{"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_count": 92, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00192835", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00192835.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-0 I 1789 \nEFTA00192835\n", "char_count": 53}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Memorandum \nSubjeci \nOperation Leap Year: Notification of Breach \nUSAO No. 2006R0 181 \nJune 9, 2009 \nTo \nJeffrey H. Sloman \nActing United States Attorney \nRobert K. Senior \nFirst Assistant U.S. Attorney \nRolando Garcia \nDeputy Chief, Criminal Division, West Palm Beach \nKaren Atkinson, Chief \nChief, Criminal Section I, Northern Division, WPB \nFrom \nA. Marie Villafan \nAUSA, Ft Laude \nINTRODUCTION.\nThis memorandum seeks approval to serve the attached letter providing notice of a breach \nof the Non-Prosecution Agreement on attorneys for Jeffrey Epstein. On Friday, June 12, 2009, \nJudge Marra will be presiding ova a hearing on Jeffrey Epstein's motions to stay all of the civil \nlawsuits filed against him by victims identified through our investigation. In his Order setting the \nmatter for a hearing, Judge Marra stated: \nThis hearing shall be limited to the issue of whether Defendant Epstein's defense of \nthe civil actions filed against him violates the non-prosecution agreement between \nEpstein and the United States. The United States' position in this matter would be \nvery helpful to the Court and, accordingly, the Court requests that the United States \nappear at the hearing. \nBased upon a review of pleadings filed by Epstein in connection with the civil suits, Epstein \nhas taken positions directly in contravention of the Non-Prosecution Agreement between Epstein \nPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL \nATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-01 1790 \nEFTA00192836\n", "char_count": 1487}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "and the United States. Accordingly, I recommend that we provide Epstein's counsel with Notice \nof the Breach at the hearing on June 12th, and proceed to indictment promptly thereafter. \nBACKGROUND \nIn the summer of 2006, the FBI approached the U.S. Attorney's Office about an investigation \nof Jeffrey Epstein (\"Epstein\") into allegations of enticing minors to engage in prostitution. The \nTown of Palm Beach Police Department (\"PBPD\") had approached the FBI after it became \nconvinced that Epstein's attorneys had placed undue pressure on the Palm Beach County State \nAttorney's Office (\"SAO\"), causing them to forego prosecution of Epstein. When the SAO \npresented the case to a state grand jury rather than proceeding by information, and when the state \ngrand jury returned an indictment charging only solicitation of adult prostitution, PBPD asked the \nFBI to begin a federal investigation. FBI, in turn, approached the USAO about possible federal \nprosecution. \nThe federal grand jury investigation began in the summer of 2006, and the first grand jury \nsubpoenas were issued in August 2006. Towards the end of 2006, Epstein's attorneys began making \ncontact with the U.S. Attorney's Office to seek resolution of the case. A meeting in West Palm \nBeach was held with Epstein's attorneys in February 2007. Aftcr that meeting, the investigation \ncontinued, and an indictment package was prepared in May 2007 with the intent to present to the \ngrand jury in mid-May. At the requests of Epstein's counsel, the indictment was delayed to allow \nEpstein's attorneys to meet with additional members of the U.S. Attorney's Office. A meeting was \nheld on Junc 26,2007, when Epstein's attorneys presented their arguments why federal prosecution \nwas inappropriate. \nOn July 31, 2007, another meeting occurred between Epstein's attorneys and the U.S. \nPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL \n2 \nATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-01 1791 \nEFTA00192837\n", "char_count": 1952}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Attorney's Office. At that meeting, the United States presented a list of terms of a possible non-\nprosecution agreement. One of those terms was: \nEpstein agrees that, if any of the victims identified in the federal investigation file \nsuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest thc jurisdiction of the U.S. \nDistrict Court for the Southern District of Florida over his person and the subject \nmatter. Epstein will not contest that identified victims are persons who, while \nminors, were victims of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section(s) 2422 \nand/or 2423. \nAt that time, Epstein's attorneys advised that an agreement involving jail time would not be \nacceptable. \nOn August 31, 2007, the FBI agents and I met with Drew Oosterbaan, Chief of the Child \nExploitation and Obscenity Section, to discuss the evidence and theory of the prosecution. Ile had \npreviously been provided with a copy of the prosecution memo related to the indictment. On \nSeptember 7, 2007, Epstein's attorneys met with the U.S. Attorney, Drew Oosterbaan, Jeff Sloman, \nJohn McMillan, and I. Ken Starr presented federalism arguments, urging deferral to state \nprosecution. When those arguments failed, Epstein's attorneys slated that he wanted to engage in \nplea negotiations. Epstein's attorneys wavered back and forth between a Non-Prosecution \nAgreement, involving pleading to state charges, or a plea to federal charges. Finally, on September \n24, 2007, the Non-Prosecution Agreement was signed.' The Agreement contains the following \nprovisions: \n'An amended indictment package had been prepared and was scheduled for presentation to \nthe grand jury on September 25, 2007. Judge Marra also had scheduled a hearing on Epstein's \nmotion to quash grand jury subpoenas for the computer equipment removed from Epstein's home \nby Roy Black's investigator when they learned of the stale investigation. This was postponed to \nallow plea negotiations and eventually was withdrawn pursuant to the ter\n... [truncated, 2145 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/3 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=3]", "char_count": 2145}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "8. \nIf any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7),2 supra, elects to file suit \npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida over his \nperson and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives his right to contest \nliability and also waives his right to contest damages up to an amount as \nagreed to between the identified individual and Epstein, so long as the \nidentified individual elects to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, \nand agrees to waive any other claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, \nfederal, or common law. Notwithstanding this waiver, as to those individuals \nwhose names appear on the list provided by the United States, Epstein's \nsignature on this agreement, his waivers and failures to contest liability and \nsuch damages in any suit are not to be construed as an admission of any \ncriminal or civil liability. \n10. \nExcept as to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively under 18 \nU.S.C. § 2255, as set forth in paragraph (8), supra, neither Epstein's \nsignature on this agreement, nor its terms, nor any resulting waivers or \nsettlements by Epstein arc to be construed as admissions or evidence of civil \nor criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdiction or other defense as to any \nperson, whether or not her name appears on the list provided by the United \nStates. \nThe Agreement also called upon Epstein to use his \"best efforts\" to enter a guilty plea and \nbe sentenced not later than October 26, 2007. (1 I 1.) Citing conflicts with attorney schedules, \nEpstein's attorneys asked the USAO to extend the deadline for his plea and sentencing. After a \nseries of delays, Epstein's attorneys sought review by members of the Justice Department. When \nit appeared that the Non-Prosecution Agreement would be undone, the indictment package was \nprepared again, and was reviewed in anticipation of presentation to the grand jury. \nOn June 23, 2\n... [truncated, 2534 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/4 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=4]", "char_count": 2534}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "reviewed your allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the facts underlying them, we see \nnothing in the conduct of the U.S. Attorney's Office that gives us any reason to alter our opinion.\" \nAfter several more skirmishes regarding the wording of the plea agreement with the State \nAttorney's Office, Epstein entered his guilty plea and was sentenced on June 30, 2008. In \naccordance with the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, later that day, Special Agent \nKuyrkcndall and I met with Attorneys Jack Goldberger and Michael Tein and provided them with \na written list of the 32 identified victims. \nSince the entry of the plea and sentencing, a number of concerns have been raised with \nEpstein's attorneys, including: (I) their objections to our efforts to notify victims of the resolution \nof the case; (2) their refusal to abide by and pay for the victims' representative, Bob Josefsberg, who \nhad been selected by Judge Michael \nacting pro bono as a Special Master; (3) their \nrepresentations to the Court about the continued pendency of the motion related to the subpoena for \nthe computer equipment removed by a private investigator; (4) inappropriate contact between people \nworking for Epstein and the identified victims; and (5) Epstein's application for and participation \nin the work release program. Some written notifications of potential breaches have been provided \nto Epstein's counsel. Those have all been resolved without a determination of breach by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office and a resultant indictment. \nTHE CIVIL SUITS AGAINST EPSTEIN \nNot surprisingly, since the entry of the guilty plea, a number of victims have filed suit against \nEpstein. In federal court, fourteen suits have been filed against Epstein. All of those casts have \nbeen assigned to Judge Marra who also was assigned the lawsuit filed against the United States by \ntwo of Epstein's victims. In the Victims' Rights suit, Judge Marra ordered the United States to make \nPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL \n5 \n\n... [truncated, 2074 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/5 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=5]", "char_count": 2074}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "the Non-Prosecution Agreement available to each of the victims and/or her attorney, so long as they \nagreed to be bound by a Protective Order. Each victim (or her attorney) was provided with notice \nof the Court's ruling, and several executed the Protective Order and were provided with copies of \nthe Non-Prosecution Agreement. \nFrom the beginning, Epstein has \"vigorously defended\" the suits, and has filed several \nmotions to dismiss. In all of the early suits, the plaintiffs raised only common law tort claims or a \ncombination of common law claims and a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. A number of plaintiffs' \nattorneys have argued that Epstein's defenses violate the NPA. Reviewing the language of the NPA \nand resolving any ambiguities in favor of Epstcin, those defenses do not breach thc NPA. However, \nsome of the later plaintiffs, especially those represented by Bob Josefsberg, filed claims exclusively \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Epstein has filed answers and Motions to Dismiss those Complaints as \nwell, asserting defenses to liability, including that there can be no liability because Epstein was not \nconvicted of an offense enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255. By doing so, Epstein has breached the \nNPA. \nThe following is a brief synopsis of the suits filed in federal court.' \nI. \nDoe I. Epstein, 08-CV-80804-KAM: This suit was filed in state court, but was \nremoved to federal court on July 18, 2008 by Epstein. The suit was filed by IM \nG., the first victim identified in PBPD's investigation. Plaintiff filed motion to \nremand to state court, which was granted by Judge Marra. \n2. \nJane Doe #2I. Epstein, 08-CV-80 I 19-KAM: Complaint filed on February 6, 2008, \nalleging: sexual assault (Count l), and intentional infliction of emotional distress \n(Count II). Epstein moved to stay the litigation, which was denied by Judge Marra. \nEpstein moved to dismiss Count I, claiming that there was no civil cause of action \niAs mentioned above, the NPA provides protection only to victims who \n... [truncated, 2317 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/6 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=6]", "char_count": 2317}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "for \"sexual assault.\" Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting: sexual assault \nand battery (Count I), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 11), and \n\"coercion and enticement to sexual activity in violation of I8 U.S.C. § 2422 (Count \nIII). Epstein again moved to dismiss, claiming that there was no civil cause ofaction \nfor\"sexual assault and battery,\" and arguing that the plaintiff had not made sufficient \nfactual allegations to support a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2422. Plaintiff then filed a \nSecond Amended Complaint raising the same claims, hut providing additional \nfactual allegations. Epstein filed an Answer, in which he cited his Fifth Amendment \nprivilege from self-incrimination as the response to the allegations in the Second \nAmended Complaint. Epstein also raised the following affirmative defenses: \nAs to all counts, Plaintiff consented to and was a willing \nparticipant in the acts alleged. \n2. \nAs to all counts alleged, Plaintiff consented to and \nparticipated in conduct similar and/or identical to the acts \nalleged with other persons which were the sole or \ncontributing cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages. \n3. \nAs to all counts, Defendant reasonably believed that the \nPlaintiff had attained the age of 18 years old at the time of the \nalleged acts. \n4. \nPlaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of \nlimitations. \nEpstein then filed another Motion to Stay all of the civil litigation. Judge Marra \nordered theUnited States to file a written response, and the matter is set for hearing \non Friday, Junc 12, 2009. Today, Epstein filed an Amended Answer, raising a \nnumber of additional affirmative defenses, including that the claims are barred by the \nstatute of limitations and that the pre-2006 version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 applies, \nwhich only creates a cause of action for a person who is still a \"minor,\" as opposed \nto \"any person who, while a minor,\" was a victim of an offense. \n3. \nJane Doe #3 I. Epstein, 08-CV-80232-KAM: This \n... [truncated, 2598 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/7 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=7]", "char_count": 2598}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "lawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. \n7. \nJane Doe #7'. Epstein, 08-CV-80993-KAM: This suit was filed by the same \nlawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. \n8. \nC.M.A. I. Epstein, 08-CV-80811-KAM: This suit was filed in state court and \nremoved to federal court. Plaintiff sued Epstein and Sarah Kellen (Epstein's \nassistant). Kellen is represented by Bruce Reinhart. CMA's initial Complaint \nalleged sexual abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress. CMA later filed \na First Amended Complaint, which alleged 30 separate claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255. Epstein filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a victim can raise only one \nclaim under section 2255, not a separate claim for each occurrence. A few days ago, \nCMA filed a document entitled \"Conditional Notice of Intent to Exclusively Rely on \nStatutory Damages provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2255.\" In that document, CMA states \nthat, if the statutory floor applies to each of her 30 claims under § 2255, then she will \nforego her civil claims. If, however, the Court decides that the statutory floor can \napply to each victim only once, then she wants to be able to pursue both her statutory \nand common law claims. \n9. \nDoe'. Epstein, 08-CV-80893-KAM: This suit was filed by one of the victims who \nbrought the victim's rights suit against the United States. She is represented by Brad \nEdwards. The Complaint raises the following claims: sexual exploitation, sexual \nabuse and/or sexual assault of a minor (Count 1), \"Cause of Action pursuant to 18 \nU.S.C. § 2255\" (Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Ill), \nand \"Civil Remedy for Criminal Practices\" (Count IV). Plaintiff also filed a separate \n\"Civil RICO Statement.\" Epstein filed a motion to dismiss or for a more definite \nstatement, which was granted in part by Judge Marra. Plaintiff filed an Amended \nComplaint in April, adding a claim for damages under a Florida stat\n... [truncated, 3253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/8 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=8]", "char_count": 3253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "minimum rather than the $ I 50,000 minimum).' \nI I. \nDoe No. 1011. Epstein, 09-CV-80591-KAM: This was the first suit filed by Bob \nlosefsberg's firm. On May I, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint alleging \nsix claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 —a separate count for each predicate offense that \nEpstein committed. Thus, Count I alleges that defendant Epstein \"used a facility or \nmeans of interstate and/or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, \nor coerce Janc Doe No. 101, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in \nprostitution and/or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a \ncriminal offense .. . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).\" The other counts charge \nthat Epstein violated § 2423(b) (travel with intcnt to engage in illicit sexual conduct); \n§ 2251 (production of child pornography); §2252(a)(I) (transportation of child \npornography); § 2252A(a)(1) (distribution of child pornography); and § 2252A(g) \n(engaging in a child exploitation enterprise). \n12. \nDoe No. 102 I. Epstein, 09-CV-80656-KAM: \nThis suit also was filed by \nJosefsberg's firm. On May I, 2009, Plaintiff filed suit alleging the same claims \nraised by Doe No. 101. Epstein has not yet filed his answer to that Complaint. \n13. \nDoe No. 81 Epstein, 09-CV-80802-KAM: This is the most recently filed suit. It \nwas filed on May 28, 2009. This suit was filed by the same lawyers as in the Jane \nDoe N2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. \nTHE PLEADING THAT VIOLATED THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nEpstein's Non-Prosecution Agreement speaks of waiving challenges to liability and damages \nand one could certainly argue that the liability waiver applies to any 2255 claim filed by one of the \nlisted victims. However, construing any ambiguity in favor of Epstein, the most conservative \nreading of the NPA requires him to waive challenges to liability in those cases where the plaintiff \nproceeds exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Jane Doe #101 has stated all claim\n... [truncated, 2668 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/9 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=9]", "char_count": 2668}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "First Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement (which is attached \nhereto): \nA. \nThe applicable version of § 2255 only permits \"minor\" to sue: . .. Yet the \nFAC [First Amended Complaint] affirmatively admits that Plaintiff is over the age \nof 18.... Plaintiff is bound by that admission, and the FAC must be dismissed with \nprcjudicc... . \nB. \nNor is Plaintiff the \"victim of a violation\" of a predicate criminal statute \nwithin the meaning of § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In our system of justice, those \naccused of \"violating\" a criminal statute arc innocent until proven guilty beyond a \nreasonable doubt in criminal court. With due respect to the courts that have \nconcluded otherwise, it defies common sense to think that Congress intended to \ninvert that fundamental legal norm, and the legislative history of § 2255 expressly \nconfirms that Congress intended to condition § 2255 actions on an antecedent \ncriminal conviction. The FAC therefore must be dismissed because it does not—and \ncannot—allege that Defendant has been convicted of a predicate criminal offense. \nC. \nEven if the applicable version of § 2255 were construed to allow adults to sue \nin the absence of a predicate conviction, the FAC.. .