{"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_count": 80, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00210758", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00210758.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "WVVW.PATHTOJUSTICECOM \nOro Tam \nClass Attie., \nPersonal Injury \nWrongful Death \nCommercial Liogation \nFarmer, Jaffe, Weissing, \nEdwards, Fistos Et Lehrman, P.L. \nJanuary 29, 2015 \nWilfredo A. Ferrer \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of Florida \n99 N.E. 4th Street \nMiami, FL 33132 \nRE: \nJane Does I and 2 v. United States \nCase No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM \nDear Mr. Ferrer: \nAs you know, we have corresponded with you in the past on the Crime Victims' Rights \nAct case captioned above. And you met with Jane Doe No. 1 several years ago, promising (as \nwe understood it) to do what could be done to help protect crime victims' rights in this case. \nIt is in that spirit that we are writing to request your assistance on three motions that we \nare planning to make shortly in this case. We hope that you will be able to agree to all three \nrequests. We will be filing these motions on Friday, February 6, 2015. Accordingly, the favor of \na reply by Wednesday, February 4, 2015, is requested. \nI. Motion to Amend the Victims' Petition to Conform to Evidence. \nThe first motion will be a motion to amend the victims' petition in this case to conform to \nthe evidence that has developed. As you may recall, Jane Doe No. 1 filed her petition for \nenforcement of her rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, on \nJuly 7, 2008. See Exhibit 1. At that time, Jane Doe No. 1 and the other victs were unaware of \nthe existence of a non-prosecution agreement (NPA). After that day, the victims gradually \nbecame aware of the existence of the NPA, as reflected in Jane Doe's reply in support of her \npetition. See Exhibit 2. And in proceedings held over the next few months, Judge Marra ordered \nthat the NPA be made available to the victims. Unable to reach a stipulation with your office, in \n425 North Andrews Avenue • Suite 2 • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \n954.524.2820 office 954.524.2822 fax \nEFTA00210758\n", "char_count": 1931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Wilfredo A. Ferrer \nJanuary 29. 2015 \nPage 2 \nMarch 2011, Jane Doe No. I (and Jane Doe No. 2) filed a detailed motion for summary \njudgment, making a series of detailed allegations about the NPA and Government efforts to \nconceal it from the victims. See Exhibit 3. \nIn light of the course of litigation, it is now appropriate for Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe \nNo. 2 to amend their petition to reflect the existence of the NPA and the current theories being \npursued (by both sides) in this case. As you know, Federal Rule of Civil 15 allows for an \namended pleading to be filed, either on consent of the opposing party or with permission of the \nCourt. The rule also provides that \"[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice \nso requires.\" \nIn compliance with Rule IS, Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 are seeking your \nconsent to file the attached, two-page amended petition that conforms to the evidence and \ntheories that have developed since their initial filing. See Exhibit 4. As you know, the case is \nstill in a discovery phase. Your Office has not yet completed production of documents in the \ncase. None of the allegations in the proposed amended complaint go beyond the victims' \nexisting pleadings. See, e.g., Exhibit 3. We don't see any good faith basis for you to withhold \nconsent to the victims' first request to amend their petition to conform to the evidence. We hope \nthat you will consent. \n2. Motion to Add Two New Parties. \nA separate question is presented by Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2's request to add \ntwo new parties into the case. We had previously asked your consent for a motion by Jane Doe \nNo. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 to join the case. You declined to provide consent, and that matter is \nnow in litigation. Compare DE 280 (victims' motion to join) with DE 290 (government's \nopposition). \nWe are now asking your consent for a Rule 15 amendment of the existing petition that \nwould add Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 into the case. In particul\n... [truncated, 3257 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/1 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=1]", "char_count": 3257}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Wilfredo A. Ferrer \nJanuary 29, 2015 \nPage 3 \nCVRA enforcement action is an \"ancillary criminal proceeding[],\" DE 290 at 2, presumably not \ncovered by a statute of limitations applicable to a \"civil action commences against the United \nStates.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). \nEven more surprising to us was your Office's failure to discuss the second sentence in § \n2401(a), which provides that the six-year rule is not applicable to \"any person . . . beyond the \nseas at the time the claim accrues . . .\" Your Office sent FBI agents to Australia to interview \nJane Doe No. 3 in 2011, and clearly was aware that she was \"beyond the seas\" — and thus, under \nthe plain language of the statute, not obligated to file within six years. We don't see any good \nfaith basis for your Office maintaining that the six-year provision applies in light of its \nknowledge that she hiding from Epstein in Australia. \nBut to avoid further unnecessary litigation about such subjects, we hope that you will \nagree to a Rule 15 amendment to simply add Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 into the case. \nA Rule 15 amendment obviates statute of limitations concerns, because it \"relates back to the \ndate of the original pleading\" by \"assert[ing] a claim . . . that arose out of the conduct, \ntransaction, or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading.\" Fed. R. \nCiv. P. 15(c)(1XB). Jane Doe No. 1's initial petition plainly mentioned other victims. The \ninitial petition alleged that, \"[u]pon information and believe, [Jeffrey Epstein] is engaged in plea \nnegotiations with the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida \nconcerning federal crimes which he is alleged to have committed against minor children, \nincluding [Jane Doe No. 1].\" DE 1 at 1-2. Jane Doe No. l's petition went on to allege that the \nGovernment was violating not only her rights but the rights of other similarly-situated victims: \n\"On information and belief, rough the same crimes were committ\n... [truncated, 3965 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/2 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=2]", "char_count": 3965}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Wilfredo A. Ferrer \nJanuary 29, 2015 \nPage 4 \nabout the non-prosecution agreement.\"). Jane Doe No. 1 asked for the \"obvious remedy\" — i.e., \nthat the court \"declare the non-prosecution agreement illegal and direct that the Government \nproceed to negotiate a new agreement . . . in a process that respects [Jane Doe No. 1's] (and the \nother victims) rights.\" Id. at 12 (emphasis added). \nAfter filing the complaint, Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 followed up with a \nsummary judgment motion, on March 21, 2011, which raised very specific allegations about Jane \nDoe No. 3, i.e., that \"Jeffrey Epstein flew at least one underage girl on his private jet for the \npurpose of forcing her to have sex with him and others. Epstein forced this underage girl to be \nsexually exploited by his adult male peers, including royalty, politicians, businessmen, and \nprofessional and personal acquaintances.\" DE 48 at 4 (citing Complaint, Jane Doe No. 102 v. \nEpstein, No. 9:09-cv-80656-ICAM (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2009) (complaint filed on behalf of Jane \nDoe No. 3, identified as \"Jane Doe No. 102\")). \nIn light of all these facts, we believe that a Rule 15 amendment adding Jane Doe No. 3 \nand Jane Doe No. 4 is clearly proper and would \"relate back\" to the original filing, thereby \neliminating time-consuming litigation about statute of limitations issues. Courts have commonly \nallowed Rule 15 amendment that relate back in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Andujar v. \nRogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing addition of new plaintiffs even after a \nstatute of limitations had expired). \nWe write to you about this request, hoping that you will consider it not as an adversary of \nJane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4, but rather as their ally. As you know, the CVRA obligates \nall prosecutors to use their \"best efforts to see that crime victims are . . . accorded the rights [in \nthe CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1). We have come up with a Rule 15 amendment as a way to \naccord Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane D\n... [truncated, 3499 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/3 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=3]", "char_count": 3499}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Wilfredo A. Ferrer \nJanuary 29, 2015 \nPage 5 \nprotect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. \n24(a). Permissive intervention is allowed where an intervenor \"has a claim or defense that shares \nwith the main action a common question of law or fact.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Jane Doe No. 3 \nand Jane Doe No. 4 obviously have common issues associated with the current litigation. In \nparticular, they are seeking invalidation of the NPA to the extent that it bars prosecution of \ncrimes committed against them. They clearly meet the requirements for intervention. \nWe are making this request for non-opposition to Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4's \nmotion to intervene recognizing that just a few days ago your Office did not oppose a motion to \nintervene in the case by Alan Dershowitz. See DE 294 (\"The Government does not oppose the \nMotion for Limited Intervention by Alan M. Dershowitz.\"). \nIf your Office is not going to \noppose a motion by a suspected co-conspirator of Epstein's to intervene in the case, we trust that \nyou will extend the same courtesy to young woman who is alleging that he repeatedly sexually \nabused her. We ask for this courtesy particularly in light of our strong belief that your Office \npossesses evidence that will help corroborate her allegations — evidence about which your Office \nhas studiously remained silent. \nThank you in advance for your assistance on each of these three requests. \nIf you are \nunwilling to agree to any of these requests, the victims would request a telephone conference call \nwith you personally so that they could bring their concerns to your attention. \nVery truly yours, \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. \nBradley J. Edwards \nPaul G. Cassell \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah•\nBJE: mwk \nEnclosures \nThis daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is \nnot intended to imply institutional en\n... [truncated, 2216 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/4 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=4]", "char_count": 2216}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 EllackiLlt of DJ  D.C. \nELE\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \n08-80736-Civ-MARRA/JOHNSON \nCASE NO.: \nIN RE: JANE DOE, \nPetitioner. \nJULY 7, 2008 \nSTEVEN M. LARIMORE \nCLERK U.S. DIST. CT. \nS.D. or FLA. • MIAMI \nEtners ewe y VICTIM'S PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF \nCRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS ACT, 18 U.S.0 . SECTION 3771 \nCOMES NOW the Petitioner, JANE DOE (hereinafter \"Petitioner\"), by and through her \nundersigned attorneys, pursuant to the Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 \n(`•CVRA\"), and files this Petition for Enforcement in the above styled action as follows: \n1. \nPetitioner, an adult, as a minor child was a victim of federal crimes committed by \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN (hereinafter \"Defendant\"). \nThese crimes included sex trafficking of \nchildren by fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, use of a means of interstate commerce to \nentice a minor to commit prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, as well as wire fraud, in \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The Defendant committed these crimes within the jurisdiction of \nthe Southern District of Florida in Palm Beach County, Florida. \nI \nUpon information and belief, the Defendant is the subject of a federal criminal \ninvestigation conducted by the United States of America in the Southern District of Florida. The \nDefendant has recently been prosecuted and pleaded guilty, on June 30, 2008, in the Circuit \nCourt for Palm Beach County to various similar state offenses including solicitation of minors \nfor prostitution. \n3. \nUpon information and belief, the Defendant is engaged in plea negotiations with \nthe Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida concerning federal \nId w \nEFTA00210763\n", "char_count": 1794}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 2 of 10 \ncrimes which he is alleged to have committed against minor children, including the Petitioner. \nSuch negotiations may likely result in a disposition of the charges in the next several days. \n4. \nUnder the CVRA, before any charges are filed against the Defendant, the \nPetitioner has the rights (among others) to notice of her rights under the CVRA, to confer with \nthe prosecutors, and to be treated with fairness. As soon as charges are filed, the Petitioner has \nthe rights (among others) to timely notice of court proceedings, the right not to be excluded from \nsuch proceedings, the right to be heard at such public proceedings regarding conditions of \nrelease, any plea, and any sentence, the right to confer with the attorney for the government, the \nright to restitution, and the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for her dignity and \nprivacy. \n5. \nThe Petitioner has been denied her rights in that she has received no consultation \nwith the attorney for the government regarding the possible disposition of the charges, no notice \nof any public court proceedings, no information regarding her right to restitution, and no notice \nof rights under the CVRA, as required under law. \n6. \nThe Petitioner is in jeopardy of losing her rights, as described above, if the \ngovernment is able to negotiate a plea or agreement with the Defendant without her participation \nand knowledge. \nWHEREFORE, for the reasons outlined above, the Petitioner respectfully requests this \nCourt to grant her Petition, and to order the United States Attorney to comply with the provisions \nof the CVRA prior to and including any plea or other agreement with the Defendant and any \nattendant proceedings. \n2 \n2 Oa \nEFTA00210764\n", "char_count": 1808}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 3 of 10 \nMEMORANDUM \nI. \nTHE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT MAKES CRIME VICTIMS \nINDEPENDENT \nPARTICIPANTS \nTHROUGHOUT \nTHE \nCRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS. \nIn October 2004, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Crime Victims' \nRights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2251 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771). Because this \nappears to be the first case involving the Act to come before this Court, a bit of background may \nbe in order. \nA. \nThe CVRA Gives Crime Victims Rights to Participate in the Criminal Justice \nProcess. \nCongress passed the CVRA \"to give crime victims enforceable rights to participate in \nfederal criminal proceedings.\" Opinion at 14. Congress was concerned that in the federal system \ncrime victims were \"treated as non-participants in a critical event in their lives. They were kept \nin the dark by prosecutors too busy to care enough ... and by a court system that simply did not \nhave a place for them.\" 150 CoNG. REC. S4262 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). \nTo remedy this problem, Congress gave victims \"the simple right to know what is going on, to \nparticipate in the process where the information that victims and their families can provide may \nbe material and relevant ... .\" Id. \nThe CVRA gives victims of federal crimes a series of rights, including the right to notice \nof court proceedings, to be heard at plea and sentencing hearings, and to reasonably \"confer with \nthe attorney for the Government in the case.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). Victims also have a \"right \nof access to the terms of a plea agreement ... .\" In re Interested Party I, 530 F.Supp. 2d 136, \n2008 WL 134233 at •7 (D.D.C. 2008). The CVRA also assures victims broadly that they will \n\"be treated with fairness.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX8). \n3 \n30110 \nEFTA00210765\n", "char_count": 1856}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 4 of 10 \nOf course, these rights would be of little use to most crime victims unless they were told \nabout them. To ensure that victims are notified of their rights, the CVRA directs employees of \nthe Justice Department \"and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the \ndetection, investigation, or prosecution of crime\" to use their \"best efforts to see that crime \nvictims are notified of... the rights described [in the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (emphasis \nadded).1 \nB. \nThe CVRA Gives Victims Rights During the Investigation of a Crime. \nThe CVRA gives victims rights during the investigation of a crime. The Fifth Circuit \nrecently reached this conclusion, holding: \nThe district court acknowledged that Itihere are clearly rights \nunder the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.\" \nBP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at *11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893, \nat *36. Logically, this includes the CVRA's establishment of \nvictims' \"reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nGovernment.