{"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_count": 15, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00211543", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00211543.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 1 of 15 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE 1 AND JANE DOE 2, \nPlaintiffs \nI. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nDefendant \n \n/ \nINTERVENOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF \nHIS ATTENDANCE AT OR PARTICIPATION IN SETTLEMENT \nCONFERENCE \nIntervenor Jeffrey Epstein has requested that he be permitted to attend, \nthrough counsel, the settlement conference to be convened in this matter. With the \nadvent of settlement negotiations, these proceedings have reached the remedy \nstage, as it is unlikely that any meaningful settlement discussions can take place \nbetween the plaintiffs and the government without touching on remedy. Granting \nMr. Epstein, through counsel, the right to participate in the settlement conference is \nnecessary to effectuate Judge Marra's order granting Mr. Epstein's motion to \nintervene as of right at the remedy stage of these proceedings and Judge Marra's \ngrant of permissive intervention regarding the release of information falling within \nI \nEFTA00211543\n", "char_count": 1135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 2 of 15 \nthe grand jury secrecy protections of Rule 6(e). Mr. Epstein's participation within \nthe parameters established for him as an intervenor will further the overall \nobjective of the scheduled settlement conference: to reach an agreed remedy that \nwill resolve all issues in the above-captioned matter. \nTo the extent that the settlement conference discussions are limited to the \nissue of the government's liability—whether the government violated the \nplaintiffs' rights under the CVRA—Mr. Epstein's counsel's role would remain that \nof a non-participating observer who would not seek to interject himself into the \ndiscussions. When, however, the settlement discussions touch on issues relating to \nremedy, as they inevitably must, Mr. Epstein's counsel would, consistent with his \nrole as an intervenor, address such issues to the extent necessary to safeguard Mr. \nEpstein's pivotally important interests in avoiding invalidation of his \nnonprosecution agreement and the release of material protected by Rule 6(e), both \nof which are remedies which the plaintiffs have said they are seeking. See Jane \nDoe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Response to Government's Sealed Motion to Dismiss \nfor Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Doc. 127 at 14. \nIf plaintiffs still intend to pursue the remedy of invalidating Mr. Epstein's \nnonprosecution agreement, there are strong constitutional and contractual \narguments for maintaining the inviolability of that agreement that are common to \n2 \nEFTA00211544\n", "char_count": 1574}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 3 of 15 \nboth the government and to Mr. Epstein. There are equally compelling reasons \nwhy the nonprosecution agreement should not be invalidated that are personal to \nMr. Epstein and properly presented only by him, through counsel, at any settlement \nconference to be held in this matter. Unless and until the plaintiffs inform the \nCourt, finally and irrevocably, that they will no longer seek rescission of Mr. \nEpstein's nonprosecution agreement or the release of information protected by the \ngrand jury secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e), Mr. Epstein has a vital role to play in \nany settlement discussions to protect these important personal interests which are \nnot adequately represented by the government.' \nCase law, including the very recent decision of the United States Court of \nAppeals for the District of Columbia, United States'. Fokker Services ■., \nF.3d \n, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C.Cir. April 5, 2016), principles of both \nconstitutional law and contract law, and doctrines of constitutional avoidance and \nfairness all provide powerful reasons why any settlement of this matter should \nleave Mr. Epstein's nonprosecution agreement intact. Moreover, although \nI Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion in a recent pleading, see Doc 381, the identity \nof each of the Jane Does has been known to Mr. Epstein for many years in part as a \nresult of each Jane Doe's decision to delay the litigation of their CVRA claims in \norder to prioritize their parallel monetary damage lawsuits against Mr. Epstein \nduring which time their identities were disclosed and their depositions taken, see \npgs. 9-10 infra. \n3 \nEFTA00211545\n", "char_count": 1704}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 4 of 15 \nCongress recently broadened the CVRA rights to include protections for crime \nvictims when the government is negotiating plea agreements or Deferred \nProsecution Agreements (\"DPAs\"), which by their terms are predicated upon \nfederal charges set forth in a formal charging instrument filed in federal court, \nCongress did not extend the CVRA to include nonprosecution agreements, such as \nMr. Epstein's nonprosecution agreement in this matter, which by their terms \nnecessarily contemplate that no federal charges have ever been filed in federal \ncourt. \nI. \nBACKGROUND. \nOn July 8, 2013, Mr. Epstein filed his Motion for Prospective Limited \nIntervention at the Remedy Stage of These Proceedings (Doc. 207), which \nplaintiffs did not oppose. In that motion, he contended that he \"has a clear and \ncompelling interest in opposing any remedy that would entail rescission of his non-\nprosecution agreement.\" Id. at 1-2. That motion continued: \n[D]enying intervention to Mr. Epstein to litigate remedy will cause him severe \nprejudice, as the plaintiffs are asking the Court to invalidate a binding contract \nto which he is a signatory and which implicates his constitutional rights. Mr. \nEpstein entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the government and \nhas fully performed, to his detriment, his obligations under that agreement . . . \n. He has an intense interest in opposing plaintiffs' effort to set that agreement \naside and in presenting to the Court reasons why the agreement should not be \nrescinded which are personal to him, as opposed to the institutional \nconsiderations which the government has and may advance. \n4 \nEFTA00211546\n", "char_count": 1731}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 5 of 15 \nId. at 5. See id. at 8 (\"If [Mr. Epstein] cannot intervene to oppose [a rescission] \nremedy, he will be forced to stand on the sidelines while others litigate rights that \nare fundamentally important to him\"). Mr. Epstein also explained why the \ngovernment would not adequately represent his interests with respect to remedy: \nMr. Epstein and the government may share a common goal of opposing a \nrescission remedy, at least at the present juncture, but their interests, as well as \nwhat they would bring to the Court on the issue, vary substantially. The \ngovernment will (most likely) present general institutional reasons why non-\nprosecution agreements into which it has entered are binding on it and cannot, \nor should not, be rescinded. In contrast, in addition to the constitutionally-\nbased arguments which the government may advance, Mr. Epstein has, specific, \npersonal, and private interests in the non-rescission of this particular agreement, \nincluding his constitutional right to due process of law, . . . his detrimental \nreliance on the agreement and his full performance of his many obligations \nunder the agreement on the basis of that reliance. . . . Mr. Epstein's personal \nconstitutional and contractual rights in the matter should be before the Court in \nmaking its determination as to remedy, if the proceedings reach that stage, and \nthe government will not adequately represent those rights that are personal to \nMr. Epstein. \nId. at 9-10. The order granting Mr. Epstein's motion allowed intervention \"with \nregard to any remedy issue concerning the non-prosecution agreement in this \ncase.\" Order Granting Jeffrey Epstein's Prospective Limited Intervention at the \nRemedy State of These Proceedings (Doc. 246). \nOn July 26, 2013, Mr. Epstein filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of \nprotecting his interests in the secrecy of matters which occurred before the federal \ngrand juries o\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00211543/4 or ?id=EFTA00211543&page=4]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 6 of 15 \nThe materials to which the government has asserted the Rule 6(e) bar to \ndisclosure include materials which would disclose substantial portions of the \nevidence presented to the grand jury, both documentary and testimonial, and \ndraft indictments of Mr. Epstein, all of which relate to allegations now more than \nfive years old, of a highly sensitive nature which Mr. Epstein never had the \nopportunity to refute . . . . He has a profound interest in opposing the release to \nplaintiffs of this grand jury material, which can only redound to his severe \nprejudice and injury. \nId. at 4. That motion also explained at length why Mr. Epstein's individual \ninterests would not be adequately represented by the government. Id. at 6-9. Judge \nMarra granted the motion as a matter of permissive intervention, over the \nplaintiffs' objection, finding that Mr. Epstein \"has a legitimate interest in asserting \na claim that the grand jury material may be protected from disclosure by the \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).