \nwithout probation or community control in lieu of \nImprisonment; and \nEpstein shall be sentenced to a tam of twelve (12) months of \ncommunity control consecutive to his two terms in county jail \nas described in Term 2(a), supra. \n3. \nThis agreement is contingent upon a Judge of the 15th Judicial Circuit \naccepting and executing the sentence agreed upon between the State \nAttorney's Office and Epstein, the details of which are set forth in this \nagreement. \n4. \nThe terms contained in paragraphs 1 and 2. supra, do not foreclose \nEpstein and the State Attorney's Office from agreeing to recommend \nany additional charge(s) or any additional term(s) of probation and/or \nincarceration. \n5. \nEpstein shall waive all challenges to the Information filed by the State \nAttorney's Office and shall waive the right to appeal his conviction and \nsentence, except a sentence that exceeds what is set forth in paragraph \n(2), supra. \n6. \nEpstein shall provide to the U.S. Attorney'\n... [truncated, 2077 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/58 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=58]", "char_count": 2077}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 15 \nproposed agreements with the State Attorney's Office prior to entering \ninto those agreements. \n7. \nThe United States shall provide Epstein's attorneys with a list of \nindividuals whom it has identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement end been sentenced. \nUpon the execution of this agreement. the United States, in consultation \nwith and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel, shall \nselect an enemy representative for thesepersons, who shall be paid for \nby Epstein. Epstein's counsel may contact the identified individuals \nthrough that representative. \n8. \nIf any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7), supra, elects to \nfile suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not conteat the \njurisdiction of the United States District Court for the SouthernDistrict \nof Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives \nhis right to contest liability and also waives his right to contest damages \nup to an amount as agreed to between the identified Individual and \nEpstein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed \nexclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other \nclaim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal, or common law. \nNotwithstanding this waiver, as to those individuals whose names \nappear on the list provided by the United States, Epstein's signature on \nthis agreement, his waivers and failures to contest liability and such \ndamages in any suit are not to be construed as an admission of any \ncriminal or civil liability. \n9. \nEpstein's signature on this agreement also Is not to be construed as an \nadmission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional \nor other defense as to any person whose name does not appear on the \nlist provided by the United States. \nI O. \nExcept as to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively und\n... [truncated, 2530 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/59 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=59]", "char_count": 2530}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 15 \nsentenced not later than October 26, 2007. The United States has no \nobjection to Epstein self-reporting to begin serving his sentence not \nlater than January 4, 2008. \n12. \nEpstein agrees that he will not be afforded any benefits with respect to \ngain time, other than the rights, opportunities, and benefits as any other \ninmate, including but not limited to, eligibility for gain time credit \nbased on standard rules and regulations that apply in the State of \nFlorida. At the United States' request, Epstein agrees to provide an \naccounting of the gain time he earned during his period of \nincarceration. \n13. \nThe parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any \npublic record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information \nAct request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of \nthe agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making that \ndisclosure. \nEpstein understands that the United States Attorney has no authority to require the \nState Attorney's Office to abide by any terms of this agreement. Epstein understands that \nh is his obligation to undertake discussions with the State Attorney's Office and to use his \nbest efforts to ensure compliance with these procedures, which compliance will be necessary \nto satisfy the United States' interest. Epstein also understands that it is his obligation to use \nhis best efforts to convince the Judge of the 15th Judicial Circuit to accept Epstein's binding \nrecommendation regarding the sentence to be imposed, and understands that the failure to \ndo so will be a breach of the agreement. \nIn consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation \nin the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions \nof this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges \nagainst any potential co-conspirat\n... [truncated, 2971 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/60 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=60]", "char_count": 2971}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 15 \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is \nmaterial to this agreement and is supported by independent consideration and that a breach \nof any one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement \nand to investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other individual or entity for any and all \nfederal offenses. \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that he is aware of the fact that \nthe Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that in all criminal \nprosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Epstein further \nis aware that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court \nmay dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint for unnecessary delay in presenting \na charge to the Grand Jury, filing an information, or in bringing a defendant to vial. Epstein \nhereby requests that the United States Attorney for the SouthemDisnict of Florida defer such \nprosecution. Epstein agrees and consents that any delay from the date of this Agreement to \nthe date of initiation of prosecution, as provided for in the terms expressed herein, shall be \ndeemed to be a necessary delay at his own request, and he hereby waives any defense to such \nprosecution on the ground that such delay operated to deny him rights under Rule 48(b) of \nthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the \nUnited States to a speedy trial or to bar the prosecution by reason of the running of the statute \nof limitations for a period of months equal to the period between the signing of this \nagreement and the breach of this agreement as to those offenses that were the subject of the \ngrand jury's investigation. Epstein further asserts and certifies that he understands that the \nFifth Amendment and Rule 7(a) of the Fede\n... [truncated, 2514 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/61 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=61]", "char_count": 2514}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 15 \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and cextiftes that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby states that be understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBy: \nDated:  74/9\n—\nDated: \nDated: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nGERALD LISPCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \n••• \nPage 7 of 7 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000732 \nEFTA00230556\n", "char_count": 620}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "1\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 \nEntered on FLED Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 15 \nBy signing this agreement. Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \nBy: \nDated: \nDated:  712-410 \nDated: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY KM JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nPago 7 of 7 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000733 \nEFTA00230557\n", "char_count": 565}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "I \n::10ili..✓i..:. \nI \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of \n15 \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein batty states that he understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with than. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBY: \nDated: \nDated:  \nGatothq-AH-0—\nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANTUS. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nGERALD LEPCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nPage 7 of 7 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000734 \nEFTA00230558\n", "char_count": 634}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 11 of \n15 \n(N RE: \nINVESTIGATION OF \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nADDENDUM TO THE NON•PROSECVTION AGREEMENT \nI7 APPEARING that the parties seek to clarify certain provisions of page 4, paragraph 7 \nof the Non-Prosecution Agreement (hereinafter \"paragraph 7\"), that agreement is modified as \nIbliows: \n1A. \nThe United Stated has the right to assign to an Independent third-party the responsibility \nfor consuhing with and, subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel, selecting \nthe attorney representative for the individuals identified under the Agreanent If the \nUnited Suites elects to assign this responsibility to an independent third-parry, both the \nUnited States and Epstein retain the right to take good faith objections to the attorney \nrepresentative suggested by the independent third-party prior to the final designation of \nthe attorney representative. \n70. \nThe parties will jointly prepare a short written submission to the independent third-party \nregarding the role of the attorney representative and regarding Eparrin's Agreement to \npay such attorney representative his or her regular customary hourly rate for representing \nsuch victims subject to the provisions of paragraph C, infra. \n7C. \nPursuant to additional paragraph 7A, Epstein has agreed to pay the fees of the attorney \nrepresentative selected by the independent third party. This provision, however, shall not \nobligate Epstein to pay the-fees and costs of contested litigation filed against him. Thus, \nif after consideration of potential settlements, an attorney representative elects to file a \ncontested lawsuit pursuant to 1$ U.S.C. a 2255 or elects to pursue any other contested \nremedy, the paragraph 7 obligation of the Agreement to pay the costs of the attorney \nrepresentative, as opposed to any statutory a other obligations to pay reasonable \nattorneys fees and costs such as those contained in s 2255 to bear the costs of the a\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/65 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=65]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "- \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 12 of \n15 \nBy signing this Addenda Epstein asserts and Militia that the above has been read and \nexplained to him. Epstein hereby, states that he understands the clarifications to the Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nIL ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \nDated: ih\nrlq -\nDated: \nDetect \nBy: \nA. MARIE VILLAPA$LA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \nEFTA00230560\n", "char_count": 598}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 13 of \n15 \nBy signing this Addendum, Epstein assats and certifies that the above has been rad and \nexplained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the NMI-\nProsecution Alyeement and agrees to comply with them. \nIt. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \nBy: \nDated: \nDated: #0 \nDated: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nIEFFREY EPSTEIN \nRALD LEFCOtiRT1 ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO NSF \nY rpsnan \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \n. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000737 \nEFTA00230561\n", "char_count": 614}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "i \n-\n-\n-\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 14 of \n15 \nBy signing this Addendum, EpAzin assets and certISes that the above has been read and \nexplained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the elarifi-nationi to the Nom \nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with than. \nDated: \nBY: \nDated: \nDated: \nDated: ifrjfa \nFt. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUN: TED STATES ATTORNEY \nA. MARIE VILLAFJA \nASSISTANT' U.S. A ITORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nGERALD LEECOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL 713 JEFFREY EPSTELN \nLILLY \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000738 \nEFTA00230562\n", "char_count": 613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "• • ..... \n. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 15 of \n15 \nDoc-OT-or \n04:61n \nF rorf orI or \nto Isroott \nAttinoutoo \n30071t9t01 \n?Olt P. 013/614 \nF-171 \nLfetthly S. Epstein do Juni* ro-ofranz the Moo Prossoc.dan Astra:led and AM' S= to \nmot dozed October 30, 2007. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000739 \nEFTA00230563\n", "char_count": 348}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 70, "text_content": ";•••••FitAti, \n• OMI \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-6 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 3 \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 08-80736-Ov-Marrii/Johnson \nEXHIBIT F \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000740 \nEFTA00230564\n", "char_count": 343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "fr7ctiiat \nT. \n. \n07/09/2008 15:14 FAX 5018059846 \nUSA° 11PB C0TIFn \n%021 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Wument 48-6 Entered on FLSD Dile3/3C2,1/N11 Rasa?, of 3 \nU.S. Departntant 01Justice \nFederal Bureau of Investigation \nFBI - West Palm \nBeath \nSuite sod \n505 South Flagler Drive \nWest Palm Beach. FL 33401 \nPhone: (581) 633-7517 \nFar (551)833-797D \nJanuary 10, 2008 \nRe: Case Number.-\nDeer C\nThis ease Is currently under Invosegation. This can be a lengthy process end we request your \ncontinued patience while we conduct a thorough Investigation. \nAs a crime victim. you have the folowtng rights under 18 United Stew Code 4 3771: (1) The right to \nbe reasonably protected from the accused: (2) The right to reasonable. accurate, and thytely notice of any \npubic court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, Involving the crime or of any rttioaca or /scope of the \naccused; (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court procastOng, unless the court, after \nreceiving deer and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by de vicam would be matertally mired it \nthe victim heard caw tesdmony al that proceeding; (4) The right to be reasonably Heard at any public \nproceeding M the district cost Involving release, plea. sentencing, or any parole crowding; (5) The \nreasonable dget to corder vdth the attorney (or the Government In the rase; (6) The right to full and timely \nrestitution as provided In law; (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; (0) The right to be \nCoated with fairness end with raged for the victim's Monty and privacy. \nWe cell make ow best efforts to ensure you are accorded the rights easorfbed Most of those rights \nporain to events occurring after Za arrest or tract:nen% of an refnrIdual for the alma, and k wilt become the \nresponsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney's Utica to ensure you are ecwded those right'. You \nmay also seek the advice of a private attorney with respect to these dohs. \nThe Victim Notitcation System (VN\n... [truncated, 3038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/71 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=71]", "char_count": 3038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "... \nWo3.51%.7:7n,,\n07/09/2006 16:14 FAX 5818059846 \nOSAO WPB COWRY \nII 027 \nCase 9;08-cv-80736-KAM tument 48-6 Entered on FLSD DapeU33/2,1J2.011 Page..3.O 3 \nIS yoa have additional questions which InvoNe this matter, please contact the office fisted above. When \nyou caa, 011141613 provkie the file number located et the top or lilts letter. Plena rernambor, your participation \nin the notification part of this program is voluntary. In order to continue to receive notification. it is your \nresponsibility to keep your cornett irforrnetor. current \nSi ncerely. \nIAA. \nSt, \n,T,A3 \nTweet Smith \n%/clan Speoalist \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000742 \nEFTA00230566\n", "char_count": 653}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "---- \n.1 \nen \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-7 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 3 \nJANE DOE *I AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEAPING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 08.80736-CivMarra/Jobown \nEXHIBIT G \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000743 \nEFTA00230567\n", "char_count": 333}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "07/09/2008 15:15 PAI 8818059810 \nMAO !PB COMB \na 028 \nGase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM \nument 48-7 Entered on FLSD Dilet9,324Ag.j1 Ppapgpf 3 \n• \nUS. Department of Justice \nFederal. Bureau of Investigeffon \nFBI - West Palm Beach \nState 500 \n505 South Flintier Drive \nWest Par Beach. FL. 33901 \nPhone' (501) 833-7517 \nFax: (581) 833•7970 \n.lanualy 10, 2008 \nJames Eisenberg \nOns Cieaaake Carter Ste 7C4 Australian South \nWest Pam Beach FL 32901 \nRe aleallillr \nDear James Eisenberg. \nYou have requested to MONS notification* for an \nThis case is currendy under Investigation. This can be 8 lengthy process and we request your \ncontinued patience whit we conduct a thorough Investigation. \nAs a crime victim, you have the following rights wider 18 United States Codo § 3771: (1) The right to \nbe reasonably protected from the eozuSed: (2) The right to reasonable, accurate. and trimly notice of any \npublic coint'proceartIng, or any parole proceeding, learnt' the crime or of arty rid.ease or escape of the \n• \naccused: (3) The ngta not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding. union the coml. after - \nreceiving c*ear and cornincmg evidence. determines that beetlmony by the Van) would be materially altered If \nthe VIZOM heard other testimony et that proceeding: (4) The right to be ressonatoty heard at any public \nproceeding In the district cowl Irrirohring resew, plea, sentendng. Of any parole proceeding; (5) The \nreasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case; (6) The right to full and timely \nrestitution as provided in low; (7) The right to proceedings free horn unreasonable delay: (8) The right to be \ntreated with farness and with respect tor the victim's digntty and prvacy. \nWe Mt make our best diode to ensure you are accorded the rigida described. Most of these rights \npertain to events occurring after the weal or Indictment of an individual far the crime, and it will become the \niszponstbillty of the proseculug Lathed States Attorney's Office to en\n... [truncated, 3203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/74 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=74]", "char_count": 3203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "07/09/2006 15:15 FAX 8618059846 \nLIMO IFB COMM \n%029 \ncase 9;08-cy: 80736-KAM _Moment 48-7 Entered on FLSD Dillet9,3/21/2011 Pale of 3 \nr. \nrat \nIf you have additional questions width Involve INs matter, *rise canted the office Rated above. When \nyou ca a. please provide the fto number bated at the top of this letter. Please remember, your parbdpaSon \nin the notification part of ells program iS voluntary. In Greer to continue to receive notthcatims. it is your \niesponsiblfity la keep your contact Inirmetion current. \nSricerely. \nj\n); Lt. -&. :t \nT4nior Smith \nVictim Speciaket \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000745 \nEFTA00230569\n", "char_count": 624}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-8 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 3 \nJANE DOE ID AND JANE DOE NI'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCAM VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 08-80736•Cir•Marrallohown \nEXHIBIT H \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000746 \nEFTA00230570\n", "char_count": 318}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "I \nOVim..n \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-8 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 3 \n4 FD-302 (Rao. 104-951 \n-1-\nFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION \nDa at trescni400 \n02/08/2008\nOn Thursday, January 31, 2008, CS \nW..met with \nAssistant United States Attorney MARIE VILLAFANA, UNITED STATES \nATTORNEY'S OFFICE (USAO) and Attorney MYESHA K. BRADEN, UNITED \nSTATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE(DOJ), CRIMINAL DIVISION. Also present \nat the meeting were Special Agents E. NESBITT KUYRKENDALL and JASON \nR. RICHARDS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. The meeting was \narranged pursuant to a federal investigation regarding the sexual \nexploitation of minors. During the course of the meeting, \nprovided the following additional or clarifying information not \npreviously documented in earlier FD-302s: \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN and his assistants, SARAH and \n-(identified \nas SARAH KELLEN and allaa) \nwould \ncontact WINIkto set up a pointments for EPSTEIN's massages. \nAccording to way, \nwould call and say that EPSTEIN was on \na flight and inquire about scheduling work for Millise \nLife was not going well for Wile during the time she was \nproviding EPSTEIN with massages. Wawa° buying and taking drugs, \ni.e. Xanax, Lorcets, and Percosets. Wee said that she stayed on \npills. Weill'explained that she wanted to feel numb. Wiestopped \nattending school at age fifteen. Her parents were addicted to \ncrack and cocaine. Prior to her parent's drug use, MIRwas in the \nband, a cheerleader, and a straight \"A\" student. We played the \ntrumpet for the school band. When her parent's drug habits got \nbad, things went downhill, they lost everything. \nwins became a dancer the day before her sixteenth \nbirthday at\n \nshe worked there for six months, \nup suntil the employer found out she was underage. Later, a \nworked for \nwhich she did for 6 months. We stopped \nseeing EPSTEIN during that time. \nwillOstated that she brought up to twenty, twenty-five, \nor thirty different girls. t \nsaid all of the girls but maybe \nten o\n... [truncated, 2667 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/77 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=77]", "char_count": 2667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-8 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 0 3/21/2011 Page 3 of 3\nF>30.2. (Rn 1O4-9S) \n31E-MM-100062 \nCootinuatioo o(PD-3O2 of \n.0. :11/24 1/2006  .hgc  2\nS \nsaid that during the massages EPSTEIN4 would push \nfurther and further regarding the sexual activity. \nAccording to \nWAIF EPSTEIN never asked, \"is this okay,\" he would just see how \nfar one would let him go. \nWIIP \nof pictures of \nneurologist. \nWilli also stated that KELLEN ,has twin, boys .\nrecalled seeing sculptures of \nkids in the library. \nnaked Women and lots \nstated that everybody thought Epsteirt \nSI \nwas a \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000748' \nEFTA00230572\n", "char_count": 637}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48-9 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 3 \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A REARING ON APPROPRIATE \nREMEDIES \nCASE NO: 08-80736-Civ-Ma r r a /J0 h ii son \nEXHIBIT I \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000749 \nEFTA00230573\n", "char_count": 329}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "07/09/2008 15:15 FAX 5818059848 \nUSAO WPB CORFU \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Sument 48-9 Entered on FLSD Dirt 03/21/ \na=••.••\n••• \n30, 2003 \nRe: ISIS \nDaer  .\nU.S. Department of Justice \nFederal Bureau of invesegatior. \nFBI - Wet Palm Beach \nSuite 500 \n505 South Flimsier Drive \nWeal Peen Beech, Fl. 33401 \nPhone: (661) 833-7517 \nFax: (561)033-7970 \nYour name was referred to the FBI's Warn Aseletarce Progrern as being a possible victim of a federal \ncrime. We appreciate your assietance and cooperation white we are InvernigaIng ties case. We would like to \nmake you aware of the victim servICes that may be evailabo to you and to answer any questions you may have \nregarding the criminal justice process throughout the kivestmetion. Our program is part of the FBI's Stott to \nensure the victims are treated with respect and are provided information about their rights under federal law. \nThese rights include notification of the status of the use. The enacted brochures provide Information about \nthe FBI's Victim Assistance Program, resources and instructions for accessing the Victim Notification System \n(VNS). VNS is designed to provide you with information regardem the status of your case. \nTh4 case is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request you-\ncontinued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation. \nAs a crime victim, you have the following rights under 18 Urited States Code § 3771: (1) The rght to\nbe reasonably protected from the accused: (2) The right to reasonable. accurate. end timely notice of any \npublic court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the \n=used; (3) The right net to be excluded from any such public creel proceeding, unless the court, after \nreceMng clear and convincing evidence, determine; that testimony by the victim would be materialty sewed If \nthe victim heard Other testimony at that proceeding; (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public \nproceeding In th\n... [truncated, 3877 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/80 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=80]", "char_count": 3877}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "07/09/2008 15:13 FAI 5618059846 \nUS60 Will CONFICif \n0031 \nCkse,:08-qv-110736-KAM Viument 48-9 Entered on FLSD Dee.1.0,3/41/?,911 PpatELlpf \nIf you have additional questions which SivoNe this matter, please contact the Ace feted above. When \nyou cab. please provide ine Ole number located al the top of this latter. Please remember, your participation \nin the notate/bon pan of this program is vriuntary. in order lo continuo to receive notifications. it is your \nresponsibility to keep your contact informabon current \nSincerely, \ncz6.4\n1 )i LC+. \no \n;TA) \nTwiler Smith \nVictim Species'! \n• \n70764. P-87 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000751 \nEFTA00230575\n", "char_count": 646}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 Entered on ['LSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 1 of 4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 013-80736-Civ-Marrellohnson \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2, \nPlaintiffs, \nI.\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nDefendant. \nMOTION TO INTERVENE \nOR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A SUA SPONTE RULE I I ORDER \nComes now, Movant Bruce E. Reinhart, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n24(b), and seeks leave to intervene as a party-in-interest in this matter. Movant seeks to \nintervene to file a Motion for Sanctions based on unfounded factual and legal accusations made \nabout Movant in Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act \n(the \"Motion\") [DE 48].1 In the context of a motion alleging that the U.S. Department of Justice \nviolated Plaintiff's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act, Plaintiffs make irrelevant and \ngratuitous accusations that Movant violated unspecified Florida Bar rules and Department of \nJustice regulations. Movant should be granted leave to intervene to rebut these false allegations, \nand to seek sanctions. Alternatively, the Court on its own initiative should require Plaintiffs and \ntheir counsel to show their compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. \nWithout any attempt to tie the allegations to the asserted violation of the CVRA, \nParagraphs 52 and 53 of the Motion falsely allege that Movant, a non-party to this matter, \nt Movant was not served with a copy of the pleading. Movant first saw the pleading on \nApril 20, 2011. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000752 \nEFTA00230576\n", "char_count": 1595}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "- ------- \n- 77777%. \nCase 9:08•cv-80736-KAM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 2 of 4 \nviolated Florida Bar rules and Department of Justice regulations by representing employees of \nJeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") in civil litigation after the undersigned retired from the United States \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (the \"Office\"). They also falsely allege \nthat Moven; while still employed by the Office engaged in improper conduct relating to Epstein. \nThe Motion does not make any effort to connect these allegations to the relief it seeks. It does \nnot explain how the accusations against Movant are relevant to its claims under the CVRA, nor \ndoes it explain how Movant's alleged conduct can be imputed to any party in the action. \nBecause there is no proper purpose for these allegations, they are made in bad faith, \nunreasonably, vexatiously, and for the improper purpose of harassing Movant. \nPlaintiff has injected into this action questions of law and fact relating to Movant's \nalleged conduct. Movant now seeks to assert a claim under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. \n§1927 arising from the same questions of law and fact that Plaintiff raised. Movant's claim \nshares with the main action common questions of law and fact. See New York News, Inc.'. \nNewspaper and Mail Deliverer's Union, 139 F.R.D. 291, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1991Xfor purposes of \nRule 24(b), claim that falsities in pleading impugned movant's reputation created a question of \nfact in common with underlying cause of action). Therefore, the Court has discretion to permit \nintervention. CI Id (permissive intervention denied because it would unduly delay and \nprejudice imminent settlement of the original claims), aff'd sub nom New York News \nKheel, \n972 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, the proposed intervention does not create a risk of \nundue delay or prejudice to the adjudication of the underlying claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. \n24(b)(3). Movant should be permitted to interve\n... [truncated, 2355 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/83 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=83]", "char_count": 2355}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 3 of 4 \nirrelevant to the Government's alleged violation of the CVRA. As such, Movant's interest is not \nadequately protected by the existing parties. \nAlternatively, Movant asks the Court sua sponse to issue an Order to Show Cause under \nRule 11(c)(3)(\"On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause \nwhy conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b)\"). This Court should \nnot countenance a party making irrelevant, slanderous accusations against a non-party. On the \nface of Plaintiffs' Motion, it is clear that the allegations in Paragraphs 52 and 53 are irrelevant to \nwhether the CVRA was violated, and therefore are not being presented for a proper purpose. \nThe Court should require Plaintiffs and their counsel to show what legal and factual inquiry they \nundertook to comply with Rule 11(b) before making the allegations in Paragraphs 52 and 53, and \nto articulate the proper purpose for which these allegations were included in their Motion. \nAs required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c), attached to this motion is a proposed Motion for \nSanctions. If leave to intervene is granted, the Motion for Sanctions which will be served on \nPlaintiffs' counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, but not filed for 21 days thereafter. See Fed. R. Civ. \nP. 11(cX2). \nPursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), undersigned counsel contacted counsel for Plaintiffs \nand counsel for the United States. Assistant United States Attorney Dexter Lee reported that the \nUnited States does not oppose the Motion to Intervene. Bradley Edwards, Esq., counsel for \nPlaintiffs reported that they oppose the Motion to Intervene. \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ Bruce E. Reinhart \nBRUCE E. REINHART,P.A. \nFlorida Bar # 10762 \n250 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \n(561) 202-6360 fax (561) 202-6976 \nBreinhart@BruceReinhartLaw.com \n3 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000754 \nEFTA00230578\n", "char_count": 1994}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 4 of 4 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that a true and correct copy of die foregoing Motion to Intervene or in the \nAlternative for a Sua Sponte Rule 11 Order was served on all counsel of record by CM/ECF on \nMay 3, 2011. \n/s/Bruce Reinhart \nBRUCE REINHART \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000755 \nEFTA00230579\n", "char_count": 386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "Case 9:08-ov-807313-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 1 of 31 \nATTACHMENT TO MOTION \nTO INTERVENE OR IN THE \nALTERNATIVE FOR A SUA \nSPONTE RULE 11 ORDER \n08-80736CV-14.11A \n000756 \nEFTA00230580\n", "char_count": 217}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "4 :F6nore• • • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 2 of 31 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2, \nPlaintiffs, \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nDefendant. \nBRUCE E. REINHART, \nIntervenor \nINTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS \nComes now, Bruce E. Reinhart, intervenor and party in interest (hereinafter \n\"Movant\"), and moves this Honorable Court to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of \nCivil Procedure 11(b) and 28 U.S.C. 1927 based on intentional or reckless false, bad \nfaith, vexatious factual and legal assertions made about Movart in Paragraphs 52 and 53 \nof Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (the \n\"Motion\") [DE 481. \nBACKGROUND \n• \nThe instant cause of action involves claims by Plaintiffk that Defendant violated \nthe Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. §3771, in its handling of a criminal \ninvestigation of Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") and others. The investigation ultimately \nresulted in a non-prosecution agreement between the United States and Epstein. On \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000757 \nEFTA00230581\n", "char_count": 1185}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 3 of 31 \nMarch 21, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Motion.' Numbered paragraphs 1-50 of the Motion \nare a chronological review of the background of the Epstein investigation, including the \ninteractions among the victims' counsel, counsel for Epstein, the Government and the \nFBI. Paragraph 51 asserts that at all relevant times it was feasible for the Government to \nprovide certain notifications to Plaintiffs. \nWithout attempting to make any connection to the asserted violation of the \nCVRA, Paragraphs 52 and 53 falsely allege that Movant violated Florida Bar rules and \nDepartment of Justice regulations by representing Epstein's employees in civil litigation \nafter Movant retired from the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of \nFlorida (\"Office\"). They also falsely allege that Movant, while still employed by the \nOffice engaged in improper conduct relating to Epstein. These allegations are made in \nbad faith, unreasonably, without reasonable inquiry into the law and facts, vexatiously, \nand for the improper purpose of gratuitously harassing Movant \nLEGAL STANDARDS \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 \nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure II states that a lawyer signing any pleading in \nfederal court is certifying that: \nMt° the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed \nafter an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: \n(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, \ncause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cos: of litigation; \n(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by \nexisting law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or \nreversing existing law or for establishing new law; \nMovant was not served with a copy of the pleading. Movant first saw the \npleading on April 20, 2011. \n2 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000758 \nEFTA00230582\n", "char_count": 1950}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "• \n47.•••••2:.• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-RAM Document 79-1 Entered on P150 Docket 05/03/2011 Page 4 of 31 \n(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so \nidentified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable \nopportunity for further investigation or discovery. \nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11 uses an objective standard. Kaplan'. Daimleravysler, \nA.G., 331 F.3d I251, 1255 (11th ar. 2003). The analysis is whether \"a reasonable \nattorney in like circumstances could believe that his actions were factually and legally \njustified.\" Id (citing Riccard \nPrudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1294 (I1th Cir. \n2002)). Violations of Rule 11 are punishable by monetary and non-monetary sanctions \nagainst both the lawyer filing the pleading and the lawyer's client. Fed: R. Civ. P. 11(c). \n28 U.S.C. 61927 \nTitle 28, United States Cod; Section 1927 states: \nAny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the \nUnited States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings \nin any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to \nsatisfy personally the excess costs, expense, and attorneys' fees reasonably \nincurred because of such conduct. \nTo impose sanctions under § 1927, the Court must find that the attorney's conduct is \n' \"'tantamount to bad faith.'\" Amlong & Amiong, 500 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2007) \n(quoting Avfrgan I. Hull, 932 F2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991)). \"[Tjhe attorney must \nknowingly or recklessly pursue a frivolous claim.\" Id at 1242. The finding of bad faith \ndoes not turn on \"the attorney's subjective intent, but on the attorney's objective \nconduct.\" Id. at 1239. The standard is \"whether, regardless of the attorney's subjective \nintentions, the conduct was unreasonable and vexatious when measured against an \nobjective standard.\" Hudson' Int 1 Comp. Negotiations, Inc., 499 F.3d 1252, 1262 (111h \nCir. 2007). \n3 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000759 \nEFTA00230583\n", "char_count": 1973}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "• • • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79.1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 5 of 31 \nDISCUSSION \nParagraphs 52 and 53 contain inflammatory claims that are false, misleading, and \nirrelevant to the relief sought in the Motion. See generally Declaration of Bruce E. \nReinhart (attached as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference). They ultimately allege, \n\"[Movant's) representations [of Epstein's employees) are in contravention of Justice \nDepartment regulations and Florida bar rules. Such representations also give, at least, the \nimproper appearance that Reinhart may have attempted to curry [sic] with Epstein and \nthen reap his reward through favorable representation.\" Plaintiff's Motion at 153. They \ndo not cite to any particular bar rule or regulation that they believe was violated. They do \nnot explain how the alleged conduct contributed to the Department of Justice's alleged \nviolation of the CVRA. Nor do they explain how the alleged conduct is imputable to the \nDepartment of Justice. These otherwise slanderous accusations against a non-party are \nfalse. They were made in bad faith, without a factual inquiry reasonable under the \ncircumstances, or elementary research into the legal basis for the allegations. \nParagraphs 52 and 53 omit the following true facts, which Plaintiffs should have \ninvestigated before making their allegations: (1) Movant did not participate in any way in \nthe Office's investigation of Epstein, (2) after leaving government employment, Movant \ndid not represent Epstein before the Department of Justice, nor did Movant communicate \nwith the Department of Justice about Epstein, and (3) Movant did not use confidential \ninformation obtained during his Government employment to the detriment of the United \nStates. See Declaration of Bruce E. Reinhart at 1111-12, 17. \nRather than conducting the required inquiry, Plaintiffs simply make two \nirresponsible and unsupported leaps. First, they incorrectly conclude that merely because \n4 \n08-80736-CV\n... [truncated, 2029 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/90 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=90]", "char_count": 2029}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 6 of 31 \nMovant worked in the Office at the time of the Epstein case, Movant must have been \ninvolved in the internal decisionmaking at the Office about Epstein. \nSecond, they \nincorrectly conclude that because Nlovant later represented Epstein's employees in \nprivate civil litigation, Movant must have used confidential Government information \nimproperly in his representation of Epstein's employees, and for his own financial gain. \nIt is apparent that Plaintiffs conducted no factual inquiry to substantiate their \naccusations before making them. They never contacted Movant. On information and \nbelief, they did not speak to any current or former personnel from the Office or the FBI \nwho were familiar with the structure of the West Palm Beach Office or with Movant's \nrole (or lack thereof) in the Epstein investigation. Had they done so, they would have \nlearned that there were approximately 20 Assistant United States Attorneys in the West \nPalm Beach Office during the relevant time period. See Declaration of Bruce E. Reinhart \nat ¶10. They would have learned that Movant was not assigned to the same section as the \nprosecutor handling the Epstein matter. Id. They would have learned that Movant had a \ndifferent chain of supervision from the prosecutor assigned to the Epstein matter. Id. \nThey would have learned that Movant had no involvement in the Epstein investigation. \nSee Declaration of Bruce E. Reinhart at 1111-12. \nFurther, Plaintiffs did not conduct an adequate inquiry into the applicable \nDepartment of Justice regulations. \nAs discussed below, to violate the relevant \nregulations, a former employee must appear before, or communicate with, the \nDepartment of Justice, about a particular matter in which the former employee \nparticipated personally and substantially while employed at the Department of Justice. \nSee 5 C.F.R. §2641.201(a). The Motion contains approximately 50 paragraphs of a \n5\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/91 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=91]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "---\n..... \n7 . 1\"\n. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 7 of 31 \ndetailed historical litany of the interactions among the parties to the Epstein matter. The \nMotion does not allege that Movant participated at all, let alone personally and \nsubstantially, as a government employee in the Epstein investigation. The Motion does \nnot allege that that Movant subsequently appeared before, or communicated with, the \nDepartment of Justice about Epstein. To the contrary, the Motion alleges only that, after \nleaving the Office, Movant represented Epstein's employees in litigation with non-\nGovernmental third parties. Had Plaintiffs conducted rudimentary research into the \napplicable regulations, they would have known that any allegation that Movant violated \nthese regulations was frivolous. \nMovam Did Not Violate Any Florida Bar Ride \nRelevant Florida Bar Rulea \nThe potentially applicable Florida Bar rules are Rule 4-1.6(a) (Confidentiality of \nInformation), Rule 4-1.9 (Conflict of Interest; Former Clients), and Rule 4-1.11 (Special \nConflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees). For \npurposes of these rules, the U.S. Department of Justice was Movant's client during his \nemployment in the Office. Movant did not violate any of the bar rules. \nRule 4-1.6(a) states: \nA lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client \nexcept as stated in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client gives \ninformed consent. \nRule 4-1.6 was not violated because Movant did not know any confidential \ninformation about the Epstein matter, so none could be revealed. \nRule 4.1.9 states: \nA lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not \nthereafter \n6 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000762 \nEFTA00230586\n", "char_count": 1808}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 8 of 31 \n(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter \nin which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests, \nof the former client unless the former client gives informed consent; or \n(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of \nthe former client except as these rules would permit or require with \nrespect to a client or when the information has become generally \nknown; or, \n(c) reveal information relating to the representation except as these rules \nwould permit or require with respect to a client. \nRule 4-1.9 was not violated because Movant never represented the United States in the \nEpstein matter. \nRule 4-1.11 states in pertinent parts: \n(a) A lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of \nthe government: \n(I) is subject to rule 4-1.9(b); and \n(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a \nmatter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a \npublic officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency \ngives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. \n(c) A lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential \ngovernment information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a \npublic officer or employee may not represent a private client whose \ninterests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information \ncould be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this \nrule, the term \"confidential government information\" means information \nthat has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the \ntime this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from \ndisclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is \nnot otherwise available to the public. \n(d) A lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee: \n(1) is subject to rules 4\n... [truncated, 2064 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/93 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=93]", "char_count": 2064}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 9 of'31 \n(2) shall not: \n(A) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated \npersonally and substantially while in private practice or \nnongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government \nagency gives its informed consent; or \n(B) negotiate for private employment with any person who \nis involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in which \nthe lawyer is participating personally and substantially. \nRule 4-1.11(a) was not violated because Movant did not participate personally and \nsubstantially in the Epstein matter. Rule 4-1.11(c) was not violated because Movant did \nnot have any confidential Government information within the meaning of the rule, so he \ndid he use any confidential Government information about a third party to the detriment \nof that third party. Rule 4-1.11(d) was not violated because Movant did not participate \npersonally and substantially in the Epstein matter. \nMovant Did Not Violate Department of Justice Regulations \nDepartment of Justice Regulations \nThe Department of Justice regulation containing post-employment restrictions, 5 \nC.F.R. §2641.201, states in most pertinent part: \n(a) Basic prohibition of 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). No former employee shall \nknowingly, with the intent to influence, make any communication to or \nappearance before an employee of the United States on behalf of any other \nperson in connection with a particular matter involving a specific party or \nparties, in which he participated personally and substantially as an employee, \nand in which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial \ninterest. \n(i) Participate: To \"participate\" means to take an action as an employee through \ndecision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, \ninvestigation, or other such action, or to purposefully forbear in order to affect \nthe outcome of a matter ... An employee does not participate in a matt\n... [truncated, 2047 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/94 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=94]", "char_count": 2047}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "/Mr \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 10 of \n31 \nmerely because he had knowledge of its existence or because it was pending \nunder his official responsibility.