\" 1$ U.S.C. \n3771(a)(5). At least in the posture of \nthis case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other \nsituations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable \nway to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and \nto ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea \nbargain. \nIn re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5i)1 Cir. 2008). \nThe position that CVRA rights apply before charges have been filed is consistent with the \nJustice Department regulations under the CVRA, which explain that government officials \"must \nadvise a victim [about their rights under the CVRA] ... at the earliest opportunity at which it may \nbe done without interfering with an investigation.\" A.G. GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS \nI Further supporting this requirement is another statute, 42 U.S.C. § I0607(0(3). which directs government officials \nto provide victims with\n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/8 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=8]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 5 of 10 \nNWP \nASSISTANCE 23 (May 2005). And the plain language of the CVRA undergirds this conclusion, as \nit applies not simply to prosecutors but to government agencies \"engaged in the detection (and] \ninvestigation ... of crime ... .\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). Indeed, if there were any doubt, the plain \nlanguage of the CVRA extends victims' right to situations \"in which no prosecution is \nunderway.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX3). \nII. \nPETITIONER IS A \"VICTIM PROTECTED BY THE CVRA. \nUnder the CVRA the crime victim is defined as \"a person directly and proximately \nharmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense ... .\" 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(e). \nIn \nparticular, Defendant called Petitioner when she was a minor over a telephone (a means of \ninterstate communication) requesting that she perform a massage in exchange for payment. As \nDefendant well knew, that request was fraudulent, as he not only intended to receive a massage, \nbut also intended to have her perform sexual acts in exchange for a cash payment to Petitioner. \nOnly when Petitioner arrived at a Defendant's mansion as directed by Defendant, did Defendant \nreveal his true purpose of obtaining sexual favors in exchange for payment. This conduct \nviolated 18 U.S.C. § 2422, which forbids using a means of interstate commerce to knowingly \n\"induce\" or \"entice\" a minor \"to engage in prostitution.\" In addition, this conduct was both a use \nof \"fraud\" to obtain a commercial sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.0 § 1591, and use of wire \ncommunications to perpetrate a \"scheme and artifice to defraud,\" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § \n1343. \nIt appears obvious that Petitioner was \"directly and proximately\" harmed by these crimes, \nthereby making her a victim under the CVRA. It should be emphasized that the CVRA \"was \ndesigned to be a 'broad and encompassing' statutory victims' bill of rights.\" United States v. \n5 \n5 el 10 \nEFTA00210767\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 6 of 10 \nDegenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1342 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. S4261 (daily \ned. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)). Congress intended the CVRA to dramatically \nrework the federal criminal justice system. In the course of construing the CVRA generously, the \nNinth Circuit observed: \"The criminal justice system has long functioned on the assumption that \ncrime victims should behave like good Victorian children -- seen but not heard. The Crime \nVictims' Rights Act sought to change this by making victims independent participants in the \ncriminal justice process.\" Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal, 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. \n2006). Accordingly, because the CVRA is remedial legislation, courts should interpret it \n\"liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purposes and intent.\" \nElliott Industries Ltd. \nPartnership v. BP America Production Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting \nremedial legislation should be \"interpreted liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purposes and \nintent\"). The CVRA itself suggests this conclusion by requiring that courts must treat crime \nvictims with \"fairness.\" United States v. Patkar, 2008 WL 233062 at •3 (D. Flaw. 2008) (citing \nUnited States v. Turner, 367 F.Supp.2d 319,335 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). \nNot only must the CVRA as a whole be interpreted liberally, but its definition of \"crime \nvictim\" requires a generous construction. After reciting the direct-and-proximate-harm language \nat issue here, one of the Act's two co-sponsors -- Senator Kyl -- explained that \"Mills is an \nintentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected \n.\" 150 Cong. Rec. S10912 (Oct. 9, 2004) (emphasis added). The description of the victim \ndefinition as \"intentionally broad\" was in the course of floor colloquy with the other primary \nsponsor of the CVRA and therefore deserves significant weight.\n... [truncated, 2118 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/10 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=10]", "char_count": 2118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 7 of 10 \n'ter \nNoir \nThe definition of \"crime victims\" must thus be construed broadly in favor of Petitioner. \nShe obviously qualifies as a \"victim\" under the CVRA. \nIII. \nPETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF HER RIGHTS, AN \nOPPORTUNITY TO CONFER WITH THE PROSECUTORS AND \nTO BE TREATED WITH FAIRNESS. \nBecause Petitioner is a \"victim\" under the CVRA, she has certain protected rights under \nthe Act. Most important, the Act promises that she will have an opportunity to \"confer with the \nattorney for the Government in the case.\" To date, Petitioner has not been given that right. This \nraises that very real possibility that the Government may negotiate and conclude a plea agreement \nwith the Defendant without giving Petitioner her protected rights.2 \nPetitioner is entitled to have this conference with prosecutors before any final plea \nagreement is reached. The Fifth Circuit reached exactly this conclusion in a very recent case. In \nIn re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5ih Cir. 2008), the Government negotiated a plea agreement with the \nwell-heeled corporate defendant without conferring with the victims. When the Government's \nfailure was challenged in the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Government had \nindeed violated the CVRA. The Fifth Circuit observed: \"In passing the [CVRA], Congress \nmade the policy decision-which we arc bound to enforce-that the victims have a right to inform \nthe plea negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached.\" \nId. at 394. \nThis Court is obligated to protect the rights of Petitioner. The CVRA directs that \"[i]n \nany court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the \n2 On information and belief, roughly the same crimes were committed against several other young females. These \nvictims, too, are in danger of losing their right to confer under the CVRA. \n7 \n7 al 10 \nEFTA00210769\n", "char_count": 1998}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 8 of 10 \ncrime victim is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(bX1). The \nCVRA also confers on crime victims the right to \"assert the rights described in [the CVRA).\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771(O1). Therefore, this Court has its own independent obligation to intercede and \nensure that the Government respects the rights of Petitioner under the CVRA. \nCONCLUSION \nThe Petitioner requests the intervention of this Court to ensure that her rights are \nrespected and accorded, as promised in the Crime Victims' Rights Act. \nDATED this 7th day of July, 2008. \nRespectfully Submitted, \nTHE LAW OFFICE OF BRAD EDWARDS & \nASSOCIATES, LLC \nBrad Edwards, Esquire \nAttorney for Petitioner \nFlorida Bar #542075 \n2028 Harrison Street \nSuite 202 \nHollywood, Florida 33020 \nTelephone: \n954-414-8033 \nFacsimile: \n954-924-1530 \n8 \no 010 \nEFTA00210770\n", "char_count": 924}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 9 of 10 \nvI \nNet \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing h \nprovided by United States mail and via facsimile to: \nUnited States Attorney's Office, 500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400, West Palm Beach, \nFlorida 33401, this 7th day of July, 2008. \nBrad Edwards, Esquire \nAttorney for Petitioner \nFlorida Bar No. 542075 \n9 \nsato \nEFTA00210771\n", "char_count": 474}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "08-80LIPsgaWSR_PAAM!`,.1§9r1 \n...IS 44 tr... 2 \nntered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 \nCIVIL COVER SHEET \n&feta  oat \n D.C. \nELECTRONIC \n• he 1544 civ I cover sheet and the infonnamon contained herein neither replace nor suppkniont the filing and seivice of pkadings or whet papers a \nby local mks of :oat. Tins form. approwed by the Judicial Conference of 'he United Stales In Septanba 1974. is required for the use of the Clerk \ntX Civil cockei nett \nSEE INSTRUC TIOVS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.' \nNOTICE: Attorneys MUST Indicate All Re-Ned \nI. (a) PLAINTIFFS \nDEFENDANTS \n,e: 32tne Poe \n1/4 ,7-ed 5-6711-s- oi l\n(b) Cams) of Residence of Fire Listed Plaintiff  Aim dc' , \nMU CPT IN U S PLAINTIFF ('ASCII \n(C) Anomcfs 'Fun lament...60k aid r 9,401.099 /Oahe° \n&if \nOak \nt.8 \n6„,.../ 644,A dis # nIsstOe-f-e5 \n0021 hile,M-on Ctere# \n.fort ?en. \n161/ wood Fe \nS3020\nftCheck Cann)' Mx re Action Most 7 MIAMI. DADE \n3 MONROE \n3 Snow Amu \"(PALM BEACH \n7 MARTIN \n3 ST. LUCIE \n3 INDIAN RIVER \n3 OKEECHOBEE \nNIG HE ANDS \nJULY 7, 2008 \nSTEVEN M. LARIMOIM \nCLERK U.S• DIST. C7-\nS.D. OF FLA. - MIAMI \nCounty of Residence of Fins Listed Defendant \nS PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY/ \nNOTE: IN LA HD C ONDEM MA MON CASES. USE THE LOCATION OF THE TR NET \nLAND INVOLVED. \n1.727 ;;;;; \nkik\nAce e \nII. BASIS OF JURISDICTION \nopine.' -X\" in On Born Dan \nIII. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PA RTIESm \nen - X- se Om Barn lea Massif \n(For Dismay Cane Gab) \nad One lin for Inkodaen \n1: S. Lon cresern \n3 3 \n:Mon Qinsine \nIMF \nDEF \nPTV \nOEF \nPinson \nIC I. (acne lelefal vin a Parts' \nCilimoof We SUN \n7 \nI \n1 \nI \nlolonmase4 or Principal Pane \nofB amens Ie Iin9 sit \n7 \n44\n74 \ni\nrt, \nU.S Lo.osnero \n•• \nCoe Jan \n3 4 \nOnsersts \nCann orAgollm Sono \n3 \n2 \n7 \n2 \nI ***** *WM wd Pnropel nut \nef 0 in nen as In Antler Slate \n1 \n5 \n7 \n5 \nI Minim ( meant, of 0411.n in non HO \nCncv So-73 v ,let A eA 0 inso, \nCS,.. in Subject Me \nFenn' COMM \n3 \n/ \n3 \n) \n/onto Ninon \n1 \n6 \n1 \n6 \nL \nCONTRACT \nTORTS \nFORFEITURE/PENALTY \nFAN KRUPTCY \nOTHER STATUTES\n\" I\n... [truncated, 5903 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/14 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=14]", "char_count": 5903}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 1 of 17 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nIN IE.: JANE DOE, \nPetitioner. \nFILED by — \n- D.C. \nJUL 11 1 2101 \n51555N M. LAMM /RE \nCLERK V.S. 0150 CT. \n5.0. OF FLO, - \n05 \nVICTIM'S REPLY TO GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY PETITION \nFOR ENFORCEMENT OF CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 \nAND OBJECTION TO GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR SEALING OF PLEADINGS \nCOMES NOW the Petitioner, JANE DOE, by and through her undersigned attorney, \npursuant to the Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (\"CVRA\"), and files this \nReply to the Government's Response to her Emergency Petition for Enforcement and Objection \nto the Sealing of the Pleadings in this matter as follows: \nINTRODUCTION \nFour days ago (July 7ib), Petitioner filed in this Court a motion seeking enforcement of \n(among other rights) her right to \"confer\" with the prosecution before a plea arrangement is \nreached disposing of the criminal charges involving her — a right promised to her in the Crime \nVictims Rights Act (CVRA). See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5) (victims of crime have the \"reasonable \nright to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case\"). Two days later (July 91h), the \nGovernment sent her a notice that, in light of defendant, Jeffrey Epstein's entry of guilty pleas to \nvarious state charges and 18-month jail sentence, the Government had agreed to defer all federal \nprosecution — including any federal prosecution for the federal crimes committed against ler. \nThis deferred prosecution agreement was reached without conferral with Petitioner — or, indeed, \nwith the many other young victims of the defendant's crimes. And the agreement remarkably \nEFTA00210773\n", "char_count": 1804}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 2 of 17 \nal owed the defendant — a billionaire with extraordinary political connections -- to escape all \nfederal prosecution for dozens of serious federal sex offenses against minors. \nOn July 9th, the Government also filed with this Court a response to the Petitioner's \npetition for enforcement of her CVRA rights. In its response, the Government argues that it did \nnot need to confer with Petitioner because there was no formal \"court proceeding\" pending at the \ntime the Government negotiated this non-prosecution agreement. This position ignores the plain \nlanguage of the CVRA - which extends the right to confer to any \"case,\" not any \"co ort \nproceeding\" — and flies in the face of the Fifth Circuit's recent decision that is squarely on point - \nIn re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (51\" Cir. 2008). Perhaps in recognition of the weakness of its position, \nthe Government goes on to argue that it used its \"best efforts\" to comply the CVRA. But the \nGovernment never conferred with Petitioner about the agreement — so the Government's efforts \nfall well short of affording Petitioner her right to confer. Finally, the Government claims that it \ndisclosed some of its activities to Petitioner in this case (identified as \"C.W.\" in the Government's \npipers). But neither Petitioner nor undersigned counsel were ever notified of the proposed non-\nprosecution agreement. \nTo the contrary, undersigned counsel was advised that a federal \nindictment was in the works. For all these reasons, the Government's response lacks merit. The \nCourt should therefore declare the proposed non-prosecution agreement an illegal one. since it \nwas reached in violation of the CVRA, and order the Government to confer with Petitioner and \nthe other victims in this matter before reaching any disposition in this case. \nThe Government also apparently proposes to keep its activities in this case secret, by filing \ndocuments under seal. It bears emp\n... [truncated, 2181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/16 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=16]", "char_count": 2181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 3 of 17 \nbears a heavy burden in deviating from the ordinary rules, a burden it has not carried. There is no \nsound basis for keeping the pleadings in this matter sealed. Moreover, the matter is one of \nexceptional public interest — involving what appears to Petitioner to be a \"sweetheart\" non-\npr3secution agreement for multiple sex crimes against children committed by a well connected \nbillionaire. Accordingly, the papers in this case should be lodged in the Court's public file. \nI. \nTHE GOVERNMENT HAS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO \"CONFER\" \nBEFORE REACHING THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT. \nThe Crime Victims' Rights Act promises Petitioner that she will have \"(t)he reasonable \nright to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5) \n(emphasis added). \nTo justify its failure to confer here, the Government's lead argument in its \nresponse is that there was no \"court proceeding\" in this case that triggered Petitioner's right to \nconfer. Gov't Response at 1-2. The Government's position flouts the plain language of the \nCVRA. The CVRA guarantees to Petitioner the right to confer with prosecutors \"in the case' — \nnot in a \"court proceeding.\" Indeed, the fact that (as the Government notes) the drafters of the \nC`/RA used the term \"court proceeding\" elsewhere in the statute makes it obvious that they \nintended to give victims a right to confer that extended beyond simple court proceedings -- that is, \nthe right to confer about \"the case.\" \nObviously there was \"a case\" going on in this matter for some time. \nIndeed, the \nGovernment sent notice to Petitioner more than a year ago that 'your case is under investigation?' \nSee Letter from A. Marie Villafatia to C.W. at 2 (June 7, 2007) (attached to Governmen'.'s \nResponse) (emphasis added). The notice went on to tell Petitioner that \"as a victim and/or \nwitness of a federal offense, you have a number of rights.\" Id. at 1. \n... [truncated, 2140 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/17 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=17]", "char_count": 2140}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 4 of 17 \nPetitioner that \"if you believe that the rights set forth above [e.g., the right to confer and other \nCVRA rights] are being violated, you have the right to petition the Court for relief.\" Id. at I. \nIf there were any doubt that the drafters of the CVRA intended for its rights to extend to \npre-indictment situations, they disappear in light of the CVRA's instruction that a crime victim \nwio seeks to assert rights in pre-indictment situations should proceed in the court where the \ncrime was committed: The rights described in subsection (a) [of the CVRA] shall be asserted in \nthe district in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, (j no prosecution is \nundentuy, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). \nPetitioner noted the importance of this language in her opening \nPetition, see Emergency Victim's 5, but the Government chose not to discuss it in its reply. \nIn a case remarkably similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit has recently held that victims \nhave a right to confer with federal prosecutors even before any charges are filed. In In re Dean, \n527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008), a wealthy corporate defendant reached a generous plea ckal \nwith the Government — a deal that the Government concluded and filed for approval with the \ndistrict court without conferring with the victims. When challenged on a mandamus petition by \nthe victims, the Fifth Circuit held: \nThe district court acknowledged that \"[t]here are clearly rights \nunder the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.