{"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_count": 21, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00201190", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00201190.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 1 of 21 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-MARRA/JOHNSON \nC.M. A., \nPlaintiff, \nv. \nEPSTEIN and \nDefendants, \nDEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST \nAMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, \nAND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MOTION TO STRIKE, \nAND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW \nDefendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (\"EPSTEIN\"), by and through his undersigned \ncounsel, moves to dismiss Count I through XXXI of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint \nfor failure to state a cause of action, and for more definite statement, or to strike, as \nspecified herein. Rule 12(b)(6), (e) and (f), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008); Local Gen. Rule 7.1 \n(S.D. Fla. 2008). In support of dismissal, Defendant states: \nThe First Amended Complaint attempts to allege 32 counts. Counts I through \nXXX are purportedly brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 - Civil Remedies for \nPersonal Injuries; Count XXXI is entitled \"Sexual Battery,\" and Count XXXII is entitled \n\"Conspiracy to Commit Tortious Assault only against Defendant,\" \nUnder \nthe heading \"Factual Allegations\" of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also \nreferences numerous federal and state criminal statutes, but fails to allege whether or \nnot she is attempting to assert claims based on these statutes. (¶15, 1st Am. Comp.). \nEFTA00201190\n", "char_count": 1426}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 2 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 2 \nDismissal is required on the following grounds: (1) A review of the complaint \nallegations establishes that Plaintiff has failed to state the 30 causes of action under 18 \nU.S.C.A. 2255. As discussed more fully below herein, this statute does not allow for the \nPlaintiff to allege 30 separate causes of action; rather, the statute allows for the Plaintiff \nto attempt to assert one claim. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of the \nrequisite predicate act as identified in 18 U.S.C. §2255 in order to state a cause of \naction. Thus, Counts I through XXX against EPSTEIN are required to be dismissed. \nRule 12(b)(6), Fla.R.Civ.P. \n(2) Count XXXI — Sexual Battery is also required to be dismissed for failure to state \na cause of action as Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite elements of such claim. \nThe count fails to sufficiently allege whether it is being brought pursuant to common or \nstatutory law. Further, in Count XXXI, Plaintiff reincorporates in their entirety Counts I \nthrough XXX; such pleading is improper and requires dismissal under the applicable \nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure. \nSupporting Memorandum of Law \nI. Motion To Dismiss Standard \nAs established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 \nS.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead \n\"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Id, at 1974. \nAlthough the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief \nin the complaint must state \"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic \nrecitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\" Id at 1965. Further, \"Iflactual \nallegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the \nEFTA00201191\n", "char_count": 1940}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 3 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 3 \nassumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\" Id. \nOn a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint are taken as \ntrue and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County \nSch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006). \nSignificantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly abrogated the \noften cited observation that \"a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a \nclaim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in \nsupport of his claim that would entitle him to relief.\" Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley \nv. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme \nCourt rejected the notion that \"a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a \nmotion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff \nmight later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery.\" Id. As \nexplained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp., supra at 1664-65: \nWhile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not \nneed detailed factual allegations, ibid.. Sanjuan v. American Bd. of \nPsychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs \nobligation to provide the \"grounds\" of his \"entitle[ment] to relief\" requires \nmore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements \nof a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, \n106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts \"are \nnot bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual \nallegation\"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief \nabove the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and \nProcedure 4 1216, pp. 235\n... [truncated, 2603 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/2 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=2]", "char_count": 2603}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 4 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 4 \nfactual allegations\"). Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, \n40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it \nappears \"that a recovery is very remote and unlikely\"). \nIn discussing Twombly, the Eleventh Circuit in Watts v. Fla. International Univ., \n495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007), noted - \"The Supreme Court's most recent \nformulation of the pleading specificity standard is that 'stating such a claim requires a \ncomplaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element.\" \nIn order to sufficiently allege the claim, the complaint is required to identify \"facts that \nare suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible.\" Watts 495 F.3d at 1296 \n(quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). \nII. Standard for More Definite Statement, Pleading, & Motion to Strike \nPursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a \npleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading \"is so vague or \nambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response.\" The motion is required \nto point out the defects and the desired details. Id. As to the general rules and form of \npleading, Rules 8 and 10, a claim for relief must contain \"a short plain statement of the \nclaim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;\" Rule 8(a)(3); and may contain \nalternative claims within a count or as many separate claims. Rule 10(d)(2) and (3). \nPursuant to Rule 12(f) - Motion to Strike, \"the court may strike from a pleading an \ninsufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.\" \nIII. Counts I through XXX, 18 U.S.C. 42255, are required to be dismissed. \nA. 18 U.S.C. §22S5 creates a single civil remedy or cause of action on behalf of a minor \nplaintiff against a defendant. The civil remedy afforded is not on a \"per violation\" basis. \nEFTA0020119\n... [truncated, 2002 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/3 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=3]", "char_count": 2002}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 5 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 5 \nContrary to Plaintiffs attempted assertion of 30 separate counts pursuant to 18 \nU.S.C.A. §2255 - Civil Remedy for Personal Injuries, this statute creates a single federal \ncause of action or \"civil remedy\" for a minor victim of sexual, abuse, molestation and \nexploitation. Under the plain meaning of the statutory text, §2255 does not create \nseparate causes of action on behalf of a minor against a defendant on a \"per violation\" \nbasis. No where in the statutory text is there any reference to the civil remedy afforded \nby this statute as being on a \"per violation\" basis. 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a civil \nremedy for \"a minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, \n2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal \ninjury as a result of such violation ... .\" See Smith v. Husband, 428 F.Supp.2d 432 \n(E.D. Va. 2006); Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe v. \nLiberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007); and the recent cases in front of \nthis court on Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement — Doe \nNo. 2 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3 v. Epstein, \n2009 WL 383330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009). Doe No. 4 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 \n(S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and Doe No. 5 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. \n12, 2009). \nThere is no reported case supporting Plaintiff's tortured and nonsensical \ninterpretation of §2255. In all of these cases (cited above), each of the Plaintiffs brought \na single count or cause of action attempting to allege numerous violations of the \n\"predicate acts\" specifically identified in §2255. \"18 U.S.C. §2255 gives victims of \nsexual conduct who are minors a private right of action.\" Martinez v. White, 492 \nEFTA00201194\n", "char_count": 1936}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 6 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 6 \nF.Supp.2d 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007), (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C.A. §2255 \"merely \nprovides a cause of action for damages in 'any appropriate United States District \nCourt.'\" Id, at 1189. See also Tilton v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 554 F.3d \n1371 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009)(District Court granted plaintiff \"the minimum 'actual \ndamages' prescribed by §2255(a),\" wherein plaintiff alleged that defendants had \nviolated three of the statutory predicate acts). \nIn improperly attempting to bring 30 separate counts pursuant to §2255, Plaintiffs \ncomplaint alleges in part that \"beginning in approximately late May or early June of \n2002, and continuing until approximately August of 2003, the Defendant coerced and \nenticed the impressionable, vulnerable, and economically deprived then minor Plaintiff \nto commit various acts of sexual misconduct. These acts occurred, on average, one to \nthree times per week from late may or early June of 2002 until August 2003. At a bare \nminimum these acts occurred twice a month from June 2002 until August of 2003.\" Am. \nComplaint, ¶13. Plaintiff then claims the identical damages in each of the 30 §2255 \ncounts. See ¶¶25, 31, 37, 43, 49, 55, 61, 67, 73, 79, 85, 91, 97, 103, 109, 115, 121, \n127, 133, 139, 145, 151, 157, 163, 169, 175, 181, 187, 193, and 199. As well, in Count \nXXXI, entitled \"Sexual Battery,\" Plaintiff claims the identical \"actual damages\" in that she \nrealleges and incorporates each and every of the 199 allegations in the 30 prior counts. \nIt is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the \nplain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS, Inc. v. Prime Time 24 \nVenture 245 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Castroneves, 2009 WL 528251, *3 \n(S.D. Fla. 2009), citing Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and Smith \nEFTA00201195\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 7 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 7 \nv. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 (\"When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry \nbegins with the text.\"). \"The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and \nscrutinize the statute's 'language, structure, and purpose.-  Id. In addition, in construing \na statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what \nit said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated \nin CBS, Inc supra at 1228 — \"Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived \nlegislative intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and \nunambiguous meaning are in effect asking courts to alter that language, and '[c]ourts \nhave no authority to alter statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] \nprovision what Congress left out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187.\" See also Dodd v. U.S. \n125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124. \nTitle 18 of the U.S.C. is entitled \"Crimes and Criminal Procedure.\" §2255 is \ncontained in \"Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of \nChildren.\" 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2003), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and \nprovides: \n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, \n2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers \npersonal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United \nStates District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains \nand the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as \ndescribed in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained \ndamages of no less than $50,000 in value. \n(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint \nis filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a \nperson under a l\n... [truncated, 2253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/6 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=6]", "char_count": 2253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 8 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 8 \nUnder the statutory rules of construction, had the legislature intended to give a plaintiff \nmultiple causes of action against a defendant on a per violation basis, the statute would \nhave included such language. Had Congress wanted to create such a remedy as \nPlaintiff attempts to bring, it could have easily included language of \"per violation\" after \nthe presumptive damages amount in subsection (a). By its own terms, the statute \nprovides for the recovery of \"actual damages the minor sustains and the cost of the suit, \nincluding attorney's fees.\" There is absolutely no language that allows for a plaintiff to \nmultiply the specified or presumptive damages recoverable on a \"per violation\" basis. \nThe Plaintiffs position on §2255 puts a strained interpretation with an absurd result. \nThe absurdity of Plaintiffs position is further evidenced by Count XXXI — \"Sexual \nBattery\" where Plaintiff reincorporates each of the 30 counts and seeks the identical \n\"actual damages.\" \nIn Martinez v. White, supra, the defendants sought to dismiss plaintiffs' 18 U.S.C. \n§2255 action based on forum non conveniens. The Northern District of California Court, \nrelying on the rules of statutory construction, rejected plaintiffs' argument that Congress \nhad intended to abrogate the forum non conveniens doctrine in a §2255 action; the \nDistrict Court noted that the statute does not contain a mandatory venue provision. Had \nCongress wanted to get rid of the forum non-conveniens doctrine, it would have said so \nin the statute. Also, in Smith v. Husband, 428 F.Supp. 432; and 376 F.Supp.2d 603, the \nplaintiff invoked \"the accompanying civil remedy for these criminal violations, stating that \nshe has sustained and continues to sustain physical and mental damages, humiliation, \nand embarrassment as a result of Defendant's criminal acts.\" In other words, she \nEFTA00201197\n", "char_count": 1993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 9 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al.\nPage 9 \nbrought a single cause of action, based on allegations of multiple violations of the §2255 \npredicate acts. Furthermore, the court refused to add a venue interpretation that simply \nwas not written into the statutory text. See other §2255 cases cited herein. \nFor an example of a statute wherein the legislature included the language \"for \neach violation\" in assessing a \"civil penalty,\" see 18 U.S.C. §216, entitled \"Penalties and \ninjunctions,\" of Chapter 11 — \"Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of Interests,\" also contained in \nTitle 18 - \"Crimes and Criminal Procedure.\" Subsection (b) of §216 gives the United \nStates Attorney General the power to bring a \"civil action ... against any person who \nengages in conduct constituting an offense under\" specified sections of the bribery, \ngraft, and conflicts of interest statutes. The statute further provides in relevant part that \n\"upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be \nsubject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of \ncompensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which \never amount is greater.