{"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_count": 13, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00222407", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00222407.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 1 of 13 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nJANE DOE NO. 3, \nVS. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \n/ \nJANE DOE NO. 4, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nJANE DOE NO. 5, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nCASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-KAM-L \n---- DC \nJUL 2 8 2008 \nSTEVEN \nCLERK M LAD \nU \n-EL-r-EyeAgr \nCASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-  -KAM-L \nCASE NO.: 08-80380-CIV-KAM-LRJ \nCASE NO.: 08-80381-CIV-KAM-LRJ \nFILED UNDER SEAL.\nEPSTEIN'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY \nThis motion is filed under seal because the deferred-prosecution agreement between the United States Attorney's \nOffice and Mr. Epstein. discussed herein, contains a confidentiality clause. \nA motion to seal has been filed \ncontemporaneously. \nEFTA00222407\n", "char_count": 817}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 2 of 13 \nThe Pendine Federal Criminal Action \nIn 2006, a Florida state grand jury indicted Jeffrey Epstein on allegations similar to those in \nthe instant actions (State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF 09454, Fifteenth Judicial \nCircuit. Palm Beach County) (the \"Florida Criminal Action\")) Shortly thereafter, the United States \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (the \"USAO\") began a federal grand-jury \ninvestigation into allegations arising out of the same incidents alleged in the instant actions (Grand \nJury No. 07-103 (WPB),2 United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida) (the \n\"Federal Criminal Action\"). \nIn September 2007, the USAO and Mr. Epstein entered into a highly unusual and \nunprecedented deferred-prosecution agreement (the \"Agreement\"), in which the USAO agreed to \ndefer (not dismiss or close) the Federal Criminal Action on the condition that Mr. Epstein continue \nto comply with numerous obligations, the first of which was pleading guilty to certain state charges \nin the Florida Criminal Action. \nThe Agreement itself uses the term \"deferred\" (rather than \n\"dismissed\" or \"closed\") to describe the status of the Federal Criminal Action: \nTHEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be \ndeferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by \nthe following conditions and the requirements of this Agreement . . . . \nAgreement, at 2. \nBy no stretch did the USAO finalize, close, complete, dismiss or abandon the Federal \nCriminal Action. Indeed, as the lead federal prosecutor recently explained, the USAO merely \nSince the filing of the motion to stay, Mr. Epstein has pled guilty and been sentenced in the Florida Criminal Action. \nSee Notice Concerning Motion to Stay (7/1/08). Acc\n... [truncated, 3181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/1 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=1]", "char_count": 3181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 3 of 13 \n\"agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida . . ..\" See In \nre. Jane Doe, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-Marra/Johnson (S.D. Fla.) (DE 14),  \n07/09/08, 1 5, attached hereto as Exhibit \"A\" (emphasis added). Under the Agreement, \nthe USAO presently retains the continuing right to indict Mr. Epstein - - or to unseal \"any\" \nalready-existing federal \"charges\" that may already have been handed up by the federal grand jury \nand sealed - - should he breach any of its provisions. Agreement, at 2. \nThe period of the deferral continues until three months after Mr. Epstein completes service \nof his sentence in the Florida Criminal Action. Id. Indeed, the final three months of the \nAgreement's term constitute an extended period during which the USAO expressly retains the \nability to evaluate whether Epstein committed any breaches of his numerous obligations under the \nAgreement while he was serving his state sentence, and, if it so determines, reserves the right to \nindict (or unseal an existing indictment against) Mr. Epstein - - even after he has completed \nserving his entire state sentence. \nThe Agreement further provides that upon Epstein's execution of a plea agreement in the \nState Criminal Case, the Federal Criminal Action \"will be suspended\" and all pending grand-jury \nsubpoenas \"will be held in abeyance unless and until the defendant violates any term of this \nagreement.\" Agreement, at 5 (emphasis added). The Agreement directs the USAO and Epstein to \n\"maintain their evidence, specifically evidence requested by or directly related to the grand jury \nsubpoenas that have been issued,\" and to maintain such evidence \"inviolate.\" Id. (emphasis \nadded). It also expressly provides that the grand-jury subpoenas continue to remain \"outstanding\" \nuntil \"the successful completion of the terms of this agreement.