\" \nBP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at *11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS \n12893, at •36. Logically, this includes the CVRA's establishment \nof victims' 'reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nGovernment.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). At least in the posture of \nthis case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other \ns\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/18 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=18]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 5 of 17 \nAs we understand the Government's response, it asks this Court to decline to follow the \nFifth Circuit's holding and create a split of authority on this important issue. See Gov't Response \nat 2-3. Notably, the Government does not cite any cases supporting its position. Instead, the \nGovernment would have this Court deviate from the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion because \nthe Circuit's \"discussion of the scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the co Jrt \nultimately declined to issue mandamus relief\" Gov't Response at 2 (citing Dean, 527 F.3d at \n395). This is simply untrue. The Fifth Circuit faced a petition for mandamus relief from The \nvictims in that case, asking that a proposed \"binding\" plea agreement negotiated under Fed. R. \nCrim. P. 11(c)(l)(C) (i.e., a plea agreement obligating the judge to impose a specific sentence) be \nrejected. The victims asked for that relief because of the Government's failure to confer with \nthem before the charges and accompanying plea agreement were filed. The Fifth Circuit held t tat \nthe victims' rights had been violated in the passages quoted above. It then went on to remand .he \nwaiter to the district court for further consideration of the effect of the violations of the victims' \nrights: \nWe arc confident, however, that the conscientious district court will fully consider \nthe victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement should \nbe accepted. \nThe decision whether to grant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude that \nthe better course is to deny relief, confident that the district court will take heed \nthat the victims have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA and will \ncarefully consider their objections and briefs as this matter proceeds. \n527 F.3d at 396. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit could not have instructed the District Court to \"take \nhed\" of the violations of victims' righ\n... [truncated, 2212 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/19 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=19]", "char_count": 2212}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 6 of 17 \nCircuit did not directly quote three words found in the CVRA's right to confer — the words \"in \nthe case.\" See Gov't Response at 2. But the Fifth Circuit had received briefs totaling close to \n100 pages in that case and was obviously well aware of the statute at hand. Indeed, in the very \nparagraph the Government claims is troublesome, the Fifth Circuit cited to the district co art \nopinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. See United States v. SP \nProducis, 2008 WL 501321 at •7 (noting victims right to confer \"in the case\"), cited in In re \nDean, 527 F.3d at 394. \nThe Government finally notes that the Fifth Circuit properly stated that its ruling about the \nGovernment violating the right to confer applied \"in the posture of this case.\" 527 F.34 at 394. \nBit the posture of this case — at least in its relevant aspects -- is virtually identical to the posture \nthere. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government had an obligation to confer with the victims \nbefore charges ;sere filed and before a final plea arrangement Has reached. Without giving the \nvictims a chance to confer before hand, the plea agreement might be fatally flawed because it did \nnot consider the concerns of the victims. Thus, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the need to confer \nwith victims before any disposition was finally decided: \"The victims do have reason to believe \nthat their impact on the eventual sentence is substantially less where, as here, their input is \nreceived after the parties have reached a tentative deal. As we have explained, that is why ..ve \nconclude that these victims should have been heard at an earlier stage.\" Id. at 395. The posture \nin this case is exactly the same — the Government should have conferred before the parties \n\"reached a tentative deal.\" The fact that the deal reached here is slightly different than the deal \nreached in the Dean case (a non-prosecution agree\n... [truncated, 2161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/20 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=20]", "char_count": 2161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 7 of 17 \nthat case. At least the defendant there agreed to plead guilty to a federal felony. Here, the \nwealthy defendant has escaped all federal punishment — a plea deal that Petitioner would have \nstrenuously objected to . .. if the Government had given her the chance. \nThe Fifth Circuit's decision in Dean has been cited in one very recent District Court \ndecision, which provides further support for Petitioner's position here. In United States v. Rubin, \n2008 WI. 2358591 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), the victims argued for extremely broad rights under the \nCVRA. After citing Dean, the District Court agreed that the rights were expansive and could \napply before indictment, but subject to the outer limit that the Government be at lean \n\"contemplating\" charges: \nQuite understandably, movants perceive their victimization as having begun long \nbefore the government got around to filing the superseding indictment. They also \nbelieve their rights under the CVRA ripened at the moment of actual victimization, \nor at least at the point when they first contacted the government. Movants rely on \na decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that CVRA rights \napply prior to any prosecution. In United States v. BP Products North America, \nInc., the district court reasoned that because § 3771(d)(3) provided for the \nassertion of CVRA rights \"in the district court in which a defendant is being \nprosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in \nthe district in which the crime occurred,\" the CVRA clearly provided for \"rights ... \nthat apply before any prosecution is underway.\" (United States v. BP Products \nNorth America, Inc., Criminal No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321 at *11 (S.D.Tex. \nFeb.21, 2008) (emphasis in original), mandamus denied in part, In re Dean, No. \n08-20125, 2008 WL 1960245 (5ib Cir. May 7, 2008). But, assuming that it was \nwithin the contemplation and inten\n... [truncated, 2791 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/21 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=21]", "char_count": 2791}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 8 of 17 \nstage\" — to a point where the Government determined that crimes had been committed and that \nthe defendant should plead guilty to either a state or federal offense. \nFor all these reasons, the Court should follow the Fifth Circuit and hold that Petitioner and \nthe other victims in this case had the right to confer with the Government before it reached its \nnon-prosecution agreement. \nII. \nTHE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT USED ITS \"BEST EFFORTS\" TO COMPLY \nWITH THE CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS ACT. \nThe Government next argues that it has somehow used its \"best efforts\" to comply with \nthe CVRA in this case. Gov't Response at 3. The bulk of the Government's arguments concern \nvarous notices that it sent to victims. \nBuried in the middle of these arguments is the \nGovernment's stark concession that proves Petitioner's claim: \"[TJhe specific terms of thn \nnegotiation here not disclosed prior to a final agreement being reached because the Government \nbelieved doing so }maid jeopardize and prejudice the prosecution in the event an agreement \ncould not be made.\" Gov't Response at 6 (emphasis added). In other words, Petitioner — and the \nmany other victims of the defendant's federal sex offenses — was deliberately kept in the dark \nabout the fact that the Government was planning to reach a deal that would permit the defendant \nto escape all federal punishment in favor of an 18-month county jail sentence. This bald decision \nto conceal from the victims what was happening violated the basic premise of the Crime Victim's \nRights Act: that victims deserve to know what is happening in their cases. \nCongress was \nconcerned that in the federal system crime victims were \"treated as non-participants in a critical \nevent in their lives. They were kept in the dark by prosecutors too busy to care enough ... and by \na court system that simply did not have a place for them.\" 150 CONG. REc. 54262 (Apr. 22. \n2044) (statement\n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/22 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=22]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 9 of 17 \nright to know what is going on, to participate in the process where the information that victim \nand their families can provide may be material and relevant ... .\" Id. \nThe CVRA required the Government to confer with Petitioner and consider her views \nabout the proposed arrangement in this case. Indeed, the Government's own regulations require \nprosecutors to \"consider victims' views about prospective plea negotiations.\" U.S.DEP'T OF \nJUSTICE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIMS AND \nWITNESS ASSISTANCE 30 (2005). Congress obviously intended for victims to have a meaningfil \nrole in the criminal justice process. \nThe Fifth Circuit recently confronted — and rejected — a very similar claim from the \nGovernment that it did not need to meaningfully confer with crime victims. \nThere, tire \nGovernment's purported justification for failing to confer was the risk of pre-trial publicity to the \ndefendant. The Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed that argument, holding: \"Congress made the \npolicy decision -- which we are bound to enforce -- that the victims have a right to inform the plea \nnegotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached.\" Id. a \n395. In this case, too, this Court is \"bound to enforce\" Congress' decision that prosecutors \nconfer with victims before reaching a plea agreement. \nThe Government is not entitled to pick and choose which particular cases it will give \nvictims the right to confer. In support of its remarkable position, the Government cites a \nprovision in the CVRA that provides that \"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to impair \nthe prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.\" 18 U.S.C. \n§ 377I(c)(6). But the Government made the same argument in the Dean case - and lost. The \nFifth Circuit reversed the District Court decision that enforcing the right to co\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/23 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=23]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 10 of 17 \nprosecutorial discretion with the following statement: \"[Giving the right to confer to victims] is \nnot an infringement, as the district court believed, on the government's independent prosecutor al \nditcretion, . . . instead, it is only a requirement that the government confer in some reasonable \nwry with the victims before ultimately exercising its broad discretion.\" 574 \nMoreover, the Government's asserted justification for failing to confer is transparently \nflimsy. It asserts that, if the victims had been told that the plea agreement gave them advantages \nin civil litigation against the defendant, then that would have \"provid[ed] Epstein the means of \nimpeaching the victim witnesses . . . .\" Gov't Response at 5. But obviously the victims were \nalready subject to impeachment on that ground — even if no plea agreement was ever reached. \nThe defense attorneys presumably would have asked all of the victims at any criminal trial ahoat\nthe possibility that they could pursue civil litigation against the defendant if he was convicted. \nThe plea agreement did not change the obvious fact that a criminal conviction - whether by plea \nagreement or by jury trial - would facilitate civil claims by the victims of the defendant's crimes. \nIn light of all this, this Court should reach the obvious conclusion: The Government did \nnot use its \"best efforts\" to protect the rights of Petitioner (and the other victims) in this cane \nwhen it failed to confer with her about the non-prosecution agreement. \nIII. \nTHE GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONFER WITH PETITIONER. \nThe Government finally makes a factual argument about the state of negotiations in this \ncate. The brief discussion (see Gov'ts Response at 7-8) is somewhat vague. One short passage \nin the response, however, seems to assert that Petitioner was given some sort of notice about tF.e \nplea agreement about nine months ago. Gov't Response at 7 (\"in Octobe\n... [truncated, 2140 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/24 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=24]", "char_count": 2140}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 11 of 17 \nvictims.\"). \nIf the Government is asserting that Petitioner was told that a non-prosecution agreement \nhad been reached with the defendant as early as October 2007, Petitioner strongly disputes this \nalleged \"fact.\" To the contrary, undersigned counsel was told by federal prosecutors within the \nlast 60 days that a federal \"indictment\" was under consideration. \nPetitioner does not believe that the Government is truly asserting that she was told about a \nnon-prosecution agreement because, elsewhere in its brieC the Government makes the opposi:e \nassertion: IT/he specific terms of the negotiation here not disclosed prior to a final agreemex \nbeing reached because the Government believed doing so Mould jeopardize and prejudice the \nprosecution in the event an agreement could not he made.\" Gov't Response at 6 (emphasis \nadded). \nBecause of the confusion about what the Government is truly asserting, Petitioner \nrequests an opportunity to address the facts directly with the Court at the hearing. If necessary, \nPetitioner also requests leave of Court after the hearing to provide whatever supplemental \ninfbrmation (by way of affidavit or otherwise) that would be needed to prove that she was never \ntold that the Government was considering a federal non-prosecution agreement with the \ndefendant, much less given a chance to confer with the Government on this extraordinarily lenient \ndisposition. \nIV. \nTHE COURT SHOULD ENTER AN ORDER DIRECTING THE GOVERNMENT \nTO CONFER WITH THE PETITIONER BEFORE ANY NON-PROSECUTION \nAGREEMENT BECOMES FINALIZED. \nFor all these reasons, it is obvious that Petitioner's right to confer was violated in this \ncast. The question then arises as to the appropriate remedy. The obvious remedy is to declare \nEFTA00210783\n", "char_count": 1844}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 12 of 17 \nthe non-prosecution agreement illegal and direct that the Government proceed to negotiate a new \nagreement -- in a process that respects Petitioner's (and the other victims') rights. \nThe non-prosecution agreement here violates federal law. \nAs described by tie \nGovernment (the victims have not been even given the courtesy of a copy of the agreement), tie\nagreement prevents federal prosecution of the defendant for numerous sex offenses. Yet Cie \nagreement was reached without giving Petitioner her right to confer — a violation of 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(O5). \nWhen other plea arrangements have been negotiated in violation of federal law, they have \nbeen stricken by the courts. For example, United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1990, \nheld that where a sentence on a new crime could not run concurrently with a probation revocation \nthe defendant was then serving — contrary to the assumption of the parties to the plea agreement — \nthe defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement. \nThe Court \nexplained that the case was one \"in which the bargain is vitiated by illegality . . .\" Here, of \ncourse, exactly the same is true: the non-prosecution agreement is vitiated by illegally — namely, \nthe fad that it was negotiated in violation of the victims' rights. Other cases reach similar \nconclusions. See. e.g.. United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor agreed \nto recommend probation, but it now appears that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and \nthus the only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw the plea); Craig v. People, 986 \nP.2d 951 (Colo. 1999) (because \"neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to \nmodify or waive the mandatory parole period,\" such \"is not a permissible subject of plea \nnegotiations,\" and thus, even if \"the trial court erroneously approves of such an illegal bargain\" \nsuch plea is \"inv\n... [truncated, 2097 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/26 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=26]", "char_count": 2097}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 13 of 17 \nsome right to specific performance of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. See State v. Garcia, \n582 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement for 81 months sentence, but court added 10-year \nconditional release term because, under facts of case, a sentence without such release term was \n\"plainly illegal,\" and thus the remedy of specific performance not available); State v. Will, 348 \nN.C. 671, 502 S.E.2d 585 (1998) (plea agreement was for sentence to be concurrent with one not \nyet completed, but state statute mandates consecutive sentence on facts of this case; \"defendant is \nnot entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this \nstale\"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where \"the plea bargain seemed \nfair on us face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to circumstances beyond the \ncortrol of [the parties], namely the fact that one of the enhancement paragraphs was \nmischaracterized in the indictment, resulting in an illegal sentence far outside the statutory range,\" \nproper remedy is plea withdrawal, as \"there is no way of knowing whether the State would have \noffered a plea bargain within the proper range of punishment that he deemed acceptable\"); State v. \nMarzone. • \nW.