{"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_count": 14, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00205830", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00205830.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09:26'2011 Page 1 of 14 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOES #1 AND #2, \nPlaintiffs, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES, \nDefendant. \n/ \nORDER \nTHIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Finding of Violations of the \nCrime Victims' Rights Act (DEs 48, 52), Plaintiffs' Motion to Have Their Facts Accepted \nBecause of the Government's Failure to Contest Any of the Facts (DE 49), Plaintiffs' Motion for \nOrder Directing the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence (DE 50), and \nMotion to Intervene or in the Alternative for a Sua Sponte Rule 11 Order \n(DE 79).1 All motions are fully briefed and ripe for review, and the Court has heard oral \narguments on all motions. The Court has carefully considered the briefing and the parties' \narguments and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. \nThe Court is awaiting supplemental briefing on the Motion to Intervene of Roy Black, \nMartin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz (DE 56) and will rule on that motion after it is fully briefed. \nAlso, because the proposed interveners seek intervention to request a protective order against \ndisclosure of certain correspondences at issue in Plaintiffs' Motion to Use Correspondence to \nProve Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act and to Have Their Unredacted Pleadings \nUnsealed (DE 51), the Court will defer ruling on the latter motion until the intervention motion is \nripe for review. \nEFTA00205830\n", "char_count": 1540}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09'26'2011 Page 2 of 14 \nBackground'\nPlaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 are alleged victims of federal sex crimes \ncommitted by Jeffrey Epstein in Palm Beach County. Between 2001 and 2007, Epstein sexually \nabused multiple underage girls at his Palm Beach mansion, including Plaintiffs. In 2006, the \nFederal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") opened an investigation into allegations that Epstein was \ninducing underage girls to engage in sexual acts. The case was eventually presented to the \nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, which accepted it for \ninvestigation. The Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office was also investigating similar \nallegations against Epstein. Plaintiffs allege that the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office's \ninvestigation developed a strong case for a federal prosecution against Epstein based on \n\"overwhelming\" evidence. \nIn June 2007, the FBI delivered to Jane Doe #1 a standard victim-notification letter, \nwhich explained that the case against Epstein was \"under investigation\" and notified Jane Doe #1 \nof her rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"). In August 2007, Jane Doe #2 \nreceived a similar notification letter. \nIn September 2007, Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office began plea discussions. The \nnegotiations led to an agreement under which Epstein would plead guilty to two state felony \noffenses for solicitation of prostitution and procurement of minors for prostitution and the U.S. \nThis background discussion is based on the allegations in Plaintiffs' Petition for \nEnforcement of Crime Victims' Rights Act (DE I) and the Statement of Material Facts in \nPlaintiffs' Motion for Finding of Violation of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (DEs 48, 52). \nThese allegations are not yet supported by evidence and the Court relies on them here solely to \nprovide the context for the threshold legal issues addressed in this order. As discussed below, \nf\n... [truncated, 2122 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00205830/1 or ?id=EFTA00205830&page=1]", "char_count": 2122}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 3 of 14 \nAttorney's Office would agree not to prosecute Epstein for federal offenses. On September 24, \n2007, Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office executed a Non-Prosecution Agreement (\"NPA\") \nunder these terms. \nPlaintiffs contend that the U.S. Attorney's Office did not confer with them regarding the \nplea discussions and, in fact, intentionally kept secret the negotiations and the NPA. From \nSeptember 24, 2007, the day on which the NPA was executed, through June 2008, the U.S. \nAttorney's Office did not notify either Plaintiff of the existence of the NPA. \nDuring this period, Plaintiffs communicated multiple times with the FBI and U.S. \nAttorney's Office, but neither Plaintiff was informed of the NPA. On January 10, 2008, the FBI \nsent letters to Plaintiffs advising them that \"[t]his case is currently under investigation,\" but \nfailing to disclose the existence of the NPA. On January 32, 2008, Jane Doe #1 met with FBI \nagents and attorneys from the U.S. Attorney's Office to discuss her abuse by Epstein. The \ngovernment did not disclose the existence of the NPA. In mid-June 2008, Plaintiffs' counsel \ncontacted the Assistant United States Attorney (\"AUSA\") handling their case to discuss the \nstatus of the investigation. The AUSA did not