\" Id. (emphasis added). \nFinally, the Agreement provide\n... [truncated, 2638 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/2 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=2]", "char_count": 2638}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 4 of 13 \nviolated, and shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of \n[sic] giving notice of the violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this \nparagraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts \nwhich may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the Agreement. \nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no \nprosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any \nother offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal \nBureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses \nthat arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this \nDistrict, and the charges against Epstein, if any, will be dismissed. \nAgreement, at 2. \nConsistent with the Agreement and its position that the Federal Criminal Action continues \nto remain pending, the USAO recently sent letters to attorneys for people that the USAO has \ndesignated as \"victims.\" In those letters, the USAO asked, \"[1]f you do file a claim under 18 \nU.S.C. § 2255 and Mr. Epstein denies that your client is a victim of an enumerated offense, please \nprovide notice of that denial to the undersigned [AUSA].\" See \nExhs. 6 \n& 7, at 2 (July 9, 2008). The clear implication of the USAO's request (by which the USAO \nappears to involve itself in the instant litigation, despite advising the recipients that it cannot \"take \npart in or otherwise assist in civil litigation,\" id.), is that the USAO believes that such denial might \nbreach the Agreement. \nAccordingly, the Federal Criminal Action remains \"pending.\" \nDiscussion \nI. \nSection 3509(k) Applies to Investigations, Not Just Indictments. \nWhile there is no unsealed indicted criminal case against Mr. Epstein, the government's \ncriminal investigation against him remains open. Section 3509(k) clearly ap\n... [truncated, 2534 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/3 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=3]", "char_count": 2534}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 5 of 13 \nattached hereto as Exhibit \"B\"). In enacting § 1595, Congress specifically intended that the term \n\"criminal action\" would be applied extremely broadly. Accordingly, Congress took pains to \nensure that courts would give it the broadest possible construction and, for that reason, specified in \nthe definition provision that \"criminal action\" also \"includes investigation.\" \n18 U.S.C. § \n1595(b)(2). The only reported decision addressing this provision interpreted it according to its \nplain language. See Ara v. Khan, No. CV 07-1251, 2007 WL 1726456,'2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, \n2007) (ordering \"all proceedings in this case stayed pending the conclusion of the government's \ncriminal investigation of the defendants and of any resulting criminal prosecution\") (emphasis \nadded). \nGiven that the USAO's Agreement with Epstein indicates that: \n• \nthe grand-jury's subpoenas remain \"outstanding\" (Agreement, at 5); \n• \nthe subpoenas are \"held in abeyance\" (id.): \n• \nthe subpoenas are not \"withdrawn\" (W.); \n• \nthe parties must \"maintain their evidence\" (id.) (which would be entirely unnecessary if \nthe investigation against Epstein were closed); \n• \"any\" existing \"charges\" will not \"be dismissed\" until after Epstein has \"timely \nfulfill[ed] all the terms and conditions of the [A]greement\" (id. at 2); and \n• \n\"prosecution in this District . . . shall be deferred\" (id.) (but not closed or dismissed), \n- - then. the only reasonable conclusion is that the Federal Criminal Action remains \"pending.-3\nThe plaintiffs argue that a § 3509(k) stay would be \"inconsistent with Mr. Epstein's \nAgreement with the U.S. Attorney\" which the plaintiffs claim is reproduced in the lead \n3 The ordinary meaning of the adjective \"pending\" is \"(r]emaining undecided; awaiting decision . . .. Black's Law \nDictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit routinely relies on \nBlack's Law Dic\n... [truncated, 3520 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/4 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=4]", "char_count": 3520}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 6 of 13 \nprosecutor's July 10 letter to their counsel (attached to Plaintiffs' responses as Exhibit A). \nApparently, on July 10, the lead prosecutor sent a letter to the plaintiffs' lawyer stating that \"[o]ne \n. . . condition to which Epstein has agreed\" is that each plaintiff \"will have the same rights to \nproceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and \nconvicted of an enumerated offense.