{"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_count": 24, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00221929", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00221929.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07'13'2009 \nPage 1 of 24 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nJANE DOE NO. 2, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 3, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 4, \nPlaintiff, \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN! \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 5, \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nCASE NO.: 08-cv-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA/JOFINSON \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOHNSON \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80381-MARRA/JOHNSON \nEFTA00221929\n", "char_count": 558}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 2 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marra/Johnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 2 of 24 \nCASE NO.: 08-80994-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 6, \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nCASE NO.: 08-80993-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE NO. 7, \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nDefendant. \nC.M.A., \nCASE NO.: 08-80811-CIV-1VIARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE, \nCASE NO.: 08-80893-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN et al, \nDefendants. \nEFTA00221930\n", "char_count": 627}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07'132009 \nPage 3 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV80893-Manaflohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of law ✓n Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 3 of 24 \nDOE II, \nCASE NO.: 09-80469-CIV-MARRA-JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN et al, \nDefendants. \nJANE DOE NO. 101, \nCASE NO.: 09-80591-CIV-MARRA-JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nDefendant. \nJANE DOE NO. 102, \nCASE NO.: 09-80656-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nPlaintiff, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nIE PSTE IN ' S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO \nJANE DOE'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTION RESTRAINING \nFRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF ASSETS. APPOINTMENT OF A \nRECEIVER TO TAKE CHARGE OF PROPERTY OF EPSTEIN. AND TO \nPOST A $15 MILLION BOND TO SECURE POTENTIAL JUDGMENT \nDefendant, JEFFERY EPSTEIN (\"Epstein\"), by and through his undersigned \ncounsel, submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's, JANE DOE \n(\"Jane Doe\"), Motion for Injunction Restraining Fraudulent Transfer of Assets, \nAppointment of a Receive to Take Charge of Property of Epstein, and to Post a $15 \nMillion Bond to Secure Potential Judgment (DE #165) (\"Injunction Motion\"), and states: \nEFTA00221931\n", "char_count": 1195}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 4 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Eosteie \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marraflohnson \nEpsteln's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPaged of 24 \nI. \nINTRODUCTION \nJane Doe filed her Injunction Motion (DE #165) on June 19, 2009 seeking an \ninjunction to restrain any transfer of assets by Epstein, appointment of a receiver to take \ncharge of Epstein's property and a $15,000,000 bond to secure her potential judgment in \nthis action. The Injunction Motion is essentially a veiled and improper attempt to \ncircumvent the statutory requirements for pre-judgment attachment set forth in Fla. Stat. \n§76.01 a seq. \nNowhere in her 18-page motion does Jane Doe cite any authority \nsupporting the relief she requests — not for an injunction, not for appointment of a \nreceiver and not for the posting of a $15,000,000 bond. \nThe Injunction Motion is premised on the wholly unsupported contention that \nEpstein is fraudulently transferring his assets. Jane Doe cites to purported facts such as \nEpstein being a billionaire, having financial sophistication and international contacts, as \nwell as invocation of his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment in response to \ndiscovery requests, to support her fraudulent transfer claim. Jane Doe has not identified \none asset transferred by Epstein nor pointed to one scintilla of evidence to suggest \nEpstein is fraudulently transferring his assets. Rather, she asks the Court to presume \nEpstein is fraudulently transferring his assets because he asserted his Fifth Amendment \nprivilege is response to Jane Doe's Request for Admissions 6, 21 and 22. See Epstein's \nResponse to Jane Doe's Request for Admissions attached as Exhibit C to Injunction \nMotion (DE #165). Based on this unsupported presumption of fraudulent transfer, Jane \nDoe asks the Court to impose significant and unjustified restraints on Epstein's assets. \nSimply put, Jane Doe is improperly seeking\n... [truncated, 2144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/3 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=3]", "char_count": 2144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 5 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Manallohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 5 of 24 \nrelief requested by Jane Doe. For the following reasons, the Court must deny Jane Doe's \nInjunction Motion. \nII. \nJANE DOE'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IS BASED ON \nSPECULATION AND HEARSAY AND CONTAINS NO MATERIAL \n\"FACTS\" \nJane Doe's \"Statement of Material Facts\" relies heavily on the affidavit Jane \nDoe's own