-even taken as true-would not \nestablish a legally \"plausible\" claim that Plaintiff is a victim of any predicate \ncriminal offense giving rise to a § 2255 cause of action. \n(Epstein's Mot' n at 2-3.) \nThe motion expands each of these arguments. With respect to his argument that only \n\"minors\" can sue for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein asserts that the 2006 amendment to \n§ 2255 was not meant to apply retroactively and cannot apply retroactively because it would violate \nthe Ex Post Facto Clause.' \nThe pre-2006 statute reads: \"Any minor who is a victim of [certain federal crimes] and who \nsuffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District \nCourt and shall recover the actual damages such \n... [truncated, 2605 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/10 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=10]", "char_count": 2605}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "As to his second argument, Epstein reiterates that the \"FAC still would fail as a matter of law \nbecause it does not (and cannot consistent with Rule I 1) allege that Defendant is guilty of 'a \nviolation' of a predicate statute.... As set forth below, the plain text of the statute and its legislative \nhistory demonstrate that § 2255 is conditioned on a prior federal conviction. Because Defendant has \nnever been convicted of a predicate federal offense, the FAC must be dismissed.\" (Epstein's Mot'n \nat 14-15.) He explains: \nGiven the presumption of innocence that animates our system of criminal justice, \nCongress's reference to \"a victim of a violation\" of a criminal statute can only be \ninterpreted to require proof that the defendant has been convicted of a predicate \nfederal offense against the plaintiff. After all, an individual accused of \"violating\" \na criminal statute is deemed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. \nIt would turn that principle upside down if plaintiffs could sue in the absence of an \nantecedent criminal conviction. \n(Id. at IS.) Epstein notes that the only district courts to have addressed § 2255 have held that an \n\"antecedent conviction\" is not required, but argues that those cases were wrongly decided. In her \nComplaint, Jane Doe #101 asserted that Epstein had been convicted of state law crimes and, taking \nlanguage directly from Alex Acosta's letter to Lilly Ann Sanchez, wrote that Epstein \"is in the same \nposition as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, \nas such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff.\" (Id. at 20.) Epstein quotes from the state plea colloquy \nand the state charging instrument to show that the state charges do not relate to Janc Doc #101. \nFurther, he writes, \"even if Defendant's state-law pleas did involve state-law offenses against \nPlaintiff—which they did not—§ 2255 only authorizes suit based on predicate convictions under \ncertain federal statutes..:'\n... [truncated, 2415 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/11 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=11]", "char_count": 2415}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Epstein then addresses each of Jane Doe #101's claims. Taking his arguments directly from \nthe various \"position papers\" that Epstein submitted to our office to urge declination, he argues: \n(I) \nEpstein could not have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) because he did not use a facility \nof interstate commerce to persuade Jane Doc #101 to engage in sexual activity — the persuasion \nalways occurred in person. \n(2) \nEpstein could not have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) because the \"dominant motive\" \nfor Epstein's interstate travel was not to engage in unlawful sexual activity. \"Instead, as the FAC \nmakes clear, Defendant is a successful businessman who maintains homes and properties around the \nworld. Even if the FAC's fanciful allegations regarding Defendant's conduct while at those homes \nwere true, the FAC does not remotely allege that his dominant motive for travel was to engage in \nillicit sexual acts ...\" (Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).) \n(3) \nPlaintiff failed to adequately plead violations of IS U.S.C. § 2251, 2252(a)(1) and \n2252A(a)( I ) because she does not allege that Epstein intended to transmit or actually did transmit \nimages of child pornography in interstate commerce, and alleged only that Epstein \"may have taken \nlewd photographs of Plaintiff . .\" \n(4) \nEpstein could not have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) because the statute was not \nenacted until 2006, and Jane Doc # 101 alleges that her interactions with Epstein occurred in 2003. \nRECOMMENDATION \nAs explained above, the Non-Prosecution Agreement provides, in relevant part, that \"If any \nof the individuals referred to in paragraph (7),6 supra, elects to file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, \n'The \"individuals referred to in paragraph (7)\" are \"individuals whom [the United States) has \nidentified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255.\" \nPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL \nI2 \nATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011801 \nEFTA00192847\n", "char_count": 1942}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District \nof Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives his right to contest liability \nand also waives his right to contest damages up to an amount as agreed to between the identified \nindividual and Epstein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed exclusively under 18 \nU.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal, \nor common law.\" The United States has performed its obligations under the NPA, and Jane Doe \n#101 has proceeded exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, yet Epstein is contesting liability. \nMoreover, Epstein is not simply contesting whether Jane Doc #101 is owed damages because of the \nparticular circumstances of his interactions with Jane Doe 4101, he is asserting that he can never be \nforced to pay damages pursuant to I8 U.S.C. § 2255 because—in reliance on the NPA—the United \nStates never prosecuted and convicted him of a predicate offense. The protection of the victims' \nrights to restitution was one of the most important aspects of the NPA and the failure of that key \npiece of consideration cannot be tolerated. This is especially true when one considers that Epstein \nhas served virtually no jail time, in contravention of the NPA and representations made to our Office \nby Epstein's attorneys. The importance of this consideration is reiterated later in the NPA: \"In \nconsideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation in the manner \ndescribed above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, \nthe United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-\nconspirators of Epstein.\" (NPA at p.5.) The Agreement continues: \"By signing this agreement, \nEpstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is material to this agreement and is supported \nby independ\n... [truncated, 2293 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/13 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=13]", "char_count": 2293}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "individual or entity for any and all federal offenses.\" (NPA at p.6.) \nAccordingly, I recommend that the Office declare that Epstein has breached the NPA and \nproceed promptly to indictment. \nNOTICE REOUIREMENTS OF TILE NPA \nPursuant to the NM, the U.S. Attorney's Office is required to provide prompt notice of a \nbreach: \nIf the United States Attorney should determine, based on reliable evidence, that, \nduring the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions \nof this Agreement, then the United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days \nfollowing the expiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide \nEpstein with timely notice specifying the condition(s) of the Agreement that he has \nviolated, and shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of \ngiving notice of this violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this \nparagraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts \nwhich may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the Agreement. \n(NPA at p.2.) \nThe pleading that is the subject of the breach was filed with the Court on May 26, 2009. \nThus, we must provide notice of the breach not later than Saturday, July 25, 2009. The Office also \nmust indict within 60 days of giving notice. In light of Judge Marra's directive that the Office \naddress the issue of breach at the hearing on Friday, June 12, 2009, I recommend that we provide \nthat Notice at the hearing. \nPRI VILF.GED AND CONFIDENTIAL \n14 \nATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011803 \nEFTA00192849\n", "char_count": 1611}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "DIRE: \nINVESTIGATION OF \nJEFFREY EPSTEBS \nIS.QPPIROSECITTIOLLAGEEEMENT \nIT APPEARING that the City of Palm Beach Police Department and the Slate \nAttorney's Office for the ISth Judicial Circuit in and foe Palm Beach County Oureinafter, \nthe \"Sum Attorney'. Office, have conducted an investigation into the conduct of kffrcy \nEpstein (hereinafter \"Epstein\"; \nIT APPEARING that the Sale AtI0OICY$ Office Nu charged Epstein by indktnxre \nwith solicitation of prottltugon, in vildko of Floddy Stamm Sutton 79607; \nIT APPEARING that the United States Attorney's Office end the Federal Bum. of \nInveuimetion have conducted their own investigation into Epstein'. background end any \noffenses that may have been committed by Epstein against de United Stow Bunt in or \naround 2001 through in or around September 2007, Including: \n(I) \n(2) \n(7) \nknowingly and willfully cornicing with othen known and unknown to \ncommit an offemc againn the United States. that is, lo use. facility ot means \nof interstate or fievign commerce to knowingly persuade, Induce, or entice \ntalon: famaka to engage in prostitution, in violation of TItle IL United States \nCork,Section2d22(b); all in violation oflitIc IS, United Mahn Code, Section \nknowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to travel \nin Interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sans./ conduct as \ndefined in It U.S.C. § 2423(0. with minor female., in violation of Tide \nUnited States Code, Section 2423(b), all In viobation of Title It, United Stases \nCode, Section 2427(e); \nwing a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly \npersuade, induce, or entice minor female. to engage In prostitution; in \nviolation of Title ILI/ailed States Code, Sections 2422(2) and 2; \n(4) \ntraveling (n Interstate ~one \nfor the purpose of tooting in illicit actual \nconducts, defined in It U.S.C. § 2427(0, with minor females; in violpion \nPage I or 7 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011804 \nEFTA00192850\n", "char_count": 1984}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "of Title IS. United Stain Code, Section 2423(b); and \nknowingly. l and effecting interstate and foreip commove, recruiting. \nenticko, std obtaining by any mean a person, knowing th t the person had \nnot attained the age of IS years and Would be caused to engage in a \ncommercial sax eel as defined In IS U.S.C. § I591(eXI); in violation of rifle \nIS, United Slate, Code, Sections 1391(.Xl)and 2; end \nIT APPEAR1NO that Epstein seeks to resolve globally hls slate and ftdetst criminal \nliability and Epstein understands and &knowledge, that, in exchange for the benefit, \nprovided by this agreement, &agrees to comply with its temo,Including andertakkotattath \nactions with the Stale Anomey's Office; \nIT APPEARING, after an investigation of the offenses and Eintcm's background by \nboth Sow and Federal law enforcement 'omelet, and idler due tenni:tenon with do State \nAmmons Office, that the interests of the United Sines, the State of Florida, and the \nDefendant soil) be sewed by the following proodum, \nTHEREFORE, on the authority of It. Alexander Acosta, United Slates Attorney for \nthe Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District foe these offenses shall be \ndefined in favor of prosecuticm by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the \nfollowing conditions and the roquinmatts of this Aapecemnt set forth below. \nIf the United States Attorney should &leonine, bawd on reliable evidence, that, \nduring the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions of this \nAgreement. then the United States Attorney any, within ninety (90) days following the \nexpiation of the tear of home confinement dismissed below, provide Epstein with timely \nnotice specifying the condition(s)of the Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate Its \nprosecution on any offane within sixty (60) days' of giving notice of the violation. Any \nnotice provided to Epstein pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided within 60 days of the \nUnited States lea\n... [truncated, 2621 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/16 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=16]", "char_count": 2621}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Terms of the Agreement: \nIiPtieln shall Plead guilty (not robs contendere) to the kakonent \ncurrently pending against him In the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for \nPalm Beach County (Case NO. 2006-cf-00919SAX)O(MB) charging \nroe (I) count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Fl. Stat. \n796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty to an Information filed \nby the State Attorney's Office charging Epstein with an offense that \nrequires him to register to a sex offender, that is, the soliductica of \nminas to engage in restitution. in viotation of Florida Statutes Section \n796.03. \n2. \nEpstein shall make a binding recommendation that the Court impose \nthirty (J0) month sentence to be divided a follows: \n(a) \nEpstein shall be sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve (12) \nmonths and Mx (6) months in county jail foe all charges, without \nany opportunity for withholding edJudleadon eras:Mewing, and \nwithout probation w community control In lieu of \nInspriscninan; and \n(b) \nEpstein shall be unlaced toe term of twelve (12) months of \ncommunity control comocutivc to hie two mina In comityJail \nas described k Term 2(e), nye°. \n3. \nIlls senescent b continual upon a fudge of the 15th hadkial Circuit \naccepting and executing ft /4111CIWA tweed upon between the State \nAttonsey's Office sod Epstein. the details orwhich are set fords In this \nagreement. \n4. \nThe tennis contained in puamsphs I and 2, supra, do not foreclose \nEpstein and the Slate Attorney's Office from agreeing to recommend \nany additional charge(s) 04 any additional krm(s) of probation ardor \nIncarcetation. \n5. \nEpstein shall waive all challenges to 0se Information flied by the Suite \nAttorneys 0111ce and shall waive the right to cusped' his conviction and \nseetena, except a sentence that exceeds what 13 set forth in paragraph \n(2), aup'o. \n6. \nEpstein skill provide to the O.S. Attorney's Office copies of all \nPssc3of 7 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011806 \nEFTA00192852\n", "char_count": 1967}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "proposed aptemenu with the Suite Attorney's Office prior mastering \ninto those agreements. \nThe United Siam shell provide Epstein's attorneys with a lin of \nindividuals whom it has Identified as victims, a defined in I g U.S.C. \n2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement and been sentenced. \nUpon the netcution of this egreeuwnt the United Sates,in consultation \nwith and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's cartel, shall \nseket an anomey representative for these persons, who shall be paid foe \nby Epstein. Epstein's counsel may contact the identified individuals \nthrough that representative. \nIf any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7), supra. elect. to \nMC suit pursuant to IS U.S.C. § 2255. Epstein will not contest the \njunsdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District \nof Florida ova his person andror the subject matter, end Ea:kitty/Dives \nhis rialst to contest liability and also waives his fight to contst damages \nup to an amount as agreed to between the Identified Individual and \nEpstein, so long as the identified individual elites to proceed \nexclusively under IS V.S.C. § 2255. and agrees to waive any other \nclaim for damages, whether pus:tent estate, Meal, or common law. \nNowrithsondird; this waiver, as to those Individuals whose names \nappear on the list provided by the United States. Epstein's signature on \nthis az:icemen, his waivers and Gam to contest liability and suth \ndamages In nay suit arc not to be construed as an admission of any \ncriminal or civil liability. \nEpstein's signature on this agyeanent also is not to be caromed as en \nadmission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver °forty jurisdktional \nor other defense as to any person whose name does not appear on the \nlist provided by the United Stale. \n10. \nExcept es to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively under \nIS U.S.0 f 2255, as set (whin penigntph (St manta. neither Epstein's \nsignature on this agreement not Mums, nor any resulti\n... [truncated, 2396 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/18 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=18]", "char_count": 2396}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "sentenced net bier thm October 26, 2007. The United States hr no \nobjection to Epstein self-rtgorting to begin serving his sentence not \nlater than January 4. 