\" Order on Motion for Intervention by \nJeffrey Epstein (Doc. 256) at 1. \nII. \nTHERE \nARE \nCOMPELLING \nREASONS \nWHY \nTHE \nNONPROSECUTION AGREEMENT CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT \nBE INVALIDATED. \nA. \nThe Court Has the Discretion to Permit Mr. Epstein to \nParticipate in the Settlement Conference. \nA party may intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) if \"(1) the application \nto intervene is timely; (2) the party has an interest relating to the property or \ntransaction which is the subject matter of the action; (3) the party is situated so that \ndisposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or impair its ability to \n6 \nEFTA00211548\n", "char_count": 1744}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 7 of 15 \nprotect that interest; and (4) the party's interest is represented inadequately by the \nexisting parties to the suit.\" Chiles,. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. \n1989). In granting Mr. Epstein's motion to intervene as of right to protect the \nvalidity of his nonprosecution agreement, Judge Marra necessarily found that these \nprerequisites to intervention were satisfied, i.e., that Mr. Epstein has an interest in \nthe subject matter of the litigation—the preservation of his nonprosecution \nagreement—that is not adequately represented by the government. \nWhen, as is true in this case, settlement negotiations will inevitably lead to \nconsideration of the very matters as to which intervention was granted of right, the \nCourt certainly has the discretion to preserve and give effect to that right by \npermitting Mr. Epstein to attend and participate in such settlement negotiations as \nnecessary. \nAn intervenor's participation in settlement negotiations is not \nuncommon. See, e.g., Professional Firefighters Ass'n of Omaha, Local 385 \nZalewski, 678 F.3d 640, 647 (8th Cir. 2012)(noting that intervenors participated in \nsettlement negotiations); City Partnership Co. I Atlantic Ltd. Partnership, 100 \nF.3d 1041, 1043 (1st Cir. 1996)(noting that intervenors participated in settlement \nnegotiations); Su \nSiemens Indus., Inc, 2013 WL 3477202 at *3 (N.D.Cal. July \n10, 2013)(intervention allowed so that intervenor could participate in settlement \nnegotiations); United States \nGrand Rapids, 166 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1220 (W.D. \nEFTA00211549\n", "char_count": 1635}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 8 of 15 \nMich. 2000)(noting that intervenors participated in settlement negotiations); In re \nDiscovery Zone Sec. Litig., 181 F.R.D. 582, 601 (N.D. Ill. 1998)(intervention \nallowed so that intervenor could participate in settlement negotiations); United \nStates.. Maine Dep't of Transp., 980 F.Supp. 546, 549 (D.Me. 1997)(noting that \nintervenors participated in settlement discussions); Buchet \nITT Consumer Fin. \nCorp., 845 F.Supp. 684, 690-91 (D.Minn.), amended 858 F.Supp. 944 \n(D.Minn.1994)(intervention allowed so that intervenor could participate in \nsettlement negotiations). Indeed, at least one court has said that it has the power to \nforce intervenors to participate in settlement negotiations \"when those negotiations \ntake place before the Court in a court-ordered settlement conference.\" United \nStates' Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 2007 WL 2020246, at *3 (E.D. Ky. \nJuly 6, 2007). \nB. \nConstitutional Considerations: \nRecent Court Decisions and \nAmendments to the Statute Under Consideration. \nThis filing is not the time to fully brief and address the complexity of \nconstitutional and contractual reasons that, if the issue were being litigated, Mr. \nEpstein would contend mandate denial of any continued attempt to invalidate his \n2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement. Mr. Epstein and the government concur to the \nextent that each party contends that the CVRA cannot be construed to invalidate a \npure exercise of executive discretion such as the decision to enter into a \n8 \nEFTA00211550\n", "char_count": 1585}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 9 of 15 \nnonprosecution agreement. \nAs stated in a new federal circuit court opinion, \ndecided only two weeks ago, \"few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than \nthe exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to \ninstitute criminal proceedings . . . .