disclose the existence of the NPA. On June 27, \n2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office notified Plaintiffs' counsel that Epstein was scheduled to plead \nguilty in state court on June 30, 2008. The U.S. Attorney's Office did not disclose the existence \nof the NPA nor the relationship between Epstein's state plea and the U.S. Attorney's Office's \nagreement to forgo federal charges. On July 3, 2008, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to the U.S. \nAttorney's Office stating Jane Doe #1's desire that it bring federal charges against Epstein. \n3 \nEFTA00205832\n", "char_count": 1886}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 4 of 14 \nOn July 7, 2008, Jane Doe #1 filed a petition in this Court to enforce her rights under the \nCVRA! Jane Doe #1 alleged that she believed plea discussions were under way between Epstein \nand the U.S. Attorney's Office, and that the government, by failing to notify her of this \ndevelopment, had violated her rights under the CVRA. The United States responded to the \npetition on July 9, 2008, arguing that (1) a federal indictment had never been returned against \nEpstein and therefore the CVRA did not attach, and (2) nevertheless, the U.S. Attorney's Office \nhad used its best efforts to comply with the CVRA. The government's response also disclosed \nthat the U.S. Attorney's Office had entered into the NPA with Epstein. \nOn July 11, 2008, this Court held a hearing on Jane Doe #1's petition, at which Jane Doe \n#2 was added as a plaintiff. At the hearing, Plaintiffs explained that their petition did not present \nan emergency and that therefore an immediate resolution was not necessary. On August 14, \n2008, the Court held a status conference and ordered the United States to turn over the NPA to \nall identified victims, including Plaintiffs, and further ordered the parties to work out the terms of \na protective order governing the NPA's disclosure. \nThis action was relatively inactive for the next year and one-half while Plaintiffs litigated \ncivil actions against Epstein. After those cases settled, Plaintiffs attempted to resolve their \nCVRA dispute with the U.S. Attorney's Office. On March 18, 2011, after the parties' settlement \nefforts failed, Plaintiffs filed a series of motions, which the Court now addresses in turn, along \nwith \nMotion to Intervene. \n'Jane Doe #2 joined this action after Jane Doe #1 filed the initial Petition for \nEnforcement of Crime Victims' Rights Act. \n4 \nEFTA00205833\n", "char_count": 1901}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 5 of 14 \nI. \nMotion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act \nThe CVRA was designed to protect victims' rights and ensure them involvement in the \ncriminal justice process. United Stalest Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 234 (4ih Cir. 2007); Kenna,. \nU.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (\"The [CVRA] was enacted to make crime \nvictims full participants in the criminal justice system.\"). The statute enumerates the following \neight rights: \n(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. \n(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court \nproceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape \nof the accused. \n(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the \ncourt, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the \nvictim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that \nproceeding. \n(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court \ninvolving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. \n(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case. \n(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. \n(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. \n(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and \nprivacy. \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). \nIf a prosecution is underway, the CVRA grants victims standing to vindicate their rights \nin the ongoing criminal action. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). If, however, a prosecution is not \nunderway, the victims may initiate a new action under the CVRA in the district court of the \n5 \nEFTA00205834\n", "char_count": 1823}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 6 of 14 \ndistrict where the crime occurred.' Id. The statute also tasks the district courts and the \nprosecutors with the responsibility of protecting these rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1) (\"[T]he \ncourt shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a).\"); § \n3771(c)(1) (\"Officers and employees of the Department of Justice . . . shall make their best \nefforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection \n(a).