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891 (2002) (where plea agreement was that defendant \nwould plead guilty to 2 felony counts of felon in possession of firearm and prosecutor would \ndismiss the remaining 6 counts re other offenses with prejudice, and all parties erroneously \nbelieved these 2 crimes were felonies, lower court \"correctly resolved this unfortunate \npredicament by holding that a plea agreement which cannot be fulfilled based upon legal \nimpossibility must be vacated in its entirety, and the parties must be placed, as nearly as possible, \nin the positions they occupied prior to the entry of the plea agreement\"). \nThis Court is obligated to\n... [truncated, 2183 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/27 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=27]", "char_count": 2183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 14 of 17 \ncrime victim is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)( I ). The \nCVRA also confers on crime victims the right to \"assert the rights described in [the CVRA].\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771(d)(I). \nObviously there is now a court proceeding before this Court in which \nPetitioner is asserting rights under the CVRA. This Court must therefore protect her rights 3),\ndeclaring the non-prosecution agreement invalid. \nV. \nTHE PUBLIC IS ENTITLED TO SEE THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATIONS \nFOR \nITS \nEXTRAORDINARILY \nLENIENT \nNON-PROSECUTION \nAGREEMENT. \nThe Government has also filed its pleadings in this matter under seal. There is no sound \nrerson for concealing from the public the Government's explanations in this matter. Accordingly, \nthe Government's pleadings should be unsealed. \nThe Government offers two explanations for sealing its pleadings. First, the Government \nclams that the pleading would reveal correspondence with minors. Gov't Motion at 1. But the \nGovernment has redacted the names of the minors involved (including Petitioner's name), so thee \nis no good basis for sealing. (Counsel does respectfully request that the Government double-\ncheck its redactions to make sure that no name has been overlooked.) Indeed, the very statute \nthat the Government cites (18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2)) envisions that minors' names will be redacted \nand then the remaining pleadings made available to the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2) (\"The \nperson who makes a filing [involving a minor] shall submit to the clerk of the court . . . the paper \nwith the portions of it that disclose the name of or other information concerning a child redacted, \nto be placed in the public record') (emphasis added). \nSecond, the Government asserts that its pleading should be kept under seal \"to maintain \nthe confidentiality of the agreement reached with an interested party.\" Gov't Motion at 2. \n14 \nEFTA00210786\n", "char_count": 1995}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 15 of 17 \nPetitioner believes exactly the opposite is true — confidentiality will undermine public confidence \nin the federal criminal justice system. \nThis case involves a non-prosecution agreement with a politically-connected billionaire \nthat has drawn considerable public attention. See, e.g., Palm Beach Post.Com, Banker Epstein \nPleads in Prostitution Case. Gets 18 Months (June 30, 2008) (\"He lives in a Palm Beach \nwaterfront mansion and has kept company with the likes of President Bill Clinton, Prince Andrew \nand Donald Trump, but investment banker Jeffrey Epstein will call the Palm Beach County jail \nhone for the next 18 months\"). \nThe public is entitled to know all of the circumstancas \nsurrounding this federal (non) prosecution. The public may well wonder — as Petitioner does in \nthis case — why a defendant who committed multiple sex crimes over an extended period of time \nagainst numerous minor victims is receiving only an 18-month jail sentence and a \"free pass\" fro n \nthe federal government. If the Government had conferred with Petitioner, she would have \nexplained why this proposed disposition did not begin to reflect \"the seriousness of the offense \" \n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). \nThe Eleventh Circuit has instructed that the district courts must make substantial findings \nbefore sealing records in cases before it. For instance, in United States v. Ochoa-Vasque, 428 \nF.3d 1015 (10 Cir. 2005), it reversed an order from this Court that had sealed pleadings in a \ncriminal case, emphasizing the importance of the public's historic First Amendment right of access \nto the courts. To justify sealing, \"a court must articulate the overriding interest along with \nfindings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was \nproperly entered.\" Id. at 1030. \nThe Government has not discussed the controlling court \nauthority on sealing orders, much less attempted to pr\n... [truncated, 2061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/29 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=29]", "char_count": 2061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 16 of 17 \njustifying sealing. For this reason, the Government's attempts to keep secret what has been done \nin this case should be rejected and its motion for scaling of its response denied. \nCONCLUSION \nThe Petitioner requests the intervention of this Court to ensure that her rights arc \nrespected and accorded, as promised in the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The Court should enter \nan order finding the non-prosecution agreement in this case was negotiated in violation of the \nCVRA and therefore is illegal and invalid. The Court should also deny the Government's motion \nto seal its pleadings in this case. \nDATED this Ilth day of July, 2008. \nRespectfully Submitted, \nTHE LAW OFFICE OF BRAD EDWARDS & \nASSOCIATES, LLC \nBrad Edwards, Esquire \nAttorney for Petitioner \nFlorida Bar #542075 \n2028 Harrison Street \nSuite 202 \nHollywood, Florida 33020 \nTelephone: \n954-414-8033 \nFacsimile: \n954-924-1530 \n16 \nEFTA00210788\n", "char_count": 995}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on Ft..SD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 17 of 17 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has born \nprovided by hand delivery in open court to the Attorney appearing on behalf of the United States \nAttorney's Office, this I I h day ofJuly 2008. \nBrad Edwards, Esquire \nAttorney for Petitioner \nFlorida Bar No. 542075 \n17 \nEFTA00210789\n", "char_count": 427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-I<AM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 42 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson \nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 \nv. \nUNITED STATES \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE ff2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF \nTHE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON \nAPPROPRIATE REMEDIES \nCOME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as \"the victims\"), by and \nthrough undersigned counsel, to move for a finding from this Court that the victims' rights under \nthe Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, have been violated by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office, and to request a hearing on the appropriate remedies for these violations. \nThe victims have proffered a series of facts to the Government, which they have failed to \ncontest. Proceeding on the basis of these facts,' it is clear that the U.S. Attorney's Office has \nrepeatedly violated the victims' protected CVRA rights, including their right to confer with \nprosecutors generally about the case and specifically about a non-prosecution agreement the \nOffice signed with the defendant, as well as their right to fair treatment. \nSee 18 U.S.C. \n3771(a)(5) & (8). \nIt is now beyond dispute, for example, that in September 2007, the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice formally signed a non-prosecution agreement with Jeffrey Epstein that barred his \nThe victims are contemporaneously filing a motion to have their facts accepted by the \nCourt. \n1 \nEFTA00210790\n", "char_count": 1515}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 42 \nprosecution for numerous federal sex offenses he committed against the victims (as well as \nagainst many other minor girls). Rather than confer with the victims about this non-prosecution \nagreement, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office and Jeffrey Epstein agreed to a \"confidentiality\" \nprovision in the agreement barring its disclosure to anyone — including the victims. For the next \nnine months, as Epstein was well aware, the U.S. Attorney's Office assiduously concealed from \nthe victims the existence of this signed non-prosecution agreement. Indeed, the Office went so \nfar as to send (in January 2008) a false victim notification letter to the victims informing them \nthat the \"case is currently under investigation.\" In fact, the U.S. Attorney's Office had already \nresolved the case three months earlier by signing the non-prosecution agreement. Again on May \n30, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent yet another victim notification letter to a recognized \nvictim informing her that the \"case is currently under investigation\" and that it \"can be a lengthy \nprocess and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation.\" \nThen in June 2008, on the eve of consummating Epstein's state guilty plea that was part of the \nnon-prosecution agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office asked legal counsel for the victims to \nsend a letter expressing the victims' views on why federal charges should be filed — not \ndisclosing to the victims' legal counsel that this was a pointless exercise because the non-\nprosecution agreement had already been signed some nine months earlier. \nThese actions and many more like them constitute clear violations of Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe #2's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act, including the right to confer with \nprosecutors and the right to fair treatment The only argument that the U.S. Attorney's Office \nadvances is that the CVRA does not \n... [truncated, 2173 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/33 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=33]", "char_count": 2173}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-1<AM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 42 \n3771(c)(1) (Justice Department agencies involved in the \"detection\" and \"investigation\" of \nfederal crimes covered by CVRA), and with persuasive case law, see, e.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d \n391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (victims should have been notified before pre-indictment plea reached). \nMoreover, the U.S. Attorney's Office itself was fully aware of its obligations to notify the \nvictims in this case, as e-mails from the Office and other evidence make perfectly clear. The \nonly reason that the Office concealed the existence of the non-prosecution agreement from the \nvictims was not to comply with some legal restriction, but rather to avoid a firestorm of public \ncontroversy that would have erupted if the sweetheart plea deal with a politically-connected \nbillionaire had been revealed. \nThe Court should accordingly find that the U.S. Attorney's Office — in coordination with \nJeffrey Epstein -- has violated the Act and set a briefing schedule and hearing on the proper \nremedy for those violations. \nSTATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 offer the following statement of undisputed material facts. \nIf the Government disputes any of these facts, the victims request an evidentiary hearing to prove \neach and every one of them:2\n1. Between about 2001 and 2007, defendant Jeffrey Epstein (a billionaire with significant \npolitical connections) sexually abused more than 30 minor girls at his mansion in West Palm \n2 The Court should accept all these facts as true for reasons the victims explain in their \ncontemporaneously-filed Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion to Have Their Facts Accepted \nBecause of the Government's Failure to Contest Any of The Facts. The Court should also direct \nthe Government to produce all evidence that it possesses supporting these facts, for reasons the \nvictims explain in their contemporaneously-filed Jane Doe NI and Jane Doe #2's Motion fo\n... [truncated, 2098 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/34 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=34]", "char_count": 2098}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 42 \nBeach, Florida, and elsewhere. Among the girls he sexually abused were Jane Doe #1 and Jane \nDoe #2. Epstein performed repeated lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts on them, including (but \nnot limited to) masturbation, touching of their sexual organs, using vibrators or sexual toys on \nthem, coercing them into sexual acts, and digitally penetrating them. Because Epstein used a \nmeans of interstate commerce and knowingly traveled in interstate commerce to engage in abuse \nof Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (and the other victims), he committed violations of federal law, \nincluding repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. See, e.g., Complaint, E.W. v. Epstein, Case \nNo. 50 2008 CA 028058 XXXXMB AB (15th Cir. Palm Beach County, Florida); Complaint, \nL.M. v. Epstein, Case No 50 2008 CA 028051 XXXXMB AB (15th Cir. Palm Beach Count, \nFlorida). \n2. Jeffrey Epstein flew at least one underage girl on his private jet for the purpose of \nforcing her to have sex with him and others. Epstein forced this underage girl to be sexually \nexploited by his adult male peers, including royalty, politicians, businessmen, and professional \nand personal acquaintances. Complaint, Jane Doe No. 102 v. Epstein, No. 9:09-CV-80656-\nKAM (S.D. Ha. May 1, 2009). \n3. In 2006, at the request of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Federal Bureau of \nInvestigation opened an investigation into allegations that Jeffrey Epstein and his personal \nassistants had used facilities of interstate commerce to induce young girls between the ages of \nthirteen and seventeen to engage in prostitution, among other offenses. The case was presented \nto the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, which accepted the \ncase for investigation. The Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office was also investigating \nEFTA00210793\n", "char_count": 1906}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:O8-cv-8O736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 42 \nthe case. See generally U.S. Attorney's Correspondence, Exhibit \"A\" to this filing (hereinafter \ncited as \"U.S. Attorney's Correspondence\" and referenced by Bates page number stamp). \n4. The FBI soon determined that both Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were victims of \nsexual assaults by Epstein while they were minors beginning when they were approximately \nfourteen years of age and approximately thirteen years of age respectively. Jane Doe #1, for \nexample, provided detailed information about her abuse (and the abuse of Jane Doe #2) to the \nFBI on August 7, 2007. Exhibit \"B.\" \n5. More generally, the FBI through diligent investigation established that Epstein \noperated a large criminal enterprise that used paid employees and underlings to repeatedly find \nand bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert as part of the enterprise with others, \nincluding Ghislane Maxwell and Jean Luc Brunel, to obtain minor girls not only for his own \nsexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others. The FBI determined that \nEpstein had committed dozens and dozens of federal sex crimes against dozens of minor girls \nbetween 2001 and 2007. They presented information to the U.S. Attorney's Office for criminal \nprosecution. See Exhibit \"B\"; U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 47-55. \n6. On about June 7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #1 a standard CVRA \nvictim notification letter. The notification promised that the Justice Department would makes its \n\"best efforts\" to protect Jane Doe #1's rights, including \"(t]he reasonable right to confer with the \nattorney for the United States in the case\" and \"to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding \nin the district court involving . \nplea . ...\" The notification further explained that \"fejt this \ntime, your case is under investigation.\" That notification meant that the FBI had identified Jane \nDoe #1 as a victim of a federal\n... [truncated, 2076 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/36 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=36]", "char_count": 2076}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 42 \nrelied on these representations and believed that the Justice Department would protect these \nrights and keep her informed about the progress of her case. See Exhibit \"C.\" \n7. On about August 11, 2007, Jane Doe #2 received a standard CVRA victim notification \nletter. The notification promised that the Justice Department would makes its \"best efforts\" to \nprotect Jane Doe #2's rights, including \"[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nUnited States in the case\" and \"to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district \ncourt involving ... plea .. ..\" The notification further explained that \"[a]t this time, your case is \nunder investigation.\" That notification meant that the FBI had identified Jane Doe #2 as a victim \nof a federal offense and as someone protected by the CVRA. Jane Doe #2 relied on these \nrepresentations and believed that the Justice Department would protect these rights and keep her \ninformed about the progress of her case. See Exhibit \"D.