{"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_count": 84, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00222670", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00222670.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9 :08-cv-80119-KAM \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2008 \nPan gtotk 6 \nFILED by VT D.C. \nELECTRONIC \nebruary 6, 2008 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCLARENCE MADDOX \nCLERK U.S. Cat \nCT. \nS.D. OF HA. • MIAMI \nCASE NO.: \n08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON \nCOMPLAINT \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe No. 2 (\"Jane\" or \"Jane Doe\"), brings this Complaint against Jeffrey \nEpstein, as follows: \nParties, Jurisdiction and Venue \n1. \nJane Doe No. 2 is a citizen and resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and is sui \njuris. \n2. \nThis Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of the \nPlaintiff because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse upon a \nminor. \n3. \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen and resident of the State of New York. \n4. \nThis is an action for damages in excess of 550 million. \n5. \nThis Court has jurisdiction of this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant to 28 \nU.S.C. §1332(a), as the matter in controversy (i) exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs; \nand (ii) is between citizens of different states. \n6. \nThis Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) as a substantial \nHERMAN 6 MERMELSTEIN. P. A. \n- 1 - \nviww.hermanlavccom \nToff \nEFTA00222670\n", "char_count": 1352}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2008 \nPage 2 of 6 \npart of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. \nFactual Allegations \n7. \nAt all relevant times, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") was an adult male, 52 \nyears old. Epstein is a financier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to \nbillionaires. He is himself a man of tremendous wealth, power and influence. He maintains his \nprincipal home in New York and also owns residences in New Mexico, St. Thomas and Palm Beach, \nFL. The allegations herein concern Epstein's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. \n8. \nUpon information and belief, Epstein has a sexual preference and obsession for \nunderage minor girls. He engaged in a plan and scheme in which he gained access to primarily \neconomically disadvantaged minor girls in his home, sexually assaulted these girls, and then gave \nthem money. In or about 2004-2005, Jane Doe, then approximately 16 years old, fell into Epstein's \ntrap and became one of his victims. \n9. \nUpon information and belief, Jeffrey Epstein carried out his scheme and assaulted \ngirls in Florida, New York and on his private island, known as Little St. James, in St. Thomas. \n10. \nEpstein's scheme involved the use of young girls to recruit underage girls. (Upon \ninformation and belief, the young girl who brought Jane Doe to Epstein was herself a minor victim of \nEpstein, and will therefore not be named in this Complaint). Under Epstein's plan, underage girls \nwere recruited ostensibly to give a wealthy man a massage for monetary compensation in his Palm \nBeach mansion. The recruiter would be contacted when Epstein was planning to be at his Palm \nBeach residence or soon after he had arrived there. Epstein or someone on his behalf would direct the \nrecruiter to bring one or more underage girls to the residence. The recruiter, upon information and \nbelief, generally sought out economically disadvantaged \n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/1 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=1]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 2, "text_content": ":Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2008 \nPage 3 of 6 \nCounty who would be enticed by the money being offered - generally $200 to $300 per \"massage\" \nsession - and who were perceived as less likely to complain to authorities or have credibility if \nallegations of improper conduct were made. This was an important element of Epstein's plan. \n11. \nEpstein's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. Upon arrival at \nEpstein's mansion, the underage victim would be introduced to Sarah Kellen, Epstein's assistant, \nwho gathered the girl's personal information, including her name and telephone number. Ms. Kellen \nwould then bring the girl up a flight of stairs to a bedroom that contained a massage table in addition \nto other furnishings. There were photographs of nude women lining the stairway hall and in the \nbedroom. The girl would then find herself alone in the room with Epstein, who would be wearing \nonly a towel. He would then remove his towel and lie naked on the massage table, and direct the girl \nto remove her clothes. Epstein would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious and sexual acts, \nincluding masturbation and touching the girl's vagina. \n12. \nConsistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Jane Doe was recruited to give \nEpstein a massage for monetary compensation. Jane was brought to Epstein's mansion in Palm \nBeach. Once at the mansion, Jane was introduced to Sarah Kellen, who led her up the flight of stairs \nto the room with the massage table. In this room, Epstein told Jane to take off her clothes and give \nhim a massage. Jane kept her panties and bra on and complied with Epstein's instructions. Epstein \nwore only a towel around his waste. After a short period of time, Epstein removed the towel and \nrolled over exposing his penis. Epstein began to masturbate and he sexually assaulted Jane. \n13. \nAfter Epstein had completed the assault, Jane was then able to get dressed, leave the \nroom and go back down the s\n... [truncated, 2193 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/2 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=2]", "char_count": 2193}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 3, "text_content": ".:Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2008 \nPage 4 of 6 \n14. \nAs a result of this encounter with Epstein, Jane experienced confusion, shame, \nhumiliation and embarrassment, and has suffered severe psychological and emotional injuries. \nCOUNT I \nSexual Assault \n15. \nPlaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. \n16. \nEpstein tortiously assaulted Jane Doe sexually. Epstein's acts were intentional, \nunlawful, offensive and harmful. \n17. \nEpstein's plan and scheme in which he committed such acts upon Jane Doe were done \nwillfully and maliciously. \n18. \nThis sexual assault was in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes, which \nrecognizes as a crime the lewd and lascivious acts committed by Epstein upon Jane. \n19. \nAs a direct and proximate result of Epstein's assault on Jane, she has suffered and will \ncontinue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological and \nemotional damages. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein for compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and such other and further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper. \nCOUNT II \nIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress \n20. \nPlaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. \n21. \nEpstein's conduct was intentional or reckless. \n22. \nEpstein's conduct was outrageous, going beyond all bounds of decency. \n23. \nEpstein's conduct caused severe emotional distress to Jane Doe. Epstein knew or had \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN, P. A. \nwww.hermanlaw.com \n- 4 - \nEFTA00222673\n", "char_count": 1623}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 4, "text_content": ":Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2008 \nPage 5 of 6 \nreason to know that his intentional and outrageous conduct would cause emotional trauma and \ndamage to Jane Doe. \n24. \nAs a direct and proximate result of Epstein's intentional or reckless conduct, Jane \nDoe, has suffered and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and pain. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein for compensatory damages, costs, punitive damages, and such other and further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper. \nJURY TRIAL DEMAND \nPlaintiffs demand a jury trial in this action. \nDated: February C2008 \nRespectfully submitted, \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN. P. A. \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN, P.A. \nAttorneys for Plaintiffs \n18205 Biscayne Blvd. \nSuite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \nTel: 305-931-2200 \nFax: 305-931-\nBy: \nJeffrey M. Herman \njherman@,hermanlaw.com \nFlorida Bar No. 521647 \nStuart S. Mcrmelstein \nsmermelstein@hermanlaw.com \nFlorida Bar No. 947245 \nAdam D. Horowitz \nFlorida Bar No. 376980 \nahorowitz@hermanlaw.com \nwww.hermanlaw.com \n- 5 - \nEFTA00222674\n", "char_count": 1120}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocuncsiMik- CCNERealt:IFEITSD Docket 02/06/2008 \nPage 6 of 6 \nThe JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing, and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, \nexcept as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of \nthe Court for the purpose of Initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.) \n1(a) PLAINTIFFS \nDEFENDANTS \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \n(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF \nOUT OF STATE \n(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) \nCOUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT NEW YORK \n(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) \n(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME. ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER) \nHerman & Mermelstein, PA.,18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218, Miami, \nFL 33160, (305) 931.2200 \n(d) CIRCLE COUNTY WHERE ACTION AROSE: PALM BEACH \nATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN) \nq !ely V foul-K/9in- ) 0 4-)/71__ \nII. BASIS OF JURISDICTION \n(PLACE AN X ONE BOX ONLY) \nO 1. U.S. Government \nPlaintin \nO 2 U.S. Government \nDefendant \nIII) \nO 3 Federal Question \n(U.S. Government Not a Party) \nX 4 Diversity \n(Indicate Citizenship of Parbes in Item \nIII. CITTZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES \n(For Diversity Case Only) \nPTF \nDEF \nCitizen of This State \n0 t O 1 \nCitizen of Another State \nX2 x 2 \nCitizen or Subject of s Foreign Country 0 3 03 \nPLACE AN X IN ONE BOX FOR PLAINTIFF \nAND ONE FOR DEFENDANT \nPTF \nDEF \nIncorporated of Principal Place of \nO 4 \n0 4 \nBusiness in This Stale \nIncorporated and Principal Place of \nO 5 \nO 5 \nBusiness in Another State \nForeign Nation \nO 6 \nO 6 \nIV. CAUSE OF ACTION \n(CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE. \nDO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY.) \nDIVERSITY ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT \nIVa. _5_ days estimated (for both sides) to try entire\n... [truncated, 5071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/5 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=5]", "char_count": 5071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 12 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008 \nPage 1 of 6 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nDEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully moves for a mandatory stay of this \naction under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3509(k). As discussed below, \nthis action is subject to a mandatory stay based on the existence of two pending \nparallel criminal actions. \nIntroduction \nThis civil action is a private counterpart to two ongoing criminal actions, one \nin Palm Beach state court, the other in Miami federal court. Both cases purport to \narise from the same occurrence: the alleged sexual assault of a minor, Jane Doe \nNo. 2. A federal statute directly on point provides that when an alleged sexual \nassault involving a child victim results in a \"criminal proceeding,\" a commonly \nEFTA00222676\n", "char_count": 976}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 12 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008 \nPage 2 of 6 \nderived civil suit \"shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the criminal \naction.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added).' A stay of this case is required \nuntil there is no longer a pending criminal action derived from the same underlying \nallegations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). \nDiscussion \nThe parallel state criminal action pending in Palm Beach Circuit Court is \nstill in the discovery phase. State of Florida v. Jeffi-ey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF \n09454 AXX (Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County). Meanwhile, there is \nalso a parallel federal criminal grand jury action pending in the Southern District of \nFlorida. In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB) (S.D. Fla.) Both cases arise \nout of the same occurrence and allege that the minor plaintiff is a victim. \nThe language of section 3509(k) of title 18, United States Code, is clear: a \nparallel \"civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the criminal \nThe full text of the mandatory-stay provision reads: \nIf, at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for \ndamage or injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is \npending which arises out of the same occurrence and in which the \nchild is the victim, the civil action shall be stayed until the end of all \nphases of the criminal action and any mention of the civil action \nduring the criminal proceeding is prohibited. As used in this \nsubsection, a criminal action is pending until its final adjudication in \nthe trial court. \n18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). \n2 \nEFTA00222677\n", "char_count": 1629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 12 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008 \nPage 3 of 6 \naction.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory \nconstruction, the mandatory nature of the word \"shall\" is well-settled. See, e.g., \nLopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory \n`shall' to impose discretionless obligations\") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. \nMilberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that \n\"the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial \ndiscretion\") (emphasis added). Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000) \n(\"Through the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act], Congress clearly intended to \nmake operation of the automatic stay mandatory, precluding courts from \nexercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay. And we conclude that this \nprovision does not violate separation of powers principles.\") (emphasis added). \nOne district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with \na pending state prosecution, recently construed \"the plain language of § 3509(k)\" \nas \"requirfing] a stay in a case . . . where . . . a parallel criminal action [is] \npending.\" Doe v. Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260 MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 950623, at *2 \n(N.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2005) (Francis I.1) (emphasis added). Accord Doe v. Francis, \nNo. 5:03 CV 260 MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 517847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) \n(Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of \"a criminal case currently \npending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and \ninvolving the same parties as the Instant action,\" noting that \"the language of 18 \n3 \nEFTA00222678\n", "char_count": 1704}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 12 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008 \nPage 4 of 6 \nU.S.C. § 3509(k) is clear that a stay is required in a case such as this where a \nparallel criminal action is pending which arises from the same occurrence \ninvolving minor victims\") (emphasis added). There is no contrary opinion from \nany court. \nIn determining that the federal stay provision is mandatory, the Francis II \ncourt expressed that there was apparently no case law supporting, or even \n\"discussing the [avoidance] of a stay [under the command of] § 3509(k).