\"). \nHere, Plaintiffs first argue that as a matter of law the CVRA's protections attach before a \nformal charge is filed against the criminal defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that the \nCVRA applied here and that the U.S. Attorney's Office violated their CVRA rights; namely, \ntheir rights to confer, to be treated with fairness, and to accurate and timely notice of court \nproceedings. Based on these violations, Plaintiffs request that this Court set a briefing schedule \nand hearing on the appropriate remedy, which according to Plaintiffs is to invalidate the non-\nprosecution agreement. \nThe United States argues that as a matter of law the CVRA does not apply before formal \ncharges are filed, i.e., before an indictment or similar charging document, and therefore does not \napply here because formal charges were never filed against Epstein. The United States further \nargues that even if the CVRA applied here, the U.S. Attorney's Office complied with its \nrequirements. \nThe Court first addresses the threshold issue whether the CVRA attaches before the \ngovernment brings formal charges against the defendant The Court holds that it does because the \nHere, because no criminal case was pending, Plaintiffs filed their petition as a new \nmatter in this judicial district, which the Clerk of Court docketed as a civil action. \n6 \nEFTA00205835\n", "char_count": 1934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 7 of 14 \nstatutory language clearly contemplates pre-charge proceedings. For instance, subsections (a)(2) \nand (a)(3) provide rights that attach to \"any public court proceeding ... involving the crime.\" \nSimilarly, subsection (b) requires courts to ensure CVRA rights in \"any court proceeding \ninvolving an offense against a crime victim.\" Court proceedings involving the crime are not \nlimited to post-complaint or post-indictment proceedings, but can also include initial appearances \nand bond hearings, both of which can take place before a formal charge. By way of example, \nunder Rule 5(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon arrest the defendant \nmust be taken before a magistrate judge \"without unnecessary delay\" for an initial appearance. If \nthe arrest takes place on a weekday, \"without unnecessary delay\" will typically require that the \ninitial appearance occur the following morning, which will often be within twenty-four hours of \narrest. See United States,. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697, 702 (56 Cir. 1973) (holding that the \ngovernment satisfied Rule 5's \"without unnecessary delay\" requirement by bringing the \ndefendant before the magistrate judge on the first weekday morning following the arrest). By \ncontrast, Rule 5(b) requires that where the defendant is arrested without a warrant, the \ngovernment must file the complaint \"promptly.\" The Supreme Court has interpreted \"promptly\" \nunder Rule 5(b) as generally requiring that the complaint be filed within forty-eight hours of \narrest. Cnty. Of Riverside.. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991). It is therefore possible that \nwhere the defendant is arrested on a weekday without a warrant, the initial appearance—which \nmay also involve the detention or bond hearing under Rule 5(d)(3)—will take place before the \ngovernment files the criminal complaint. \nSubsection (cX1) requires that \"Officers and employees of the Department of Justi\n... [truncated, 2121 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00205830/6 or ?id=EFTA00205830&page=6]", "char_count": 2121}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 8 of 14 \nprosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and \naccorded, the rights in subsection (a).\" (Emphasis added). Subsection (c)(I)'s requirement that \nofficials engaged in \"detection [or] investigation\" afford victims the rights enumerated in \nsubsection (a) surely contemplates pre-charge application of the CVRA. \nSubsection (d)(3) explains that the CVRA's enumerated rights \"shall be asserted in the \ndistrict court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is \nunderway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" (Emphasis added). If \nthe CVRA's rights may be enforced before a prosecution is underway, then, to avoid a strained \nreading of the statute, those rights must attach before a complaint or indictment formally charges \nthe defendant with the crime. \nThis interpretation is consistent with other federal decisions that have addressed the scope \nof the CVRA. For instance, in In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5* Cir. 2008), the court held that \nsubsection (a)(5)'s \"right to confer\" applied before any prosecution is underway. Id. at 394. \nSpecifically, the court explained: \nThe district court acknowledged that \"there are clearly rights under the CVRA that \napply before any prosecution is underway.\" Logically, this includes the CVRA's \nestablishment of victims' reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nGovernment.\" At least in the posture of this case (and we do not speculate on the \napplicability to other situations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable \nway to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and to ascertain the \nvictims' views on the possible details of a plea bargain. \nId. at 394 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Federal district courts have reached \nsimilar conclusions. See, e.g., United States'. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d \n... [truncated, 2222 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00205830/7 or ?id=EFTA00205830&page=7]", "char_count": 2222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 9 of 14 \nCircuit has noted that victims acquire rights under the CVRA even before prosecution. This \nview is supported by the statutory language, which gives the victims rights before the accepting \nof plea agreements and, therefore, before adjudication of guilt.