\" As noted, 18 U.S.C. §2255 does not include such language. \nAccordingly, Plaintiffs multiple counts brought pursuant to §2255 are required to \nbe dismissed for failure to state multiple causes of action. \nB. Also requiring dismissal Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege \nthe requisite §2255 predicate acts. \nAlso requiring dismissal of Plaintiff's purported §2255 claim(s) is Plaintiffs failure \nto sufficiently allege any violation of a requisite predicate act as specifically identified in \nsubsection (a) of the statute quoted above. Relevant to Plaintiffs complaint, 18 U.S.C. \n2255(a) creates a civil remedy for \"a minor who is a victim of a violation of section \n2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, \n... [truncated, 2061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/8 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=8]", "char_count": 2061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 10 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 10 \nand who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... .\" See cases cited above \nherein. Plaintiff has failed to plead any factual allegations whatsoever pertaining to \nviolations of the specified \"predicate acts.\" In paragraph 15, Plaintiff makes reference \nby citation only to the following federal statutes — \"18 U.S.C. §§2241, 2242, 2243, 2421, \nand 2423.\" See endnote following the Certificate of Service herein for the complete \nstatutory text.' \nFirst, Plaintiffs reliance on 18 U.S.C. §2241 in its entirety as a predicate act is \nimproper; it is a violation of subsection §2241(c) that is a designated predicate act. A \nreading of the text of the other referenced federal statutes shows that no where in \nPlaintiff's Amended Complaint are there any allegations setting forth the requisite \nelements of the cited predicate ad. Further, any attempted reliance by Plaintiff on other \nfederal or state statutes not specifically identified in 18 U.S.C. §2255 is improper and \nfails to state a cause of action. See ¶15 of Am. Complaint wherein Plaintiff references \nby citation additional Florida State statutes and thereafter incorporates such reference \ninto her §2255 claim(s). See Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d, and 428 Supp.2d, \nsupra, requiring allegations/evidence to establish predicate act under 18 U.S.C. §2255 \nin order to be afforded civil remedy. \nPlaintiff appears to be relying solely on an \"agreement with the Federal \nGovernment\" as a basis for imposing liability under 18 U.S.C. §2255. See ¶¶17, 18, \nand 19 of 151 Am. Complaint. There is nothing in Plaintiffs allegations that would allow \nfor a §2255 claim to go forward without specifying the statutory predicate act and factual \nallegations pertaining to a violation of the requisite predicate act(s). Accordingly, under \nEFTA00201199\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 11 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 11 \nthe standard of pleading as established in Twombly, supra, Plaintiff has failed to \nsufficiently allege the requisite elements of a §2255 claim, thus requiring dismissal; for \nfailure to state a cause of action. \nC. 18 U.S.C. §2255 does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages. \nThus, Plaintiffs request for punitive damages under 42255 is required to be \ndismissed or stricken. \nIn each of the improperly asserted Counts I through XXX, Plaintiff also seeks \npunitive damages. \nA plain reading of 18 U.S.C. §2255, quoted above herein, \nestablishes that the statute does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages. Had \nCongress wanted to allow for such a recovery, it could have easily written such \nlanguage into the damages provision of the statute. The legislative body chose not to \nwrite a punitive damages component into §2255 as it has done in other statutes \naffording civil remedies. In relevant part, §2255 reads - Any minor who is a victim of a \nviolation of section ... of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such \nviolation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the \nactual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a \nreasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be \ndeemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value.\" See discussion \nof rules of statutory construction in part M.A. herein. See subsection (0(2) of 18 U.S.C. \n§2252A, entitled Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child \npornography, also contained in Chapter 110, Part I, Crimes, within which specific \nreference is made to \"compensatory and punitive damages\" in setting forth the relief \nwhich may be afforded to a plaintiff in bringing a civil action under §2252A(f). \nEFTA00201200\n", "char_count": 1962}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 12 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 12 \nAccordingly, Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages are required to be dismissed with \nprejudice or stricken. \nD. In the alternative, pursuant to constitutional law principles of statutory \ninterpretation, 18 U.S.C. V255 is required to be interpreted as creating a \nsingle \"civil remedy\" or cause of action on behalf of a minor plaintiff \nagainst a defendant. The \"civil remedy\" afforded is not on a \"per violation\" \nbasis. \nAs set forth above, it is Defendant's position that the text of 18 U.S.C. §2255 \ndoes not allow a Plaintiff, such as C.M.A., to pursue the civil remedy and the damages \nafforded under the statute on a \"per violation\" basis. See part III.A. above. In the \nalternative, simply for the sake of argument, if one were to assume that the language of \n§2255 were vague or ambiguous, under the constitutional based protections of due \nprocess, judicial restraint, and the rule of lenity applied in construing a statute, \nDefendant's position as to the meaning of the statute would prevail over Plaintiffs view. \nSee United States v. Santos 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). As summarized by the \nUnited States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: \n... The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in \nfavor of the