\" \n8. Early in the investigation, the FBI agents and an Assistant U.S. Attorney had several \nmeetings with Jane Doe #I. Jane Doe #2 was represented by counsel that was paid for by the \ncriminal target Epstein and, accordingly, all contact was made through that attorney. \n9. In and around September 2007, plea discussions took place between Jeffrey Epstein, \nrepresented by numerous attorneys (including lead criminal defense counsel Jay Lefkowitz), and \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, represented by Assistant U.S. \nAttorney A. Marie Villafafia and others. The plea discussions generally began from the premise \nthat Epstein would plead guilty to at least one federal felony offense surrounding his sexual \nassaults of more than 30 minor girls. From there, the numerous defense attorneys progressively \nnegotiated more favorable terms so that Epstein would ultimately plead to only \n... [truncated, 2033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/37 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=37]", "char_count": 2033}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 42 \nfelony offenses and would serve only county jail time. Many of the negotiations are reflected in \ne-mails between Lefkowitz and the U.S. Attorney's Office. See generally Exhibit \"A.\" \n10. \nThe evidence supporting these \ncharges was overwhelming, including the interlocking consistent testimony of several dozen \nminor girls, all made automatically admissible in a federal criminal sexual assault prosecution by \noperation of Fed. R. Evid. 414. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 4. \n12. The correspondence also shows that the U.S. Attorney's Office was interested in \nfinding a place to conclude a plea bargain that would effectively keep the victims from learning \nwhat was happening through the press. The Office wrote in an e-mail to defense counsel:' \nThe \n7 \nEFTA00210796\n", "char_count": 859}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Office was aware that most of the victims of Epstein, including Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe #2, resided well outside the Miami area in the West Palm Beach area. The Office was \nalso aware that the chances of press coverage of a case filed in Miami would be significantly less \nlikely to reach the;Palm Beach area. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 29. \n13. On about September 24, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Jay \nLefkowitz, criminal defense counsel for Epstein, regarding the agreement. The e-mail stated that \nthe Government and Epstein's counsel \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 153 (emphases added). \n14. On about September 25, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz \nstating:\nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 156. \n15. On about September 26, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz \nin which she stated: illiMallan \n8 \nEFTA00210797\n", "char_count": 1003}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 42 \nApparently the lillegreed \nto between the Government and Epstein's \ndefense counsel was that no mention would be made of the non-prosecution agreement between \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office and Epstein, as no subsequent mention was made to the victims of the \nnon-prosecution agreement and a confidentiality provision was made part of that agreement (as \ndiscussed below). U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 359. \n16. On about September 25, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter to Jay Jefkowitz \nin which it suggested that the victims should be represented in civil cases against Epstein by \nsomeone who was not an experienced \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 157. The U.S. Attorney's Office continued to \npush a different attorney in part because it would reduce publicity, explaining that \nId. \n17. On about September 24, 2007, Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office formally \nreached an agreement whereby the United States would defer federal prosecution in favor of \nprosecution by the State of Florida. Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office accordingly entered \ninto a \"Non-Prosecution Agreement\" (NPA) reflecting their agreement. Most significantly, the \nNPA gave Epstein a promise that he would not be prosecuted for a series of federal felony \noffenses involving his sexual abuse of more than 30 minor girls. The NPA instead allowed \nEpstein to plead guilty to two state felony offenses for solicitation of prostitution and \n9 \nEFTA00210798\n", "char_count": 1541}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 42 \nprocurement of minors for prostitution. The NPA also set up a procedure whereby a victim of \nEpstein's sexual abuse could obtain an attorney to proceed with a civil claim against Epstein, \nprovided that the victim agreed to limit damages sought from Epstein. To obtain an attorney \npaid for by Epstein, the victim would have to agree to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § \n2255 (i.e., under a law that provided presumed damages of $150,000 against Epstein — an \namount that Epstein argued later was limited to $50,000). The agreement was signed by Epstein \nand his legal counsel, as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office, on about September 24, 2007. Non-\nProsecution Agreement, Exhibit \"E.\" \nIS. Epstein insisted on, and the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed to, a provision in the non-\nprosecution agreement that made the agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: \"The \nparties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United \nStates receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding \nthe disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making the disclosure.\" \nBy entering into such a confidentiality agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office put itself in a \nposition that conferring with the crime victims (including Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) about \nthe non-prosecution agreement would violate terms of the agreement — specifically the \nconfidentiality provision. Indeed, even notifying the victims about the agreement would \npresumably have violated the provision. Accordingly, from September 24, 2007 through at least \nJune 2008 — a period of more than nine months -- the U.S Attorney's Office did not notify any of \nthe victims of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement. Epstein was well aware of this \nfailure to notify the victims and, indeed, arranged for this failure to notify the victims. \n... [truncated, 2028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/41 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=41]", "char_count": 2028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 11 of 42 \nAttorney's Correspondence at 270; Transcript of Hearing in this case on July 11, 2008, at 4-6, \n18-19, 22-23, 28-29 (hereinafter cited as \"'Tr. July 11, 2008\"). \n19. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the U.S. Attorney's Office — pushed \nby Epstein — wanted the non-prosecution agreement kept from public view because of the intense \npublic criticism that would have resulted from allowing a politically-connected billionaire who \nhad sexually abused more than 30 minor girls to escape from federal prosecution with only a \ncounty court jail sentence. Another reasonable inference is that the Office wanted the agreement \nconcealed at this time because of the possibility that the victims could have objected to the \nagreement in court and perhaps convinced the judge reviewing the agreement not to accept it. \n20. The Non-Prosecution Agreement that had been entered into between the U.S. \nAttorney's Office and Epstein was subsequently modified by an October 2007 Addendum and a \nDecember 19, 2007, letter from the U.S. Attorney to Attorney Lilly Ann Sanchez. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office did not confer with any of the victims about these modifications of the \nagreement (or even notify them of the existence of these modifications) through at least June \n2008 — a period of more than six months. See Supplemental Declaration of A. Marie Villafafia \n(doc. #35, at 1); U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 234-37; Tr. July 11, 2008, 18-19, 22-23, 28-\n29.3\n21. In October 2007, shortly after the initial plea agreement was signed, FBI agents \ncontacted Jane Doe #1. On October 26, 2007, \nn\net in person with Jane Doe #1. The Special Agents explained that Epstein would \n3 On about August 14, 2008, Epstein's defense counsel told the U.S. Attorney's Office \nthat they did not consider the December 19, 2007, letter to be operative. \n1! \nEFTA00210800\n", "char_count": 1944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 12 of 42 \nplead guilty to state charges involving another victim, he would be required to register as a sex \noffender for life, and he had made certain concessions related to the payment of damages to the \nvictims, including Jane Doe #1. During this meeting, the Special Agents did not explain that an \nagreement had already been signed that precluded any prosecution of Epstein for federal charges \nagainst Jane Doe #1. The agents could not have revealed this part of the non-prosecution \nagreement without violating the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. Whether the agents \n• themselves had been informed of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office is not certain. Because the plea agreement had already been reached with \nEpstein, the agents made no attempt to secure Jane Doe #1's view on the proposed resolution of \nthe case. Exhibit \"E,\" Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23. \n22. Jane Doe /Ws (quite reasonable) understanding of the Special Agent's explanation \nwas that only the State part of the Epstein investigation had been resolved, and that the federal \ninvestigation would continue, possibly leading to a federal prosecution. Jane Doe #1 also \nunderstood tier own case was move forward towards possible prosecution. Tr. July 11, 2008, at \n4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 28-29. \n23. On about November 27, 2007, Assistant U.S. Attorney \nsent an e-mail to \nJay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein. The e-mail stated that the U.S. Attorney's Office \nhad an obligation to notify the victims \n12 \nEFTA00210801\n", "char_count": 1630}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 13 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 (emphasis rearranged). \n24. On about November 29, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a draft of a crime victim \nnotification letter to Jay Leflcowitz, defense counsel for Jeffrey Epstein. The notification letter \nwould have explained: \nThe letter then would have gone on to explain \nthat Epstein would \nThe \nletter would not have explained that, as part of the agreement with Epstein, the Justice \nDepartment had previously agreed not to prosecute Epstein for any of the numerous federal \noffenses that had been committed. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 256-59. \n25. Because of concerns from Epstein's attorneys, the U.S. Attorney's Office never sent \nthe proposed victim notification letter discussed in the previous paragraph to the victims. \nInstead, a misleading letter stating that the case was \"currently under investigation\" (described \nbelow) was sent in January 2008 and May 2008. At no time before reaching the non-prosecution \nagreement did the Justice Department notify any victims, including for example Jane Doe #I, \nabout the non-prosecution agreement. The victims were therefore prevented from exercising \ntheir CVRA right to confer with prosecutors about the case and about the agreement. Epstein \n13 \nEFTA00210802\n", "char_count": 1361}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 14 of 42 \nwas aware of these violations of the CVRA and, indeed, pressured the U.S. Attorney's Office to \ncommit these violations. Tr. July 11, 2008, at 9. \n26. On about December 6, 2007, Jeffrey H. =, \nFirst Assistant U.S. Attorney sent a \nletter to Jay Lefkowitz, noting the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims \ninformed of thellEll==MI \nThe letter stated: \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added). \n27. Despite this recognition of its obligation to keep victims \nabout the non-prosecution agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office did not follow through and \ninform the victims of the non-prosecution agreement. To the contrary, as discussed below, it \ncontinued to tell the victims that the case was \"under investigation.\" Tr. July 11, 2008, at 4-5, \n18-19, 22-29. \n28. On December 13, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter to Jay Lefkowitz, \ndefense counsel for Epstein, rebutting allegations that had apparently been made against the \n14 \nEFTA00210803\n", "char_count": 1079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 15 of 42 \nAUSA handling the case by the Epstein defense team. (The Justice Department concluded the \nallegations were meritless.) The letter stated that a federal indictment against Epstein a t\nThe letter also recounted \nthat \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 269. \n29. The December 13, 2007, letter also reveals that the Justice Department stopped \nmaking victim notifications because of \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 270 (emphasis added). It was a \ndeviation from the Justice Department's standard practice to negotiate with defense counsel \nabout the extent of crime victim notifications. \n30. The December 13, 2007, letter also demonstrates that the Justice Department was well \naware of who the victims of Epstein's sexual offenses were. The Justice Department was \nprepared to make notifications to the victims, but suspended those notifications only because \nobjections from defense counsel. Id. \n31. The December 13, 2007, letter reveals it would have been possible to confer with the \nvictims about the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The U.S. Attorney's Office was fully able to \n15 \nEFTA00210804\n", "char_count": 1183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 16 of 42 \nconfer with Epstein's counsel about the parameters of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but \nrefused to confer with Epstein's victims about the Agreement. Id. \n32. Following the signing of the Agreement and the modifications thereto, Epstein's \nperformance was delayed while he sought higher level review within the Department of Justice. \nSee U.S. Attorney's Correspondence passirn. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that \nEpstein used his significant political and social connections to lobby the Justice Department to \navoid significant federal prosecution. The Justice Department has in its possession internal \ndocuments (i.e., phone logs, emails, etc.) that would reveal the event of those lobbying efforts. \nThe Justice Department, however, has refused to make these materials available to the victims. \n33. On January 10, 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 received letters from the FBI \nadvising them that \"[Obis case is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process \nand we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation.\" Exhibits \n\"F\" & \"G.\" The statement in the notification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. The case \nwas not currently \"under investigation.\" To the contrary, the federal cases involving Jane Doe \n#1 and Jane Doe #2 had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement entered into by Epstein \nand the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Moreover, the FBI did not notify Jane Doe \n#1 or Jane Doe #2 that a plea agreement had been reached previously, and that part of the \nagreement was a non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida. Exhibit \"E.\" Whether the FBI was aware of this fact at this time is unclear. \nIn any event, the FBI was acting at the direction of the U.S. Attorney's Office, which clearly did \nnot confer with Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 about the cas\n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/47 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=47]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 17 of 42 \nthese actions of the U.S. Attorney's Office and, indeed, solicited these actions of the U.S. \nAttorney's Office. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92, 270. \n34. Jane Doe NI and Jane Doe #2 relied on the representations of the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice to their detriment. Had they known the true facts of the case — i.e., that Epstein had \nnegotiated a non-prosecution agreement — they would have taken steps to object to that \nagreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 28-29. \n35. Undersigned counsel believes that the FBI was lead to believe that their investigation \nof Epstein was going to lead to a federal criminal prosecution and that the FBI was also mislead \nby the U.S. Attorney's office about the status of the case. \n36. In early 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 believed that criminal prosecution of \nEpstein was extremely important. They also desired to be consulted by the FBI and/or other \nrepresentatives of the federal government about the prosecution of Epstein. In light of the letters \nthat they had received around January 10, they believed that a criminal investigation of Epstein \nwas on-going — including investigation into Epstein's crimes against them — and that they would \nbe contacted before the federal government reached any final resolution of that investigation. Tr. \nJuly 11, 2008, at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 2.8-29. \n37. On January 31, 2008, Jane Doe #1 met with FBI Agents and AUSA's from the U.S. \nAttorney's Office. She provided additional details of Epstein's sexual abuse of her. The \nAUSA's did not disclose to Jane Doe #I at this meeting (or any other meeting) that they had \nalready negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Exhibit \"H.