2006. \n12. \nEpstein agree, Chit he\n not be afforded any benefits with ~set to \npin time,other Menthe rights, opportungies, and benefits as any other \ninmate, including but not limited to, eligibility for gain time credit \nbased on ruusdud role, and regulations that apply In the State of \nFonda. Al the United Sias' toques«. Epstein *gnu M provide en \naccounting of the gain time he eamwd during his period of \nIncer«ration. \nI3. \nthe ponies anticipate Nat this agreement will not be mede pan of any \npublic record. if the United Slates receive, e Freedom of Information \nAct request or any compubory worm conunanding the disclosure of \nthe agreement, int will provide notice to Epstein before making that \ndisclosure. \nEpstein cederstands that the United States Attorney has no authority lo requite the \nSlate Attorney', Office to abide by any tema of this agreement Ennoln undershuldt that \nit Is Ma obligation to undertake din-Lesions with the Stale Artorerry's Office ard 10 we his \nbut efforts to ensure compliance with them prwedurts which compliance will be necessary \nto ardsfy the United States' interest. Epstein alm understands that It is his obligation louse \nhin blot ,Ron, to convince the lodge of the 12th Judicial Circuit to accept Epstein', binding \nrecc nmendation regarding the sentence to be imposed, and understand, that the failure to \ndo so will be e breach of the agreement \nIn consideration of Epstein, agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation \nIn the rriamwrdeseribed above, if fipseeir.succesfiilly NNW' all of the forma andconditions \n*IOW agreement, the United Slats also »grow that It will not institute any criminal charges \nagainst any potential coconspirator* of Epstein, Including but not limited to Sarah Kellen \nAdrian& R033, Lesley Groff, r $.dia hiarcinkova Further, upon execution of this \n... [truncated, 2833 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/19 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=19]", "char_count": 2833}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Dy signifia this agreement. Epstein usons and eertilks that mari of dies. Items is \nmataial Io Nb agreement and If supported by independall eawideration and Ne a lunch \n°Demy onc of the... condition; alloua the United Steel to edect to terminate the agnement \nand to invertigke and protocole Epstein and any °the; individuel or entity te dey and ail \nCoderai offenses \nsysigningthis agreement, Renias usent and outilles thmhe mare °tee (euh.: \nUw Shah Arceiximent to the Coralituion of the United States uovides 141 ln a11 uirninal \nprosecutions the keuao1stioll enjoy the right to a spzedy and publie trid. Esowin furexr \nis 'watt dut Ruk Ill(b) of the Redent{ Rulea ofCriminel Procedtae provides dut the Cowt \nmay &kolas an \nInfonnation, or complaini for traweessuy delay it pteartaing \na charge to the Grand Rn, Ming an Informatiog ce ln bringing a Uri:adent to trial. Epstein \nhereby soumets that the United States Attorney for ne Southem Distrietof Floride de r« sikh \nproseseution Epstein egree and contenu thal anyckley Dom the due of titis Agnerunt to \nthe date of initiation of prou:notion, 03 provided for th the tenu tantes:cd herein, thall te \ndan\n be a neeessary *lapa Alamos mue«, and he hcreby %s'Iwo anydefense b mach \nproxoution on the t'oued Nat nich delay operatcd w deny him nets Linder Rule 48(b) of \nthe Roderai Rides of enterrai Procedwe and the Sbilh Arnendmentto the Constitution of the \nUnitedStaffatom speedy trial or to bu lie proseeutionby tesson of the moins of the 'talle \nof limitations for a pulod of monte <quai la Na period banco the signIng of Une \n0g:cernent and the kaaeh of US OgIVellall 03 us th'« offensa that vere the subito of the \ngrand jury's Investigation. Epstein further muta and ratifia tint he undenumda Mat the \nFlfth Amenament and Rule 7(a) of the Roderai Rule. of Crimiral Wou:dure Koulak daall \nMordes mut lys charged in en {cillement praentod to a grand Jury. Epstein hereby aigres \nand (CeSetw the if • prosecution apaisai him h irntinned for a\n... [truncated, 2297 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/20 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=20]", "char_count": 2297}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "By signing Ibis agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby states that be understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBy: \nDated:  77P/4\" \nDated: \nDated: \nA. MARIE VTLLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nOERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nPage 7 of 7 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-01 1810 \nEFTA00192856\n", "char_count": 542}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBy: \nDated: \nDated:  HD  7 \nDated: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nEFCOL \nES Q. \nOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nPogo 7 of 7 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011811 \nEFTA00192857\n", "char_count": 547}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "By Arniog :Ms Lirknamt, PosWai steers end catnips NY the above Ina bran IS \nad explained whim. Epsiola hereby macs the he uodastsais the coodEloca of Mt Non. \nErossorrtion Aryirsmeat sod wets to comply with them \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \n%MIMED SIAM ATTORNEY \nMud: \nDeb!:  \nOast \nHY: \nA. MARIE YILLAPA9A \nASSISTANT US ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nATTORNEY FOR EIFTIO3Y EPSOM \nhp /of 7 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-01 1 8 12 \nEFTA00192858\n", "char_count": 434}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "IN RE: \nIMIESTIGA11074 OP \nJEMMY IIPSTIPN \n612jamiamm\ntwor \nIT APPEARING that W pullet seek to elerity cenaln peosisloas «page 4, puma 7 \nof Oa Non,hosccutIon Agnarnan Nation': 'pongees* 7), Wu agreement Is neodiflod ot \n%Porn: \n7A \nThe United States tat the right to au@ to an Indopendmt ettedftaity the responsibility \nftr consulting with ted, subject to the good YON apron; of Epsteires counsel. relict* \nWt money reftatiftetive for els ladiviehmis Wonted ur/.<: to Agyeemenl. IS No \nlirfted %us elects 4> assign this rospottititey to at. iftetepenteM thitatarty, boa the \nUndid States end P.pstelsa robin the right to make µok ION objemloas to We eummey \nnpiesenusftvo rvapasied by the Intl:widen, third-pray ?dot to the Mn ckalpariees of \nthe anomey represeabilve. \n70. \nlbc panics will jointly moans a short veekan nsbmIssicm to No Indowklent thInSparty \n:exalting the solo piths atterney roprescntatins and regaiding Epocein's Agromert on \npay wok attorney rtmeoentethe hit te her stouter ontoussey hearty rate tot tronstating \ntoch *Cm subject to i7e pfterisken of prograph C. Infra. \n7C \nPiesewit to additional paragraph 7A,E➢srin/as,Ereedlo py We fees or the ottomey \nnyernaftstive telakd by the ladepenclud ihtd patty.11t pcooision, hosnwr, stall ea \nobligate Pastel» to pay the fee and cot of oftneolod inolun nw «Silts* b;',,\n;tin« comblerelce of ',medal fettleincm. en °nano teprestrgatIn elects to flit e \ncorium.: lovesoit penman. to I8 V.S.C. t 2235 or cleat to pate Sty mho: waited \n,7medY. the Pun rif h 7 obitgatilin of Ne Atnemeet to pay the togs of the eteftecy \nrepitscralive,M opposed to any netstory et oft* obligilkot to pay reat:neifie \nattorneys foes sad costs mots el those Oallehlig k t 2253 to boe: doe cons of Ne annrey \nrepextmelve. shall caw. \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011813 \nEFTA00192859\n", "char_count": 1829}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Ey t;p:ng Mb Addentkm, Efmcb Isme end meien GA1 iba above km boer iod ani \nespisIned b Mm. !nuk henby. sist Pat te vederrards OM GhlifiCatiord CO We Non-\nPr oucuton Agraimen1 and *pm to tomply wkihztote. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nVinTED STATER ATTOMEY \nA. MARE VII1APA A \nASSISTANT VS. ATTORNEY \nDáie.1  \nril\n-\nOs& \nDw.* \nGERALD LEPCOURT,ESO. \nCOUNSEL TO MPFREY MIEN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ. ESQ. \nATTORNEY POR WEM ETSTEN \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011814 \nEFTA00192860\n", "char_count": 465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "By signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and \nexplained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBy: \nDated: \nDated: \nDated: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nRALD LEFCO r RT ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFR Y EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011815 \nEFTA00192861\n", "char_count": 538}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "By signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and \nexplained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with than. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBy: \nDated: \nDated: \nDated: )\n219\"\" \nA. MARIE VILIAFAFIA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nOBRALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANPPSANCHEZ, ES . \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011816 \nEFTA00192862\n", "char_count": 548}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of Florida \nR ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDELIVERY BY FACSIMILE \nLilly Ann Sanchez \nFowler White Burnett, PA \n1395 Stickel! Ave, le Floor \nMiami, FL 33131 \nRe: \nJeffrey Epstein \nDear Ms. Sanchez: \n99N£ !Street \nUSK FL 13112 \n003)961.9100 - Tetteatle \nO03)3366444 - FaesteSk \nDecember 19, 2007 \nI write to follow up on the December le meeting between defense counsel and the Eps \nprosecutors, as well as our First Assistant, the Miami FBI Special A ent in Charge and mysel . \n'Section 2255 provides that: Imlay person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of (enumerated SCCII0115 \nof Title IS] and who suffen personal Injury as a result of such violation ... may sue in any appropriate United States \nDiStliet Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, Including a \nreasonable attorney's fee.\" \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011817 \nEFTA00192863\n", "char_count": 987}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "With this in mind, I have considescd defamecount' nouns, rep/ding the Section 2255 \nprtions of the Agreement. As I previously absent:Iour Intral has been to place the victims in the \nwoe position as they would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted al trial. No more; no less. \nFrom our muting. It appears Mu the defense wets that ibis was the Weed. Uwing the comae of \nnesoliMions that intent was reduced 10 tithing in Pang aph3 7 and 8, which all wrote previnsfr. \nwas fa: from simple to undersuod. I meld thus propose that we solve our eksagitements over \nink:veterans by saying precisely whet we mean in a simple fashion. I would replace Paragraphs 7 \nsod S with the following language: \n\"Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an offense enumerated in \nTitle IS. United States Code. Section 2255, will have the same riche to proceed undo \nSecdon nss 14 ale would have had. if Mt.Epsteinbeen tried federally and convicted of an \nenumerated °Menu- For ImPose Of imPlenwnling this awagraph, the United Saks shall \nprovide Mr. Epstein's atkencys with a list of individuals *horn it was petpued toriame in an \n44kt:oral as victims of an exonerated offense by Mr. P.pskin Any judicial authority \nink:pitting thin provision, including any euthorityiklennining which evidentiary burdens if \nany e plaintiff must meet, shall consider that it is the intent of the panics In place these \nidentified 1114111113 in the 1411% position ILI they would have been had Mt. Epstein been \nconvicted al vial. No mac; no kis.\" \n2 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011818 \nEFTA00192864\n", "char_count": 1589}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Srstrely. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \n3 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011819 \nEFTA00192865\n", "char_count": 110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice \nWashington, D.C. 20530 \nJune 23, 2008 \nJay Lefkowitz„ Esq. \nKenneth Starr, Esq. \nKirkland and Ellis LLP \n777 South Figueroa Street \nLos Angeles, CA 90017 \nGentlemen: \nThis Office has completed a thorough review of the U.S. Attorney's handling of the matter \ninvolving your client, Jeffrey Epstein. We have received and reviewed your letters of May 19, \nJune 3 and June 19, 2008, the attachments to the June 19 letter, as well as your submissions to \nthe Criminal Division and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Additionally, we have reviewed en \nextensive set of materials provided by the U.S. Attorney's Office and conferred with a number of \nhighly experienced Department attorneys about this matter. The Deputy Attorney General has \nalso been briefed. \nAs you know, the Department of Justice vests considerable discretion in its U.S. Attorneys, and \nthe Deputy Attorney General will intervene in only the most unusual of circumstances. We do \nnot believe such intervention is warranted here. Even if we were to substitute our judgment for \nthat of the U.S. Attorney, we believe that federal prosecution of this case is appropriate. \nMoreover, having reviewed your allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the facts \nunderlying them, we see nothing in the conduct of the U.S. Attorney's Office that gives us any \nreason to alter our opinion. \ncc: \nAlex Acosta \nSincerely, \nJohn Roth \nSenior Associate Deputy Attorney General \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011820 \nEFTA00192866\n", "char_count": 1504}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES CALCULATION \n(Using November 1.2004 Guidelines Manual} \nEach count of §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(6): \nBase Offense Level under 2G1.3: \nOffense involved sexual contact: \n24 \n+2 \n26 \nCounts do not group, so add 5 levels for more than 5 units, pursuant to 3D1.4 \nOffense Level 31 \nApply Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender against Minors enhancement at 4B1.5 \nTotal Offense Level 36 \nAssuming Criminal History Category!, advisory guideline range is 188 - 235 months with \nlifetime supervised release. \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011821 \nEFTA00192867\n", "char_count": 577}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "CONFIDENTIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS \nTERMS OF EPSTEIN NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \n■ \nEpstein pleads guilty (not nolo contendere) to an Information filed by the \nPalm Beach County State Attorney's Office charging him with: \n(a) \nlewd and lascivious battery on a child, in violation of Fl. Stat. \n800.04(4); \n(b) \nsolicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Fl. \nStat. 796.03; and \n(c) \nengaging in sexual activity with minors at least sixteen years of age, \nin violation of Fl. Stat. 794.05. \n■ \nEpstein and the State Attorney's Office make a joint, binding \nrecommendation that Epstein serve at least two years in prison, without any \nopportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing; and without \nprobation or community control in lieu of imprisonment. \n■ \nEpstein agrees to waive all challenges to the information filed by the State \nand the right to appeal. \n■ \nEpstein agrees that, if any of the victims identified in the federal \ninvestigation file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest \nthe jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of \nFlorida over his person and the subject matter. Epstein will not contest that \nthe identified victims arc persons who, while minors, were victims of \nviolations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections(s) 2422 and/or 2423. \n■ \nAfter Epstein enters his state court plea and is sentenced, the FBI and the \nU.S. Attorney's Office will close their investigations. \nCase No. 08-R0736-CV-MARRA \nP-011822 \nEFTA00192868\n", "char_count": 1524}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 1 of 19 \nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nJANE DOE No. 101, \nPlaintiff, \nVS. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \n09 - 8059 1 \nCivil Action No. \nCIV-MARRP \nMAGISTRATE JUDGE \nJOHNSON \nEtrpy  ,fir \n DC\nINTAKE \nAPR 1 7 2009 \nSTEVEN M. LARIMORE \nCLERK U.S. OIST. CT. \nS.O. OF FLA. MIAMI \nCOMPLAINT AND \nDefendant. \nDEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL \nCOMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe No. 101 (\"Jane Doe\"), brings this Complaint against Defendant. \nJeffrey Epstein, and states as follows: \nPARTIES• JURISDICTION. AND VENUE \nI. \nAt all times material to this cause of action, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a resident of \nPalm Beach County, Florida. \n2. \nThis Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and \nabuse of a then minor. \n3. \nAt all times material to this cause of action, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, had a \nresidence located at 358 El Bulb  Way, West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida. \n4. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is currently a citizen of the State of Florida, as he is \ncurrently incarcerated in the Palm Beach County Stockade. \n5. \nAt all times material to this cause of action, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, was an \nadult male born in 1953. \nPodhunt Orseck, P.A. \n25 West Hagler Street Suite 800, MWµ FL 33130, MINA 3053582800 Fax 305358.238I • For Lauder:10e 051.4624346 \nwww.podhuyst corn \nCILSC No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011823 \nEFTA00192869\n", "char_count": 1586}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 2 of 19 \n6. \nThis Court has jurisdiction of this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant \nto 18 U.S.C. § 2255. \n7. \nThis Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as a \nsubstantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \n8. \nAt all relevant times, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, was an adult male, \napproximately 50 years old. Epstein is known as a billionaire financier and money manager with \na secret clientele limited exclusively to billionaires. He is a man of tremendous wealth, power, \nand influence. He owns a fleet of aircraft that includes a Gulfstream IV, a helicopter, and a \nBoeing 727. Until his incarceration, he maintained his principal place of residence in the largest \nhome in Manhattan, a 51,000-square-foot eight-story mansion on the Upper East Side. Upon \ninformation and belief, he also owns a S6.8 million mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, a $30 \nmillion 7,500-acre ranch in New Mexico he named \"Zorro,\" and a 70-acre private island known \nas Little St. James in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. The allegations herein concern \nDefendant's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. \n9. \nUpon information and belief, Defendant has a sexual preference for underage \nminor girls. He engaged in a plan, scheme, or enterprise in which he gained access in his home \nto countless relatively economically disadvantaged minor girls, sexually assaulted or molested \nthese girls, and then gave them money. \n10. \nBeginning in or around 2001 through in or around September 2007, Defendant \nused his resources and his influence over vulnerable minor children to engage in a systematic \npattern of sexually exploitative behavior. \n11. \nDefendant's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. \nDefendant coerced and enticed impressionable, vulnerable, and relatively economically less \nPodhurat Orseck, P.A. \n2 \n2s W\n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/35 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=35]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 3 o(19 \nfortunate minors to participate in various acts of sexual misconduct that he committed upon \nthem. Defendant's scheme involved the use of underage girls as well as other individuals to \nrecruit other underage girls. Upon information and belief, Defendant or an authorized agent \nwould call and alert Defendant's assistants shortly before or after he arrived at his Palm Beach \nresidence. His assistants would seek out economically disadvantaged and underage girls from \nWest Palm Beach and surrounding areas who would be enticed by the money being offered—\ngenerally $200 to $300 per \"massage\" session—and who Defendant and/or his assistants \nperceived as less likely to complain to authorities or have credibility issues if allegations of \nimproper conduct were made. The then minor Plaintiff and other minor girls, some as young as \n14 years old, were transported to Defendant's Palm Beach county mansion by Defendant's \nemployees, agents, and/or assistants in order to provide Defendant with \"massages.\" \n12. \nDefendant would pay the procurer of each girl's \"appointment\" approximately \n$200. Many of the instances of illegal sexual conduct committed by Defendant were perpetrated \nwith the assistance, support, and facilitation of at least three assistants who helped him \norchestrate this child exploitation enterprise. These assistants would often arrange times for \nunderage girls to come to Defendant's residence, transport or cause the transportation of \nunderage girls to Defendant's residence, escort the underage girls to the massage room where \nDefendant would be waiting or would enter shortly thereafter, urge the underage girls to remove \ntheir clothes, deliver cash from Defendant to the underage girls and/or their procurers at the \nconclusion of each \"massage appointment,\" and, upon information and belief, take nude \nphotographs and/or videos of the underage girls' for Defendant without their k\n... [truncated, 2463 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/36 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=36]", "char_count": 2463}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 4 of 19 \ndifficult for the minor girls to flee the premises and/or to credibly report his actions to law \nenforcement or other authorities. The girls were usually transported by his employees, agents, \nand/or assistants or by a taxicab paid for by Defendant in order to make it difficult for the girls to \nflee his mansion. \n14. \nUpun arrival at Defendant's mansion, each underage victim would generally be \nintroduced to one of Defendant's assistants, who would gather the girl's personal contact \ninformation. The minor girl would then be led up a flight of stairs to a room that contained a \nmassage table and a large shower. The staircase leading to the room was plastered with nude \nphotographs of young girls, including some photographs depicting two or more young girls \nengaged in lewd acts. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstcin, had such \nphotographs in each of his four homes and on his computer. \n15. \nAt times, if it was the girl's first \"massage\" appointment, another female would \nbe in the room to \"lead the way\" until Defendant would have her leave. Generally, Defendant \nwould start his massage wearing only a small towel, which eventually would be removed. \nDefendant would direct the girl to massage him, giving her specific instructions as to where and \nhow he wanted to be touched, and then direct her to remove her clothing. He would then \nperform one or more lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts, including masturbation, fondling the \nminor's breasts and/or sexual organs, touching the minor's vagina with a vibrator and/or back \nmassager, digitally penetrating her vagina, performing intercourse, oral sex, and/or anal sex, \nand/or coercing or attempting to coerce the girl to engage in lewd acts and/or prostitution. The \nexact degree of molestation and frequency with which the sexual crimes took place varied and is \nnot yet completely known; however, at least when Defendant was i\n... [truncated, 2323 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/37 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=37]", "char_count": 2323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 5 of 19 \n16. \nAs previously stated in paragraph 14, Defendant displayed nude photographs of \nunderage girls throughout his homes in New York, Palm Beach, Ncw Mexico, and the U.S. \nVirgin Islands. Upon information and belief, some of the photographs in the possession of \nDefendant were taken with hidden cameras set up throughout his home in Palm Beach. On the \nday of his arrest, police found two hidden cameras and photographs of underage girls on a \ncomputer in Defendant's home. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, may \nhave taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff, Jane Doe, with his hidden cameras and may have \ntransported lewd photographs of Plaintiff (among many other victims) to his other residences and \nelsewhere using a facility or means of interstate commerce. \n17. \nConsistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Defendant used his money, \nwealth, and power to unduly and improperly manipulate and influence the then minor Plaintiff \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was recruited by one of Defendant's agents to give Defendant a massage for \ncompensation. Plaintiff was apprehensive, but needed the money and finally agreed to go. \nPlaintiff was first thought to Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003, when she was \nmerely 17 years old and in high school. Epstein's procurer drove her to Jeffrey Epstcin's \nmansion. Plaintiff was led up a flight of stairs by a blonde woman to a spa room with a shower \nand a massage table, where she was left alone. A woman with dark hair, an accent, and naked \nfrom the waist up entered and tried to coax Plaintiff to remove her shirt, but Plaintiff refused. \nAfter the woman showed Plaintiff how to use the lotions that were there, the woman left. \nDefendant walked in wearing only a small towel. He lay down on the massage table still \nwearing the small towel, and Plaintiff began to massage his shoulders and neck. Nervously, she \nasked him what he di\n... [truncated, 2465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/38 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=38]", "char_count": 2465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 6 of 19 \ntold her to remove his towel. Defendant told her that he had just worked out and wanted his \nbuttocks massaged. Although disgusted, she was afraid to refuse and did it. At some point, \nDefendant ordered Plaintiff to remove her clothes. In shock, fear, and trepidation, Plaintiff partly \ncomplied, removing only her shirt and bra. When Defendant turned over, Plaintiff was afraid \nand embarrassed and she wanted to leave. \nDefendant repeatedly told her to relax and \ncomplimented her, saying that she had a nice body. Defendant then pulled Plaintiff closer to \nhim. He began masturbating and then began fondling her breasts. He asked her to do more and \nmentioned more money, which she adamantly declined. Defendant continued masturbating until \nhe ejaculated. Plaintiff next recalls that she received $200 and was transported by the procurer, \nwhom she later learned received $200 for having brought her to Epstein's mansion. \n18. \nDefendant thereafter lured the then minor Plaintiff to the Epstein mansion on at \nleast one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003. The procurer \nmade another appointment for her to return, but Plaintiff didn't want to see Defendant. By \nhaving his assistants continue to contact Plaintiff and attempt to lure her to the mansion for other \nsexual acts, Defendant engaged in a continuous course of conduct that injured Plaintiff upon \neach instance of contact and/or abuse. \n19. \nIn addition to the direct sexual abuse and molestation of the then minor Plaintiff, \nDefendant used his money, wealth, and power to unduly and improperly manipulate and \ninfluence the then minor Plaintiff to bring him another minor girl in a promised exchange for \nmoney. Rather than go herself, Plaintiff and the procurer took another girl there one time. \n20. \nAs a result of these encounters with Defendant, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, has in the past \nsuffered, and will in the \n... [truncated, 2480 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/39 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=39]", "char_count": 2480}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 7 of 19 \nother damages associated with Defendant's controlling and manipulating her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. \n21. \nAny assertions by Defendant that he was unaware of the age of the then minor \nPlaintiff are belied by her telling him her high school graduation year, as well as his own actions, \nand are rendered irrelevant by the provision of applicable federal statutes concerning the sexual \nexploitation and abuse of a minor child. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, at all times material to this \ncause of action, knew and should have known of Plaintiff's age of minority. In fact, his \npreference for underage girls was well-known to those who regularly procured them for him. \n22. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, committed the above-referenced acts upon the then \nminor Plaintiff in violation of federal statutes condemning the coercion and enticement of a \nminor to engage in prostitution or sexual activity, travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual \nconduct, sex trafficking of children, sexual exploitation of minor children, transport of visual \ndepictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, transport of child pornography, child \nexploitation enterprises, and other crimes, specifically including, but not limited to, those crimes \ndesignated in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), § 2423(b), § 2423(e), § 2251, § 2252, § 2252A(a)(I), § \n2252A(g)(I), and * 1591. \n23. \nAfter investigations by the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State \nAttorney's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorney's Office \nfor the Southern District of Florida, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, entered picas of \"guilty\" to \nvarious Florida state crimes involving the solicitation of minors for prostitution and the \nprocurement of minors for the purposes of prostitution in June 2008 in the Fifteenth Judicial \nCircuit in Palm Beach County, Florida. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is\n... [truncated, 2309 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/40 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=40]", "char_count": 2309}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 8 of 19 \nmust admit liability unto Plaintiff, Jane Doe. Plaintiff hereby exclusively seeks civil remedies \npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. \nCOUNT ONE \nfCause of Action for Coercion and Enticement of Minor to Engage in Prostitution or \nSexual Activity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ti 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(bfl \n24. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. \n25. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, used a facility or means of interstate commerce to \nknowingly persuade, induce, or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 years, to \nengage in prostitution and/or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(h). \n26. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this \nSection of the United States Code. \n27. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff \nhas suffered a loss of income, a toss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the \ncapacity to enjoy\n... [truncated, 2323 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/41 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=41]", "char_count": 2323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 9 of 19 \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nCOUNT TWO \n(Cause of Action for Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct pursuant to 18 \nU.S.C. & 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. & 2423(bi) \n28. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 above. \n29. \nijpon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, traveled in interstate \ncommerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § \n2423(f), with minor females, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). \n30. \nPlaintiff. Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this \nSection of the United States Code. \n31. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plainti\n... [truncated, 2293 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/42 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=42]", "char_count": 2293}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 10 of 19 \ncapacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to \nsuffer these losses in the future. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nCOUNT THREE \n(Cause of Action for Sex Traffickine of Children pursuant to 18 U.S.C. b 2255 in Violation \nof 18 U.S.C. ti 1591(a)) \n32. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. \n33. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly, in or affecting interstate or foreign \ncommerce, recruited, enticed, and obtained Plaintiff, Jane Doe, knowing that she had not attained \nthe age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act as defined in 18 \nU.S.C. § 1591(0)(1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). \n34. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this \nSection of the United States Code. \n35. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a pe\n... [truncated, 2220 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/43 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=43]", "char_count": 2220}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 9:09-Oi-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 11 of 19 \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff \nhas suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the \ncapacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to \nsuffer these losses in the future. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nCOUNT FOUR \n(Cause of Action for Sexual Exploitation of Children pursuant to 18 U.S.C. & 2255 in \nViolation of 18 U.S.C. & 22511 \n36. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doc, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 above. \n37. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly induced, enticed, or coerced then minor \nPlaintiff Jane Doe to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual \ndepiction of such conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. As previously stated in paragraphs \n14 and 16, Defendant displayed a myriad of photographs of underage girls throughout his homes \nin New York, Palm Beach, New Mexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Upon information and \nbelief, many of the photographs in the possession of Defendant were taken with hidden cameras \nset up throughout his home in Palm Beach. On the day of his arrest, police found two hidden \ncameras and photographs of underage girls on a computer in Defendant's home. \nUpon \ninformation and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, may have taken lewd photographs of \nPla\n... [truncated, 2294 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/44 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=44]", "char_count": 2294}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 12 of 19 \nPlaintiff (among many other victims) to his other residences and elsewhere using a facility or \nmeans of interstate commerce. \n38. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this \nSection of the United States Code. \n39. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff \nhas suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the \ncapacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to \nsuffer these losses in the future. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \nI2 \n25 West Rasher Street, SUMP SOO, Maud, FT. 33130, MIanL 3053582880 Fax 3053582382 • Fort Lauderdale 554.463A346 \nwww.podlutroterom \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \n... [truncated, 2024 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/45 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=45]", "char_count": 2024}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 13 of 19 \nCOUNT FIVE \n(Cause of Action for Transport of Visual Depiction of Minor Eneanine in Sexually Explicit \nConduct pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. & 2252(a)(1)1 \n40. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, =lieges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. \n41. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly mailed, transported, or shipped in \ninterstate or foreign commerce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(1). As \npreviously stated in paragraphs 14, 16, and 37, upon information and belief, Defendant displayed \na myriad of photographs of underage girls throughout his homes in New York, Palm Beach, New \nMexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Upon information and belief, many of the photographs in \nthe possession of Defendant were taken with hidden cameras set up throughout his home in Palm \nBeach. On the day of his arrest, police found two hidden cameras and photographs of underage \ngirls on a computer in Defendant's home. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff, Jane Doe, with his hidden cameras and \nmay have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff (among many other victims) to his other \nresidences and elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate commerce. \n42. \nAs previously stated in paragraph 21, any assertions by Defendant that he was \nunaware of the age of the then minor Plaintiff are belied by his actions and rendered irrelevant by \nthe provision of applicable federal and state statutes concerning the sexual exploitation and abuse \nof a minor child. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, at all times material to this cause of action, knew \nand should have known of Plaintiff's age of minority. In fact, his preference for underage girls \nwas well-known to those who regularly procured them for him. \n43. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of \n... [truncated, 2389 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/46 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=46]", "char_count": 2389}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 14 of 19 \n44. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff \nhas suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the \ncapacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to \nsuffer these losses in the future. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nCOUNT SIX \n(Cause of Action for Transport of Child Pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. & 2255 in \nViolation of 18 U,S.C. ti 2252A(a)(1)1 \n45. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. \n46. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly mailed, transported, or shipped in \ninterstate or foreign commerce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). \nPodhurst Orsecic, P.A. \n14 \nZS West Meer Street. Suite 800, MWµ P1.13130. Ittlen\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/47 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=47]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 15 of 19 \n47. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, and, as such asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this \nSection of the United States Code. \n48. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is in the same position as if he had been tried and \nconvicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability \nunto Plaintiff, Jane Doe. \n49. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff \nhas suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the \ncapacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to \nsuffer these losses in the future. \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \n25 Wag FlalJer Street Suite SOO, Wan* FL 33130. Miura 305358.2800 Fax 305358.2382\n... [truncated, 2106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/48 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=48]", "char_count": 2106}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 16 of 19 \nCOUNT SEVEN \n(Cause of Action for Envie.Ina in a Child Exploitation Enterprise pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § \n2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 6 2252Alafi \n50. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by \nreference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. \n51. \nDefendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, \nas defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 USC § 2252A(g)(1). As more fully set \nforth above in paragraphs 9 through 19, Defendant's actions involved countless victims and \ncountless incidents of abuse, and he committed those offenses against minors in concert with at \nleast three other persons. \n52. \nPlaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this \nSection of the United States Code. \n53. \nAs a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \nbeing committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, \nand will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, \npsychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, \nloss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and \nother damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and \nunhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, \nand Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff \nhas suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the \ncapacity to enjoy life. These injuries arc permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to \nsuffer these losses in the f\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/49 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=49]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 17 of 19 \nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey \nEpstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual \nand compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this \nCourt deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by \na jury. \nDate: April 17, 2009 \nC. \n6-1 \nRobert C. Jose s \nre gt1tIo. 040856 \nKatherine W. Ezell, Bar No. 114771 \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 \nMiami, Florida 33130 \n(305) 358-2800 \n(305)358-2382 (fax) \nriosefsberg@podhurst.com \nkezell@podhurst.com \nAttorneys for Plaintiff \nREMAND FOR JURY TRIAL \nPlaintiff demands to have her case tried before a jury. \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \n17 \nRobert C. Josefstrreei\nr No. 04\\0-;. -6 \nKatherine W. Ezell, Bar No. 114771 \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 \nMiami, Florida 33130 \n(305) 358-2800 \n(305) 358-2382 (fax) \nriosefsbenaoodhurst.com \nkezell@podhurst.com \nAttorneys for Plaintiff \nC • \ni•Ln \n25 Wat Hagler Stmt.Sat SOO, 1,41sent FI, 33130. Pallid 3053%2903 Fax 305.3567382 • Fort Lauderdale 954463.4346 \nwww.padhurst coen \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-0 I I 819 \nEFTA00192885\n", "char_count": 1329}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 18 of 19 \nJ544 (Rev. I103) \nCIVIL COVER SHEET \n• \nlbelS MI civil covet shod end lhelnfOnnelionceetainedhereinneihrvcohet NNSupg6pmenllho filing and strike of pleadings of other papers as required by law, except as provided \n•by local rules °rowel This form approved by lbelldicial COnkrence of Die United Slate% in SoNanbm 1974. is scomed forthe use of the flak of Court foe Ilse purpose of milialing \nthe civil dada shed. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RE VERSE OF THE FOAM I \nNOTICE: Attoroeys MUST ladkate All Re-filed Cones Below. \nI. (R) PLAINTIFFS \nJane Doe No. 101 \n(b) COunly Of Reddest* of Eitel Lime, Plaintiff \nWeal Palm Beach \n(EXCEPT NUS. PLAINTS'S CASES) \n(C) Anomeys Sinn Nana. Addrem, endTelephone Asti \nRobert C. losefsberg, EsqACatherine W. Ezell, Esq. \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \n25 W. Magic: St., Suite 800 \nmini\"; Pt \nO9_ O41 sosq, ... Morro, \nId) Check County When Anion Atom 0 MIAM6 DAVE 0 SICHROB 0 BROWARD j1 PAW BEACH 0 MARTIN 0 ST. (ACE 0 INDIAN RIVER CI OKEECHOBEE \nHIGHLANDS \nII. BASIS OF JURISDICTION \n(Slam WI' FOR \nOrdy) \n0 I \n11S. Geninlicild \nV) 3 Want ()union \nPNiniR \n(U.S. Gnawer. Ha a Perry) \nDEFENDANTS \nJeffrey Epstein \nCounty of Residence of Final Lilted Defendant Fli*P0 Pa\nw_SL\nIM \nExc.\n(IN US. PLAINTIFF CA pgpgikE, \nNOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASE USE THE LOCATION OF THE \nLAND INVOLVED. \nAPR 1 \nAttorneys DtKrown) \nJack A. Goldberger, Esq., Atterbury \nAusuallan Ave., PICA West Palm \nSTEVEN M. \nold \nid „taw \net \nB \nO 2 \nU.S. Government \n0 4 \nDiven6y \nDs knew* \nIn\n Cittuntan, of Panics In Item III) \nIII. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIESirace uric...on aim Re ?Mart \nV. NATURE Ot' SUIT irkedoolc...no.oaco. \n(For Dinnby Cams Only) \nPTV \nDEF \nand One Boa for De &Seal \nPIS \nDEP \nCiliate a TN, Stale \n• ' \nI \nI \nbcorpsisted ne PrincipalPlaca \nof Business In Tah Stan \n0 \n4 \n04 \nChiles of Manta Sale \n0 \n2 \n0 2 \nIrecepomio1 and ',inns/ Phu \nof Buttress In Amite Stec \n0 \nII 5 \nMune( Stied a\n... [truncated, 5911 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/51 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=51]", "char_count": 5911}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 1 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 \nPage 19 of 19 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nWEST PALM BEACH DIVISION \nATTACHMENT TO CIVIL COVER SHEET \nFOR: Jane Doe No. 101'. Jeffrey Epstein \nVI. \nRELATED/RE-FILED CASE(S): \n08.80069 \n08-80119 \n08-80232 \n08-80380 \n08-80381 \n08-08804 \n08-80811 \n08-80893 \n08-80993 \n08-80994 \n08.80469 \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP411841 \nEFTA00192887\n", "char_count": 438}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591 -KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 1 of 36 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nJANE DOE No. 101, \nPlaintiff, \nI \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nCase No.: 9:09-CV-80591-KAM \nDEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED \nCOMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves to \ndismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement of, the First Amended Complaint. Fed. R. \nCiv. RR. 12(b)(6) & 12(e) (2009); Loc. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In support, Defendant states: \nPleadine Standard & Summary of Areument \nThe First Amended Complaint (\"FAC\") alleges claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 that \nexplicitly incorporate, and thus necessarily require Plaintiff to prove that Defendant is guilty of \nviolating, specific criminal prohibitions set forth in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. While the \nSupreme Court has held that every complaint \"'must contain something more than a statement of \nfacts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action,'\" Hell Atlantic Corn. \n1 Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and just last week made clear that \"Twombly expounded \nthe pleading standard for 'all civil actions' and not just pleadings made in the context of an \nantitrust dispute,\" Ashcroft'. Iqbal No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (slip op. at 20) (quoting \nFed. R. Civ. P. 1), the need to enforce these pleading requirements is especially acute in this \ncontext. After all, the defendant in a § 2255 action is essentially being put on trial for violating \ncriminal laws, and the statutory penalty is obviously and intentionally punitive. \nAs a result, it not only is appropriate to require \"more than an unadorned, the-defendant-\nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011842 \nEFTA00192888\n", "char_count": 1863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 2 of 36 \nunlawfully-harmed-me accusation\" before allowing plaintiffs to launch a fishing expedition for \nevidence of possible crimes, label, slip op. at 14 (citing Thyombly, 550 U.S. at 555), but essential \nthat the accused be given \"'such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform [him] \nof the specific offense ... with which he is charged,\" including a \"specific identification of \nfact[s)\" required to establish \"fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or \nambiguity, ... all the elements necessary to constitute the offence.\" Russell'. United States, 369 \nU.S. 749, 764-65 (1962) (quoting United States \nHess 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888); United States \nCarl[, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)). The FAC does not come close to discharging that burden. \n& The applicable version of § 2255 only permits \"minors\" to sue: \"Any minor who is a \nvictim of a violation of [certain criminal statutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of \nsuch violation may sue.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003) (emphasis added). \nYet the FAC \naffirmatively admits that Plaintiff is over the age of 18. See FAC ¶ 18 (\"Plaintiff was first \nbrought to Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003, when she was merely 17 years \nold.\"). Plaintiff is bound by that admission, and the FAC must be dismissed with prejudice. \nBest Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc.'. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. \n1983) (\"[A] party is bound by the admissions in his pleadings.\"). \nL. Nor is Plaintiff the \"victim of a violation\" of a predicate criminal statute within the \nmeaning of § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In our system of justice, those accused of \"violating\" a \ncriminal statute are innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal court. \nWith due respect to the courts that have concluded otherwise, it defies common sense to think \nthat Congress intended to invert that fundamental \n... [truncated, 2445 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/54 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=54]", "char_count": 2445}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 3 of 36 \nabsence of a predicate conviction, the FAC not only fails to meet the modest pleading standards \nelucidated by Twombly and Tribal, but—even taken as true--would not establish a legally \n\"plausible\" claim that Plaintiff is a victim of any predicate criminal offense giving rise to a \n§ 2255 cause of action. See Iqbal, slip op. at 15 (explaining that every civil complaint must state \n\"a plausible claim for relief,\" and that \"where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to \ninfer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not \n'shown'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.\") (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). \nD. Finally, Plaintiff's attempt to multiply the penalties recoverable under § 2255(a) by \npleading six separate counts is inconsistent with the language and structure of § 2255. The law \nallows for a single action predicated on any and all predicate criminal acts, and entitles the \nplaintiff only to a single recovery of actual damages (subject only to a presumptive minimum). \nI. \nTHE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MINOR. \nA. \nThe Version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 In Effect When The Predicate Acts Allegedly \nWere Committed Allowed Only \"Minors\" To File Suit. \nThe FAC is predicated exclusively on acts that allegedly occurred in 2003. FAC 1 18 \n(\"Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion in ... the spring of 2003.\"); id. 119 \n(\"Defendant thereafter lured [Plaintiff] to [his home] on at least one and perhaps two other \noccasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003.\"). At that time, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provided: \nAny minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain specified federal statutes] and \nwho suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any \nappropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages \nsuch minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reas\n... [truncated, 2588 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/55 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=55]", "char_count": 2588}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 4 of 36 \nwords of the statutory provision.\") (quoting Karns I. Garner 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. \n2000) (en bane)) (first alteration omitted). In this case, the plain text of the 2003 statute is both \nclear and unmistakable. It allowed only minors (or the representative of a then-minor, see Fed R. \nCiv. P. 17(c)) to initiate suit under § 2255. It provided only that \"any minor ... may sue\" and \nthat \"any minor ... shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains\" as a result of the \npredicate acts. Id. (emphasis added). The law's use of the present tense further underscored its \nlimited scope: It spoke of \"any minor who is a victim,\" provided that \"such minor ... shall \nrecover\" damages arising from the underlying offense, and stated that \"any minor ... shall be \ndeemed\" to have sustained at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the \nstatute's words are unambiguous--as the arc here—the \"judicial inquiry is complete.\" Mewl s\nPittard Paver Co 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 \nversion of the statute, only minors could initiate suit. \nTo the extent there is any ambiguity in the text—and there is none—the law's legislative \nhistory further underscores Congress's intent to limit the right of action to minors: \"Current law \nprovides for a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from child pornography offenses. This \nsection expands the number of sex offenses in which a minor may pursue a civil remedy for \npersonal injuries resulting from the offense.\" H.R. Rep. 105-557, at 23 (1998), as reprinted in \n1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 692. And perhaps most telling, Congress amended § 2255 in 2006—\nthree years after the alleged misconduct in this case supposedly took place—to make the civil \naction available to persons who had turned 18 by the time they filed suit: \n(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of \ns\n... [truncated, 2598 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/56 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=56]", "char_count": 2598}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 5 of 36 \n18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (emphasis added). \nThe contrast between the 2003 and 2006 versions of § 2255 is stark. The 2006 law \nreplaces each of the 2003 law's uses of the term \"minor\" with the term \"person.\" Where the \n2006 law does refer to a \"minor,\" it changes the 2003 law's present-tense references (\"is\") to \npast-tense references (\"was\"). And the 2006 law's new language now makes clear that, unlike \nthe 2003 statute, those victimized while under the age of 18 may sue after they turn 18. Given \nthat amendments must be interpreted \"to have real and substantial effect,\" Stone'. I.N.S., 514 \nU.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can be no doubt that Congress recognized the prior statute's strict \nlimitations and for the first time expanded the tight of action to adults. \nIndeed, the history of the 2006 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended to \nchange the law, not merely to clarify it. Those amendments were made by § 707 of the Adam \nWalsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 650 (2006), and are \nknown as \"Masha's Law.\" As Senator Kerry—the author of Masha's Law—explained: \nWhat Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it changes \"any \nminor\" to \"any person,\" so that if a minor Is depicted in photographs \npornographically that are distributed over the Internet, but by the time the \nabuser is caught, the minor is an adult, they can still recover. They cannot \nLtqL,v and that is ridiculous. It makes sure that recovery on the part of a minor \ncart take place when they become an adult.... \nAlthough I don't think there is any price too high to cost an individual who would \ntake advantage of a minor, I think it is only appropriate to ... make sure that \nreaching the age of adulthood does not exempt someone from recovery. It is a \ntribute to continuing to do what this bill does, and that is look after the protection \nof minors and ensure that th\n... [truncated, 2330 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/57 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=57]", "char_count": 2330}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 6 of 36 \nS.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) (\"[A] sponsor's statement to the MI Senate carries considerable \nweight.\"),I There is no basis to depart from that rule here. \nIt thus is no answer that the 2003 statute's limitations clause provided that \"in the case of \na person under a legal disability, [the complaint may be filed] not later than three years after the \ndisability,\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2003), such that the unamended version of the law implicitly \nmust have permitted victims to sue even after they turned 18. That interpretation not only would \nrender Masha's Law superfluous; it would make Masha's Law's internally redundant, because \nMasha's Law retained the \"legal disability\" language from the 2003 version of § 2255(b). See \n18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006). In short, the retained \"legal disability\" language in § 2255(b) of the \n2006 statute would be entirely redundant were it construed to do implicitly what the law \nelsewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional Ma against surplusage and \nredundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan'. Walker 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). \nThe \"legal disability\" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal \ndisabilities like insanity, mental disability, or imprisonment—not age. \nIndeed, that is precisely how Congress typically uses the term \"legal disability\": most \nfederal statutes that use the term make clear that it doesn't include age. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. \n§ 590c CA share or interest payable to enrollees less than eighteen years of age or under legal \nSimilarly, the official summary prepared by the Congressional Research Service (\"CRS\") explained that \nMasha's Law \"(devises provisions allowing victims of certain sex-related crimes to seek civil remedies to: (I) \nallow adults as well as minors to sue for injuries; and (2) increase from 550,000 to $150,000 the minimum \nlevel of damages.\" \nOfficial Summa\n... [truncated, 2956 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/58 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=58]", "char_count": 2956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 7 of 36 \ndisability shall be paid ....\") (emphasis added); id. § 783 (\"Funds payable under sections 781 to \n785 of this title to minors or to persons under legal disability shall be paid....\") (emphasis \nadded); id. § 1128 (\"Sums payable to enrollees ... who are less than eighteen years of age or \nwho are under a legal disability shall be paid....\") (emphasis added); id. § 1253 (\"Sums payable \n... to enrollees ... who are less than eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability \nshall be paid....\") (emphasis added); id. § 1273 (same); id. § 1283 (same); id. § 1295 (same); id. \n§ 1300a-3 (same); id. § 1300c-3 (same); id. § 1300d-7 (same); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3501. \nNeedless to say, Congress would not have had to address age expressly in any of these \nstatutes if the term \"legal disability\" necessarily included one's status as a minor; instead, \nCongress's mere use of the term \"legal disability\" already would account for a would-be \nplaintiff's minority status. Given the rule \"against reading a text in a way that makes part of it \nredundant,\" Nat'l Ass'n of Home BuildersI, Defenders of Wildlife 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing \nTRW Inc. \nAndrews 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that \"where words are employed \nin a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of this country, they are \npresumed to have been used in that sense,\" $tandard Oil Co. I, United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 \n(1911), § 2255's reference to \"legal disability\" can only be interpreted as a reference to classic \ndisabilities like insanity or mental incapacity, but not age. \nBut this Court need not even reach that issue in this case. Regardless of whether \n§ 2255(6) would allow a minor to sue within three years of turning 18, that carve-out would not \nhelp Plaintiff in this case. After all, she openly admits that she was 17 years-old in 2003. FAC \n11 18, 19. That means that she was either 22 or 23\n... [truncated, 2494 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/59 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=59]", "char_count": 2494}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 8 of 36 \nB. \nMasha's Law Does Not Apply To This Case. \nThe presumption against retroactivity and the Ex Post Facto clause preclude application \nof Masha's Law in this case, where the alleged predicate conduct was completed before 2006. \n1. \nCongress Dld Not Intend To Apply Masha's Law Retroactively. \nIt is axiomatic that \"retroactivity is not favored,\" Bowen'. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 \nU.S. 204, 208 (1988), and the \"traditional presumption teaches that [an amended statute) does \nnot govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.\" Lanchtraf I. USI Film \nProds. 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). As the Supreme Court has explained, this presumption \nembodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary \nconsiderations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to \nknow what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled \nexpectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the \"principle that \nthe legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed \nwhen the con uct took place has timeless and universal appeal.\" Kaiser Alum. & \ntrt Corp \n. B \nmo 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). \nId. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the \nunderlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply \nretroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co.', United States ex rel. \nSchumer 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) (\"Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of \ncongressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment, \nwe ... hold that, under the relevant 1982 version of the [statute), the District Court was obliged \nto dismiss this action.\"). \nThere is no clear indication that Congress intended Masha's Law to apply retroactively. \nUnlike the many cases in which C\n... [truncated, 2499 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/60 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=60]", "char_count": 2499}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 9 of 36 \narguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.\"). \nFar more important, the only expression of congressional intent regarding retroactivity \nstrongly suggests that Congress did not intend Masha's Law to apply retroactively. As set forth \nabove, Masha's Law was enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Act. The centerpiece of that Act \nwas an expanded sex-offender registry (\"SORNA\") intended to bolster tracking of convicted sex \noffenders. See Pub. L. 109-248 §§ 1-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590-611 (2006). To effectuate SORNA, \nCongress provided that offenders must register \"before completing a sentence of imprisonment \nwith respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement, or not later than 3 business \ndays after being sentenced\" if no prison term was imposed. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b). It also \nimposed penalties on offenders who fail to register. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). At the same time, \nand of particular relevance in this case, Congress recognized that applying SORNA to past \noffenders would raise retroactivity concerns. It therefore addressed retroactivity expressly: \nThe Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the \nrequirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or \nits implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the \nregistration of any such sex offenders. \n42 U.S.C. § 16913 (d). \nWhile Congress clearly provided that SORNA could be applied retroactively, it did not \ndo so with respect to Masha's Law. As the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have long \nobserved, \"'where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it \nin another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and \npurposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" United States I. lordm, 915 F.2d 622, \n6\n... [truncated, 2402 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/61 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=61]", "char_count": 2402}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 10 of 36 \n2. \nThe Ex Post Facto Clause Bars Application Of Masha's Law. \nEven if Congress did intend Masha's Law to apply retroactively, doing so would violate \nthe Ex Post Facto clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained: \n[The] Constitution provides that \"[Mt) Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall \nbe passed\" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law violates the Ex Post \nFacto Clause if it \"'applies to events occurring before its enactment and \ndisadvantages the offender affected by it' by altering the definition of criminal \nconduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.\" Lynce I. Mathis 519 U.S. \n433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver,. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). \nUnited States'. Sim!, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal \nalterations omitted). Even though this case nominally involves a civil cause of action, the Ex \nPost Facto Clause is triggered both because Masha's Law dramatically increased the penalties \nfor predicate criminal violations and because its retroactive application would revive \nDefendant's exposure to penalties that previously had become barred as a matter of law. \na. \nRetroactive Application Of Masha's Law Would Increase The \nPenalties For Violating The Predicate Criminal Statutes. \nWhile the 2003 statute provided that \"[a]ny minor ... shall be deemed to have sustained \ndamages of no less than $50,000,\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2003) (emphasis added), Masha's Law \ntrebles the minimum statutory damages by providing that plaintiffs \"shall be deemed to have \nsustained damages of no less than $150,000.\" Id. (2006) (emphasis added). As a result, the \nenhanced monetary penalties provided by Masha's Law \"increas[e] the punishment for the \ncrime,\" Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, and make \"the punishment for crimes committed before its \nenactment 'more onerous\"' than the punishment would have been under the unam\n... [truncated, 2539 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/62 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=62]", "char_count": 2539}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 11 of 36 \nS8012-02 at S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (\"[Masha's Law) raises from \n$50,000 to $150,000 the penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.\") (emphasis \nadded). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. \nThe Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States I, Siegel 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. \n1998), is virtually on point. In Siegel, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under 18 U.S.C. \n§ 371 and § 1956(a)(1XA) that arose out of actions taken he took between February 1, 1988 and \nMay 1, 1990. Id. at 1259. Under the restitution statute in effect when the crimes were \ncommitted (\"VWPA'), courts had discretion \"to order `that the defendant make restitution to any \nvictim of the offense.\" Id. at 1259 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1985)). But that discretion was \nlimited: \"In exercising this discretion, the court was required to consider `the amount of the loss \nsustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the \nfinancial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such \nother factors as the court deems appropriate,' before fixing the amount of the restitution, if any, \nthat the defendant was required to pay.\" Id. at 1260 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (1985)). \nBefore Siegel pleaded guilty in July 1996, Congress passed the Mandatory Victims \nRestitution Act (\"MVRA\"). Id. at 1258-59 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 211). That law \nmandated the award of full restitution without regard to the defendant's economic circumstances. \nId. at 1260. Congress expressly made those changes \"effective for sentencing proceedings in \ncases in which the defendant is convicted on or after April 24, 1996.\" Id. at 1258 (quoting \nstatute; alteration omitted). The district court applied MVRA at Siegel's sentencing and ordered \nhim to pay restitution totaling $1,207,000 without co\n... [truncated, 2524 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/63 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=63]", "char_count": 2524}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 12 of 36 \nAccordingly, if the court determines that the VWPA should apply to this case, it \nmust use the old version to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. \nId. (quoting United States,. Baggett, 125 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997)). \nThis case is indistinguishable from Siegel. As in Siegel, Masha's Law caused \"a \nsubstantive change ... to [defendantrs detriment,\" by trebling the minimum statutory penalty \npayable to the victim of a predicate crime. Id. at 1260. As in Siegel, Masha's Law thus has \"the \npotential to increase the amount of restitution [defendants] would have to pay\" to victims of a \npredicate crime. Id. Accordingly, and as in Siegel, Masha's Law cannot be applied where the \npredicate criminal conduct allegedly occurred prior to the amended statute's effective date. \nIt is no answer that the law at issue in Siegel provided \"restitution\" to the victim of a \ncriminal offense while this statute provides \"damages\" to the victim of a criminal offense; by \ndefinition, damages paid by an offender to the victim of a criminal offense are restitution. See \nBlack's Law DIet. (8th ed. 2004) (defining restitution as \"[c]ompensation for loss; esp., full or \npartial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim.\"). Indeed, the case for applying ex post \nfacto principles is even stronger here than in Siegel: While MVRA mandated the award of actual \ndamages to the victim, Masha's Law mandates the payment of at least $150,000 to the victim \neven if the victim did not actually sustain $150,000 in damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) \n(\"My [victim] shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,0001n value.\") \n(emphasis added). Given its obviously penal nature, there is little wonder why Senator Kerry \nrepeatedly described Masha's Law as increasing \"the penalty\" for persons convicted of a \npredicate crime. 152 Cong. Rec. 58012-02, S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.\n... [truncated, 2415 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/64 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=64]", "char_count": 2415}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 13 of 36 \nPerhaps more important, the Ex Post Facto clause precludes application of Masha's Law \nhere because it would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties that previously had become \nbarred by operation of law—no matter their amount. As set forth above, the 2003 statute \nallowed only \"minors\" to file suit. Because Plaintiff was 17 when the predicate offenses \nallegedly were committed, she could have sought the statutory penalty under the 2003 version of \n§ 2255. Once Plaintiff turned 18, however, she lost her ability to sue. That extinguished \nDefendant's exposure to penalties for his alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would \nrevive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Ex Post Facto clause. \nThe Supreme Court's decision in California \nStogner 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly \nillustrates the point. In Stegner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he \nallegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of limitations \nfor those offenses long had lapsed, a California law purported to \"revive\" stale claims by \nauthorizing the filing of charges within one year of a new police report alleging past child sexual \nabuse. 539 U.S. at 609-10 (discussing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 803(g) (2003)). The defendant \nmoved unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment, and later appealed to the Supreme Court. \nThat Court reversed, explaining that \"the new statute threatens the kinds of harm that ... \nthe Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to avoid,\" because its revival of previously barred claims would \nsubject the defendant to penalties for criminal conduct \"after the State has assured 'a man that he \nhas become safe from its pursuit,\"' and thus would \"deprive the defendant of the 'fair warning' \nthat might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence.\" 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter t \nUnited States 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928\n... [truncated, 2474 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/65 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=65]", "char_count": 2474}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 14 of 36 \nThe second category—including any \"law that aggravates a crime, or makes it \ngreater than it was, when committed,\" describes California's statute as long as \nthose words are understood as Justice Chase understood them—i.e., as referring to \na statute that \"inflict[s] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to \nany punishment.\" After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had \nexpired, a party such as Stogner was not \"liable to any punishment.\" California's \nnew statute therefore \"aggravated\" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it \"greater \nthan it was, when committed,\" in the sense that, and to the extent that, it \"inflicted \npunishment\" for past criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did \nnot trigger any such liability. \nId. at 613 (quoting Calder, 3 DaII. at 391) (internal citations omitted). The Court held that the \nPost Facto clause precludes the revival of claims predicated on past crimes. \nThe precise concerns animating Stogner are present in this case. \nAs in Stogner \nDefendant was \"liable to punishment\" under § 2255 before Plaintiff turned 18, but once she \nattained that age, he no was longer \"liable to punishment\" under § 2255 for his alleged \ncommission of the predicate crimes against her. And as in Stegner, retroactively applying \nMasha's Law in a manner that would revive Defendant's exposure to statutory penalties would \n\"aggravate\" his alleged crimes \"in the sense, and to the extent that, it 'inflicted punishment' for \npast criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did not trigger any such liability.\" \nId. (quoting Calder 3 Dail. at 391). At bottom, then, well-settled retroactivity and ex post facto \nprinciples preclude application of Masha's Law to Defendant's alleged pre-enactment conduct. \nC. \nThe FAC Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Concededly Is Not A Minor. \nAs the FAC makes clear, Plaintiff was 17 in the sprin\n... [truncated, 2630 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/66 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=66]", "char_count": 2630}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 15 of 36 \nconsistent with Rule 11) allege that Defendant is guilty of \"a violation\" of a predicate statute. \nSee 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003 & 2006) (plaintiff must be \"a victim of a violation of [certain \nfederal statutes]\"). As set forth below, the plain text of the statute and its legislative history \ndemonstrate that § 2255 is conditioned on a prior federal conviction. Because Defendant has \nnever been convicted of a predicate federal offense, the FAC must be dismissed. \nA. \nThe Statute Requires Proof Of A Prior Federal Conviction. \nBy its plain terms, § 2255 only permits \"a victim of a violation\" of certain federal \ncriminal statutes to seek statutory penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003 & 2006). Given the \npresumption of innocence that animates our system of criminal justice, Congress's reference to \n\"a victim of a violation\" of a criminal statute can only be interpreted to require proof that the \ndefendant has been convicted of a predicate federal offense against the plaintiff After all, an \nindividual accused of \"violating\" a criminal statute is deemed innocent until proven guilty \nbeyond a reasonable doubt. It would turn that principle upside down if plaintiffs could sue in the \nabsence of an antecedent criminal conviction. Given that \"Congress is understood to legislate \nagainst a background of common-law adjudicatory principles,\" Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. \nSolimino 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991), 'the courts may take it as given that Congress has \nlegislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to \nthe contrary is evident.\"' Id. (quoting Jsbrandtsen Co. I. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). \nIn this case, however, the Court need not take anything \"as given.\" Even if the statute's \nlanguage were not clear—which it is—§ 2255's legislative history confirms that Congress \nintended to require a prior criminal conviction. While the histor\n... [truncated, 2459 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/67 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=67]", "char_count": 2459}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 16 of 36 \nthe amendments, explained that \"the sanctions provided for in my bill, such as ... the amended \ncivil remedy section [would] provide much needed criminal enforcement tools\" against \nconvicted offenders. 134 Cong. Rec. 5372-01 (Feb. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Not \nsurprisingly, the House Report accompanying that legislation used classic terms associated with \nan adjudicated conviction in order to make clear that the bill targeted those convicted of the \npredicate crimes: \"It is the intention of the Committee that only the offender who perpetrated \nthe offense against the minor is liable for damages under this section.\" H.R. Rep. 105-557, P.L. \n105-314: Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998, at 23 (emphasis added). \nThe legislative history of Masha's Law is even more explicit: \nWhat Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it ... makes sure that \nrecovery on the part of a minor can take place when they become an adult, \nwhether or not the guilty person is incarcerated. It raises from $50,000 to \n$150,000 the penalty for which that individual can be recompensated if, in fact, \nsomeone who depicts that picture and puts it on the Internet and uses them is \ncaught and convicted. \n152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02 at S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry). These references \ncould hardly be clearer: for the statute to apply, the defendant must be arrested, tied, and found \n\"guilty\"—the \"penalty\" is available only \"if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.\" Id. \nAs noted above, courts give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor. Corlev 129 \nS.Ct. at 1569. Given these clear statements from Senator Kerry, the only plausible conclusion is \nthat § 2255 requires proof of an antecedent criminal conviction. \nThat having been said, we do recognize that two district courts have held that plaintiffs \nmay pursue a § 2255 action even wi\n... [truncated, 2505 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/68 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=68]", "char_count": 2505}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 17 of 36 \nrelating to unenacted drafts of the legislation. See Smith, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 610-12; Liberatore \n478 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55. \nFirst, both courts found it significant that § 2255 initially was proposed as an amendment \nto the civil RICO statute, and in particular that an early draft of the legislation allowed \"[a]ny \nperson injured (1) personally by reason of a violation of [RICO] if such injury results from an \nact Indictable under sections 2251 and 2252 of this title (relating to sexual exploitation of \nchildren) ... [to] sue therefor.\" Smith 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 \n(June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. \nSupp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, \"[t]his \nlanguage ... indicates that it was not Congress's intent that a conviction under the other sexual \nexploitation statutes be a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil suit for damages,\" because the \ndraft bill grounded the cause of action on \"'an act indictable' under the statute\" instead of one \nthat actually produced an indictment and conviction. Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 612. \nSmith's analysis draws precisely the wrong conclusion from this unenacted draft \nlanguage. After all, the law Congress actually passed did not contain the language on which \nSmith and Liberatore relied. Instead, it allowed only by minors injured by an actual \"violation\" \nof the predicate statutes to sue—not those who merely alleged that a defendant could have been \nindicted (but was neither indicted nor convicted) for conduct that allegedly breached those \nstatutes. It is odd to treat the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted \nbill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. F.ussello 464 U.S. at \n23-24 (\"Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of\n... [truncated, 2440 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/69 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=69]", "char_count": 2440}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 18 of 36 \nSupp. 2d at 755 (citing Smith). According to Smith, the CRS report stated that \"violations are to \nbe determined by a preponderance of the evidence. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover \nthe cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, from those found guilty of a violation.\" \nId. (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 83242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986)). smith thus held that \"[t)he analysis of \nthat proposed draft indicated that a violation under § 2255 was to be proven only by a \npreponderance of the evidence,\" and \"indicates that 18 U.S.C. § 2255 was intended to provide a \nremedy ... without requiring a criminal conviction.\" Id. at 611-12. \nSet aside that Congress eventually deleted from the bill the preponderance-of-the-\nevidence standard discussed in the CRS report; while that alone renders this portion of the CRS \nreport irrelevant, the key point here is that Smith's analysis of the report is flawed on its own \nterms. To begin with, the fact that draft's proposed preponderance-of-the-evidence standard \ndoes not remotely prove that Congress sought to permit § 2255 actions in the absence of a \npredicate criminal conviction. To the contrary, requiring a prior criminal conviction is perfectly \nconsistent with such a standard, since the plaintiff in a § 2255 case could simply introduce proof \nof the prior conviction and thereby discharge her burden of proving a violation under a \npreponderance-of-the-evidence standard. As a result, the (never adopted) preponderance-of-the-\nevidence standard on its own sheds no light on the question. \nMoreover, the Smith court overlooked the key line in its quotation from the CRS report—\nnamely, the report's statement that the draft version of § 2255 would allow plaintiffs to recover \npenalties from \"'those found guilty of a violation.