\" See Response Memo, at 5 & Ex. A, at 1-2 (emphasis \nadded). This argument warrants absolutely no consideration, however, since the plaintiffs have \nnot pled any claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. \nH. \nSection 3509(k) Applies Even After a Plaintiff Turns 18. \nWithout citing to a single case, the plaintiffs argue that § 3509(k) does not apply to \nplaintiffs over the age of 18. An examination of the legislative history and related statutes shows \nthat this unsupported argument must be rejected. \nThe parallel stay provision in § 1595, discussed supra at 3-4, mandates, without exception, \nthat \nany \ncivil \naction \nbrought \nunder \nthat \nsection \nfor \nviolations \nof \n§ 1591 (prohibiting transportation of minors for prostitution) \"shall be stayed during the pendency \nof any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 1591(bX1). Whether the § 1595 plaintiff has turned 18 does not vitiate the efficacy of \nthis mandatory stay. \nAn example illustrates why the stay provided in § 3509(k) has the same broad scope as the \nstay provided in § 1591(b)(1). As discussed above, § 3509(k) stays any civil suit for injury to a \nminor, arising out of the same occurrence as a pending criminal action. One type of civil suit \nfalling within § 3509(k)'s ambit is a suit seeking redress for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). \nSection 2423(a) - - just like § 1591 - - prohibits transportation of minors for prostitution. The \nelements of b\n... [truncated, 2489 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/5 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=5]", "char_count": 2489}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 7 of 13 \nLogic compels a rule requiring continued application of the § 3509(k) stay to a putative \nvictim who has since turned 18. Consider again the example of § 2243(a). Assume that the \nUSAO is investigating a § 2243(a) violator with two alleged victims: one who is now 17, and one \nwho has turned 19. Assume further that both decide to sue the alleged offender while the USAO \nis still in the process of conducting its criminal investigation. Why would Congress prohibit the \ndefendant from conducting civil discovery in the 17-year-old's lawsuit, but permit him to conduct \nfull discovery in the 19-year-old's lawsuit, including taking the depositions of both the 19- and the \n17-year-old, the federal investigating agents and all the grand-jury witnesses? This could not have \nbeen Congress' intent. \nThe legislative history to a statute resembling § 1595 is also instructive. When Congress \nenacted 18 U.S.C. § 2255, it provided a civil remedy to any \"minor . . . victim\" of enumerated \nfederal sex offenses. See Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. \n1783. § 703 (1986). In 2006, Congress amended the statute to clarify that the civil cause of action \nwas available not just while the victim was a minor, but even after she or he turned IS. See Pub. \n1. 109-248, 120 Stat. 650, § 707 (bX1XA) (amending § 2255 to permit suit by adults who were \nvictims of enumerated federal offenses whcn they were minors, by deleting \"Any minor who is [a \nvictim]\" and adding \"Any person, who, while a minor, was [a victim]\"). \nMeanwhile, the stay \nprovisions of § 3509(k) remained unchanged. There is no reason to think that Congress would \nafford prosecutors protection for their investigations while the victims were minors, but \ncompletely eliminate those protections the moment one of the victims turned 18. \nThe District Court for the Northern District of Florida confirmed this position and \n... [truncated, 2613 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/6 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=6]", "char_count": 2613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 8 of 13 \npending before this Court, are literally lifted° from the plaintiffs' brief submitted to, and rejected \nby, the Northern District of New York in Francis.) The court specifically held that \"because the \nvictims were minors at the time of the Defendants' actions alleged in both [the civil and \ncriminal] cases, § 3509(k) applies.\" Id. (emphasis added). \nThe United States Department of Justice has itself emphatically embraced the \ninterpretation of § 3509(k) as applying to stay all civil actions relating to sex offenses against \nminors, pending the completion of a parallel criminal action, without regard to whether the \nplaintiff has turned 18 during her civil lawsuit: \nThe subsection should stay all pending civil actions in the wake of a criminal \nprosecution. Notably, in the context of 18 USC § 2255 (\"civil remedy for personal \ninjuries\"), all civil actions are stayed pending the completion of a criminal action. \nSee also 18 USC § 3509(k). \nH.R. Rep. 108-264(11), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), reprinted at 2003 WL 22272907, at •16-17 \n(\"agency view\" by the Department of Justice on bill later codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595). \nThe Department specifically argued to Congress in the clearest terms: \"We believe that \nprosecutions should take priority over civil redress and that prosecutions should be complete prior \nto going forward with civil suits.\" Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Nowhere did the Department \nremotely suggest - - as the plaintiffs have implied - - that pending prosecutions warrant less \nprotection (Le., should be \"hinder[ed]\") simply because a particular civil plaintiff happens to reach \nhis or her 18th birthday. \nIII. \nA Stay is Mandatory Despite Resulting \"Delay\" to Civil Lawsuits. \nInherent in any § 3509(k) stay is delay to the progress (discovery, trial, appeal) of all \nrelated civil lawsuits. Congress recognized this in enacting the stay provision, which necessarily \nprior\n... [truncated, 2670 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/7 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=7]", "char_count": 2670}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 9 of 13 \ncourt specifically refused to provide any relief to plaintiffs \"simply because the state [criminal] \nmatter is not progressing as fast as they would hope.\" 2005 WL 950623, at *2. The court made \nthis determination despite the plaintiffs' complaints about the \"frustrating delay\" and that \"the \nstate criminal case 'has languished for almost two years with no end in sight,' finding that this \"is \na matter to be addressed in state [criminal] court.\" Id. Accordingly, the anticipated delay in this \ncase, attendant to the term of the deferred-prosecution agreement, does not change the clear \ncommand of § 3509(k). \nAccording to their own pleadings, the plaintiffs waited between three and six years before \nfiling these lawsuits, and so cannot rightfully claim prejudice from additional temporary delay. \nIV. \nSection 3509 Aside, a Discretionary Stay is Warranted. \nEven, arguendo, were this Court not to apply the mandate of § 3509, a discretionary stay \nshould still be entered during the pendency of the Federal Criminal Action. SEC v. Healthsouth \nCorp.. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1326 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (\"No question exists that this court has the \npower to stay a civil proceeding due to an active, parallel criminal investigation.\"). Other federal \nstatutes support such a stay -- particularly when the criminal action may be adversely affected by \nthe civil litigation. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 2712(e)(1), \"the court shall stay any action \ncommenced [against the United States] if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely \naffect the ability of the Government to conduct a related investigation or prosecution of a related \ncriminal case.\" Allowing these lawsuits to progress while Epstein remains subject to the Federal \nCriminal Action will prejudice him irrevocably and irreparably. As provided below, there are \nseveral adverse effects to allowing the civil litigation to proceed whil\n... [truncated, 2477 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/8 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=8]", "char_count": 2477}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 10 of 13 \nShould he choose his Fifth Amendment rights, he will expose himself to an adverse \ninference at the summary-judgment stage and at trial. See generally. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. \nSys., 611 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that \"invocation of the privilege would be \nsubject to the drawing of an adverse inference by the trier of fact\"). \nOn the other hand, should Epstein choose his right to defend himself in these lawsuits, the \nUSAO will be able to use his responses at every stage of the discovery and trial process (e.g., his \nAnswer, responses to document requests, responses to requests for admissions, sworn answers to \ninterrogatories, answers to deposition questions, and trial testimony) to his detriment in the \nFederal Criminal Action.' \nIn these lawsuits, even before civil discovery begins, under the Initial Disclosures required \nby Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and S.D. Fla. Local Rule 26.1, Epstein \"must\" disclose the identities of all \nthe witnesses he would call in his defense to the Federal Criminal Action (Rule 26(aXI XAXi)), \ncopies of \"all documents\" he \"may use to support [his] defenses\" (Rule 26(aX1XA)(ii)), as well as \nthe identity of \"any\" expert witness he \"may use at trial,\" along with mandatory disclosure of \"a \nwritten report\" containing \"a complete statement of all opinions the [expert] will express and the \nbasis and reasons for them\" (Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i)). \nIn contrast, in the pending Federal Criminal Action, which is governed exclusively by the \nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pm-trial \nproduction of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(bX1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United \nStates v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production \nprivilege). \nThus, absent a stay of this civil action, the USAO would receive fundamentally unfair \naccess to defense information and h\n... [truncated, 2677 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/9 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=9]", "char_count": 2677}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 11 of 13 \nstrategy. See Comment, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1030 (\"To the extent that a prosecutor acquires \nevidence that was elicited from the accused in a parallel civil proceeding, the criminal process \nbecomes less adversarial.