counsel. ate Affidavit of Paul Cassell, Esq., attached as Exhibit A to the \nInjunction Motion (DE #165). \nMr. Cassell's affidavit is riddled with hearsay, \nspeculation, conjecture and unsupported assumptions and does not contain one material \n\"fact\" based on his personal knowledge. The majority of Mr. Cassell's assertions in his \naffidavit are based on a 2005 Vanity Fair article (the \"2005 Vanity Fair Article\"). See \nVicky \nWard, \n\"The \nTalented \nMr. \nEpstein,\" \nVanity \nFair \nchttp://vickyward.com/wordpress/archives/30> (January 24, 2005; accessed June 24, \n2009). Mr. Cassell's affidavit is essentially a recitation of irrelevant, speculative and \nhearsay statements contained in an article published over four years ago. The Court \nshould disregard Mr. Cassell's affidavit in determining the Injunction Motion. ate ?di \nU.S. v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that newspapers articles \nwere inadmissible double hearsay when offered to prove the truth of their contents - the \nidentity of the gunman); Dollar v. State, 685 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) \n(holding that a newspaper article, introduced to prove the truth of out of court statements \ncontained therein, constitutes inadmissible hearsay); Frasher v. Fox Distributing of S.W. \nFla.. Inc., 813 So. 2d 1017, 1020 (Ha. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that an affidavit \nsupporting a prejudgment writ of attachment \"must not be based on hearsay or the \nplaintiffs subjec\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/4 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=4]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 6 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marrallohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 6 of 24 \ndefendant's actions,\" citing Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudv's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067, \n1071 (Fla. 1976)) \nIn his affidavit, Mr. Cassell states that \"[i]t appears that defendant Jeffery Epstein \nis an extremely wealthy individual.\" See Affidavit of Paul Cassell $2. Mr. Cassell's \naffidavit goes on to state that Epstein \"has great skills in trading in international currency \nmarkets\" and therefore \"it is reasonable to infer that he has significant financial \nsophistication.\" \nId. $4. This appearance of extreme wealth and sophistication in \ninternational financial matters is based on inadmissible hearsay newspaper reports, \nWikipedia, and the 2005 Vanity Fair Article. \nMr. Cassell asserts that Epstein's \"real mentor [Steven Hoffenberg] was sent to \nfederal prison for twenty years for bilking investors out of more than $450 million on one \nof the largest Ponzi schemes in American history.\" Id. ¶5. First, the foregoing statement \nhas absolutely no relevance to the instant case, except to attempt to link Epstein to an \nindividual convicted of operating a Ponzi scheme. The 2005 Vanity Fair Article reports \non Epstein's business dealings with Steven Hoffenberg during the 1980's and merely \nnotes that Hoffenberg is \"currently ... serving a 20-year sentence\" for operating a Ponzi \nscheme. \nImportantly, despite all the questionable and speculative suggestions and \ninferences in the 2005 Vanity Fair Article, it does not in any way link Epstein to the \nPonzi scheme. Yet, Mr. Cassell tries to forge a link between Epstein and Hoffenberg's \nPonzi scheme, ultimately to cast Epstein in a negative light and suggest he, like Mr. \nHoffenberg, is committing financial crimes. Even Vanity Fair did not attempt to make \nthis untenable connection. Similarly, Mr.\n... [truncated, 2146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/5 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=5]", "char_count": 2146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 7 of 24 \nJane Doe v. EDSICia \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Mananohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 7 of 24 \nItalian and Swiss investors. Id. 16. This statement is obviously intended to associate \nEpstein with Bear Sterns, a tarnished financial institution apparently involved in \nquestionable international transactions in the 198O's, to somehow suggest Epstein is \nfraudulently transferring his assets overseas. It is worth noting that the questioning \noccurred approximately twenty-eight years ago, in 1981, and that Epstein was merely \nquestioned because the SEC believed \"Epstein had information on insider trading at Bear \nSterns.\" The foregoing assertions in Mr. Cassell's affidavit have absolutely no bearing \non Jane Doe's Injunction Motion. \nThen, Mr. Cassell goes beyond the pale and resorts to celebrity gossip to suggest \nEpstein may be transferring his assets to Israel. Specifically, in paragraph 8 of his \naffidavit, Mr. Cassell cites a May 2008 Vanity Fair article and states \"rumors were \ncirculating (to celebrities such as Dustin Hoffman, Alec Baldwin and filmmaker Michael \nMailer) that Epstein was moving all of his considerable assets to Israel.\" \nId. 18 \n(emphasis added). The article actually stated \"Walk that Epstein had moved himself and \nhis assets to Israel reached the ears of such luminaries as Harvey Weinstein....\" See \nVicky Ward, \"You Will Have Jeffrey Epstein to Kick Around!