defendants subjected to them. See United States v. Gradwell, \n243 U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917); McBoyle v. United \nStates, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931); United States v. \nBass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This \nvenerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen \nshould be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are \nuncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also \nplaces the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to \nspeak more clearly and kee\n... [truncated, 2243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/11 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=11]", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 13 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 13 \nstatute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal 'proceeds.'\" Id, at 2023. Noting \nthat the term \"proceeds\" was not defined in the statute, the Supreme Court stated the \nwell settled principle that \"when a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning.\" Id, \nat 2024. Under the ordinary meaning principle, the government's position was that \nproceeds meant \"receipts,\" while the defendant's position was that proceeds meant \n\"profits.\" The Supreme Court recognized that under either of the proffered \"ordinary \nmeanings,\" the provisions of the federal money-laundering statute were still coherent, \nnot redundant, and the statute was not rendered \"utterly absurd.\" \nUnder such a \nsituation, citing to a long line of cases and the established rule of lenity, \"the tie must go \nto the defendant.\" Id, at 2025. See portion of Court's opinion quoted above. \"Because \nthe 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendant friendly that the 'receipts' \ndefinition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted.\" Id. \nPlaintiffs position would subject Defendant EPSTEIN to a punishment that is not \nclearly prescribed — an unwritten multiplier of the \"actual damages\" or the presumptive \ndamages. The rule of lenity requires that Defendant's interpretation of the remedy \nafforded under §2255 be adopted. \nIn addition, under the Due Process Clause's basic principle of fair warning - \n... a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a \ncrime ... . As was said in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 \nS.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, \n'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal \nstatute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that \nhis contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying \nprinciple is that no man shall be held criminally respo\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/12 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=12]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 14 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 14 \nThus we have struck down a [state] criminal statute under the Due Process \nClause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject \nto it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' \nConnally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 \nL.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either \nforbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common \nintelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its \napplication violates the first essential of due process of law,' ibid., and that \n'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to \nthe meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the \nState commands or forbids.' Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 \nS.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888. \nThus, applying these well-entrenched constitutional principles of statutory interpretation \nand application, Plaintiff's 30 separate counts brought under 18 U.S.C. §2255 are \nrequired to be dismissed. \nIV. Count XXXI — \"Sexual Battery\" is required to be dismissed for failure to \nstate a cause of action. In the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more \ndefinitely state whether she is attempting to allege a claim under Florida \ncommon or statutory law, or some federal law, and further allege the required \nelements and factual allegations. \nIn Count XXXI, although entitled \"Sexual Battery,\" Plaintiff improperly realleges \nand incorporates each and every allegation and each and every count (30) which she \npreviously attempted to allege, resulting in a count that is 204 paragraphs long and \nincludes reference to Federal and Florida statutory law, while also including language \nsounding in common law. The count is such a hodgepodge of legal allegations that \nPlaintiff fails to st\n... [truncated, 2411 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/13 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=13]", "char_count": 2411}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 15 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 15 \noffenses outlined in Chapter 800 of the Federal Codes, as well as those designated in \nFlorida Statutes §796.03, §796.07, §796.045, §796.04, §39.01; and §827.04.\" In ¶203 \nPlaintiff also alleges that Defendant's \"tortious commission of sexual battery upon \nC.M.A. were (sic) done willfully and maliciously.