{"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_count": 500, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00191587", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00191587.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "USAM 9:4.000 RELEASE AND DETENTION PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS \nPage 1 of 2 \nUS Attorneys > USAM > Title 9\nprey I next I Criminal Resource Manual \n9-6.000 \nRELEASE AND DETENTION \nPENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS -\n18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 ET SEQ. \n9-6.190 Introduction \n9-6.200 Pretrial Disclosure of Witness Identity \n9-6.100 Introduction \nThe release and detention of defendants pending judicial proceedings is governed by the Due \nProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the \nBail Reform Act of 1984. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides procedures to detain a dangerous \noffender, as well as an offender who is likely to flee pending trial or appeal. See United States v. \nSalerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). \nFor a discussion of the provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.0 §§ 3141 et seq.) and \nrelated case law see the Criminal Resourceiganutl  at 26. \n9-6.200 Pretrial Disclosure of Witness Identity \nInsuring the safety and cooperativeness of prospective witnesses, and safeguarding the judicial \nprocess from undue influence, are among the highest priorities of federal prosecutors. See the Victim \nand Witness Protection Act of 1982, P.L. 97-291, § 2, 96 Stat. 1248-9. The Attorney General Guidelines \nfor Victim Witness Assistance 2000 provide that prosecutors should keep in mind that the names, \naddresses, and phone numbers of victims and witnesses are private and should reveal such information \nto the defense only pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 16, any local rules, customs or court orders, or \nspecial prosecutorial need. \nTherefore, it is the Department's position that pretrial disclosure of a witness' identity or statement \nshould not be made if there is, in the judgment of the prosecutor, any reason to believe that such \ndisclosure would endanger the safety of the witness or any other person, or lead to efforts to obstruct \njustice. Factors relevant to the possibility of witness intimidation or obstruction of justi\n... [truncated, 2656 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/0 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=0]", "char_count": 2656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "USAM 9-6.000 RELEASE AND DETENTION PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS \nPage 2 of 2 \n. \npromote the prompt and just resolution of the case. Such disclosure may enhance the prospects that the \ndefendant will plead guilty or lead to the initiation of plea negotiations; in the event the defendant goes \nto trial, such disclosure may expedite the conduct of the trial by eliminating the need for a continuance. \nAccordingly, with respect to prosecutions in federal court, a prosecutor should give careful \nconsideration, as to each prospective witness, whether absent any indication of potential adverse \nconsequences of the kind mentioned above reason exists to disclose such witness' identity prior to trial. \nIt should be borne in mind that a decision by the prosecutor to disclose pretrial the identity of potential \ngovernment witnesses may be conditioned upon the defendant's making reciprocal disclosure as to the \nidentity of the potential defense witnesses. Similarly, when appropriate in light of the facts and \ncircumstances of the case, a prosecutor may determine to disclose only the identity, but not the current \naddress or whereabouts of a witness. \nProsecutors should be aware that they have the option of applying for a protective order if \ndiscovery of the private information may create a risk of harm to the victim or witness and the \nprosecutor may seek a temporary restraining order under 18 U.S.C. § 1514 prohibiting harassment of a \nvictim or witness. \nIn sum, whether or not to disclose the identity of a witness prior to trial is committed to the \ndiscretion of the federal prosecutor, and that discretion should be exercised on a case-by-case, and \nwitness-by-witness basis. Considerations of witness safety and willingness to cooperate, and the \nintegrity of the judicial process are paramount. \nNovember 2000 \nUSAM Chapter 9-6 \nhttp://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usarn/title9/6mcrm.