\" Francis \nH, 2005 WL 950623, at *2. Deferring to the statute as written, the Francis H court \nrejected the plaintiffs' argument that some of the alleged victims had already \nreached their majority. \nSee id. \nThe court similarly rejected the plaintiffs' \nargument that it would be in the victims' best interests to avoid a stay so as to \ncounteract the victims' \"ongoing and increasing mental harm due to the `frustrating \ndelay in both the criminal case and [the civil] case.'\" Id. The Francis II court, in \nadhering to the plain language of the statute, also adhered to the \"well established \npriority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings.\" Cf. United States v. \nHanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. I11. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. \n50(a)). \nConclusion \nBecause this civil action arises from the same allegations as two pending \ncriminal actions, § 3509(k) mandates a stay of this civil action. \n• \n4 \nEFTA00222679\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 12 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008 \nPage 5 of 6 \nWHEREFORE, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully requests that the \nCourt enter a stay under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k), coextensive with the state and \nfederal criminal actions. \nRespectfully submitted, \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & \nWEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel: 561 659 8300 \nFax: 561 835 8691 \nBy: /s/ Jack A. Goldberger \nJack A. Goldberger \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \nj goldberger@agwpa.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jeffiey Epstein \n5 \nEFTA00222680\n", "char_count": 583}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 12 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008 \nPage 6 of 6 \nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7 \nCounsel for defendant has conferred in good faith with counsel for the \nplaintiff, who opposes the relief requested in this motion. \nIs/ Jack A. Goldberger \nJack A. Goldberger \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 20, 2008, I electronically filed the \nforegoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that \nthe foregoing document is being served this day on counsel of record identified \nbelow by facsimile and U.S. Mail. \nJeffrey M. Herman, Esq. \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nHerman & Mermelstein, P.A. \n18205 Biscayne Blvd, Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \nFax: 305 931 0877 \n/s/ Jack A. Goldberger \nJack A. Goldberger \n6 \nEFTA00222681\n", "char_count": 837}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 16 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/01/2008 \nPage 1 of 3 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nDEFENDANT'S NOTICE CONCERNING MOTION TO STAY IDE 121 \nIn connection with his motion to stay this action [DE 12], Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein hereby notifies the Court that the State Court action, State of Florida' \nJeffrey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF 09454 AXX (Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm \nBeach County), was resolved on June 30, 2008. See Final Disposition sheets, \nattached hereto as Exhibit A. The federal criminal proceeding, however, remains \npending. \nRespectfully submitted, \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & \nWEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel: 561 659 8300 \nFax: 561 835 8691 \nEFTA00222682\n", "char_count": 894}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 16 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/01/2008 \nPage 2 of 3 \nBy: /s/ Jack A. Goldberger \nJack A. Goldberger \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \njgoldberger@ agwpa.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \n2 \nEFTA00222683\n", "char_count": 235}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 16 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07'01'2008 \nPage 3 of 3 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 1, 2008, I electronically filed the \nforegoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that \nthe foregoing document is being served this day on counsel of record identified \nbelow by facsimile and U.S. Mail. \nJeffrey M. Herman, Esq. \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nHerman & Mermelstein, P.A. \n18205 Biscayne Blvd, Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \nFax: 305 931 0877 \n/s/ Jack A. Goldberger \nJack A. Goldberger \n3 \nEFTA00222684\n", "char_count": 614}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 16-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07:01:2008 \nPage 1 of 4 \nEXHIBIT A \nEFTA00222685\n", "char_count": 111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 16-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/01/2008 \nPage 2 of 4 \n: \ntiP \n• ' \nCASE PIO \n±-122OO.1.:IFO-51/4\n541sXXX \nCF \nV. \nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN \nZ41 \n'FP \n^i ria4 \nY \ntr..mr.y..PRzia\"rtnivz•zrt \n: . • \n. \n7 \n'Crt. Rep. lun,L__ \nDate : • -17 vcri \nJ \n„Asir \n)----=-- \n• \n/ PD e--P:9fot Pres, \nDe ft--Pres \nof Pres.- W /- /O  \nS \nBefore the Court for. \nC \nr \nO Granted O Denied O With /Without Prejudiced ^-O Withdrawn O Court Reserves Ruling O Written Order to Follow \nO \nWarrant O ordered O Recalled O Bort \nCl See Belbw DAlso Covers . 04 Cond \nO Bond Forf \nOOR: Distil / Revoked /Reinstated \nO Bond Fat Vacated O Previous Bond Reinstated, if B \nan \n/Reuniter \nO$GR:Disch/Revoked/Reinsmted \n• \n- \n- \nO State failed to file charges 0 -Released OR /8:O1L \nO Deft \nIndigent \nO PD Appt \nO Erg only . PD Pres \n• O- Court Appts\n_ \nEvaluation for: O Drug Farm \nO DOC Non-Secure Bed by •\n• \n• \nO Pre-Plea . O PSI ordered by/within \n' \n.days \nO wfinput from DU / Staffing \nO Referred to: FIT / SAAP / PADD \nO Case p cod on theabsentee docket \nDEFT ENTERED A LEA OF: O NOT GUILTY \nGUILTY O NO CONTEST O BEST INTEREST O TO THE COURT \nAls,Charged-Cts \nMA.' \ner Cts \nLesser Charge ' \n40' Sw & lest \ndv of Rts \nWaived PSI \nLesser Cts \nLesser Charge \n17ADJ GUILTY as Charged as to Cu____,21264 \nLesstr Cts \nO FOUND GUILTY as Charged as to Cts \nLesser Cts \n. \nO ADJ WftiELD as to Cts \nO SENT W/BELD as to Cts \nO FOUND AND ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT as to Cts \n' ODisoOolenofollowflikd \nO FOUND & AD: NOT GUILTY as to Cts \nO Dismiss \nO Nolte Prase Cts \n. \nProb / Comm Control: O Revoked \nO Reinsta \nO Modified \nO Stip/Found: (violent) Habitual Off. 775.084 \na \no \nSENTENCE: \nPBCJisilP/15 \nCis: \nO Term. Successfully / Unsuccessfully - \n- \n. • . \ne-- - \n• \nexual Predator \nO Stip/Found:. P.R.R. \n/ \ne \nOs. \nPBC2- \nCts• \n/ DOC. \n- Os.\nfor \n \n/ \n. \n. \nDeft Remanded \n:meretirlf \nO Deft to remain on same rel. status pending sent. \n•\nSt\nW/Credit \nan / Consec / Co-'h in w/cases / \n: \n• \nO Execution of S\n... [truncated, 3201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/16 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=16]", "char_count": 3201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 1 6- 2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/01/2008 \nPage 3 of 4 \nCase No.:  \n20080=ND093Si= \nW \n ST of FL vs.  \nJEFFREY'EPSEBIN \ncharges.  PROCURE PERSON lla \nMB GE' 18 FOR PAGSTI5lll-liCN \n(eater FROM 2006CF009454=kr \nAssad/ - \n \nBond# \nDate \nin \nn \n• \n• \n- \n/udge \n \n. \n-• \n- \n. Crt. Rep. / \n• .11 )11017/4'..)\nASA \n.4/./.47 \nDC \nr- \n , \n• \n- \n• \nInt \n_ . \n4/..../j.::..n/tf \n.-Tet--Pres-/,Oot Pres. \nW i/W/O pa. OS. \n.1,: tin \n• \nEsq CP137-\nres / Not Pros. \n_....• \n. . \n-Beftliellti Court for: 9.4 A05 \nf \nI \nO Granted 0 Denied .. 0 With / Without Prejudice 0 Withdravin \n0 COurt Reserves Ruling a Written Order to Follow \nO Warrant \n0 Ordered \n0 Recalled \n0 Bond Set at S \n. Ince Below \n0\n \nAlso Covers 0 Sp Cond \n0. Bond Pod \n0 OR: Disch / Revoked / Reinstated \n0 Bond] Disch /Revoked •cISOR: Discb / Revoked /Reinstated \nCl Bond Foil Vacated \nCl Previous Bond Reinstated, if Bondsman agrees . Cl State failed to file charges - 0 Released O.R. / S.O.R. . \n0 Deft \nIndigent o pp Sppt \nCI firg only \nPD Pres \na Court ApPts \n_ \n. \nEvaluation for: 0 Drug PAIR 0 DOC Non-Secure Bed by \n• \n0 Pre-Plea 0 PSI ordered by/within \n• \ndays. \n0 vainput. from DJJ /Staffing \n0 Referred to: PTI / SAAP / PADD 0 Case pla \non the absentee docket . \n• \n' \nDEFT ENTERED A PLEA O12: 't3 NOT GUILTY. \nGUILTY ONO CONTEST Cl BEST INTEREST 0 TO THE COURT \n•• I i loc. \nAt \nCharged-Cts \n.< \nLesser Cts \n• \n-Lesser Charge \n.\nt\n i\nq sw & Thu \nAdv of Rts of gaived PSI ' \nLesser Cts \n• \nteiserCharge • \nADS GUILTY as Charged as to Cts \nel •1••?A• y \nLesser CG \n• • • • \n0 FOUND GUILTY as Charged as to as \n.. \nLesser Cts• •• \nCP ADJ• W/HELD as to Cts \n0 -SENTW/1-= astoCts ' \nCI FOUND AND ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT as to Cts• \n• \n' • • \n• \n0 Dispo Order to follow / Piled \n0 POUND & ADI NOT GUILTY as to Cts \n0 DisMies : 0 NolleProsseCts \nProb / Comm Control: \n0 Revoked .0 Reinstated \n0 Modified. 0 Term. Successfully / Unsuccessfully . • \n0 Deft. to pay fine or complete \nhrs. Community Service or S\n... [truncated, 3544 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/17 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=17]", "char_count": 3544}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument.16-2 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/01/2008 \nP ge 4 of 4 \n0 \n• \nTh\n.\" \n0 \nDATE: 6 3 OS-.\n7age 2 \n• \n• \nr , \nI\nCL/ \nTERM OF Prob / Sex Off / Drug Off \nC.C.9 C.C. II: \nAZ. \n— (mos yh-as tiers ___L\n_ \nO conc w/ O bonsec. w/ \nO Probation transferred to: \nSPECIAL CONDITIONS: \n- \nO Complete Originally Ordered Conditions \n. \n ' \n\" \n. \nO Curfew: \np m with the following exception. \n• • \n• \n, \nO Deft. to report to Prob.. Dept. immediately upon release \n, • \n• \nO Deft. not Jo have in care, custody; or control any.unlawful &illegal material, subst, device, or object. \nO Deft. to Immediately notify Prob. Officer if place of residence or job changes. \n• \nO Restitution CRO filed .. \n. \n. \n. . \nO Subject to all ordinary and special odnditions of Probation •' • \n• \n_..... \n. \nO Substance Abuse Eval. / PeycholdgiCal Eval: / Psychosexual Eval. within / by' \na\nand deft. to successfullycomplete' recommended treatment \" •' : •- \n•\n• \n• • • •' . \nCI Random DrUg/Alcohol Testing .. • \nO At Deit's Expense • .\" CI Costs Waived \n0 No Consumption/Possession of Alcohol or. Drugs or intoxicants without a Piescription. \n• \nO Attend \n.AA and/or NA Meetings per. Week: \n- \n,\nO Deft. not to frequent any place of business whose primary purpose is the sale of alcohol. ' . \nO Complete \nCommunity Senlice to be done at the rate of • \nHrs..per Wk /Mo.(Min.).\n_ -___Hreof \nO License Revoked / Suspended for \n• \n. \nmos /\n • \n. \nQ Attend and successfully complete DUI' chool and 1 session of Victim impact Panel\nO No Contact / No Violent Contact / No Direct or: Indirect contact w/yictim(s) or others listed: .• •\n, \n. \n• \n. \ncl Nd Contact w/Minor Children w/o Adult'Supervision aware 0 thii case and the disposition: \n. \nO Cost of Bdpervision: $ \n. \n‘: \nper month \nO Waived by Court. \nO Enter and Successfully Complete DOC Non-Becure.Bed Program and Any Recommended Aftercare. \nO Hold in Custody, release only to DOC Non-Secure Bed•Prograni Officer. \nO Enter and Successfully Complete PBSCILon\n... [truncated, 2722 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/18 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=18]", "char_count": 2722}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 21 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07:1672008 \nPage 1 of 3 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nNO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \n1. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL \nTHIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Jeffrey Epstein's Motion to File Ex \nPane and Under Seal, filed July 10, 2008. Defendant seeks to file a Notice of Continued \nPendency of Federal Criminal Action under seal.' The Court has carefully considered the motion \nand the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. \nAs stated in the Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida, \"proceedings in \nthe United States District Court are public and Court filings are matters of public record.\" S.D. \nFla. L.R. 5.4(A). It is well settled that the media and the public in general possess a common-law \nright to inspect and copy judicial records. See Nixon I Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. \n589, 597 (1978). \"The right to inspect and copy records is not absolute, however. As with other \nforms of access, it may interfere with the administration of justice and hence may have to be \ncurtailed.\" \nGraddick, 696 F.2d 796, 803 (11th Cir.1983). This right of access creates \n'All documents filed conventionally shall henceforth be filed directly with the Office of \nthe Clerk in West Palm Beach, Florida. The parties shall not file documents conventionally in \nany other division of the Southern District of Florida. \n1 \nEFTA00222689\n", "char_count": 1520}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 21 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07'162008 \nPage 2 of 3 \na presumption in favor of openness of court records, which \"must be balanced against any \ncompeting interest advanced.\" United Stalest Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (S.D. \nFla.1990). For example, courts may look to see whether the records sought are for illegitimate \npurposes. \n696 F.2d at 803. Likewise, the Court may consider whether \"the press has \nalready been permitted substantial access to the contents of the records.\" Id. \nIn his motion to seal, Defendant has made no argument as to why his Notice of Continued \nPendency of Federal Criminal Action should not be made available to the public. Defendant \nstates only that he wishes \"[t]o avoid disclosure of confidential material.