\"). \nWithout a stay in place, discovery will proceed, including against third parties. Mr. \nEpstein will have no alternative but to issue subpoenas seeking evidence from state and federal \nlaw-enforcement officers. For example, Epstein is clearly entitled to discover evidence of prior \nstatements (including inconsistent statements) given by witnesses whom law-enforcement has \npreviously interviewed. See. e.g., Cox v. Treadway. 75 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that \ndistrict court properly admitted testimony of prosecutor about prior inconsistent statements that \nwitness made to the prosecutor). Likewise, Epstein may be entitled to discovery of relevant \nevidence that is in the present possession of the grand jury or other law-enforcement agencies. \nSee, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 729 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (\"The grand jury has \nconcluded its deliberations ... . The need for secrecy of these specific tapes no longer outweighs \nother concerns.\"); Golden Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers. Inc., 87 \nF.R.D. 53, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (\"[W]here, as here, the grand jury has completed its work and all \nthat is sought are those documents turned over to the grand jury by the corporations which are \ndefendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the \npoint.\") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). \nIn response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that \nit will be the government, not Mr. Epstein, who will object to discovery in these civil cases, until \nthe final conclusion of the Federal Criminal Action. \nConclusion \nBeca\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/10 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=10]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 12 of 13 \nRespectfully submitted, \nLEWIS TEIN, P.L. \n3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 \nCoconut Grove, Florida 33133 \nTel: 305 442 1101 Fax: 305 442 6744 \nBy: \nGUY A. EWIS \nFla. Bar No. 623740 \nlewis®Iewistein.com \nMICHAEL R. TEIN \nFla. Bar No. 993522 \ntein@lewistein.com \nATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nTel. 561 659 8300 Fax. 561 835 8691 \nBy: \nJack A. Goldberger \nFla. Bar No. 262013 \njgoldberger®agwpa.com \nAttorneys for Defendant Jay Epstein \nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 711.A.3 \nWhile defense counsel admittedly did not confer with plaintiffs' counsel prior to filing the motion \nto stay, it was by no means in willful disregard of the Local Rule. Shortly after the filing of the \nmotion and before plaintiffs filed their response memoranda suggesting that no conference had \ntaken place, the parties did confer in a good faith and specific attempt to resolve the motion and \nwere unable to do so, because plaintiffs' counsel would not agree to a stay. Accordingly, the brief \ndelay in conducting the Rule 7.1 conference did not prejudice the plaintiffs at all or result in \nunnecessary judicial intervention. It is perhaps worth noting that, contrary to their Rule 7.1 \ncertificate, plaintiffs did not confer prior to filing their motion to extend time to file their response \nmemoranda (which extension defendant did not oppose anyway, including on the basis of failure \nto comply with Rule 7.1). Further information on the reasons the Rule 7.1 conference for the \ninstant motion to stay was conducted after filing the motion to stay will be provided to the Court \nupon its request, preferably ex pane in order to avoid disclosure of privileged information. The \ndefendant respectfully requests the opportunity to make such an ex pane disclosure in the event \nthat the Court considers denying the motion under Local Rule 7.1.A.3\n... [truncated, 2442 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00222407/11 or ?id=EFTA00222407&page=11]", "char_count": 2442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00222407", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 38 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2008 \nPage 13 of 13 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was served on July 28, 2008 by U.S. \nmail on all counsel named on the service list. \n4444 \nMichael R. Tein \nSERVICE LIST \nJeffrey M. Herman, Esq. \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nHerman & Mermelstcin, P.A. \n18205 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2218 \nMiami, Florida 33160 \n12 \nEFTA00222419\n", "char_count": 462}]}