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191588\n", "char_count": 1946}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "•• • -7 \nEFTA00191589\n", "char_count": 22}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 1 of 22 \nUSABook Online > Criminal Procedure > Sixth Circuit  Desk Book > Chapter 7 \nnext I help I download\nChapter 7 \nBail and Detention Issues \n1. \nThe Bail Reform.Act of 19,84 \nH. \nRelease or Detention Pending Trial \nILA. \nGenerally \nII.B. \nRelease on Personal Recognizance or Unsecured Appearance Bond \nII.C. \nRelease on Conditions \nII.C.I. sera* \nII.C.2. Release on Secured Appearance Bond \nII.C.3. gelease,_on Bail Bond with a Solyent Surety \nLLD. \nThe Defendant's Failure tst  Appear \nILE. \nTemporary Detention for Revocation of  Conditional Release or Deportation \nII.F. \nDetention \nII.F.1. Generally \nII.F.2. Risk of Flight\nILF.3. Dangerousness \nII.G. \nThe Detention Hearing \nII.G.I. Hearing Procedures \nILG.2. Criteria for Pretrial Release or_Detention \n11.G.3. Content  of Release or Detention Order \nII.G.4. Reopening the Detention Hearing \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/ole/usabook/desk/07desk.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191590\n", "char_count": 1005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 2 of 22 \nII.H. \nReview of Release/Detention Order by District Judge, Court of Appeals \nIll. \nRelease or Detention Pending Imposition or Execution of Sentence \nIV. \nRelease or Detention Pending Appeal \nV. \nRelease or Detention of Arrestees Other than Ordinary Defendants \nV.A. \nProbationers and Supervised Releasees \nV.B. \nMaterial Witnesses \nV.C. \nAliens \nVI. \nAdditional Resources \nI. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 \nAll things relating to bail in fede ral prosecutions are governed by the \nBail Reform Act of 1984 (Act or 1984 Act) . In Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 \n(1995), the Supreme Court explained: \nThe Bail Reform Act of 1984 pr ovides a federal court with two \nchoices when dealing with a crimina 1 defendant who has been \"charged with \nan offense\" and is awaiting trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), or who \"has \nbeen found guilty of an offense and \n. . . is awaiting imposition or \nexecution of sentence,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). \nThe court may either (1) \"release\" the defendant on bail or (2) order him \n\"detained\" without bail. A court m ay \"release\" a defendant subject to a \nvariety of restrictive conditions, including residence in a community \ntreatment center. See SS 3142(c)(1)(2)(i), (x), and \n(xiv). If, however, the court \"fin ds that no condition or combination of \nconditions will reasonably assure t he appearance of the person as required \nand the safety of any other person and the community,\" § 3142(e), the \ncourt \"shall order the detention of the person,\" ibid., by issuing \na \"detention order\" \"direct(ing) th at the person be committed to the \ncustody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections \nfacility,\" S 3142(i)(2). Thus, under the language of t he Bail Reform \nAct of 1984, a defendant suffers \"d etention\" only when committed (by the \ndistrict court) to the custody of t he Attorney General; a defendant \nadmitted to bail on restrictive con ditions, as respondent was, \n... [truncated, 2169 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/4 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=4]", "char_count": 2169}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 3 of 22 \njudicial officer [i.e., federal magistrate judge or district judge] . . \nbefore whom an arrested person is brought shall order that such person be \nreleased or detained, pending [further) j udicial proceedings, under this \n[Act].\"). \nThe 1984 Act completely superseded the Bail Reform Act of 1966 and funda -\nmentally changed the law. \"It transforme d preexisting practice in very \nsignificant ways, providing among other t hings for the pretrial detention of \npersons charged with certain serious felo nies on the ground of dangerousness \n--\na ground theretofore not cognizable.\" \nUnited States v. Tortora , 922 F.2d \n880, 884 (1st Cir. 1990).[9111] As a technical matter, the 1984 Act ad ded \nsections 3062 and 3141-3150 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code, and it repealed then \nexisting sections 3043 and 3141 -3151. The 1984 Act also amended 18 U.S.0 . \n9S 3041, 3042, 3154, 3156, 3731, 3772, and 4 282; 28 U.S.C. § 636; \nFed. R. Crim. P. 5, 15, 40, 46, and 54; a nd Fed. R. App. P. 9. \nII. Release or Detention Pending Trial \nA. Generally \nA person arrested for a federal off \nunnecessary delay before the nearest avai \ninitial appearance. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a \nmagistrate judge \"shall,\" among other thi \nthe defendant as provided by statute or i \nRule 46, captioned \"Release from Custody, \nrelease prior to trial shall be in accord \nand 3144.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a). Sect \nBail Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Act). \nense must be brought \"without \nlable federal magistrate judge\" for his \n), 9(c)(1). At this proceeding, the \nngs, \"detain or conditionally release \nn these rules.