\" (Def. Mot. 2.) The \nCourt finds this justification insufficient to justify keeping this document (filed ex parte) under \nseal. The Court is supported in this conclusion by its decision in a similar case, In re: Jane Doe, \nNo. 08-80736-CW (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2008), in which the Court unsealed, over the objection of \nthe United States Attorney, documents containing similar information regarding Defendant's \ncriminal plea agreement. Thus, any argument regarding confidentiality is vitiated by the fact that \ninformation regarding Defendant's criminal plea arrangement is already a matter of public \nrecord. See, e.g., Sally Apgar, Victims Object to Palm Beach Billionaire's Plea Deal in \nUnderage Sex Case, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel, July 12, 2008. Similarly, Defendant has not justified \nthe necessity of filing his Notice ex parte. As such, Defendant's Motion to Seal shall be denied. \nAccordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to File Ex \nParte and Under Seal is DENIED. The Clerk shall UNSEAL docket entries 19 and 20 and make \nthem available for public inspection through CM/ECF at the earliest possible time. Defendant is \nfurther ORDERED to serve a copy of his Notice on Plaintiff within five (5) d\n... [truncated, 2036 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/20 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=20]", "char_count": 2036}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 21 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/16/2008 \nPage 3 of 3 \nentry of this Order. \nDONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, \nFlorida, this le day of July, 2008. \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \nCopies furnished to: \nall counsel of record \n3 \nEFTA00222691\n", "char_count": 322}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80-OSstO4108-DeaCifirlellit 2A of: CEntgred0BICEISDAAncfidefi07:1Ball98 \nPage 1 of 3 \nU.S. District Court \nSouthern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) \nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nInternal Use Only \nDoe'. Epstein \nAssigned to: Judge Kenneth A. Marra \nReferred to: Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson \nCase: 212S232-lithl \nCause: 28:1391 Personal Injury \nPlaintiff \nJane Doe \nNo. 2 \nDefendant\nJeffrey Epstein \nDate Filed: 02/06/2008 \nJury Demand: Plaintiff \nNature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other \nJurisdiction: Diversity \nrepresented by Adam D. Horowitz \nHerman &Mermelstein, P.A. \n18205 Biscayne Blvd. \nSuite 2218 \nMiami, FL 33160 \n305-931-2200 \nFax: 305-931-0877 \nEmail: ahorowitz@hermanlaw.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nJeffrey Marc Herman \nHerman &Mertnelstein \n18205 Biscayne Boulevard \nSuite 2218 \nMiami, FL 33160 \n305-931-2200 \nFax: 931-0877 \nEmail: jherman@hermanlaw.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nStuart S. Mermelstein \nHerman &Mertnelstein \n18205 Biscayne Boulevard \nSuite 2218 \nMiami, FL 33160 \n305-931-2200 \nFax: 931-0877 \nEmail: Irivera@hermanlaw.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nrepresented by Jack Alan Goldberger \nAtterbury Goldberger &Weiss, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South \nSuite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 \n561-659—8300 \nFax: 835-8691 \nEmail: jagesq@bellsouth.net \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nMichael Ross Tein \nLewis Tein \n3059 Grand Avenue \nSuite 340 \nEFTA00222692\n", "char_count": 1456}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80-OSsKA108-Eraelrleit 2Ae2of: CatliadethollIDIEIMEN07/11156138 \nPage 2 of 3 \nCoconut Grove, FL 33133 \n305-442-1101 \nFax: 442-6744 \nEmail: tein@lewistein.com \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nDate Filed \n# \nDocket Text \n02/06/2008 \n1 COMPLAINT against Jeffrey Epstein; Filing fee $ 350. Receipt#: 542215, filed \nby Jane Doe No.2.(1k) (Entered: 02/06/2008) \n02/06/2008 \n2 Summons Issued as to Jeffrey Epstein. (1k) (Entered: 02/06/2008) \n02/08/2008 \nI \nOrder Requiring Counsel to Confer and Joint Scheduling Report.Signed by \nJudge Kenneth A. Marra on 2/8/08.(ir) (Entered: 02/08/2008) \n05/22/2008 \nA AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Complaint served on Jeffrey Epstein \non May 7, 2008, filed by Jane Doe. (Herman, Jeffrey) (Entered: 05/22/2008) \n05/22/2008 \n5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jane Doe. Jeffrey Epstein served on \n5/7/2008, Answer due 5/27/2008. (1k) (Entered: 05/27/2008) \n05/27/2008 \n6 NOTICE of Docket Correction and Instruction to Filer: reA Affidavit of Service \nfiled by Jane Doe. Error: Wrong Event Selected; Correction=Redocketed as \n\"Summons returned executed\", D.E. 5 . Instruction to Filer=In the future please \nselect \"summons returned executed\" as the proper Event. (1k) (Entered: \n05/27/2008) \n05/29/2008 \n1 Plaintiffs MOTION for Entry of Default by Clerk Against Defendant by Jane \nDoe. (Attachments: #_1, Exhibit A and B, #.2 Text of Proposed Order Default \nOrd)(Horowitz, Adam) (Entered: 05/29/2008) \n06/06/2008 \n8 CLERK'S NOTICE Denying for Improper Service 7 Plaintiffs MOTION for \nEntry of Default by Clerk Against Defendant ( ) (Entered: 06/06/2008) \n06/1 UMW \n2 Plaintiffs MOTION to Compel Clerk to Enter Default Against Defendant, or \nAlternatively, for an Enlgargement of Time to Serve Process, and Incorporated \nMemorandum of Law by Jane Doe. Responses due by 6/30/2008 (Attachments: # \n.I. Exhibit A, #_2 Exhibit B)(Horowitz, Adam) (Entered: 06/11/2008) \n06/13/2008 \n22 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Jack Alan Goldberger on behalf of Jeffrey \nEpstein \n... [truncated, 3264 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/23 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=23]", "char_count": 3264}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-801216s1MO8-difs8Ohleit 2AS2of: CalifloW31692DilikkEDT07/1366101)8 \nPage 3 of 3 \n07/08/2008 \n12 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Michael Ross Tein on behalf of Jeffrey \nEpstein (Tein, Michael) (Entered: 07/08/2008) \n07/10/2008 \n18 Plaintiff's MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 12 Defendant's \nMOTION to Stay by Jane Doe. (Attachments: CI, Text of Proposed \nI \nOrder)(Horowitz, Adam) (Entered: 07/10/2008) \n07/10/2008 \n19 Sealed Document. (yc) (Entered: 07/10/2008) \n07/10/2008 \n20 Sealed Document. (yc) (Entered: 07/10/2008) \n07/16/2008 \n21. ORDER denying motion to file Ex Parte and Under Seal. The clerk shall unseal \nDE 19 and 20 and make them available for inspection through CM/ECF at the \nearliest possible time. Signed by Judge Kenneth A. Marra on 7/16/08. (ir) \n(Entered: 07/16/2008) \n07/16/2008 \n22, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE why default should not be entered against \nDefendant. Show Cause Response due by 7/28/2008. Signed by Judge Kenneth \nA. Marra on 7/16/08. (ir) (Entered: 07/16/2008) \nEFTA00222694\n", "char_count": 1039}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 23 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07,17'2008 \nPage 1 of 4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nFILED EX PARTE \nUNDER SEAL \nI-\n \nI \n0 \nfV\nDEFENDANT'S MOTION TO FILE EX PARTE AND UNDER SEAL \nEFTA00222695\n", "char_count": 353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 23 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/17/2008 \nPage 2 of 4 \nPursuant to S.D. Fla. L.R. 5.4, defendant Jeffrey Epstein hereby moves to \nfile his Notice of Continued Pendency of Federal Criminal Action, as well as this \nmotion, ex pane and under seal, stating as follows: \n1. \nIn support of his motion to stay [DE 12], defendant has herewith filed \na Notice of Continued Pendency of Federal Criminal Action. \n2. \nThe Notice relates to a confidential agreement between the United \nStates Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and the defendant. \n3. \nThe information contained in the Notice is material to this Court's \nconsideration of Epstein's motion to stay. \n4. \nTo avoid disclosure of confidential material, Epstein requests leave to \nfile the Notice, and this motion, ex parte and under seal. \n5. \nPending a ruling from this Court, Epstein has not served this motion \nor the Notice on counsel for plaintiff: \n2 \nEFTA00222696\n", "char_count": 970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 27, "text_content": ". \nCase 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 23 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07)17/2008 \nPage 3 of 4 \nWHEREFORE, defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully requests leave to file \nthis motion and his Notice of Continued Pendency of Federal Criminal Action, ex \nparte and under seal. \nRespectfully submitted, \nLEWIS TEIN, P.L. \n3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 \nCoconut Grove, Florida 33133 \nTel: 305 442 1101 Fax: 305 442 6744 \nBy: \nGUY A. LEWIS \nFla. Bar No. 623740 \nlewis@lewistein.com \nMICHAEL R. TEIN \nFla. Bar No. 993522 \ntein@lewistein.com \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel. 561 659 8300 Fax. 561 835 8691 \nBy: \nJACK A. GOLDBERGER \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \njgoldberger@agwpa.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \n3 \nEFTA00222697\n", "char_count": 798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 23 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/17/2008 \nPage 4 of 4 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that this motion, in accordance with S.D. Fla. L.R. \n5.4, has not been served on opposing counsel and was filed under seal on July I0, \n2008. \nMichael R. Tein \n4 \nEFTA00222698\n", "char_count": 302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 29, "text_content": ",Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 24 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07,17.2008 \nPage 1 of 4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nFILED EX PARTE \nUNDER SEAL \nEFTA00222699\n", "char_count": 288}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 30, "text_content": ".Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 24 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 071 7/2008 \nPage 2 of 4 \nNOTICE OF CONTINUED PENDENCY \nOF FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACTION \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein hereby notifies the Court of the continued \npendency of a federal criminal action against him, stating as follows: \nOn June 30, 2008, after defendant Jeffrey Epstein filed his motion to stay \nIDE 121, he was sentenced in the state-court criminal case described in that motion \n(State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF 09454 AXX, Fifteenth \nJudicial Circuit, Palm Beach County) (the \"Florida Criminal Action\"). \nAs \nexplained below, the parallel federal criminal action against him described in that \nmotion (In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB), United States District Court for \nthe Southern District of Florida) (the \"Federal Criminal Action\"), remains pending. \nOn September 24, 2007, the United States Attorney's Office for the \nSouthern District of Florida (\"USAO\"), represented by Assistant United States \n \n, and Mr. Epstein, entered into a deferred-\nprosecution agreement (\"Agreement\"), which the parties agreed to keep \nconfidential. Prior to entering into that Agreement, \nidvised that she \nhad already prepared a federal criminal indictment against Mr. Epstein in the \nFederal Criminal Action. \nUnder the Agreement, beginning on the date Mr. Epstein began serving his \nsentence in the Florida Criminal Action, the USAO agreed to suspend its grand \njury investigation in the Federal Criminal Action. The USAO, however, retains the \n2 \nEFTA00222700\n", "char_count": 1543}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 31, "text_content": ",Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 24 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07)1T2008 \nPage 3 of 4 \nright to reactivate the grand jury and indict Mr. Epstein should he breach any part \nof the Agreement during its term, which runs for 33 months, beginning on the date \nMr. Epstein began serving his sentence in the Florida Criminal Action. \nAccordingly, the Federal Criminal Action will remain pending against Mr. Epstein \nfor 33 months from June 30, 2008. \nMr. Epstein will provide the Court with a copy of the confidential \nAgreement for its in-camera inspection at the Court's request. \nWHEREFORE, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein hereby notifies the Court of the \ncontinued pendency of the Federal Criminal Action. \nRespectfully submitted, \nLEWIS TEM, P.L. \n3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 \nCoconut Grove, Florida 33133 \nTel: 305 442 1101 \nFax: 305 442 6744 \nBy: \nIAN \nGUY A. LEWIS \nFla. Bar No. 623740 \nlewis@lewistein.com \nMICHAEL R. TEN \nFla. Bar No. 993522 \ntein@lewistein.com \n3 \nEFTA00222701\n", "char_count": 976}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 24 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07)17:2008 \nPage 4 of 4 \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel. 561 659 8300 \nFax. 561 835 8691 \nBy: \nJack A. Goldberger \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \njgoldberger@agwpa.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that this motion, in accordance with S.D. Fla. L.R. \n5.4, has not been served on opposing counsel and was filed under seal on July 10, \n2008. \nMichael R. Tein \n4 \nEFTA00222702\n", "char_count": 560}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 33 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/0512008 \nPage 1 of 5 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nNO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \n1. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY \nTHIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Jeffrey Epstein's Motion to Stay \n(DE 12), filed June 20, 2008. The motion is now fully briefed and is ripe for review. The Court \nhas carefully considered the motion and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein (\"Defendant\") seeks a stay of this civil action under a federal \nstatute which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: \nIf, at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for \ndamage or injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is \npending which arises out of the same occurrence and in which the child is \nthe victim, the civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the \ncriminal action and any mention of the civil action during the criminal \nproceeding is prohibited. As used in this subsection, a criminal action is \npending until its final adjudication in the trial court. \n18 U.S.C. § 3509 (k). In his motion, Defendant cites a state case, Florida.. Epstein, No. 2006 \n1 \nEFTA00222703\n", "char_count": 1297}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 33 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/05/2008 \nPage 2 of 5 \nCF 09454AXX (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008)' and a federal case, In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB) \n(S.D. Fla.), that arise out of the same occurrences and are pending and thus require a stay of this \ncivil case. The federal \"case,\" according to Defendant, involves a \"deferred-prosecution\" \nagreement whereby the U.S. Attorney agreed to suspend its investigation of Defendant while \n\"retaining the right to reactivate the grand jury.\" (DE 24.) Defendant essentially reasons, \nbecause the U.S. Attorney could bring criminal charges against Defendant, that a criminal action \nis \"pending.\" The Court rejects this definition of a \"pending criminal action.\" \nWhen interpreting the text of a statute, the Court begins with the plain meaning of the \ntext. In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d 1175, 1186 (11* Cir. 2008). If the plain meaning of a statute is \nclear, the Court should not deviate from that interpretation. Id. Pending is defined as \"remaining \nundecided\" and \"awaiting decision.\" Blacks Law Dictionary (81h ed. 2004).2 Likewise, an \n'As Defendant recognizes, the state court case was \"finally adjudicated\" and thus no \nlonger pending as of June 30, 2008. (See DE 12.) \n'Defendant attempts to argue that the fact that grand jury subpoenas are still \n\"outstanding\" and \"not withdrawn\" and that the grand jury will not be dismissed until Defendant \ncompletes his obligations under the state plea agreement means that a \"criminal action\" is \n\"pending.\" (Def. Reply 4.) Defendant misunderstands the purpose of a grand jury. A grand \njury, as Blackstone writes, is composed of citizens who \"inquire, upon their oaths, whether there \nbe sufficient cause to call upon the party to answer\" the charge of criminal activity. Beavers\" \nHenkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904) (quoting William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *303). The grand \njury's sole purpose is to inquire into whether there is probable cause to bring an individual before \na trib\n... [truncated, 2828 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/34 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=34]", "char_count": 2828}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 33 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/05/2008 \nPage 3 of 5 \n\"action\" is defined as a \"criminal judicial proceeding.