\" Smith, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (emphasis \nadded) (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 83242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep\n... [truncated, 2443 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/70 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=70]", "char_count": 2443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 19 of 36 \nFinally—and perhaps most important—Smith's selective quotation from the CRS report \nomitted key language showing Congress's intent to require proof of an antecedent criminal \nconviction. Quoted in its entirety, the relevant portion of the CRS report explained: \nFor purposes of this section, violations are to be determined by a preponderance \nof the evidence. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover the cost of the suit, \nincluding a reasonable attorney's fee, from those found guilty of a violation. \nProposed § 2250(d) states that a defendant found guilty in any criminal \nproceeding brought by the United States under this chapter is estopped from \ndenying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil \nproceeding. \nSince the standard of proof in criminal cases, \"beyond a \nreasonable doubt,\" is stronger than the \"preponderance of the evidence\" \nstandard contained in proposed § 2255, this relieves the plaintiff from having to \nestablish those facts which have already been proven under a higher standard \nof proof in a finalized criminal proceeding. \n132 Cong. Rec. E3242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Green) (emphasis added). \nAs the omitted language makes clear, the whole point of the proposed preponderance-of-\nthe-evidence standard was that it would work hand-in-glove with the draft legislation's estoppel \nprovision in order to ensure that plaintiffs would not have to replicate proof of guilt after the \ndefendant was convicted in a prior criminal case. Thus, to the extent the draft bills that \neventually led to § 2255 have any bearing on the meaning of the language that Congress actually \nenacted, the legislative history relied upon by Smith and Liberatore makes clear that Congress \nintended to authorize a\"subsequent civil proceeding\" only after a defendant had been convicted \n\"beyond a reasonable doubt ... in afinalized criminal proceeding.\" I\n... [truncated, 2658 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/71 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=71]", "char_count": 2658}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 20 of 36 \nas if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as \nsuch, must admit liability unto Plaintiff.\" FAC 124. While it generally is true that a complaint's \nallegations must be taken as true, \"unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions \nmasquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.\" Oxford Asset Mgnt.. Ltd.'. Jaharis, 297 F.3d \n1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). Courts likewise may take note of public-record materials subject to \njudicial notice—even if those materials were not attached to the Complaint. N. (citing cases). \nThe key point, then, is that Defendant's plea to two single-count charges under Florida \nlaw (one involving solicitation of prostitution — without regard to the prostitute's age — and one \ninvolving procurement of a minor for prostitution) does not remotely establish that Defendant \ncommitted any offense against Plaintiff much less that Defendant was convicted of violating \nany predicate federal statute that can give ground liability under § 2255. The official Florida \njudgment of conviction contains no reference to Plaintiff. See Exh. A. The official transcript of \nDefendant's plea colloquy makes clear that the state-law offenses to which he pleaded guilty \ntook place in 2004 and 2005—years after the events alleged to give rise to this case. \nTHE COURT: State, please give me a factual basis. \nMS. BELOHLAVEK: In 069454 CF AMB, between August 1, 2004 and October \n31, 2005, the defendant in Palm Beach County did solicit or procure someone to \ncommit pros[titution] on three or more occasions. And in 08 CF 9381 CF AMB \nbetween August 1, 2004 and October 9, 2005, the defendant did procure a minor \nunder the age of 18 to commit prostitution in Palm Beach County also. \nExh. Bat 41-42; compare al. with FAC 118 (\"Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion \nin or about the spring of 2003.\") (emphasis added) and FAC\n... [truncated, 2495 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/72 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=72]", "char_count": 2495}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 21 of 36 \nBut even if Defendants' state-law pleas did involve state-law offenses against Plaintiff—\nwhich they did not—§ 2255 only authorizes suit based on predicate convictions under certain \nfederal statutes: \"Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, \n2251A, 2252, 22524, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title ... may sue.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255 \n(2003 & 2006). Needless to say, a conviction under Florida law is not a conviction under federal \nlaw, and there is no basis for accepting Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant's Florida pleas put \nhim \"in the same position as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed \nagainst Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff.\" FAC ¶ 24. To reiterate, this \nCourt may not accept \"unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as \nfacts,\" Oxford Asset Mgnt, 297 F.3d at 1188 (citing Femandez-Montes 987 F.2d at 284), and \nPlaintiff's contrary assertions \"will not prevent dismissal.\" Id. \nBecause Plaintiff has not alleged—and cannot allege—that Defendant has been convicted \nof committing a predicate federal criminal offense against her, the FAC must be dismissed. \nIII. \nCOUNT ONE OF THE FAC MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT \nPLEAD A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). \nCount I of the FAC asserts a cause of action under IS U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on a \nclaim that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). As set forth above, this Count is legally \nunsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted of an offense under \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count I must be dismissed because the \nFAC does not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated \n§ 2422(b) or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. That statute provides: \nWhoever, using the mail or any facility or means \n... [truncated, 2409 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/73 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=73]", "char_count": 2409}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 22 of 36 \nAs the statute's text makes clear, the essence of this crime is the misuse of an interstate \nfacility to communicate prohibited things—that is, the using of a means or facility of interstate \ncommerce to persuade, induce, entice or coerce a person known by the defendant to be a minor \nto engage in prohibited sexual conduct—rather than the sexual conduct itself. As a result, the \ncommunication (the inducement of a known minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct) must \noccur through the interstate facility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the \nscienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States'. Murrell, \n368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (\"[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], \nusing the Internet, acted with a specific intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to \nengage in unlawful sex.\") (emphasis added); United States'. \n165 Fed. Appx. 586, 588 \n(10th Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he government must show: '(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) \nto knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) \nto engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or \nattempting to do so.\") (quoting United States', ThontaE 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005)). \nA simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that a \"John\" walks to a downtown area \nwhere prostitutes are known to gather. He approaches several women, and asks each one how \nold she is. The first few women state that they are 18, but eventually one states that she is 16. \nThe \"John\" then threatens to call the police unless she has intercourse with him. She does so; he \npays her $200 and walks away. There is no question that the \"John\" has knowingly solicited \n(and, indeed, coerced) prostitution from a minor in violation of state law. But there also is no \nquestion tha\n... [truncated, 2520 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/74 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=74]", "char_count": 2520}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 23 of 36 \nCircuit Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal (2003) (instructing jury that it must find beyond \nreasonable doubt that \"the Defendant knowingly used [the mail] [a computer] [describe other \ninterstate facility as alleged in indictment] to attempt to persuade, induce, entice [or coerce] an \nindividual under the age of eighteen (18) to engage in sexual activity\") (emphasis added). \nWhile the statute is unambiguous on this point, it bears note that this plain-text reading of \nthe law finds additional support in the law's legislative history. Congress first enacted § 2422(b) \nas part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to combat sexual predators who solicit minors \nover the Internet. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104.458, at 193 (1996) (expressing \"the need for \nCongress to take effective action to protect children and families from online harm\") (emphasis \nadded); see also United States'. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Ilth Cir. 2005) (noting that \nCongress enacted § 2422(b) \"after the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing regarding child \nendangerment via the Internet\") (emphasis added). Prior to that time, § 2422 targeted only \ninducements to travel across state or national borders: \"Whoever knowingly persuades, \ninduces, entices or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce ... to \nengage in prostitution or any [criminal] sexual activity ... shall be fined under this title or \nimprisoned not more than five years, or both.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1995). With no nexus to use \nof an interstate instrumentality, the existing law did nothing to address the problem of intemet \npredators, whose conduct might have nothing to do with interstate or transnational travel. \nAccordingly, when Congress added § 2422(b), it borrowed the predecessor statute's \nlanguage about knowing persuasion, and—with an eye to online communications—criminalized \nthe use of an interstate facility to \n... [truncated, 2484 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/75 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=75]", "char_count": 2484}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 24 0136 \nengaging in illegal sexual activity.\"). \nThis simple point is dispositive. The FAC never alleges that Defendant \"persuade[d], \ninduce[d], entice[d], or coerce[d]\" Plaintiff to engage in prohibited sexual conduct \"using the \nmail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). It does \nnot allege that Defendant ever mailed Plaintiff anything, much less that he coerced her to engage \nin prohibited sexual activity by doing so. It does not allege that Defendant ever called or text-\nmessaged Plaintiff, much less that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity by \ndoing so. It does not allege that Defendant ever e-mailed or instant-messaged Plaintiff, much \nless that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity using any intemet technology. \nTo the contrary, the MC alleges that Defendant's efforts to induce Plaintiff to engage in \nprohibited sexual conduct took place exclusively in person, without any use of an interstate \nmeans or facility. The FAC alleges that \"in or about the spring of 2003,\" Plaintiff \"was recruited \nby one of Defendant's agents to give Defendant a massage for compensation,\" and that \nDefendant's agent \"drove [Plaintiff] to [Defendant's] mansion.\" FAC 1 18. After she allegedly \nwas led to the massage room, the FAC alleges that a topless woman \"with dark hair [and] an \naccent ... tried to coax Plaintiff to remove her shirt.\" Id. Defendant entered the room, and \neventually asked Plaintiff to massage his buttocks. Id. He then allegedly \"ordered Plaintiff to \nremove her clothes,\" \"began masturbating and fondling her breasts,\" and \"asked her to do more,\" \nbut \"she adamantly declined.\" Id. She allegedly was paid $200, and then driven away by \nDefendant's agent. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that she was \"lured\" to the mansion \"on at least \none and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003,\" but p\n... [truncated, 2453 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/76 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=76]", "char_count": 2453}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 25 of 36 \nfactual allegations that, if true, would show that Plaintiff is the victim of a violation of § 2242(b). \nTo be sure, Plaintiff does allege that \"Defendant or an authorized agent would call and \nalert Defendant's assistants shortly before or after he arrived at his Palm Beach residence,\" FAC \n¶ ll—just like any professional would alert his or her administrative assistant that he or she was \ncoming to town. But Congress has not made that a crime, and even if Defendant's assistants \nlater \"would seek out economically disadvantaged and underage girls from West Palm Beach,\" \nid., it cannot reasonably be said that Defendant was \"using the mail or any facility or means of \ninterstate ... commerce [to) knowingly persuade[], induce()) entice[], or coerce[ a minor) to \nengage in prostitution or any sexual activity.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2242(b). Again, the statute only \nprohibits online or telephonic contact with minors—not with one's secretary. \nNor is it sufficient that Plaintiff baldly asserts that Defendant \"traveled to his mansion in \nPalm Beach for the purpose of luring minor girls,\" and \"used the telephone to contact these \nminor girls for the purpose of coercing them into acts of prostitution.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2242(6). \nThese bald allegations cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, slip op. at 14 (\"Threadbare \nrecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not \nsuffice.\"); Thrombi)+, 550 U.S. at 561 (it is not enough that \"the pleadings le[ave] open the \npossibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support \nrecovery\") (quotation and alteration omitted). And even if they could, these unsupported claims \ndo not demonstrate that this Plaintiff is entitled to relief: whether or not Defendant ever used to \nphone to contact some minor, a bare allegation that he called someone, sometime, does not \nremotely establi\n... [truncated, 2462 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/77 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=77]", "char_count": 2462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 26 of 36 \ndescribes. But she hasn't—because she can't—and Count I must be dismissed with prejudice. \nIV. \nCOUNT TWO MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A \nVIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). \nCount II of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on a \nclaim that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(6). Again, as set forth above, this Count is \nlegally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under \n§ 2423(b). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count II still must be dismissed because the FAC \ndoes not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated \n§ 2423(6) or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. \nAs a threshold matter, however, it bears note that the FAC's factual allegations are so \nvague that it cannot be determined which version of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) even applies to this \nCount. Prior to April 30, 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) provided that: \nA person who travels in interstate commerce, or conspires to do so, or a United \nStates citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States \nwho travels in foreign commerce, or conspires to do so, for the purpose of \nengaging in any sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 \nyears of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act \noccurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States \nshall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2002) (emphasis added). On April 30, 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies \nand Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, or \"PROTECT Act,\" \nPub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, became effective, and § 2423 was amended to read: \nA person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a \nUnited States citizen or an alien admitt\n... [truncated, 2526 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/78 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=78]", "char_count": 2526}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLS0 Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 27 of 36 \nDefendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003,\" FAC 1 18, and that she later was \"lured ... \nto the Epstein mansion on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or \nsummer of 2003.\" Id. 119. Since these vague allegations leave open the possibility that the \nalleged predicate conduct could have occurred either before or after the PROTECT Act's \neffective date, it is impossible to determine what law governs. No matter how generously ono \nconstrues the pleading standards, they at least require allegations that are sufficiently precise to \npermit the Court to determine what law governs. Yet without alleging any specific dates, the \nFAC falls well short of that mark and ought to be dismissed for that reason alone. \nUnder either version of the statute, however, the key point is that § 2423 does not prohibit \ninterstate travel that merely happens to result in illicit sexual conduct. Instead, the courts \nrepeatedly have held that the statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for \ninterstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States'. Tvkarskv, \n446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was \na dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.\") (citing United State/. Hayward, \n359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously \ncorrect. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it first was enacted as part of the Violent Crime \nControl and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, 2037—it was \nadded to the Mann Act (first passed in 1910) and uses the identical \"for the purpose of language \nset forth in the original version of that statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (1986). Accordingly, \ncourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's \nuse of the statutory phra\n... [truncated, 2514 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/79 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=79]", "char_count": 2514}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 28 of 36 \nthe same act are intended to have the same meaning.\") (quotation and citation omitted). \nTwo Mann Act cases are particularly apt. In Hansen', Half, 291 U.S. 559 (1934), the \nGovernment charged the defendant with violating the Mann Act after she returned to the country \nwith a man with whom she was having \"illicit relations.\" Id. at 561. Despite the fact that the \nwoman intended to \"continue her irregular and improper conduct [after] returning,\" the Court \nheld that she had not violated the Act: \"People not of good moral character like others, travel \nfrom place to place and change their residence. But to say that, because they indulge in illegal or \nimmoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore \nwhat is of primary significance.\" Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen'. United States 322 \nU.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at \ntheir Nebraska brothel traveled to Utah and back, where they resumed their unlawful activities. \nId. at 372. Again, the Supreme Court reversed: \"An intention that the women or girls shall \nengage in the conduct outlawed by [the Mann Act] must be found to exist before the conclusion \nof the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement. And the \ntransportation must be designed to bring about such result.