\" \n38. On about February 25, 2008, \nsent an e-mail to Jay \nLefkowitz, Epstein's criminal defense counsel, explaining that the Justice Department's Child \n17 \nEFTA00210806\n", "char_count": 1946}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 18 of 42 \nExploitation Obscenity Section (CEOS) had agreed to review Epstein's objections to the \nproposed plea agreement that had been reached with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida. The letter indicated that, should CEOS reject Epstein's objections to the \nagreement, then \nU.S. Attorneys Correspondence at 290-91. \n39. On May 30, 2008, another of Mr. Edwards's clients who was recognized as an Epstein \nvictim by the U.S. Attorney's Office, received a letter from the FBI advising her that \"folds case \nrs currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued \npatience while we conduct a thorough investigation.\" Exhibit \"I.\" The statement in the \nnotification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. \nThe case was not currently \"under \ninvestigation.\" To the contrary, the case had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement \nentered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Exhibit \"E.\" \n40. In mid-June 2008, Mr. Edwards contacted the AUSA handling the case to inform her \nthat he represented Jane Doe #1 and, later, Jane Doe #2. Mr. Edwards asked to meet to provide \ninformation about the federal crimes committed by Epstein against these victims, hoping to \nsecure a significant federal indictment against Epstein. The AUSA and Mr. Edwards discussed \nthe possibility of federal charges being filed. At the end of the call, the AUSA asked Mr. \nEdwards to send any information that he wanted considered by the U.S. Attorney's Office in \ndetermining whether to file federal charges. Because of the confidentiality provision that existed \nin the plea agreement, Mr. Edwards was not informed that previously, in September 2007, the \nU.S. Attorney's Office had reached an agreement not to file federal charges. Mr. Edwards was \n18 \nEFTA00210807\n", "char_count": 1926}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 19 of 42 \nalso not informed that resolution of the criminal matter was imminent. This concealment \nprevented Edwards from (among other things) exercising his client's CVRA right to confer with \nthe prosecutors about the case. Epstein was aware of this concealment — and, indeed, sought this \nconcealment. Tr. July 11, 2008, at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 28-29. \n41. On Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15 p.m., the U.S. Attorney's Office \nreceived a copy of Epstein's proposed state plea agreement and learned that the plea was \nscheduled for 8:30 a.m., on Monday, June 30, 2008. The U.S. Attorney's Office and the Palm \nBeach Police Department attempted to provide notification to victims in the short time that \nEpstein's counsel had provided. The U.S. Attorney's Office called attorney Edwards to provide \nnotice to his clients regarding the hearing. The notice, however, was only that Epstein was \npleading guilty to state solicitation of prostitution charges involving another victim. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office did not tell Edwards that the guilty pleas in state court would bring an end to \nthe possibility of federal prosecution pursuant to the plea agreement. Thus, there was no reason \nfor attorney Edwards to believe that the guilty pleas in state court had any bearing on the cases of \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2. As a result, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 did not attend the plea \nhearing, as they did not think that it was pertinent to their particular cases. Had they known that \nthe plea agreement made it impossible to prosecute Epstein federally for his crimes against them, \nthey would have objected to this resolution. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 thus detrimentally \nrelied on the inaccurate representations of the U.S. Attorney's Office that their cases were still \nunder investigation. Tr. July I I, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23. \n42. On June 30, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Jack Go\n... [truncated, 2121 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/50 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=50]", "char_count": 2121}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 20 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 321. \n43. On July 3, 2008, as requested, Mr. Edwards sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office a letter. \nIn the letter, Mr. Edwards indicated his client's desire that federal charges be filed against \ndefendant Epstein. In particular, he wrote on behalf of his clients: \"We urge the Attorney \nGeneral and our United States Attorney to consider the fundamental import of the vigorous \nenforcement of our Federal laws. We urge you to move forward with the traditional indictments \nand criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has committed, and we \nfurther urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our children from this very dangerous \nsexual predator.\" See Exhibit \"J.\" \n44. When Mr. Edwards wrote his July 3, 2008 letter, he was still unaware that a non-\nprosecution agreement had been reached with Epstein — a fact that continued to be concealed \nfrom him (and the victims) by the U.S. Attorney's Office. Mr. Edwards first saw a reference to \nthe NPA on or after July 9, 2008, when the Government filed its responsive pleading to Jane \nDoe's emergency petition. That pleading was the first public mention of the non-prosecution \nagreement and the first disclosure to Mr. Edwards (and thus to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) of \nthe possible existence of a non-prosecution agreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, \n28-29. \n45. Mr. Edwards detrimentally relied on the misleading representations made by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office that the case was still under investigation when he was writing this letter. He \nwould not have wasted his time undertaking a pointless exercise had he known that the U.S. \n20 \nEFTA00210809\n", "char_count": 1769}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 21 of 42 \nAttorney's Office had previously negotiated a non-prosecution agreement. See Exhibits \"E\" & \n46. On July 7, 2008, Jane Doe #1 filed a petition for enforcement of her rights under the \nCVRA. At the time, Jane Doe #1 was not aware of the non-prosecution agreement, so she \nsought a court order directing the Justice Department to confer with her before reaching any such \nagreement. Epstein quickly became aware of this petition. Doc. #1 at 1-2. \n47. On July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a victim notification to Jane Doe #1 \nvia her attorney, Bradley Edwards. That notification contains a written explanation of some of \nthe terms of the agreement between Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office. A full copy of the \nterms was not provided. A notification was not provided to Jane Doe #2 because the agreement \nlimited Epstein's liability to victims whom the United States was prepared to name in an \nindictment. As a result, Jane Doe #2 never received a notification letter about the agreement. \nThe notification did not mention the non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office. \nExhibits \"E\" & \"K.\" \n48. The notification that the U.S. Attorney's Office sent to Jane Doe #1 and other victims \ncontained false and inaccurate information about the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. \nThe false information was specifically approved by Epstein's attorneys. \nSupplemental \nDeclaration of A. Marie Villafana, Dec. 22, 2008, doe. #35 at 2-3. \n49. On July 11, 2008, the Court held a hearing on Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doc #2's \nEmergency Petition for Enforcement of Rights. During the hearing, the Government conceded \nthat Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were \"victims\" within the meaning of the Crime Victim's \n21 \nEFTA00210810\n", "char_count": 1829}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 22 of 42 \nRights Act. Epstein was aware of these and subsequent proceedings involving the CVRA. Tr. \nJuly 11, 2008, at 14-15. \n50. During the July II, 2008 hearing, the Government conceded that its agreement had \nbeen concluded months before the victims were notified about it. See id. at 12 (\". . . the \nagreement was consummated by the parties in December of 2007.\"). \n51. At all times material to this statement of facts, it would have been practical and \nfeasible for the federal government to inform Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 of the details of the \nproposed non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, including in particular the fact that the \nagreement barred any federal criminal prosecution. See U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-\n92. \n52. One of the senior prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office joined Epstein's payroll \nshortly after important decisions were made limiting Epstein's criminal liability — and \nimproperly represented people close to Epstein. During the federal investigation of Epstein, \nBruce Reinhart was a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the \nSouthern District of Florida. Within months after the non-prosecution agreement was signed, \nReinhart left the Office and immediately went into private practice as a \"white collar\" criminal \ndefense attorney. \nHis office coincidentally happened to be not only in the same building (and \non the same floor) as Epstein's lead criminal defense counsel, Jack Goldberger, but it was \nactually located right next door to the Florida Science Foundation — an Epstein-owned and -run \ncompany where Epstein spent his \"work release.\" See http://www.brucereinhartlaw.com. \n53. While working in this Office adjacent to Epstein's, Reinhart undertook the \nrepresentation of numerous Epstein employees and pilots during the civil cases filed against \n22 \nEFTA00210811\n", "char_count": 1937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 23 of 42 \nEpstein by the victims — cases that involved the exact same crimes and same evidence being \nreviewed by the U.S. Attorney's office when he was employed there. Specifically, he \nrepresented \n(Epstein's number one co-conspirator who was actually named as such \nin the NPA), his housekeeper \nhis pilots Larry Morrison, Larry Visoski, David \nRogers, William Hammond and Robert Roxburgh. (Hammond and Roxburgh were not deposed, \nbut the others were.) See depositions of these individuals in various Epstein civil cases. On \ninformation and belief, Reinhart's representation of these individuals was paid, directly or \nindirectly, by Epstein. \nSuch representations are in contravention of Justice Department \nregulations and Florida bar rules. \nSuch representations also give, at least, the improper \nappearance that Reinhart may have attempted to curry with Epstein and then reap his reward \nthrough favorable employment. \nLEGAL MEMORANDUM \nThe victims have previously briefed the issues of why they are entitled to entry of an \norder by this Court finding that the U.S. Attorney's Office violated their rights under the CVRA. \nSee doc. #1; doc #9 at 3-11; doc. #19 at 3.9, 14. The victims specifically incorporate those \npleadings by reference here. In short, as explained in the victims' earlier pleadings, the Office \nviolated the victims' right to confer before reaching the non-prosecution agreement and also \nfailed to use its best efforts to comply with the CVRA. The victims now provide additional \nbriefing on two issues: (1) the CVRA applies to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 even though no \nindictment was filed in their case; and (2) the Court should find that the government has clearly \nviolated the CVRA in this case and set up a briefing schedule and hearing on the appropriate \nremedy. \n23 \nEFTA00210812\n", "char_count": 1897}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 24 of 42 \nI. \nCVRA PROTECTS JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2 EVEN THOUGH \nTHIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY A NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nRATHER THAN INDICTMENT. \nIn this litigation, the Government is apparently taking the position that the Crime \nVictims' Rights Act does not extend rights to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 because no \nindictment was ever filed in federal court and thus no federal court proceedings were ever held. \nThis crabbed litigation position about the 'breadth of the CVRA cannot be sustained. Indeed, \nneither the FBI nor the U.S. Attorney's Office itself took this position during the Epstein \ninvestigation — until the victims in this case filed their petition requesting enforcement of their \nrights. Instead, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office recognized that because the U.S. \nAttorney's Office was negotiating a non-prosecution agreement that affected the rights of \nspecifically identified victims, the CVRA was applicable. \nThe Court should reject the \nGovernment's newly-contrived position. \nA. \nThe Plain Language of the CVRA Makes Clear that Victims Have Rights \nBefore an Indictment is Filed. \nThe CVRA promises crime victims that they will have various rights, including \"Whe \nreasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case,\" 18 U.S.C. § \n3771(a)(5) (emphasis added), and \"the right to be treated with fairness,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).. \nIn earlier pleadings filed in this action, the Government has tried to narrowly construe the CVRA \nso that it applies only to a \"court proceeding.\" See Gov't Response to Victim's Emergency \nPetition (doc. #13) at 1-2. \nThe Government's position contravenes the plain language of the CVRA. The CVRA \nguarantees to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 the right to confer with prosecutors \"in the case,\" \n24 \nEFTA00210813\n", "char_count": 1886}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 25 of 42 \nnot in a \"court proceeding.\" And the CVRA broadly extends a right to them \"to be treated with \nfairness\" — a right that is not circumscribed to just court proceedings. Indeed, the fact that (as the \nGovernment notes) the drafters of the CVRA used the term \"court proceeding\" elsewhere in the \nstatute (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 377 l(a)(2) (victim's right to notice \"of any public court proceeding\")) \nmakes it obvious that they intended to give victims a right to confer that extended beyond simple \ncourt proceedings — that is, the right to confer about \"the case\" — as well as a broad right to be \ntreated fairly throughout the process. \nMoreover, it is patently obvious that a criminal \"case\" against Epstein had been going on \nfor months before the victims learned about the non-prosecution agreement. As recounted in the \nstatement of facts above, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of \nFlorida had opened a \"case\" involving Epstein's sexual abuse of the victims well before they \nentered into plea negotiations with Epstein. Indeed, as early as June 7, 2007 — more than three \nmonths before they concluded the NPA with Epstein — the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a notice to \nJane Doe #1 stating \"your case is under investigation.\" See Exhibit \"C\" (emphasis added). The \nnotice went on to tell Jane Doe #1 that \"as a victim and/or witness of a federal offense, you have \na number of rights.\" Id. at I. Among the rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself told Jane \nDoe that she possessed was \"Wile right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the \ncase.\" Of course, she would not have had those rights if she was not covered by the CVRA. \nInterestingly, the letter also advised Jane Doe #1 that \"if you believe that the rights set forth \nabove [e.g., the right to confer and other CVRA rights] are being violated, you have the right to \npetition the Court for relie\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/56 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=56]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 26 of 42 \nThe plain language of the CVRA makes clear that crime victims have right even before \nthe filing of any indictment. The CVRA's instructs that crime victims who seeks to assert rights \nin pre-indictment situations should proceed in the court where the crime was committed: \"The \nrights described in subsection (a) [of the CVRA] shall be asserted in the district in which a \ndefendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court \nin the district in which the crime occurred.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). The \nvictims have relied on this language through their pleadings, but the Government has not offered \nany response. \nThe CVRA also directs that \"[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice and \nother departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or \nprosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and \naccorded, the rights described in [the CVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (emphasis added). Of \ncourse, there would be no reason to direct that agencies involved in the \"detection\" and \n\"investigation\" of crime have CVRA obligations if the Government's construction of the Act \nwere correct \nPlainly, Congress envisioned the victims' rights law applying during the \n\"detection\" and \"investigation\" phases of criminal cases. \nFor all these reasons, the Court need look no further than the language of the CVRA to \nconclude that the victims in this case had protected rights under the Act. \nB. \nOther Courts Have Recognized That Crime Victims Have Rights Before An \nIndictment is Filed. \nIn its briefing to date, the Government has yet to cite a single case that has accepted its \nsweeping position that the CVRA only extends rights to victims after the formal filing of an \n26 \nEFTA00210815\n", "char_count": 1934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 27 of 42 \nindictment. This is because the case law all cuts the opposite way and recognizes that the CVRA \ndoes protect victims during the investigation of federal criminal cases. \nIn a case remarkably similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit has held that victims have a \nright to confer with federal prosecutors even before any charges are filed. In In re Dean, 527 \nF.