\" Id. Because the U.S. Attorney has not \nfiled an indictment or an information against Defendant, the Court fails to see how there is an \nundecided judicial proceeding in federal court against Defendant. \nDefendant argues that this statute should be read to include the definition of \"criminal \naction\" used in 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(2), which reads as follows: \"In this subsection, a 'criminal \naction' includes investigation and prosecution and is pending until final adjudication in the trial \ncourt.\" Defendant argues that \"Congress specifically intended that the term 'criminal action' \nwould be applied extremely broadly\" under § 1595, so Congress \"took pains to ensure that courts \nwould give it the broadest possible construction\" and defined \"criminal action\" as including \ninvestigatory stages. (Def. Reply 4.) Defendants argue that the Court should borrow this \ndefinition. \nThe Court disagrees. The Court believes that Congress's inclusion of this broader \ndefinition under § 1595 evinces Congressional intent to depart from the normal meaning of the \nterm \"criminal action.\"' This addition to the text suggests that Congress knows the plain \nmeaning of the term \"criminal action\" and that Congress decided, under § 1595, that the \ndefinition of \"criminal action\" should be broader. In contrast, Congress could have made such an \naddition to § 3509 had it intended the mandatory stay provision to apply to pre-indictment \ninvestigations, but it did not. In other words, by not broadening the definition of \"criminal \naction\" § 3509, Congress intended that the term should only have its ordinary meaning: that an \nindictment or information has been filed naming a specific defendant. Instead, it seems clear that \n'In fact, Congress made this intent clear by stating that this broader definition of a \n\"criminal action\" applied only \"in this subsection\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/35 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=35]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 33 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08;05'2008 \nPage 4 of 5 \nCongress intended that these two statutory provisions should each have a different scope. \nDefendant's argument of statutory construction fails. \nThe single case cited by Defendant in support of his motion is not on point. In Doe \nFrancis, No. 5:03CV260/MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 517847 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005), the stay was \nentered because criminal charges had been filed against the defendant in a state court several \nmonths earlier (i.e., the defendants had been indicted by the state attorney). See Memorandum in \nSupport of Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Outcome of Parallel Criminal Proceedings at 3, \nDoe li Francis, No. 5:03CV260/MCR/WCS (N.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2003). The Court agrees with \nDefendant that a stay under § 3509(k) is mandatory when a criminal action is pending; the Court \nsimply disagrees that the \"deferred-prosecution agreement\" constitutes a pending criminal action. \nThe Court also does not believe a discretionary stay is warranted. Defendant did not seek \nthis relief in his motion; including such a request in the reply brief is inappropriate. Further, the \nCourt sees no reason to delay this litigation for the next thirty-three months. After all, Defendant \nis in control of his own destiny - it is up to him (and him alone) whether the plea agreement \nreached with the State of Florida is breached. If Defendant does not breach the agreement, then \nhe should have no concerns regarding his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The \nfact that the U.S. Attorney (or other law enforcement officials) may object to some discovery in \nthese civil cases is not, in an of itself, a reason to stay the civil action. Any such issues shall be \nresolved as they arise in the course of this litigation. \nAccordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: \nI \nDefendant's Motion to Stay (DE 12) is DENIED. \n2. Defendant's Motion for Hearing (DE 27) is DENIED AS MOOT. \n4 \nEFTA00222706\n", "char_count": 2000}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 33 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/05/2008 \nPage 5 of 5 \n3. Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to File Response (DE 18) is GRANTED NU NC \nPRO TUNC. \nDONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, \nFlorida, this 4ih day of August, 2008. \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \nCopies furnished to: \nall counsel of record \n5 \nEFTA00222707\n", "char_count": 404}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 34 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/0512008 \nPage 1 of 2 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nNO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \n1. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL \nTHIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Jeffrey Epstein's Motion to File \nUnder Seal, filed July 28, 2008. Defendant seeks to file his reply to his Motion to Stay under \nseal.' The Court has carefully considered the motion and the record and is otherwise fully \nadvised in the premises. \nAs the Court has previously explained to the parties, the Local Rules for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida state that \"proceedings in the United States District Court are public and Court \nfilings are matters of public record.\" S.D. Fla. L.R. 5.4(A). It is well settled that the media and \nthe public in general possess a common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records. See Nixon \nI. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). \"The right to inspect and copy \nrecords is not absolute, however. As with other forms of access, it may interfere with the \nadministration of justice and hence may have to be curtailed.\" \nGraddick, 696 F.2d \n'The parties are reminded that all documents filed conventionally (including those filed \nunder seal) must be filed with the Clerk's Office in West Palm Beach, Florida. \nEFTA00222708\n", "char_count": 1403}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 34 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/05/2008 \nPage 2 of 2 \n796, 803 (11th Cir.1983). This right of access creates a presumption in favor of openness of court \nrecords, which \"must be balanced against any competing interest advanced.\" United States\" \nNoriega, 752 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (S.D. Fla.1990). For example, courts may look to see whether \nthe records sought are for illegitimate purposes. \n696 F.2d at 803. Likewise, the Court \nmay consider whether \"the press has already been permitted substantial access to the contents of \nthe records.\" Id. \nIn his motion to seal, Defendant states that he seeks to file this document under seal \"to \ncomply with the confidentiality clause\" in the agreement between Defendant and the U.S. \nAttorney cited in his brief. (Def. Mot. 2.) The Court is familiar with the U.S. Attorney's \nobjections to unsealing any part of the agreement, see In re: Jane Doe, No. 08-80736-CIV (S.D. \nFla. July 11, 2008). However, as the Court has previously held, the U.S. Attorney's objections \ndo not outweigh the public interest in having access to court records. Further, the details of the \nagreement contained in Defendant's Reply brief have, in large part, already been unsealed and \nreleased to the public. The Court finds no justification to keep these documents under seal. \nAccordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to File \nUnder Seal is DENIED. The Clerk shall UNSEAL docket entries 29 and 30 and make them \navailable for public inspection through CM/ECF at the earliest possible time. \nDONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, \nFlorida, this 4ih day of August, 2008. \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \nCopies furnished to: all counsel of record \n2 \nEFTA00222709\n", "char_count": 1785}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 1 of 13 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nJANE DOE NO. 3, \nVS. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \n/ \nJANE DOE NO. 4, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nJANE DOE NO. 5, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-KAM-L \n---- DC \nJUL 2 8 2008 \nSTEVEN \nCLERK M LAD \nU \n-EL-r-EyeAgr \nCASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-  -KAM-L \nCASE NO.: 08-80380-CIV-KAM-LRJ \nCASE NO.: 08-80381-CIV-KAM-LRJ \nFILED UNDER SEAL.\nEPSTEIN'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY \nThis motion is filed under seal because the deferred-prosecution agreement between the United States Attorney's \nOffice and Mr. Epstein. discussed herein, contains a confidentiality clause. \nA motion to seal has been filed \ncontemporaneously. \nEFTA00222710\n", "char_count": 817}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 2 of 13 \nThe Pendine Federal Criminal Action \nIn 2006, a Florida state grand jury indicted Jeffrey Epstein on allegations similar to those in \nthe instant actions (State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF 09454, Fifteenth Judicial \nCircuit. Palm Beach County) (the \"Florida Criminal Action\")) Shortly thereafter, the United States \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (the \"USAO\") began a federal grand-jury \ninvestigation into allegations arising out of the same incidents alleged in the instant actions (Grand \nJury No. 07-103 (WPB),2 United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida) (the \n\"Federal Criminal Action\"). \nIn September 2007, the USAO and Mr. Epstein entered into a highly unusual and \nunprecedented deferred-prosecution agreement (the \"Agreement\"), in which the USAO agreed to \ndefer (not dismiss or close) the Federal Criminal Action on the condition that Mr. Epstein continue \nto comply with numerous obligations, the first of which was pleading guilty to certain state charges \nin the Florida Criminal Action. \nThe Agreement itself uses the term \"deferred\" (rather than \n\"dismissed\" or \"closed\") to describe the status of the Federal Criminal Action: \nTHEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be \ndeferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by \nthe following conditions and the requirements of this Agreement . . . . \nAgreement, at 2. \nBy no stretch did the USAO finalize, close, complete, dismiss or abandon the Federal \nCriminal Action. Indeed, as the lead federal prosecutor recently explained, the USAO merely \nSince the filing of the motion to stay, Mr. Epstein has pled guilty and been sentenced in the Florida Criminal Action. \nSee Notice Concerning Motion to Stay (7/1/08). Acc\n... [truncated, 3181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/41 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=41]", "char_count": 3181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 3 of 13 \n\"agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida . ... \nSee In \nre. Jane Doe, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-Marra/Johnson (S.D. Fla.) (DE 14), \n5, attached hereto as Exhibit \"A\" (emphasis added). Under the Agreement, \nthe USAO presently retains the continuing right to indict Mr. Epstein - - or to unseal \"any\" \nalready-existing federal \"charges\" that may already have been handed up by the federal grand jury \nand sealed - - should he breach any of its provisions. Agreement, at 2. \nThe period of the deferral continues until three months after Mr. Epstein completes service \nof his sentence in the Florida Criminal Action. Id. Indeed, the final three months of the \nAgreement's term constitute an extended period during which the USAO expressly retains the \nability to evaluate whether Epstein committed any breaches of his numerous obligations under the \nAgreement while he was serving his state sentence, and, if it so determines, reserves the right to \nindict (or unseal an existing indictment against) Mr. Epstein - - even after he has completed \nserving his entire state sentence. \nThe Agreement further provides that upon Epstein's execution of a plea agreement in the \nState Criminal Case, the Federal Criminal Action \"will be suspended\" and all pending grand-jury \nsubpoenas \"will be held in abeyance unless and until the defendant violates any term of this \nagreement.\" Agreement, at 5 (emphasis added). The Agreement directs the USAO and Epstein to \n\"maintain their evidence, specifically evidence requested by or directly related to the grand jury \nsubpoenas that have been issued,\" and to maintain such evidence \"inviolate.\" Id. (emphasis \nadded). It also expressly provides that the grand-jury subpoenas continue to remain \"outstanding\" \nuntil \"the successful completion of the terms of this agreement.\" Id. (emphasis added). \nFinally, the Agreement provides that the USA\n... [truncated, 2624 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/42 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=42]", "char_count": 2624}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 4 of 13 \nviolated, and shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of \n[sic] giving notice of the violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this \nparagraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts \nwhich may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the Agreement. \nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no \nprosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any \nother offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal \nBureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses \nthat arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this \nDistrict, and the charges against Epstein, if any, will be dismissed. \nAgreement, at 2. \nConsistent with the Agreement and its position that the Federal Criminal Action continues \nto remain pending, the USAO recently sent letters to attorneys for people that the USAO has \ndesignated as -victims.\" In those letters, the USAO asked, \"[1]f you do file a claim under 18 \nU.S.C. § 2255 and Mr. Epstein denies that your client is a victim of an enumerated offense, please \nprovide notice of that denial to the undersigned [AUSA].\" See Decl. of \nExhs. 6 \n& 7, at 2 (July 9, 2008). The clear implication of the USAO's request (by which the USA() \nappears to involve itself in the instant litigation, despite advising the recipients that it cannot \"take \npart in or otherwise assist in civil litigation,\" id.), is that the USAO believes that such denial might \nbreach the Agreement. \nAccordingly, the Federal Criminal Action remains \"pending.\" \nDiscussion \nI. \nSection 3509(k) Applies to Investigations, Not Just Indictments. \nWhile there is no unsealed indicted criminal case against Mr. Epstein, the government's \ncriminal investigation against him remains open. Section 3509(k) \n... [truncated, 2544 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/43 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=43]", "char_count": 2544}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 5 of 13 \nattached hereto as Exhibit \"B\"). In enacting § 1595, Congress specifically intended that the term \n\"criminal action\" would be applied extremely broadly. Accordingly, Congress took pains to \nensure that courts would give it the broadest possible construction and, for that reason, specified in \nthe definition provision that \"criminal action\" also \"includes investigation.