\nMovant did not violate 5 C.F.R. §2641.201 because he did not participate personally and \nsubstantially in the Epstein matter as a Government employee. He did not appear before \nthe United States on behalf of Epstein after leaving Government employment. He did \nnot communicate with the United States on behalf of Epstein after leaving Government \nemployment. \nHe represented Epstein's employees in civil cases in which the \nGovernment was not a party. \nIt is clear from the face of the regulations that Movant's representing Epstein's \nemployees in civil matters not involving the Government did not violate §2641(a). In \nfact, had Plaintiffs and their counsel properly investigated the facts and law, they would \nhave seen that §2641(a) would have permitted Movant to represent Epstein, himself, \nopenly against the Department of Justice. Movant did not. The allegation that Movant \nviolated Department of Justice mule/ions is frivolous. \n2 A comp:ete copy of this regulation is attached to this Motion as Exhibit 2. \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000765 \nEFTA00230589\n", "char_count": 1265}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80 736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 11 of \n31 \nCONCLUSION \nThe allegations in Paragraph 52 and 53 of the Motion are false, made in bad faith, \nand made without sufficient inquiry into the law and facts. They are irrelevant to whether \nthe United States Attorney complied with the CVRA. Notably, the Motion does not \nattempt to tie the allegations against Movant to the alleged violation of the CVRA. The \nallegations arc included gratuitously in the Motion solely to harass Movant in a forum \nwhere the accusations are not legally slanderous. The allegations are made without \nreasonable pre-filing inquiry into the facts or law. This Court should issue an Order to \nShow Cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule II or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ Bruce E. Reinbari \nBRUCE E. REINHART,P.A. \nFlorida Bar,/ 10762 \n250 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \n(561) 202-6360 fax (561) 202-6976 \nBreinhart®BruceReinhartLaw.com \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Intervenor's Motion \nFor Sanctions was served on all counsel of record by CIV1/ECF on \n2011. \n/s/Bruce\nBRUCE REINHART \n10 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000766 \nEFTA00230590\n", "char_count": 1271}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 12 of \n31 \nEXHIBIT 1 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000767 \nEFTA00230591\n", "char_count": 138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 13 of \n31 \nDECLARATION OF BRUCE E. RE1NFIART \nI, Bruce E. Reinhart, make the following declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746. \nI. \nI am a licensed attorney in solo practice as Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A. My office \nis located at 250 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 1400, West Palm Beach, Florida, \n33401. \n2. \nI am a member in good standing of the bars of the states of Florida, \nPennsylvania, and New Jersey. I am also admitted to the practice in the \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the U.S. \nCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court, and \nseveral other federal courts. \n3. \nI graduated from Princeton University in 1984 with a B.S.E. in civil \nengineering can laude. I graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law \nSchool in 1987, can laude. I also served as an Editor of the University of \nPennsylvania Law School. \n4. \nAfter graduating from law school, I served as judicial law clerk to the \nHonorable Norma L. Shapiro, Unitqd States District Judge for the Eastern \nDistrict of Pennsylvania. \n5. \nIn 1988, I began working at the Criminal Division of the United States \nDepartment of Justice in Washington, D.C., through the Attorney General's \nHonors Program. From 1988-1994, I worked in the Public Integrity Section \nof the Criminal Division. While working there, I received two Special \nAchievement Awards for Meritorious Acts and Service from the \nDepartment of Justice. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000768 \nEFTA00230592\n", "char_count": 1558}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 14 of \n31 \nPage 2 of 4 \n6. \nWhile at the Public Integrity Section, I was involved in investigating and \nprosecuting people who violated federal conflict of interest and post-\nemployment statutes. I attended multiple training conferences where federal \nconflicts of interest laws and regulations were diccAssed. \n7. \nFrom in or about July 1994 to on or about May 1, 1996, I served as Senior \nPolicy Advisor to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement at the \nUnited States Department of the Treasury. \nIn that position, I helped the \nUndersecretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Secretary of the Treasury to \ndevelop law enforcement policies for U.S. Customs, ATF, Secret Service, and \nIRS Criminal Investigations. I also acted as principal staff liaison to the \nDeputy Attorney General, the FBI and the other Department of Justice law \nenforcement agencies. For my service, I was awarded the Undersecretary for \nEnforcement's Award for Exceptional Service. \n8. \nI am the former Vice Chair of the Palm Beach County Bar's Professionalism \nCommittee. I am the former President of the Palm Beach County Chapter of \nthe Federal Bar Association. I currently serve as an Ethics Commissioner on \nthe Palm Beach County Commission on Ethics. \n9. \nFrom May 1, 1996 to January 1, 2008, I served as an Assistant United States \nAttorney in the Southern District of Florida, assigned to the West Palm Beach \noffice. From in or about July 1998 to in or about October 2002, I was a \nSupervisory Assistant United States Attorney. From October 2002 to January \n2008, I was a non-supervisory Assistant United States Attorney handling my \nown docket of cases. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000769 \nEFTA00230593\n", "char_count": 1768}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "______ .\n. \n. \n--.4\"in it___ -- ---------\nCase 9:0S-cv-807313-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 15 of \n31 \nPage 3 of 4 \n10. \nAt all relevant times, the Office had approximately 20 Assistant U.S. \nAttorneys assigned to the West Palm Beach location. The prosecutor assigned \nto the Epstein case, Ann Marie Villafana, end I were assigned to different \nsections within the Office. We reported to different supervisors. \n11. \nI did not participate in any way in the Office's investigation of Epstein. I was \nnot involved in any of the Office's decisionmalcing with regard to the Epstein \nmatter. \n12. \nI never teamed any confidential, non-public information about the Epstein \nmatter. \n13. \nIn late December 2007, I had an \"exit meeting\" with Dexter Lee, the Office's \nethics officer. As part of that meeting, Mr. Lee reviewed with me the \nDepartment of Justice's post-employment restrictions. \nBased on our \nconversation, it was my understanding that I could work on any matter so long \nas I had not participated in it personally and substantially as a government \nemployee. I also understood that I could not use non-public Government \ninformation for any purpose. \n14. \nAfter opening my private practice on January 2, 2008, I was retained to \nrepresent Sarah Kellen for purposes of civil depositions in causes of action to \nwhich the United States was not a party. At a later time, I was retained to \nrepresent several other members of Mr. Epstein's staff in their civil \ndepositions. \nI5.. \nAfter leaving the Office, I did not participate in any of the negotiations over \nMr. Epstein's non-prosecution agreement \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000770 \nEFTA00230594\n", "char_count": 1676}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 16 of \n31 \nPage 4 of 4 \n16. \nAfter leaving the Office, I did not communicate with the Office, in person or \nin writing, about any matters relating to possible criminal charges against Mr. \nEpstein. \n17. \nBecause I did not have any, I did not share non-public confidential \ninformation about the Epstein investigation with any of Epstein's attorneys. \n18. \nPrior to the filing of Plaintiffs Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime \nVictims' Rights Act, neither Mr. Edwards, nor Judge Cassell, nor anyone on \ntheir behalf contacted me to determine if the allegations in Paragraphs 52 and \n53 of that Motion were true. \nI declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. \nExecuted on May 3, 2011. \nBrace E. Reinhart \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000771 \nEFTA00230595\n", "char_count": 860}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "f\",00,9,1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011' Page 17 of \n31 \nEXHIBIT 2 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000772 \nEFTA00230596\n", "char_count": 150}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on Ft.SD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 18 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Parrnanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.Ft. § 2641.201 \nCode of Federal Regulations \nTitle 5. Administrative Personnel \nChapter XVI. Office of Government Ethics \nSubchapter B. Government Ethics \nPart 2641. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions (Refs & Annos) \nSubpart B. Prohibitions \n5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's representations to United States \nconcerning particular matter in which the employee participated personally and substantially. \nEffective July 25, 2008 \nCurrentness \n• \n(a) Basic prohibition of 18 U.S.0 207(a)(1). No former employee shall knowingly, with the intent to influence, make any \ncommunication to or appearance before an employee of the United States on behalf of any other person in connection with a \nparticular matter involving a specific party or parties, in which he participated personally and substantially as an employee, and \nin which the United States is a patty or has a direct and substantial interest \n(b) Exceptions and waivers. The prohibition of 18 U.S.C. 207(aX1) does not apply to a former employee who is: \n(1) Acting on behalf of the United Staves. See § 2641.301(a). \n(2) Acting ac an elected State or local government official. See § 2641.301(b). \n(3) Communicating scientific or technological information pursuant to procedures or certification. See § 2641.301(e). \n(4) Testifying under oath. See § 2641.3010). (Note that this exception from § 2641.201 is generally not available for expert \ntestimony. See § 2641.301(1)(2).) \n(5) Acting on behalf of an international organization pursuant to a waiver. See § 2641.301(h). \n(6) Acting as an employee of a Government-owned, contractor-operated entity pursuant to a waiver. See § 2641.301(1). \n(c)Conlitiencernert and length of restricfion. 18 \n207(aX I) is a pennenent restriction that commences upon an employee's \nterminati\n... [truncated, 3241 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/103 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=103]", "char_count": 3241}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 19 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former empioyee's_., a C.F.R. g 2641.201 \n(3) Behind-the-scenes assistance. Nothing in this section prohibit a former employee from providing assistance to another \nperson, provided that the assistance does not involve a communication to or an appearance before an employee of the \nUnited States. \nExample 1 to paragraph (d): A former employee of the Federal Bus-eau of Investigation makes a brief telephone call to a.\ncolleague in her former office concerning an ongoing investigation. She has made a communication. If she personally attends \nan informal meeting with agency personnel concerning the matter, she will have made an appearance. \nExample 2 to paragraph (d): A former employee of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEE) accompanies other \nrepresentatives of an NCH grantee to a meeting with the agency. Even if the former employee does not say anything at the \nmeeting, he has made an appearance (although that appearance may or may not have been made with the intent to influence, \ndepending on the circumstances). \nExample 3 to paragraph (d): A Government employee administered a particular contract fix agricultural research with Q \nCompany. Upon termination of ha Government employment, she is hired by Q Company. She works on the matter covered by \nthe contact, but has no direct contact with the Government. At the request of a company vice president, she prepares a paper \ndescribing the persons at her former agency who should be contacted and what should be said to them in an effort to increase \nthe scope of funding of the contact and to resolve favorably a dispute over a contract clause She may do so. \nExample 4 to paragraph (d): A firmer employee of the National Institutes of Health (NIN) prepares an application for an NIH \nresearch grant on behalf of her university employer. The application is signed and submitted by another univers\n... [truncated, 4587 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/104 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=104]", "char_count": 4587}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 20 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any tonne. employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 2 to paragraph (e)(l): A former Government employee calls an agency official to complain about the auditing methods \nbeing used by the agency in conr.ection with an audit of a Government contractor for which the former employee serves as \na consultant. The former employee has made a communication with the intent to influence because his call was made for the \npurpose of seeking Government action in connection with an issue involving an appreciable element of dispute. \n(2) Intent to influence not present. Certain communications to and appearances before employees of the United States are \nnot made with the intent to influence, within the meaning of paragraph (e)(I) of this section, including, but not limited to, \ncommunications and appearances made solely for the purpose of: \n(i) Making a routine request not involving a potential controversy, such as a request for publicly available documents or \nan inquiry as to the status of a matter; \n(ii) Making factual statements or asking factual questions in a context that involves neither an appreciable element of \ndispute nor are. effort to seek discretionary Government action, such as conveying factual information regarding matters \nthat are not potentially controversial during the regular course of performing a contract; \n(iii) Signing and filing the tax return of another person as preparet; \n(iv) Signing an assurance that one will be responsible as principal investigator for the direction and conduct of research \nunder a Federal grant (see example 4 to paragraph (d) of this section); \n\"Filing a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Porn 10-K or similar disclosure forms required by the SEC; \n(v0 Making a communication, at the initiation of the Government, concerning work performed or to be performed under a \nGovernment contract or grant, during \n... [truncated, 4597 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/105 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=105]", "char_count": 4597}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 21 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restrle0on on any former employee's—, 5 O.F.R. § 2641.201 \nfor the contractor to develop a range of alternative options for potential restructuring of certain internal Government procedures. \nThe former employee would like to meet with agency representatives to present a tentative list of options developed by the \ncontractor. She may not do so. There is a potential for controversy between the Government and the contractor committing the \nextent and adequacy of any options presented, and, moreover, the oor.tractor may have its own interest in emphasizing certain \noptions as opposed to others because some options may be more difficult and expensive for the contractor to develop fully \nthan others. \nExample 6 to paragraph (eX2): A former employee of the internal Revenue Service (IRS) prepares his client's tax return, signs \nit as prepare:, and mails it to the IRS. He has not made a communication with the intent to influence. In the event that any \ncontroversy should arise concerning the return, the former employee may not represent the client in the proceeding, although \nhe may answer direct factual questions about the records be used to compile figures for the return, provided that he does not \nargue any theories or positions tojustify the use of ore figure rather than another. \nExample 7 to paragraph (eX2): An agency officialvisitsthepremises of a prospective contractor to evahmte the testingprocedure \nbeing proposed by the contractor for a research contract on which it has bid. A former employee of the agency, now employed \nby the contractor, is the person most thmiliar with the technical aspects of the proposed testing procedure. The agency official \nasks the former employee about certain technical features of the equipment used in connection with the testing procedure. The \nformer employee may provide factual information that is responsive to the questions p\n... [truncated, 4600 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/106 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=106]", "char_count": 4600}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 107, "text_content": ".\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n \n4 \ntrc4.555--4,;:c.W4--  ..... \nx`-\"-'4T•w\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03(2011 Page 22 of \n31 \n§ 21141.201 Permanent restriction on any former employes's—, 5 C.F.R. § 2841201 \n(vii)Thefonner employee has entered a formal appearance in connection withalegal proceeding at which he is present and \n(viii) The appearance is before former subordinates or others in the same chain of command as the former employee. \nExample I tc paragraph (e)(4): A formerRegional Administrator ofthe Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) \nbecomes a consultant for a company being investigated for possible enforcement baton by the regional OSHA Office. She is \nhired by the company to coordinate and guide its response to the OSHA investigation. She accompanies company officers to \nan informal meeting with OSHA, which is held for the purpose of airing the company's explanation of certain findings in en \nadverse inspection report. The former employee is introduced at the meeting as the company's compliance and governmental \naffairs adviser, but she does not make any statements during the meeting concerning the investigation. She is paid a fee for \nattending this meeting. She has made an appearance with the intent to influence \nExample 2 to paragraph (eXt): A former employee of an agency row works for a manufacturer that seeks agency approval for a \nnew product. The agency convenes a public advisory committee meeting for the purpose of receiving expert advice concerning \nthe product. Representatives of the manufacturer will make an extended presentation of the data supporting the application for \napproval, and a special table has been reserved for them in the meeting room for this purpose. The former employee does not \nparticipate in the manufacturer's presentation to the advisory carmine* and does not even sit in the section designated for the \nmanufacturer. Rather, he sits in the back of the room in a large area reserved for the\n... [truncated, 4123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/107 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=107]", "char_count": 4123}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 23 of \n31 \n§ 2541.201 Pemsanent restriction on any former employee's—, 5 C.P.R. § 2641.201 \n(i)A former employee who addresses a public gathering or a conference, seminar, or similar forum as a speaker or panel \nparticipant will not be considered to be making a prohibited communication or appearance if the forum: \n(A) Is not sponsored or co\n-sponsored by an entity specified in paragraphs (f)(1Xi) through (f)(1Xiv) of this section; \n(B) Is attended by a large number of people; and \n(C) A significant proportion of those attending ate not employees of the United States. \n(ii) In the circumstances described in paragraph (f)(3)(i) of this section, a former employee may engage in exchanges with \nany other speaker or with any member of the audience. \n(iii) A former employee also may permit the broadcast or publication of a commentary provided that it is broadcast or \nappears in a newspaper, periodical, or similar widely available publication. \nExample 1 to paragraph (f): A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) employee participated in the Fit's decision to initiate an \nenforcement proceeding against a particular company. After terminating Government service, the former employee is hired \nby the company to lobby key Members of Congress concerning the necessity of the proceeding. He may contact Members of \nCongress or their staff since a communication to or appearance before such persons is not made to or before an \"employee of \nthe United States\" as that term is defined in paragraph (0(1) of this section. \nExample 2 to paragraph (t): In the previous example, the former FTC employee arranges to meet with a Congressional staff \nmember to discuss the necessity of the proceeding. A current FTC employee is invited by the staff member to attend and is \nauthorized by the FTC to do so k order to present the agency's views. The former employee may not argue his new employer's \nposition at that meeting since his arg\n... [truncated, 4618 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/108 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=108]", "char_count": 4618}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "Pictice\"..e......e. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 24 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employea-., 5 C.F.R. §2641.201 \nExample 7 to paragraph (f): ABC Company has a contract with the. Department of Energy which requires that contractor \npersonnel work closely with agency employees in adjoining offices and work stations in the same building. After leaving the \nDepartment, a former employee goes to work for another corporation that has an interest in performing certain work related to \nthe same contract, and he arranges a meeting with certain ABC employees at the building where he previously worked on the \nproject. At the meeting, he asks the ABC employees to mention the interest of his new employer to the project supervisor, who \nis an agency employee. Moreover, he tells the ABC employees that they can say that ho was the source of this information. The \nABC employees in tuna convey this information to the project supervisor. The former employee has made a comnr.usicati on to \nart employee of the Department of Energy. His communication is directed to an agency employee because he intended that the \ninformation be conveyed to an agency employee with the intent that it be attributed to himself, and the circumstances indicate \nsuch a close working relationship between contractor personnel and agency employees that it was likely that the information \nconveyed to contractor personnel would be received by the agency. \n(g) On behalf of any other person—\n(1) On behalf of. \n(i) A former employee makes a communication or appearance on behalf of another person if the Conner employee is acting \nas the other person's agent or attorney or if: \n(A)The former employee is acting with the consent of the other person, whether express or implied; and \n(B) The former employee is acting subject to some degree of control or direction by the other person in relation to \nthe communication or appearance. \n(ii) A former employ\n... [truncated, 4844 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/109 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=109]", "char_count": 4844}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "r-zerne\":\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 25 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's, 5 C.F.R. S 2541201 \nExample 4 to paragraph (g): An Assistant Secretary of Defense participated in a meeting at which a defense contractor pressed \nDepartment of Defense (DOD) officials to continue lording the contractor's sole source contract to develop the prototype of a \nspecialized robot. After terminating Government service, the former Assistant Secretary approaches the contractor and sugges:s \nthat she can convince her former DOD colleagues to pursue development of the prototype robot. The contractor agrees that the \nformer Assistant Socretatts proposed efforts could be useful and asks her to set up a meeting with key DOD officials for the \nfollowing week. Although the former Assistant Secretary is not an employee of the contractor, the circumstances establish that \nshe is acting subject to some degree of control or direction by the contractor. \n(h) Particular matter involving a specific party or panics—\n(1) Basic concept The prohibition applies only to communications or appearances made in connection with a \"particular \nmanor involving a specific party or parties.\" Although the statute defines \"particular matter\" broadly to include \n\"any investigation, application, request for a ruling or determination, rulemaking, contract, controversy, claim, charge, \naccusation, arrest, or judicial or other proceeding,\" 18 U.S.C. 207(1)(3), only those particular matters that Involve a specific \nparty or parties fall within the prohibition of section 20700(4 Such a matter typically involves a specific proceeding \nerecting the legal rights of the parties or an isolatable transaction or related set of transactions between identified parties, \nsuch as a specific contract, grant, license, product approval application, enforcement action, administrative adjudication, \nOr COUR Case \nExample I to paragraph (hX1): An employee of \n... [truncated, 4873 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/110 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=110]", "char_count": 4873}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "I \nr' \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 26 of \n31 \n§ 2141.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 4 to paragraph (hX2): An employee in the legislative affairs office of the Department of Homeland Security \n(DHS) drafted official COMM= submitted to Congress with respect to a pending immigration reform bill. After leaving \nthe Government, he contracts DHS on behalf of a private organization seeking to influence the Administration to insist on \ncertain amendmer.ts to the bill. This is not prohibited. Generally, legislation is not a particular matter involving specific panics. \nHowever, if the same employee had participated as a D115 employee in formulating the agency's position on proposed private \nrelief legislation granting citizenship to a specific individual, this matter would involve specific parties, and the employee would \nbe prohibited from later making representational contacts in connection with this matter. \nExample 5 to paragraph (hX2): An mr.ployee of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) dratted a proposed rule requiring \nall manufacturers of a particular type of medical device to obtain pre-market approval for their products. It was known at the \ntime that only three or four manufacturers cun entry were marketing or developing such products. However, there was nothing \nto preclude other manufacturers from entering the market in the future. Moreover, the regulation on its face was not limited in \napplication to those companies already known to be involved with this type of product at the time of promulgation. Because \nthe proposed rule would apply to an open-coded class of manufacturers, not just specifically identified companies, it would not \nbe a particular matter involving specific parties. After leaving Government, the former FDA employee would not be prohibited \nfrom representing a manufacturer in connection with the final rule or the application of the rule in a\n... [truncated, 5371 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/111 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=111]", "char_count": 5371}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "•••••••:..7,..\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 27 of \n31 \n§ 2041.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's—, S C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 2 to paragraph (h)(3): A former employee in an agency inspector general's office conducted the first investigation of \nits kind concerning a particular fraudulent accounting practice by a grantee. This investigation resulted in asignificant monetary \nrecovery for the Government, as well as a sett:ement agreement in which the grantee agreed to use only certain specified \naccounting methods in the future. As a result of this case, the agency decided to issue a proposed rule expressly prohibiting \nthe fraudulent accounting practice and requiring all grantees to use the same accounting methods that had been developed \nin connection with the settlement agreement. The former employee may represent a group of grantees submitting comments \ncritical of the proposed regulation. Although the proposed regulation in some respects evolved from the earlier fraud case, \nwhich did involve specific parties, the subsequent rulemaking proceeding does not involve specific parties. \n(4) Preliminary or informal stages in a matter. When a particular mater involving specific parties begins depends on \nthe facts. A particular matter may involve specific parties prior to any formal action or filings by the agency or other \nparties. Much of the work with respect to a particular riveter is accomplished before the matter reaches its final stage, \nand preliminary or informal action is covered by the prohibition, provided that specific parties to the matter actually have \nbeen identified. With mailers such as grants, contracts, and other agreements, ordinarily specific parties are first identified \nwhen initial proposals or indications of interest, such as responses to requests for proposals (RP?) or earlier expressions \nof interest, are received by the Government; in unusual circumstances, however, such as \n... [truncated, 5467 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/112 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=112]", "char_count": 5467}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 28 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2841.201 \nsource contract with that same farm for the new work. Even before the firm was contacted or expressed any interest \nconcerning the sole source contract, the former employee participated in meetings in which specifications fora potential \nsole source contract with the firm were dismissed. The former employee may not represent XYZ before the Government \nin connection with this matter. \n(5) Same particular matter—\n(t) General. The prohibition applies only to communications or appearances in connection with the same particular matter \ninvolving specific parties in which the former employee participated as a Government employee. The same particular \nmatter may continue in another form or in part. In determining whether two particular mitten involving specific parties \nare the same, all relevant factors should be considered, including the extent to which the matters involve the same basic \nfacts, the satne or related parties, related lames, the same confidential information, and the amount of time elapsed. \n(ii) Considerations in the case of contracts, grants, and other agreements. With respect to matters such as contracts, grants \nor other agreements: \n(A) A new matter typically does not arise simply because there are amendments, modifications, or extensions of a \ncontract (or other agreement), unless there are fundamental changes in objectives or the nature of the matter; \n(B) Generally, successive or otherwise separate contracts (or other agreements) will be viewed as different matters \nfrom each other, absent some indication that one contract (or other agreement) contemplated the other or that both \nare in support of the same specific proceeding;. \n(C) A contract is almost always a single particular matter involving specific parties. However, under compelling \ncircumstances, distinct aspects or phases\n... [truncated, 4894 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/113 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=113]", "char_count": 4894}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 29 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 5 to the paragraph (hX5): In the previous example, certain changes in technology occurred since the date of the \noriginal contract, and the proposed contract modifications would require the additional shells to incorporate new design \nfeatures. Moreover, because of changes in the Army's internal system for storing and distributing shells to various locations, \nthe modifications would require Munitions to deliver its product to several decentralized destination points, thus requiring \nMunitions to develop novel delivery and handling systems and incur new transportation costs. The Army considers these \nmodifications to be fundamental changes in the approach and objectives of the contract and may determine that these changes \nconstitute a new particular matter. \nExample 6 to paragraph (h)(5): A Government employee reviewed and approved certain wiretap applications. The prosecution \nof a person overheard during the wiretap, although not originally targeted, must be regarded as part of the same particular matter \nas the original wiretap application. Thc reason is that the validity of the wiretap may be put in issue and many of the facts giving \nrise to the wiretap application would be involved. \nExample 7 to paragraph (hX5): The Navy awards an indefinite delivery contract for environmental remediation services in the \nnortheastern U.S. A Navy engineer is assigned as the Navy's technical representative on a task order for remediation of an oil \nspill at a Navy activity in Maine. The Navy engineer is personally and substantially involved in the task order (e.g., he negotiates \nthe scope of work, the labor hours required, and monitors the contractor's performance). Following successful completion of the \nremediation of the oil spill in Maine, the Navy engineer leaves Government service and goes to w\n... [truncated, 5094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/114 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=114]", "char_count": 5094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "••:\".\", txrx,c-rf,\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 30 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R § 2641.201 \nperipheral issue. A finding of substantiality should be based not only on the effort devoted to a matter, but also on the \nimportance of the effort. While a series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, the single as of approving or \nparticipating in a critical step may be substantial. Provided that an employee participates in the substantive merits of a \nmatter, his participatien may be substantial even though his role in the matter, or the aspect of the matter in which he \nis participating, may be minor in relation to the matter as a whole. Participation in peripheral aspects of a matter or in \naspects not directly involving the substantive merits of a matter (such as reviewing budgetary procedures or scheduling \nmeetings) is not substantial. \nExample I to paragraph (i): A General Services Administration (GSA) attorney drafted a standard form contract and certain \nstandard terms and classes for use in future contracts. A contracting officer uses one of the standard clauses in a subsequent \ncontras without consulting the GSA attorney. The attorney did not participate personally in the subsequent contract. \nExamp!e 2 to paragraph (I): An Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attorney is neither in charge of nor does she have official \nresponsibility for litigation involving a particular delinquent taxpayer. At the request of a co-worker who is assigned \nresponsibility for the litigation, the lawyer provides advice concerning strategy during the discovery stage of the litigation. The \nIRS attorney participated personally in the litigation. \nExample 3 to paragraph (i): The IRS attorney in the previous example had no further involvement in the litigation. She \nparticipated substantially in the litigation notwithstanding that the post-discovery stages of the litigation lasted for te\n... [truncated, 4525 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/115 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=115]", "char_count": 4525}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 31 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's—, 6 C.F.R. § 2841.201 \n(2) Party or direct and substantial interest The United States may be a patty to or have a direct and substantial interest in \na particular matter even though it is pending in a non-Federal forum, such as a State court. The United States is neither a \nparty to nor does it have a direct and substantial interest in a particular muter merely because a Federal statute is at issue \nor a Federal court is serving as the forum for resolution of the matter. Whenit is not clear whether the United States is \na patty to or has a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter, this determination shall be made in accordance \nwith the folbwing procedure: \n(i) Coordination by designated agency ethics official. The designated agency ethics official (DAEO) for the former \nemployee's agency shall have the primary responsibility for coordinating this determination. When it appears likely that \na component of the United States Government other than the former employee's former agency may be a party to or have \na direct and substantial interest in the particular matter, the DAEO shall coordinate with agency ethics officials serving \nin those components. \n(ii) Agency determination. A component of the United States Government shall determine if it is a party to or has a direct \nand substantial interest in a matter in accordance with its own internal procedures. It shall consider al: relevant factors, \nincluding whether. \n(A) The component his a financial interest in the matter; \n(D) The matter is likely to have an effect on the policies, programs, or operation of the component; \n(C) The component is involved in any proceeding associated with the matter, e.g., as by having provided witnesses \nor documentary evidence; and \n(D) The component has more than an academic interest in the outcome of the matter. \nExample l to \n... [truncated, 3197 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/116 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=116]", "char_count": 3197}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "• \n. \n.:5.-7;55:tiart;??7. ---\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 1 of 4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2, \nPlaintiffs, \nI \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nDefendant. \n/ \nMOTION TO INTERVENE \nOR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A SUM SPONTE RULE 11 ORDER \nComes now, Movant Bruce E. Reinhart, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n24(b), and seeks leave to intervene as a party-in-interest in this matter. Movant seeks to \nintervene to file a Motion for Sanctions based on unfounded factual and legal accusations made \nabout Movant in Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act \n(the \"Motion\") [DE 48]. I In the context of a motion alleging that the U.S. Department of Justice \nviolated Plaintiff's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act, Plaintiffs make irrelevant and \ngratuitous accusations that Movant violated unspecified Florida Bar rules and Department of \nJustice regulations. Movant should be granted leave to intervene to rebut these false allegations, \nand to seek sanctions. Alternatively, the Court on its own initiative should require Plaintiffs and \ntheir counsel to show their compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. \nWithout any attempt to tie the allegations to the asserted violation of the CVRA, \nParagraphs 52 and 53 of the Motion falsely allege that Movant, a non-party to this matter, \nI Movant was not served with a copy of the pleading. Movant first saw the pleading on \nApril 20, 2011. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000787 \nEFTA00230611\n", "char_count": 1627}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 2 of 4 \nviolated Florida Bar rules and Department of Justice regulations by representing employees of \nJeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") in civil litigation after the undersigned retired from the United States \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (the \"Office\"). They also falsely allege \nthat Movant, while still employed by the Office engaged in improper conduct relating to Epstein. \nThe Motion does not make any effort to connect these allegations to the relief it seeks. It does \nnot explain how the accusations against Movant are relevant to its claims under the CVRA, nor \ndoes it explain how Movant's alleged conduct can be imputed to any party in the action. \nBecause there is no proper purpose for these allegations, they are made in bad faith, \nunreasonably, vexatiously, and for the improper purpose of harassing Movant. \nPlaintiff has injected into this action questions of law and fact relating to Movant's \nalleged conduct. Movant now seeks to assert a claim under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. \n§1927 arising from the same questions of law and fact that Plaintiff raised. Movant's claim \nshares with the main action common questions of law and fact. See New York News, Inc.'. \nNewspaper and Mail Deliverer's Union, 139 F.R.D. 291, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1991Xfor purposes of \nRule 24(b), claim that falsities in pleading impugned movant's reputation created a question of \nfact in common with underlying cause of action). Therefore, the Court has discretion to permit \nintervention. CI Id. (permissive intervention denied because it would unduly delay and \nprejudice imminent settlement of the original claims), aff'd sub nom New York News'. Kheel, \n972 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, the proposed intervention does not create a risk of \nundue delay or prejudice to the adjudication of the underlying claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. \n24(b)(3). Movant should be permitted to intervene under Fed. R. C\n... [truncated, 2336 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/118 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=118]", "char_count": 2336}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "\".4',7•Ve.ner \n7 \n... \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 3 of 4 \nirrelevant to the Government's alleged violation of the CVRA. As such, Movant's interest is not \nadequately protected by the existing parties. \nAlternatively, Movant asks the Court sua sponte to issue an Order to Show Cause under \nRule 11(cX3X\"On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause \nwhy conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b)\"). This Court should \nnot countenance a party making irrelevant, slanderous accusations against a non-party. On the \nface of Plaintiffs' Motion, it is cleat that the allegations in Paragraphs 52 and 53 are irrelevant to \nwhether the CVRA was violated, and therefore are not being presented for a proper purpose. \nThe Court should require Plaintiffs and their counsel to show what legal and factual inquiry they \nundertook to comply with Rule 11(b) before making the allegations in Paragraphs 52 and 53, and \nto articulate the proper purpose for which these allegations were included in their Motion. \nAs required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c), attached to this motion is a proposed Motion for \nSanctions. If leave to intervene is granted, the Motion for Sanctions which will be served on \nPlaintiffs' counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, but not filed for 21 days thereafter. See Fed. R. Civ. \nP. 11(cX2). \nPursuant to Local Rule 7.1(aX3), undersigned counsel contacted counsel for Plaintiffs \nand counsel for the United States. Assistant United States Attorney Dexter Lee reported that the \nUnited States does not oppose the Motion to Intervene. Bradley Edwards, Esq., counsel for \nPlaintiffs reported that they oppose the Motion to Intervene. \nRespectfully submitted, \nhi Bruce E. Reinhart \nBRUCE E. REINHART,P.A. \nFlorida Bar N 10762 \n250 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \n(561) 202-6360 fax (561) 202-6976 \nBreinhart®BruceReinhartLaw.com \n3 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000789 \n... [truncated, 2014 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/119 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=119]", "char_count": 2014}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 4 of 4 \nCERTIFICATE OP SERVICE \nI hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Intervene or in the \nAlternative for a Sua Sponte Rule 11 Order was served on all counsel of record by CMIECF on \nMay 3, 2011. \n/s/Bruce Reinhart \nBRUCE REINHART \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000790 \nEFTA00230614\n", "char_count": 386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cvAO]35-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 1 of 31 \nATTACHMENT TO MOTION \nTO INTERVENE OR IN THE \nALTERNATIVE FOR A SUA \nSPONTE RULE 11 ORDER \n08-80736CV-INARIZA \n1300791 \nEFTA00230615\n", "char_count": 217}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 2 of 31 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Jolmson \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2, \nPlaintiffs, \nI \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nDefendant. \nBRUCE E. REINHART, \nIntervenor \nINTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS \nComes now, Bruce B. Reinhart, intervenor and party in interest (hereinafter \n\"Movant\"), and moves this Honorable Court to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of \nCivil Procedure 11(b) and 28 U.S.C. 1927 based on intentional or reckless false, bad \nfaith, vexatious factual and legal assertions made about Movant in Paragraphs 52 and 53 \nof Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (the \n\"Motion\") (DE 48]. \nBACKGROUND \nThe instant cause of action involves claims by Plaintiffs that Defendant violated \nthe Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. §3771, in its handling of a criminal \ninvestigation of Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") and others. The investigation ultimately \nresulted in a non-prosecution agreement between the United States and Epstein. On \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000792 \nEFTA00230616\n", "char_count": 1169}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 3 of 31 \nMarch 21, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Motion.l Numbered paragraphs 1-50 of the Motion \nare a chronological review of the background of the Epstein investigation, including the \ninteractions among the victims' counsel, counsel for Epstein, the Government and the \nFBI. Paragraph 51 asserts that at all relevant times it was feasible for the Government to \nprovide certain notifications to Plaintiffs. \nWithout attempting to make any connection to the asserted violation of the \nCVRA, Paragraphs 52 and 53 falsely allege that Movant violated Florida Bar rules and \nDepartment of Justice regulations by representing Epstein's employees in civil litigation \nafter Movant retired from the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of \nFlorida (\"Office\"). They also falsely allege that Movant, while still employed by the \nOffice engaged in improper conduct relating to Epstein. These allegations are made in \nbad faith, unreasonably, without reasonable inquiry into the law and facts, vexatiously, \nand for the improper purpose of gratuitously harassing Movant. \nLEGAL STANDARDS \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 \nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states that a lawyer signing any pleading in \nfederal court is certifying that: \n[Ty° the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed \nafter an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: \n(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, \ncause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; \n(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by \nexisting law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or \nreversing existing law or for establishing new law; \nMovant was not served with a copy of the pleading. Movant first saw the \npleading on April 20, 2011. \n2 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000793 I \nEFTA00230617\n", "char_count": 1954}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 4 of 31 \n(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so \nidentified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable \nopportunity for further investigation or discovery. \nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11 uses an objective standard. Kaplan ! DaintlerChrysler, \nA.G., 331 F.3d 1251, .1255 (11th Cir. 2003). The analysis is whether \"a reasonable \n• \nattorney in like circumstances could believe that his actions were factually and legally \njustified.