\" \nSupporting Defendant's position that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action \nin Count XXXI, 18 U.S.C. §§2241(c), not §2241 in its entirety, as discussed above, is \none of the predicate acts, along with 2242, 2243, 2421, and 2423, designated in the \nfederal civil remedy statute — 18 U.S.C. §2255. Plaintiff attempted and failed to allege \nsuch a claim in the previous counts. Defendant can find no criminal offenses in any \n\"Chapter 800 of the Federal Codes\" which give rise to a civil cause of action. \nThe same is true for Plaintiffs reference to the Florida Statutes. Not one of the \nstatutes referenced creates a private cause of action or affords a civil remedy on behalf \nof the alleged victim of the criminal offense.' (Except for Florida Statute §39.01, all of \nthe statutes referenced by Plaintiff are contained Title XLVI. Crimes of the Florida \nStatutes). The referenced criminal statutes set forth acts subject to criminal prosecution \nand the criminal penalties therefor, if proven. See generally, Am. Home Assurance Co. \nv. Plaza Materials Corp. 908 So.2d 360, 374 (Fla. 2005)(\"not every statutory violation \ncarries a civil remedy\"); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ferre 636 F.Supp. 970 (S.D. Fla. \n1985)(violation of Florida's criminal extortion statute does not give rise to civil cause of \nFlorida Statutes §§796.03 - Procuring person under age 18 for prostitution; 796.04 —\nForcing, compelling, or coercing another to become a prostitute; 796.045 (which did not \nbecome effective until Oct. 1, 2004) - Sex trafficking; penalties; 796.07 — Prohibi\n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/14 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=14]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 16 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein. et al. \nPage 16 \naction for damages): Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So.2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), per \ncuriae?, (Dismissal of plaintiffs civil complaint affirmed where parental kidnapping \nstatutes concerned only criminal violations and did not create a civil remedy). \nAs well, the Count XXXI allegations make absolutely no reference to any \nviable common law cause of action; Defendant should not be required to guess or \nspeculate as to the nature of Plaintiffs cause of action. Even if Defendant were to \nspeculate as to the supposed cause of action, these causes of action (common law or \notherwise) have not been sufficiently alleged. On its face, in accordance with the \npleading requirements annunciated in Twombly, supra, Count XXXI is completely \nlacking as to any common law elements or the underlying factual allegations to support \neach element, and thus, Count XXXI is required to be dismissed for failure to state a \ncause of action. \nIn the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more definitely state whether her \nclaim is being brought pursuant to federal or Florida statutory law, specifically identify \nthe statute it is being brought under, or whether her claim is being asserted under \ncommon law. \nOnce Plaintiff identifies the nature of her claim, she is required to \nsufficiently allege in accordance with Twombly, the requisite elements of the identified \nclaim, along with sufficient factual allegations supporting the elements. \nConclusion \nPursuant to applicable law, Counts I through XXXI of Plaintiffs First Amended \nComplaint are required to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 18 U.S.C. \ndoes not allow for the Plaintiff C.M.A. to allege separate causes of action against \nEFTA00201205\n", "char_count": 1845}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 17 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 17 \nDefendant EPSTEIN, but rather allows Plaintiff to attempt to assert a single civil remedy \nif she can prove a violation of any of the statutory enumerated predicate acts. Further, \nPlaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a requisite predicate act under §2255. In \naddition, §2255 does not allow for recovery of punitive damages. Count XXXI is also \nsubject to dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action, as Plaintiff has \nfailed to allege a legally viable or recognizable cause of action. \nWHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court grant his motion to dismiss \nCounts I through XXXI, or alternative motion for more definite statement, and motion to \nstrike. \nCertificate of Service \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with \nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being \nserved this day on all counsel of recd A identified on the following Service List in the \nmanner specified by CM/ECF on this \nday of  March  , 2009: \nRichard Horace Willits, Esq. \nRichard H Willits P A \ntom* \nLake Worth, FL 33461 \nCounsel for Plaintiff C.M.A. \nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq. \nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss P.A. \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 \nounse \nor \na en an s Jeffrey Epstein \nand Sarah Kellen \nJack Scarola, Esq. \nJack P. Hill, Esq. \nBruce Reinhart, Esq. \nSearcy \nDenney \nScarola \nBarnhart \n& Bruce E. Reinhart. P.A. \nShiolev, P A \nWest Palm beach, FL 33401 \nvvest rain tseacn, FL ss4uy \nEFTA00201206\n", "char_count": 1626}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 18 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 18 \nWOW \nRespectfully su \ntted, \nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. \nFlorida Bar #617296 \nBURMAN \nCRITTON, JR., ESQ. \n4162 \nRITT • k \n■ \n• s \nllen \nCOLEMAN \n(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) \n' ENDNOTE: \nU.S.C.A. - Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, \nChapter 109A. Sexual Abuse \n§2241. Aggravated Sexual Abuse. \n(c) With children.