\" \n18 U.S.C. § \n1595(b)(2). The only reported decision addressing this provision interpreted it according to its \nplain language. See Ara v. Khan, No. CV 07-1251, 2007 WL 1726456,'2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, \n2007) (ordering \"all proceedings in this case stayed pending the conclusion of the government's \ncriminal investigation of the defendants and of any resulting criminal prosecution\") (emphasis \nadded). \nGiven that the USAO's Agreement with Epstein indicates that: \n• \nthe grand-jury's subpoenas remain \"outstanding\" (Agreement, at 5); \n• \nthe subpoenas are \"held in abeyance\" (id.): \n• \nthe subpoenas are not \"withdrawn\" (W.); \n• \nthe parties must \"maintain their evidence\" (id.) (which would be entirely unnecessary if \nthe investigation against Epstein were closed); \n• \"any\" existing \"charges\" will not \"be dismissed\" until after Epstein has \"timely \nfulfill[ed] all the terms and conditions of the [A]greement\" (id. at 2); and \n• \n\"prosecution in this District . . . shall be deferred\" (id.) (but not closed or dismissed), \n- - then. the only reasonable conclusion is that the Federal Criminal Action remains \"pending.-3\nThe plaintiffs argue that a § 3509(k) stay would be \"inconsistent with Mr. Epstein's \nAgreement with the U.S. Attorney\" which the plaintiffs claim is reproduced in the lead \n3 The ordinary meaning of the adjective \"pending\" is \"(r]emaining undecided; awaiting decision . . .. Black's Law \nDictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit routinely relies on \nBlack's Law Dic\n... [truncated, 3520 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/44 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=44]", "char_count": 3520}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 6 of 13 \nprosecutor's July 10 letter to their counsel (attached to Plaintiffs' responses as Exhibit A). \nApparently, on July 10, the lead prosecutor sent a letter to the plaintiffs' lawyer stating that \"[o]ne \n. . . condition to which Epstein has agreed\" is that each plaintiff \"will have the same rights to \nproceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and \nconvicted of an enumerated offense.\" See Response Memo, at 5 & Ex. A, at 1-2 (emphasis \nadded). This argument warrants absolutely no consideration, however, since the plaintiffs have \nnot pled any claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. \nH. \nSection 3509(k) Applies Even After a Plaintiff Turns 18. \nWithout citing to a single case, the plaintiffs argue that § 3509(k) does not apply to \nplaintiffs over the age of 18. An examination of the legislative history and related statutes shows \nthat this unsupported argument must be rejected. \nThe parallel stay provision in § 1595, discussed supra at 3-4, mandates, without exception, \nthat \nany \ncivil \naction \nbrought \nunder \nthat \nsection \nfor \nviolations \nof \n§ 1591 (prohibiting transportation of minors for prostitution) \"shall be stayed during the pendency \nof any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 1591(bX1). Whether the § 1595 plaintiff has turned 18 does not vitiate the efficacy of \nthis mandatory stay. \nAn example illustrates why the stay provided in § 3509(k) has the same broad scope as the \nstay provided in § 1591(b)(1). As discussed above, § 3509(k) stays any civil suit for injury to a \nminor, arising out of the same occurrence as a pending criminal action. One type of civil suit \nfalling within § 3509(k)'s ambit is a suit seeking redress for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). \nSection 2423(a) - - just like § 1591 - - prohibits transportation of minors for prostitution. The \nelements of b\n... [truncated, 2489 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/45 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=45]", "char_count": 2489}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 7 of 13 \nLogic compels a rule requiring continued application of the § 3509(k) stay to a putative \nvictim who has since turned 18. Consider again the example of § 2243(a). Assume that the \nUSAO is investigating a § 2243(a) violator with two alleged victims: one who is now 17, and one \nwho has turned 19. Assume further that both decide to sue the alleged offender while the USAO \nis still in the process of conducting its criminal investigation. Why would Congress prohibit the \ndefendant from conducting civil discovery in the 17-year-old's lawsuit, but permit him to conduct \nfull discovery in the 19-year-old's lawsuit, including taking the depositions of both the 19- and the \n17-year-old, the federal investigating agents and all the grand-jury witnesses? This could not have \nbeen Congress' intent. \nThe legislative history to a statute resembling § 1595 is also instructive. When Congress \nenacted 18 U.S.C. § 2255, it provided a civil remedy to any \"minor . . . victim\" of enumerated \nfederal sex offenses. See Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. \n1783. § 703 (1986). In 2006, Congress amended the statute to clarify that the civil cause of action \nwas available not just while the victim was a minor, but even after she or he turned IS. See Pub. \n1. 109-248, 120 Stat. 650, § 707 (bX1XA) (amending § 2255 to permit suit by adults who were \nvictims of enumerated federal offenses whcn they were minors, by deleting \"Any minor who is [a \nvictim]\" and adding \"Any person, who, while a minor, was [a victim]\"). \nMeanwhile, the stay \nprovisions of § 3509(k) remained unchanged. There is no reason to think that Congress would \nafford prosecutors protection for their investigations while the victims were minors, but \ncompletely eliminate those protections the moment one of the victims turned 18. \nThe District Court for the Northern District of Florida confirmed this position and \n... [truncated, 2613 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/46 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=46]", "char_count": 2613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 8 of 13 \npending before this Court, are literally lifted° from the plaintiffs' brief submitted to, and rejected \nby, the Northern District of New York in Francis.) The court specifically held that \"because the \nvictims were minors at the time of the Defendants' actions alleged in both [the civil and \ncriminal] cases, § 3509(k) applies.\" Id. (emphasis added). \nThe United States Department of Justice has itself emphatically embraced the \ninterpretation of § 3509(k) as applying to stay all civil actions relating to sex offenses against \nminors, pending the completion of a parallel criminal action, without regard to whether the \nplaintiff has turned 18 during her civil lawsuit: \nThe subsection should stay all pending civil actions in the wake of a criminal \nprosecution. Notably, in the context of 18 USC § 2255 (\"civil remedy for personal \ninjuries\"), all civil actions are stayed pending the completion of a criminal action. \nSee also 18 USC § 3509(k). \nH.R. Rep. 108-264(11), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), reprinted at 2003 WL 22272907, at •16-17 \n(\"agency view\" by the Department of Justice on bill later codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595). \nThe Department specifically argued to Congress in the clearest terms: \"We believe that \nprosecutions should take priority over civil redress and that prosecutions should be complete prior \nto going forward with civil suits.\" Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Nowhere did the Department \nremotely suggest - - as the plaintiffs have implied - - that pending prosecutions warrant less \nprotection (Le., should be \"hinder[ed]\") simply because a particular civil plaintiff happens to reach \nhis or her 18th birthday. \nIII. \nA Stay is Mandatory Despite Resulting \"Delay\" to Civil Lawsuits. \nInherent in any § 3509(k) stay is delay to the progress (discovery, trial, appeal) of all \nrelated civil lawsuits. Congress recognized this in enacting the stay provision, which necessarily \nprior\n... [truncated, 2670 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/47 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=47]", "char_count": 2670}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 9 of 13 \ncourt specifically refused to provide any relief to plaintiffs \"simply because the state [criminal] \nmatter is not progressing as fast as they would hope.\" 2005 WL 950623, at *2. The court made \nthis determination despite the plaintiffs' complaints about the \"frustrating delay\" and that \"the \nstate criminal case 'has languished for almost two years with no end in sight,' finding that this \"is \na matter to be addressed in state [criminal] court.\" Id. Accordingly, the anticipated delay in this \ncase, attendant to the term of the deferred-prosecution agreement, does not change the clear \ncommand of § 3509(k). \nAccording to their own pleadings, the plaintiffs waited between three and six years before \nfiling these lawsuits, and so cannot rightfully claim prejudice from additional temporary delay. \nIV. \nSection 3509 Aside, a Discretionary Stay is Warranted. \nEven, arguendo, were this Court not to apply the mandate of § 3509, a discretionary stay \nshould still be entered during the pendency of the Federal Criminal Action. SEC v. Healthsouth \nCorp.. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1326 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (\"No question exists that this court has the \npower to stay a civil proceeding due to an active, parallel criminal investigation.\"). Other federal \nstatutes support such a stay -- particularly when the criminal action may be adversely affected by \nthe civil litigation. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 2712(e)(1), \"the court shall stay any action \ncommenced [against the United States] if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely \naffect the ability of the Government to conduct a related investigation or prosecution of a related \ncriminal case.\" Allowing these lawsuits to progress while Epstein remains subject to the Federal \nCriminal Action will prejudice him irrevocably and irreparably. As provided below, there are \nseveral adverse effects to allowing the civil litigation to proceed whil\n... [truncated, 2477 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/48 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=48]", "char_count": 2477}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 10 of 13 \nShould he choose his Fifth Amendment rights, he will expose himself to an adverse \ninference at the summary-judgment stage and at trial. See generally. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. \nSys., 611 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that \"invocation of the privilege would be \nsubject to the drawing of an adverse inference by the trier of fact\"). \nOn the other hand, should Epstein choose his right to defend himself in these lawsuits, the \nUSAO will be able to use his responses at every stage of the discovery and trial process (e.g., his \nAnswer, responses to document requests, responses to requests for admissions, sworn answers to \ninterrogatories, answers to deposition questions, and trial testimony) to his detriment in the \nFederal Criminal Action.' \nIn these lawsuits, even before civil discovery begins, under the Initial Disclosures required \nby Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and S.D. Fla. Local Rule 26.1, Epstein \"must\" disclose the identities of all \nthe witnesses he would call in his defense to the Federal Criminal Action (Rule 26(aXI XAXi)), \ncopies of \"all documents\" he \"may use to support [his] defenses\" (Rule 26(aX1XA)(ii)), as well as \nthe identity of \"any\" expert witness he \"may use at trial,\" along with mandatory disclosure of \"a \nwritten report\" containing \"a complete statement of all opinions the [expert] will express and the \nbasis and reasons for them\" (Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i)). \nIn contrast, in the pending Federal Criminal Action, which is governed exclusively by the \nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pm-trial \nproduction of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(bX1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United \nStates v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production \nprivilege). \nThus, absent a stay of this civil action, the USAO would receive fundamentally unfair \naccess to defense information and h\n... [truncated, 2677 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/49 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=49]", "char_count": 2677}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 11 of 13 \nstrategy. See Comment, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1030 (\"To the extent that a prosecutor acquires \nevidence that was elicited from the accused in a parallel civil proceeding, the criminal process \nbecomes less adversarial.\"). \nWithout a stay in place, discovery will proceed, including against third parties. Mr. \nEpstein will have no alternative but to issue subpoenas seeking evidence from state and federal \nlaw-enforcement officers. For example, Epstein is clearly entitled to discover evidence of prior \nstatements (including inconsistent statements) given by witnesses whom law-enforcement has \npreviously interviewed. See. e.g., Cox v. Treadway. 75 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that \ndistrict court properly admitted testimony of prosecutor about prior inconsistent statements that \nwitness made to the prosecutor). Likewise, Epstein may be entitled to discovery of relevant \nevidence that is in the present possession of the grand jury or other law-enforcement agencies. \nSee, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 729 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (\"The grand jury has \nconcluded its deliberations ... . The need for secrecy of these specific tapes no longer outweighs \nother concerns.\"); Golden Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers. Inc., 87 \nF.R.D. 53, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (\"[W]here, as here, the grand jury has completed its work and all \nthat is sought are those documents turned over to the grand jury by the corporations which are \ndefendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the \npoint.\") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). \nIn response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that \nit will be the government, not Mr. Epstein, who will object to discovery in these civil cases, until \nthe final conclusion of the Federal Criminal Action. \nConclusion \nBeca\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/50 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=50]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 12 of 13 \nRespectfully submitted, \nLEWIS TEIN, P.L. \n3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 \nCoconut Grove, Florida 33133 \nTel: 305 442 1101 Fax: 305 442 6744 \nBy: \nGUY A. EWIS \nFla. Bar No. 623740 \nlewis®Iewistein.com \nMICHAEL R. TEIN \nFla. Bar No. 993522 \ntein@lewistein.com \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel. 561 659 8300 Fax. 561 835 8691 \nBy: \nJack A. Goldberger \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \njgoldberger®agwpa.