\" Id (citing Placard I. Prudential Ira. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. \n2002)). Violations of Rule 11 are punishable by monetary and non-monetary sanctions \nagainst both the lawyer filing the pleading and the lawyer's client. Fed: R Civ. P. 11(c). \n28 U.S.C. 61927 \nTitle 28, United States Code, Section 1927 states: \nAny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the \nUnited States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings \nin any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to \nsatisfy personally the excess costs, expense, and attorneys' fees reasonably \nincurred because of such conduct. \nTo impose sanctions under § 1927, the Court must find that the attorney's conduct is \n\"'tantamount to bad faith.'\" Amlong & Amlong, 500 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2007) \n(quoting Avirgani. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991)). \"(Tjhe attorney must \nknowingly or recklessly pursue a frivolous claim.\" Id at 1242. The finding of bad faith \ndoes not turn on \"the attorney's subjective intent, but on the attorney's objective \nconduct.\" Id. at 1239. The standard is \"whether, regardless of the attorney's subjective \nintentions, the conduct was unreasonable and vexatious when measured against an \nobjective standard.\" Hudson.. Intl Comp. Negotiations, Inc., 499 F.3d 1252, 1262 (11th \nCir. 2007). \n3 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000794 \nEFTA00230618\n", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "v , \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 5 of 31 \nDISCUSSION \nParagraphs 52 and 53 contain inflammatory claims that are false, misleading, and \nirrelevant to the relief sought in the Motion. See generally Declaration of Bruce E. \nReinhart (attached as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference). They ultimately allege, \n\"[Movant's) representations [of Epstein's employees] are in contravention of Justice \nDepartment regulations and Florida bar rules. Such representations also give, at least, the \nimproper appearance that Roinhart may have attempted to curry [sic] with Epstein and \nthen reap his reward through favorable representation.\" Plaintiff's Motion at 153. They \ndo not cite to any particular bar rule or regulation that they believe was violated. They do \nnot explain how the alleged conduct contributed to the Department of Justice's alleged \nviolation of the CVRA. Nor do they explain how the alleged conduct is imputable to the \nDepartment of Justice. These otherwise slanderous accusations against a non-party are \nfalse. They were made in bad faith, without a factual inquiry reasonable under the \ncircumstances, or elementary research into the legal basis for the allegations. \nParagraphs 52 and 53 omit the following true facts, which Plaintiffs should have \ninvestigated before making their allegations: (1) Movant did not participate in any way in \nthe Office's investigation of Epstein, (2) after leaving government employment, Movant \ndid not represent Epstein before the Department of Justice, nor did Movant communicate \nwith the Department of Justice about Epstein, and (3) Movant did not use confidential \ninformation obtained during his Government employment to the detriment of the United \nStates. See Declaration of Bruce E. Reinhart at 111-12, 17. \nRather than conducting the required inquiry, Plaintiffs simply make two \nirresponsible and unsupported leaps. First, they incorrectly conclude that merely because \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MA\n... [truncated, 2026 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/125 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=125]", "char_count": 2026}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 6 of 31 \nMovant worked in the Office at the time of the Epstein case, Movant Must have been \ninvolved in the internal decisionmaking at the Office about Epstein. Second, they \nincorrectly conclude that because Movant later represented Epstein's employees in \nprivate civil litigation, Movant must have used confidential Government information \nimproperly in his representation of Epstein's employees, and for his own financial gain. \nIt is ipparent that Plaintiffs conducted no factual inquiry to substantiate their \naccusations before making them. They never contacted Movant. On information and \nbelief, they did not speak to any current or former personnel from the Office or the FBI \nwho were familiar with the structure of the West Palm Beach Office or with Movant's \nrole (or lack thereof) in the Epstein investigation. Had they done so, they would have \nlearned that there were approximately 20 Assistant United States Attorneys in the West \nPalm Beach Office during the relevant time period. See Declaration of Bruce E. Reinhart \nat ¶10. They would have learned that Movant was not assigned to the same section as the \nprosecutor handling the Epstein matter. Id. They would have learned that Movant had a \ndifferent chain of supervision from the prosecutor assigned to the Epstein matter. Id. \nThey would have learned that Movant had no involvement in the Epstein investigation. \nSee Declaration of Bruce E. Reinhart at ¶111-12. \nFurther, Plaintiffs did not conduct an adequate inquiry into the applicable \nDepartment of Justice regulations. \nAs discussed below, to violate the relevant \nregulations, a former employee must appear before, or communicate with, the \nDepartment of Justice, about a particular matter in which the former employee \nparticipated personally and substantially while employed at the Department of Justice. \nSee 5 C.F.R. §2641.201(a). The Motion contains approximately 50 paragraphs of a \n5 \n\n... [truncated, 2040 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/126 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=126]", "char_count": 2040}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 7 of 31 \ndetailed historical litany of the interactions among the parties to the Epstein matter. The \nMotion does not allege that Movant paiticipated at all, let alone personally and \nsubstantially, as a government employee in the Epstein investigation. The Motion does \nnot allege that that Movant subsequently appeared before, or communicated with, the \nDepartment of Justice about Epstein. To the contrary, the Motion alleges only that, after \nleaving the Office, Movant represented Epstein's employees in litigation with non-\nGovernmental third parties. Had Plaintiffs conducted rudimentary research into the \napplicable regulations, they would have known that any allegation that Movant violated \nthese regulations was frivolous. \nMovant Did Not Violate Any Florida Bar Rule \nRelevant Florida Bar Rules \nThe potentially applicable Florida'Bar rules are Rule 4-1.6(a) (Confidentiality of \nInformation), Rule 4-1.9 (Conflict of Interest; Former Clients), and Rule 4-1.11 (Special \nConflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees). For \npurposes of these rules, the U.S. Department of Justice was Movant's client during his \nemployment in the Office. Movant did not violate any of the bar rules. \nRule 4-1.6(a) states: \nA lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client \nexcept as stated in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client gives \ninformed consent. \nRule 4-1.6 was not violated because Movant did not know any confidential \ninformation about the Epstein matter, so none could be revealed. \nRele 4-1.9 states: \nA lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not \nthereafter: \n6 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000797 \nEFTA00230621\n", "char_count": 1790}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "Case 9 08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 8 of 31 \n(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter \n' in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests, \nof the former client unless the former client gives informed consent; or \n(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of \nthe former client except as these rules would permit or require with \nrespect to a client or when the information has become generally \nknown; or, \n(c) reveal information relating to the representation except as these rules \nwould permit or require with respect to a client. \nRule 4-1.9 was not violated because Movant never represented the United States in the \nEpstein matter. \nRule 4-1.11 states in pertinent parts: \n(a) A lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of \nthe government: \n(1) is subject to rule 4-1.9(b); and \n(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a \nmatter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a \npublic officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency \ngives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. \n(c) A lawyer having information that :he lawyer knows is confidential \ngovernment information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a \npublic officer or employee may not represent a private client whose \ninterests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information \ncould be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this \nrule, the term \"confidential government information\" means information \nthat has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the \ntime this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from \ndisclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is \nnot otherwise available to the public. \n(d) A lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee: \n(1) is subject to rule\n... [truncated, 2067 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/128 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=128]", "char_count": 2067}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 9 of'31 \n(2) shall not: \n(A) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated \npersonally and substantially while in private practice or \nnongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government \nagency gives its informed consent; or \n(B) negotiate for private employment with any person who \nis involved as a party or as attorney fora party in a matter in which \nthe lawyer is participating personally and substantially. \nRule 4-1.11(a) was not violated because Movant did not participate personally and \nsubstantially in the Epstein matter. Rule 4-1.11(c) was not violated because Movant did \nnot have any confidential Government information within the meaning of the rule, so he \ndid he use any confidential Government information about a third party to the detriment \nof that third party. Rule 4-1.11(d) was not violated because Movant did not participate \npersonally and substantially in the Epstein matter. \nMaya* Did Not Violate Department of Justice  Regulations \nDepartment of Justice Regulations \nThe Department of Justice regulation containing post-employment restrictions, 5 \nC.P.R. §2641.201. states in most pertinent part: \n(a) Basic prohibition of 18 U.S.C. 207(aX1). No former employee shall \nknowingly, with the intent to influence, make any communication to or \nappearance before an employee of the United States on behalf of any other \nperson in connection with a particular matter involving a specific party or \nparties, in which he participated personally and substantially as an employee, \nand in which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial \ninterest \n(i) Participate: To \"participate\" means to take an action as an employee through \ndecision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, \ninvestigation, or other such action, or to purposefully forbear in order to affect \nthe outcome of a matter .. . An employee does not participate in a matte\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/129 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=129]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cir-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 10 of \n31 \nmerely because he had knowledge of its existence or because it was pending \nunder his official responsibility.\nMov.ant did not violate S C.F.R. §2641.201 because he did not participate personally and \nsubstantially in the Epstein matter as a Government employee. He did not appear before \nthe United States on behalf of Epstein after leaving Government employment. He did \nnot communicate with the United States on behalf of Epstein after leaving Government \nemployment. \nHe represented Epstein's employees in civil cases in which the \nGovernment was not a party. \n' \nIt is clear from the face of the regulations that Movant's representing Epstein's \nemployees in civil matters not involving the Government did not violate §2641(a). In \nfact, had Plaintiffs and their counsel properly investigated the facts and law, they would \nhave seen that §2641(a) would have permitted Movant to represent Epstein, himself, \nopenly against the Department of Justice. Movant did not. The allegation that Movant \nviolated Department of Justice regulations is frivolous. \n2 A complete copy of this regulation is attached to this Motion as Exhibit 2. \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000800 \nEFTA00230624\n", "char_count": 1267}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 11 of \n31 \nCONCLUSION \nThe allegations in Paragraph 52 and 53 of the Motion are false, made in bad faith, \nand made without sufficient inquiry into the law and fac. They are irrelevant to whether \nthe United States Attorney complied with the CVRA. Notably, the Motion does not \nattempt to tie the allegations against Movant to the alleged violation of the CVRA. The \nallegations are included gratuitously in the Motion solely to harass Movant in a forum \nwhere the accusations are not legally slanderous. The allegations are made without \nreasonable pre-filing inquiry into the facts or law. This Court should issue an Order to \nShow Cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. §1927. \nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Bruce E. Reinhart \nBRUCE E. REINHART,P.A. \nFlorida Bar # 10762 \n250 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \n(561) 202-6360 fax (561) 202-6976 \nBreinhart®BruceReinhartLaw.com \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Intervenor's Motion \nFor Sanctions was served on all counsel of record by CM/ECF on \n2011. \n/s/Bruce Reinhart \nBRUCE REM MART \n10 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000801 \nEFTA00230625\n", "char_count": 1274}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 12 of \n31 \nEXHIBIT 1 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000802 \nEFTA00230626\n", "char_count": 138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLED Docket 05/03/2011 Page 13 of \n31 \nPECLARATION OF BRUCE E. RELN HART \nI, Bruce E. Reinhart, make the following declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746. \n1. \nI am a licensed attorney in solo practice as Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A. My office \nis located at 250 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 1400, West Palm Beach, Florida, \n33401. \n2. \nI am a member in good standing of the bars of the states of Florida, \nPennsylvania, and New Jersey. I am also admitted to the practice in the \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the U.S. \nCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court, and \nseveral other federal courts. \n3. \nI graduated from Princeton University in 1984 with a B.S.E. in civil \nengineering cum laude. I graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law \nSchool in 1987, cum laude. I also served as an Editor of the University of \nPennsylvania Law School. \n4. \nAfter graduating from law school, I served as judicial law clerk to the \nHonorable Norma L. Shapiro, United States District Judge for the Eastern \nDistrict of Pennsylvania. \n5. \nIn 1988, I began working at the Criminal Division of the United States \nDepartment of Justice in Washington, D.C., through the Attorney General's \nHonors Program. From 1988-1994, I worked in the Public Integrity Section \nof the Criminal Division. \nWhile working there, I received two Special \nAchievement Awards for Meritorious Acts and Service from the \nDepartment of Justice. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000803 \nEFTA00230627\n", "char_count": 1557}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on FLSD Dodket 05/03/2011 Page 14 of \n31 \nPage 2 of 4 \n6. \nWhile at the Public Integrity Section, I was involved in investigating and \nprosecuting people who violated federal conflict of interest and post-\nemployment statutes. I attended multiple training conferences where federal \nconflicts of interest laws and regulations were discussed. \n7. \nFrom in or about July 1994 to on or about May 1, 1996, I served as Senior \nPolicy Advisor to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement at the \nUnited States Department of the Treasury. \nIn that position, I helped. the \nUndersecretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Secretary of the Treasury to \ndevelop law enforcement policies for U.S. Customs, ATF, Secret Service, and \nIRS Criminal Investigations. I also acted as principal staff liaison to the \nDeputy Attorney General, the FBI and the other Department of Justice law \nenforcement agencies. For my service, I was awarded the Undersecretary for \nEnforcement's Award for Exceptional Service. \n8. \nI am the former Vice Chair of the Palm Beach County Bar's Professionalism \nCommittee. I am the former President of the Palm Beach County Chapter of \nthe Federal Bar Association. I currently serve as an Ethics Commissioner on \nthe Palm Beach County Commission on Ethics. \n9. \nFrom May 1, 1996 to January 1, 2008, I served as an Assistant United States \nAttorney in the Southern District of Florida, assigned to the West Palm Beach \noffice. From in or about July 1998 to in or about October 2002, I was a \nSupervisory Assistant United States Attorney. From October 2002 to January \n2008, I was a non-supervisory Assistant United States Attorney handling my \nown docket of cases. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000804 \nEFTA00230628\n", "char_count": 1769}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "........... \n....\n. \n. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 \nEntered on F LSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 15 of \n31 \nPage 3 of 4 \n10. \nAt all relevant times, the Office had approximately 20 Assistant U.S. \nAttorneys assigned to the West Palm Beach location. The prosecutor assigned \nto the Epstein case, Ann Marie Villafana, and I were assigned to different \nsections within the Office. We reported to different supervisors. \n11. \nI did not participate in any way in the Office's investigation of Epstein. I was \nnot involved in any of the Office's decisionmaking with regard to the Epstein \nmatter. \n12. \nI never learned any confidential, non-public information about the Epstein \nmatter. \n13. \nIn late December 2007, I had an \"odt meeting\" with Dexter Lee, the Office's \nethics officer. \nAs part of that meeting, Mr. Lee reviewed with me the \nDepartment of Justice's post-employment restrictions. \nBased on our \nconversation, it was my understanding that I could work on any matter so long \nas I had not participated in it personally and substantially as a Government \nemployee. I also understood that I could not use non-public Government \ninformation for any purpose. \n14. \nAfter opening my private practice on January 2, 2008, I was retained to \nrepresent Sarah Kellen for purposes of civil depositions in causes of action to \nwhich the United States was not a party. At a later time, I was retained to \nrepresent seven] other members of Mr. Epstein's staff in their civil \ndepositions. \n15. \nAfter leaving the Office, I did not participate in any of the negotiations over \nMr. Epstein's non-prosecution agreement \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000805 \nEFTA00230629\n", "char_count": 1656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 16 of \n31 \nPage 4 of 4 \n16. \nAfter leaving the Office, I did not communicate with the Office, in person or \nin writing, about any matters relating to possible criminal charges against Mr. \nEpstein. \n17. \nBeesnse I did not have any, I did not share non-public confidential \ninformation about the Epstein investigation with any of Epstein's attorneys. \n18. \nPrior to the filing of Plaintiffs Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime \nVictims' Rights Act, neither Mr. Edwards, nor Judge Cassell, nor anyone on \ntheir behalf contacted me to determine if the allegations in Paragraphs 52 and \n53 of that Motion were true. \n1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. \nExecuted on May 3,2011. \nBruce E. Reinhart \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000806 \nEFTA00230630\n", "char_count": 859}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 17 of \n31\nEXHIBIT 2 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000807 \nEFTA00230631\n", "char_count": 137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "•ic \n••••••••• ....... \n• • \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 18 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any fanner employee's..., II C.F.R. *2641.201 \nCode of Federal Regulations \nTitle 5. Administrative Personnel \nChapter XVI. Office of Government Ethics \nSubchapter B. Government Ethics \nPart 2641. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions (Refs & Annos) \nSubpart B. Prohibitions \n5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's representations to United States \nconcerning particular matter ln which the employee participated personally and substantially. \nEffective: July 25, 2008 \nCurrentness \n(a) Basic prohibition of till U.S.C. 207(aX1). No forma employee shall knowingly, with the intent to influence, make any \ncommunication to or appearance before an employee of the United States on behalf of any other person in connection with a \nparticular matter involving a specific party or parties, in which he participated personally and substantially as an employee, and \nin which die United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest \n(b) Exceptions and waiver. The prohibition of 18 U.S.C. 207(aXI) does not apply to a forma employee who is: \n(1) Acting on behalf of the United States. See § 2641.301(a). \n(2) Acting as an elected State or local government official. See § 2641301(b). \n(3) Communicating scientific or technological information pursuant to procedures or certification. See § 2641.301(e). \n(4) Testifying under oath. See *2641_301(0. (Note that this exception from 12641.201 is generally not available for expert \ntestimony. See § 2641.301(f)(2).) \n(5) Acting on behalf of an international organization pursuant to a waiver. See § 2641.301(h). \n(6) Acting as an employee of a Govemment-owned, contractor-operated entity pursuant to a waiver. See § 2641.301(i). \n(e) Commencement and length of restriction. 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) is a permanent restriction that commences upon\n... [truncated, 3271 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/138 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=138]", "char_count": 3271}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 19 of \n31 \n2541.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's.., 5 C.F.R. 12641.201 \n(3) Behind-the-scenes assistance. Nothing in this section prohibits a former employee from providing assistance to another \nperson, provided that the insistence does not involve a communication to or an appearance before an employee of the \nUnited States. \nExample 1 to paragraph (d): A former employee of the Federal Bureau of investigation makes a brief telephone call to a. \ncolleague in her former office concerning an ongoing investigation. She has made a communication. If she personally attends \nan informal meeting with agency personnel concerning the muter, she will have made an appearance. \nExample 2 to paragraph (O A former employee of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) accompanies other \nrepresentatives of an NEH grantee to a meeting with the agency. Even if the former employee does not say anything at the \nmeeting, he has made an appearance (although that appearance may or may not have been made with the intent to influence, \ndepending on the circumstances). \nExample 3 to paragraph (d): A Government employee administered a particular contract for agricultural research with Q \nCompany. Upon termination of her Government employment, she is hired by Q Company. Stn works on the matter covered by \nthe contact, but has no direct contact with the Government. At the request of a company vice president, she prepares a paper \ndescribing the persons at her former agency who should be contacted and what should be said to them in an effort to increase \nthe scope of funding of the contract and to resolve favorably a dispute over a contract clause. She may do so. \nExample 4 to paragraph (d): A former employee of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) prepares an application for an NTH \nresearch grant on behalf of her university employer. The application is signed and submitted by another universit\n... [truncated, 4584 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/139 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=139]", "char_count": 4584}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 20 of \n31 \n2841.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 2 to paragraph (eX1): A former Government employee calls an agency official to complain about the auditing methods \nbeing used by die agency in connection with an audit of a Government contractor for which the former employee servos as \na consultant. The former employee has made a communication with the intent to influence because his call was made for the \npurpose of seeking Government action in connection with an issue involving an appreciable element of dispute. \n(2) intent to influence not present. Certain communications to and appearances before employees of the United States are \nnot made with the intent to influence, within the meaning of paragraph (e)(1) of this section, including, but not limited to, \ncommunications and appearances made solely for the purpose of: \n(i) Making a routine request not involving a potential controversy, such as a request for publicly available documents or \nan inquiry as to the status of a matter; \n(in) Making factual statements or asking factual questions in a context that involves neither an appreciable element of \ndispute nor an effort to seek discretionary Government action, such as conveying factual information regarding matters \nthat are not potentially controversial during the regular course of performing a contact; \n(iii) Signing and filing the tax return of another person as paperer; \n(iv) Signing an assurance that one will be responsible as principal investigator for the direction and conduct of research \nunder a Federal grant (see example 4 to paragraph (d) of this section); \n4) Filing a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 10-K or similar disclosure forms required by the SEC; \n(vi) Making a communication, at the initiation of the Government, concerning work performed or to be performed under a \nGovernment contract or grant, daring a rou\n... [truncated, 4592 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/140 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=140]", "char_count": 4592}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 21 of \n31 \n§ 2841.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2841.201 \nfor the contractor to develop a range of alternative options for potential restructuring of certain internal Government procedures. \nThe former employee would hie to meet with agency representatives to present a tentative list of options developed by the \nconnector. She may not do so. There is a potential for controversy between the Government and the contractor concerning the \nextent and adequacy of any options presented, and, moreover, the contactor may have its own interest in emphasizing certain \noptions as opposed to others because some options may be more difficult and expensive for the contractor to develop fully \nthan others. \nExample 6 to paragraph (e)(2): A former employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prepares his client's tax return, signs \nit as preparer, and mails it to the IRS. He has not made a communication with the intent to influence. In the event that any \ncontroversy should arise concerning the return, the former employee may not represent the client in the proceeding, although \nhe may answer direct factual questions about the records he used to compile figures for the return, provided that he does not \nargue any theories or positions to justify the use of one figure rather than another. \nExample 7 to paragraph (e)(2): An agency official visits thepremises of aprospective contractor to evaluate the testing procedure \nbeing proposed by the contractor for a research contract on which it has bid. A former employee of the agency, now employed \nby the contractor, is the person most familiar with the technical aspects of the proposed testing procedure. The agency official \nasks the former employee about certain technical features of the equipment used in connection with the testing procedure. The \nformer employee may provide factual information that is respells-we to the quest\n... [truncated, 4610 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/141 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=141]", "char_count": 4610}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 22 of \n31 \ng2m1.2oi Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. 42641201 \n(vii)The forma employee has ententda formal appearance in connection witha legal proceeding at which he is present; and \n(viii) The appearance is before former subordinates or others in the unit chain of command as the former employee. \nExample Ito paragraph (eX4): A former Regional Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) \nbecomes a consultant fora oompany being investigated for possible enforcement action by the regional OSHA office. She is \nhired by the company to coordinate and guide its response to the OSHA investigation. She accompanies company officers to \nan informal meeting with OSIIIA, which is held for the purpose of airing the company's explanation of certain findings in an \nadverse inspection report. The former employee is introduced at the meeting as the company's compliance and governmental \naffairs adviser, but she does not make any statements during the meeting concerning the investigation. She is paid a fee for \nattending this meeting. She has made an appearance with the intent to influence. \nExample 2 to paragraph (eX4): A former employee of an agency now works for a manufacturer that seeks agency approval for a \nnew product The agency convenes a public advisory committee meeting for the purpose of receiving expert advice concerning \nthe product. Representatives of the manutlicturer will make an extended presentation of the data supporting the application for \napproval, and a special table has been reserved for them in the meeting room for this purpose. The former employee does not \nparticipate in the manufacturer's presentation to the advisory committee and does not even sit in the section designated for the \nmanufacturer. Rather, he sits in the back of the room in a largo area reserved for the public and the media. The manufacturer's \nspeakers mak\n... [truncated, 4071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/142 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=142]", "char_count": 4071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 23 of \n31 \n2641.201 Permanent restriction on eny fanner employee's..., IS C.F.R. S 2641.201 \n(0 A former employee who addresses a public gathering or a conference, seminar, or similar forum as a speaker or panel \nparticipant will not be considered to be making a prohibited communication or appearance if the forum: \n(A) Is not sponsored or co-sponsored by an entity specified in paragraphs (fXIXi) through (f)(1Xiv) of this section; \n(B) Is attended by a large number of people; and \n(C) A significant proportion of those attending are tot employees of the United States. \n(ii) in the circumstances described in paragraph ()(3)(i) of this section, a former employee may engage in exchanges with \nany other speaker or with any member of the audience. \n(iii) A former employee also may permit the broadcast or publication of a (*momentary provided that it is broadcast or \nappears in a newspaper, periodical, or similar widely available publication. \nExample 1 to paragraph (0: A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) employee participated in the FTC's decision to ir.itiate an \nenforcement proceeding against a particular company. After terminating Government service, the former employee is hired \nby the company to lobby key Members of Congress concerning the necessity of the proceeding. He may contact Members of \nCongress or their staff since a communication to or appearance before such persons is not made to or before an \"employee of \nthe United States\" as that term is defined in paragraph (NI) of this section. \nExample 2 to paragraph (f): In the previous example, the former FTC employee arranges to meet with a Congressional staff \nmember to discuss the necessity of the proceeding. A current FTC employee is invited by the staff member to attend and is \nauthorized by the FTC to do so in order to present the agency; views. The former employee may not argue his new employer's \nposition at thatmeeting since his argume\n... [truncated, 4612 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/143 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=143]", "char_count": 4612}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 24 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 7 to paragraph (f): ABC Company has a contract with the. Department of Energy which requires that contractor \npersonnel work closely with agency employees in adjoining offices and work stations in the same building. After leaving the \nDepartmeat, a former employee goes to work for another corporation that has an interest in performing certain work related to \nthe same contract, and he arranges a meeting with certain ABC employees at the building where he previously worked on the \nproject. At the meeting, he asks the ABC employees to mention the interest of his new employer to the project supervisor, who \nis an agency employee. Moreover, he tells the ABC employees that they can say that he was the source of this information. The \nABC employees in own convey this information to the project supervisor. The former employee has made a communication to \nan employee of the Department of Energy. His communication is directed to an agency employee because he intended that the \ninformation be conveyed m an agency employee with the intuit that it be attributed to himself; and the circumstances indicate \nsuch a close working relationship between contractor personnel and agency employees that it was likely that the information \nconveyed to contractor personnel would be received by the agency. \n(g) On behalf of any other person—\n(I) On behalf of \n(i) A former employee makes a communication or appearance on behalf of another person if the former employee is acting \nas the other person's agent or attorney or it \n(A) The former employee is acting with the consent of the other person, whether express or implied; and \n(B) The former employee is acting subject to some degree of control or direction by the other person in relation to \nthe communication or appearance. \n(i) A former employee does not act on behalf\n... [truncated, 4824 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/144 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=144]", "char_count": 4824}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "LreaCC.iii0 -------------- \n-------\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 25 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 4 to paragraph (g): An Assistant Secretary of Defense participated in a meeting at which a defense contractor pressed \nDepartment of Defense (DOD) officials to continue thnding the contractor's sole source contract to detelop the prototype of a \nspecie/4W robot After terminating Government service, the former Assistant Secretary approaches the contractor and suggests \nthat she can convince her former DOD colleagues to pursue development of the prototype robot The contractor agrees that the \nformer Assistant Secretary's proposed efforts could be useful and asks her to set up a meeting with key DOD officials for the \nfollowing week. Although the former Assistant Sderetary is not an employee of the contractor, the circumstances establish that \nshe is acting subject to some degree of control or direction by the contractor. \n(h) Particular matter involving a specific party or parties--\n(1) Basic concept. The prohibition applies only to communications or appearances made in connection with a \"particular \nmatter involving a specific party or parties.\" Although the statute defines \"particular matter\" broadly to include \n\"any investigation, application, request for a ruling or determination, mien:taking, contract, controversy, claim, charge, \naccusation, arrest, orjudicial or other remedies,\" 18 U.S.C. 207(1X3), only those particular matters that involve a specific \nparty or parties fall within the prohibition of section 207(aX1). Such a matter typically involves a specific proceeding \naffecting the legal rights of the parties or an isolatable transaction or related set of transactions between identified parties, \nsuoh as a specific contract, grant, license, product approval application, enforcement action, administrative adjudication, \nor court case. \nExample Ito \n... [truncated, 4914 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/145 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=145]", "char_count": 4914}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 26 of \n31 \n2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. ¢ 2841.201 \nExample 4 to paragraph (6)(2): An employee in the legislative affairs office of the Department of Homeland Security \n(DHS) drafted official comments submitted to Congress with respect to a pending immigration reform bill. After leaving \nthe Government, he contacts DHS on behalf of a private organization seeking to influence the Administration to insist on \ncertain amendments to the bill. This is not prohibited. Generally, legislation is not a particular matter involving specific parties. \nHowever, if the same employee had participated as a DHS employee in formulating the agency's position on proposed private \nrelief legislation granting citizenship to a specific individual, this matter would involve specific parties, and the employee would \nbe prohibited from later making representational contacts in connection with this matter. \nExample 5 to paragraph (h)(2): An employee of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drafted a proposed rule requiring \nall manufacturers of a particular type of medical device to obtain pre-market approval for their products. It was known at the \ntime that only three or four manufacturers currently were marketing or developing such products. However, there was nothing \nto preclude other manufactures from entering the market in the future. Moreover, the regulation on its face was not limited in \napplication to those companies already known to be involved with this type of product at the time of promulgation. Because \nthe proposed rule would apply to an open-ended class of manufacturers, not just specifically identified companies, it would not \nbe a particular matter involving specific parties. After leaving Government, the former FDA employee would not be prohibited \nfrom representing a manufacturer in connection with the final rule or the application of the rule in any speci\n... [truncated, 5360 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/146 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=146]", "char_count": 5360}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 27 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's.... 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nExample 2 to paragraph (h)(3): A former employee in an agency inspector general's office conducted the rust investigation of \nits kind concerning a particular fraudulent accounting practice by a grantee. This investigation resulted inn significant monetary \nrecovery for the Government, as well as a settlement agreement in which the grantee agreed to use only certain specified \naccounting methods in the future. As a result of this case, the agency decided to issue a proposed rule expressly prohibiting \nthe fraudulent accounting practice and requiring all grantees to use the same accounting methods that had been developed \nin connection with the settlement agreement. The forme employee may represent a group of grantees submitting comments \ncritical of the proposed regulation. Although the proposed regulation in some impacts evolved from the earlier fraud case, \nwhich did involve specific parties, the subsequent rulemaking proceeding does not involve specific parties. \n(4) Preliminary or informal stages in a matter. When a particular matter involving specific parties begins depends on \nthe facts. A particular matter may involve specific parties prior to any formal action or filings by the agency or other \nparties. Much of the work with respect to a particular matter is accomplished before the matter reaches its final stage, \nand preliminary or informal action is covered by the prohibition, provided that specific parties to the matter actually have \nbeen identified. With matters such as grams, contracts, and other agreements, ordinarily specific parties are first identified \nwhen initial proposals or indications of interest, such as responses to requests for proposals (REP) or earlier expressions \nof interest, are received by the Government; in unusual circumstances, however, such as a sole source procu\n... [truncated, 5448 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/147 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=147]", "char_count": 5448}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 28 of \n31 \n§ 2541.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nsource contract with that mine firm for the new work. Even before the firm was contacted or expressed any interest \nconcerning the sole source contract, the former employee participated in meetings in which specifications for a potential \nsole source contract with the fiat were discussed. The fanner employee may not represent XYZ before the Government \nin connection with this manor. \n(S) Same particular matter—\n() ()aural. The prohibition applies only to communications or appearances in connection with the same particular matter \ninvolving specific parties in which the former employee participated as a Government employee. The same particular \nmatter may continue in another form or in part In determining whether two particular matters involving specific pasties \nare the same, all relevant factors should be considered, including the extent to which the matters involve the same basic \nfacts, the same or related parties, related issues, the same confidential information, and the amount of time elapsed. \n(ii) Considerations in the case of contracts, grants, and other agreements. With respect to matters such as contracts, grants \nor other agreements: \n(A) A new matter typically does not arise simply because there are amendments, modifications, or extensions of a \ncontract (or other agreement), unless there are fundamental changes in objectives or the nature of the matter; \n(B) Generally, successive or otherwise separate connects (or other agreements) will be viewed as different matters \n• from each other, absent some indication that one cor.tract (or other agreement) contemplated the other or that both \nare in support of the same specific proccednr& \n(C) A contract is almost always a single particular matter involving specific parties. However, under compelling \ncircumstances, distinct aspects or phases \n... [truncated, 4891 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/148 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=148]", "char_count": 4891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03k011 Page 29 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former \n5 C.F.R. ti 2641.201 \nExample 5 to the paragraph (hX5): In the previous example, certain changes in technology occurred since the date of the \noriginal contract, and the proposed contact modifications would require the additional shells to incorporate new design \nfeatures. Moreover, because of changes in the Army's internal system for storing and distributing shells to various locations, \nthe modifications would require Munitions to deliver its product to several de-centralized destinaticn points, thus requiring \nMunitions to develop novel delivery and handling systems and incur new transportation costs. The Army considers these \nmodifications to be fundamental changes in the approach and objectives of the contract and may determine that these changes \nconstitute a new particular matter. \nExample 6 to paragraph (1X5): A Government employee reviewed and approved certain wiretap applications. The prosecution \nof a person overheard during the wiretap, although not originally targeted, must be regarded aspartof the same particular matter \nas the original wiretap application. The reason is that the validity of the wiretap may be put in issue and many of the facts giving \nrise to the wiretap application would be involved. \nExample 7 to paragraph (hX5): The Navy awards an indefinite delivery contract for environmental remediation services in the \nnortheastern U.S. A Navy engineer is assigned as the Navy's technical representative on a task order for remediation of an oil \nspill at a Navy activity in Maine. The Navy engineer is personally and substantially involved in the task order (e.g., he negotiates \nthe scope of work, the labor hours required, and monitors the contractor's performance). Following successful completion of the \nremediation of the oil spill in Maine, the Navy engineer leaves Government service and goes to work for the Na\n... [truncated, 5085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/149 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=149]", "char_count": 5085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 0510312011 Page 30 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 \nperipheral issue. A finding of substantiality should be based not only on the effort devoted to a matter, but also on the \nimportance of the effort while a series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, the single act of approving or \nparticipating in a critical step may be substantial. Provided that an employee participates in the substantive merits of a \nmatter, his participation may be substantial even though his role in the matter, or the aspect of the matter in which ho \nis participating, may be minor in relation to the matter as a whole. Participation in peripheral aspects of a matter or in \naspects not directly involving the substantive merits of a matter (such as reviewing budgetary procedures or scheduling \nmeetings) is nor substantial. \nExample 1 to paragraph (i): A General Services Administration (GSA) attorney drafted a standard form contract and certain \nstandard terms and clauses for use in future contracts. A contracting officer uses one of the standard clauses in a subsequent \ncontract without consulting the GSA attorney. The attorney did not participate personally in the subsequent contract. \nExample 2 to paragraph (i): An Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attorney is neither in charge of nor dots she have official \nresponsibility for litigation involving a particular delinquent taxpayer. At the request of a co-waiter who is assigned \nresponsibility for the litigation, the lawyer provides advice concerning strategy during the discovery stage of the litigation. The \nIRS attorney participated personally in the litigation. \nExample 3 to paragraph (i): The IRS attorney in the previous example had no further involvement in the litigation. She \nparticipated substantially in the litigation notwithstanding that the post-discovery stages of the Litigation lasted for ten years \nafter th\n... [truncated, 4503 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/150 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=150]", "char_count": 4503}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "a \n...! \n..