\"); United States\" BP Prods N. \nAm. Inc., No. 07-434, 2008 WL 501321, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) (\"There are clearly \nrights under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.\"), mandamus denied in \npart, In re Dean 527 F.3d 391 (5ih Cir. 2008). \nThe United States argues that because the CVRA accords rights related to \"any court \nproceeding,\" 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(b)(1), (d)(3), and \"in the case,\" § 3771(b)(5), the CVRA applies \nonly after formal charges are filed. The Court finds this argument unavailing. First, as discussed \nabove, \"court proceedings\" can occur before formal charges are filed. Similarly, subsection \n(a)(5)'s reference to the right to confer with \"the attorney for the Government in the case,\" is not \nlimited to post-charge proceedings, as the United States is represented by attorneys in each \ncriminal case at, for example, initial appearances and bond hearings.' Last, the government's \ninterpretation ignores the additional language throughout the statute that clearly contemplates \npre-charge protections, such as subsection (c)(1)'s mandate that U.S. agencies involved at the \n\"detection\" and \"investigation\" stage use their best efforts to accord victims their enumerated \nrights under the CVRA and subsection (d)(3)'s provision that victims may vindicate their CVRA \nFor this reason, the Court respectfully disagrees with the interpretation adopted in In re \nPetersen, No. 10-298, 2010 WL 5108692 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2010), upon which the United States \nrelies. See id. at *2 (holding that a \"victim's 'right to be treated with fairness and with respect \nfor [his or her] dignity and privacy' may apply before any p\n... [truncated, 2493 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00205830/8 or ?id=EFTA00205830&page=8]", "char_count": 2493}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 10 of 14 \nrights even if \"no prosecution is underway.\" See United States.. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, \n1281 (11ih Cir. 1999) (\"[W]e read the statute to give full effect to each of its provisions. We do \nnot look at one word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire statutory context.\") \n(citation omitted). \nThe Court also rejects the United States' argument that pre-charge CVRA rights could \nimpair prosecutorial discretion and decision-making. Any encroachment into the prosecutors' \ndiscretion is expressly limited by the CVRA itself, which provides: \"Nothing in this chapter shall \nbe construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under \nhis direction.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). As the court explained in Rubin, \"there is absolutely no \nsuggestion in the statutory language that victims have a right independent of the government to \nprosecute a crime, set strategy, or object to or appeal pretrial or in limine orders .... In short, the \nCVRA, for the most part, gives victims a voice, not a veto.\" 558 F. Supp. at 418; see also BP \nProds N. Am., 2008 WL 501321, at *15 (\"Even under an expansive approach, the reasonable \nright to confer on a proposed plea agreement and the government's obligation to provide notice \nof that right is subject to the limit that the CVRA not impair prosecutorial discretion.\"). Thus, to \nthe extent that the victims' pre-charge CVRA rights impinge upon prosecutorial discretion, under \nthe plain language of the statute those rights must yield. \nHaving determined that as a matter of law the CVRA can apply before formal charges are \nfiled, the Court must address whether the particular rights asserted here attached and, if so, \nwhether the U.S. Attorney's Office violated those rights. However, the Court lacks a factual \nrecord to support such findings and must therefore defer ruling on these two issues pending the \nlimited dis\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00205830/9 or ?id=EFTA00205830&page=9]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 11 of 14 \nII. \nMotion to Have Their Facts Accepted Because of the Government's Failure to \nContest Any of the Facts \nFor the reasons stated on the record at the August 12, 2011 hearing on this motion, the \nCourt will deny Plaintiffs' request to have their facts accepted as true. \nIII. \nMotion for Order Directing the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Withhold Relevant \nEvidence \nPlaintiffs request an order from the Court \"directing the U.S. Attorney's Office not to \nsuppress material evidence relevant to this case.