\" Vanity Fair \n<http://www.vanitvfaincom/online/dailv/2008/05/vickv-ward-you.html>, (May 7, 2008; \naccessed June 24, 2009) (emphasis added). Not only does Mr. Cassell rely on utterly \nunreliable celebrity \"rumors,\" he cites it out of context to suggest that Epstein is \nfraudulently transferring assets to Israel. \nSome other irrelevant, speculative and/or hearsay statements in Mr. Cassell's \naffidavit include: (1) Epstein may own a Boeing 727 with a trading room \n... [truncated, 2118 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/6 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=6]", "char_count": 2118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 8 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marratlohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of taw in Opposition to Jane Doe's In/unction Motion \nPage 8 of 24 \nclose friends with Prince Andrew and therefore it is reasonable to infer Epstein has \ninternational financial contacts ULL 19); (3) Epstein reportedly limited his clients to those \nwith a net worth over $1 billion and kept all his deals and clients secret (Id• 9[4); (4) the \ncurrent lawsuits could cause Epstein to financial ruin (hd, 110); and (5) Mr. Cassell attests \nhe was \"advised\" that Epstein works at managing his financial interests while on a \"work \nrelease\" program (a 111). Mr. Cassell also admittedly relies on unsubstantiated reports \nthat Epstein is transferring assets out of the country with the intent to make it impossible \nfor Jane Doe and other plaintiffs to satisfy a potential judgment. Id. 112. \nBased on the foregoing irrelevant, speculative and unreliable hearsay information \nprimarily gleaned and taken out of context from a four-year-old Vanity Fair article as \nwell as unsubstantiated reports from unnamed individual(s), Mr. Cassell concludes that \nEpstein \"might\" be transferring his assets overseas with the intent to defeat any judgment \nthat might be entered against him. Id. 112. Mr. Cassell does not attest to one material \nfact of which he has personal knowledge that would have any bearing on Jane Doe's \nInjunction Motion. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should disregard Mr. \nCassell 's affidavit. \nJANE DOE IS NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF \nA. \nJane Doe Is Not Entitled To an Adverse Inference Based on Epstein's \nInvocation of His Fifth Amendment Privilege \nJane Doe is not entitled to an adverse inference based on Epstein's invocation of \nhis Fifth Amendment privilege in response to Jane Doe's Request for Admissions 6, 21 \nand 22. A two-step inquiry must be undertaken to determine whether such an infere\n... [truncated, 2107 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/7 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=7]", "char_count": 2107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 9 of 24 \nAwe Doe v, Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marra/Johnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 9 of 24 \nFirst, the court must determine whether there was a valid basis for invocation of the \nprivilege, which requires only \"the existence of a plausible possibility that the person \nmight be prosecuted in this country.\" Id. Jane Doe would be hard pressed to contend \nthat Epstein's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege is invalid. However, in an \nabundance of caution, Epstein incorporates by reference the argument and authority set \nforth in his section \"Br of his Motion to Stay And Or Continue Action for Time Certain \nBased on Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings with Incorporated Memorandum of \nLaw (DE # 24). \nThe second step requires an assessment of whether the requested inferences, \nwhich are a form of evidence, comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Sse Custer \nBattles, LLC, 415 F.Supp.2d at 634. That is, they must be relevant, reliable and not \nunfairly prejudicial, confusing or cumulative. Id. An \"adverse inference can only be \ndrawn when independent evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to \nanswer.\" Id. at 635 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Custer Battles. LLC unlike \nthe instant case, the court found the record contained \"ample evidence of Morris' \ninvolvement in the [fraudulent) billing ... which in turn ensures that the proposed adverse \ninferences, should the jury choose to draw them, are not unreliable.\" Id. See also \nAvirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1580 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that \"the negative \ninference to be drawn from the assertion of the fifth amendment does not substitute for \nevidence needed to meet the burden of production\")• Eagle Hospital Physicians, LLC v. \nSRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that \"dismissal \nfollowing the assertion of the F\n... [truncated, 2065 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/8 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=8]", "char_count": 2065}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 10 of 24 \nJane Poe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marrallohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunaion Motion \nPage 10 of 24 \ninferences drawn from Fifth-Amendment-protected silence are treated as a substitute for \nthe need for evidence on an ultimate issue of fact,\" citing Avirgan, supra). \nAs belabored throughout this memorandum, Jane Doe cites no independent \nevidence that Epstein is fraudulently transferring assets. \nAccordingly, an adverse \ninference would be wholly unreliable and is clearly impermissible under the instant \ncircumstances. \nAdditionally, granting the relief sought by Jane Doc based solely on an adverse \ninference would violate Epstein's Fifth Amendment rights. \nLaSalle Bank Lake View \nv. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that \"the Supreme Court has \nprohibited practices that are coercive in that they make the exercise of the privilege \n'costly,'\" citing Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967)). As the LaSalle  court \nexplained, \"deeming an allegation of a complaint [or Jane Doe's allegation that Epstein is \nfraudulent transferring assets] to be admitted based on the invocation of the Fifth \nAmendment privilege without requiring the complainant to produce evidence in support \nof its allegations would impose too great a cost and exceed the authorization of Baxter v. \nPalmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)].\" See LaSalle Bank Lake View, 54 F.3d at 391; see \nalso National Acceptance v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that \njudgment imposing liability cannot rest solely upon a privileged refusal to admit or deny \nat the pleading stage. The cost to a defendant of treating his claim of privilege as an \nadmission would be to excuse a plaintiff of presenting proof of his claim; \"[w]e think \nBaxter indicates that this is too great a cost\"). \nAs Jane Doe fails to present any \nindependent evidence of fraudulent tra\n... [truncated, 2122 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/9 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=9]", "char_count": 2122}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 11 of 24 \n,lane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marraaohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 11 of 24 \nB. \nJane Doe Has Not Properly Pled a Claim for Nor Requested \nInjunctive Relief \nJane Doe does not properly plead a claim for an injunction. While the title of \nJane Doe's motion appears to request injunctive relief, nowhere in the motion does Jane \nDoe set forth the elements of an injunction. Moreover, the ad damnutn clause of the \nmotion does not request injunctive relief. It is well settled that the party seeking an \ninjunction must establish: (1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) \nirreparable injury unless an injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the \nharm to the defendant if the injunction issues; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve \nthe public interest. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide. Inc.. 522 F.3d 1211, \n1217 (11th Cir. 2008). An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which should \nbe granted sparingly and only after the moving party has alleged and proven facts \nentitling it to relief. See Shands at Lake Shore, Inc. v. Ferrero, 898 So. 2d 1037, 1038 \n(Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Wade v. Brown, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). \nAs a threshold matter, the Court should disregard Jane Doe's motion for \ninjunctive relief as she has not properly pled the claim. She does not even attempt to \nallege any of the elements set forth in Axiom Worldwide. Inc., supra, and does not \nrequest injunctive relief in her motion. Moreover, in her First Amended Complaint (DE \n#38), Jane Doe does not seek an injunction nor does she assert a claim under Fla. Stat. \n§726.101 a seq. See Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) \n(holding that a party must \"file suit under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act\" to enjoin \nfraudulent transfer of assets) (emphasis added). \nEFT\n... [truncated, 2010 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/10 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=10]", "char_count": 2010}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 12 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marrallohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 12 of 24 \nAs Jane Doe has not properly pled a claim for injunctive relief, the Court should \ndeny Jane Doe's motion, if in fact she intended to make one, for an injunction. \nC. \nInjunctive Relief is Unavailable as Jane Doe Seeks Only Money \nDamages \nEven assuming arguendo Jane Doe properly pled the elements of an injunction, \ncases in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover money damages do not fall within the \njurisdiction of equity and injunctive relief is therefore unavailable. See Rosen v. Cascade \nInt'l. Inc. 21 F.3d 1520, 1529-30 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court lacked \nthe general equitable authority to issue an injunction where the plaintiff sought only the \naward of monetary damages). Jane Doe's First Amended Complaint (DE #38) does not \nseek equitable relief. \nRather, Jane Doe demands judgment against Epstein for \ncompensatory damages (Counts 1, II, III and V), punitive damages (Counts I - III), \nattorney's fees (Counts II, IV and V), minimum damages authorized by law and all actual \ndamages sustained (to be trebled as authorized by law) (Count IV) and such other relief \nas the Court deems just and proper (Counts I - V).1 See ad damnum clauses of Counts I \n— V, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (DE #38). The Court should deny Jane Doe's \nInjunction Motion as her pleadings do not invoke the Court's equity jurisdiction. \nD. \nThe Court is Without Authority to Issue an Injunction Restraining \nEpstein's Use of His Assets \nJane Doe is not entitled to the injunctive relief requested. Preliminary injunctive \nrelief freezing a defendant's assets to establish a fund with which to satisfy a potential \njudgment for money damages is not an appropriate exercise of a federal district court's \nThe Eleventh Circuit in Rosen \"reject\n... [truncated, 2392 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/11 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=11]", "char_count": 2392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07; 13 •2009 \nPage 13 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marra/Johnson \nEpsiebe's Memorandum of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 13 of 24 \nauthority. See Rosen 21 F.3d at 1530. It is well settled by a long and unbroken line of \nFlorida cases that in an action at law for money damages there is no judicial authority for \nan order requiring the deposit of the amount in controversy into the registry of the court, \nor indeed for any restraint upon the use of a defendant's assets prior to the entry of \njudgment. a at 1531 (citations omitted); slit also Proctor v. Eason, 651 So. 2d 1301, \n1301-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In Rosen, plaintiffs brought a securities fraud action to \nrecover money damages. See Rosen 21 F.3d at 1522. To ensure they could collect their \npotential judgment, plaintiffs moved for, and the court granted, preliminary injunctive \nrelief freezing the defendant's assets. Id- at 1525. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the \ninjunction and held the district court did not have the authority to issue an injunction \nsimply to tie up the defendant's assets during the pendency of the litigation. The court \nnoted, \"[tjhe general federal rule of equity is that a court may not reach a defendant's \nassets unrelated to the underlying litigation and freeze them so that they may be \npreserved to satisfy a potential judgment.\" a at 1527. The court went on to cite an oft-\nquoted passage from the United States Supreme Court in De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. \nUnited States, 325 U.S. 212, 221 (1945): \nTo sustain the challenged order would create a precedent of \nsweeping effect. This suit, as we have said, is not to be \ndistinguished from any other suit in equity. What applies \nto it applies to all such. \nEvery suitor who resorts to \nchancery for any sort of relief by injunction may, on a mere \nstatement of belief that the defendant can easily make away \nwith or transport his money or go\n... [truncated, 2403 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/12 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=12]", "char_count": 2403}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 14 of 24 \nJane Dot v, Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-MarraiJohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 14 of 24 \nhis opponent's assets pending recovery and satisfaction of \na judgment in such a law action. \nNo relief of this \ncharacter has been thought justified in the long history of \nequity jurisprudence. \n(Emphasis added). \nAccordingly, the court held that preliminary injunctive relief freezing a \ndefendant's assets to establish a fund with which to satisfy a potential money judgment is \nnot an appropriate exercise of a district court's authority. See Rosen, 21 F.3d at 1530. \nThe court also noted the injunctive remedy sought was equivalent to a writ of \nattachment. \nat 1530. \"Rule 64 [governing seizure of persons or property], and not \nRule 65 (which governs injunctions generally), provides the standard for evaluating a \nrequest for preliminary injunctive relief that is, in reality, no more than a request for \nprejudgment attachment.\" ld. (Citations omitted). In actions at law, plaintiffs \"possess\nan adequate, exclusive prejudgment remedy for the sequestration of assets under [Fla. \nStat. §76.01 a seq.] provided that they can satisfy the enumerated statutory grounds for \nrelief. Accordingly, the use of injunctive relief as a substitute for the remedy of \nprejudgment attachment, with its attendant safeguards, is improper.\" Id. at 1531 \n(emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also SME Racks. Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos \nPara, Electroncia, S.A., 243 Fed. Appx. 502, 504 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming district \ncourt's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction freezing defendant's assets). \nSimilarly, in Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Ha. 2d DCA 1993), \nplaintiffs filed a \"motion to prohibit defendant from transferring assets.\" The motion \ncited plaintiffs' extensive injuries, defendant's perceived lack of insurance coverage, a \nbelief that \n... [truncated, 2089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/13 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=13]", "char_count": 2089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 15 of 24 \nSive Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08•CV•80893•Marra/7ohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 15 of 24 \ncounsel skilled in the area of execution of judgment.\" Id. The trial court granted \nplaintiffs' motion, which the Second District Court of Appeals characterized as \"a series \nof temporary injunctions without the necessary showing of entitlement to injunctive \nrelief.\" Id. The Second District quashed the order granting the injunction and held that \n\"[a]n injunction cannot be used to enforce money damages or prevent a party of \ndisposing of assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law.\" Id, .5_e_e also Briceno v. \nBryden Investment, Ltd., 973 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (noting that in Florida, \nan injunction cannot be entered to prevent a party of disposing of assets prior to \njudgment, even where the party seeking the injunction alleges the defendant may be \ndissipating assets; a judgment for money damages is adequate and injunctive relief is \nimproper) (citations omitted). The Lawhon court also noted that the order was similar to \na pit-judgment writ of attachment. 611 So. 2d at 1368. \"A writ of attachment cannot \nissue unless there is a debt due or an existing debt not yet due\" and plaintiff must file a \n\"verified complaint or sworn allegation that the defendant is removing or disposing of \nproperty. Hearsay or `subjective belief will not suffice.