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jay Epstein \nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 711.A.3 \nWhile defense counsel admittedly did not confer with plaintiffs' counsel prior to filing the motion \nto stay, it was by no means in willful disregard of the Local Rule. Shortly after the filing of the \nmotion and before plaintiffs filed their response memoranda suggesting that no conference had \ntaken place, the parties did confer in a good faith and specific attempt to resolve the motion and \nwere unable to do so, because plaintiffs' counsel would not agree to a stay. Accordingly, the brief \ndelay in conducting the Rule 7.1 conference did not prejudice the plaintiffs at all or result in \nunnecessary judicial intervention. It is perhaps worth noting that, contrary to their Rule 7.1 \ncertificate, plaintiffs did not confer prior to filing their motion to extend time to file their response \nmemoranda (which extension defendant did not oppose anyway, including on the basis of failure \nto comply with Rule 7.1). Further information on the reasons the Rule 7.1 conference for the \ninstant motion to stay was conducted after filing the motion to stay will be provided to the Court \nupon its request, preferably ex pane in order to avoid disclosure of privileged information. The \ndefendant respectfully requests the opportunity to make such an ex pane disclosure in the event \nthat the Court considers denying the motion under Local Rule 7.1.A.3\n... [truncated, 2442 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/51 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=51]", "char_count": 2442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 13 of 13 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was served on July 28, 2008 by U.S. \nmail on all counsel named on the service list. \n4444 \nMichael R. Tein \nSERVICE LIST \nJeffrey M. Herman, Esq. \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nHerman & Mermelstcin, P.A. \n18205 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \n12 \nEFTA00222722\n", "char_count": 462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 1 of 8 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nDefendant. \nMOTION TO DISMISS \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of \nCivil Procedure and Rule 7.1(A) of the Local Rules for the Southern District of \nFlorida, moves to dismiss Count I of plaintiffs complaint,' and states as follows: \n' The time to answer the remaining allegations of the complaint is tolled pending the Court's \nruling on the present motion. See Beaulieu v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of W. Fla., No. \n3:07cv30/RV/EMT, 2007 WL 2020161, * 2 (N.D. Fla. July 9, 2007) (holding that defendant's \npartial motion to dismiss \"automatically extends its time to answer . . . until after the court has \nruled on [its] motion to dismiss\"); Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, \n249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding \"that the filing of a motion that only addresses part of a \ncomplaint suspends the time to respond to the entire complaint, not just to the claims that are the \nsubject of the motion\"); Schwartz v. Berry College, Inc., No. Civ.A. 4:96CV338-HLM, 1997 WL \n579166, *1 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 1997) (noting that there is significant case law to support the \nposition that \"when a defendant files a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, addressing only some of \nthe claims contained in the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant is not required to file an answer \nuntil the court rules on the motion to dismiss\"). \nEFTA00222723\n", "char_count": 1613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 2 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT \nThis action arises out of the alleged assault of the plaintiff. According to the \nallegations in her complaint, the plaintiff went to Mr. Epstein's house to give him \n\"a massage for monetary compensation\" (Compl. ¶ 12), where Mr. Epstein \nallegedly assaulted her \"in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes.\" \n(Comp!. ¶ 18). \nThe plaintiff tries to assert a claim for sexual assault (Compl. ¶¶ 15-19.) \nThis theory of liability, however, cannot be supported by the allegations in the \ncomplaint. In fact, even if everything in the complaint were true, recovery against \nJeffrey Epstein, for Count I, under any formulation, is impossible under Florida \nlaw. Accordingly, this count must be dismissed. \nARGUMENT \nA motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) should be granted when a \ncourt cannot identify \"each of the material elements necessary to sustain a \nrecovery under some viable legal theory.\" Snow v. DirectTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, \n1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. For Choice, Inc., 253 \nF.3d 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, a court should dismiss a complaint \n\"when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual \nallegations will support a cause of action.\" Marshall County Bd. of Ethic. v. \nMarshal County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). \"[T]o survive a \n2 \nEFTA00222724\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLED Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 3 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nmotion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions; \nthey are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions . \nHolt v. Grist, No. 06-14617, 2007 WL 1156938, *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2007). As \nsuch, \"conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions \nmasquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.\" Snow, 450 F.3d at 1320. \nI. \nCount I Fails to State a Cause of Action For Assault Recoenized by \nFlorida Law. \nThe plaintiff attempts to plead a cause of action against Mr. Epstein for \n\"sexual assault\" based on a \"violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes\"2 for \nthe \"lewd and lascivious acts committed by Epstein upon Jane Doe.\" (Compl. \n18.) Plaintiff cannot assert a cause of action for \"violation of Chapter 800, Florida \nStatutes\" because there is no private right of action under that Chapter. See \ngenerally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 374 \n(Fla. 2005) (observing that \"not every statutory violation carries a civil remedy\" \n(citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. \n2003)). See also, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ferre, 636 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. \nFla. 1985) (King, C.J.) (holding that violation of Florida's criminal extortion \nstatute does not give rise to a civil cause of action for damages). \n2 Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, is entitled, \"Lewdness; Indecent Exposure.\" \n3 \nEFTA00222725\n", "char_count": 1586}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 4 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-C1V-MARRA/JOHNSON \nWhere a plaintiff brings a civil action pursuant to a criminal statute that \nprovides no civil remedy, her complaint is properly dismissed for failure to state a \ncause of action. See Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So. 2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA \n1990) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim for parental kidnapping \nwhere \"the mentioned statutes concern only criminal violations and do not afford \na civil remedy\") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). \nEven if Chapter 800 provided a civil remedy (which it does not) the statute \ndoes not apply to the plaintiff. The statute prohibits sexual activity with or lewd or \nlascivious offenses against \"a person . . . less than 16 years of age.\" § 800.04, Fla. \nStat. (2008) (emphasis added). \nBy her own admission, the plaintiff was \n\"approximately 16 years old.\" (Comp/. ¶ 8.) (emphasis added). \nPlainly, the \nplaintiff falls outside of the scope of the statute's protection. Accordingly, the \nplaintiff's claim for sexual assault against Mr. Epstein, pursuant to a violation of \nChapter 800, Florida Statutes, must be dismissed. \nShould the Court look beyond the plain language of the plaintiff's complaint \nand construe Count I as a claim for common-law assault, that claim would also \nfail. As the court explained in Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st \nDCA 1982), an assault is \"an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to \nanother by force, or force unlawfully directed toward another under such \ncircumstances as to create a fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent \n4 \nEFTA00222726\n", "char_count": 1698}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 5 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \npresent ability to effectuate the attempt.\" An assault thus requires \"an affirmative \nact—a threat to use force, or the actual exertion of force.\" Sullivan v. Ad. Fed. \nSay. & Loan Assoc., 454 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (affirming dismissal of \nassault claim where there was no affirmative act). \nIn this case, there is no such affirmative act. The only thing that Mr. Epstein \nis alleged to have said to the plaintiff is \"to take off her clothes\" and \"to give him a \nmassage.\" (Compl. ¶ 12.) These allegations fall far short of an \"offer of corporal \ninjury by force.\" There are no allegations that Jane Doe was placed in any fear of \nimminent peril. See Gatto v. Pubblx Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. \n3d DCA 1980) (holding that where there was no evidence to show that Gatto was \nplaced in fear of imminent peril, there was no assault). In fact, the plaintiff does \nnot even allege that Mr. Epstein touched her. Thus, there was no assault. \nAccordingly, because the plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action for \nassault recognized in Florida, Count I against Mr. Epstein must be dismissed. \nConclusion \nFor the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully \nrequests that Count I of the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. \n5 \nEFTA00222727\n", "char_count": 1413}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLED Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 6 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nRespectfully submitted, \nLEWIS TEIN, P.L. \n3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 \nCoconut Grove, Florida 33133 \nTel: 305 442 1101 \nFax: 305 442 6744 \nBy: /s/ Michael R. Tein \nGUY A. LEWIS \nFla. Bar No. 623740 \nlewis@lewistein.com \nMICHAEL R. TEIN \nFla. Bar No. 993522 \ntein@lewistein.com \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & \nWEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel. 561 659 8300 \nFax. 561 835 8691 \nBy: \nJack A. Goldberger \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \njgoldberger@agwpa.com \nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & \nCOLEMAN, LLP \n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel. 561 842 2820 \nFax. 561 515 3148 \n6 \nEFTA00222728\n", "char_count": 782}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 7 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nBy: \nRobert D. Critton, Esq. \nFla. Bar No. 224162 \nrcritton@bc1claw.com \nMichael J. Pike, Esq. \nFla. Bar No. 617296 \nmpike@bc1claw.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1 \nUndersigned counsel has conferred in good faith with counsel for the \nplaintiff, who opposes the relief requested in this motion. \n/s/ Michael R. Tein \nMichael R. Tein \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 4, 2008, I electronically filed the \nforegoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the \nforegoing document is being served this day on all individuals on the following \nservice list via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF. \n/s/ Michael R. Tein \nMichael R. Tein \n7 \nEFTA00222729\n", "char_count": 913}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 40 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 \nPage 8 of 8 \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nService List \nJeffrey M. Herman, Esq. \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nHerman & Mermelstein, P.A. \n18205 Biscayne Blvd, Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \nFax: 305 931 0877 \n8 \nEFTA00222730\n", "char_count": 333}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 41 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 1 of 4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nPLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE \nTO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe No. 2, (\"Jane\" or \"Jane Doe\"), by and through her undersigned counsel, \nfiles this Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and states as follows: \n1. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein is alleged to have sexually abused Jane Doe when she was \na minor. The Complaint is in two Counts: Count I is labeled \"Sexual Assault\", and alleges an \nintentional tort based on the actions of Jeffrey Epstein; Count II alleges the tort of intentional \ninfliction of emotional distress based on the same factual allegations. Defendant Epstein has moved \nto dismiss only Count I of the Complaint, contending that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. \nSimultaneously herewith, Plaintiff intends to file an Amended Complaint which substantially revises \nCount I and moots the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.' \n2. \nIn any event, the Complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for sexual assault and battery. \n' The Amended Complaint also adds as Count III a federal claim against Defendant Epstein under 18 \nU.S.C. §§2422 and 2255. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), a party may amend the pleading once as a \nmatter of course before being served with a \"responsive pleading\". Defendant has not to date filed a \n\"responsive pleading\" in this case within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a). It is established in the \ncourts of the Eleventh Circuit that a motion to dismiss is not a \"responsive pleading\" and does not \naffect a plaintiff's right to amend the pleading once as a matter of course. Williams t. Board of \nRegents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007). \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN, P. A. \nwww.hermanlaw.com \n- 1 - \nEFTA00222731\n", "char_count": 1943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 41 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 2 of 4 \nThe gravamen of the claims in Count I is set forth in paragraph 16 of the Complaint: \"Epstein \ntortiously assaulted Jane Doe sexually. Epstein's acts were intentional, unlawful, offensive and \nharmful.\" \n3. \nCount I does not purport to be brought under the criminal statutes.2 Whether a \nComplaint states a claim for relief is not based on labels or conclusions; rather it is determined by \nthe factual allegations, which \"must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.\" \nBell Atlantic Corp. I. Twombley 127 5. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Here, the factual allegations \nestablish an intentional tort claim for sexual assault and battery.3 See Paul . Holbrook, 696 So.2d \n1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (\"[a] battery consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact \nupon another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is \nimminent\"); Scelta \nDelicatessen Support Services. Inc. 57 F.Supp. 2d 1327, 1358-59 (M.D. Fla. \n1999) (allegation that defendant attempted to put his hands down plaintiff's dress, and that there was \nan actual and intentional touching, sufficient to state a claim for battery); Hogan'. Tavzel, 660 \nSo.2d 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (tortfeasor may be liable for battery for infecting another with a \nsexually transmitted disease); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Assault, § 21 (1965) (stating \nthat an assault occurs when a person \"acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the \nperson of the other, or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and the other is thereby put in \nsuch imminent apprehension\"). \n'Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes is mentioned in the Complaint (118) because conduct against a \nperson in violation of the criminal laws of the State generally give rise to a civil claim for intentional \ntort. Count I does not purport to bring a separate civil claim for violation of a strictly c\n... [truncated, 2535 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/62 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=62]", "char_count": 2535}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 41 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 3 of 4 \n4. \nEpstein's conduct as alleged in this case of masterbating during the massage, \ndirecting the Plaintiff to remove her clothes, and touching the Plaintiff, constitutes the intentional \ntort of assault and battery. Accordingly, even if the Complaint had not been amended, it sufficiently \nalleges facts establishing an assault and battery. \nBased on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is moot, and, in any event, not well \nfounded, and therefore should be denied. \nDated: September 22, 2008. \nRespectfully submitted, \nBy:  \ns/ Jeffrey M. Herman \nJeffrey M. Herman (FL Bar No. 521647) \njherman@hermanlaw.com \nStuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245) \nssm@hermanlaw.com \nAdam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980) \nahorowitz@ hermanlaw.com \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN, P.A. \nAttorneys for Plaintiffs Jane Doe \n18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \nTel: 305-931-2200 \nFax: 305-931-0877 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that on September 22, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing document \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being \nserved this day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via \ntransmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized \nmanner for those parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic \nFiling. \n/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN. P. A. \nwww.hermanlaw.com \n- 3 - \nEFTA00222733\n", "char_count": 1586}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 41 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 4 of 4 \nSERVICE LIST \nDOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq. \nigoldberger@agwpa.com \nMichael R. Tein, Esq. \ntein@lewistein.com \nRobert D. Critton, Esq. \nrcritton@bciclaw.com \nMichael Pike, Esq. \nmpike@bc1claw.com \n/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman \nHERMAN & MERMELSTEIN. P. A. \nwww.hermanlaw.com \n4 \nEFTA00222734\n", "char_count": 488}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 1 of 8 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nAMENDED COMPLAINT \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe No. 2 (\"Jane\" or \"Jane Doe\"), brings this Complaint against Jeffrey \nEpstein, as follows: \nParties, Jurisdiction and Venue \nI. \nJane Doe No. 2 is a citizen and resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and is sui \njuris. \n2. \nThis Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of the \nPlaintiff because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse upon a \nminor. \n3. \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen and resident of the State of New York. \n4. \nThis is an action for damages in excess of $50 million. \n5. \nThis Court has jurisdiction of this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant to 28 \nU.S.C. §1332(a), as the matter in controversy (i) exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs; \nand (ii) is between citizens of different states. \n6. \nThis Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) as a substantial \npart of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. \nFactual Allegations \n- 1 - \nEFTA00222735\n", "char_count": 1304}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 2 of 8 \n7. \nAt all relevant times, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") was an adult male, 52 \nyears old. Epstein is a financier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to \nbillionaires. He is himself a man of tremendous wealth, power and influence. He maintains his \nprincipal home in New York and also owns residences in New Mexico, St. Thomas and Palm Beach, \nFL. The allegations herein concern Epstein's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. \n8. \nUpon information and belief, Epstein has a sexual preference and obsession for \nunderage minor girls. He engaged in a plan and scheme in which he gained access to primarily \neconomically disadvantaged minor girls in his home, sexually assaulted these girls, and then gave \nthem money. In or about 2004-2005, Jane Doe, then approximately 16 years old, fell into Epstein's \ntrap and became one of his victims. \n9. \nUpon information and belief, Jeffrey Epstein carried out his scheme and assaulted \ngirls in Florida, New York and on his private island, known as Little St. James, in St. Thomas. \n10. \nEpstein's scheme involved the use of young girls to recruit underage girls. (Upon \ninformation and belief, the young girl who brought Jane Doe to Epstein was herself a minor victim \nof Epstein, and will therefore not be named in this Complaint). Under Epstein's plan, underage girls \nwere recruited ostensibly to give a wealthy man a massage for monetary compensation in his Palm \nBeach mansion. The recruiter would be contacted when Epstein was planning to be at his Palm \nBeach residence or soon after he had arrived there. Epstein or someone on his behalf would direct \nthe recruiter to bring one or more underage girls to the residence. The recruiter, upon information \nand belief, generally sought out economically disadvantaged underage girls from western Palm \nBeach County who would be enticed by the money being offered - generall\n... [truncated, 2243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/66 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=66]", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 3 of 8 \n11. \nEpstein's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. Upon arrival at \nEpstein's mansion, the underage victim would be introduced to Sarah Kellen, Epstein's assistant, \nwho gathered the girl's personal information, including her name and telephone number. Ms. Kellen \nwould then bring the girl up a flight of stairs to a bedroom that contained a massage table in addition \nto other furnishings. There were photographs of nude women lining the stairway hall and in the \nbedroom. The girl would then find herself alone in the room with Epstein, who would be wearing \nonly a towel. He would then remove his towel and lie naked on the massage table, and direct the girl \nto remove her clothes. Epstein would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious and sexual acts, \nincluding masturbation and touching the girl's vagina. \n12. \nConsistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Jane Doe was recruited to give \nEpstein a massage for monetary compensation. Jane was brought to Epstein's mansion in Palm \nBeach. Once at the mansion, Jane was introduced to Sarah Kellen, who led her up the flight of \nstairs to the room with the massage table. In this room, Epstein told Jane to take off her clothes and \ngive him a massage. Jane kept her panties and bra on and complied with Epstein's instructions. \nEpstein wore only a towel around his waste. After a short period of time, Epstein removed the towel \nand rolled over exposing his penis. Epstein began to masturbate and he sexually assaulted Jane. \n13. \nAfter Epstein had completed the assault, Jane was then able to get dressed, leave the \nroom and go back down the stairs. Jane was paid $200 by Epstein. The young girl who recruited \nJane was paid $100 by Epstein for bringing Jane to him. \n14. \nAs a result of this encounter with Epstein, Jane experienced confusion, shame, \nhumiliation and embarrassment, and has suffered severe psychological and emot\n... [truncated, 2244 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/67 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=67]", "char_count": 2244}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 4 of 8 \napprehension of such a contact, and Jane Doe was thereby put in such imminent apprehension. \n17. \nEpstein made an intentional, unlawful offer of offensive sexual contact toward Jane \nDoe, creating a reasonable fear of imminent peril. \n18. \nEpstein intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact on the person of Jane Doe, \nwith the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is imminent. \n19. \nEpstein tortiously committed a sexual assault and battery on Jane Doe. Epstein's acts \nwere intentional, unlawful, offensive and harmful. \n20. \nEpstein's plan and scheme in which he committed such acts upon Jane Doe were \ndone willfully and maliciously. \n21. \nAs a direct and proximate result of Epstein's assault on Jane, she has suffered and \nwill continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological and \nemotional damages. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein for compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and such other and further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper. \nCOUNT II \nIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress \n22. \nPlaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. \n23. \nEpstein's conduct was intentional or reckless. \n24. \nEpstein% conduct with a minor was extreme and outrageous, going beyond all bounds \nof decency. \n25. \nEpstein committed willful acts of child sexual abuse on Jane Doe. These acts resulted \nin mental or sexual injury to Jane Doe, that caused or were likely to cause Jane Doe's mental or \nemotional health to be significantly impaired. \n26. \nEpstein's conduct caused severe emotional distress to Jane Doe. Epstein knew or had \n-4-\nEFTA00222738\n", "char_count": 1821}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 5 of 8 \nreason to know that his intentional and outrageous conduct would cause emotional distress and \ndamage to Jane Doe, or Epstein acted with reckless disregard of the high probability of causing \nsevere emotional distress to Jane Doe. \n27. \nAs a direct and proximate result of Epstein's intentional or reckless conduct, Jane \nDoe, has suffered and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and pain. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein for compensatory damages, costs, punitive damages, and such other and further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper. \nCOUNT III \nCoercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 C.S.C. §2422 \n28. \nPlaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. \n29. \nEpstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, \ninduce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or \nsexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. \n30. \nEpstein's acts and conduct are in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422. \n31. \nAs a result of Epstein's violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422, Plaintiff has suffered personal \ninjury, including mental, psychological and emotional damages. \n32. \nPlaintiff hired Herman & Mermelstein, P.A., in this matter and agreed to pay them a \nreasonable attorneys' fee. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey \nEpstein for all damages available under 28 U.S.C. §2255(a), including without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, costs of suit, and attorneys' fees, and such other and further relief as \nthis Court deems just and proper. \nJURY TRIAL DEMAND \nPlaintiff demands a jury trial in this action on all claims so triable. \n- S - \nEFTA00222739\n", "char_count": 1893}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09122,2008 \nPage 6 of 8 \nDated: September 22, 2008 \nRespectfully submitted, \nBy:  \ns/ Jeffrey M. Herman \nJeffrey M. Herman (FL Bar No. 521647) \njherman@hermanlaw.com \nStuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245) \nssm@hermanlaw.com \nAdam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980) \nahorowitz@hermanlaw.com \nHERMAN & MERMELSTE1N, P.A. \nAttorneys for Plaintiff \n18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \nTel: 305-931-2200 \nFax: 305-931-0877 \n- 6 - \nEFTA00222740\n", "char_count": 519}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 7 of 8 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that on September 22, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing document \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being \nserved this day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via \ntransmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized \nmanner for those parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic \nFiling. \n/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman \n- 7 - \nEFTA00222741\n", "char_count": 636}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 42 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 \nPage 8 of 8 \nSERVICE LIST \nDOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOHNSON \nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida \nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq. \njgoldberger@agwpa.com \nMichael R. Tein, Esq. \ntein@lewistein.com \nRobert D. Critton, Esq. \nrcritton@bciclaw.com \nMichael Pike, Esq. \nmpike@bciclaw.com \n/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman \n- 8 - \nEFTA00222742\n", "char_count": 444}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 43 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/23'2008 \nPage 1 of 1 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA \nJane Doe No. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nORDER DENYING MOTIONS AS MOOT \nTHIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to \nAnswer or Otherwise Respond to Complaint (DE 13) and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss \nComplaint (DE 40). As Plaintiff's Complaint has been replaced by an Amended Complaint, it is \nhereby \nORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: \n(1) Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to \nComplaint (DE 13) is DENIED as moot. \n(2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE 40) is DENIED as moot. This denial \nis without prejudice to Defendant reasserting the grounds asserted in the motion if he deems it \nappropriate as to the Amended Complaint. \nDONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, \nthis 23s day of September, 2008. \nse \n \nrZ \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \ncopies to: \nAll counsel of record \nEFTA00222743\n", "char_count": 1133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 1 of 10 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 2 \nPlaintiff, \nv. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nDEFENDANT'S. EPSTEIN, MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR MORE \nDEFINITE STATEMENT DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT \nDefendant, JEFFERY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves \nto dismiss and for more definite statement of Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 2's Amended \nComplaint. Rules 12(b)(6), and 12(e) and (f), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008). In support of his \nmotion, Defendant states: \nIntroduction \nDefendant is filing similar motions to dismiss and for more definite statement \ndirected to the Amended Complaints filed against Defendant in this Court in JANE DOE \nNO. 2, JANE DOE NO. 3, JANE DOE NO. 4 and JANE DOE NO. 5. The motions are \ndirected to the Counts for \"Sexual Assault and Battery,\" and \"Coercion and Enticement \nto Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422\" in each of the respective complaints. \nHowever, there are distinctions in the four motions filed based on the complaint \nallegations. For example, Defendant challenges the Plaintiffs' allegations as to assault \nin all four actions, and challenges the battery allegations in JANE DOE NOS. 2 and 3, \nEFTA00222744\n", "char_count": 1343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 2 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 2 \nbut not in JANE DOE NOS. 4 and 5. Defendant moves to dismiss the §2422 count in all \nfour actions. \nMotion \n1. Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint are required to be dismissed for \nfailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has \nfailed to allege sufficient factual allegations in the Counts and instead alleges labels and \nconclusions, and an attempted formulaic recitation of the elements in each Count. \n2. In the alternative, Defendant seeks more definite statement of Count I and Ill. In \nCount I, the Plaintiff is required to more definitely allege what was done to her; what \nEPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what \nwas the intentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and \nbattery. In Count III, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the underlying factual \nallegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C. §2422(b) and \n§2455. Rule 12(e). See discussion of law below herein. \n3. Also, Plaintiffs reference in Count III to 28 U.S.C. §2255, pertaining to habeas \ncorpus proceedings is required to be stricken as immaterial. Rule 12(f). Plaintiff is \nrequired to more definitely state what statutory provision she is relying on. Rule 12 (e). \nWHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and \nIII, strike the immaterial statutory reference, and require Plaintiff to more definitely plead \nthe underlying elements of her claims. \nSupporting Memorandum of Law \nStandard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss \nAs established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly 127 \nS.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead \nEFTA00222745\n", "char_count": 1907}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 3 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 3 \n\"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Id, at 1974. \nAlthough the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief \nin the complaint must state \"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic \nrecitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\" Id, at 1965. Further, \"[f]actual \nallegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the \nassumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\" Id. \nOn a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint are taken as \ntrue and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County \nSch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006). \nSignificantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twomblv abrogated the \noften cited observation that \"a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a \nclaim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove not set of facts in \nsupport of his claim that would entitle him to relief.\" Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley \nv. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme \nCourt rejected the notion that \"a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a \nmotion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff \nmight later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery.\" Id. As \nexplained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. supra at 1664-65: \nWhile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not \nneed detailed factual allegations ibid.. Sanivan v. American Bd. of \nPsychiatry and Neurology. Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs \nobligation to provide the \"grounds\" of his \"entitle[ment] to relief\" requires \nmore than labels and con\n... [truncated, 2445 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/76 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=76]", "char_count": 2445}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 4 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 4 \nProcedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) \n(\"[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts \nthat merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action\"), on \nthe assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if \ndoubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, \nn. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, \n327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (\" Rule 12(b)(6) does not \ncountenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's \nfactual allegations\"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, \n40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it \nappears \"that a recovery is very remote and unlikely\"). \nPursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a \npleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading \"is so vague or \nambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response.\" The motion is required \nto point out the defects and the desired details. Id. \nCount I — \"Sexual Assault and Battery\" is sublect to dismissal as Plaintiff has \nfailed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. \nIt is well settled that this Court is to apply Florida substantive law in this action. \nErie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Pursuant to Florida law, although the term \n\"assault and battery\" is most commonly referred to as if it were a legal unit, or a single \nconcept, \"assault and battery are separate and distinct legal concepts, assault being the \nbeginning of an act which, if consummated, constitutes battery.\" 3A FIa.Jur.2d Assault \n§1. An assault and battery are intentional acts. See generally, Spivey v. Battaglia 258 \nSo.2d 815 (Fla. 1972); and Travelers lndem. Co. v. PCR. Inc., 889 So.\n... [truncated, 2382 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/77 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=77]", "char_count": 2382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 5 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 5 \nexertion of force. See 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1(\"The essential element of the tort of \nassault is the violence offered, and not actual physical contact.\"). \nTort of \"battery\" consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon \nanother with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is \nimminent. Quilling v. Price, 894 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Sullivan v. Atlantic \nFederal Savings & Loan 454 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)(\"a battery consists of the \nintentional infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon the person of another\"). See \n3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1. \nWith the standard of pleading established in Twomblv, supra, in the context of \nthe elements for assault and battery, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which \nrelief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). As to the elements of assault, here are no factual \nallegations as to what was said or done to Plaintiff such that it constituted an \n\"intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or exertion of force \ndirected toward another under such circumstances as to create a reasonable fear of \nimminent peril.\" See ¶12 of Am. Comp. The same is true for the claim of battery. \nPlaintiff makes the general allegation that \"he (Defendant) sexually assaulted Jane.\" \nThe other allegations in ¶12 pertain to what Plaintiff allegedly did. Under applicable law, \nPlaintiff is required to give more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation \nof the elements of a cause of action. Twomblv, supra. Plaintiff is required to allege the \nfacts of what was done to her; what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear \nand apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the intentional offensive or harmful contact? \nAs noted in the introduction and as this Court is well aware, there is more than \none action brought against this D\n... [truncated, 2069 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/78 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=78]", "char_count": 2069}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 6 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 6 \nWith all due respect, the details as to a particular claim asserted by a particular Plaintiff \nare important to give this Defendant fair notice of Plaintiffs claim so he may properly \nrespond. Accordingly, under applicable law, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for \nsexual assault and battery. \nIn the alternative to dismissing Count I, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be \nrequired to give more definite statement as to what was done to her; what EPSTEIN \nsaid and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the \nintentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and battery. \nRule 12(e). \nCount III — \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 \nU.S.C. §2422\" - Is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim \nupon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Count III also contains an \nimmaterial reference to 28 U.S.C. fi2255, which is required to be stricken \nand more definitely stated. \nCount III of Plaintiffs Complaint attempts to assert a claim for \"Coercion and \nEnticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422.\" In her prayer for relief in \nCount III, Plaintiff \"demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey Epstein for all \ndamages available under 28 U.S.C. §2255(a), \n.\" \nAlthough the reference to \"28 U.S.C. §2255,\" pertaining to habeas corpus \nproceedings - federal custody and remedies on motion attacking sentence, is probably \na typographical error by Plaintiff, and the reference to \"28\" was meant to be \"18,\" \nDefendant requests that Plaintiff correct this error so that Defendant may have fair \nnotice of the claim Plaintiff is attempting to assert. \nWhether or not the \"28\" is \ntypographical error, Defendant is still entitled to dismissal of the count. \nThe applicable version of these statutory provisions, (pre-2006 Amendments, as \n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/79 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=79]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 7 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 7 \nCHAPTER 117--TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY \nAND RELATED CRIMES \n§ 2422. Coercion and enticement \n(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any \nindividual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or \nPossession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual \nactivity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or \nattempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than \n20 years, or both. \n(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign \ncommerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the \nUnited States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any \nindividual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution \nor any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned \nnot less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. \nCHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF \nCHILDREN \n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries \n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242 2243 \n2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who \nsuffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any \nappropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual \ndamages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable \nattorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be \ndeemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. \n(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the \ncomplaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in \nthe case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years \n... [truncated, 2489 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222670/80 or ?id=EFTA00222670&page=80]", "char_count": 2489}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 8 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 8 \nin the statute without underlying factual allegations pertaining to the Plaintiff and any \nconduct by Defendant. See ¶29 of Am. Comp. Plaintiff's allegations, (or lack of factual \nallegations), are precisely what the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell \nAtlantic Corp. prohibits — Plaintiffs complaint alleges only \"labels and conclusions, and \na (partial) formulaic recitation of the elements.\" \nFirst, the Amended Complaint fails to designate whether Plaintiff is relying on \n§2422(a) or §2422(b). Second, although the complaint does contain a partial tracking of \nthe language in 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), it contains absolutely no factual allegations \nconcerning the requisite \"using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign \ncommerce\" by Plaintiff to state a cause of action based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. \n2422(b). As well, there are no underlying factual allegations involving this Plaintiff as to \nthe requisite elements that a defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or \ncoerced any individual (Plaintiff in this case) who has not attained the age of 18 years, \nto engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with \na criminal offense, or attempted to do so. See 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); i.e. with what criminal \noffense could Plaintiff and Defendant have been charged. Again, a Plaintiff cannot \nsimply track the language of a statute without some underlying factual allegations to \nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Count III is required to be \ndismissed, and the reference to 28 USC 2455 be stricken. \nIn the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more definitely state the \nunderlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C. \n§2422(b) and §2455. \nEFTA00222751\n", "char_count": 1944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 9 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 9 \nConclusion \nAs discussed above herein, under the pleading standard established in Twombly,\nsupra, and law concerning the elements of Count I and III, Plaintiff has failed to state \nclaims upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs complaint lack \nunderlying factual allegations and, thus, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the \nrequisite factual allegations. Finally, Plaintiff should correct any improper statutory \nreferences. \nCertificate of Service \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with \nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being \nserved this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the \nmanner specified by CM/ECF on this 6th day of October, 2008: \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nJeffrey Marc Herman, Esq. \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \n18205 Biscayne Boulevard \nSuite 2218 \nMiami, FL 33160 \n305-931-2200 \nFax: 305-931-0877 \na horowitz hermanlaw.com \njhermanehermanlaw.com \nIrivera(a.hermanlaw.com \nCounsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 \nJack Alan Goldberger \nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South \nSuite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 \n561-659-8300 \nFax: 561-835-8691 \njaqesq(abellsouth.net \nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nMichael R. Tein, Esq. \nLewis Tein, P.L. \n3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 \nCoconut Grove, FL 33133 \n305-442-1101 \nFax: 305 442 6744 \nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nteinAlewistein.com \nEFTA00222752\n", "char_count": 1643}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222670", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 46 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 \nPage 10 of 10 \nCase No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson \nPage No. 10 \nRespectfully submi \nBy: \nROBERT D. RITTON, JR., ESQ. \nFlorida Bar o. 224162 \nrcritebc1claw.com \nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar #617296 \nmpike(a.bcIclaw.com \nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN \n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n561/842-2820 Phone \n561/515-3148 Fax \n(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) \nEFTA00222753\n", "char_count": 485}]}