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008), a wealthy corporate defendant reached a generous plea deal with \nthe Government — a deal that the Government concluded and filed for approval with the district \ncourt without conferring with the victims. When challenged on a mandamus petition by the \nvictims, the Fifth Circuit held: \nThe district court acknowledged that \"Where are clearly rights \nunder the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.\" \nBP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at 'II, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS \n12893, at *36. Logically, this includes the CVFtA's establishment \nof victims' \"reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nGovernment.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). At least in the posture of \nthis case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other \nsituations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable \nway to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and \nto ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea \nbargain. \nId \nAs we understand the Government's attempt to distinguish Dean, it asks this Court to \ndecline to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding and create a split of authority on this important \nissue. See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2-3. Instead, the Government would have this \nCourt deviate from the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion because the Circuit's \"discussion of \nthe scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the court ultimately declined to issue \nmandamus relief.\" Gov't Response at 2 (citing Dean, 527 F.3d at 395). This is simply untrue. \nThe Fifth Ci\n... [truncated, 2103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/58 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=58]", "char_count": 2103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 28 of 42 \nCourt to reject a proposed \"binding\" plea agreement negotiated under Fed. R. Crim. P. \n11(c)(1)(C) (i.e., a plea agreement obligating the judge to impose a specific sentence). The \nvictims asked for that relief because of the Government's failure to confer with them before the \ncharges and accompanying plea agreement were filed. The Fifth Circuit held that the victims' \nrights had been violated in the passages quoted above. It then went on to remand the matter to \ndistrict court for further consideration of the effect of the violations of the victims' rights: \nWe are confident, however, that the conscientious district court will fully consider \nthe victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement \nshould be accepted. \nThe decision whether to grant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude that \nthe better course is to deny relief, confident that the district court will take heed \nthat the victims have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA and will \ncarefully consider their objections and briefs as this matter proceeds. \nIn re Dean, 527 F.3d at 396. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit could not have instructed the District \nCourt to \"take heed\" of the violations of victims' rights unless it has specifically held, as a matter \nof law, that the victims' rights had been violated. \nThe Government's next effort to deflect the force of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that the \nCircuit did not directly quote three words found in the CVRA's right to confer — the words \"in \nthe case.\" See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2. But the Fifth Circuit had received \nbriefs totaling close to 100 pages in that case and was obviously well aware of the statute at \nhand. Indeed, in the very paragraph the Government claims is troublesome, the Fifth Circuit \ncited to the district court opinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. \nSee United States\n... [truncated, 2143 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/59 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=59]", "char_count": 2143}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 29 of 42 \nThe Government finally notes that the Fifth Circuit stated that its ruling about the \nGovernment violating the right to confer applied \"in the posture of this case.\" In re Dean, 527 \nF.3d at 394. But the posture of the case involving Epstein here — at least in its relevant aspects --\nis virtually identical to the posture there. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government had an \nobligation to confer with the victims before charges were filed and before a final plea \narrangement was reached. Without giving the victims a chance to confer before hand, the plea \nagreement might be fatally flawed because it did not consider the concerns of the victims. Thus, \nthe Fifth Circuit emphasized the need to confer with victims before any disposition was finally \ndecided: \"The victims do have reason to believe that their impact on the eventual sentence is \nsubstantially less where, as here, their input is received after the parties have reached a tentative \ndeal. As we have explained, that is why we conclude that these victims should have been heard \nat an earlier stage.\" Id. at 395. The posture in this case is exactly the same — the Government \nshould have conferred before the parties \"reached a tentative deal.\" The fact that the deal \nreached here is slightly different than the deal reached in the Dean case (a non-prosecution \nagreement versus a plea agreement) is truly a distinction without a difference. If anything, the \nfacts here cry out for conferral even more than in that case. At least the defendant there agreed \nto plead guilty to a federal felony. Here, the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal \npunishment — a plea deal that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 would have strenuously objected to . \n.. if the Government had given them the chance. \nThe Fifth Circuit's decision in Dean has been cited favorably in two recent District Court \ndecisions, which provides further support for Petitioner\n... [truncated, 2149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/60 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=60]", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 30 of 42 \nthe CVRA. After citing Dean, the District Court agreed that the rights were expansive and could \napply before indictment, but subject to the outer limit that the Government be at least \n\"contemplating\" charges: \nQuite understandably, movants perceive their victimization as having begun long \nbefore the government got around to filing the superseding indictment. They also \nbelieve their rights under the CVRA ripened at the moment of actual \nvictimization, or at least at the point when they first contacted the government. \nMovants rely on a decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that \nCVRA rights apply prior to any prosecution. In United States v. BP Products \nNorth America, Inc., the district court reasoned that because § 3771(d)(3) \nprovided for the assertion of CVRA rights \"in the district court in which a \ndefendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in \nthe district court in the district in which the crime occurred,\" the CVRA clearly \nprovided for \"rights . . . that apply before any prosecution is underway.\" (United \nStates v. BP Products North America, Inc., Criminal No. 1-1-07-434, 2008 WL \n501321 at *11 (S.D.Tex. Feb.21, 2008) (emphasis in original), mandamus denied \nin part, In re Dean, No. 08-20125, 2008 WL 1960245 (5th Cir. May 7, 2008). \nBut, assuming that it was within the contemplation and intendment of the CVRA \nto guarantee certain victim's rights prior• to formal commencement of a criminal \nproceeding, the universe of such rights clearly has its logical limits. For example, \nthe realm of cases in which the CVRA might apply despite no prosecution being \n\"underway,\" cannot be read to include the victims of uncharged crimes that the \ngovernment has not even contemplated. It is impossible to expect the government, \nmuch less a court, to notify crime victims of their rights if the government has not \nverified to at lea\n... [truncated, 2802 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/61 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=61]", "char_count": 2802}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 9:O8-cv-8O736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 31 of 42 \nrights under the CVRA even before prosecution. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th \nCir.2008). This view is supported by the statutory language, which gives the victims rights \nbefore the accepting of plea agreements and, therefore, before adjudication of guilt. See 18 \nU.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).\" 2009 WL 790042 at *2 (E.D.Va. 2009). \nAccordingly, rather than create a split of authority, this Court should follow the Fifth \nCircuit's holding in Dean (and the view of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of \nNew York and the Eastern District of Virginia) and conclude that the CVRA extends rights to \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 under the facts of this case. \nC. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office Has Previously Recognized that Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe #2 Have Rights Under the CVRA. \nA final reason for concluding that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 are protected by the \nCVRA is that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself reached that conclusion — well before the victims \nfiled this petition. The U.S. Attorney's Office arranged to have the FBI send a notice to, for \nexample, Jane Doe #1 informing her that she had rights under the CVRA. Later, in discussions \nwith defendant Epstein, the Office explained to Epstein their obligations to the victims under the \nCVRA. Indeed, it was only after Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 filed a petition with this Court \nseeking protection of their rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office reversed its position. The Court \nshould reject this remarkable about-face. \nAs recounted in more detail above, the U.S. Attorney's Office made clear to both the \nvictims and to Epstein that the victims had rights under the CVRA. For example, on about June \n7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #1 a standard CVRA victim notification letter, \npromising that the Justice Department would makes its \"best efforts\" to protect Jane Doe MI 's \n31 \nEFTA00210820\n", "char_count": 1978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 32 of 42 \nrights, including \"Mlle reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the \ncase\" and \"to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . . \nplea . . . .\" Exhibit \"C.\" Similarly, on about November 27, 2007, then First Assistant U.S. \nAttorney ■— \nsent an e-mail to Jay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein stating: in \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 \n(emphasis rearranged). \nApparently, this assertion produced some sort of objection from \ndefendant Epstein. The U.S. Attorney's Office, however, rejected those objections In a letter \non about December 6, 2007, Jeffrey H. MI, \nFirst Assistant U.S. Attorney again sent a letter \nto Jay Lefkowitz, reiterating the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims \ninformed of the status of \n32 \nThe letter stated: \nEFTA00210821\n", "char_count": 937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 33 of 42 \nU.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added). What this correspondence shows \nis that the U.S. Attorney's Office quite clearly took the position with defendant Epstein that the \nCVRA extended rights to Epstein's victims. Yet when the victims in this case filed a petition in \nthis Court asking those rights to be respected, the Government simply reversed course. The U.S. \nAttorney's Office had it right the first time — the CVRA does extend rights to Jane Doe #1 and \nJane Doe #2 in this case. \nD. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office Is Estopped From Arguing that the CVRA Does \nNot Apply in this Case. \nFor all the reasons just explained, it is clear that the CVRA applies to this case and the \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 had rights under the Act. In addition, however, the Government is \nsimply stopped from arguing otherwise. The Government told the victims that they had rights \nunder the CVRA and would keep them informed about the progress of the case. Exhibits \"C,\" \n\"D,\" \"17,\" & \"G.\" Having made those representations to the victims — and having induced \nreliance by the victims — the Government is stopped from taking a different position now. \nAs explained by the Eleventh Circuit, to make out a claim of estoppel against the \nGovernment, a party must adduce evidence of the following: \n(1) words, conduct, or acquiescence that induces reliance; \n(2) willfulness or negligence with regard to the acts, conduct, or acquiescence; \n(3) detrimental reliance; and \n(4) affirmative misconduct by the Government. \nUnited States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292 (11a ' Cir. 2003). Each of these four factors is easily \nmet here. \n33 \nEFTA00210822\n", "char_count": 1735}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 34 of 42 \nFirst, the Government made statements to the victims that induced reliance. The victims \nreceived an official notice on Justice Department letterhead that they were crime victims in the \nEpstein case and that the Justice Department would use its \"best efforts\" to protect their rights. \nSecond, these statements were obviously not accidental — to the contrary, the Government \nspecifically and deliberately sent these notices to the victims. \nThird, the victims detrimentally relied on these statements. As explained at greater \nlength in the victims proposed facts, the victims were lead to believe that their case was \"under \ninvestigation.\" As a result, they did not take steps to object to Epstein's plea agreement and, \nindeed, did not even attend the court hearing where Epstein pled guilty. Similarly, their attorney \n(Mr. Edwards) was induced to spend an afternoon writing a letter to the U.S Attorney's Office \nabout why Epstein should be federally prosecuted — time that was taken away from other matters \nat his busy law practice. This was a complete wild goose chase, as the U.S. Attorney's Office \nwas concealing from Mr. Edwards at the time that a federal non-prosecution agreement had \nalready been reached with Epstein. \nFourth, the U.S. Attorney's Office engaged in affirmative misconduct. We do not make \nthis allegation lightly. But the facts recounted above demonstrate the following chain of events. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office first reached a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, in which it \nagreed not to prosecute him for numerous crimes (including, for example, sex offenses \ncommitted by Epstein against Jane Doe NI). As part of that agreement, the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice agreed to a \"confidentiality\" provision that forbade publicly disclosing the existence of \nthe agreement. \nAs a result, the U.S. Attorney's Office (and FBI agents acting tinder its \n34 \nEFTA00210823\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 35 of 42 \ndirection4) kept the existence of the non-prosecution agreement secret from the victims and the \npublic. The reasonable inference from the evidence is that the U.S. Attorney's Office wanted to \nkeep the agreement a secret to avoid intense criticism that would have surely ensued had the \nvictims and the public learned that a billionaire sex offender with political connections had \narranged to avoid federal prosecution for numerous felony sex offenses against minor girls. \nAs part of this pattern of deception, the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed victim \nnotification with the defendant sex offender and, after he raised objections, stopped making \nnotifications. Then later in January 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office arranged for letters to be \nsent to the victims — including Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 — that falsely stated that to each that \nyour \"case is currently under investigation.\" This was untrue, as the U.S. Attorney's Office had \nalready resolved the federal case by signing a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Indeed, \nthe pattern of deception continued even after Jane Doe ill and Jane Doe #2 were represented by \nlegal counsel. In May 2008, the Office sent a similar letter stating \"your case is currently \ninvestigation\" to another victim (represented by attorney Bradley J. Edwards). As late as the \nmiddle of June 2008 — more than eight months after the non-prosecution agreement had been \nsigned -- the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case told Edwards to send information that he \nwanted the Office to consider in determining whether to file federal charges. The Office \nconcealed from him that it had already made the determination not to file federal charges and \nthat the Office had in fact signed a non-prosecution agreement long ago. The Office also \nconcealed from him the fact that guilty pleas in state court were imminent. The Office disclosed \n4 It is unknown whethe\n... [truncated, 2104 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/66 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=66]", "char_count": 2104}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 36 of 42 \nthe non-prosecution agreement only after Epstein had entered his guilty pleas in state court — in \nother words, only after the time for the victims to be able to object to the non-prosecution \nagreement during the plea process had come and gone. Even at that time, the Office did not \ndisclose the provisions in the agreement. In short, the victims never learned about the non-\nprosecution agreement barring federal prosecution of their cases because of a deliberate \ndecisions by the U.S. Attorney's Office, not mere \"negligence or inaction.