\" Id. (Emphasis added). See \nalso Frasher, 813 So. 2d at 1020 (holding that an affidavit supporting a prejudgment writ \nof attachment \"must not be based on hearsay or the plaintiff's subjective beliefs but rather \non the plaintiff's personal knowledge of the defendant's actions, citing Unique Caterers, \n338 So. 2d at 1071). \nIn the instant case, Jane Doe seeks the same relief the courts in Rosen and \nLawhon prohibited — an injunction freezing Epstein's assets during the pendency\n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/14 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=14]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 16 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Evsteig \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marranohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 16 of 24 \n[Epstein] can easily make away with or transport his money or goods ... it is difficult to \nsee why a plaintiff in any action for a personal judgment in tort or contract may not. also, \napply to the chancellor for a so-called injunction sequestrating his opponent's assets \npending recovery and satisfaction of a judgment in such a law action.\" See peBeers, 325 \nU.S. at 221. Since Jane Doe is not seeking prejudgment attachment under Fla. Stat. \n§76.01 et seq.. there is no authority to enjoin Epstein's use of his assets. The Court must \ntherefore deny Jane Doe's Injunction Motion. \nIV. \nJANE DOE'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER AND \nFOR A $15,000,000 BOND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY LAW \nJane Doe moves the Court, pursuant to Ha. Stat. §726.108(1)(c), to appoint a \nreceiver to take charge of and account for Epstein's assets. However, Jane Doe's reliance \non the foregoing statute is misplaced in that §726.108(1)(c) does not provide for the \nappointment of a receiver to take charge of the debtor's assets. To the contrary, the \nstatute permits \"[ajppointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of \nother property of the transferee.\" See Fla. Stat. §726.108(1)(c) (emphasis added). \nEpstein is clearly not a \"transferee\" and the court should deny Jane Doe's motion to \nappoint a receiver to take control of Epstein's assets. \nJane Doe also improperly attempts to obtain an accounting of Epstein's assets \nthrough the receiver. She states, \"[a] receiver is the only way to start to block further \ndissipation of assets — by, first, gaining control over Epstein's assets and then, second, \nmaking an accounting of what assets of Epstein's remain in this country or are otherwise \nsubject to control by this Court.\" 5O Injunction Motion (DE \n... [truncated, 2125 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/15 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=15]", "char_count": 2125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 17 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893.Marraffohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 17 of 24 \nwould entitle her to an accounting; she just asks for one. See Florida Software Systems, \ninc. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Com., 46 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1285 (M.D. Fla. 1999) \n(holding that a party seeking an equitable accounting must show the existence of a \nfiduciary relationship or a complex transaction and must demonstrate that the remedy at \nlaw is inadequate); Nautica Int'l Inc. v. Intermarine USA, L.P., 5 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1343 \n(S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for equitable accounting as \nplaintiff failed to allege the remedy at law was inadequate). The Court should deny Jane \nDoe's motion to the extent it requests an accounting as she has not properly pled a claim \nfor an accounting. \nIn addition, not unlike her motion for an injunction and to appoint a receiver to \ntake control of Epstein's assets, there is no authority for Jane Doe's motion to require \nEpstein post a $15,000,000 bond to secure a potential judgment. Jane Doe does not cite \none case or statute that addresses posting a bond to secure a potential judgment. Instead, \nJane Doe references cases generally addressing the court's power to grant equitable \nrelief.2 The request for a bond is akin to Jane Doe's motion for an injunction in that it \nseeks to \"establish a fund with which to satisfy a potential judgment for money \ndamages,\" which the court in Rosen held was beyond the authority of the district court. \nSee Rosen, 21 F.3d at 1530. \"There is simply no judicial authority for an order requiring \nthe deposit of the amount in controversy into the registry of the court, or indeed for any \nrestraint upon the use of a defendant's assets prior to the entry of judgment.\" Id. at 1531 \n(citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court should deny Jane Do\n... [truncated, 2222 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/16 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=16]", "char_count": 2222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 18 of 24 \nJane Doe v. Engem \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marrallohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 18 of 24 \nV. \nRELIEF UNDER THE UFTA IS INAPPROPRIATE AS THERE IS NO \nEVIDENCE EPSTEIN IS FRAUDULENTLY TRANSFERRING ASSETS \nThe crux of Jane Doe's Injunction Motion is premised on the unsupported \nassumption that Epstein is fraudulently transferring his assets. Jane Doe asks the Court to \ninfer, based on Epstein's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to Jane \nDoe's Request for Admissions 6, 21 and 22, and the irrelevant, hearsay and speculative \nassertions in Paul Cassell's affidavit, that Epstein is fraudulently transferring assets. Jane \nDoe has not, and cannot, point to any evidence which would suggest Epstein fraudulently \ntransferred anything. For the reasons set forth below, Jane Doe is not entitled to any \nrelief under Fla. Stat. §726.101 et seq. — the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (\"UFTA\"). \nA. \nJane Doe's Burden of Proof Under the UFTA \n1. \nThe \"Badges of Fraud\" and Proof of Fraudulent Intent \nTo prove a fraudulent transfer, Jane Doe must demonstrate: (1) a transfer of \nproperty has in fact occurred; (2) the property transferred belonged to the debtors; (3) the \ntransfer occurred within certain statutory time periods; and (4) the debtor made the \ntransfer with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. See In re Leneve, 341 B.R. \n53, 56 (S.D. Fla. 2006). Courts typically resort to the \"badges of fraud,\" to determine \nfraudulent intent. Id. at 61. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the badges of fraud \ncontained in Fla. Stat. §726.105(2) in determining a debtor's actual intent with regarding \na transfer. See jp re Ramsurat 361 B.R. 246, 254 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (citations omitted). \nThe badges of fraud are whether: (a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (b) the \ndebtor retained possession or control of the p\n... [truncated, 2150 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/17 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=17]", "char_count": 2150}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 19 of 24 \nJane Doc v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marra/Johnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 19 of 24 \nobligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; (e) the transfer \nwas of substantially all of the debtor's assets; (f) the debtor absconded; (g) the debtor \nremoved or concealed assets; (h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor \nwas reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the \nobligation incurred; (i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent after the transfer \nwas made or obligation incurred; and (j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly \nafter a substantial debt was incurred. See In re Ramsurat, 361 B.R. at 254; In re Dealers \nAgency Services, Inc., 380 B.R. 608, 613 (M.D. Ha. 2007) (recognizing that the Eleventh \nCircuit adopted the \"badges of fraud\" to determine fraudulent intent); Fla. Stat. \n§726.105(2). \nMoreover, Ha. Stat. §726.106, which applies to creditors whose claims arose \nbefore the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, provides that a transfer is \nfraudulent \"if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a \nreasonably equivalent value ... and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor \nbecame insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.\" See Fla. Stat. §726.106(1). \nSubsection (2) provides that the transfer is fraudulent \"if the transfer was made to an \ninsider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had \nreasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.\" See Fla. Stat. §726.106(2). \n2. \nJane Doe's \"Means, Motive and Opportunity\" Test is \nUnfounded \nDespite the well-settled statutory framework to determine fraudulent transfer, \nJane Doe appears to have conveniently made up her own test, likely because Jane Doe \ncannot poi\n... [truncated, 2091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/18 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=18]", "char_count": 2091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 20 of 24 \nJane Dot v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Matrailohnson \nEpstein's Memorandums of law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 20 of 24 \napply to Epstein. Indeed, Jane Doe cannot identify a single transfer made by Epstein. \nYet Jane Doe urges the Court to conclude Epstein is fraudulently transferring assets \nbecause he purportedly has the means, the motive and the opportunity to do so, citing \nUnited States v. Smirks, 265 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2001). \nInjunction Motion (DE \n#165) at 11. Sparks is completely inapposite as it concerned whether probable cause for \nan arrest can be based on a showing of means, motive and opportunity. No court has \nrecognized the \"means, motive and opportunity test\" to determine fraudulent transfer. \nB. \nJane Doe Cannot Make The Requisite Showing for Relief Under the \nUFTA; There Is No Evidence of Fraudulent Transfer \nAs set forth above, there are various ways, set forth in the UFTA and applicable \ncase law, in which a creditor could prove a debtor is fraudulently transferring assets. \nJane Doe fails to point to one iota of evidence that Epstein is fraudulently transferring \nassets. In In re Stewart 280 B.R. 268 (M.D. Fla. 2001), proceedings were brought to set \naside certain transfers of the debtor as fraudulent to creditors. The bankruptcy trustee \nclaimed, among other things, that the debtor made a series of transfers to his wife totaling \n$392,691. Id. at 273. There were deposits into the wife's securities accounts in the sum \nof $392,691 which were not explained by the entries on the account statements. Id. at \n274. The trustee concluded the funds must have originated from the debtor and pointed \nto the debtor's income to show that he had the financial means and the financial \nwherewithal to supply the funds. Id. No other evidence was presented to establish the \ndebtor transferred $392,691 to his wife. Under these circumstances, the \n... [truncated, 2212 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/19 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=19]", "char_count": 2212}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 21 of 24 \nJane Doe v, Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Mraragohnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 21 of 24 \nSmart. Inc., 381 B.R. 359, 382 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that bankruptcy trustee failed to \nestablish a fraudulent transfer claim as the trustee failed to establish that the debtor made \nany transfers).3\nMoreover, the court refused to enter a final default judgment against the debtor \nbecause the complaint contained \"virtually no allegations of fact.