\" (DE 50 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek all \ninformation and material known to the government that may be favorable to the victims \nregarding possible violations of their rights under the CVRA. The United States opposes the \nmotion, arguing that neither the CVRA nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose a duty \nupon the U.S. Attorney's Office to provide evidence to Plaintiffs here. \nAt the August 12, 2011 hearing on this motion, the United States agreed that this Court, \nunder its inherent authority to manage this case, could impose discovery obligations on each \nparty. Because the Court finds that some factual development is necessary to resolve the \nremaining issues in this case, it will permit Plaintiffs the opportunity to conduct limited \ndiscovery in the form of document requests and requests for admissions from the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice. Either party may request additional discovery if necessary. \nBecause the Court will allow this limited factual development, it is unnecessary to decide \nhere whether the CVRA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide discovery rights in this \ncontext. The Court therefore reserves ruling on Plaintiffs' motion. \n11 \nEFTA00205840\n", "char_count": 1795}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 12 of 14 \nIv. \n11 Order \nMotion to Intervene or in the Alternative for a Sua Sponte Rule \nut.t C. \nscut beeks leave to intervene as a party-in-interest under Rule 24(b) of the \nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure. Reinhart seeks to intervene to file a motion for sanctions \nbased on allegedly \"unfounded factual and legal accusations made about Movant in Plaintiffs' \nMotion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act.\" (DE 79 at 1). In that \nmotion, Plaintiffs alleged that Reinhart, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, \"joined Epstein's \npayroll shortly after important decisions were made limiting Epstein's criminal liability\" and \nimproperly represented Epstein victims in follow-on civil suits. (DE 48 at 22). Plaintiffs \ncontend that such conduct \"give[s], at least, the improper appearance that Reinhart may have \nattempted to curry [favor] with Epstein and then reap his reward through favorable employment.\" \n(DE 48 at 23). Reinhart takes great offense to these accusation—which he contends are false, \nirrelevant to the CVRA claims, and gratuitous—and seeks intervention to rebut these allegations \nand move for sanctions. \nUnder Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, \"the court may permit anyone \nto intervene who ... has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question \nof law or fact.\" It is \"wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under \nRule 24(b) and even though there is a common question of law or fact, or the requirements of \nRule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention.\" In re Bayshore \nFord Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1246 (11th 2006). The Court will deny-\nrequest to intervene. \n12 \nEFTA00205841\n", "char_count": 1812}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 13 of 14 \nFirst, the Court finds that \nclaim does not share a common question of law or \nfact with the CVRA action. Reinhart claims that two paragraphs of Plaintiffs' forty-page motion \nmake groundless and bad-faith accusations against his integrity and character. However, the \nveracity of Plaintiffs' two paragraphs—i.e., whether4WMIumt used his position at the U.S. \nAttorney's Office to ingratiate himself with Epstein and advance his career in private \npractice—involves no common questions with the Plaintiffs' claims that the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice violated their CVRA rights through the process in which it entered into the NPA with \nEpstein. Indeed, \nmotion argues that the allegations against him are \"irrelevant\" and \nthat Plaintiffs \"do[] not make any effort to connect these allegations to the relief [they] seek[].\" \n(DE 79 at 2). \nSecond, even if these accusations shared common questions with Plaintiffs' CVRA \nclaims, the Court would exercise its discretion and deny intervention. The Court cannot permit \nanyone slighted by allegations in court pleadings to intervene and conduct mini-trials to vindicate \ntheir reputation. Absent some other concrete interest in these proceedings, the Court does not \nbelieve that the allegations here are sufficiently harmful to justify permissive intervention. \nReinhart has publicly aired his opposition to and denial of Plaintiffs' contentions, both on this \ndocket and in open court, and the Court finds that further proceedings on this issue are \nunwarranted. For the same reason, the Court declines to conduct a sua sponte Rule 11 inquiry. \nConclusion \nFor the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' \nMotion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (DEs 48, 52) is GRANTED \nIN PART. The Court concludes that the CVRA can apply before formal charges are filed. The \n13 \nEFTA00205842\n", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00205830", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 99 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2011 Page 14 of 14 \nCourt defers ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs' CVRA claims until the parties complete the \ndiscovery ordered herein. \nIt is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Have Their Facts \nAccepted (DE 49) is DENIED. \nThe Court reserves ruling Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Directing the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence (DE 50) pending the discovery ordered herein. \nIt is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that \nMotion to Intervene \nor in the Alternative for a Sua Sponte Rule 11 Order (DE 79) is DENIED. \nDONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida \nthis 26ih day of September, 2011. \nKENNETH A. MARRA \nUnited States District Judge \n14 \nEFTA00205843\n", "char_count": 800}]}