{"efta_number": "EFTA00214678", "page_count": 5, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00214678", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00214678.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00214678", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "12/26/2007 14:45 FAX\nKIRKLAND&ELLIS\nJa/P. Lefkowitz, P.C.\nTo Call Writer Directly:\nKIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP\nAND AFFILIATED PARTNERSHIPS\nCitigroup Center\n153 East 53rd Street\nNew York, New York 10022-4611\nwww.kirkland.com\nVIA FACSIMILE (305) 530-6444\nHonorable R. Alexander Acosta\nUnited States Attorney\nUnited States Attorney's Office\nSouthern District of Florida\n99 NE 4th Street\nMiami, FL 33132\nDecember 26, 2007\nFacsimile:\n002/006\nDear Alex:\nRe: Jeffrey Epstein\nI write to address the questions you posed to me during a conversation we had late last\nweek. Specifically, you requested a clarification of our position on two issues: (1) our view on\nyour latest proposal regarding notification to the alleged victims under 18 U.S.C. § 3771; and (2)\nour response to your proposed language regarding the 18 U.S.C. § 2255 component of the\ndeferred-prosecution agreement (the \"Agreement\"). Before I turn to these questions, I would\nlike to reiterate that this letter responds to your invitation to discuss proposed modifications to\nthe Agreement and should not be construed in any way as a breach of the Agreement. With that\nsid, I must tell you that the more I look into these issues, the more difficulties I see in trying to\ntic the resolution of a federal criminal matter with a federal civil matter involving minors, and\nthis is even further complicated when the premise of the resolution is a deferred federal\nprosecution conditioned on a plea to specific state offenses with a specific sentence pre-\ndetermined and required to be imposed by the state court, without consideration of the fact that\nthe State view of this case differs dramatically from yours. With that in mind, I turn to each of\nyour questions below.\nFirst, although we appreciate your willingness to modify your Office's § 3771 notice,\nwhich is embodied in your latest proposal, we must still object to aspects of your proposal on the\nground that notice under § 3771 is per se inapplicable to this case under the Attorney General's\nown guidelines, because the alleged victims are not \"crime victims\" under § 3771. The Attorney\nCeneral Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance defines \"crime victim\" as follows:\nFor the purpose of enforcing the rights enumerated in article L.B, a victim is 'a person\ndirectly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an\noffense in the District of Columbia' (18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)) if the offense is charged in\nFederal district court. If a victim is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or\nChicago\nHong Kong\nLondon\nLos Angeles\nMunich\nSan Francisco\nWashington, D.C.\nEFTA00214678\n", "char_count": 2627}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00214678", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "12/26/2007 14:45 FAX\nKIRKLAND&ELLIS\n003/006\nDecember 26, 2007\nPage 2\ndeceased, a family member or legal guardian of the victim, a representative of the\nvictim's estate, or any other person so appointed by the court may exercise the victim's\nrights, but in no event shall the accused serve as a guardian or representative for this\npurpose. (18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)).\nThe Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, at 9 (emphasis added).\nIlere, the women are clearly not \"crime victims\" under the Attorney General Guidelines\ndefinition. To be a \"crime victim\", a person or entity must be harmed by an offense that has\nbeen charged in Federal district court. See U.S. v. Guevara-Toloso, 2005 WL 1210982 at *2\n(E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005) (noting that § 3771's reference to \"the crime\" suggests \"a focus only\non the crime with which a defendant is charged in the case in which a victim seeks to assert her\nstatutory rights.\") (emphasis added) Since there has been no offense charged in Federal district\ncourt in this matter, the identified individuals necessarily do not qualify as \"crime victims\". In\naddition, the Attorney General Guidelines further defines a \"crime victim” as \"a person that has\nsuffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime.\n(-12 U.S.C. § 10607(e)(2))\" Id. As you know, we believe we have shown that at least some (if\nnot all) of the identified individuals did not suffer any injury at all in connection with Mr.\nEpstein's alleged conduct.'\nIn addition, under the Attorney General Guidelines, notification must be balanced against\nany action that may impinge on Mr. Epstein's duc process rights. The Attorney General\nCuidelines clearly call into question \"the wisdom and practicality of giving notice\" to a \"possible\nwitness in the case and the effect that relaying any information may have on the defendant's right\nto a fair trial.\" The Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, at 30. The\nAttorney General Guidelines caution federal prosecutors from providing notice to potential\nwitnesses in instances where such notice could compromise the defendant's due process rights.\nThis is particularly true, as here, if the notice includes confidential information, including the\nconditions of a confidential deferred-prosecution agreement or non-prosecution agreement. In\nlight of these concerns, wc respectfully request that you reconsider sending notices to the alleged\nvictims pursuant to § 3771.\nOur objection to § 3771 notwithstanding, we do not object (as we made clear in our letter\nlast week) that some form of notice be given to the alleged victims. To that end, we request an\nopportunity to review the notification before it is sent in order to avoid any confusion or\nmisunderstandings. We believe, however, that any and all notices with respect to the alleged\nvictims of state offenses should be sent by the State Attorney rather than your Office, and we\n1 See for example, our prior submissions regardin\nz and\nEFTA00214679\n", "char_count": 3030}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00214678", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "12/26/2007 14:46 FAX\nKIRKLAND&ELLIS\n1004/006\nDecember 26, 2007\nl'age 3\nagree that your Office should defer to the discretion of the State Attorney regarding all matters\nwith regard to those victims and the state proceedings.\nSecond, the more we work to resolve our mutual concerns regarding the § 2255\ncomponent of the Agreement, the more our growing fears are realized that the implementation of\n$2255 in this case is inherently flawed and becoming truly unmanageable. In the first instance,\nthe implementation of § 2255 in this matter causes manageability concerns because it appears the\ncivil component of this case must be stayed until after all phases of a criminal action have been\nresolved. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k), which codifics child victims' and child witnesscs' rights, seems\non its face to preclude any interference arising from a potential or pending civil action on a\nrelated criminal proceeding in order to protect a defendant's right to due process. The statute\nStates:\nIf, at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for damage or injury to\nthe person of a child exists, a criminal action is pending which arises out of the same\noccurrence and in which the child is the victim, the civil action shall be stayed until the\nend of all phases of the criminal action and any mention of the civil action during the\ncriminal proceeding is prohibited. As used in this subsection, a criminal action is pending\nuntil its final adjudication in the trial court.\n18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). See also, John Doe 1 v. Francis, 2005 WL 517847, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb.\n10, 2005) (\"the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) is clear that a stay is required in a case such as\nthis where a parallel criminal action is pending which arises from the same occurrence involving\nn:inor victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). Inasmuch as Plaintiffs have offered no authority or\nevidence to the contrary, the Court finds that the stay in this case must remain in effect until final\na ljudication of the criminal case by the state court.\")\nIt appears that any attempt to resolve the civil component of this case (be it through\nstructured settlements or civil litigation) may be precluded by § 3509(k) insofar as all phases of\nthe criminal action have not yet been resolved. To allow for a civil cause of action while a\nrelated criminal action remains pending can unduly bias the witnesses who could be improperly\nir ccntivized by a potential monetary recovery. The prevention of such a result is precisely the\nreason that $3509(k) was enacted. Indeed, there can be no such resolution of \"all phases of the\ncriminal action\" here, until Mr. Epstein's state sentence is concluded and all opportunity for the\ninitiation of a federal prosecution is forcclosed.\nIn addition, we have reiterated in previous submissions that Mr. Epstein does not believe\nhe is guilty of the federal charges enumerated under § 2255. For this reason, wc believe that\nyour proposed language regarding an appropriate § 2255 procedure unfairly asks Mr. Epstein to\nagree that each and every alleged victim identified by the Government is a victim of an\nenumerated federal offense under § 2255 and should, therefore, be placed in the same position\nEFTA00214680\n", "char_count": 3214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00214678", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "12/26/2007 14:46 FAX\nKIRKLAND&ELLIS\n005/006\nDecember 26, 2007\nPage 4\nshe would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted of such an offense. As we discussed last\nweck, it is this requirement that makes your § 2255 proposal so problematic. As much as we\nappreciate your willingness to revisit the § 2255 issues, we cannot accept your language as\nproposed, because we believe that the conduct of Mr. Epstein with respect to these alleged\nvictims fails to satisfy the requisite elements of any of the enumerated offenses, including 18\nU.S.C. § 2422(b) or 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). In light of the information we have presented to you\nregarding the two alleged victims whom we understand appear on your list, we hope you\nInderstand why your language presents us with these concerns. Essentially, you are asking us to\nhelp put these women in a position that may not be warranted.\nIn short, your proposed language regarding § 2255 states that Mr. Epstein should be\ntreated \"as if he had been convicted\" of an enumerated federal crime. This requires Mr. Epstein\nto in essence admit guilt, though he believes he did not commit the requisite offense. The United\nStates Attorney Manual (\"USAM\") 9-27.440, Principles of Federal Prosecution, sets forth a clear\nrequirement when a defendant tenders a plea of guilty but subsequently denies committing the\noffense to which he has offered to plead. Specifically, 9-27.440 provides, in part:\nIn a case in which the defendant tenders a plea of guilty but denies committing the\noffense to which he/she offers to plead guilty, the attorney for the government should\nmake an offer of proof of all facts known to the government to support the conclusion\nthat the defendant is in fact guilty. See also USAM 9-16.015.\nTo date, your Office has refused our requests to share such information with us. For the\npurposes of attempting to resolve the § 2255 issue, we once again request that your Office make\nthis proof available. Specifically, your Office has represented that liability exists under\n§ 2422(b) and § 2423(b), as well as the state offense, Florida Statute § 796.03. We would\nwelcome this previously sought information at your earliest convenience to enable us to resolve\ntl is matter in a timely fashion.\nFinally, I would like to address your request that we provide revised language to your\nOffice regarding the appropriate § 2255 procedure. Given the inherent complexities described\nalove, we have not been able to find language that comports with the Agreement and your stated\ngoals, especially given your insistence that the women be placed in the same position as if Mr.\nEstein \"had been convicted\". However, if you so choose and keeping in mind that we\n2 In addition, we remind you that wholly and apart from the judicial stay that appears to be required under\n§ 3509(k), we believe that the minimum damages amount referenced in § 2255 ($150,000) is subject to un ex-\npost facto molion, as the statutory minimum was $50,000 at the time of the alleged conduct and the statute is\nbeing implemented in a deferred-prosecution agreement.\nEFTA00214681\n", "char_count": 3083}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00214678", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "12/26/2007 14:47 FAX\nKIRKLAND&ELLIS\n1006/006\nDecember 26, 2007\nPage 5\nintend to abide by the Agreement we would be willing at you carliest convenience to discuss\npossible alternatives.\nThank you for your time and consideration. We remain available to work with you to\nresolve these difficult issues in a constructive manner, and we look forward to your response to\nThe concerns we have raised that have not yet been addressed by your Office.\nCC:\nSincerely,\nFully\nJay P. Lefkowitz\nFirst Assistant U.S. Attorney\nEFTA00214682\n", "char_count": 523}]}