\" See In re Stewart, 280 \nB.R. at 285. The court noted that \"[n]owhere in the Complaint does Barbara Stewart \nallege that an identifiable asset was transferred on a specific date pursuant to a specific \ntransfer. Further, nowhere in the Complaint does Barbara Stewart allege any specific \nfacts which, even if admitted, would support a finding that a transfer was made with the \nactual intent to defraud a creditor.\" Id. at 285-86. \nAs in In re Stewart Jane Doe does not allege \"an identifiable asset was \ntransferred on a specific date pursuant to a specific transfer\" or allege any facts which \n\"would support a finding that a transfer was made with the actual intent to defraud a \ncreditor.\" See In re Stewart, 280 B.R. at 285-86. Moreover, the only \"evidence\" Jane \nDoe presents to prove fraudulent transfer is her assertion that Epstein \"has the financial \nmeans and the financial wherewithal\" to fraudulently transfer his assets. As the court in \nIn re Stewart rejected such an argument and found that the trustee did not establish the \nexistence of a transfer of property as required by Fla. Stat. §726.105, so should the Court \nhere. \nIn so holding, the court cited 11 U.S.C. §548. See In re Enerav Smart, Inc., 381 B.R. 359 at 382. Section \n548 of the Bankruptcy Code and §726.105, Florida Statutes, \"are substantially the same, with the result that \n'the analysis of what must be show to prove actual fra\n... [truncated, 2181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00221929/20 or ?id=EFTA00221929&page=20]", "char_count": 2181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2009 \nPage 22 of 24 \nJane Dos v, Engem \nCase No. 08-CV43089344arra/Johnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 22 of 24 \nV. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, Epstein respectfully requests the Court deny Jane \nDoe's Injunction Motion. \nBy: \nROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. \nFlorida Bar No. 224162 \nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar #617296 \nDAVID A. YAREMA, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar No. 12492 \nCertificate of Service \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed \nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is \nbeing served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in \n,3-O) \nthe manner specified by CM/ECF on this 1-2 day of July 2009 \nRespectf \nted. \nBy: \nROBE T D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. \nFlorida Bar No. 224162 \nrcrit@bc1claw.com \nDAVID A. YAREMA, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar No. 12492 \ndyarema@ belclaw.com \nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTHER & COLEMAN \nCounsel for Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein \nEFTA00221950\n", "char_count": 1102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07)13:2009 \nPage 23 of 24 \nJane Doc v. Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marra/Johnson \nEpstein's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 23 of 24 \nCertificate of Service \nJane Doe No. 2 v. Jeffrey Epstein \nCase No. 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON \nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. \nBrad Edwards, Esq. \nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq. \nRothstein Rosenfeldt Adler \nMermelstein & Horowitz, P.A. \nCounsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. \n08-80893 \nounse or amttj s \nIn related Cases Nos. 08-80069, 08-80119, \n08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80993, Paul G. Cassell, Esq. \n08-80994 \nRichard Horace Willits, Esq. \nRichard H. Willits, P.A. \nCounsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. \n08-80811 \nJack Scarola, Esq. \nJack P. Hill, Esq. \nSearcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, \nCounsel for Plaintiff C.M.A. \nPro Hac Vice \ncasselip@law.utah.edu \nCo-counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe \nIsidro M. Garcia, Esq. \nGarcia Law Firm, P.A. \nCounsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. \n08-80469 \nRobert C. Josefsberg, Esq. \nKatherine W. Ezell, Esq. \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \nBruce Reinhart, Esq. \nCounsel for Plaintiffs in Related Cases \nEFTA00221951\n", "char_count": 1195}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00221929", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM \nDocument 198 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07)13:2009 \nPage 24 of 24 \njaw Doe v. Eosteth \nCase No. 08-CV-80893-Marra/Johnson \nEpstein's Manorandwn of Law in Opposition to Jane Doe's Injunction Motion \nPage 24 of 24 \nBruce E. Reinhart, P.A. \nounse or ►e \nt 'ri Kellen \nTheodore J. Leopold, Esq. \nSpencer T. Kuvin, Esq. \nRicci-Leo ' .ld, P.A. \nounse \n08-08804 \nor \nawl \nin •e ate. Case No. \nNos. 09-80591 and 09-80656 \nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq. \nAtterb \nGoldbe \nr & Weiss, P.A. \nCounse or De en ant Je i rey pstein \nEFTA00221952\n", "char_count": 546}]}