\" McCorkle, 321 F.3d \nat 1297. Accordingly, the Goveinment is stopped from arguing that the Crime Victims' Rights \nAct does not apply to this case. \nII. \nTHE COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS HAVE BEEN \nVIOLATED AND THEN SET UP A BREWING SCHEDULE AND HEARING ON \nTHE APPROPRIATE REMEDY. \nThis U.S. Attorney's Office's behavior in this case does not satisfy the Office's \nobligations under the CVRA to use its \"best efforts\" to insure that victims receive protection of \ntheir rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). In particular, the undeniable chain of events makes clear \nthat the victims were not afforded their right \"to confer with the attorney for the Government in \nthe case.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). Whatever else may be said about the deception, it also \nstarkly violates the victims' right \"to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's \ndignity . . . .\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). The pattern also denied the victims of timely notice of \ncourt proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3), including in particular the state court guilty plea. \nAs we understand the position of the Government, it does not truly contest that — if the \nCVRA applied — it managed to discharge its various obligations under the Act. Instead, the \nGovernment relies solely on a technical argument to reach the conclusion that it discharged its \nobligations — namely, the argumen\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/67 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=67]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 37 of 42 \nfiled. As just explained, however, that technical argument must be rejected as inconsistent with \nthe CVRA's plain language and interpretation by other courts. Accordingly, this Court should \nfind that the Government has violated its CVRA obligations. \nOnce the Court finds such a violation, the next issue becomes what remedy should apply. \nSince the earliest days of our nation, it has been settled law that \"where there is a legal right, \nthere is also a legal remedy . . . ..\" Marbury-v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (internal \nquotation omitted). Moreover, \"[i]f the right is created by a federal statute, the federal courts \nhave the power to fashion an appropriate remedy.\" Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, \nGeorgia 482 F.2d 361, 371 (5d1 Cir. 1973). As we understand the Government's position in this \ncase, however, they believe that this Court is powerless to do anything to correct the palpable \nviolation of victims' rights documented in this case. \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 respectfully request that the Court set up a briefing \nschedule and a hearing on this important issue. The victims believe that they can establish that \nthe appropriate remedy for the clear violations of their rights is to invalidate the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement. While the victims request an opportunity to provide more extensive briefing on this \nsubject, they provide a few citations in support of their position here. \nWhen other plea arrangements have been negotiated in violation of federal law, they have \nbeen stricken by the courts. For example, United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), \nheld that where a sentence on a new crime could not run concurrently with a probation \nrevocation the defendant was then serving — contrary to the assumption of the parties to the plea \nagreement — the defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement. The \nCourt explained t\n... [truncated, 2103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/68 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=68]", "char_count": 2103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 38 of 42 \n947. Here, of course, exactly the same is true: the non-prosecution agreement is vitiated by \nillegality — namely, the fact that it was negotiated in violation of the victims' rights. Other cases \nreach similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1995) \n(prosecutor agreed to recommend probation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal \nsentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); \nCraig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because \"neither the prosecutor nor the trial \ncourt have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period,\" such \"is not a permissible \nsubject of plea negotiations,\" and thus, even if \"the trial court erroneously approves of such an \nillegal bargain\" such plea is \"invalid\" and thus will not be specifically enforced). Nor can the \ndefendant claim some right to specific performance of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. See \nState v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement for 81 months sentence, \nbut court added 10-year conditional release term because, under facts of case, sentence without \nsuch release term \"plainly illegal,\" and thus remedy of specific performance not available); State \nv. Wall, 348 N.C. 671, 502 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1998) (plea agreement was for sentence to be \nconcurrent with one not yet completed, but state statute mandates consecutive sentence on facts \nof this case; \"defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action \nwould violate the laws of this state\"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. \n2006); (where \"the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become \nunenforceable due to circumstances beyond the control of [the parties], namely the fact that one \nof the enhancement paragraphs was mischaracterized in the indictment, resulting in an ill\n... [truncated, 2212 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/69 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=69]", "char_count": 2212}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 39 of 42 \npunishment that he deemed acceptable\"); State v. Mazzone, 212 W.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891, 897 \n(2002) (where plea agreement was that defendant would plead guilty to 2 felony counts of felon \nin possession of firearm and prosecutor would dismiss remaining 6 counts re other offenses with \nprejudice, and all parties erroneously believed these 2 crimes were felonies, lower court \n\"correctly resolved this unfortunate predicament by holding that a plea agreement which cannot \nbe fulfilled based upon legal impossibility must be vacated in its entirety, and the parties must be \nplaced, as nearly as possible, in the positions they occupied prior to the entry of the plea \nagreement\"). \nThe Non-Prosecution Agreement that the Government entered into in this case was \nsimply illegal. The Government did not protect the congressionally-mandated rights of victims \nbefore it entered into this Agreement. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Agreement is so \nshockingly lenient — blocking prosecution for dozens and dozens of federal felony sex offenses \nagainst several dozen minor girls. But regardless of the leniency, the only issue for the Court is \nwhether the Agreement was lawful. It was not, and so the Court invalidate it.5 The victims \nrespectfully ask for a full briefing schedule and a hearing on this important issue. \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein was notified about this case long ago, and was notified on \nAugust 26, 2010, that the victims would be filing correspondence in support of their motions. \nHe has not chosen to intervene in this action, and so he should not be heard to complain about \nremedy the Court might impose. \nIn any event, there arc no double jeopardy barriers to invalidating the plea. As explained \nin a leading criminal procedure treatise: \nThe review of defendant's sentence is also provided in federal cases upon \napplication of a victim. The Crime Victim's Rights Act allows a vict\n... [truncated, 2272 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00210758/70 or ?id=EFTA00210758&page=70]", "char_count": 2272}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 40 of 42 \nCERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE \nAs recounted above, counsel for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have approached the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for more than two and a half years in an effort to reach stipulated facts. The \nU.S. Attorney's Office ultimately terminated those efforts on March 15, 20 II, taking the position \nthat the facts of the case are irrelevant and that, on any set of facts, it did not violate the CVRA. \nCONCLUSION \nFor all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find the U.S. Attorney's Office violated \nJane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act and then schedule an \nappropriate hearing on the remedy for these violations. The scope of the remedy that is \nappropriate may depend in part of the scope of the violations that the Court finds. For this \nreason, it makes sense for the Court to bifurcate the process and determine, first, the extent of the \nviolations and then, second, the remedy appropriate for those violations. If the Court would \nprefer to see more immediate briefing on remedy issues, the victims stand prepared to provide \nthat briefing at the Court's direction. \ndifficulties if as the [DiFrancesco] Court explained . . . the defendant is 'charged \nwith knowledge of the statute and its . . . provisions, and has no expectation of \nfinality in his sentence until the [review by writ] is concluded . . ..'\" \nLAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL Procedure § 26.7(b) (Nov. 2010) (quoting United States v. \nDiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 146 (1980)). \n40 \nEFTA00210829\n", "char_count": 1596}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 41 of 42 \nDATED: March 21.2011 \nRespectfully Submitted, \ns/ Bradley J. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, \nEDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 \nand \nPaul G. Cassell \nPro Hoc Vice \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah \n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake Ci , UT 84112 \nAttorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 \n41 \nEFTA00210830\n", "char_count": 494}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 \nEntered on FLSD Docket O3/21/2O11 Page 42 of 42 \nCERTIFICATE O1? SERVICE \nThe foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's \nCM/ECF system: \nAssistant U.S. Attorney \n500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nE-mail: \nAttorney for the Government \nJoseph L. Ackerman, Jr. \nJoseph Ackerman, Jr. \nFowler White Burnett PA \n777 S. Flagler Drive, West Tower, Suite 901 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nCriminal Defense Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein \n(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) \n42 \nEFTA00210831\n", "char_count": 590}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 9:08-ev-80736-ICAM \nJANE DOE NO. 1 and JANE DOE NO. 2, \nPetitioners, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nRespondent. \nVICTIMS FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT \nOF THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT \nCOME NOW petitioners Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe 2, to file this first \namended petition for enforcement of their rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act \n(CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. \n1. Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Jane Doe, No. 3, and Jane Doe \nNo. 4 (hereinafter collectively referred to as \"the petitioners\"), now adults, were as minor \ngirls the victims of federal sex crimes committed by Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter \n\"Defendant\") and by other co-conspirators between about 1998 and 2006. These crimes \nincluded sex trafficking of children (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591), use of a means of \ninterstate commerce entice a minor to commit prostitution (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § \n2422), travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct (in violation of 18 U.S.0 § \n2423), wire fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343), and conspiracy (in violation of 18 \nU.S.C. § 371). The Defendant and others committed these crimes within the jurisdiction \nof the Southern District of Florida in Palm Beach County, Florida, as well as in other \n1 \nEFTA00210832\n", "char_count": 1344}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "jurisdictions inside and outside the United States. The Defendant and his co-conspirators \ncommitted similar crimes against dozens of other victims. \n2. Upon information and belief, in and around 2005 to 2007, the Defendant and \nothers were the subject of a federal criminal investigation conducted by the United States \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (hereafter \"the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice\") for crimes committed against the petitioners and other similarly situated victims. \nIn around September 2007, the Defendant and the U.S. Attorney's Office entered a non-\nprosecution agreement (\"NPA\"), under which the Defendant and other potential co-\nconspirators would not be prosecuted for their federal crimes against petitioners and other \nsimilarly-situated victims, in exchange for the Defendant's guilty plea to two state \noffenses, including solicitation of a minor for prostitution. On June 30, 2008, in the \nCircuit Court for Palm Beach, the Defendant entered his guilty plea to the State offenses \nand, pursuant to the previous agreement, was sentenced to 18 months in jail. \n3. Upon information and belief, around and after September 2007, the Defendant \nand the U.S. Attorney's Office conspired together to make the NPA confidential and \nthereafter conceal its existence from the petitioners and other similarly situated victims \nfor as long as possible. This conspiracy was designed to prevent the outcry that would \nhave resulted from awareness by the petitioners, other victims, and members of the public \nthat a wealthy, politically-connected defendant was receiving only a short county jail \nsentence for hundreds of federal sex crimes committed against minor girls. Among the \nmeans used by the conspiracy to conceal the existence of the non-prosecution agreement \nwere false statements directed by the Office that the case was \"still under investigation\" \n2 \nEFTA00210833\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "and the Office was considering whether to file charges, when in fact the Office had \nalready entered into the NPA. \n4. Under the CVRA, when the investigation had focused on the Defendant, the \npetitioners and other similarly-situated victims had the rights (among others) to notice of \ntheir rights under the CVRA, to reasonably confer with the prosecutors, to notice of court \nhearings involving them, and to be treated with fairness. \n5. By cooperating together to conceal the NPA's existence until after it has \nbecome fully effective — and by taking other improper steps to prevent the investigation \nand prosecution of the Defendant and his co-conspirators — the U.S. Attorney's Office \nand the Defendant denied petitioners and other similarly-situated victims their rights \n(among others) to reasonably confer with prosecutors about the NPA and other aspects of \nthe case, to notice that the June 30, 2008, hearing related to crimes committed against \nthem, to restitution, and to be treated with fairness. \nWHEREFORE, the petitioners respectfully request this Court grant them \nappropriate remedies to fully enforce their rights, including (1) a declaration that the NPA \nis illegal and was entered into in violation of their rights, (2) a declaration that if after \nconsultation with the victims the U.S. Attorney's Office determines that prosecution of \nEpstein and of others is appropriate then prosecution is permitted, (3) a declaration that \nthe Office shall reasonably confer with the petitioners and other similarly-situated victims \nabout whether to prosecute Epstein and his co-conspirators, (4) a release of all \ninformation surrounding the circumstances of the Office's initial decision not to pursue \ncriminal prosecution, and (5) all other appropriate remedies that the Court deems just and \nproper. \n3 \nEFTA00210834\n", "char_count": 1838}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "The petitioners request appropriate discovery and an evidentiary hearing to prove \ntheir allegations and secure the relief requested above. \nDATED: February 6.2015 \nRespectfully Submitted, \n/s/ Bradley J. Edwards \nBradley J. Edwards \nFARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, \nEDWARDS, \nFISTOS \n& \nLEHRMAN, P.L. \n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 \nFort Lauderdale Florida 33301 \nPaul G. Cassell \nPro liac Vice \nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the \nUniversity of Utah.\n332 S. 1400 E. \nSalt Lake City, UT 84112 \nAttorneys for Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 \nThis daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only \nand is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah \n4 \nEFTA00210835\n", "char_count": 734}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI certify that the foregoing document was served on February 6, 2015, on the \nfollowing using the Court's CM/ECF system: \n500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nAttorneys for the Government \n/s/ Bradley J. Edwards \n5 \nEFTA00210836\n", "char_count": 278}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00210758", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "• Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete \nitem 4 if Restricted Delivery Is desired. \n• Print your name and address on the reverse \nso that we can return the card to you. \n• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, \nor on the front if space permits. \n1. Article Addressed to: \nW\n1. I-Recio -Fer rep-\nLA_ c. A 4/g -n et \nCO /US \nkb& I ai l, pi 2,3/sa \n2. All \nA. Signature \nO Agent \nX \nO Addressee \nC. Date of Defivery \nB. Received by (Printed Nemo) \n7014 3490 0000 4595 6739 \nPS Form 3811. July 2013 \nSt1O.1,11JISUI 401 OS,  A-abr Dag \n_StoC -b C—I \nOlen \nNaLUISOcl \nez4/ \nDomestic Return Receipt \nemu v efieRoe Peel \n45.41tell IUMUIPticpa) \n0.4 AgV400 POPPINIS \n(Matti eireueempat \nfisa Ofieed Wried \nsea Peslag \np \n149038 GAIVINAmCIMAIIOasOLuod833 \n„eopues le/sod 'S71 \n0 \n0 \nLO4 LLI \n-r ..c \n-.0 -0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n0 \n-C -a \nCm In \n-CI -0 \nIn In \nIT• \ntil Li \n.11 -0 \nasn 11/1O1.d.dO \nEFTA00210837\n", "char_count": 921}]}