\n • • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 79-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 31 of \n31 \n§ 2641.201 Permanent restriction on any former employee's..., 5 C.F.Ft. § 2441.201 \n(2) Party or direct and substantial interest The United States may be a party to or have a direct and substantial interest in \na particular matter even though it is pending in a non-Federal forum, such as a State court. The United States is neither a \nparty to nor does it have a direct and substantial interest in a particular meter merely because a Federal statute is at issue \nor a Federal court is serving as the form for resolution of the matter. When it is not clear whether the United States is \na party to or has a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter, this determination shall be made in accordance \nwith the following procedure: \n() Coordination by designated agency ethics official. The designated agency ethics official (DAEO) for the former \nemployees agency shall have the primary responsibility for coordinating this determination. When it appears likely that \na component of the United States Government other than the former employee's former agency may be a party to or have \na direct and substantial interest in the particubr matter, the DAEO shall coordinate with agency ethics officials serving \nin those components. \n(ii) Agency determination A component of the United States Government shall determine if it is a party to or has a direct \nand substantial interest in a matter in accordance with its own interne/ procedures. it shall consider all relevant factors, \nincluding whether: \n(A) The component has a financial interest in the matter; \n(B) The matter is likely to have an effect on the policies, programs, or operations of the component; \n(C) The component is involved in any proceeding associated with the matter, e.g., as by having provided witnesses \nor documentary evidence; and \n(1)) The component has more than an academic interest in the outcome of the ma\n... [truncated, 3211 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/151 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=151]", "char_count": 3211}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 152, "text_content": ".??;. \n----\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 1 of 54 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2, \nPetitioners, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES, \nRespondent. \nUNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO JANE DOE NI AND JANE DOE #2'S \nMOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS \nACT AND REOUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE REMEDIES \nRespondent, United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, files its \nResponse to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime \nVictims Rights Act and Request for a Hearing on Appropriate Remedies, and states: \nI. \nINTRODUCTION \nThe issue before this Court is whether the petitioners, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2, had \nany rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), in the absence of a criminal charge being filed in the \nSouthern District of Florida, charging someone with the commission of a federal crime in which \npetitioners were victims. Resolution of this issue is a matter of statutory interpretation of the \nlanguage of the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA). \nWhether the government had a legal duty \nunder § 3771(a) is not resolved with reference to the position taken by employees of the \nDepartment of Justice (DOJ) in letters to the petitioners, or the defense attorneys representing \nJeffrey Epstein. Nor are the subjective beliefs of DO.1 employees relevant to the issue of \nwhether a duty existed under § 3771(a)(5) to consult with petitioners prior to entering into a Non-\n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000822 \nEFTA00230646\n", "char_count": 1613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 3 of 54 \ntreated with fairness and with respect for her dignity and privacy. \n5. \nThe Petitioner has been denied her rights in that she has received no \nconsultation with the attorney for the government regarding the possible \ndisposition of the charges, no notice of any public court proceedings, no \ninformation regarding her right to restitution, and no notice of rights under \nthe CVRA, as required under law. \n6. \nThe Petitioner is in jeopardy of losing her rights, as described above, if the \ngovernment is able to negotiate a plea or agreement with the Defendant \nwithout her participation and knowledge. \nWHEREFORE, for the reasons outlined above, the Petitioner respectfully \nrequests this Court to grant her Petition, and to order the United States Attorney to \ncomply with the provisions of the CVRA prior to and including any plea or other \nagreement with the Defendant and any attendant proceedings. \n(DE1 at 1-2.) \nOn the same day, the government was ordered by the Court to respond. (DE3). Two days \nlater, on July 9, 2008, the Government filed its Response and an accompanying Declaration, \nestablishing that (1) no federal criminal case charging Epstein had ever been filed and that a non-\nprosecution agreement (\"NPA\") had been signed and (2) despite this, the U.S. Attorney's Office \nhad used its best efforts to comply with the CVRA. (DE 6-8, 12-14.) \nOn July 10, 2008, the Court set the matter for a hearing on July 11, 2008. (DE 5.) At the \nhearing, Jane Doe #2 was added as a Petitioner. (DE15 at 14.) The Court inquired of Petitioners \nwhat remedy they sought, and Petitioners made clear that they wanted to invalidate the Non-\nProsecution Agreement with Epstein. (Id. at 12.). The Court recognized that Epstein had entered \nhis State court guilty plea in reliance on the NPA (id. at 20), and the Petitioners concurred (id. at \n20-21). Nonetheless, the Petitioners asked the Court \"to vacate the age\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/153 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=153]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 4 of 54 \nmatter?\" (Id. at 24.) The Petitioners said that there was not — \"Your Honor is correct in stating \nthat it is not an emergency and it doesn't need to happen today.. . . It doesn't seem like there will \nbe any prejudice to any party.\" (Id. at 26.)' \nTwo weeks later, on July 29, 2008, the government filed a notice informing the Court of \nits position that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing and that the matter was ready for \nruling. (DE17.) \nA few days later, Petitioners filed a response to the government's notice, arguing that the \ndocuments submitted by the government in its attachments to the Declarations it had filed \nshowed that violations of the CVRA had occurred and demanding the production of the NPA and \nthe report of an interview with Jane Doe #1.4 (DE19.) In that \"Response,\" the Petitioners asked \nthe Court to enter \"judgment in their favor that their rights under the CVRA have been violated.\" \n(Id. at II.) \nOn August 14, 2008, the Court held a status conference. (DE25.) The parties discussed \ntwo matters. First, there was a discussion of the status of the litigation. Second, there was a \ndiscussion of the Petitioners' request to have access to the NPA. With regard to the second topic, \nthe Court decided to order the government to make the NPA available to any and all identified \nvictims, so long as they agreed to abide by the terms of a Protective Order, and ordered the \nparties to work out the terms of such a Protective Order. (DE27 at 22-24.) \nAs to the first topic, the Court inquired of the Petitioners whether there was a sufficient \n'The Court also heard argument on whether the government's filings needed to remain \nunder seal. (Id. at 27-32.) \n'With regard to the report of the meeting with Jane Doe #I, the government informed the \nCourt that no report was ever prepared. (DE22.) \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000824 \nEFTA00230648\n", "char_count": 1960}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "• • • \n1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 5 of 54 \n`e\"\"*.r.4•7'n- -----\nfactual record for the Court to make its determination. Petitioners responded: \"I believe that you \ndo have a sufficient record, in that I don't think that — I think that we're in agreement that \nadditional evidence does not need to be taken in the case for Your Honor to make a ruling.\" \n(DE27 at 4 (emphasis added).) Petitioners also stated that, \"because of the legal consequences of \ninvalidating the current agreement, it is likely not in my clients' best interest to ask for the relief \nthat we initially asked for. So in order to effectively evaluate the situation and ask for the \nappropriate relief, we would just be asking Your Honor at this point in time to allow us to see the \nfull entire plea agreement ...\" (Id.) \nthe Court enquired, \"All right. And then if I grant that relief, you will evaluate the \nagreement and then decide whether to either dismiss your case or go forward and ask for some \nadditional relief?\" (Id.) \nPetitioners responded, \"That's correct, Your Honor.\" (Id. at 5.) \nOne week after the status conference, on August 21, 2008, the Court entered the agreed \nProtective Order, (DE26,) and the Petitioners were provided with a copy of the NM. More than \na month later, on September 25, 2008, Petitioners did not dismiss their action, but, rather, asked \nfor additional relief — that is, they filed a motion to unseal the NPA. (DE28.) On October 8, \n2008, the government responded (DE29), stating that the NPA was never filed with the Court \nand there was no reason to unseal the document. Petitioners filed a Reply on October 16, 2008, \n(DE30,) asserting, in part, that the failure to unseal the NM allowed the government to file \nfactually inaccurate Declarations. In the Reply, Petitioners again did not ask for any additional \nrelief, now that they had the NM in their possession, other than their renewed request to unseal \nthe NPA. (See DE30.) \n5 \n\n... [truncated, 2040 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/155 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=155]", "char_count": 2040}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 7 of 54 \nRights Act.\" (DE.48, 49, 50, 51.) This response follows. \nARGUMENT \nPetitioners are not entitled to any relief in this case for several reasons. First, as stated in \nthe government's response to Petitioners' Emergency Petition, CVRA rights do not attach in the \nabsence of federal criminal charges filed by a federal prosecutor. And crime victims cannot file a \nstand-alone suit to enforce those rights. This conclusion is required by the CVRA itself and \nseparation of powers principles. Second, despite owing no legal duty, the U.S. Attorney's Office \nused its best efforts to treat both Petitioners fairly as set forth in the original response to the \nEmergency Petition, and as further explained herein. Third, Petitioners' failure to prosecute this \ncase in a timely fashion has extinguished their desired remedy under Due Process principles. \nPETITIONERS HAD NO RIGHTS UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) BECAUSE \nCRIMINAL CHARGES WERE NEVER FILED AGAINST EPSTEIN \nIN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nThe CVRA appears in Title 18, \"Crimes and Criminal Procedure,\" and the procedures for \nenforcing the CVRA were implemented in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771; Fed. R. Crim. P. 60.6 The CVRA clearly states that it creates no civil \"cause of \naction for damages\" for victims and that it does not \"impair the prosecutorial discretion of the \nAttorney General or any officer under his direction.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX6). \"Crime victims \nhave not been recognized as parties, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not allow \nthem to intervene as parties to a prosecution.\" In re Amy Unknown, \nF.3d \n, 2011 WL \n988882 at •2 (5th Cr. Mar. 22, 2011). See also United States. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, \n'Fed. R. Crim. P. 60 was adopted on April 23, 2008 and made effective on December 1, \n2008. While this was after most of the relevant events in this case, it reenforces the CVRA's \n\n... [truncated, 2117 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/156 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=156]", "char_count": 2117}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 8 of 54 \n53 (1st Cir. 2010) (\"Notwithstanding the rights reflected in the restitution statutes, crime victims \nare not parties to a criminal sentencing proceeding. . .. Thus the baseline rule is that crime \nvictims, as non-parties, may not appeal a defendant's criminal sentence.\") \nWhile the CVRA provides specific procedures for what should occur if a victim is not \naccorded rights in \"any court proceeding involving any offense against a crime victim,\" in a \nfederal criminal case, such as a change of plea or sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(bX1), (d)(3), \nno mandates are provided in instances where no federal criminal charges are ever filed. \nOf the eight victims' rights set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), the petition alleges a \nviolation of § 3771(aX5), the right to consult with the attorney for the Government; § 3771(a)(2), \nthe right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding § 3771(a)(6), \nthe right to full and timely restitution as provided in law; and notice of their rights under the \nCVRA. \nIt is undisputed that no federal criminal charges have been filed against Jeffrey Epstein, in \nthe U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, pertaining to the sexual abuse of minors.?\nThe United States submits that, since there was no \"case\" pending in the Southern District of \nFlorida against Epstein, or any \"court proceeding\" involving an offense against Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe# 2, they cannot invoke any protections under the CVRA. \nTitle 18, United States Code, § 3771(aX5), provides that a \"crime victim\" has \"[t]he \nreasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.\" (emphasis supplied). \nIn its interpretation of a federal statute, the court assumes that \"Congress used words in a statute \n\"A district court may take judicial notice of public records within its files relating to the \nparticular case before it or other related cases\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/157 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=157]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on F LSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 9 of 54 \nas they are commonly and ordinarily understood,\" and reads the statute to give full effect to each \nof its provisions. United States' DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), citing \nUnited States,. McLymont, 45 F3d 400, 401(11° Cir. 1995). Section 3771(aX5) grants a \ncrime victim the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government \"in the case.\" \nThe phrase \"in the case\" must be considered since there is a canon of statutory construction that \n\"discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere \nsurplusage.\" Bailey'. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a \nstatute is intended to have \"particular, nonsuperfluous meaning\"). \nCongress intended the phrase \"in the case\" to mean a case filed in a federal court. Federal \ncriminal cases are filed in the United States district courts through the filing of a criminal \ncomplaint, Fed.R.Crim.P. 3, or indictment, Fed.R.Crim.P. 7. In each instance, an attorney \nrepresenting the United States Government is required to sign the complaint or indictment. \nFed.R.Crim.P. 7(eX1) provides that \"[the] indictment or information must be a plain, concise, \nand definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and must be \nsigned by an attorney for the government.\" Interestingly, section 3771(aX5) provides that a \ncrime victim has \"[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the \ncase.\" The exact phrase \"attorney for the government\" is used in both Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(eX1) \nand 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5), with the addition of the term, \"in the case,\" in latter provision. \nThus, each criminal case filed in the district court has an \"attorney for the Government\" \nrepresenting the sovereign United States. \nPetitioners attempt to distort the meaning of \"case\" by arguing that a case existed in June \n2007, when t\n... [truncated, 2129 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/158 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=158]", "char_count": 2129}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 159, "text_content": "1 r\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 10 of 54 \nview, a case commences when a law enforcement agency begins its investigation of a potential \ncrime. This interpretation is completely contrary to the text of section 3771(aX5), since there is \nno \"attorney for the government\" when a crime is first reported to a law enforcement agency. In \nmost instances, the law enforcement agency begins its preliminary investigation without \nconsulting the U.S. Attorney's Office. Only when it appears the investigation may generate a \npotential for an indictment does the investigative agency refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice. An \"attorney for the government\" appears only when a complaint or indictment is filed \nin the district court. \nFurther, as used in legal documents, the word \"case\" is a term of art that has long been \nunderstood to mean \"a suit instituted according to the regular course of judicial procedure.\" \nMuskrat' United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (Article HI \"case\" or controversy); see also \nBlack's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) 215 (\"case\" is a \"general term for an action, cause, suit or \ncontroversy at law or in equity\"). \"Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws or \ntreaties of the United States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, \nthen it has become a case.\" Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 356. A \"case,\" in other words, is an adversarial \ndispute where one party purposefully invokes the judicial power seeking an adjudication of their \nrights and obligations. ILL; see also Black's at 215 (defining \"case\" as \"a question contested \nbefore a court of justice\"). This general understanding is equally applicable to criminal \nproceedings. In Chavez  Martine:, 538 U.S. 760 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a \ncriminal \"case\" — as distinct from an investigation — \"at the very least requires the initiation of \nlegal proceedings.\" Id. at 766 (holding that police questioning during t\n... [truncated, 2163 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/159 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=159]", "char_count": 2163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 160, "text_content": "• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 11 of 54 \nIncrimination Clause) (citing Blyewl United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 595 (1871), and \nBlack's Law Dictionary). \nFinally, Congress's use of the definite article \"the\" in reference to the word \"case\" \nsupports respondent's view that \"the case\" implies a specific adversary proceeding rather than an \nindefinite ongoing investigation. Cf. Buntsfeld \nPadilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (use of \ndefinite article \"the person\" in 28 U.S.C. 2241's provision regarding a habeas custodian signifies \nthat there is usually only one proper custodian, and not several different ones). \nBecause there was not and is not any case against Epstein in the Southern District of \nFlorida, petitioners have no rights under § 3771(aX5) to consult with the attorney for the \nGovernment. The United States Attorney's Office was under no obligation to consult with \npetitioners prior to concluding its Non-Prosecution Agreement with Epstein. \nFor the same \nreason, petitioners' claim under § 3771(a)(2) also fails. There has been no \"public court \nproceeding\" against Epstein in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, since no \ncriminal case has been filed against him in the federal court. Consequently, there has been \nnothing for which the U.S. Attorney's Office was required to give notice to petitioners. \nA different provision in the CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b), also supports the Government's \ninterpretation of § 3771(aX5). \nSection 3771(b)(1) provides as follows: \nIn any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime \nvictim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the \nrights described in subsection (a). Before making a determination \ndescribed in subsection (aX3), the court shall make every effort to \npermit the fullest attendance possible by the victim and shall \nconsider reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from \nthe criminal proceeding. The reasons for \n... [truncated, 2132 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/160 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=160]", "char_count": 2132}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 161, "text_content": "Case 9:08-ov-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 12 of 54 \nThere is no \"court proceeding\" in this case because no federal criminal charges have been \nlodged against Jeffrey Epstein. \nSection 3771(b)(1) envisions that a district court presiding over \na criminal trial will be responsible for ensuring that a crime victim will be afforded rights granted \nin § 3771(a). \nSection 3771(a)(3), which is expressly referenced in § 3771(bX1), provides that a \ncrime victim has \nThe right not to be excluded from any such public court \nproceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing \nevidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be \nmaterially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that \nproceeding. \nThis provision contemplates that, in the event a defendant invokes the rule of sequestration in \nFed.R.Eivid. 615, the court must consider the crime victim's rights under § 3771(aX3), and can \nonly exclude the victim from the proceeding if the court fords there is clear and convincing \nevidence that the victim's testimony would be materially altered if the victim was allowed to hear \nother testimony at the proceeding. \nBy providing a difficult evidentiary standard which must be \nmet before a victim's right to be present in the court proceeding can be denied, Congress was \npurposefully limiting a court's discretion in sequestering trial witnesses, when the witness is a \ncrime victim. \nIn the instant case, there is no \"court proceeding\" since no federal criminal charges have \nbeen brought against Epstein. \nTherefore, § 3771(bX1) is inapplicable. There is no role for \nthis Court to fulfill under § 3771(b)(1).' \nsAs discussed, infra, this interpretation is buttressed by the Federal Rules Committee's \ndecision to incorporate the CVRA into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at Fed. R. Crim. \nP. 60. \n12 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000831 \nEFTA00230655\n", "char_count": 1917}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 162, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-1(Atvl Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 13 of 54 \nA. \nThe Venue Provision, Section 3771(4)(3), Does Not Support Petitioners' \nArgument That CVRA Rights Attach Prior to Formal Charges Being Filed \nPetitioners also attempt to buttress their argument by claiming that section 3771(dX(3), \nwhich sets forth the venue where a victim can seek relief, supports their view that the rights in \nsection 3771(a) attach before any criminal charges are filed. DE 48 at 26. Section 3771(d)(3) \nprovides, in pertinent part, that \"Whe rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the \ndistrict court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is \nunderway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" As the respondent \nexplained at the July 11, 2008 hearing, section 3771(4)(3) is a venue provision, which provides \nfor where a motion under that section shall be filed. Congress' provision of a location where a \nmotion can be filed does not lead to the conclusion that Congress also intended rights in section \n3771(a) to exist even if no federal criminal charges are ever filed. \nThe venue language in the CVRA states that rights \"shall be asserted ... if no \nprosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred,\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771(0)(3). Petitioners maintain that this provision establishes that the CVRA \ncontemplated a case such as this where no charges were ever filed. To the contrary, the \nSeparation of Powers doctrine and the full context of the CVRA counsel otherwise.* Here, \nBy making this suggestion, the government is not suggesting that this language is \nsuperfluous. Rather the period referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) is the time between arrest \nand indictment. As stated by the Supreme Court, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to \ncounsel, \"criminal prosecution\" does not commence with the filing of a complaint and issuance \nof an arrest \n... [truncated, 2451 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/162 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=162]", "char_count": 2451}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 163, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 14 of 54 \nPetitioners have not articulated what they are seeking. As set forth above in the Procedural \nHistory, originally, Petitioners sought to have the NPA set aside.10 (DEI5 at 12, 21.) They later \nexplicitly denied that they were seeking that remedy. (DE27 at 4.) The Court asked Petitioners \nto review the NPA and either dismiss their case or advise the Court promptly what remedy they \nwere seeking. (It) Thereafter, Petitioners asked only to have the NPA unsealed and made \nThe filing of a federal criminal complaint does not commence a formal \nprosecution. Rather, the main reason a law enforcement officer files such a \ncomplaint is to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. \n3, 4(a); United States'. Moore, 122 F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir.1997). The criminal \nprocess is still in the investigative stage, and \"the adverse positions of government \nand defendant\" have yet to solidify. The filing of the federal complaint, therefore, \ncan no more be characterized as \"the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings \nagainst the defendant,\" than can the filing of an affidavit in support of a search \nwarrant. \nUnited States. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 200 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States■. Gouveia, \n467 U.S. 180, 187, 189) (emphasis added). See also United States'. Langley, 848 F.2d 152 \n(11th Cir. 1988) (formal criminal prosecution does not commence upon issuance of arrest \nwarrant). \nDuring the period between the filing of a Criminal Complaint or a defendant's arrest \n(whichever occurs first), and the filing of an Indictment or an Information, several important \nevents will occur, including his initial appearance and bond hearing. There also may be pre-\nindictment plea negotiations. Also, if the defendant is arrested outside of the district where he \nwas charged, i.e., outside the district where the criminal activity occurred, the defendant may ask \nfor permission to\n... [truncated, 2791 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/163 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=163]", "char_count": 2791}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 164, "text_content": "i \n• \n• • \n;:!!,•.;••;;,;(1),..7..•:•.• • \nev.\"...Vt• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 15 of 54 \npublic. (DE28.) The Court denied that motion. (DE36.) Now, more than two years later, they \nhave asked the Court only to make a finding of a violation of the CVRA, asking that the issue of \nremedy be saved for a later date. \nThe fundamental rationale of the separation of powers doctrine is particularly compelling \nin the context of this case, the handling of criminal prosecutions. \"The Attorney General and \nUnited States Attorneys retain `broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. They \nhave this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him \ndischarge his constitutional responsibility to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'\" \nUnited States' Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Waytel. United States, 470 U.S. \n598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). \nThis broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute \nis particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the \ncase, the prosecution's general da‘stence value, the Government's enforcement \npriorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement \nplan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to \nundertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of \nparticular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal \nproceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's \nmotives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial \neffectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these are \nsubstantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the \ndecision whether to prosecute. \nWaytel. United States, 470 U.S.598, 607-08 (1985). See a\n... [truncated, 2466 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/164 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=164]", "char_count": 2466}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 165, "text_content": "• ! \nCrio,y -yet \n• \n--- 1 \nf \" , \"\":57 • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 16 of 54 \nFinally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice \nsystem that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge.\"). In the \nEpstein case, the U.S. Attorney's Office also had to balance its federal prosecutorial discretion \nwith its relationship with the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office in light of the pre-\nexisting state investigation. \nIn addition to the authorities cited above, the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler!. \nChaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), further supports the interpretation that the CVRA does not provide \nfor judicial intervention in a case where no criminal charges were ever filed against a defendant. \nIn Chaney, the Supreme Court held that an agency's decision to refuse enforcement of one of its \nregulations is unsuitable for judicial review, despite the existence of the Administrative \nProcedures Act (\"APA\"), like, in this case, the Justice Department's regulations on victim \nconsultations.\" See id at 831; see also American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today'. \nUnited States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 170 F.3d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 1999 (citing \n\"The reasons are identical to those that disfavor judicial intervention into prosecutorial \ndiscretion: \nFirst, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of \na number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency \nmust not only atsets whether a violation had occurred, but whether agency \nresources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely \nto succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits \nthe agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough \nresources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against \neach technical violation of the statute\n... [truncated, 2223 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/165 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=165]", "char_count": 2223}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 166, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket O4/08/2011 Page 17 of 54 \nChaney) (\"Agency actions are typically presumed to be reviewable under the APA.12 Importantly \nhowever, the Supreme Court has established a presumption against judicial review of agency \ndecisions that involve whether to undertake investigative or enforcement actions.\"). Thus, as \nexplained in Chaney, the existence of the APA and an agency's refusal to act, without more, will \nnot create a \"case or controversy.\" Chaney explained that, the agency's refusal is \"only \npresumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has \nprovided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.\" Chaney at \n833. \nThe CVRA reiterates the presumption created by the language contained in 3771(dX6) — \nthat there is no \"cause of action\" — and in 3771(f)(2)(D)— that there shall be no \"judicial review \nof the final decision of the Attorney General\" of any complaints of violations of the CVR.A. \nBlock v. Securities and Exchange Comm 'n, 50 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1995), is instructive. In \nBlock, petitioners filed a petition asking the Court to find that the SEC had failed to fulfill its \nobligation to hold a hearing and determine whether petitioners were \"interested persons\" under \nthe Investment Advisers Act. Id. at 1080. The SEC responded that its decision not to act upon \npetitioners' application was a decision not to enforce that is committed to the agency's discretion \nand, therefore, was not subject to judicial review under Chaney. Block at 1081. The D.C. Circuit \nfound that the Chaney rule applied: \nThe Supreme Court in Chaney provided no formula by which to determine \nwhether agency decisions of a particular type are \"decisions to refuse \nenforcement.\" The Court clearly included within that set, however, not only an \nagency's determination not to proceed against a recognized violation, but also its \nantecedent judgment upon the question \"whe\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/166 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=166]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 167, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLED Docket 04/08/2011 Page 18 of 54 \nBlock, 50 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831). \nThat type of inquiry is exactly the one requested by Jane Does #1 and #2 — did the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida violate the CVRA. Here, Petitioners' \nrequest should be examined with even greater caution than the average agency decision because \nit involves a decision regarding a criminal prosecution. \nAt least one district court has also recognized that finding a CVRA violation, especially \nof the right to be treated with dignity and respect — the right that is the primary focus of \nPetitioners' Motion for Finding of Violations — does not always provide a remedy, even when a \nfederal criminal case exists. In United States'. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), the \ndistrict court treated the victims with a fair amount of skepticism, and noted that the government \nbelieved that the victims were trying to use the CVRA as a mechanism to \"undo Rubin's guilty \nplea in exchange for a favorable settlement of their ongoing civil suit in California state court. \nMovants take vigorous exception to any [such] suggestion ...\" although the Court later noted \nthat the victims were attempting to use the CVRA to obtain discovery from the defendant. Id. at \n416, 425. With respect to certain CVRA rights, the Rubin court noted the lack of a remedy: \nThe CVRA also lists among the rights secured to a victim the right to \"be treated \nwith fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.\" 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(a)(8). As Magistrate Judge Orenstein observed in Turner \"Neither the text \nof the statute nor its legislative history provides guidance as to what specific \nprocedures or substantive relief, if an , Congress intended this provision to \nrequire or prohibit.\" [United States,. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (E.D.N.Y \n2005).] While this provision must be read liberally as giving courts and the \n\n... [truncated, 2532 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/167 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=167]", "char_count": 2532}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 168, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 19 of 54 \ntry impartially.. . . the Court refuses to adopt an interpretation of (aX8) that \nprohibits the government from raising legitimate arguments in support of its \nopposition to a motion simply because the arguments may hurt a victim's feelings \nor reputation. More pointedly, such a dispute is precisely the kind of dispute a \ncourt should not involve itself in since it cannot do so without potentially \ncompromising its ability to be impartial to the government and defendant, the only \ntrue parties to the trial of the indictment. \nId. at 428. Cf. Cole'. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1245 n.4 (D. \nMont. 2010) (Purported crime victims brought class action claim against FBI and U.S. Attorney's \nOffice for repeated failures to investigate and prosecute crimes involved Native American \nvictims asserting, inter alia, violations of the CVRA. District court dismissed most claims, \nincluding CVRA claims, noting that the alleged CVRA injury \"does not meet the requirements \nfor an injury-in-fact for standing purposes. The lost opportunities to receive benefits under the \ncrime victims statutes are too speculative to give rise to an Article III injury.\") \nB. \nConstruing the CVRA to Apply Before a Decision to Prosecute Federally Is Made \nWill Improperly Impair the Decision-Making Authority of the Executive Branch, \nin Contravention of the Legislative History of the CVRA \nThe ramifications of the position espoused by the Petitioners in this case are significant \nAnd those ramifications were understood by Congress. Thus, Congress maintained separate \nlegislation aimed at rights governing pre-charging protections, see 42 U.S.C. § 10607, and \nlegislation aimed at rights governing post-charging protections, that is, the CVRA. Senator Kyl \nnoted that the right to confer with the \"attorney for the Government in the case\" only applied post \ncharging: \nThis right to confer does not giv\n... [truncated, 2350 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/168 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=168]", "char_count": 2350}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 169, "text_content": "• \n?K-t. -••••• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on F LSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 20 of 54 \nto confer with the Government's attorney about proceedings after \ncha\ng. \n150 Cong.Rec. S4260, S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004)(statement of Sen. Ky1Xemphasis added). \nIn addition to issues of prosecutorial discretion described above, additional considerations \nprior to filing criminal charges include grand jury secrecy, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), and due \nprocess rights of persons under investigation. \nPetitioners' argument fails to take into account the admonition of Congress in section \n3771(d)(6) that In]othing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion \nof the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.\" \nIt is well-settled that \"the decision \nof whether or not to prosecute ... is a decision firmly committed by the [C]onstitution to the \nexecutive branch of the government.\" United States I Renfro, 620 F.2d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 1980). \nFurther, \"intervention by the court in the internal affairs of the Justice Department would clearly \nconstitute a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.\" Id. In Dresser Industries, Inc.. \nUnited States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1979), the court of appeals observed that tilt \ndecision to prosecute is largely unreviewable by the courts.\" citing United States. Cox, 342 \nF.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). \nThe logical corollary to this proposition is that, the decision not to \nprosecute, or to dispose of a matter by entering into a non-prosecution agreement, is also largely \nunreviewable by the courts. \nAn interpretation that the rights enumerated in section 3771(a) do not attach until formal \ncharges are filed in a district court comport with the notion of giving broad deference to the \nprosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General. Under petitioners' interpretation, a case is \ncommenced when a law enforcement agency begins to investigate to determine if a crime was \n20 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA\n... [truncated, 2023 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/169 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=169]", "char_count": 2023}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 170, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 21 of 54 \ncommitted. Under their view of section 3771(a)(5), a putative victim could file a motion with \nthe district court, in the district where the crime occurred, to complain that a law enforcement \nagency declined to refer a case for prosecution to the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the law \nenforcement agency did not afford him or her \"the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for \nthe Government in the case,\" prior to making its decision not to refer the case. It is only a small \nstep to the next phase, a motion to challenge the U.S. Attorney's Office's decision to decline \nprosecution, without having conferred with the putative victim prior to making the decision. \nEven if the U.S. Attorney's Office decided to seek a grand jury indictment, under \npetitioners' interpretation, a dissatisfied victim could file a motion challenging the Attorney \nGeneral's choice of the charges to bring, or who it chose to charge, by arguing the U.S. \nAttorney's Office did not confer with the victim prior to drafting the indictment. Of course, \nsuch judicial scrutiny is not available since \"[d]ecisions on whether to charge, who to charge, and \nwhat to charge, are all in the prosecutor's discretion.\" United States'. BP Products North \nAmerica, Inc., 2008 WL 501321 at *11, citing United States'. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 \n(1996Xquoting Bordenkircherl. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). \nAllowing claims like Petitioners' to proceed would open the inner workings of that \nprosecutorial discretion and the grand jury to judicial scrutiny exactly the outcome that the \nCVRA states is disallowed. \nFor example, in In re Petersen, 2010 WL 5108692 (N.D. ltd. Dec. 8, 2010), an individual \nand a corporation filed an emergency petition for enforcement of the CVRA, \"seeking an order \ncompelling the Department of Justice and United States Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. to \ncomply with the CVRA and to accord them va\n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/170 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=170]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 171, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 22 of 54 \nthe Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a),\" in a case where no charges were ever filed against the putative \ndefendants. Id. at •1. The petitioners claimed that they were victims of various federal crimes \nrelated to fraud, securities crimes, and money laundering, among others, and that the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for the Northern District of Indiana had \"refused to confer with them, denied \nthem their right to full and timely restitution, ... and demonstrated 'a total indifference and lack \nof respect to the victims of real estate and mortgage fraud crimes,' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(a)(5)-(8).'\" \nCiting the CVRA's express prohibition on impairing prosecutorial discretion, id. at *2, \nand noting that the court had \"no authority under the CVRA to compel the Attorney General to \npromulgate regulations, 'meaningful' or otherwise,\" id. at *3, the Petersen court dismissed the \nCVRA petition. Simply, \"the U.S. Attorney didn't have an obligation under the CVRA to confer \nwith the petitioners until after a charge was filed and a case opened, and the decision not to bring \ncharges against the alleged perpetrators was a matter of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to \nreview under the CVRA.\" Id. at *2. \nPetersen previews the reasons for limiting CVRA actions to cases where criminal charges \nhave already been filed. Failure to do so could divert limited prosecutorial and judicial resources \nto dealing with numerous frivolous claims. For example, any assault that occurs in a federal \nprison could be charged as a federal offense.\" The Bureau of prisons also has its own \nadministrative remedies for resolving prisoner disputes. Construing the CVRA in the way that \n\"See 18 U.S.C. § 113 (assault within territorial jurisdiction of the United States); United \nStates. Anderson, 528 F.2d 590, 591 (5th Cir. 1976) (in prosecution for assault with intent to \ncommit murder within territorial jurisdiction of \n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/171 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=171]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 172, "text_content": ",5tit;c7/.1.7/.7. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 23 of 54 \nPetitioners urge would require AUSAs to meet and confer with each and every prisoner who \nalleged that he or she was the victim of an assault from another prisoner. If the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice determined that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute, or exercised its discretion to \ndecline prosecution in favor of administrative remedies, the prisoner could, according to \nPetitioners, file a CVRA claim, and then a petition for mandamus that would have to be heard \nwithin 72 hours.\" At least one prisoner has filed exactly this type of suit, not once, but twice. \nSee Seamy'. NEN Paletz, 2007 WL 1875802 (D.S.C. June 27, 2007) (prisoner who alleged he \nwas victim of assault filed suit under CVRA attempting to force U.S. Attorney's Office, FBI, and \nBOP to prosecute alleged perpetrator); Seamy'. NFN Skinner, 2006 WL 1677177 (D.S.C. June \n16, 2006) (same). \nThese fears are not imagined — several individuals have tried to use the CVRA to force \nthe United States — via the federal courts — to act in ways never contemplated by the CVRA's \ndrafters. For example, a prisoner filed a writ of mandamus asking the Third Circuit Court of \nAppeals to find that the United States had violated his victims' tights under the CVRA by failing \nto file a Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence after he provided information against another \nprisoner who had committed theft from the prison. See In re Dawalibi, 338 Fed. Appx. 112, \n2009 WL 2186517 (3d Cir. 2009). The other prisoner had assaulted Dawalibi when he learned \nthat Dawalibi had provided information against him, and Dawalibi asserted that the failure to \naward a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction violated his right under the CVRA to be treated with \nfairness. See id., 338 Fed. Appx. at 113-14. \n\"Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(O(3), \"(i]f the district court denies the relief sought, the \nmovant may petition the court of appeals for a wri\n... [truncated, 2190 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/172 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=172]", "char_count": 2190}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 173, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 24 of 54 \nIn Sieverding l. United States Deft opus:ice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2010), the \ndistrict court discussed a series of claims brought by the Sieverdings, a husband and wife so well \nknown to the court for their \"abusive litigation practices\" that the district court \"imposed filing \nrestrictions\" on them and \"arrested and jailed [Mrs. Sieverding] for civil contempt several times \nbetween 2005 and 2007.\" Id. at 99 (citations omitted). Thereafter, the Sieverdings alleged \ndozens of Privacy Act and other violations stemming from these arrests and incarcerations. The \nallegations by Mrs. Sieverding included that: \nDOJ was required to meet with her and investigate (if not prosecute) her various \nallegations of criminal behavior [by FBI agents and Deputy U.S. Marshals in \nconnection with the court-ordered arrests]. She argues that the Justice for All Act \nof 200415 \"gives her the right to discuss her allegation of criminal acts and DOJ's \ndecisions to prosecute or not prosecute with a U.S. Attorney.\" .. . Ms. Sieverding \nalso alleges that the Justice for All Act and the Mandatory Victim's Restitution \nAct require DOJ to \"subpoena the parties whom she alleges committed federal \ncrimes that injured her.\" Similarly she contends that DOJ had \"a specific \nstatutory mandate to investigate alleged crimes and they chose not to.\" \nM at 110. Just as in Petersen, the Sieverding court dismissed these claims, relying on 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(dX6) (\"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of \nthe Attorney General or any officer under his direction.\"). The Court should do the same in this \ncase. \nAnalysis of Whether an Individual is a Victim Entitled to Protections under § \n3771(a) Is Based Upon the Criminal Charge Lodged By the United States \nGovernment in the United States District Court \nFederal court decisions construing the CVRA have focused upon the charges f\n... [truncated, 2317 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/173 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=173]", "char_count": 2317}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 174, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 25 of 54 \nsentence of its opinion, that \"[tjhe Crime Victim Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, \nprovides that victims of a federal crime may appear and be heard during some phases of the \nprosecution of the person charged with the crime.