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c). \n\" provides that \"felligibility for \nante with 18 U.S.C. S9 3142 \nions 3142 and 3144 are a part of the \nUnder the 1984 Act, the magistrate judge \"shall\" \ncharged with an offense\" be \n(1) released on personal recogniza \nappearance bond, under subsect \n(2) released on a condition or com \nsubsection (c) of this section \n(3) t\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/5 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=5]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nU.S.C. § 3142(a). \nIn figuring out which option to pic k, the magistrate judge relies \n-- at \nleast in part -- on the recommendation of the U.S. Pretria 1 Services Agency. \nSee 18 U.S.C. 55 3152-3154 (establishing Pretrial Services \nAgency in every judicial district and pre scribing duties); E.D. Mich. Local Crim. \nR. 5.1(b), 10.1(b). This recommendation is the result of a Pretrial Services \nOfficer's (1) interview of the defendant, (2) receipt of information from the \ngovernment and defense counsel, and (3) i ndependent (though brief and necessarily \ncursory) investigation of the defendant's residential, familial, and employment \nsituations. The recommendation is usuall \nlonger than 4 pages with a radioactive o \nuncommon for the recommendation to be mad \ninsufficient time for the Pretrial Servic \nThese recommendations typically carry som \nare not controlling. Remember that the P \nnot know anything about the specifics of \ndefendant unless those facts are made pla \nprovide this information to the officer. \ngovernment is seeking detention or restri \nshould contact the Pretrial Services Offi \nthat she has all of the available informa \nthe defendant's (1) criminal record, (2) \ndrug or alcohol abuse, (3) employment sit \ndomestic situation and recent residential \nrelevant. \nB. Release on Personal Recognizance or an \n\"Release on personal recognizance,\" \nmeans release on the following conditions \nappear at all subsequent judicial proceed \na Federal, State, or local crime,\" id. \ny made in writing (in a report rarely \nrange cover sheet), but it is not \ne orally in open court because there was \nes Officer to prepare a written report. \ne weight with the magistrate judges, but \nretrial Services Officer will usually \nthe offense or the dangerousness of the \nin in the charging document or you \nThus, in any case in which the \nctive conditions of release, the AUSA \ncer early in the process to make sure \ntion about both \n... [truncated, 2975 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/6 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=6]", "char_count": 2975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 5 of 22 \nby a deposit of or lien on property,\" id. \nreleased on an unsecured bond, the defend \nsigning an unsecured appearance bond in t \nthat he agrees to forfeit $10,000 to the \njudicial proceeding. \nC. Release on Conditions \nat 170. \nThus, if ordered \nant need not put up any money. His \nhe amount of, say, $10,000, simply means \ncourt if he fails to appear for a \n1. General ly \nIf the court believes that release on personal recognizance or an unsecured \nappearance bond is inadequate to the task , it may order the defendant's release \non certain additional conditions. \nSee 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(8). \n\"Release on conditions,\" id. § 3142(c) (caption), means release on \nthe following conditions: (1) that he pro mise to appear at all subsequent \njudicial proceedings; (2) that he not com mit another crime; and (3) that he be \n\"subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of \nconditions, that such judicial officer de termines will reasonably assure the \nappearance of the person as required and( /or) the safety of any other person and \nthe community(.]\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). Section 3142(c)(1)(8) lists the \nadditional conditions of pretrial release that the court may impose, including \na catch-all for \"any other condition that is reas onably necessary to assure the \nappearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person \nand the community.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv). Some of the more \ncommonly used conditions require that def endants report as directed to their \nPretrial Services Officers, stay within a specific geographical area (e.g., the \nState of Michigan, metropolitan Detroit ( specifying certain counties), surrender \ntheir passports, reside in specific house s or apartments, be electronically \ntethered to their houses (\"home detention \"), remain in the \"custody\" of a third \nparty (e.g., uncle Sam, granny), seek or maintain employment, or submit t\n... [truncated, 2912 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/7 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=7]", "char_count": 2912}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 6 of 22 \nfor contempt of court.