--Whoever crosses a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act \nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or in the special maritime and \nterritorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, \ninstitution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a \ncontract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly \nengages in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12 years, \nor knowingly engages in a sexual act under the circumstances described in subsections \n(a) and (b) with another person who has attained the age of 12 years but has not \nEFTA00201207\n", "char_count": 1144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 19 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 19 \nattained the age of 16 years (and is at least 4 years younger than the person so \nengaging), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not \nless than 30 years or for life. If the defendant has previously been convicted of another \nFederal offense under this subsection, or of a State offense that would have been an \noffense under either such provision had the offense occurred in a Federal prison, unless \nthe death penalty is imposed, the defendant shall be sentenced to life in prison. \n§ 2242. Sexual abuse \nWhoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in \na Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in \ncustody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any \nFederal department or agency, knowingly--\n(1) causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that \nother person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that \nany person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping); or \n(2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is--\n(A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or \n(B) physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating \nunwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; \nor attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any term of years \nor for life. \n§ 2243. Sexual abuse of a minor or ward \n(a) Of a minor.--Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the \nUnited States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which \npersons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with \nthe head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with \nanother person w\n... [truncated, 2644 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/18 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=18]", "char_count": 2644}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 20 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 20 \n(1) in official detention; and \n(2) under the custodial, supervisory, or disciplinary authority of the person so \nengaging; \nor attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, \nor both. \n(c) Defenses.--(1) In a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, it is a defense, \nwhich the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the \ndefendant reasonably believed that the other person had attained the age of 16 years. \n(2) In a prosecution under this section, it is a defense, which the defendant must \nestablish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the persons engaging in the sexual \nact were at that time married to each other. \n(d) State of mind proof requirement--In a prosecution under subsection (a) of this \nsection, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew--\n(1) the age of the other person engaging in the sexual act; or \n(2) that the requisite age difference existed between the persons so engaging. \nChapter 117 Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes \n§ 2421. Transportation generally \nWhoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in \nany Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage \nin prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a \ncriminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not \nmore than 10 years, or both. \n§ 2423. Transportation of minors \n(a) Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity.--A person who \nknowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate \nor foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United \nStates, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for\n... [truncated, 2584 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00201190/19 or ?id=EFTA00201190&page=19]", "char_count": 2584}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00201190", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM \nDocument 47 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 03/12/2009 \nPage 21 of 21 \nC.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. \nPage 21 \n(c) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places.--Any United States citizen or \nalien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages \nin any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or \nimprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. \n(d) Ancillary offenses.--Whoever, for the purpose of commercial advantage or private \nfinancial gain, arranges, induces, procures, or facilitates the travel of a person knowing \nthat such a person is traveling in interstate commerce or foreign commerce for the \npurpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct shall be fined under this title, imprisoned \nnot more than 30 years, or both. \n(e) Attempt and conspiracy.--Whoever attempts or conspires to violate subsection (a), \n(b), (c), or (d) shall be punishable in the same manner as a completed violation of that \nsubsection. \n(f) Definition.--As used in this section, the term \"illicit sexual conduct\" means (1) a \nsexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would \nbe in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and \nterritorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex act (as defined in \nsection 1591) with a person under 18 years of age. \n(g) Defense.--In a prosecution under this section based on illicit sexual conduct as \ndefined in subsection (f)(2), it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a \npreponderance of the evidence, that the defendant reasonably believed that the person \nwith whom the defendant engaged in the commercial sex act had attained the age of 18 \nyears. \nEFTA00201210\n", "char_count": 1783}]}