\" Id. at 1285-86 (footnote omitted and \nemphasis added). In Stewart, the issue was whether individuals who had purchased houses from \nvarious real estate developers were victims under the CVRA, when the purchasers were required \nto pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank \nof Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be \npaid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an \nExecutive Vice-President of Coast Bank, and defendant John Miller, president of American \nMortgage Link. \nCoon and Miller were charged in a one-count Information on October 15, 2008, with \nconspiracy to deprive the bank of honest services in violation of the wire fraud statute. Id. at \n1287. On November 5, 2008, Coon and Miller entered into a plea agreement with the \ngovernment. On the same day, Coon and Miller appeared before a Magistrate Judge to tender \ntheir pleas of guilty. The petitioners appeared and asked to be heard. Id. The government \nobjected, arguing that the petitioners were not victims of the offense charged in the information. \nThe Magistrate Judge agreed and denied the petitioners the right to be heard. Id. \nOn appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, \"[title question the petition presents is whether \npetitioners are victims of the criminal conduct as described in the information pending in the \ndistrict court.\" IS at 1288. Referencing the definition of victim in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c), the \nEleventh Circuit noted that, to determine a crime victim, first, the court identifies the behavior \nconstituting \"commission of a federal offense,\" and seco\n... [truncated, 2085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/174 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=174]", "char_count": 2085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 175, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSO Docket 04/08/2011 Page 26 of 54 \neffects of that behavior on parties other than the United States. Id. If the criminal behavior \ncauses a party direct and proximate harmful effects, the party is a victim under the CVRA. \nThe Eleventh Circuit ultimately found that the petitioners had been harmed because they \nhad to pay the extra one percent. In doing so, the appellate court examined the relevant criminal \nbehavior which formed the basis for the criminal violation charged in the information. Id. at \n1288-89. \nSimilarly, in United States. Tunic, 367 F.Supp.2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), the district \ncourt analyzed the means by which a court would identify the victims in a criminal case, when \napplying the definition in § 3771(e).16 \nNoting the presumption of innocence that a defendant \nenjoys, the court observed that it could presume no person would meet the definition of victim \nunless and until the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 326. This \napproach was rejected because it would produce an absurd result that the court assumed \nCongress did not intend. Next, the court found that, while the CVRA does not include an \nexpress provision preserving the presumption of a defendant's innocence, such a reasonable \nlimitation must be inferred as a matter of due process and to avoid an interpretation that would \nrender the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 326(citations omitted). The district court then \nconcluded: \nAccordingly, I interpret the definition in § 3771(e) to include any \nperson who would be considered a \"crime victim\" if the \ngovernment were to establish the truth of the factual allegations in \nits charging instrument. \n16 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) defines \"crime victim\" as \"a person directly and proximately \nharmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of \nColumbia.\" \n26 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000845 \nEFTA00230669\n", "char_count": 1957}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 176, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 27 of 54 \nId. (emphasis added). \nIn In Re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344 (6` Cir. 2010), the petitioner claimed he was a victim \nunder the CVRA in a prosecution of Arctic Glacier International, Inc., for participating in a \nconspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition by allocating packaged-ice customers in \nsoutheastern Michigan and the Detroit, Michigan, metropolitan area. McNulty had been an \nemployee of Arctic Glacier, and was told of the conspiracy. Id. at 346-47. When he refused to \nparticipate in the conspiracy, he was fired by Arctic Glacier. \nOn September 29, 2009, the United States government charged Arctic Glacier, in a sealed \ninformation, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 1. Id. at 347. Arctic Glacier and the government \nentered into a plea agreement on October 13, 2009, in which Arctic Glacier agreed to plead guilty \nto the charge; the parties agreed to recommend a fine of $9 million; and the government agreed \nnot to seek restitution. Id. \nAt the sentencing hearing held on February 22, 2010, the district court found that the \nvictims in the case were the customers of Arctic Glacier, and that McNulty was an employee of \nthe defendant, not a customer. Id. at 348. The court further found that there was no evidence \nMcNulty was directly or proximately harmed by the conspiracy for which Arctic Glacier was \nconvicted. Accordingly, the district court held McNulty was not a \"victim of the offense \ncharged in this case.\" Id. \nMcNulty sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). \nRelying upon appellate court decisions from other circuits, including Stewart, the Sixth Circuit \nfound that § 377I(e)'s definitional requirement that a victim be \"directly and proximately \nharmed\" encompassed the traditional \"but for\" and proximate cause analyses. Id. at 350, citing \n27 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000846 \nEFTA00230670\n", "char_count": 1934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 177, "text_content": "ff ell.;;;;;:t; ---\n------- 1 \nCase 9:O8-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 28 of 54 \nIn Re Rendon Galyis, 564 F.3d 170, 175 (2gd Cir. 2009). As applied to McNulty, the issue was \nwhether he was directly and proximately harmed by criminal conduct in the course of the \nconspiracy or if the actions taken by defendants in the underlying case which allegedly harmed \nMcNulty were merely ancillary to the conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit stated: \nIn making this determination, we must (1) look to the offense of \nconviction, based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or \nadmitted by defendant; and then (2) determine, based on those \nfacts, whether any person or persons were \"directly and \nproximately harmed as a result of the commission of [that] Federal \noffense. Id. at 351, citing United States'. Ad. States Cast Iron \nPipe Co., 612 F.Supp.2d 453, 536 (D.N.J. 2009). \nAgain, in determining whether an individual qualified as a victim, the appellate court looked to \nthe charging document, and the crime charged, to decide whether the individual had been directly \nand proximately harmed. In McNulty, the Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district \ncourt's conclusion that McNulty was not a victim. 597 F.3d at 351-52. The appellate court \nfound that the alleged harm to McNulty stemmed front his firing for refusing to participate in the \nconspiracy, and his \"blackballing\" from future employment with packaged-ice companies until \nhe stopped working with the government in exposing the conspiracy. \"If proven, these would \nindeed be halms to McNulty, but they are not criminal in nature, nor is there any evidence that \nthey are normally associated with the crime of antitrust conspiracy.\" Id. at 352. \nInterestingly, the Sixth Circuit observed that McNulty's firing and subsequent \nblackballing in the packaged-ice industry may have supported a charge of obstruction of justice. \nId. at 352 n.9. Nonetheless, the court found this to be irrelevant b\n... [truncated, 2269 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/177 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=177]", "char_count": 2269}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 178, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 29 of 54 \nRendon Galvis, 64 F.3d at 175. \nPlainly, the analysis of whether an individual is entitled to invoke rights provided in § \n3771(a) is based upon an examination of the criminal charge in the charging instrument. It \nfollows, therefore, that in the absence of any charging instrument, there are no rights under § \n3771(a). \nD. \nIn re Dean Is Inapplicable to this Case \nPetitioners rely heavily upon In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008). DE 48 at 27-31. \nThey argue Dean is \"remarkably similar\" to their case (DE 48 at 27), but close examination \ndemonstrates there are major differences which render Dean inapplicable. \nFirst, unlike here, a criminal charge was actually filed in Dean. The government in Dean \nfiled its criminal information on October 22, 2007, and defendant BP signed the plea agreement \ntwo days later. Id The information was unsealed, and notices sent to the victims in November \n2007 and January 2008, advising of scheduled proceedings and their tight to be heard. On \nFebruary 4, 2008, BP plead guilty at a hearing, and all victims who wished to be heard were \npermitted to speak. \nSecond, \"[b]efore bringing any charges, the government, on October 18, 2007, filed a \nsealed ex parte motion for 'an order outlining the procedures to be followed under the \n[CVRA]..\" Id at 392. The government invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2), applicable to cases \ninvolving multiple crime victims, and sought judicial review and approval of what the \ngovernment deemed was a \"reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not \nunduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.\" United States' BP Products North America, \nInc., 2008 WL 501321 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) at \" 2. The government announced to the court \n29 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000848 \nEFTA00230672\n", "char_count": 1860}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 179, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 30 of 54 \nthat a plea agreement was expected to be signed in about a week, and that because of the number \nof victims, consulting all the victims would not be practicable, and notifying the victims would \nresult in media coverage that could impair the plea negotiation process and might prejudice the \ncase in the event no plea was reached. Dean, 572 F.3d at 392. The district court granted the \ngovernment's ex pane motion, finding that notifying all the victims was impracticable due to \ntheir large number, and that extensive media coverage could prejudice the plea negotiation \nprocess or prejudice the case if no plea was reached. The court directed that, once an agreement \nwas signed, the government should provide reasonable notice to all identifiable victims and \nafford the victims of the rights set forth in the CVRA, prior to the actual entry of the guilty plea. \nId at 393. \nUltimately, the Fifth Circuit found the district court erred in entering its ex pane order \nbecause the fewer than 200 victims \"could be easily reached.\" Id. at 394-95. Additionally, the \nFifth Circuit assailed the district court's reasoning that any public notification of a potential \ncriminal disposition of the case, due to extensive media coverage of the explosion, would \nprejudice BP and could impair the plea negotiation process and could prejudice the case in the \nevent that no plea was reached. Id. at 395. The Fifth Circuit observed: \nIn passing the Act, Congress made the policy decision — which we \nare bound to enforce — that the victims have a right to inform the \nplea negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a \nplea agreement is reached. Id. \nIn the instant case, the U.S. Attorney's Office never invoked the Court's authority to \nobtain a dispensation on the application of the CVRA. Since no filing of federal charges was \ncontemplated, there was no need to seek Court approval of the manner in whic\n... [truncated, 2149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/179 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=179]", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 180, "text_content": "t••••••••••.,!,r \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 31 of 54 \nfiling criminal charges against BP, and thc provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) would become \napplicable. Since it expected to formally file the criminal charges after a plea agreement had \nbeen concluded, it needed to consult the Court to obtain judicial approval of what it deemed \nwould satisfy the CVRA. \nIn contrast, the U.S. Attorney's disposition of the Epstein matter was to enter into a non-\nprosecution agreement with him. Unlike a plea agreement, non-prosecution agreements are not \nsubject to judicial pre-approval. United Stalest Dorsett, 2009 WI. 2386070 at •4 (D.Neb. Jul. \n23, 2009)(\"Non-prosecution agreements are similar to plea agreements, except adherence to a \nnon-prosecution agreement is the responsibility of the prosecutor alone while a plea agreement is \nsubject to the approval of the court\"), and United States'. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 551 \nF.2d 1106, 1112 (13th Cir. 1977rThis was not a traditional plea bargain arrangement in which the \ntrial judge was a participant. Rather, it was a prosecutorial agreement, the inviolability of which \nrested completely in the province of the government prosecutors, who have sole power and \nresponsibility to institute criminal proceedings\"). Consequently, the U.S. Attorney's Office did \nnot invoke the authority of the Court, or file a formal charge against Epstein. These two key \ndistinctions, the absence of any invocation of the Court's authority and the absence of any formal \ncharge being filed, render Dean inapplicable to the instant case. \nIV. \nTHE SUBJECTIVE BPI WFS OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE \nOFFICIALS, THAT PETITIONERS WERE COVERED BY THE CVRA, ARE \nIRRELEVANT \nPetitioners next argue they are protected by the CVRA because the U.S. Attorney's Office \ntook that position in letters to Jane Doe #1 and to Epstein's attorneys. DE 48 at 31-33. Further, \npetitioners have assembled a list of purportedly unc\n... [truncated, 2089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/180 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=180]", "char_count": 2089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 181, "text_content": "red \n• \n4..4. \n• \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/0812011 Page 32 of 54 \nmessages and correspondence between U.S. Attorney's Office officials and the legal \nrepresentatives of Jeffrey Epstein, in the time surrounding the execution of the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement. In several of the e-mails, U.S. Attorney's Office personnel express the view that \nthe CVRA applied to petitioners, or that the CVRA obligated the U.S. Attorney's Office to take \ncertain actions with regard to the victims. \nPetitioners argue that the Government is somehow bound by the position taken in these e-\nmails and letters. This assertion is plainly incorrect. These e-mails authored by members of the \nU.S. Attorney's Office are \"merely a statement of assertion or concession made for some \nindependent purpose,\" and may be controverted or explained by the party who made it. Martinez \nI. Bally's Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476-77 (V' Cir. 2001), citing McNamara'. Miller, 269 \nF.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In contrast, a judicial admission is a formal concession in the \npleadings or stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the party making them. \nMartinez, 244 F.3d at 476. \nSignificantly, an admission is binding as a judicial admission only if it pertains to a fact, \nnot a legal conclusion. McCaskill. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 681-82 (7th Cir. \n2002)(Rovner, J., concurring). In Sulkofft United States, 2003 WL 1903349 (S.D. lad. 2003), \nthe United States filed its answer in a Federal Tort Claims Act case, in which it admitted that a \nphysician, Dr. Jackson, was an employee of the Veterans Administration at the time he treated \nthe plaintiff Sulkoff. Subsequently, the United States Attorney's Office became aware that Dr. \nJackson was not an employee of the United States. When the United States sought to amend its \nanswer, Sulkoff claimed the government was bound by its judicial admission that Dr. Jackson \nwas an employee of the United States. Id. at \n... [truncated, 2049 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/181 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=181]", "char_count": 2049}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 182, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 33 of 54 \nThe district court found that the United States' admission that Dr. Jackson was an \nemployee was not a judicial admission, because \"[w]hether Dr. Jackson was a federal employee \nunder the FTCA appears to be a question of law.\" Id.(citations omitted). The court also \nobserved that, \"[fjactual admissions can be binding as judicial admissions; admissions of legal \nconclusions cannot.\" Id.(citations omitted). See also Dabertint HCR Manor Care, Inc., 68 \nF.Supp.2d 998, 1000 (N.D. Dl. 1999)(\"It is well established that judicial admissions on questions \nof law have no legal effect.\")(citation omitted). \nInasmuch as judicial admissions, which are formally made in pleadings or stipulation by a \nparty or its counsel, cannot extend to legal conclusions, it follows that evidentiary admissions, \nwhich are not made in the course of the litigation itself, also cannot bind a party on a question of \nlaw. Simply stated, the subjective beliefs of some U.S. Attorney's Office officials that the \nCVRA applied to petitioners does not make it so. \nWhether any of the rights in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) applied to petitioners is a question of \nlaw, to be decided by this Court. Under petitioners' argument, the pre-litigation position taken \nby the U.S. Attorney's Office should be binding. Of course, if the same e•mails and letters \nexpressed the view that 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) did not apply until a formal charge was Sled, the \ngovernment doubts petitioners would be withdrawing their motion. If petitioners' argument is \ncorrect, then the resolution of whether rights accorded in § 3771(a) apply would depend upon the \nposition asserted by the government, prior to the litigation. Court decisions would be based \nupon what position the DOJ took prior to the inception of the litigation, what could lead to \nconflicting decisions, based not upon statutory interpretation, but the pre-litigation position taken \nby the Government\n... [truncated, 2119 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/182 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=182]", "char_count": 2119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 183, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLED Docket 04/08/2011 Page 34 of 54 \nletters are irrelevant to the resolution of the legal question of whether § 3771(a) applies prior to \nthe filing of a fortnal charge. \nCONSIDERING EACH OF THE CVRA RIGHTS SEPARATELY, THERE \nWAS NO CVRA VIOLATION \nAs set forth above, the CVRA did not apply because the U.S. Attorney's Office ultimately \nexercised its discretion to defer prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida. \nNonetheless, during its investigation, the agents and AUSA, in compliance with the Justice \nDepartment's guidelines on working with victims and witnesses, went above and beyond the \nlegal minimum requirements and provided information and assistance prior to the decision to \ndecline prosecution and even afterwards. Those guidelines encourage Justice Department \nemployees to do more than the legal minimum when possible and to treat victims and witnesses \nwith courtesy and respect. In doing so, the Court will see that, even if the CVRA had applied, \nthere was compliance. \n1. \nThe right to be reasonably protected from the accused \nThe first CVRA right is to be \"reasonably protected from the accused.\" 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(aX1). As explained in Rubin, some victims have fastened \"on this first enumerated right as \na wellhead of boundless authority to fashion protection for victims in the guise of 'protecting \nthem from the accused.' .. . Simply put, the 'accused' must be accused by the government, not \njust be someone complaining to the government that they have been the victim of a crime. The \nCVRA cannot realistically be read to create upon mere citizen complaint a self effectuating right \nto protection from the one accused, regardless of its impact on resources, any pending \ninvestigation or prosecutorial discretion.\" Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 420. Thus, according to the \n34 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000853 \nEFTA00230677\n", "char_count": 1915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 184, "text_content": "' \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 35 of 54 \nstatute's language, this first right only applies following a formal charge filed via a Criminal \nComplaint or Indictment.\" Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Petitioners were given letters in \napproximately June 2007 [Jane Doe #1] and August 2006 [Jane Doe #2) wherein they were \nadvised of this right and given the phone numbers of AUSA Villafaila, FBI Special Agent \nKuyrkendall, and the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime. The letters specifically \nadvised that if the Petitioners felt that they were \"being threatened or harassed, then please \ncontact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or [AUSA Villafafia]. (See DE14, Exs. 1 and 2.) \nIt is further undisputed that Jane Doe #1 actually took advantage of the offer of protection \nwhen Epstein's counsel began harassing her to take her deposition. Although not required to do \nso, the AUSA and agents handling the investigation went above and beyond the minimum \nrequired by law and secured legal representation for Jane Doe #1 in connection with that \ndeposition. (See DE14 ¶ 9.) \n2. \nThe right to notice of any public court proceeding, or release of the accused \nAgain, by definition, a \"public court proceeding\" requires the existence of a federal case. \nNonetheless, it is undisputed that the Petitioners were advised, through counsel, of the state court \nproceeding by the AUSA who conducted the federal investigation, so that the Petitioners, or their \ncounsel, could attend if they desired and could address the Court, either in person or via letters to \n\"The Victims Rights and Restitution Act (VRRA), 42 U.S.C. § 10607(c)(2), provides for \na crime victim to have \"reasonable protection from a suspected offender and persons acting in \nconcert with or at the behest of the suspected offender.\" Congress's use of the term \"suspected \noffender\" in the VRRA, and \"the accused\" in section 3771(a)(1) of the CVRA, demonstrates the \nintent to have the \n... [truncated, 2416 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/184 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=184]", "char_count": 2416}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 185, "text_content": "1-z \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 36 of 54 \nthe judge. They elected not to do so.\" \nAlthough not required to do so, the AUSA who conducted the federal investigation also \nattempted to keep the victims apprised of Epstein's release. These attempts were met with \nresistance from Epstein's counsel, who took the position that the CVRA required no such \nnotification and were evidence of overreaching by the AUSA conducting the investigation. \nNonetheless, the AUSA and agents attempted to go above and beyond on behalf of these victims. \nA request was made to the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office ('PBSO\") that it notify the U.S. \nAttorney's Office of Epstein's release so that further release notification could be made, but \nPBSO did not honor that request. \n3. \nThe right not to be excluded from public court proceeding \nThere is no dispute that the Petitioners have never been excluded from a public court \nproceeding. \n4. \nThe right to be reasonably heard at a public proceeding in the district court \nThere was no proceeding in the District Court, and there is no allegation that Petitioners \nwere ever kept from being heard at a public proceeding in the District Court.\" \n\"In the \"statement of undisputed fact,\" Petitioners suggest that, during negotiations for a \npossible plea to a federal charge, discussions of \"avoiding the press\" and handling the case in \nMiami were done so that the victims would not be informed of the case. This is directly \ncontradicted by the fact that, as shown, there was no obligation to inform the victims of the state \ncourt plea but, instead, the AUSA and agents who handled the federal investigation worked to \ncontact the identified federal victims to personally inform them of the state court hearing so that \nthey could attend. Instead, as will be explained, infra, as part of the duty to respect the victims' \nprivacy, the AUSA and agents sought a venue where the victims could participate in the process \nwit\n... [truncated, 2385 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/185 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=185]", "char_count": 2385}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 186, "text_content": "r•••••ft,..,..• \n• . . . \n1\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 37 of 54 \n5. \nThe reasonable right to confer with the government in the case \nAgain, the use of the words \"in the case,\" as opposed to \"in the investigation\" or \notherwise, by definition requires that a case — i.e., a filed federal criminal charging instrument —\nexist. Thus, because no federal criminal case was ever filed against Epstein, this statutory right \nto confer never ripened. \nNonetheless, AUSA Villafafia and the agents who conducted the federal investigation \nwent above and beyond the minimum statutory requirements. For example, it is undisputed that: \n(1) Petitioners were both advised of their right to consult with AUSA Villafaiia in August 2006 \nand June 2007 and were given her telephone number; (2) Petitioners both met with AUSA \nVillafaiia and the agents before the NM was signed in the context of witness interviews; (3) \nneither of them contacted AUSA Villafafia prior to the NPA being signed to discuss plea \nnegotiations or asked to be consulted regarding a plea;\" (4) there was never a time when \nPetitioners asked to consult with AUSA Villafaxia when she refused to meet with Petitioners; (5) \nwhen counsel for Petitioners contacted AUSA Villafaiia to ask her to consider certain evidence, \nshe encouraged counsel to send the evidence to her to review; and (6) at the time the Petitioners \nbecame interested in seeing Epstein prosecuted in January 2008, he had already signed the NPA. \nThus, by the time the Petitioners were interested in urging individuals at the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice to seek harsher punishment for Epstein, the decision to decline prosecution in favor of the \nstate's prosecution had already been made. \nprosecutorial decision, strategy or tactic regarding bail, release, plea, sentencing or parole.\" \nRubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (citation omitted). \n\"As is discussed in the Response to DE49, Jane Doe #2's position at the time of her \nintervie\n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/186 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=186]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 187, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 38 of 54 \n6. \nThe right to full and timely restitution as provided in law \nWith respect to restitution, the \"CVRA does not grant victims any rights against \nindividuals who have not been convicted of a crime. Concomitantly, neither the Government nor \nthe sentencing court are restricted by the CVRA from effecting reasonable settlement or \nrestitution measures against nonconvicted defendants.\" In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgt. Co., LLC, 409 \nF.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). In WR. Huff petitioners filed two writs of \nmandamus seeking to vacate settlement agreements of forfeiture actions between the United \nStates and members of the Rigas family. Two members of the Rigas family were convicted of \nsecurities fraud. A third was acquitted. Adelphia Communications Corporation (a company \nfounded by the Rigas family) entered into a non prosecution agreement with the Government, \npursuant to which it paid the Government $715 million for a Victim Compensation Fund. The \nRigas family members signed a proposed Settlement Agreement with the government consenting \nto forfeitures. As part of the Settlement Agreement, any victim who agreed to receive restitution \nfrom the Victim Compensation Fund had to agree to a release of all civil and other claims, \nincluding claims in bankruptcy court, against the Rips family, Adelphia, and other conspirators. \nThe district court approved the Settlement Agreement over the objection of the victims and the \nvictims filed the petitions for mandamus. \nOn appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the victims: \nTo the extent that the Government recognizes that victims would have difficulty \nin effecting any recoveries from the Rigas family members because of difficulties \nin proof of culpability and because of security interests affecting the family's \nassets, petitioners cannot meet their burden in showing that the Government or the \ndistrict court acted unreasonably \n... [truncated, 2255 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/187 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=187]", "char_count": 2255}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 188, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 39 of 54 \nrather took into consideration the numerosity of victims, the uncertainty of \nrecovery, and the prospect of unduly prolonging the sentencing proceedings when \nadopting the settlement, factors which Congress has required the court to \nconsider. See 18 U.S.C. § 377l(dX2). \nW11. Huff 409 F.3d at 564. \nIn this instance, as in W.R. Huff there was an un-convicted defendant, Epstein. Unlike in \nWit. Huff here Epstein was the only defendant. Nonetheless, the AUSA who investigated \nEpstein developed a procedure to provide for restitution, despite the fact that the \"CVRA does \nnot grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime.\" Id. \nThat procedure not only provided for funds and attorney representation, it also provided for \nprivacy and discretion, again to protect the victims' dignity. (See discussion, infra.) \n7. \nThe right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay \nThe use of the term \"proceedings\" again refers to a federal court proceeding. \nAccordingly, Petitioners have not alleged a violation of this right. Nonetheless, Petitioners do \ncomplain about the delay in notification between the time of signing the NPA and the notification \nof its existence at the time of Epstein's state court plea. As has been explained at hearings in this \nmatter, the delay stemmed from Epstein's appeal to higher authority within the Department of \nJustice. As will be further explained in the response to DE49, one of the bases for Epstein's \ncounsel to appeal to the Department of Justice — which has been explained to Petitioners' counsel \n— was the inclusion of Jane Doe #2 among the list of identified victims. The efforts of the AUSA \nand the agents to treat Jane Doe #2 with respect, despite her own insistence at the time that she \nwas not a victim — resulted in allegations of overreaching and prosecutorial misconduct. After \nseveral levels of review, the Senior Associat\n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/188 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=188]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 189, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 40 of 54 \nno misconduct. \n8. \nThe right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and \nprivacy \nThe Petitioners maintain that this right has been violated. Because there has been no \n\"court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim [where] the court shall ensure that \nthe crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a),\" Petitioners are alleging that \nthe \"employees of the Department of Justice \n. [failed to] make their best efforts to see that \ncrime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).\" 18 U.S.C. \n3771(6)(1), (cX1). It is undisputed that Jane Does #1 and #2 were notified of this right in August \n2006 and June 2007. (DE14 Exs. I and 2.) Thus the allegation is that best efforts weren't used \nto accord them these rights. Since this right is the only one that does not mention the existence \nof a court proceeding or an accusation, Petitioners are trying to assert through this right \neverything from the right to be advised of and veto pre-indictment plea negotiations, to a demand \nthat the prosecutor disregard her ethical obligation to treat opposing counsel and the putative \ndefendant politely. \nSo, for example, Petitioners make numerous allegations regarding efforts to mininthP\npress coverage, for example, \"the U.S. Attorney's Office was interested in finding a place to \nconclude a plea bargain that would effectively keep the victims from learning what was \nhappening through the press.\" (UE48 at 7.) Yet Petitioners admit that they were notified \nregarding the change of plea in state court. Petitioners also neglect to mention that numerous \nother victims were not willing to give up their privacy and were very concerned about family \nmembers learning that they were even connected to the Epstein case, much less that they were \n40 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000859 \nEFTA00230683\n", "char_count": 1970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 190, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 41 of 54 \nvictims. To allow them to participate in court proceedings, while maintaining their dignity and \nprivacy, the AUSA handling the case thought it was, balancing the competing interests of several \ndifferent girls, best to consider a venue outside of Palm Beach County. \nPetitioners also allege that they were not treated with respect when they received letters \nstating that the case was \"still under investigation\" after the NPA was signed. As noted above \nand in earlier presentations, after the NPA was signed, Epstein's counsel sought higher-level \nreview in the Department of Justice seeking to set aside the NM. The U.S. Attorney's Office \ndetermined that, if Epstein were not to abide by the terms of the NPA, then it wanted to be \nprepared to go forward with charges. Accordingly, the investigation of Epstein had to continue. \nThus, the letters sent to Jane Does #1 and #2 were not false. In fact, as set forth in Petitioners' \n\"Undisputed Facts,\" on \"January 31, 2008, Jane Doe #1 met with FBI Agents and AUSA's from \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office. She provided additional details of Epstein's sexual abuse of her.\" \n(DE48 at 17.) And, one of Petitioners' counsel's other clients, S.R., was originally interviewed \nin October 2007 and refused to provide information regarding Epstein. (DE14 at It 7.) During \nthe time that Epstein was challenging the NPA, the investigation continued and agents were able \nto conduct a more thorough interview of S.R. in May 2008, such that she was identified as a \nvictim who could benefit under the NPA. Thus, the \"undisputed facts\" themselves show that the \ninvestigation was ongoing. \nPetitioners also argue that \"[alt all times material to this statement of facts, it would have \nbeen practical and feasible for the federal government to inform Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 of \nthe details of the proposed non-prosecution agreement with Epstein . ..\" \nFirst, Jane Doe #1 was\n... [truncated, 2113 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/190 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=190]", "char_count": 2113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 191, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 42 of 54 \nbe prosecuted federally, shortly after the NPA was signed. (See DE14 at ¶ 8.) In Petitioners' \n\"Undisputed Facts,\" Petitioners allege that Jane Doe #1 was told that Epstein would enter a \nguilty plea to state charges, would register as a sex offender for life, and \"he had made certain \nconcessions related to the payment of damages to the victims, including Jane Doe #1.\" (DE48 at \n12.) Despite this, Petitioners suggest that it was \"quite reasonable\" for Jane Doe #1 to believe \nthat \"Jane Doe #1 also understood her own case was move [sic] forward towards possible \nprosecution.\" (Id.) It was not \"quite reasonable\" for Jane Doe #1 to believe that Epstein would \npay damages to Jane Doe #1 while still being exposed to criminal penalties for his conduct \ntowards Jane Doe #1. While Jane Doe #1 may not have understood this, it was not due to any \nmisleading behavior by the agents; it was simply a misunderstanding on Jane Doe # l's part. And \nthat misunderstanding was not a reasonable one. \nSecond, after Jane Doe #1 was notified about the NPA, Epstein's attorneys began their \nappeal to the Justice Department. Hence, there was a situation where there was a signed NPA \nthat provided, amongst other things, that the victim-witnesses would receive compensation from \nEpstein as a result of his resolution of the matter, but there also was a possibility that Epstein \nwould not perform the NPA. A determination was made to cease notifications for the simple \nreason that, if Epstein did not perform, and there was a trial, on cross-examination of the victim-\nwitnesses, Epstein would claim that the victims had been told, by the United States, that Epstein \nwould pay them if he were convicted. This concern was not an unfounded one. Epstein's \nattorneys actually made these baseless allegations in depositions and other court filings. (See, \ne.g., Jane Doei Jeffrey Epstein, , and Sarah Kellen, Court File No. 0\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/191 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=191]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 192, "text_content": "fmney,'\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 43 of 54 \nPetitioners' allegations provide further examples of why die CVRA contains the caveat \nthat nothing within the statute is meant to \"impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney \nGeneral or any officer under this direction.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX6). Petitioners simply cannot \nunderstand how their demands and allegations would have impacted the plan to prosecute \nEpstein. The AUSA and agents did use their \"best efforts\" to accord all of the tights to these and \nall of the identified victims. They also needed to preserve the possibility of prosecuting Epstein \nshould he violate or not perform the NPA. \nThese Petitioners' interests are adverse to several of the other victims. For example, they \nneglect to mention that several other victims obtained counseling services during the \ninvestigation through the efforts of the AUSA and agents. If the Petitioners succeed in using \nthese \"above and beyond\" efforts as proof of violations of the CVRA, it will preclude AUSAs \nand agents from offering such services in the future. \nFinally, if Petitioners succeed in convincing the Court to set aside the NPA, all of the \nvictims who obtained counsel and damages paid for by Epstein through the NM will be \nadversely affected. \nVL \nUNDER ELEVENTH CIRCUIT LAW, ESTOPPEL WILL NOT LIE AGAINST \nTHE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT ACTS IN ITS SOVEREIGN CAPACITY \nPetitioners argue the government should be estopped from denying that they had right \nunder the CVRA, due to its representations in letters to Jane Doc #1 and Jane Doc #2 that they \ndid have rights under § 3771(a). DE 48 at 33-36. \nThis argument should be rejected because \nthe government, under Eleventh Circuit law, cannot be estoppel when it is acting in its sovereign \ncapacity. \n43 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000862 \nEFTA00230686\n", "char_count": 1872}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 193, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 44 of 54 \nIn FDIC' Harrison, 735 F.2d 408 (11• Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit found that, \n\"(aJctivities undertaken by the government primarily for the commercial benefit of the \ngovernment or an individual agency are subject to estoppel while actions involving the exercise \nof exclusively governmental or sovereign powers are not.\" Id. at 411. In a subsequent case, \nUnited Stalest Vondereau, 837 F.24 1540 (I I* Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit observed: \nThis Court has held that for estoppel to apply against the \nGovernment (1) the traditional private law elements of estoppel \nmust have been present; (2) the Government must have been acting \nin its private or proprietary capacity as opposed to its public or \nsovereign capacity; and (3) the Government's agent must have \nbeen acting within the scope of his or her authority. \nId. at 1541, citing FDIC I Harrison, 735 F.2d at 410. \nIn this case, the Government was acting in its sovereign capacity when it investigated \nwhether Epstein had committed any federal crimes, and entered into the non-prosecution \nagreement with Epstein, which was an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. Nixon' United \nStates, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)(\"the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute \ndiscretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.\"). \nTherefore, estoppel will not lie against the \nGovernment. \nEstoppel will also not lie in this case because this Court's authority is limited by what \nlegal duties are created by section 3771(a). \"The proposition that the law alone defines the \nlimits of a court's power to enter a judgment can be traced to this Court's early precedents.\" \nLibretti'. United States, 116 S.Ct. 356, 371 (1995)(Stevens, J., dissenting). Just as a court's \nsubject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, MickkrI Nimishillen and \nTuscarawas Railway Co., 13 F.3d 184, 189 (6* Cir. 1993), and Intercontinental Dave! \n44 \n08-80\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/193 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=193]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 194, "text_content": "ovenfiedry#,\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 45 of 54 \nMarketing Inc. \nFDIC, 45 F.3d 1278, 1286 (9' Cir. 1994)(\"Estoppel may not prevent an \nobjection to subject matter jurisdiction, because such an objection to subject matter jurisdiction \nmay be raised at any time, by any party or the court.\"), estoppel cannot prevent the Government \nfrom contending it owed no duty to petitioners under section 3771(a). This Court's authority to \nenter a judgment is based on its determination whether any legal duties were owed to petitioners \nunder section 3771(a) in the absence of a formal charge being filed against Epstein. The \nGovernment cannot be estopped from maintaining that such duties did not exist. \nVII. \nPETMONERS' CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THEIR FAILURE \nTO PROSECUTE THEIR CASE EXPEDITIOUSLY AS REQUIRED BY THE \nCVRA \nAs explained above, at the initial hearing on the Emergency Petition, Petitioners stated \nthat their desired result was the setting aside of the NPA and the prosecution of Epstein. At the \nsecond hearing on the matter, counsel stated that they no longer wanted that remedy and stated \nthat they would inform the Court of their desired remedy upon reviewing the full NPA. \nHowever, after reviewing the NPA, no such notification was provided, other than filing a motion \nto unseal the NPA. And, although the most recent motion (DE48) contains no demand for a \nremedy, the clear suggestion is that Petitioners are seeking to set aside the NPA.21\nEpstein entered his guilty plea to state charges on June 30, 2008. At the time that \nPetitioners filed the Emergency Petition on July 7, 2008, Epstein had been imprisoned for seven \n21 See Jon Swaine, Duke of York to Face Fresh Questions as Epstein Case Takes New \nTwist, TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 11, 2011 (\"Several women who claim they were sexually \nabused by Epstein are challenging a plea bargain deal that enabled the billionaire to avoid being \ntried for offences that carried \n... [truncated, 2345 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/194 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=194]", "char_count": 2345}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 195, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 46 of 54 \n(7) days. At the time of the first hearing on the matter on July 11th, when the Petitioners made \nclear that they wanted to invalidate the NPA, Epstein had been imprisoned for eleven (11) days. \nAt that hearing, the Petitioners again stated that they wanted to invalidate the NPA, even though \nEpstein had entered his state court guilty plea in reliance on the NPA. (DE15 at 20.21.) The \nCourt asked Petitioners about whether the Court needed to rule on the Emergency Petition \nquickly, and the Petitioners said that the Court did not need to do so. (Id. at 26.) \nBriefing on the \"Emergency Petition\" was completed by August 1st, and the second \nhearing on the Petition was completed on August 14, 2008, wherein the Petitioners admitted that \nthe Court had a sufficient record and did not need to take any additional evidence in the matter. \n(DE19; DE27 at 4-5.) By this point, Epstein had served 49 days of his 18-month term of \nimprisonment. \nThereafter, other than Petitioners' motion to unseal the NPA, there was no further action \non the matter until the Court's Order to administratively close the case. Epstein was released \nfrom prison in July 2009 and his term of probation ended in July 201032\nThe CVRA's drafters understood that victims' rights of access needed to be balanced \nagainst defendants' rights to Due Process. Unlike victims' rights, which are only statutory \nconstructs, defendants' rights are guaranteed in the Constitution. Accordingly, the CVRA \ncontains strict time constraints. First, a \"district court shall take up and decide any motion \n22To be clear, the delay from October 28, 2010 through early March 2011 was due to the \nUnited States' efforts to reach amicable resolution of the case and the need to obtain an opinion \nfrom the Justice Department as set forth in the Status Report filed by the United States. (DE45.) \nThat additional delay is irrelevant to the analysis under the \n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/195 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=195]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 196, "text_content": "•\n \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 47 of 54 \nasserting a victim's right forthwith.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(4X3).\" Second, if the district court \ndenies the victim's motion, the victim may petition the court of appeal for a writ of mandamus \nand the \"court of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours \nafter the petition has been filed.\" Id. Third, in \"no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject \nto a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter.\" Id. Fourth, the \nCVRA specifies that \"Din no case shall failure to afford a right under this chapter provide \ngrounds for a new trial. A victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if .. . \n(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within 14 days . . .\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771(d)(5). \nThe First Circuit addressed how the conflict between the rights of victims and defendants \nis exacerbated by the passage of time in United States'. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. \n2010). In Aguirre-Gonzalez, a group of victims appealed an order of restitution, asserting that \nthey were improperly excluded from the restitution award. However, rather than seeking a writ \nof mandamus under the expedited procedure in the CVRA, the victims filed a \"regular\" appeal. \nThe Court of Appeals began by deciding that \"crime victims are not parties to a criminal \nsentencing proceeding [and) the baseline rule is that crime victims, as non-parties, may not \n[directly] appeal a defendant's criminal sentence;\" id. at 53 (extensive citations omitted); thus, \ncrime victims are limited to proceeding via mandamus. Id. at 54-55. \nNext, the First Circuit considered whether it could convert the crime victims' direct \nappeal into a petition for writ of mandamus. Although the parties agreed that the court had the \n\"The Federal Rules Committee interpreted this as: \"The court must promptly decide any \nmotion asserting a victi\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/196 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=196]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 197, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 48 of 54 \nauthority to do so, the First Circuit declined because of its effect on the Duo Process rights of the \ndefendant: \nThe CVRA plainly envisions that crime victims' petitions challenging a denial of \ntheir rights will be taken up and decided in short order. It requires expeditious \nconsideration by the district court, quick appellate review, and provides that a \nvictim may not move to disturb a defendant's plea or sentence unless, among \nother things, \"the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus \nwithin 14 days\" of the denial of the victim's motion in the district court. 