\" United States'. Fokker Services a. \nF.3d \n, 2016 WL 1319266 at *5 (D.C.Cir. April 5, 2016), quoting \nI \nUnited States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.Cir. 1967). Fokker Services addressed the \nintersection of judicial and executive powers with respect to a deferred prosecution \nagreement and held, based on constitutional considerations regarding the powers \nconferred solely on the Executive, that the district court could not reject the \ndeferred prosecution agreement in that case based on its disagreement with the \nExecutive's charging decisions. Unlike a deferred prosecution agreement, which is \npredicated on federal criminal charges set forth in a formal charging instrument \nfiled in federal court, and, thus, confers at least some role upon the Judiciary, \nnonprosecution agreements are contracts exclusively between the government and \nthe defendant, are never filed with the federal court and by definition precede the \ninstitution of federal criminal charges. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, \nActing Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department \nComponents, U.S. Att'ys re: Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred \nProsecution Agreements and Non—Prosecution Agreements with Corporations \n9 \nEFTA00211551\n", "char_count": 1606}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 10 of 15 \n(Mar. 7, 2008) \nat note 2, available at http://www.justice.gov/usatn/criminal-\nresource-manual-163-selection-and-use-monitors (last visited February 26, 2016) \n(\"In the nonprosecution agreement context, formal charges are not filed and the \nagreement is maintained by the parties rather than being filed with a court.\"). \nThe government has absolute discretion to decide not to prosecute. ICC I \nBrotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 283 . . . (1987) (\"[I]t is \nentirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial \nreview.\"). Even a formal, written agreement to that effect, which is often \nreferred to as a \"non-prosecution agreement,\" is not the business of the courts. \nUnited States. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, \n2013)(emphasis added). The distinction between deferred prosecution agreements \nand nonprosecution agreements is embodied in the recent May, 2015 amendments \nto the CVRA, which added the right \"to be informed in a timely manner of any \nplea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement,\" 18 U.S.C.A. §3771(a)(9), but \nmade no mention of nonprosecution agreements, even though the federal \ngovernment then regularly entered into nonprosecution agreements and Congress \nwas surely aware of their existence. Congress's omission of nonprosecution \nagreements from §3771(a)(9), when it had the ability to include them in an \namendment whose purpose was to clarify the scope of the CVRA, is evidence of \nCongress's recognition that the deferred prosecution agreement (\"DPA\") and the \nnonprosecution agreement (\"NPA\") embody two very different scenarios. The \n10 \nEFTA00211552\n", "char_count": 1742}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 11 of 15 \nDPA, taking place after the filing in federal court of formal federal charges, is now \nundeniably subject to judicial supervision and the CVRA, and Congress amended \n§3771(a)(9) to make that point clear. An NPA, on the other hand, which precedes \nany filing of federal charges in federal court, represents the exercise of the \nExecutive's exclusive prosecutorial discretion prior to any judicial involvement \nand was thus excluded from §3771(a)(9) and coverage under the CVRA. Congress \nrecognized the plenary discretion given to the Executive, alone, by the Constitution \nover decisions regarding what, if any, federal criminal charges should be brought \nand that such decisions should not be subject to judicial review.2\nC. \nMr. Epstein's Personal Considerations. \nNot permitting Mr. Epstein to attend and participate if necessary in the \nsettlement conference would be fundamentally inconsistent with the reasons why \nintervention was granted in the first instance, as it would substantially compromise \nhis ability to protect his critically important interests in preserving his \nnonprosecution agreement and preventing the release of personally damaging \ngrand jury materials. \"Nonprosecution agreements . . . are contractual in nature, \n2 Where such grave constitutional concerns are present, the doctrine of \nconstitutional avoidance counsels strongly against construing the CVRA to permit \nrescission of a private individual's nonprosecution agreement as a remedy for \nviolation of its terms by the government. See, e.g., Clark'. Martinez, 543 U.S. \n371, 381-82 (2005); Brown'. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014). \n11 \nEFTA00211553\n", "char_count": 1742}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 12 of 15 \nand are therefore interpreted in accordance with general principles of contract law. \nUnder these principles, if a defendant lives up to his end of the bargain, the \ngovernment is bound to perform its promises.\" United States \nCastaneda, 162 \nF.3d 832, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1998). Mr. Epstein has fully performed each and every \none of his obligations under the nonprosecution agreement. To the extent that this \nremedy is addressed during the settlement conference, Mr. Epstein alone can fully \nilluminate the scope of his performance under his nonprosecution agreement and \nthe extent of prejudice that would result from any rescission. \nMoreover, Mr. Epstein alone can best explain the disregard for issues of \nfairness that would be sanctioned by permitting rescission in response to plaintiffs' \ndilatory prosecution of their claims in this matter. The action has been pending \nsince 2008, but plaintiffs knowingly sat on their CVRA claims for years while Mr. \nEpstein fully performed all of the penal, civil, and extensive monetary obligations \nof his nonprosecution agreement. At the beginning of this case, plaintiffs declined \nto proceed on an emergency basis just as Mr. Epstein began performing the \nnonprosecution agreement, and a month later specifically asked that this Court not \ninvalidate the agreement as they initially requested because \"it is likely not in [the \nplaintiffs'] interest to ask for the [rescission] relief that we initially asked for.\" Tr. \n8/14/08 at 4. So inactive were plaintiffs in this case that the Court dismissed the \n12 \nEFTA00211554\n", "char_count": 1658}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 13 of 15 \ncase for lack of prosecution in September, 2010. (Doc. 38). \nPlaintiffs thus \neschewed moving this case forward in favor of their pursuing, over at least the next \neighteen months, civil actions against Mr. Epstein prior to, rather than \nconcurrently with, litigating their CVRA rights. During this 18-month period that \nplaintiffs sought to keep the nonprosecution agreement intact in furtherance of \ntheir own interests, not only did Mr. Epstein fully perform the agreement's penal \nrequirements, but he paid millions of dollars in total to and for the benefit of \nnumerous civil claimants, including both plaintiffs, in satisfaction of his civil and \nmonetary obligations under the nonprosecution agreement. \nBecause of the formidable equitable considerations implicated by plaintiffs' \neffort to set his nonprosecution agreement aside, Mr. Epstein has an intense \ninterest in presenting to the Court reasons why the agreement should not be \nrescinded. These reasons are personal to him, as opposed to the more general \ninstitutional considerations which the government will likely advance. In order to \npreserve and give full effect to Mr. Epstein's intense personal interests, he must be \npermitted to advance his own contractual and equitable considerations at any \nsettlement conference in the event that the plaintiffs do not withdraw their current \nproposal to seek the invalidation of this now 8 'A year old nonprosecution \nagreement that he has fully performed. \n13 \nEFTA00211555\n", "char_count": 1576}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 14 of 15 \nCONCLUSION \nDeclining to permit Mr. Epstein to participate in the settlement conference \nwould be inconsistent with the intervention which was granted to protect his \ninterests in preserving his nonprosecution agreement and continued grand jury \nsecrecy. This Court plainly has the discretion to permit him to participate in the \nsettlement conference and should exercise that discretion. \nRespectfully submitted, \nBLACK, SREBNICIC, KORNSPAN \n& STUMPF, P.A. \nBy: \n/s/ \nROY BLACK, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar No. 126088 \nrblack@royblack.com \nJACKIE PERCZEIC, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar No. 042201 \njperczek@ rovblack. corn \nOn behalf of Jeffrey Epstein \nMARTIN G. WEINBERG, P.C. \n14 \nEFTA00211556\n", "char_count": 762}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00211543", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 385 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/22/2016 Page 15 of 15 \nBy: \nIs/ \nMARTIN G. WEINBERG, ESQ. \nMassachusetts Bar No. 519480 \nowlmgw@attnet \nOn behalf of Jeffrey Epstein \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was filed by my \noffice via CM/ECF on April 22, 2016. \nBy: \nIs/ \nROY BLACK, ESQ. \n15 \nEFTA00211557\n", "char_count": 370}]}