\" Id. at 374. \nThe FAC does not remotely allege that Defendant's dominant motive for traveling to \nPalm Beach \"in or about the spring of 2003\" was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. FAC \n¶ 18. Instead, as the FAC makes clear, Defendant is a successful businessman who maintains \nhomes and properties around the world. Id.1 8. Even if the FAC's fanciful allegations regarding \nDefendant's conduct while at those homes were true, the FAC does not remotely allege that his \ndominant motive for travel was to engage in illicit sexual \n... [truncated, 2478 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/80 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=80]", "char_count": 2478}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 29 of 36 \nfacts\" to support the claim. Instead, each element must be supported by an adequate factual \nallegation. Twombly 550 U.S. at 561; see also iqbal, slip op. at 14 (\"The plausibility standard \n... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a \ncomplaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of \nthe line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.\") (quoting Thvombly, 550 \nU.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). \nIndeed Twombly itself supplies an excellent parallel. Plaintiffs there alleged that the \ndefendants engaged in coordinated activities that violated the antitrust laws, and asserted that \ndefendants thus must have agreed to restrain trade. As the Court observed, however, plaintiffs' \notherwise specific allegations of parallel conduct were as likely innocent as they were consistent \nan agreement to restrain trade: \n[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not \nsuffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a \nconclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply \nfacts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are \nset out..., they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding \nagreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent. \nId. at 556.57. \nSo too here. The mere fact that Defendant traveled between his residences and allegedly \nengaged in illicit conduct while at his homes hardly suggests that the dominant purpose of his \ntravel was to engage in illicit sexual activity. Instead, Defendant's travel is equally consistent \nwith the truth: that his vast business operations and charitable activities required frequent travel, \nand that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legiti\n... [truncated, 2453 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/81 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=81]", "char_count": 2453}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 30 of 36 \ntourism that violates 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), or that Plaintiff herself is the victim of such an \noffense. See Twomblv 550 U.S. at 557. Count U muse be dismissed. \nCOUNT THREE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A \nVIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2251. \nCount III of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on \nallegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Again, as set forth above, this Count is \nlegally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under \n§ 2251. Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count III still must be dismissed because the FAC does \nnot make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2251 or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. \nYet again, Plaintiff's failure adequately to plead the dates on which the alleged predicate \nconduct occurred makes it impossible to determine which version of § 2251 applies in this case. \nPrior to April 30, 2003, § 2251 provided that: \nAny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor \nto engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any \nvisual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished ... If such person knows or \nhas reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported In interstate or \nforeign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using \nmaterials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign \ncommerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has \nactually been transported in Interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. \n18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2002) (emphasis added). As with § 2423(b), however, Congress made \nsignificant changes to the statute when the PROTECT Act became effective on April 30, 2003: \nAny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor\n... [truncated, 2871 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/82 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=82]", "char_count": 2871}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 31 of 36 \nor foreign commerce or mailed. \n18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2003) (emphasis added; underscored to denote amended text). \nUnder either version, however, Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to \nplead that Defendant's dominant motive for enticing her to engage in sexual conduct was to \nproduce images of that conduct; that Defendant actually produced an image of Plaintiff; or that \nDefendant either knew that the resulting images would be transported in interstate commerce or \nactually transported or transmitted those photographs in interstate commerce. Instead, the FAC \nalleges only that Defendant displayed photos of other women in his homes and on his computer, \nsee FAC at ¶¶ 14 & 16, and \"may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... and may have \ntransported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere using a \nfacility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce.\" all 16 & 34 (emphasis added). \nThose speculative assertions are insufficient to sustain Plaintiff's burden at the pleading \nstage. In our legal system, defendants cannot properly be subjected to the burden and expense of \ndiscovery—and the accompanying pressure to settle—based on claims that they \"may have\" \ndone something wrong. Instead, \"the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the \nplaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the \nplaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.\" James River Ins. Co. I. Ground Down Ellett. Inc. \n540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation omitted); see also jqbal, slip op. at \n15 (complaint must be dismissed \"where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer \nmore than the mere possibility of misconduct\") (emphasis added); Bawa I. U.S. No. C 07-\n00200 WHA, 2007 WL 1456040, *5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2007) (dismissing complaint alleging \nthat defendant \"may ha\n... [truncated, 2395 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/83 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=83]", "char_count": 2395}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 32 of 36 \nallowing Plaintiff to proceed. Count III must be dismissed with prejudice. \nVI. \nCOUNTS FOUR AND FIVE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT \nPLEAD VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) OR 2252A(a)(1). \nCount IV of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on \nallegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252(aX1). Count, of the FAC asserts a cause \nof action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2252A(a)(I). Again, as set forth above, these Counts are legally unsustainable for the simple \nreason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2252(a)(1) or § 2252A(a)(1). Supra at \n§ II. In the alternative, Counts IV and, still must be dismissed because the FAC does not make \nfactual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated either statute or that \nPlaintiff is a victim of such a violation. By its plain terms, § 2252(a)(1) provides: \nAny person who ... knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of \ninterstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if ... the producing of \nsuch visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit \nconduct and ... such visual depiction is of such conduct ... shall be punished as \nprovided in subsection (b) of this section. \n18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added). \nSimilarly, the pre- and post-\nPROTECT Act versions of § 2252A(aX I ) provide: \nAny person who ... knowingly malls, or transports or ships in interstate or \nforeign commerce by any means, Including by computer, any child pornography \n... shall be punished as provided [by law). \n18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added). \nIn turn, the term \"child \npornography\" was defined both pre- and post-PROTECT Act, and in relevant part, as: \nany visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer \nor co\n... [truncated, 2461 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/84 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=84]", "char_count": 2461}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 33 of 36 \ndisplayed photos of other unidentified women in his homes and on his computer, see FAC at \n¶¶ 14 & 16, and \"may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... with his hidden cameras and \nmay have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere \nusing a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce.\" FAC ¶¶ 16, 38, 43 (emphasis \nadded). Again, it simply is not enough to allege that Defendant \"may have\" done something \nwrong: \"the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, \nraising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should \nbe dismissed.\" James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted); see also \nlqbal, slip op. at 15 (holding the a complaint must be dismissed \"where the well-pleaded facts do \nnot permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct\") (emphasis added). \nBecause the FAC only speculates that Defendant \"may have\" committed a crime, and because \nPlaintiff surely would have charged that Defendant actually committed a crime if she had a \ngood-faith basis for doing so, Counts IV and, must be dismissed with prejudice. \nVII. COUNT SIX MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) WAS NOT \nENACTED UNTIL 2006. \nCount VI of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on \nallegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). Again, as set forth above, this Count \nis legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under \n§ 2251. Supra at § IL In the alternative, Count VI still must be dismissed because § 2252A(g) \nwas not enacted until 2006—three years after the alleged conduct underlying this case took \nplace. See Pub. L. 109-248, Title VII, § 701, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 614, 647. As set forth \nabove, supra § I.B.2, the Ex Post Fact\n... [truncated, 2401 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/85 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=85]", "char_count": 2401}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on F LSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 34 of 36 \nWalsh Act retroactive, but not others). Thus, while Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a \nviolation of § 2252A(g) in the first place, there is no lawful basis under which she could assert a \ncause of action predicated on that statute. Count VI must be dismissed with prejudice. \nVIII. ANY SURVIVING COUNTS SHOULD BE MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT. \nWhile we respectfully submit that none of the FAC's counts are viable and that each \nshould be dismissed with prejudice, this Court should require the merger of all claims into a \nsingle count to the extent it rejects the foregoing analysis and allows more than one count to \nproceed. Contrary to Plaintiff's attempt to multiply her recovery by asserting six separate \ncounts, § 2255 creates a single cause of action with a single penalty for all violations of a \npredicate offense, not separate causes of action and separate recoveries on a \"per violation\" \nbasis. We have not found a single precedent where a § 2255 plaintiff has been allowed to assert \nclaims on a \"per violation\" basis—each of the prior cases (including the prior cases involving \nthis defendant in this Court) involved a single count predicated on multiple alleged violations of \npredicate criminal statutes. See Tilton \nPlayboy Entertainment Group. Inc., 554 F.3d 1371 \n(I lth Cir. Jan. 15, 2009); Smith, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 432; Doe, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 754; poc No. 2 \nI. Epstein 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3 1. Epstein 2009 WL 383330 \n(S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); poe No. 41. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and \nDoe No. 5I, Epstein 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009). \nThere is no basis for indulging Plaintiff's contrary approach. Instead, the plain language \nand structure of the statute foreclose Plaintiffs unprecedented approach. First, the order of the \ntwo sentences establishing the statutory penalty under § 2255(a) demonstrate that Co\n... [truncated, 2449 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/86 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=86]", "char_count": 2449}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 35 of 36 \nThen, in recognition of the fact that damages in these cases may be hard to prove, the second \nsentence provides for recovery of a minimum amount: \"My minor as described in the preceding \nsentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000.\" Id. Together, \nthese provisions indicate that Congress intended to provide restitution to victims—that is, to \naward them \"actual damages\"—but that where actual damages were less than $50,000 or \notherwise impossible to prove, the statute would guarantee a lump-sum, make-whole penalty of \n$50,000 for all injuries sustained as a result of the predicate acts. \nMoreover, the fact that Congress did not expressly provide for damages on a \"per \nviolation\" basis further underscores the fact that Congress sought to provide only a lump-sum \nrecovery for all injuries sustained by a victim. After all, while Congress lmows exactly how to \nprovide for damages on a \"per violation\" basis when it wants to, it did not do so here. See, e.g., \n18 U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing a \"civil action ... against any person who engages in conduct \nconstituting an offense under\" specified sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest \nstatutes, and authorizing \"a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the \namount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which \never amount is greater') (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 49; 18 U.S.C. § 1034; 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2318. As the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly has explained, \"where Congress knows how to say \nsomething but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.\" Delgado,. United States Att'y Gen. \n487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS, 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 \nF.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). \nBecause the statute provides a single cause of action with a single remedy\n... [truncated, 2153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00192835/87 or ?id=EFTA00192835&page=87]", "char_count": 2153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM \nDocument 29 \nEntered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 \nPage 36 of 36 \nCertificate of Service \nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the \nClerk of the Court using CM/BCF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this \nday on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the manner specified by \nCM/BCF on this  26th  day of  \nMay \n , 2009 \nRobert C. Josefsbcrg, Esq. \nKatherine W. Ezell, Esq. \nPodhurst Orseck, P.A. \n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 \nMiami, FL 33130 \n305 358-2800 \nFax: 305 358-2382 \nrjosefsberg@podhurst.com \nkezell®podhurst.com \nCounsel for Plaintiff \nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq. \nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. \n250 Australian Avenue South \nSuite 1400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 \n561-659-8300 \nFax: 561-835-8691 \njagesq@bellsouth.net \nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nRespectfully submitted: \nBy: \nRobert D. ntton, ., Esq. \nFlorida Bar No. 2 162 \nrcrit@bciclaw.c \nMichael J. Pike, Esq. \nFlorida Bar No. 617296 \nmpike@bciclaw.com \nBurman Critton Luther & Coleman, P.A. \n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nTelephone: \n(561) 842-2820 \nFacsimile: \n(561)515-3148 \nrerit@belelaw.com \nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein \nCase No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA \nP-011877 \nEFTA00192923\n", "char_count": 1326}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of Florida \n5001 Australian Ave, Ste 400 \nWest Palm Reach, FL 33401 \n(561) 820-8711 \nFacsimile.• (561) 820.8777 \nJune 12, 2009 \nDELIVERY BY HAND \nJack A. Goldberger, Esq. \nAtterbury, Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. \nOne Clearlake Centre, Suite 1400 \n250 Australian Ave S. \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5015 \nRe: \nJeffrey Epstein \nDear Mr. Goldberger: \nPursuant to the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States Attorney's \nOffice for the Southern District of Florida hereby provides you with notice that the United \nStates Attorney has determined, based on reliable evidence, that Jeffrey Epstein has willfully \nviolated one of the conditions of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Specifically, on May 26, \n2009, Jeffrey Epstein, through his counsel, filed a \"Motion to Dismiss the First Amended \nComplaipt or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement,\" in the matter of Jane Doe \nNo. 101 Jeffity Epstein, Court File No. 09-CV-80591-ICAM. \"Jane Doe No. 101\" was on \nthe list provided to Mr. Epstein's attorneys of individuals whom the United States had \nidentified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and \"Jane Doe No. 101\" has elected to \nproceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. By filing the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Epstein \nis contesting liability and, therefore, has violated Term 8 of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. \nGus! \nPOI 187S \nEFTA00192924\n", "char_count": 1442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "JACK GOLDBERGER, ESQ. \nJUNE 12,2009 \nPAGE 2 OF 2 \nBased upon Mr. Epstein's breach of that term, the U.S. Attorney's Office has elected \nto terminate the Non-Prosecution Agreement and to investigate and prosecute Mr. Epstein \nand others for federal offenses. \nSincerely, \nJeffrey H. Sloman \nActing United States Attorney \nBy: \nA. Marie Villafana \nAssistant United States Attorney \ncc: \nKaren Atkinson, Chief, Northern Division \nRoy Black, Esq. (via electronic mail) \nCa< Sta C4.$0736 CV-MARRA \nP-01379 \nEFTA00192925\n", "char_count": 515}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00192835", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Dispoto, Mark (USAFLS) \nFrom: \nSent: \nTo: \nCc: \nSubject: \nCarlton, Stephen (USAFLS) \nWednesday, May 8, 2019 4:53 PM \nAcosta, Diana (USAFLS); \nBella, Gabrielle (USAFLS); Cannon, Aileen (USAFLS); Coxless, Kelly (USAFLS); Funk \nDaniel (USAFLS); Gyires, Marton (USAFLS); Hem, Mara (USAFLS); Mazari, Jessica (USAFLS) [Contractor); Lineberger, \nCarmen (USAFLS); Porter, Michael (USAFLS) \nUSAFLS-WPB \nBlue Cross contact \nA new Blue Cross rep. stopped by the office today, Omar Amador; here is his contact information. He is available to \npersonally assist you \non ANY problem you have with Blue Cross if you have a health issue that needs attention, or want to make sure your \ndoctor is in network, etc.; \nhe covers the area from Vero to Key West, and the sw coast of FLA also: He also reminded me that our coverage is \nnationwide, and he can help \nif you need to go out of state for any treatment for you or a family member. \nFlorida Blue 41\nIn the pursuit of health \nOmar Amador \nAccount Manager \nFederal Employee Program / Motors \nOmarAmaclor@bcbsfIcom \n8600 NW 36th Street \nSuite 800 \nMiami, FL 33166 \nSteve Carlton \nChief, Ft. Pierce \nUnited States Attorney's Office \nS.D. Fla. \n(772) 293-0947 \nCell. (561) 398-7727 \nC c44 \nTel 305.921.7023 \nToll Free 800.955.7635 \nExt. 17023 \nFax 904.301.1953 \nEFTA00192926\n", "char_count": 1307}]}