18 \nU.S.C. §§ 37771(d)(3), 3771(dX5). We are mindful that the federal restitution \nstatutes are intended to protect victims, not defendants. See, e.g., United States'. \nRostoff, 164 F.3d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying VWPA). However, the \ncriminal justice system also has a strong interest in the finality of criminal \nsentences. Olsen'. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 69 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting society's \n\"interest in the integrity of the system of compromise resolution of criminal \ncharges\"); see Blackledgel Allison, 431 U.S. 63,71 (1977) (\"The guilty plea and \nthe often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's \ncriminal justice system . . . The advantages can be secured, however, only if \ndispotision by guilty plea are accorded a great measure of finality.\"); see also \nTeague'. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (\"The principle of fmality ... is \nessential to the operation of our criminal justice system.\") These finality concerns \nanimate the CVRA's procedural mechanisms. \nThe CVRA was in force when appellants elected to pursue a direct appeal rather \nthan petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have \npassed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we \nconclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief ... \nId\n... [truncated, 2650 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/197 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=197]", "char_count": 2650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 198, "text_content": "1 \nr\"C P49.rn\" \n• \nZ \n?.• \n1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 49 of 54 \ndraft of Rule 60. See 153 Cong. Rec. 58742, S8746 (June 29, 2007) (\"Federal district court judge \nPaul Cassell initiated the process [of incorporating the CVRA into the Federal Rules] by \nrecommending rule changes to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules.\") And Petitioners \nwere also well aware that Epstein was serving his prison sentence for his state court guilty plea, \nas administered by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, in accordance with the terms of the \nNPA. \nAgainst this backdrop, the Petitioners elected to focus on exercising their right to collect \ndamages from Epstein, and filed civil suits against him. Through those civil suits, they had the \nopportunity to have a public trial where they could have held him publicly accountable for the \nharms they alleged he caused them. Instead, they chose to enter into confidential settlement \nagreements with him. Only after those confidential settlement agreements were signed, and after \nEpstein completed his term of imprisonment and his term of community control, did the Court \nfile its administrative order closing the case, which prompted Petitioners to file their notice that \nthey intended to continue litigating this claim. \nPetitioners bear the burden of proof as to all stages of their claim, that is, (1) that there is \na justiciable case or controversy; (2) that there was any violation of the CVRA in this case where \nno federal charges were ever filed; and (3) that there is still a remedy available for the harm that \nwas alleged to have occurred and that Petitioners are entitled to that remedy despite their failure \nto proceed promptly. The remedy that is sought is an equitable one, because the CVRA clearly \nstates that no claim for damages is allowed, see 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6), and that remedy will \nimpact a non-party to this suit — Epstein. In deciding whether the Petitioners have shown th\n... [truncated, 2143 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/198 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=198]", "char_count": 2143}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 199, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 50 of 54 \nCourt should consider a comment from Washington Supreme Court Justice James M. DoInver. \n\"[E]mphasizing the conflict between the victim and the accused and placing the victim in the role \nof a quasi-prosecutor or co-counsel... represents a dangerous return to the private blood feud \nmentality.\" Dolliver, James, \"Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment A Bad Idea Whose \nTime Should Not Come,\" 34 Wayne L. Rev. 87, 90 (1987) (quoted in Levine, Danielle, \"Public \nWrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's Role in a System of Public Prosecution,\" 104 \nNw. U. L. Rev. 335, 353 (2010)). \nEveryone who has encountered the Epstein case has an opinion regarding the NPA, the \nstate court plea, the sentence imposed, and the way the sentence was served. If the civil \nsettlement agreements were made public, people would doubtless have differences of opinion on \nthose, as well. Nonetheless, the facts remain that Epstein entered his state court guilty plea in \nreliance on the NPA and he served his sentence. The Petitioners knew these facts and could have \nsought expedited review of their claim. They elected not to do so. As in Aguirre, the \nPetitioners' election not to seek expedited resolution should not be used to violate a criminal \ndefendant's Due Process rights. \nVIII. PETITIONERS LACK STANDING TO SEEK RELIEF UNDER SECTION \n3771(d)(3)\nBased on the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioners have no enforceable rights under \nsection 3371(a) because no charges were filed in the district court. Petitioners invoked section \n3771(d)(3) in seeking relief, but they lack standing to seek such relief since the rights provided in \nsection 3771(a) have not attached. In Balocol. Drummond Company, Inc., 631 F.3d 1350 (11th \nCir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit observed that the Supreme Court discussed the standing inquiry \n50 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000869 \nEFTA00230693\n", "char_count": 1959}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 200, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 51 of 54 \nas asking two questions, whether Article III standing exists, and whether the statute at issue \ngrants the purported plaintiff a means to seek relief under the applicable statute. Id. at 1355. \nRespondents believe petitioners cannot seek relief under section 3771(d)(3) because they \ncannot establish that the rights enumerated in section 3771(a) attached, in the absence of a formal \ncharge being filed. Consequently, petitioners lack standing. \nIX. \nPETITIONERS' MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT, AND REQUEST FOR \nHEARING. SHOULD BE DENIED \nThe statutory text, legislative history, and case authority support the view that the right to \nconfer enumerated in section 3771(aX5) does not attach until a formal charge is filed in the \ndistrict court. Therefore, petitioners' motion for enforcement should be denied. \nThe remedy petitioners seek is to have this Court set aside the non-prosecution \nagreement. DE 48 at 36-40. Assuming amend° that the Court finds the right to confer did arise \nin the absence of a formal charge being filed, respondents respectfully submit the Court would \nlack the authority to set aside the non-prosecution agreement. As stated previously, a non-\nprosecution agreement, unlike a plea agreement, is not subject to judicial pre-approvaL It is an \nexercise of prosecutorial discretion that is \"largely unreviewable.\" \nInasmuch as a non-prosecution agreement would not normally come before the Court for \njudicial scrutiny and approval, it should not come before the Court in the guise of a motion to \nenforce the CVRA. This would be contrary to section 3771(d)(6)'s clear intention that nothing \nin the CVRA should be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General. \nPetitioners contend that a violation of a right must have a remedy. However, this is not \nalways the case. Indeed, courts have recognized that a controversy is moot if effective relief \n51 \n08-80736-CV-MA\n... [truncated, 2026 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/200 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=200]", "char_count": 2026}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 201, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 52 of 54 \ncannot be granted. Continental Casualty Co.'. Fibreboard Corp., 4 F.3d 777, 778 (' Cir. \n1993). The non-prosecution agreement in this case was signed in 2007, and Epstein entered his \npleas of guilty in July 2008, in Florida circuit court. I k was sentenced by the state court, and \nhas served his sentence. Individuals who were sexually abused by Epstein have filed civil \nactions against him, relying upon certain provisions of the non-prosecution agreement. \nAny failure to confer under section 3771(aX5) does not render the non-prosecution \nagreement illegal, as petitioners suggest. A plea agreement that was entered into by the \ngovernment without having conferred with a victim can be disapproved by the district court, \nsince all plea agreements are subject to judicial scrutiny and approval. A non-prosecution \nagreement is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial pre-approval. While \npetitioners may assail the government's exercise of its discretion in this case, the exercise of that \ndiscretion is not subject to judicial review, either independent of a CVRA motion, or in \nconjunction with such a motion. \n52 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000871 \nEFTA00230695\n", "char_count": 1273}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 202, "text_content": "1\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 53 of 54 \nCONCLUSION \nPetitioners' motion for finding of violations of the Crime Victim Rights Act and request \nfor a hearing on appropriate remedies should be denied. \nRespectfully submitted, \nWIFREDO A. FERRER \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nBy: \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \nFla. Bar No. 0936693 \n99 N.E. 4th Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \n(305) 961-9320 \nFax: (305) 530-7139 \nE-mail: dexter.lee(a)usdoLtov \nAttorney for Respondent \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 8, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing document \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n53 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000872 \nEFTA00230696\n", "char_count": 790}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 203, "text_content": "• . \n. \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 54 of 54 \nSERVICE LIST \nJane Does 1 and 2 \nUnited States, \nCase No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nBradley J. Edwards, Esq., \nFarmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \n(954) 524-2820 \nFax: (954) 524-2822 \nE-mail: bradarloathtoiustice.com \nPaul G. Cassell \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, Utah 841 12 \n(801) 585-5202 \nFax: (801) 585-6833 \nE-mail: cassetp(4law.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 \n54 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000873 \nEFTA00230697\n", "char_count": 736}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 204, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johason \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 \nI.\nUNITED STATES \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION TO HAVE THEIR FACTS ACCEPTED \nBECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO CONTEST ANY OF THE FACTS \nCOME NOW Jane Doe til and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as \"the victims\"), by and \nthrough undersigned counsel, to move this Court to accept all of their facts in their Motion for \nFinding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The victims have been attempting to \nnegotiate with the Government for more than 30 months on a stipulated set of facts. Despite \nrepeated opportunities to advise the victims of what facts they are contesting, the Government in \nthe last few days has flatly declared that it will not discuss the facts in this case. This is violation \nof the Court's direction to the parties as well as the local rule on the subject. Accordingly, the \nGovernment should be deemed to have failed to contest the victims' facts and the Court should \nproceed to resolve this case on the basis of the victims' proffered facts. \nFACTUAL BACKGROUND \nThe victims have been attempting to reach an agreement on the facts surrounding this \ncase since filing their petition on June 7, 2008. In that petition, the victims' recited the facts as \nThe petition was initially filed on behalf of Jane Doe #1. Jane Doe #2 was quickly \nadded into the case. For simplicity, we will refer to the pleadings as having been filed by \"the \n1 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000874 \nEFTA00230698\n", "char_count": 1637}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 205, "text_content": "•riccoo70•••••-•-\n-Ft \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 10 \nthey understood them at the time — i.e., the victim asserted \"upon information and belie?' that \nthey understood that Epstein was involved in on-going plea negotiations with the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice for the Southern District of Florida. Victims' Petition (doe. #1) at 1. On July 9, 2008, the \nGovernment responded with a sealed response (quickly unsealed by the Court), that stated that \nan agreement had already been reached with Epstein. Government's Response to Victims' \nEmergency Petition (dos. #13). Two days later, the victims replied, explaining that they were \njust learning these facts from the Government's pleading. \nSee. e.g.. Victims' Reply to \nGovernment's Response (doe. #9) at 8. \nThe Court quickly scheduled a hearing on the victims' petition, held on July 11, 2008. \nThe Court discussed a need to \"hav[e] a complete record, and this is going to be an issue that's \n... going to go to the Eleventh Circuit, (so it] may be better to have a complete record as to what \nyour position is and the government's is as to what actions were taken.\" Tr. at 25-26. Counsel \nfor the victims explained: \" . . . I will confer with the government on this and if evidence needs \nto be taken, it [can] be taken at a later date.\" Tr. at 26. The Court concluded the hearing with the \nfollowing instructions: \"So I'll let both of you confer about whether there is a need for any \nadditional evidence to be presented. Let me know one way or the other. If there is, we'll \nschedule a hearing. If there isn't and you want to submit sonic additional stipulated information, \ndo that, and then I'll take care of this in due course.\" Tr. at 32. \nThe victims and the U.S. Attorney's Office then attempted to reach a stipulated set of \nfacts underlying the case. The U.S. Attorney's Office offered a very abbreviated set of proposed \nfacts, and the victims responded with a detailed set of proposed fa\n... [truncated, 2087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/205 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=205]", "char_count": 2087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 206, "text_content": "tw•Iir\"^\" \n• • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 10 \nvictims' specific facts, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office suddenly reversed course. On July \n29, 2008, it filed a Notice to Court Regarding Absence of Need for Evidentiary Hearing (dos. \n#17). \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office took the following position: \"After consideration, the \nGovernment believes that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary\" (dos. #17 at 1). The Office \nasserted that the Court need only take judicial notice of the fact that no indictment had been filed \nagainst Epstein to resolve the case. \nOn August 1, 2008, the victims filed a response to the Government's \"Notice\" (doe. #19), \ngiving a proposed statement of facts surrounding the case. The proposed statement of facts \nhighlighted the fact that the Government had signed a non-prosecution agreement containing an \nexpress confidentiality provision, which prevented the Government from disclosing the \nagreement to them and other victims. Id. at 5. The victims response also requested that the \nCourt direct the Government to confer with the victims regarding the undisputed facts of the \ncase, produce the non-prosecution agreement and other information about the case. Id at 14. \nOn August 14, 2008, the Court held a hearing on the case regarding the confidentiality of \nthe non-prosecution agreement. The Court ultimately ordered production of the agreement to the \nvictims. \nAfter the U.S. Attorney's Office made the non-prosecution agreement available to the \nvictims, the victims reviewed it and pursued further discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office. \nUltimately, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to reach a stipulated set of facts with \nthe victims and declined to provide further information about the case. \nWith negotiations at an impasse, the victims attempted to learn the facts of the case in \nother ways. In approximately May 2009, counsel for the victims propounded discovery requests \n3 \n08\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/206 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=206]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 207, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 10 \nin both state and federal civil cases against Epstein, seeking to obtain correspondence between \nEpstein and prosecutors regarding his plea agreement — information that the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice was unwilling to provide to the victims. Epstein refused to produce that information, and \n(as the Court is aware) extended litigation to obtain the materials followed. The Court rejected \nall of Epstein's objections to producing the materials. \nOn June 30, 2010, counsel for Epstein sent to counsel for the victims approximately 358 \npages of e-mail correspondence between criminal defense counsel and the U.S. Attorney's Office \nregarding the plea agreement that had been negotiated between them. See Jane Doe #1 and Jane \nDoe #2's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act and Request for a \nHearing on Appropriate Remedies, Attachment \"A.\" These e-mails fully disclosed for the rust \ntime the extreme steps that had been taken by the U.S. Attorney's Office to avoid prosecuting \nEpstein and to avoid having the victims in the case learn about the non-prosecution agreement \nthat had been reached between Epstein and the Government. \nIn mid-July 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 settled their civil lawsuits against \nEpstein. \nThen, armed with the new information, they turned to moving forward in the CVRA \ncase. \nOn September 13, 2010, the victims informed the Court that they were preparing new \nfilings in the case. \nOn October 12, 2010, the Court entered an order directing the victims to provide a status \nreport on the case by October 27, 2010. That same day, counsel for the victims again contacted \nthe U.S. Attomey!s Office about the possibility of reaching a stipulated set of facts in the case. \nThat same day, the U.S. Attorney's Office responded: \"We don't have any problem with \nagreeing that a factual assertion is correct if we agree that is what occurred\" (doc. #41 at 2). \n\n... [truncated, 2043 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/207 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=207]", "char_count": 2043}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 208, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 10 \nOn October 23, 2010, the victims e-mailed to the U.S. Attorney's Office a detailed proposed \nstatement of facts, with many of the facts now documented by the correspondence between the U.S. \nAttorney's Office and Epstein's counsel. The victims requested that the U.S. Attorney's Office \nidentify which facts it would agree to. In a letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office, the victims stated: \nIf you believe that any of the facts they propose are incorrect, Jane Doe #1 and Jane \nDoe #2 would reiterate their long-standing request that you work with us to arrive at a \nmutually-agreed statement of facts. As you know, in the summer of 2008 Jane Doe \n#1 and Jane Doe #2 were working with you on a stipulation of facts when you \nreversed course and took that position that no recitation of the facts was necessary \n(see doc. #19 at 2). . . . I hope that your e-mail means that you will at least look at our \nfacts and propose any modifications that you deem appropriate. Having that evidence \nquickly available to the Court could well help move this case to a conclusion. \nThat same day, the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed to forward the proposed statement of facts to the \nappropriate Assistant U.S. Attorney for review (doc. #41 at 2-3). \nOn October 26, 2010, rather than stipulate to undisputed facts, the U.S. Attorney's Office \ncontacted the victims' attorneys and asked them to delay the filing of their motion for a two-week \nperiod of time so that negotiations could  be held between the Office and the victims in an attempt to \nharrow the range of disputes in the case and to hopefully reach a settlement resolution without the \nneed for further litigation. Negotiations between the victims and the U.S. Attorney's Office then \nfollowed over the next two days. However, at 6:11 p.m. on October 27, 2010 — the date on which the \nvictims' pleading was due — the U.S. Attorney's Office informed the victims that it d\n... [truncated, 2538 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/208 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=208]", "char_count": 2538}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 209, "text_content": "??.W•2;1,5,5;;; .. ----------\n.. . \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 10 \nAs a result, purely as an accommodation to the U.S. Attorney's Office, on October 27, 2010, \nthe victims filed a report with the Court in which they agreed to delay filing their motion and \naccompanying facts for up to two-weeks to see if negotiations can resolve (or narrow) the disputes \nwith the U.S. Attorney's Office (doe. #41 at 4). Discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office dragged \non, including a meeting between Jane Doe #1 and the U.S. Attorney in December 2010. \nAfter further discussions failed to produce any agreement or other visible progress, the \nvictims informed the U.S. Attorney's Office that they would file their \"summary judgment\" \nmotion with the Court on March 18, 2011 and requested further cooperation from the Office on \nthe facts. \nUltimately, after months of discussion, the U.S. Attorney's Office informed counsel for \nthe victims that — contrary to promises made earlier to stipulate to undisputed facts — no such \nstipulation would be forthcoming. Instead, on March 15, 2011, the U.S. Attorney for the \nSouthern District of Florida, Wilted° A. Ferrer, sent a letter to the victims declining to reach any \nagreement on the facts: \nBecause, as a matter of law, the CVRA is inapplicable to this matter in which no \nfederal criminal charges were ever filed, your requests for the government's \nagreement on a set of proposed stipulated facts is unnecessary and premature. \nThat is, because whether the rights in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) attach prior to the filing \nof a charge in a federal court is a matter of statutory interpretation, resolution of \nthat question is not dependent upon the existence of any certain set of facts, other \nthan whether a charging document was ever filed against Jeffrey Epstein in the \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. And while this \nOffice remains willing to cooperate, cooperation does\n... [truncated, 2471 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/209 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=209]", "char_count": 2471}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 210, "text_content": "1\n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 10 \nLetter from Wifrcdo A. Ferrer to Paul G. Cassell (March 15, 2011).3\nAccordingly, the victims were left with no choice but to file a motion without stipulated \nfacts. Contemporaneously with the filing of this motion, the victims are filing a comprehensive \nMotion for Finding of Violations of the Cu= Victims' Rights Act and Request for a Hearing on \nAppropriate Remedies. The motion contains the detailed set of facts which the victims have long \nbeen attempting to discuss with the government. \nTHE COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CASE ON THE BASIS \nOF THE VICTIMS' PROFFERED FACTS. \nIn view of the deliberate decision by the U.S. Attorney's Office not to discuss with the \nvictims which facts they are disputing, the Court should resolve this case on the basis of facts \nthat the victims offer in their motion seeking a finding of violations of the CVRA. For more than \n30 months, the victims have given the U.S. Attorney's Office repeated opportunities contest their \nfacts, only to see the Office first commit to reviewing the facts, then later claim they did not have \nsufficient time to review the facts, and then ultimately renege on that commitment to review the \nfacts. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney's Office now argues that the facts are \"not relevant\" to the \ncourt's determination. If so, the Court should take up the U.S. Attorney's Office's position and \nsimply accept the facts that the victims proffer. If the U.S. Attorney's Office is correct that the \nfacts are irrelevant, they should not be heard to object when the victims propose a specific set of \nfacts for resolving this case. \n3 \nTo avoid any suggestion that the victims are disclosing confidential settlement \ndiscussions, we are not attaching a copy of this letter to this pleading. We believe, however, that \nthis paragraph is relevant to the issue before the Court and have accordingly reproduced it. See \nFed. R. Evict. 408(b) (while settleme\n... [truncated, 2167 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/210 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=210]", "char_count": 2167}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 211, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 10 \nThe Court should also accept the victims' facts because the U.S. Attorney's Office has \nviolated the local rules regarding stipulating to facts. Local Rule 88.10(O) contains a broad, \ncommonsense provision requiring the parties to work together to reduce disputes over the facts: \nThe Local Rule provides: \"The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to stipulate \nto all facts or points of law the truth or existence of which is not contested and the early \nresolution of which will expedite the trial.\" For more than two-and-a-half years, the victims \nhave been trying to get the U.S. Attorney's Office to stipulate to uncontested facts. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office, however, promised to do so, then refused to do so, then promised to do so, \nand now finally is refusing to do so. Because its failure to try and reach a stipulation is a clear \nviolation of the local rule, the Court should simply adopt the victims' facts. \nThe Court should also accept the victims' facts because the Government has failed in its \nduty to confer with the victims. Not only did this Court order counsel for the Government and \nthe victims to confer at the conclusion of the July 11, 2008 hearing, but the Crime Victims' \nRights Act specific afford to victims It]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nGovernment in the case.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). A fundamental part of conferring about a \ncase would at least be learning what the Government agrees were the facts in the case. But the \nGovernment is apparently unwilling to do even that. Accordingly, the Court should simply find \nthat the victims' understanding of the facts is correct and proceed to resolve this case on that \nbasis. \nCERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE \nAs recounted above, the victims have repeated sought to learn which facts the \nGovernment is disputing, but the Government has declined to review the facts with the victims. \n8 \n08-807\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/211 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=211]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 212, "text_content": "1 rncrtrnr -\n1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLED Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 10 \nCONCLUSION \nFor all the foregoing reasons, the Court should resolve this case on the basis of the facts \nthat the victims have offered. \nDATED: March 21, 2011 \nRespectfully Submitted, \ns/ Bradley J. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, \nEDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.I.. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nTelephone (954) 524-2820 \nFacsimile (954) 524-2822 \nFlorida Bar No.: 542075 \nE-mail: Imad@pathtojustice.com \nand \nPaul G. Cassell \nPro Hac Vice \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, UT 84112 \nTelephone: 801-585-5202 \nFacsimile: 801-585-6833 \nE-Mail: cassellp@law.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000882 \nEFTA00230706\n", "char_count": 864}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 213, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSO Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 10 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nThe foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's \nCM/ECF system: \nA. Marie Villafafla \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n(561) 820-8711 \nFax: (561) 820-8777 \nE mail: ann.marie.c.villafana(ieusdoj.gov \nAttorney for the Government \nJoseph L. Ackerman, Jr. \nFowler White Burnett PA \n777 S. Flagler Drive, West Tower, Suite 901 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nCriminal Defense Counsel for Jeffrey Epstei \n(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) \n10 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000883 \nEFTA00230707\n", "char_count": 684}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 214, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 1 of 15 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOES #1 AND #2, \nPetitioners, \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nRespondent. \nUNITED STATES' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO \nJANE DOES #1 AND #2'S MOTION TO HAVE \nTHEIR FACTS ACCEPTED BECAUSE OF \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO CONTEST ANY OF THE FACTS IDE491 \nThe United States, by and through the undersigned, hereby opposes Petitioners' Motion to \nhave their \"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts\" accepted as true 03E49]. Petitioners argue that \nthe Court should accept their Statement as true, despite its conclusory allegations and internal \ninconsistencies, solely because of the United States' failure to stipulate to the Statement. The Court \nshould deny the motion because: (1) Petitioners have misstated that United States' efforts at reaching \nagreement on the Statement; (2) the \"Undisputed Material Facts\" are irrelevant, as Petitioners have \npreviously acknowledged; (3) agreeing to the \"Undisputed Material Facts\" demanded by Petitioners \nwould have required the United States to violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(c) and/or \nconstitutional and ethical mandates; and (4) the United States is not obligated to agree to any \"facts,\" \nespecially those that are incomplete or false. \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000884 \nEFTA00230708\n", "char_count": 1418}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 215, "text_content": "tt,\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 2 of 15 \nBACKGROUND \nIn DE 49, Petitioners ask the Court to accept as true their proposed \"Statement of Undisputed \nMaterial Facts\" contained in DE48 because they claim that the United States has failed \"to advise \nthe victims of what facts they are contesting.\" Petitioners then spend several pages making \nunsupported assertions and reciting from letters and email correspondence in an attempt to persuade \nthe Court to adopt as true the Petitioners' averments even when the falsity of some of those \"facts\" \nis apparent from the text itself. \nContrary to their assertions, the Petitioners have not been attempting to negotiate with the \ngovernment for more than 30 months. As set forth in the Procedural History Section of the United \nStates' Opposition to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime \nVictim Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), at the last hearing on the Petitioners' Emergency Petition, on August \n14, 2008, counsel for Petitioners stated to the Court, \"I believe that you do have a sufficient record, \nin that 1 don't think that — I think that we're in agreement that additional evidence does not need to \nbe taken in the case for Your Honor to make a niling.\" (DE27 at 4 (emphasis added).) \nThereafter, there was no contact regarding the CVRA petitioner for years — until the Court \nissued its administrative order closing the case. A flurry of activity ensued. Efforts  were made to \nresolve the matter amicably, without success, including allowing the Petitioners, that is Jane Does \n#1 and #2, and their counsel, the opportunity to meet with the U.S. Attorney, as Jeffrey Epstein's \nattorneys did.' \nDespite the Petitioners' earlier statement to the Court that no additional facts were needed, \nmany hours were spent trying to revise the Petitioners' proposed statement of facts so that it would \n'Only Jane Doe #1 and her counsel elected to attend a meeting with the U.S. Attorn\n... [truncated, 2048 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/215 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=215]", "char_count": 2048}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 216, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80136-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 3 of 15 \ncontain only facts, not argument, not inferences, not incorrect innuendos.' Even after the U.S. \nAttorney's Office advised Petitioners that the Justice Department's position was that the CVRA's \nrights only attached upon the filing of federal criminal charges and, hence, that none of the \nPetitioners' proposed facts were relevant, further attempts were made. Petitioners' counsel, \nhowever, demonstrated no interest in proposed compromises. Specific factual corrections also were \nsuggested and rejected' Thus, counsel for Petitioners know that some of the proposed \"undisputed \nmaterial facts\" are in fact disputed and, in many cases, wrong. \n2The U.S. Attorney's Office also repeatedly reminded Mr. Cassell of the Justice \nDepartment's policy not to comment on the guilt or innocence of an unconvicted person. The \nABA's Model Rule of Professional Conduct on the SpecialResponsibilities of a Prosecutor contains \nsimilar guidance. For example, there has been no civil or criminal fording by any judge or jury that: \ndefendant Jeffrey Epstein (a billionaire with significant with significant political \nconnections) sexually abused more than 30 minor girls at his mansion in West Palm \nBeach (sic), Florida, and elsewhere. Epstein performed repeated lewd, lascivious, \nand sexual acts on them, including (but not limited to) masturbation, touching of their \nsexual organs, using vibrators or sexual toys on them, coercing them into sexual acts, \nand digitally penetrating them. Because Epstein used a means of interstate commerce \nand knowingly traveled in interstate commerce to engage in abuse of Jane Doe #1 \nand Jane Doe #2 (and the other victims), he committed violations of federal law, \nincluding repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. \n(DEA8 at 3-4' 1.) Jane Does No. 1 and No. 2 had the opportunity to prove these allegations at trial \nbut elected to sign confidential settlement agreements where, presu\n... [truncated, 2529 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/216 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=216]", "char_count": 2529}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 217, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 4 of 15 \nARGUMENT \nI. \nALL OF THE \"UNDISPUTED FACTS\" ARE IRRELEVANT. \nIn their motion asking the Court to accept as true all of their purported \"undisputed material \nfacts,\" Petitioners rely on only two citations, the CVRA's \"right to confer with the attorney in the \ncase\" and Local Rule 88.10(0), which governs discovery in criminal cases. \nLocal Rule 88.10(0) reads: \"The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to \nstipulate to all facts or points of law the truth and existence of which is not contested and the early \nresolution of which will expedite the trial.\" (Emphasis added.) Contrary to Petitioners' suggestion, \nreaching agreement on Petitioners' \"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts\" would not expedite \nthe resolution of this matter. As the United States has explained since August 1, 2008, at the very \nstart of the litigation, (see DEI9,) — and as admitted by Petitioners during the hearing on August 14, \n2008, (see DE27 at 3) — no additional facts are needed for the Court to resolve the Emergency \nPetition and Petitioners' Motion seeking a finding that the CVRA was violated. The only material \nfact is that the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida never filed federal \n°Whether or not the CVRA applies is the central question in dispute in this maser because \nno federal criminal case was ever filed against Jeffrey Epstein and one is certainly not pending now. \nThe undersigned knows of no case where the •right to confer with the attorney in the case\" has been \ninterpreted to allow victims to demand that the Government confer repeatedly—even after good faith \nefforts at reaching compromise have failed — in a case filed by victims against the Government \npursuant to the CVRA. Nonetheless, Petitioners' argument seems to be that, because they aver that \nthe CVRA applies, the Government's failure to accord them their very expansive reading of the \n... [truncated, 2783 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/217 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=217]", "char_count": 2783}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 218, "text_content": "1\n.i i r-\nate':\n, \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 5 of 15 \ncriminal charges against Jeffrey Epstein. That fact is undisputed. \nAccordingly, all of the \"facts\" contained in Petitioners' statement are not \"material\" and the \nresolution of those \"facts\" will not \"expedite the trial.\" Quite simply, all of the allegations, \ninferences, and innuendos contained in Petitioners' statement serve no purpose relevant to this \nlitigation. \nH. \nAGREEING WITH MANY OF PETITIONERS' \"FACTS\" WOULD HAVE \nVIOLATED FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) AND/OR CONSTITUTIONAL \nMANDATES. \nSeveral of the \"facts\" that Petitioners include allege that Epstein and others have committed \ncrimes for which they were never charged or convicted. Others refer to matters that were occurring \nbefore the grand jury. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, constitutional mandates, and the \nABA Model Rules on the Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor address several of the items to \nwhich the Petitioners asked the Government to agree. The Government correctly refused to agree \nto those \"facts,\" and the Petitioners cannot now use that refusal to ask the Court to adopt those \n\"facts\" as true. \nA. \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) \nRule 6(e) states that \"an attorney for the government\" \"must not disclose a matter occurring \nbefore the grand jury.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(0)(2)(3).5 Courts have construed \"a matter occurring \nbefore the grand jury\" to include \"events which have already occurred before the grand jury, such \nas a witness's testimony, [and] matters which will occur, such as statements which reveal the identity \nof persons who will be called to testify or which report when the grand jury will return an \n5Pctitioncrs have no similar obligation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2XA). \n5 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000888 \nEFTA00230712\n", "char_count": 1850}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 219, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 6 of 15 \nindictment.' In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1980). \nWhile Petitioners were merely asking the Government to agree with their assertions of \"fact\" \nbased upon materials Petitioners had received from counsel for Epstein, rather than asking the \nGovernment to make affirmative disclosures of grand jury material, \"Rule 6(e) does not create a type \nof secrecy which is waived once public disclosure occurs.\" In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 \nF.3d 496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting in re North,16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). \"[E]ven \nif material concerning the grand jury investigation had been disclosed to the public, the Government \nattorney ... had a duty to maintain grand jury secrecy. This attorney could neither confirm nor deny \nthe information presented by the 'external party.\"' Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico'. \nUnited States Dep't of Justice, 1992 WL 119127 at *3 (D.D.C. May 13, 1992) (citing Barry. \nUnited States, 740 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.D.C. 1990) (\"Rule 6(e) does not create a type of secrecy \n'It is worth noting that, within the same case, a court can take differing positions on this. \nCompare: \n[Title disclosure of information obtained from a source independent of the grand jury \nproceedings, such as a prior government investigation, does not violate Rule 6(e). \nA discussion of actions taken by government attorneys or officials, e.g., a \nrecommendation by the Justice Department attorneys to department officials that an \nindictment be sought against an individual does not reveal any information about \nmatters occurring before the grand jury. Nor does a statement of opinion as to an \nindividual's potential criminal liability violate the dictates of Rule 6(e). \nWith: \nDisclosures which expressly identify when an indictment would be presented to the \ngrand jury, the nature of the crimes which would be charged, and the number of \npers\n... [truncated, 2385 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/219 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=219]", "char_count": 2385}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 220, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 7 of 15 \nwhich is waived once public disclosure occurs. The Government is obligated to stand silent \nregardless of what is reported, accurate or not, by the press.\").) \nThe reasons for Rule 6(e) are multiple: \nIn addition to preventing adverse pretrial publicity about a person who may be \nindicted and subsequently tried, secrecy protects the reputation of a person under \ninvestigation who is not indicted. The secrecy requirement also encourages reluctant \nwitnesses to testify without fear of reprisals from those against whom testimony is \ngiven, prevents tampering with grand jury witnesses in an effort to alter their trial \ntestimony, and 'permits the grand jury to deliberate free from the influence of \npublicity. Finally, secrecy prevents disclosures to persons who may be interested in \nthe investigation if the facts are known or might attempt to escape if they have reason \nto believe certain indictments will issue. \nUnited States. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States. Procter & \nGamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958)). \nSeveral of the \"facts\" contained in Petitioners' submission contain allegations related to \nmatters occurring before the grand jury. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), the Government cannot \nconfirm or deny the accuracy of those allegations. \nB. \nDue Process and the ABA Rule for Prosecutors \nAs noted above, one of the reasons behind 6(e) is to protect the reputations of persons who \nare under investigation but not indicted. This is a corollary to what the Court of Appeals found to \nbe a due process protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution — \nnamely, \"that the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth Amendment protect an individual from \nbeing publicly and officially accused of having committed a serious crime, particularly where the \naccusations gain wide notoriety.\" See In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1106\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/220 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=220]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 221, "text_content": "VA FA ri\ne' \nr \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on F LSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 8 of 15 \nomitted)! In Smith, the petitioner filed a motion seeking to have his name stricken from the factual \nproffers of two criminal defendants. Smith had not been criminally charged or convicted. The Court \nof Appeals agreed with Smith, castigating the Government \nno legitimate governmental interest is served by an official public smear of an \nindividual when that individual has not been provided a forum in which to vindicate \nhis rights... . \n[W]e completely fail to perceive how the interests of criminal justice were advanced \nat the time of the plea hearings by such an attack on the Petitioner's character. The \npresumption of innocence, to which every criminal defendant is entitled, was \nforgotten by the Assistant United States Attorney in drafting and reading aloud in \nopen court the factual resumes which implicated the Petitioner in criminal conduct \nwithout affording him a forum for vindication. \nId. at 1106, 1107. The Court of Appeals ordered the District Court Clerk's Office to \"completely \nand permanently obliterate and strike from the records of the pleas of guilty . . . any and all \nidentifying reference to or name of Mr. Smith, the Petitioner, so that such references may not be used \nas a public record to impugn the reputation of Petitioner.\" Id. at 1107. The Court further ordered \nthat all of the pleadings in the case be sealed. Id. \nCourts have interpreted Smith to apply not only to references to unindicted co-conspirators \nin indictments and factual proffers, but also to motion papers. See, e.g.. United States'. Anderson, \n55 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1168 (D. Kan. 1999) (\"After carefully reviewing the government's moving \npapers on the conflict of interest issue, the court can find no reason why the government might have \n'forgotten' the presumption of innocence in such a public pleading .. .') (citing Smith, 656 F.2d at \n1107); United States, Holy Land Foundation, \n... [truncated, 2364 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/221 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=221]", "char_count": 2364}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 222, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 9 of 15 \nin pm-trial brief). \nThe Model Rules further advise prosecutors not to engage in comments that \"have a \nsubstantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.\" (ABA Model Rule 3.8.) \nIn Petitioners' \"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,\" they included allegations related \nto crimes for which Epstein and several other individuals were neither charged nor convicted. \nPursuant to Smith and its progeny, and as previously explained to Petitioners' counsel, the \nGovernment denies all such allegations, including but not limited to the allegations contained in \nparagraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 37, 52, and 53.s\nIR \nTHERE IS NO LEGAL OBLIGATION THAT THE UNITED STATES \nADMIT OR DENY THE PETITIONERS' \"FACTS,\" MANY OF WHICH ARE \nFALSE. \nAlthough docketed as a Civil Case, the CVRA does not provide for a civil cause of action. \nSee, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX6). Rather, the CVRA creates rights for victims in federal criminal \ncases where criminal charges have already been filed. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(bXI) (\"In any court \nproceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim \nis afforded the rights described in subsection (a).\"); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 60 (incorporating \nCVRA into Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). Thus, there is no obligation in this case, as there \nmight be in a case governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where sovereign immunity was \nwaived, that requires the United States to make any evidentiary disclosures. \nPetitioners next rely on Local Rule 88.10(O), which governs discovery in criminal cases. \nFirst, no standing discovery order has been entered because no criminal proceedings are pending. \naft should be noted that Petitioners preface many of these allegations with afalse imprimatur \nof FBI findings. Compare, for example, paragraph 5 with the pages cited in support thereof. \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n\n... [truncated, 2021 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/222 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=222]", "char_count": 2021}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 223, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 10 of 15 \nSecond, victims are not \"parties\" to criminal proceedings. See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, \nF.3d \n2011 WL 988882 at •2 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2011). (\"Crime victims have not been recognized \nas pasties, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not allow them to intervene as pasties to \na prosecution.); United States'. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2010) \n(\"Notwithstanding the rights reflected in the restitution statutes, crime victims are not parties to a \ncriminal sentencing proceeding.). Third, many of Petitioners' asserted \"facts\" are not facts at all, but \ninstead arc inferences, legal conclusions, or innuendos. And, most importantly, many arc plainly \nfalse. \nAs stated above, the United States does not believe that any of these issues arc material to \nthe resolution of the Emergency Petition or Jane Does #1 and #2's Motion for Finding of Violation \nof the CVRA [DE1 and DE48]. Nonetheless, to correct misstatements in the record, the United \nStates points out the following examples of areas where Petitioners have included \"undisputed facts\" \nthat arc known to them to be in dispute. \nPrior to Epstein's state court plea, Jane Doe #2 was represented by counsel for Epstein, was \nadverse to any investigation of Epstein, and contacted other potential victim-witnesses and advised \nthem not to speak to investigators. When interviewed by the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office, \nJane Doe #2 denied any sexual abuse by Epstein and said that Epstein was an \"awesome man\" and \nthat she would marry hint Jane Doe #2 further expressed a belief to the government that Epstein \nshould not be prosecuted. \nJane Doe #2 not only made the government's investigative efforts more difficult, she also \nmade the victim notification process more difficult. A great deal of the complaints made by the \nPetitioners come from the delay between the time that Epstein signed the NPA on September 24, \n10 \n0\n... [truncated, 2039 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/223 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=223]", "char_count": 2039}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 224, "text_content": "• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 11 of 15 \n2007, and when he actually entered his guilty plea on June 30, 2008. (See DE 48 at V 25, 32, et \nseq.) As set forth in their \"Statement of Undisputed Facts,\" this was the period when Epstein \n\"sought higher level review within the Department of Justice.\" (Id. at 1 32.) As is known to \nPetitioners, but as they neglected to mention in their \"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,\" one \nof the unfounded allegations made against AUSA Villafafia by Epstein's counsel during the \"higher \nlevel review\" was that she \"wrongfully\" tried to include Jane Doe #2 among the list of Epstein's \nvictims. Ironically, these same attempts to protect lane Doe #2's rights are now being used by Jane \nDoe #2 to allege violations of the CVRA. \nPetitioners also allege that the letters sent to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 during the period \nwhen Epstein was pursuing Justice Department review, which stated that their cases were still under \ninvestigation, were false. Yet Petitioners know that the investigation was ongoing because, as stated \nin their own \"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,\" on \"January 31,2008, Jane Doe #1 met with \nFBI Agents and AUSA's from the U.S. Attorney's Office.\" (DE48 at 17.) And another individual \nrepresented by Petitioners' counsel was interviewed on May 28, 2008. These and other interviews \nwere conducted so that, if Epstein did not follow through with the NPA, the Office would be ready \nto address that situation as appropriate. Thus, the investigation was, in fact, continuing. \nThe Petitioners also know that the terms of the NPA were disclosed to Jane Doe #1 shortly \nafter the NPA was signed. Jane Doe #1 avers that she believed that Epstein agreed to pay damages \nto her, but agreed that he would still be federally prosecuted for criminal charges based on crimes \nallegedly committed against her. Petitioners aver that it is a \"fact\" that this was a \"quite reasonable \nunderstan\n... [truncated, 2222 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/224 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=224]", "char_count": 2222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 225, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 12 of 15 \nhowever, that it was \"quite reasonable\" to believe that a criminal defendant would agree to pay \ndamages to Jane Doe #1 as part of his resolution of a criminal case involving another victim while \nstill agreeing that he could be criminally charged for acts involving Jane Doe #1. \nFurthermore, Petitioners know well that one of the reasons why the terms of the NPA were \nnot disclosed to additional victims when Epstein began appealing to the Justice Department was \nbecause of concerns that, if Epstein did not follow through with the NPA and federal criminal \ncharges were thereafter filed against him, Epstein's counsel would argue at trial that the victims had \nbeen told, by the prosecution team, that they would receive money if they claimed that they had been \nvictimized by Epstein. l'his was not a frivolous concern; such allegations actually were raised by \nEpstein's counsel in depositions of some of the identified victims that were filed before this Court. \nPetitioners also suggest that efforts were made to move proceedings to Miami to keep these \nPetitioners from learning of court proceedings. Yet, it is undisputed that Petitioners were notified, \nthrough counsel, of the only public court proceeding — Epstein's state court plea and sentencing — \nand were specifically invited to attend. The Petitioners also know that some of the victims in the \nease were terrified that their family members might learn of their connection to the investigation and \nthat other victims had privacy concerns that were very different than those of Petitioners. Having \nthe proceedings outside the glare of the victims' hometown press would have allowed those other \nvictims to participate while maintaining some semblance of privacy. \nPetitioners also reiterate baseless allegations made against AUSA Villafalia regarding the \nchoice of the attorney-representative for the victims, despite knowing that: (1) the\n... [truncated, 2254 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/225 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=225]", "char_count": 2254}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 226, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 13 of 15 \nelected to use a Special Master (retired U.S. District Court Judge Edward Davis) to make the final \nselection. \nThe Petitioners also know that the AUSA, the agents, and the FBI's victim-witness \ncoordinator obtained counseling services for some of the identified victims. And Petitioners are well \naware that the AUSA even provided notifications of Epstein's work release status. \nParagraph 17 of Petitioners' filing also misstates a provision of the NPA. Petitioners stated \nthat Iltjo obtain an attorney paid for by Epstein, the victim would have to agree to proceed \nexclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (i.e., under a law that provided presumed damages of $150,000 \nagainst Epstein[.]\" Section 2255 actually provides minimum presumed damages of $150,000, not \na \"cap\" of $150,000. \nThere are a number of additional inferences and legal conclusions interspersed in the \n\"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,\" which the Government denies. For example, contrary \nto Petitioners' contentions, the Government denies that notifying the victims about the NPA would \nhave violated the NPA (DE48 at 10, ¶ 18); and that the U.S. Attorney's Office wanted the NPA to \nbe kept confidential to avoid public criticism or to avoid victims from convincing \"the judge \nreviewing the agreement not to accept it\" (DE48 at 11, 1 19). The Government denies these and all \nother unsupported innuendos advanced by Petitioners. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the reasons set forth herein and in the United States' Response to Jane Does #1 and #2's \nMotion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims Rights Act and Request for a Hearing on \nAppropriate Remedies, the Petitioners' \"Statement of Undisputed Facts\" is completely irrelevant to \nthe Court's determination of the merits of this case. As both of the parties agreed shortly after the \n13 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000896 \nEFTA00230720\n", "char_count": 1941}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 227, "text_content": "• w'rern\"----\n1 \n- \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 14 of 15 \nfiling of the Emergency Petition, the Court had all of the relevant facts back in August 2008 and the \nmatter was ready to be decided. \nPetitioners cannot demand that the Government agree to their allegations, innuendos, and \nlegal conclusions, especially when many of them would run afoul of Rule 6(e) and the Fifth \nAmendment and others are clearly false. Accordingly, Petitioners' Motion to Have Their Facts \nAccepted should be denied. \nRespectfully submitted, \nWIFREDO A. FERRER \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nBy: \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \nFla. Bar No. 0936693 \n99 N.E. 4' Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \n(305) 961-9320 \nFax: (305) 530-7139 \nE-mail: dexter. lee(ratusdoi•nov \nAttorney for Respondent \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 7, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing document \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n14 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000897 \nEFTA00230721\n", "char_count": 1093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 228, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 15 of 15 \nSERVICE LIST \nJane Does 1 and 2 \nUnited States, \nCase No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nBradley J. Edwards, Esq., \nFarmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \n(954) 524-2820 \nFax: (954) 524-2822 \nE-mail: bradtkpathtoiustice.com \nPaul G. Cassell \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, Utah 84112 \n(801) 585-5202 \nFax: (801) 585-6833 \nE-mail: casselrQlaw.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 \n15 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000898 \nEFTA00230722\n", "char_count": 725}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 229, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLS0 Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 15 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80136-Civ-Mant/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 \nI \nUNITED STATES \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING THE U.S. \nATTORNEY'S OFFICE NOT TO WITHHOLD RELEVANT EVIDENCE \nCOME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as \"the victims\"), by and \nthrough undersigned counsel, to move for an order from this Court directing the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice not to suppress material evidence relevant to this case. The Court should enter an order, \nas it would in other criminal or civil cases, requiring the Government to make appropriate \nproduction of such evidence to the victims. \nBACKGROUND \nIn discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office about this case, counsel for Jane Doe #1 \nand Jane Doe #2 inquired about whether the Office would voluntarily provide to the victims \ninformation in its possession that was material and favorable to the victims' case. Victims' \ncounsel pointed out that, if they were criminal defense attorneys representing criminals, the \nOffice would promptly turn over all information in its possession that was helpful to these \ncriminals under Brady. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and related decisions. Victims' counsel \nasked the Office to extend to the victims the same assistance that it would provide to criminal \n1 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000899 \nEFTA00230723\n", "char_count": 1469}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 230, "text_content": "C. nee ..... \n• \ny••••••••••••••••,••••••••, ••• \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 15 \ndefendants — i.e., to voluntarily provide to the victims information in its possession that was \nfavorable to the victims' CVRA case. \nIn response, victims' counsel were informed by the Office that it could - and would --\nwithhold from the victims such information, apparently on the theory that the CVRA does not \napply to these case or on the theory victims lack due process rights under the CVRA. The \nvictims accordingly have been forced to file this motion, seeking an order from the Court \ndirecting the U.S. Attorney's Office to produce to the victims favorable information. \nThe victims are entitled to such information for four separate reasons. First, the U.S. \nAttorney's Office is statutorily-obligated to use it \"best efforts to see that crime victims are . . . \naccorded[] the rights described in [the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1) (emphasis added). The \nOffice flouts this best efforts obligation when it deliberately withholds favorable information \nfrom the victims. \nSecond, just as criminal defendants are entitled to receive favorable information in the \nGovernment's possession under due process rights, see, e.g., Brady. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 \n(1963), victims are entitled to receive favorable information under their CVRA \"right to be \ntreated with faimess,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX8) — a right that clearly includes due process \nconsiderations. The U.S. Attorney's Office is not treating the victims with fairness if it \nwithholds the very information that might enable them to prove their case. \nThird, the U.S. Attorney's Office has obligations under the civil discovery rules to \nvoluntarily provide information to the victims. See Fed. R Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (initial disclosures in \ncivil cases). The victims' action has been opened as a civil case, and the U.S. Attorney's Office \nhas previously argued that it should be treated as a civil ca\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/230 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=230]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 231, "text_content": "_\nXVIS#0.0),\"\"'\"\",\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 15 \nordinary civil discovery rules apply and the U.S. Attorney's Office should disclose relevant \ndocuments \"without awaiting a disciivery request.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(aXI)(A). \nFinally, a decision by the U.S. Attorney's Office to withhold information relevant to this \ncase has serious ethical ramifications. The attorneys have a duty of candor to the Court. It is not \nimmediately clear how the U.S. Attorney's Office can satisfy those obligations while concealing \ninformation that might enable the victims to prove their case. \nFor all these reasons, the Court should enter an order directing the U.S. Attorney's Office \nto produce to the victims all information in its possession favorable to the victims. A proposed \norder to that effect is attached to this pleading, largely tracking the standard discovery order that \nthis Court routinely enters in criminal cases. \nDISCUSSION \nI. \nTHE GOVERNMENT VIOLATES ITS \"BEST EFFORTS\" OBLIGATIONS IF IT \nWITHOLDS EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE VICTIMS. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office is obliged to produce favorable information to the victims \nbecause of the CVRA's requirement that prosecutor use their \"best efforts\" to protect crime \nvictims' rights. The CVRA directs that \"[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice \nand other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, \nor prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and \naccorded, the rights described in [the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1) (emphasis added). It is \nhard to understand how the Government can argue with a straight face that it is using its \"best \nefforts\" to protect victims' rights while simultaneously withholding readily-identifiable \ndocuments from the victims that might allow them to protect those very rights. If a best efforts \n3 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000901 \nEFTA00230725\n", "char_count": 1995}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 232, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 15 \nobligation means anything, it must mean that the U.S. Attorney's Office cannot suppress \nfavorable information. \nThis understanding of the best efforts obligation is confirmed by the plain meaning of the \nphrase \"best efforts.\" That phrase is generally understood as requiring \"[djiligent attempts to \ncarry out an obligation.\" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (8i6 ed. 2004). See generally E. Allen \nFarnsworth, CM Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duo, of Best Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. \nPin. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984). \nAs a result, \"[Nest efforts are measured by the measures that a \nreasonable person in the same circumstances and of the same nature as the acting party would \ntake.\" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (8i° ed. 2004). A reasonable prosecutor who is obligated \nto work to \"accord\" crime victims their rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1), would not simultaneously \ndeny victims access to the very evidence that could help them protect their rights. Put another \nway, an obligation to use \"best efforts\" is usually understood \"in the natural sense of the words \nas requiring that the party puts its muscles to work to perform with full energy and fairness the \nrelevant express promises and reasonable implications therefrom.\" Stabile'. Stabile, 774 N.E.2d \n673, 676 (Mass. App. Ct 2002). Here, far from putting its full energies towards protecting \nvictims' their rights, the U.S. Attorney's Office is devoting its energies to blocking those rights. \nThe cases construing \"best efforts\" language have routinely recognized that this language can \ncreate affirmative obligations to act. See, e.g., Hughes Communications Galaxy, The.\n United \nStates, 26 Cl. Ct. 123, 135 (1992) (\"A best efforts clause . . . can also affirmatively obligate.\"). \nHere, the action that is affirmatively required by the U.S. Attorney's Office is to produce readily-\nidentifiable information that will assist the victims. \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MA\n... [truncated, 2026 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/232 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=232]", "char_count": 2026}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 233, "text_content": "1 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 15 \nIt is also important to recognize that the victims here are not seeking to force some kind \nof burdensome wild goose chase on the U.S. Attorney's Office. In their letter to the U.S. \nAttorney requesting relevant evidence, the victims offered to provide a list of specific items they \nwere seeking: \"To avoid burdening your Office, we would be happy to provide a specific list of \nthe information that we believe is material to the victims' CVRA case — a limited amount of \ninformation that could be swiftly located by your Office.\" Letter from Bradley J. Edwards & \nPaul G. Cassell to Wifiedo A. Ferrer, Mar. I, 2011. The victims have, for example, requested \nthat the U.S. Attorney's Office provide to them unredacted copies of correspondence between \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office and Jeffrey Epstein. Through civil discovery from Epstein, the \nvictims have obtained half of that correspondence — the words written by the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice — but arc lacking the other half — the words written in reply by Epstein's counsel. This \ncorrespondence specifically discusses crime victims' rights, so it is obviously quite material to \nthe victims' case. The U.S. Attorney's Office could obviously provide this information without \nmuch difficulty. But instead, the Office has refused to provide to the victims any of the \ncorrespondence — or, indeed, any other similar information that might assist the victims. \nFor all these reasons, the Court should find that the Department's \"best efforts\" \nobligations require it to produce to the victims information favorable to the victims' case. \nII. \nTHE VICTIMS HAVE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO ACCESS TO FAVORABLE \nEVIDENCE UNDER THEIR CVRA \"RIGHT TO BE TREATED WITH \nFAIRNESS.\" \nThe victims are also entitled to receive favorable evidence in the Government's \npossession for the same reason that criminal defendants receive such information: fundamental \nconsiderations of\n... [truncated, 2117 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/233 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=233]", "char_count": 2117}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 234, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 5O \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03121/2011 Page 6 of 15 \ninformation contrary to its position in court. For criminal defendants, this principle traces back \nto the landmark decision of Brady I. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), in which the Court \nexplained the production of exculpatory evidence is a principle designed for \navoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty \nare convicted but when criminal trials are fair, our system of the administration of \njustice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of \nthe Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: \n\"The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the \ncourts.\" A prosecutor that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if \nmade available would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a \ntrial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an \narchitect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice ... . \nId. at 87-88. Of course, precisely the same points can be made here about production of \nevidence to crime victims. The Justice Department will \"win its point if justice is done\" to crime \nvictims in this case — but justice can be done only if these proceedings are fair, in the sense that \nall relevant infonnation is provided to the court. To have this case move forward with the \nprosecutors withholding material information is to truly cast them \"in the role of an architect of a \nproceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.\" \nTo be sure, the victims in this case do not rely on a federal constitutional right to due \nprocess. But they have a parallel statutory right under the CVRA, which promises victims of \ncrime that they will be \"treated with fairness.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). The clear intent of \nCongress in passing this provision was to provide a substantive \"due proc\n... [truncated, 2444 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/234 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=234]", "char_count": 2444}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 235, "text_content": "rflARleer \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 15 \nvictimization at the hands of the criminal justice system. This provision is intended to direct \nGovernment agencies and employees, whether they are in executive or judiciary branches, to \ntreat victims of crime with the respect they deserve.\" 150 CONG. REc. S4269 (Apr. 22, 2004) \n(emphasis added). \nBecause the CVRA extends a \"due process\" right to crime victims like Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe #2, victims have a right to fair access to evidence to prove their case. \nThe very \nfoundation of the Brady obligation is such a notion of due process: \"[T]he suppression by the \nprosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is \nmaterial either to guilt or to punishment.\" Brady' Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). It would \nsimilarly violate due process — and thus not treat victims with \"fairness\" — for the prosecution to \nsuppress evidence favorable to a crime victim where the evidence is material either to proving a \nCVRA violation or to the remedy for a violation. \nThe Brady principles are well understood, and the Government does not have difficulty in \nproviding favorable information to criminal defendants. For example, it is our understanding \nthat such discovery was provided by the government to Jeffrey Epstein during the course of \nnegotiations that led to the non-prosecution agreement in this case. \nIf the Government's \nobligations to see \"that justice is done,\" Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, requires it to produce helpful \ninformation to a sex offender, surely principles of fairness require the same kind of production to \nthe sex offender's victims when they are properly pursuing a contested case against the \nGovernment before this Court. \nThe familiar Brady principles are so commonplace that this Court routinely enters a \n\"Standing Discovery Order\" in criminal cases directing the Government to provide favorable \n7 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n0009\n... [truncated, 2017 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/235 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=235]", "char_count": 2017}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 236, "text_content": "----\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 15 \nevidence to the defendant. The Order typically provides: \"The government shall reveal to the \ndcfendant(s) and permit inspection and copying of all information and material known to the \ngovernment which may be favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilty or punishment \nwithin the scope of Brady'. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States. Agars, 427 U.S. \n97 (1976).\" See, eg., Standing Discovery Order, United States. Enriquex, No. 1:10-CR-20488-\nMGC (July 9, 2010) (doc. #115). These Standing Discovery Orders follow from identical \nlanguage in the local rule on these issues. See Local Rule 88.10. \nInteresting, the Standing Discovery Order— and associated local rule 88.10(O) — contains \na broad, commonsense provision which the Government has plainly violated in this case. The \nOrder provides: \"The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to stipulate to all facts \nor points of law the truth or existence of which is not contested and the early resolution of which \nwill expedite the trial.\" For more than two-and-a-half years, the victims have been trying to get \nthe Government to stipulate to undisputed facts, precisely as the Court's rules envision. ' The \nGovernment, however, has refused to do so. \nIt is a simple matter to tailor the Standing Discovery Order from a situation involving a \ncriminal defendant's need for information to the current situation of a crime victim's need for \ninformation. A proposed order to that effect is attached to this pleading, largely tracking the \nlanguage of the Standing Discovery Order. The Court should enter that order. The Court has its \nown obligations to ensure that victims' rights are protected. The CVRA directs that \"[i]n any \ncourt proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the \ncrime victim is afforded the rights [described in the CVRA]\" — rights that include a right to \"be \n... [truncated, 2044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/236 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=236]", "char_count": 2044}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 237, "text_content": "_ __ \n________ \n_\n ____ \n. •\n^om >u.. t  \n4 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 15 \ntreated with fairness?' See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(I), (a)(8). The Court should ensure fair \ntreatment for the victims by directing the Government to produce relevant evidence. \nILL \nTHE VICTIMS ARE ENTITLED TO DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FEDERAL \nRULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. \nThe victims are further entitled to receive information favorable to them under the rules \ncivil procedure. The victims' petition seeking to set aside the non-prosecution agreement has \nbeen opened as a civil case — as reflected in the case number the matter has borne for the last \ntwo-and-a-half years: 9:08-CV-80736-Marra/Johnson. \nIndeed, the Government has seized on \nthis point to deny the victims rights that they would otherwise enjoy in a criminal case. For \nexample, on October 27, 2010, the U.S. Attorney's Office advised Jane Doc #1 and Jane Doe #2 \nthat the Office was taking the position that they did not enjoy a right \"to confer\" with the Office \nunder the CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5), in this enforcement action because the action was \n\"civil\" litigation rather than criminal litigation. See Doc. #41 at 1-2. \nIf the U.S. Attorney's Office is correct that this matter is \"civil\" litigation, then the \nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure govern discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (\"These rules govern \nthe procedure in all civil actions and proceeding in the United States district courts . . . .\").' \nUnder those Rules, generous discovery is provided. Of particular relevance to this motion is the \nrequirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(aXI)(A) that parties are automatically required produce \nrelevant information to a case without waiting for a discovery request. \nin light of the \nGovernment's position that this case is civil litigation, the victims have been making (and are \nRule 1 note that there are certain limitations to application of the Civil Rules, found in \nFed. R. Civ. P. 81. Non\n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/237 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=237]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 238, "text_content": "4 \n. . \nX --- \n.\"-e/447,\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 15 \ncontinuing to make) initial disclosures consistent with Rule 26(aXI)(A). But the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice has recently informed the victims that they do not believe that this Rule applies to their \ncase and that they will not be making any such disclosures. Accordingly, the victims seek an \norder from the Court requiring the ordinary kinds of document production that are made in civil \ncases. \nTo order the Government to make such production, the Court need not engage in \nmetaphysical ruminations about whether this CVRA enforcement action is ultimately a \"civil\" \ncase or a \"criminal\" case. For purposes of this motion, it is enough to say that the Government \nhas taken the position that it is a civil action and therefore the Government must at least carry \nthrough on the discovery obligations that attend civil cases. \nMoreover, Congress clearly allowed the filing of this action in this Court. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(dX3) (allowing assertion of CVRA rights \"in the district court in which a defendant is \nbeing prosecuted or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which \nthe crime occurred.\"). Congress did not specify whether such actions would be civil or criminal \nin nature. But Congress no doubt envisioned at least a minimum level of cooperation with \nvictims by the Government Congress, in fact, mandated prosecutors to make their \"best efforts\" \nto afford victims their rights. In a case such as this one where there is a dispute about the factual \nevents surrounding, it makes sense to read the CVRA has at least giving victims access to \ninformation that might prove their case rather than permitting the Government to suppress such \nevidence. The Court should accordingly require the Government to make the disclosures that it \nwould ordinarily make in a civil case. The proposed order attached to this pleading includes a \nprovision t\n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/238 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=238]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 239, "text_content": "I \n1 \nfam , P,.',  \n. 73-\n \n• \n. . \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 11 of 15 \nIV. \nALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO WITHHOLD RELEVANT EVIDENCE \nWOULD RAISE SERIOUS ETHICAL ISSUES. \nOn a final note, it is worth considering the ethical ramifications of the Government's \nstark position that it can withhold even relevant and material evidence from the victims in this \ncase. Prosecutors, no less than other attorneys, have duties of candor to the Court that would not \npermit them to present evidence or testimony to the Court that is known to be false. Fla. Bar \nRule 4-3.3(a)(4). Allowing the victims access to evidence favorable to their claim will insure \ncompliance with this rule. Similarly, in an ex pane proceeding, a lawyer must inform the court \nof all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the court to make an informed decision \n\"whether or not the facts are adverse.\" Fla. Bar. Rule 4-3.3(d). If the U.S. Attorney's Office is \ncorrect that the victims are not entitled to access to favorable evidence, then the proceedings \ninvolving that evidence are essentially ex pane — requiring the Office to make disclosures to the \nCourt with notice to the victims. \nAn illustration of this problem comes from the sworn declaration filed by one of the \nAUSA's in this case in support of the Government's response to the victims' petition. This \nsworn affidavit recounts a provision in the non-prosecution agreement that would have placed \nvictims of Bpstein's sexual abuse in \"the same position as they would have been had Mr. Epstein \nbeen convicted at trial.\" Declaration of Marie Villafana, July 9, 2008 (doe. #14) at 3-4. \nThe \naffidavit also goes on to say that \"these provisions were discussed,\" id. at 4, apparently referring \nto this provision. Id. (noting that \"as explained above\" there was a remedy for crime victims). \nAnd the declaration notes that on July 9, 2008, the victims in this case (including Jane Doe #I) \nwere notified about\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/239 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=239]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 240, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 12 of 15 \nOn October 9, 2008, victims' counsel wrote to government counsel, pointing out that this \ndeclaration appeared to be (albeit inadvertently) false in two important respects. First, the quoted \nprovision was not actually in the non-prosecution agreement. And second, if it was discussed \nwith Jane Doe #1, for example, then that would have created false impression. Victims' counsel \nasked for a clarification to be filed with the Court about these two points. See Exhibit \"A.\" \nIn response, on December 22, 2008, the government filed a supplemental declaration. \nDoc. #35. The corrective supplemental declaration addressed the first point, agreeing that the \ninformation was false. The supplemental declaration, however, did not address the second \nquestion of whether this false information had previously been discussed with the crime victims. \nMoreover, the supplemental declaration raised additional question about Epstein's role in the \nfalse information. The supplemental declaration states the Epstein's attorney's approved the \ntransmission of false information to the victims on and about July 9, 2008. Doc. #35 at 2. But \nnone of the underlying information regarding the approval of that false information is included in \nthe supplemental declaration. \nRather than have the government serving as the exclusive conduit for information to the \nCourt about these subjects, it seem more consistent with the spirit of the ethical rules — and with \nthe general obligations of disclosure discussed previously in this pleading — for the Government \nto make available to the victims all material and favorable information. For example, the \nGovernment could provide to the victim the underlying correspondence with Epstein's attorneys \napproving the transmission of this false information. This information will be highly relevant to \nthe victims' position that the non-prosecution agreement should be set aside in \n... [truncated, 2064 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/240 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=240]", "char_count": 2064}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 241, "text_content": "-, \n• \nA-\n7 \nCase 9.08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 13 of 15 \nof the victims' rights. The Court should accordingly order production of this and other similar \nfavorable evidence to the victims. \nCERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE \nAs recounted above, counsel for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have repeatedly requested \nthat the U.S. Attorney's Office voluntarily stipulate to undisputed facts in this case and provide \nmaterial information favorable to the victims case for more than two and a half years. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office, however, takes the position that the victims are not entitled to any such \ninformation. \nCONCLUSION \nFor all the foregoing reasons, the Court should order the U.S. Attorney's Office to \nproduce information favorable to the victims. A proposed order to that effect is attached. \nDATED: March 21.2011 \nRespectfully Submitted, \ns/ Bradley 3. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, \nEDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nTelephone (954) 524-2820 \nFacsimile (954) 524-2822 \nFlorida Bar No.: 542075 \nE-mail: bradigpathtojustice.com \nand \n13 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000911 \nEFTA00230735\n", "char_count": 1214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 242, "text_content": "rr.',7774—\n ralnraern \nrr\n—\n \n7  \nv \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 14 of 15 \nPaul O. Cassell \nPro Hac Vice \nQuinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, UT 84112 \nTelephone: 801-585-5202 \nFacsimile: 801-585-6833 \nE-Mail: casselloRlaw.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 \n14 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000912 \nEFTA00230736\n", "char_count": 413}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 243, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 15 of 15 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nThe foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's \nCMIECF system: \nA. Marie Villafrula \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n(561) 820-8711 \nFax: (561) 820-8777 \nE-mail: ann.maric.c.villafanarbrusdoi.gov \nAttorney for the Government \nJoseph L. Ackerman, Jr. \nJoseph Ackerman, Jr. \nFowler White Burnett PA \n777 S. Plagler Drive, West Tower, Suite 901 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nCriminal Defense Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein \n(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) \n15 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000913 \nEFTA00230737\n", "char_count": 707}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 244, "text_content": "r7nntr.if\"'\" \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Docurnor450L1A w Eptyppeop FLSD Docket 03121/2011 Page 1 of 2 \n• aitadedataa% • \nAND ASSOCIATES \nOctober 9, 2008 \nDexter Lee, AUSA \nUnited States Attorney's Office \n99 N.E. 4th Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \nRe: \nJane Doe # and Jane Doe #2 \nUnited States of America \nCase No.: \n08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nDear Mr. Lee: \nI am writing to call to your attention two potentially false statements that the Government \nmade, albeit inadvertently, in a sworn declaration submitted to the Court in connection with the \nabove-captioned case. I request that your office file a corrected declaration and accompanying \nexplanation. \nThe first statement is found at page 3 to 4 of the July 9th, 2008 declaration of Marie \nVillafafia. There a provision in a plea agreement with Mr. Jeffrey Epstein is recounted. As we \nunderstand the Government's current position in this case, it is that this provision is not in fact \npart of the plea agreement in this case. If our understanding is correct, then Ms. Villafafia has \nfiled a false affidavit with the court, albeit inadvertently. We respectfidly request that she file a \nnew affidavit that corrects this false information, along with all other information relevant to \nunderstanding how the false information came to be provided to the court — and to the victims in \nthis case. This correction should, in my view, include more details about how Epstein and his \nattorneys approved a submission of false information to the victims as you stated on Page 5, n.2 \nin your October 8, 2008 filing \"Respondent's Opposition to Victims' Motion to Unseal Non-\nProsecution Agreement\" — presumably knowing that litigation surrounding the victims' rights \nissues was on-going and that such false information might be ultimately presented to the court. \nSuch information is highly relevant to what remedy the victims might ultimately choose to seek \nfor violations of their rights in this case. \nThe second statement may or may not be fa\n... [truncated, 3047 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/244 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=244]", "char_count": 3047}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 245, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 2 \nDexter Lee, AUSA \nUnited States Attorney's Office \nOctober 9, 2008 \nPage Two \nI continue to be interested in working out a joint stipulation of proposed facts in this case \nwith the Government. If you would like to proceed in that direction, please give me a call. If, \nhowever, the Government is not willing to work out a joint stipulation of facts, then 1 need to \nhave the record be as clear as possible, and at a minimum would request that the Government \ncorrect the inaccurate information it has provided to the court and clarify precisely how such \ninaccurate information came to be made a part of the record and the extent to which Mr. Epstein, \nthrough his attorneys, was culpable. \nSincerely, \nBE/sg \nBrad Edwards \n2028 minnow \n8TRXIT,8171T11 202, HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA 33020 \nOFFICE: 954-414-8033/305-935-2011 \nFARz 954 - 924 - 1530/305-955-4227 \nBRORADIDWARDSLAW.0O11 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000915 \nEFTA00230739\n", "char_count": 1002}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 246, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 2 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 0880736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 \nI \nUNITED STATES \n'PROPOSED' ORDER GRANTING JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR \nORDER DIRECTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE NOT TO WITHHOLD \nRELEVANT EVIDENCE \nTHIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Order \nDirecting the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence, filed March 21, 2011. \nIt is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion is GRANTED. \n1. The government shall reveal to the victims and permit inspection and copying of all \ninformation and material known to the government which may be \"favorable\" to the victims, see \nBrady' Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (discussing evidence \"favorable\" to defendants); United \nStates \nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (same), on issue of possible violations of their rights under \nCVRA and remedy for such violations, including any impeachment information under Giglio i \nUnited States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). \n2. The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to stipulate to all facts or points of \nlaw the truth and existence of which is not contested and the early resolution of which will \nexpedite the proceedings. \n1 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000916 \nEFTA00230740\n", "char_count": 1378}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 247, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 2 \n3. The parties shall make to each other the disclosures requited under Fed. R. Civ. P. \n26(aXI)(A). \nDONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, \nthis \nday of March, 2011. \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \n2 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000917 \nEFTA00230741\n", "char_count": 382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 248, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 1 of 9 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2, \nPetitioners, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES, \nRespondent. \nUNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S \nMOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE NOT \nTO WITHHOLD RELEVANT EVIDENCE \nRespondent, United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, files its \nResponse to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Order Directing The U.S. Attorney's \nOffice Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence, and states: \nL \nTHE CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS ACT CREATES NO LEGAL DUTY UPON \nTHE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE TO PROVIDE RELEVANT EVIDENCE \nPetitioners maintain the U.S. Attorney's Office is \"withholding\" relevant evidence, which \nsuggests there is a legal obligation to disclose such information to them. \nPetitioners contend \nthe government has an obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) \"to make their best efforts to see \nthat crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).\" \nSection 3771(cXl) is no authority to impose a duty upon the U.S. Attorney's Office to \nprovide evidence to petitioners, or allow them a right of access to records maintained by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office. Petitioners do not point to any of the eight rights enumerated in section \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000918 \nEFTA00230742\n", "char_count": 1455}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 249, "text_content": "T\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 2 of 9 \n3771(a) that provides a right to access to information in the government's possession, either in \nthe context of the criminal case in which the requesting individual is a crime victim under section \n3771(e), or in a motion for relief filed under section 3771(d)(3). \nPetitioners' attempt to engraft a right of access to government information to section \n3771(cXI) should be rejected. In Pennsylvania'. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme \nCourt recognized that the Confrontation Clause grants a criminal defendant a trial right to cross-\nexamine a witness. It hastened to add, Itthe ability to question adverse witnesses, however, \ndoes not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might \nbe useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.\" Id. at 52(footnote omitted). In the same vein, \nthe obligation of the government to use its best efforts \"to see that crime victims are notified of, \nand accorded, the rights described in subsection (a),\" does not include a duty to provide \ninformation supporting whatever claim a victim may wish to assert in a motion for relief under \nsection 3771(d)(3). \nIn United States'. Rubin, 558 F.Supp.2d 411 (ED.N.Y. 2008), an alleged victim of a \nstock swindle claimed the right to confer in section 3771(aX5) included a right to obtain \ninformation to base his views to express to the court. This argument was rejected by the district \ncourt, which noted that \"rainy information-gathering aspect of the right to confer is necessarily \ncircumscribed, in the first instance, by its relevance to a victim's right to participate in the federal \ncriminal proceedings at hand and to do so within the bounds demarked by the CVRA.\" Id. at \n425(citation omitted). The court found the CVRA no more requires disclosure of the pre-\nsentence report to meet its remedial goal of giving crime victims a voice in sentencing than it \ndoes disclo\n... [truncated, 2134 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/249 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=249]", "char_count": 2134}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 250, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 3 of 9 \nplea proceedings. 111, cititgi United States,. Inzrassia, 2005 WL 2875220 at •17 (B.D.N.Y. Sep. \n7, 2005). The district court concluded, \"[t]he CVRA, therefore, does not authorize an unbridled \ngallop to any and all information in the government's files.\" 558 F.Supp.2d at 425. \nSimilarly, in United States I. Coxton, 598 F.Supp.2d 737 (W.D.N.C. 2009), several crime \nvictims invoked the. CVRA in at attempt to obtain portions of the pit-sentence investigation \nreport (PSR). The victims argued that the CVRA granted them the implicit right to access to \nthe request portions of the PSR in order to prepare for sentencing. Id. at 739. The district court \nrejected the victims' argument. The court first noted the confidential nature of a PSR, Id at 738-\n39, and then found that a victim's right to be reasonably heard at sentencing did not grant a right \nof access to the PSR. The court relied upon In re Brock, 262 Fed.Appx. 510 (4\" Cir. 2008), \nwhich held that a victim's right to be heard does not afford access to a PSR, since the victim had \nbeen provided ample information concerning the applicable Sentencing Guidelines and other \nissues related to the defendants' sentencing. The district court in Coxton found that the victims \nin that case were present during trial and continued to enjoy access to the United States \nAttorney's Office. Id. at 740. \nThe district court also rejected the victim's argument that their right to restitution granted \na right of access to the PSR. Id. The Coxton court relied upon United States I. Sacane 2007 \nWL 951666 (D.Conn. Mar. 28, 2007), where the victim of a fraud sought access to the convicted \ndefendant's financial status by invoking the CVRA. The Sacane court relied upon the caselaw \nfinding a victim had no right to the defendant's PSR, and found that, \"if the CVRA does not \nprovide crime victims with a tight to disclosure of the presentence report, that a forti\n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/250 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=250]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 251, "text_content": "Case 9 08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 4 of 9 \n2007 WL 951666 at '1. \nOther attempts to engraft discovery rights onto the CVRA have also been rejected. In \nUnited States'. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220 (41h Cir. 2007), several victims in the September 11, \n2001 terrorist attacks sought access to files and records provided by the government to defendant \nMoussaoui, in satisfaction of the government's criminal discovery obligations. The victims \nwere plaintiffs in civil actions filed in the Southern District of New York, against private airlines, \nairports, and security services. Id. at 224. The victims sought non-public criminal discovery \nmaterials for use in their civil actions. \nIn its opinion, the Fourth Circuit noted the victims had relied heavily upon the CVRA and \nthe Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act (ATSSSA) in the district court, to support \ntheir claim of a right to access the criminal discovery information. Id. at 234. On appeal, \nhowever, the civil plaintiffs abandoned the argument that those two statutes provided the district \ncourt the authority to enter an order compelling the government to provide to the civil plaintiffs \ncertain categories of information. The appellate court observed that, \"[t]his was wise strategy, \nas nothing in those two statutes supports the district court's exercise of power.\" It \nAs to the CVRA, the Fourth Circuit found \"[t]he rights codified by the CVRA, however, \nare limited to the criminal justice process; the Act is therefore silent and unconcerned with \nvictims' rights to file civil claims against their assailants.\" It at 234-35, \nIn re Kenna 453 \nF.3d 1136, 1137 (9* Cir. 2006). There is no criminal justice process in the instant case since no \ncriminal charges have been filed. Even if the criminal justice process has been initiated by the \nfiling of charges, courts have rejected claims by victims that one or more of the rights in section \n3771(a) create a right of access to inf\n... [truncated, 2102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/251 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=251]", "char_count": 2102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 252, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 5 of 9 \nto PSR); Kenna (same); and Sacane (no right to financial information from defendant). The \nCVRA imposes no duty on the U.S. Attorney's Office to provide evidence to petitioners to assist \nthem in presenting their claims under the CVRA. \nTT. \nPETITIONERS HAVE NO DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE CVRA \nPetitioners also contend they have a right to due process under the CVRA, and liken their \nsituation to the rights enjoyed by criminal defendants. DE 50 at 5-9. This argument suffers \nfrom a fundamental defect, the absence of any protected life, liberty, or property interest, which \nwould trigger the due process clause. \n\"The necessary first step in evaluating any procedural due process claim is determining \nwhether a constitutionally protected interest has been implicated.\" Tefel I. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, \n1299 (11th Cir. 1999), citing Economic Dev. Corp... Stierheirn, 782 F.2d 952, 954-55 (11th Cir. \n1986)(\"In accessing a claim based on an alleged denial of procedural due process a court must \nfirst decide whether the complaining party has been deprived of a constitutionally protected \nliberty or property interest. Absent such a deprivation, there can be no denial of due process.\"). \nPetitioners concede that \"the victims in this case do not rely on a federal constitutional right to \ndue process.\" DE 50 at 6(emphasis in original). \nHowever, they contend that section 3771(aX8), which provides that a crime victim should \nbe treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy, creates a statutory \nright. Petitioners argue that Congress intended to provide a substantive due process right to \ncrime victims. DE 50 at 6. This argument is plainly incorrect. There is no life, liberty, or \nproperty interest implicated in the CVRA, and courts are hesitant to find that a substantive due \nprocess right has been created. \nSee Collins \nCity of Harker FIeights. Texas, 503 U.S. 115, \n5 \n0\n... [truncated, 2039 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/252 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=252]", "char_count": 2039}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 253, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 6 of 9 \n125 (1992X\"As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of \nsubstantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaldng in this uncharted area \nare scarce and open ended. (citation omitted). The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to \nexercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.\"). This \njudicial reluctance would be particularly well-founded in the instant case, where petitioners are \nmaintaining that Congress's use of the amorphous terms \"fairness\" and \"respect for the victim's \ndignity and privacy\" have created a substantive due process right. \nSimilarly unavailing is petitioners' reliance upon Brady'. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), \nand other criminal law cases finding a due process obligation on the government's part to \ndisclose exculpatory and impeachment information. \nPetitioners are charged with no crime, and \nthey are in no jeopardy of losing their liberty. Consequently, the government has no due process \nobligation to provide information to petitioners. \nPETITIONERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL \nRULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE \nPetitioners argue they arc entitled to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil \nProcedure, but they point to no particular rule, or case, which provides that such a discovery \nrights exists. Instead, petitioners seize upon the government's assertion that the right to confer \nunder section 3771(aX5) only applied to the criminal case, not to a civil action filed to attempt to \nenforce rights under the CVRA. \nPetitioners filed their motion for relief under section 3771(d)(3). Such motions for relief \nare filed in the district court \"in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime,\" or \"if no \nprosecution is underway, in the district court in which the crime occurred.\" If a motion under \n• \n6 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000923 \nEFTA00230747\n", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 254, "text_content": ".5-%%*.ev.r...— \n---1 \n•.nnevAn \n9 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 7 of 9 \nsection 3371(d)(3) is filed in the district court in which the defendant is being prosecuted, the \nmotion is being entertained as part of the criminal case, not a civil action. In the instant case, \npetitioners filed their motion under the second provision. Presumably, because there was no \ncriminal case, the Clerk's Office assigned the motion a civil case number. \nCongress created a procedure by which a putative victim could seek relief for alleged \nviolations of CVRA rights, If a section 3771(d)(3) motion were filed in an existing criminal \ncase, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not apply, since it is not a civil case. Under \npetitioners' theory, because of the happenstance that no criminal case was pending, and the \nClerk's Office assigned the motion a civil case number, they are entitled to full discovery under \nthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. \nPetitioner's theory is illogical because there is no basis for believing that Congress \nintended individuals seeking relief under section 3771(d)(3) to enjoy widely differing procedural \nrights, depending on whether there was a criminal case pending. If a putative victim filing a \nmotion in an existing criminal case would be entitled to no discovery under the Federal Rules of \nCivil Procedure, then none should exist where there is no existing criminal case. \nIV. \nTHE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS' DUTY OF CANDOR DOES NOT \nCREATE A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION \nPetitioners argue that, because the government's attorneys owe a duty of candor to the \nCourt, they are entitled to have access to government records in order to ensure the government \nattorneys are honoring their ethical obligations. DE 50 at 11-13. \nThe government's attorneys arc well-aware of their obligations of candor to the Court. If \nthe Court believes any attorney in the instant case has breached that ethical duty, it has the \n7 \n08\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/254 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=254]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 255, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 8 of \nauthority to take remedial action to factually determine whether the duty has been breached. \nHowever, the mere existence of an attorney's duty of candor to a court does not a right of access \nto information in the opposing party, to ensure the ethical duty is being met. \nCONCLUSION \nPetitioners' motion for order directing the U.S. Attorney's Office not to withhold relevant \nevidence should be denied. \nRespectfully submitted, \nWIFREDO A. FERRER \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nBy: \ns/ Dexter A. Lcc \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \nFla. Bar No. 0936693 \n99 N.E. 4* Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \n(305) 961-9320 \nFax: (305) 530-7139 \nE-mail: dexter.lee(ausdoLgov \nAttorney for Respondent \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 7, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing document \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n8 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000925 \nEFTA00230749\n", "char_count": 1028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 256, "text_content": "1 \nP\"\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/0712011 Page 9 of 9 \nSERVICE LIST \nlane Does 1 and 2 \nUnited States, \nCase No. 08-80736-C1V-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nBradley J. Edwards, Esq., \nFarmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \n(954) 524-2820 \nFax: (954) 524-2822 \nE-mail: bradaroatbtoiustice.com \nPaul G. Cassell \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, Utah 84112 \n(801) 585-5202 \nFax: (801) 585-6833 \nE-mail: casselpfilaw.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000926 \nEFTA00230750\n", "char_count": 729}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 257, "text_content": "Case 9:08•cv-80736-KAM Document 51 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 and JANDE DOE #2 \nI \nUNITED STATES \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION TO USE CORRESPONDENCE TO \nPROVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHT ACT AND TO HAVE \nTHEIR UNREDACTED PLEADINGS UNSEALED \nCOME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as \"the victims\"), by and \nthrough undersigned counsel, to move this Court to allow use of correspondence between the \nU.S. Attorney's Office and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein to prove violations of the Crime Victims' \nRights Act. Because this Court has already ruled that the correspondence is not privileged — and \nbecause it is highly relevant to the victims' case — the motion should be granted. The victims' \nunredacted pleading quoting the correspondence should also be unsealed, particularly in light of \nthe intense, international public interest in Epstein's controversial plea deal. \nBACKGROUND \nAs the Court is aware, beginning 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 pursued civil \nlitigation against Jeffrey Epstein for sexually abusing them. During the course of that litigation, \nin June 2001, they obtained correspondence between the U.S. Attorney's Office and Jeffrey \nEpstein's legal counsel. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 ultimately settled their civil suits in July \n2010. During the settlement discussions, they informed Epstein's legal counsel that they would \n1 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000927 \nEFTA00230751\n", "char_count": 1562}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 258, "text_content": "er7/0 \n------- \n- \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 10 \nbe using the correspondence in this CVRA action. Epstein requested advance notice of such \nfiling. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 saw no basis for any objection to their using the materials, \nbut agreed to give advance notice to Epstein so that he could make whatever arguments he \nwished. Accordingly, as part of their settlement, the victims agreed with Epstein that they would \nfile under seal the correspondence so that Epstein would have an opportunity to object if he so \ndesired: \nCounsel for [Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2] have received, as part of discovery in \nthis lawsuit, certain correspondence between Epstein's agents and federal \nprosecutors. \n[Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2] may desire to use this \ncorrespondence to prove a violation of [their] right to notice by the government \nand to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect during criminal investigations \nand prosecutions under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. \nsection 3771, and to seek remedies for any violation that [they] may prove. The \nparties agree that Epstein will receive at least seven days advance notice, in \nwriting, of intent to so use the correspondence in any CVRA case . . . [Jane Doe \n#1 and Jane Doe #2] agree to . . . file the documents .. . under seal until a judge \nhas ruled on any objection that Epstein may file.\" \nOn August 26, 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 provided the specified advance notice \nto Epstein of their intent to use the correspondence. The notice specifically covered this CVRA \naction: \n[AJs you know, there is currently pending before Judge Man a case filed under \nthe Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, in which two victims \nof sexual assault by [you] allege they were deprived of their rights under the Act. \nFor example, the victims allege that there were deprived of notice of pending plea \nbargain arrangements and an opportunity to be hea\n... [truncated, 2574 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/258 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=258]", "char_count": 2574}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 259, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 10 \nLetter from Bradley J. Edwards to Robert D. Critton, Jr., Case No. 9:08-CV-80893, Doc. #214 \n(attachment 2). \nOn September 2, 2010, Epstein filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to bar \ndisclosure of the U.S. Attorney's correspondence in both a pending state court case and the \nCVRA case. Case No. 9:08-CV-80893, Doc. #214. \nOn September 13, 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's responded, explaining that \nEpstein had already litigated — and lost — the claim that the information was somehow protected. \nThey also explained that Epstein could not object to use of the information in the CVRA ease \nunless he intervened in the CVRA case. Doc. #217. \nOne day later, on September 14, 2010, the Court (Magistrate Judge Johnson) denied the \nmotion for a protective order. Doc. #218. The Court explained that \"[t]he Court agrees with \n[Jane Doe] . . . that if [Epstein] believes he has a valid basis for preventing disclosure of the \nsubject documents in the subject state court proceeding, he should file a motion to that effect in \nthe appropriate state court.\" \nOn September 28, 2010, Epstein filed an appeal of the Magistrate Judge's order. Epstein \nargued that because the Magistrate Judge had ruled so rapidly, he had been precluded from filing \na reply brief. \nOn October 7, 2010, Jane Does' legal counsel filed a response (Doc. #221), explaining \nthat no basis existed for barring use of the documents and that, in any event, Epstein needed to \nintervene in the CVRA case if he was going to have standing to object to use of the documents \nthere. \n3 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000929 \nEFTA00230753\n", "char_count": 1686}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 260, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 10 \nOn October 20, 2010, this Court (Marra, J.), entered an order (Doc. #222) remanding to \nthe magistrate judge to give Epstein an opportunity to file a reply brief. \nOn November 1, 2010, Epstein filed a reply to the response to his motion for protective \norder. Doc. #223. \nOn January 5, 2011, this Court (Johnson, J.) entered an order (Doe. #226) resolving \nEpstein's objection. The Order began by stating: \"To the extent Epstein's Counsel ask the Court \nto find the subject correspondence privileged and on that basis prohibiting Plaintiffs' Counsel \nfrom disclosing it in either of the two proceedings, said request is denied.\" Id. at 3. The Order, \nhowever, indicated that Jane Does' counsel should file the correspondence under seal with \"the \nappropriate institution\" so that the institution could \"make the determination of admissibility as it \nrelates to their respective cases.\" Id. at 3.1\nDISCUSSION \nI. \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2 SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO USE TILE \nCORRESPONDENCE, AS IT IS HIGHLY RELEVANT TO THEIR CASE. \nUnder the Magistrate Judge's Order, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 are directed to submit \nthe correspondence to \"the appropriate institute\" for a \"determination of admissibility.\" The \nvictims have done that, filing only a redacted version of their pleading in the public court file, \nAt one point, the Magistrate Judge appeared to think that the \"appropriate institution\" \nfor the CVRA was the Justice Department, as the Magistrate Judge thought that Jane Doe was \nproceeding by way of an \"internal Justice Department Complaint procedure.\" Of course, Jane \nDoe is not proceeding here by way of the internal Justice Department procedure, but rather the \nstatutorily authorized procedure for filing a motion in the district court. See 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(d)(3). \n4 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000930 \nEFTA00230754\n", "char_count": 1916}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 261, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 10 \nsubmitting an unredacted version to the Court. The victims have also submitted all of the \ncorrespondence to the Court under seal as well. \nThe only remaining issue for the Court under the Magistrate Judge's Order is a \n\"determination of admissibility as it relates\" to the CVRA case. The correspondence is plainly \nadmissible, as it is bigWy_relevara to _thityictints1 argument—that-the--Justiee—Departmenuns \nintentionally concealed the existence  of  tlle...nonzprqsecution agreement from them. \nThe \ncorrespondence specifically shows that the U.S. Attorney's Office reached a firm non-\nprosecution agreement with Epstein in September 2007, but subsequently deliberately decided to \nconceal the existence of that agreement from the victims. The correspondence further shows that \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office was aware of its statutory obligation to inform the victims of the non-\nprosecution agreement. Indeed, some of the correspondence involves specific discussion of the \nCVRA and victim notices. \nAll relevant evidence is admissible. See Fed. R. Evict. 402. Relevant evidence is \n\"broadly defined,\" United States I Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1560 (11i° Cir. 1985), as evidence \nthat has \"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the \ndetermination of the action more probably or less probable than it would be without the \nevidence.\" Fed. R. Evid. 401. Much of the correspondence bears directly on points that the U.S. \nAttorney's Office has already discussed in its pleadings. The Government's Response to the \nVictim's Petition, for example, contains an extensive discussion of the background of the \ninvestigation, the plea negotiations, and the U.S. Attorney's Office's understanding of its \nobligations under the CVRA. See Government's Resp. to Victim's Emergency Petition for \nEnforcement of Crime Victims Rights Act at 3-6 (dos. #13) (citing Declaration of Asst. U.S. \n5 \n08\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/261 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=261]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 262, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 10 \nAttorney Marie Villafafia). \nThese same subjects were also discussed at length at the Court's \nJuly 11, 2008, hearing on the matter. See, e.g., Tr. July 11, 2008, at 3-4, 18-19, 22-29. The \ncorrespondence provides far more detailed information on this subject than was previously \navailable to the victims. More important, the correspondence also shows a concerted effort by \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office and Epstein to conceal the non-prosecution agreement from the \nvictims. \nThe victims should therefore be allowed to use the correspondence, as it sheds important \nlight on the events surrounding the non-prosecution agreement, which are central to the victims' \narguments that the U.S. Attorney's Office violated their rights. \nII. \nTHE VICTIMS' PLEADINGS SHOULD BE UNSEALED. \nThe victims' pleadings should also be unsealed. The victims have, of course, filed only a \nredacted version of their pleading in the court public file, thereby ensuring full compliance with \nthe Court's order that they give Epstein a chance to object. But there is no underlying reason for \nsealing of these documents. The Court has already ruled that the correspondence is not \nprivileged. Accordingly, no good reason exists for keeping the pleadings confidential, and \naccordingly they should be made part of the Court's public file. \nIn addition, no sealing order could be justified in this case. The Eleventh Circuit has \ninstructed that the district courts must make substantial findings before sealing records in cases \nbefore it. For instance, in United States. Ochaa-Masque, 428 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2005), it \nreversed an order from this Court that had sealed pleadings in a criminal case, emphasizing the \nimportance of the public's historic First Amendment right of access to the courts. To justify \n6 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000932 \nEFTA00230756\n", "char_count": 1917}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 263, "text_content": ".. . \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 10 \nsealing, \"a court must articulate the overriding interest along with findings specific enough that a \nreviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.\" Id at 1030. \nHere there is no overriding interest in keeping the pleadings secret. To the contrary, there \nis an overriding interest in having these matters exposed to public light. There is considerable \npublic interest in the question of how a serial pedophile could arrange such a lenient plea \nagreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office. There has long been suspicion that Jeffrey_KEstein\nwas receiving favorable treatment in the criminal investigation because of his wealth and power. \nSee, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Questions of Preferential Treatment Are Raised in Florida Sex \nCase, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, at 19 (noting questions that the public had been left \"to wonder \nwhether the system tilted in favor of a wealthy, well-connected alleged perpetrator and against \nvery young girls who are alleged victims of sex crimes\"). Indeed, the interest in the matter is \nstrong enough that the widely-viewed television program Law and Order: Special Victim Unit \ndevoted an episode to it last month, suggesting in its plot that federal government had intervened \nimproperly to prevent effective prosecution. See Law & Order Commemorates Jeffrey Epstein's \nTaste for Teen Hookers, hup://gawkencom/#!5751094/law—order-commemorates-jeffity-\nepsteins-taste-for-teen-hookers. Also, there is strong current media interest in the case. \"British \ntabloids have gone berserk the past two weeks with the growing scandal over the friendship that \nPrince Andrew, 51, fourth in line for the throne, has maintained with the multimillionaire, a \nregistered sex offender [Jeffrey Epstein].\" Jose Lambiet, Prince's Friendship with Pedophile \nCauses Furor Across the Pond, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 9, 2011, at 2B. There are also current \nreports tha\n... [truncated, 2206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/263 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=263]", "char_count": 2206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 264, "text_content": ". . .. . .... \nr.)7 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 10 \nOf course, the Court is not being asked in this pleading to decide the wisdom of the non-\nprosecution agreement entered into by the U.S. Attorney's Office. The public can make up its \nown mind on that subject — but only if it is allowed to review the facts surrounding the \nnegotiation of the agreement and the treatment of crime victims during the negotiation process. \nThe Court should accordingly unseal the victims' pleading. \nM. \nEPSTEIN HAS NO \"STANDING\" TO RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS WITHOUT \nINTERVENING IN THE CVERA CASE. \nAs a courtesy to Epstein, we have provided copies of all these pleadings to defendant \nEpstein. It should be noted, however, that while Epstein is well aware of this CVRA action, he \nhas chosen not to intervene. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (providing procedures for intervention). \nWithout intervening in the case, he cannot raise any objections to use of the correspondence in \nthis case — or to any relief that the Court might grant to the victims. \nThe victims have no objection to Epstein intervening in this case — at this time. If, \nhowever, Epstein delays intervention until after a reasonable period of time, the victims will \nargue that his motion to intervene is untimely. The victims will argue that any attempted \nintervention by Epstein after the date on which the Government must respond to the victims' \nmotion for a finding of violation of the CVRA is untimely, as that is when the victims must \nbegin drafting reply pleadings. See United States' Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th\nCir. 1983) (listing factors to be considered in determining whether motion to intervene is timely). \nCERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE \n8 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000934 \nEFTA00230758\n", "char_count": 1803}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 265, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 10 \nThe Government has no objection to the motion to unseal. On August 26, 2010, Epstein \nwas given notice of the victims' intent to use these materials in this case. He has yet to intervene \nin this case, let alone interpose any objection in this case. \nCONCLUSION \nFor all the foregoing reasons, the Court should allow Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 to use \nthe U.S. Attorney's correspondence in this CVRA action. The Court should therefore unseal the \nvictims redacted pleading, entering the full pleading — and the attached correspondence — as \npublicly accessible records. \nDATED: March 21, 2011 \nRespectfully Submitted, \ns/ Bradley J. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, \nEDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nTelephone (954) 524-2820 \nFacsimile (954) 524-2822 \nFlorida Bar No.: 542075 \nE-mail: brad@pathtojustice.com \nand \nPaul G. Cassell \nPro Hac Vice \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, UT 84112 \nTelephone: 801-585-5202 \nFacsimile: 801-585-6833 \nE-Mail: cassellp®law.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doc #1 and Jane Doe #2 \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000935 \nEFTA00230759\n", "char_count": 1283}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 266, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 10 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nThe foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's \nCM/ECF system: \nA. Marie Villafafla \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n(561) 820-8711 \nFax: (561) 820-8777 \nE-mail: ann.maric.c.villafanaaiNsdoi.gol\nAttorney for the Government \nJoseph L. Ackerman, Jr. \nFowler White Burnett PA \n777 S. Flagler Drive, West Tower, Suite 901 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nCriminal Defense Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein \n(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) \n10 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000936 \nEFTA00230760\n", "char_count": 683}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 267, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 1 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOES #1 AND #2, \nPetitioners, \nI.\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nRespondent. \nUNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION \nTO USE CORRESPONDENCE TO PROVE VIOLATIONS OF THE \nCRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND TO HAVE THEIR \nUNREDACTED PLEADINGS UNSEALED !DEMI \nThe United States of America, by and through the undersigned, hereby files this Response \nin partial opposition to Petitioners' Motion to Use Correspondence to Prove Violations of the Crime \nVictims' Rights Act and to Have Their Unredacted Pleadings Unsealed (DE51). As explained in the \nUnited States' Response to Petitioners' Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims \nRights Act (DE48), and Petitioners' Motion to Have Their Facts Accepted (DE49), it is the position \nof the United States that this case presents a straightforward legal issue and no additional facts or \nevidence are necessary for the resolution of the matter. The United States also was not a party to the \naction wherein Petitioners were ordered to obtain court approval prior to using the correspondence \nas evidence.' Accordingly, the United States takes no position as to that portion of Petitioners' \n'The Government does note, however, that Petitioners have filed the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement (\"NPA\") in the public portion of the Court file. (DE48, Ex. E.) That document is the \nsubject of a Protective Order in the instant suit. (See DE26.) Petitioners have previously moved to \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000937 \nEFTA00230761\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 268, "text_content": "twored\nen— \ntwm4prn, --\"\" \n. . \n. \n• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 2 of 10 \nMotion, although it notes that merely attaching the correspondence to a motion without \nauthenticating it does not make it admissible evidence. \nWith regard to Petitioners' Motion to Unseal, when Petitioners' originally conferred with the \ngovernment, the undersigned stated that there was no objection to the motion to unseal. However, \na copy of what Petitioners intended to file was not provided. Also, upon undertaking some research \nin preparation for a response to DE49, it was determined that the Government could not, in \naccordance with our legal obligations, agree to unsealing the documents referenced herein. \nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the United States opposes, in part, Petitioners' Motion \nto Unseal. Instead, the United States has filed herewith, under seal, a redacted version of DE48 and \nthe relevant portions of Exhibit A, and asks the Court to unseal only redacted versions, if the Court \ndecides to grant Petitioners' Motion to Unseal. \nCERTAIN PORTIONS OF PETITIONERS' PLEADINGS RUN AFOUL OF FED. R. \nCRIM. P. 6(e) AND/OR CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES. \nSeveral of the \"facts\" that Petitioners include in their Statement of Undisputed Facts allege \nthat Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") and others have committed crimes for which they were never \ncharged or convicted. Others refer to matters that were occurring before the grand jury. The \ndocuments contained in Exhibit A to their pleading contain similar materials. The Federal Rules of \nCriminal Procedure and constitutional mandates dictate that these should be kept sealed. \nA. \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) \nRule 6(e) states that \"an attorney for the government\" \"must not disclose a matter occurring \nunseal the NPA in this action, (see DE28,) which the Court has denied. (DE36.) Although the \nGovernment acknowledges that the NPA is a matter of public record in other courts, \n... [truncated, 2181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/268 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=268]", "char_count": 2181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 269, "text_content": "1 \ntvo\", 77.—•-•—\n. • \n. \ni \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 3 of 10 \nbefore the grand jury.\" Fed. IL Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B). Furthermore, court hearings and court records \nand orders must be sealed \"to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized \ndisclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(eX5) & (6). \nCourts have construed \"a matter occurring before the grand jury\" to include \"events which \nhave already occurred before the grand jury, such as a witness's testimony, [and] matters which will \noccur, such as statements which reveal the identity of persons who will be called to testify or which \nreport when the grand jury will return an indictment.\" In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d \n202, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1980). \nWhile Petitioners were merely asking the Government to agree with their assertions of \" fact\" \nbased upon materials Petitioners had received from counsel for Epstein, rather than asking the \nGovernment to make affirmative disclosures of grand jury material, \"Rule 6(e) does not create a type \n'It is worth noting that, within the same case, a court can take differing positions on this. \nCompare: \nWith: \n['Me disclosure of information obtained from a source independent of the grand jury \nproceedings, such as a prior government investigation, does not violate Rule 6(e). \nA discussion of actions taken by government attorneys or officials, e.g., a \nrecommendation by the Justice Department attorneys to department officials that an \nindictment be sought against an individual does not reveal any information about \nmatters occurring before the grand jury. Nor does a statement of opinion as to an \nindividual's potential criminal liability violate the dictates of Rule 6(e). \nDisclosures which expressly identify when an indictment would be presented to the \ngrand jury, the nature of the crimes which would be charged, and the number of \npersons who would be charged run afoul of \n... [truncated, 2348 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/269 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=269]", "char_count": 2348}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 270, "text_content": "•-•••,\" • • \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 4 of 10 \nof secrecy which is waived once public disclosure occurs.\" In re Motions ofDow Jones & Co., Inc., \n142 F.3d 496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). \n\"[E]ven if material concerning the grand jury investigation had been disclosed to the public, the \nGovernment attorney .. . had a duty to maintain grand jury secrecy. This attorney could neither \nconfirm nor deny the information presented by the 'external party.'\" Senate of the Commonwealth \nof Puerto Rico'. United States Dept of Justice, 1992 WL 119127 at '3 (D.D.C. May 13, 1992) \n(citing Bony. United States, 740 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.D.C. 1990) (\"Rule 6(e) does not create a \ntype of secrecy which is waived once public disclosure occurs. The Government is obligated to \nstand silent regardless of what is reported, accurate or not, by the press.\"). \nThe reasons for Rule 6(e) are multiple: \nIn addition to preventing adverse pretrial publicity about a person who may be \nindicted and subsequently tried, secrecy protects the reputation of a person under \ninvestigation who is not indicted. The secrecy requirement also encourages reluctant \nwitnesses to testify without fear of reprisals from those against whom testimony is \ngiven, prevents tampering with grand jury witnesses in an effort to alter their trial \ntestimony, and permits the grand jury to deliberate free from the influence of \npublicity. Finally, secrecy prevents disclosures to persons who may be interested in \nthe investigation if the facts are known or might attempt to escape if they have reason \nto believe certain indictments will issue. \nUnited States'. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States'. Procter & \nGamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958)). \nSeveral of the \"facts\" contained in Petitioners' submission contain allegations related to \nmatters occurring before the grand jury. Pursuant to Fed. \n... [truncated, 2386 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/270 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=270]", "char_count": 2386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 271, "text_content": "f, ^^neernn\" ..\"-- \n-••• \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 5 of 10 \nof access is not absolute and sealing is appropriate in connection with grand jury proceedings. As \nexplained by Judge Jordan in United States. Swinger, 626 F. Supp. 24i 1231 (S.D. Fl. 2009): \n\"The proper functioning of our grandiury system depends upon the secrecy of grand \njury proceedings,\" Douglas Oil Co. I. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 \n(1979), and this expectation of privacy is generally codified in Rule 6(e) of the \nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure \nThere is a second reason why sealing is currently appropriate. As noted above, the \nPublic Integrity Section has determined that six former or present public officials had \nno knowledge of, or involvement in, the alleged wrongdoing, and its probe continues \nagainst others who have yet to be indicted or cleared. The sealed documents and \ntranscripts refer to many of those individuals by name. Disclosure of those names, \nand the matters being investigated, could have devastating consequences for those \npersons who have been cleared of any misconduct, as well as for those still under \ninvestigation. As William Shakespeare put it centuries ago, \"the purest treasure \nmortal times afford is spotless reputation; that away, men are but guilded loam, or \npainted clay.\" W. Shakespeare, RICHARD II, ACT 1, SCENE 1, lines 177-78 (1597). \nAnd if it is true that \"at every word a reputation dies,\" A. Pope, THE RAPE OF THE \nLock, CANTO III, line 16 (1712), then public access to the sealed documents and \ntranscripts here could easily kill many reputations. This overriding interest is, I \nbelieve, of a higher value under [Ness-Enterprise Co.'. Superior Court, 464 U.S. \n501 (1984)] so as to warrant sealing, and provides good cause under the common-law \naccess balancing test to preclude disclosure. \nSwinger, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1235-36 (brackets in original omitted). See also In re Petition of \nAmerican Historic\n... [truncated, 2464 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/271 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=271]", "char_count": 2464}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 272, "text_content": "e•;;S\",:%%::: - - \n• \n/len\" \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 6 of 10 \nB. \nDue Process \nAs noted above, one of the reasons behind 6(e) is to protect the reputations of persons who \nare under investigation but not indicted. This is a corollary to what the Court of Appeals found to \nbe a due process protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution — \nnamely, \"that the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth Amendment protect an individual from \nbeing publicly and officially accused of having committed a serious crime, particularly where the \naccusations gain wide notoriety.\" See In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation \nomitted)! In Smith, the petitioner filed a motion seeking to have his name stricken from the factual \nproffers of two criminal defendants. Smith had not been criminally charged or convicted. The Court \nof Appeals agreed with Smith, castigating the Government: \nno legitimate governmental interest is served by an official public smear of an \nindividual when that individual has not been provided a forum in which to vindicate \nhis rights... . \n[W]e completely fail to perceive how the interests of criminal justice were advanced \nat the time of the plea hearings by such an attack on the Petitioner's character. The \npresumption of innocence, to which every criminal defendant is entitled, was \nforgotten by the Assistant United States Attorney in drafting and reading aloud in \nopen court the factual resumes which implicated the Petitioner in criminal conduct \nwithout affording him a forum for vindication. \nId. at 1106, 1107. The Court of Appeals ordered the District Court Clerk's Office to \"completely \nand permanently obliterate and strike from the records of the pleas of guilty . . . any and all \nidentifying reference to or name of Mr. Smith, the Petitioner, so that such references may not be used \nas a public record to impugn the reputation of Petitioner.\" Id. at 1107. T\n... [truncated, 2298 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/272 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=272]", "char_count": 2298}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 273, "text_content": "----\nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 7 of 10 \nCourts have interpreted Smith to apply not only to references to unindicted co-conspirators \nin indictments and factual proffers, but also to motion papers. See, e.g., United States'. Anderson, \n55 F. Supp. 24 1163, 1168 (D. Kan. 1999) (\"After carefully reviewing the government's moving \npapers on the conflict of interest issue, the court can find no reason why the government might have \n'forgotten' the presumption of innocence in such a public pleading . .\") (citing Smith, 656 F.2d at \n1107); United States'. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2010) (Fifth Amendment \nrights of organization were violated when its name was listed among 246 unindicted coconspirators \nin pre-trial brief). \nPetitioners' \"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,\" and Exhibit A to DE48 contain \nallegations related to uncharged crimes against not only Epstein but several other individuals.' In \nkeeping with the First Amendment's limited right of access, the United States does not oppose the \nmotion to unseal in full, rather, pursuant to Smith and its progeny, the relevant allegations should be \nredacted. See, e.g., Smith, 656 F.2d at 1107 (ordering Clerk's Office to \"completely and permanently \nobliterate and strike from the records ... any and all identifying reference to or name of Mr. Smith\" \nand sealing all other related records); United States'. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2c1 1163, 1170 (D. Kan. \n1999) (ordering Clerk's Office to \"completely and permanently strike\" all references to petitioners); \nSteinger, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (concluding that documents must be kept fully sealed because \n\"redactions would be so heavy as to make the released versions incomprehensible and \nunintelligible\"). \nFiled herewith, under seal in accordance with Rule 6(e), is a proposed redacted copy of DE48 \nand the relevant pages of Exhibit A. With respect to DE48 itself, the Government has only redacted \n°The NPA al\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/273 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=273]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 274, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 8 of 10 \nlanguage that in some way suggests that the Government (including the FBI) is the source of the \nallegation. However, the Government reiterates, as it has stated in its opposition to \"Petitioners' \nMotion to Have Their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Accepted\" that it denies all of the \nallegations contained in Petitioners' Statement that aver violations of law by Epstein or others that \nhave not resulted in a conviction, including but not limited to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 37, \n52, and 53. With respect to Exhibit A, out of 359 pages, the United States only seeks to redact 40 \nfull pages, and seeks to redact individual words or sentences on an additional 20 pages. \nThe United States further respectfully requests that the Court allow it to redact the personal \ntelephone number and email address of its personnel, that appears on eighteen pages in Exhibit A \nto DE48. The information serves no evidentiary purpose. \nThe United States has conferred with counsel for Petitioners on these matters. Petitioners \nhave no objection to the redaction of the personal telephone number and email address of \ngovernment personnel and to the redaction of individual statutory references in Exhibit A. \nPetitioners object to redactions of DE48 and to further redactions ofErthibit A. For ease of reference \nby the Court, the redactions that arc agreed to are marked in blue; those that are in dispute are \nmarked in red. Redactions that appear in plain black are pre-existing (i.e., they are redactions done \neither by Petitioners or by Epstein's counsel). \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court deny, in part, \nPetitioners' Motion to Unseal its Motion for Finding of Violations of Crime Victim's Rights Act and \nRequest for Hearing on Appropriate Remedies [DE481 and Exhibit A thereto and, instead, that the \nCourt unseal only a redacted version\n... [truncated, 2103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00230494/274 or ?id=EFTA00230494&page=274]", "char_count": 2103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 275, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 9 of 10 \nherewith. \nRespectfully submitted, \nWIFREDO A. FERRER \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nBy: \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \nFla. Bar No. 0936693 \n99 N.E. 4° Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \n(305) 961-9320 \nFax: (305) 530-7139 \nE-mail: dexter.lee\ntisdoiszov \nAttorney for Respondent \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 7, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing document \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. \ns/ Dexter A. Lee \nDEXTER A. LEE \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n9 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000945 \nEFTA00230769\n", "char_count": 635}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00230494", "page_number": 276, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 10 of 10 \nSERVICE LIST \nJane Does I and 2 \nUnited States, \nCase No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nBradley J. Edwards, Esq., \nFanner, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \n(954) 524-2820 \nFax: (954) 524-2822 \nE-mail: brad(apathtoimtice.com \nPaul G. Cassell \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, Utah 84112 \n(801) 585-5202 \nFax: (801) 585-6833 \nE-mail: casseMaiilaw.utah.edu \nAttorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 \n10 \n08-80736-CV-MARRA \n000946 \nEFTA00230770\n", "char_count": 725}]}