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a). \n2. Release on Secured A ppearance Bond \nA secured appearance bond, see 18 V.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xi), \nis an unsecured appearance bond that requ ires security in the form of personal \nor real property that is specified by the court. If the collateral for a secured \nappearance bond is cash, often referred t o as a \"cash bond,\" the defendant must \ndeposit the \"cash\" with the clerk's offic e. In this district, \"cash\" may take \nthe form of \"cash, [a] money order, or [a ] cashier's check made payable to \n'Clerk, United States District Court.'\" E .D. Local Crim. R. 46.1(b)(1). A \"VISA \nor MasterCard credit card is [also] accep table for a cash bond.\" \nId. \nIf the collateral for a secured app earance bond is property other than \ncash, the magistrate judge must obtain th e prior approval of a district judge. \nSee E.D. Local Crim. R. 46.1(b)(2) (\"Unless approved in writing by a \nDistrict Judge, property [other than cash ] shall not be accepted as collateral \nfor a bond.\"). A defendant seeking relea se on an appearance bond secured by non \ncash property \"shall provide the court wi th proof of ownership and the value of \nthe property along with information regar ding existing encumbrances as the \njudicial office may require.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xi). This office \nordinarily opposes the use of non -cash property to collateralize an appeara nce \nbond.[FN3) \nTo prevent property constituting or derived from criminal proceeds from \nserving as collateral for an appearance b ond, the 1984 Act provides: \nIn considering the conditions of re \n(c)(1)(B)(xi) or (c)(1)(B)(xii) of \nupon his own motion, or shall upon \nan inquiry into the source of the p \nforfeiture or offered as collateral \naccept the designation, or the use \nbecause of its source, will not rea \nperson as required. \nlease described in subsection \nthis section, the judicial officer may \nthe motion \n... [truncated, 2794 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/8 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=8]", "char_count": 2794}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 7 of 22 \nrepresenting or derived from criminal pro ceeds are not likely to assure the \nappearance of the defendant, who will oft en be all too happy to abandon such \nproperty as the cost of doing business. \nThus, if indicated, the AUSA should request the court to examine whether \nthe proposed collateral for an appearance bond is derived from criminal proceeds. \nDepending on the evidence produced at the hearing, called a \"Nebbia \nhearing,\" the court could refuse to accep t the defendant's proposed collateral \nor the proposed surety. And whatever the court's decision turns out to be, if the \nAUSA believes that the collateral is \"dir ty,\" she should consult with the Asset \nForfeiture Unit of this office's Civil Di vision to assess the likelihood that the \ncollateral (whether cash or non -cash property) could be subject to crimin al or \ncivil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. SS 981, 982 or 21 U.S.C. 9$ \n853, 881. \n3. Release on Bail Bond wit h a Solvent Surety \nA \"bail bond with solvent sureties, \" Is U.S.C. S 3142(c)(1)(3)(xii), \nis the other harsher financial alternativ e to an unsecured appearance bond. A \nbail bond with a solvent surety, also cal led a \"surety bond,\" is basically a \nthree-party agreement involving, naturally, a t hird party, the surety.[FN41 The \ndefendant \"executers) a bail bond with [a ] solvent suret[y],\" and the solvent \nsurety \"executers) an agreement [with the court) to forfeit [to the court) such \namount as is reasonably necessary to assu re appearance of the person as \nrequired.\" id.[FN5) Thus, if the court sets a surety bond in the amount \nof $100,000, and if the defendant thereaf ter fails to appear at a judicial \nproceeding, the surety must pay the court $100,000. \nMost sureties are corporations esta \nbailing people out. Corporate sureties, \ntheir customers a fee. Defendants in thi \nsureties that have been approved by the d \nFor the court to approve of the use \nblished to enga\n... [truncated, 2829 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/9 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=9]", "char_count": 2829}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 8 of 22 \nFdd. R. Crim. P. 46(d). Similarly, the 1 984 Act directs that a surety \nshall provide the court with inform \nand liabilities of the surety if of \nnature and extent of encumbrances a \nsurety shall have a net worth which \nvalue to pay the amount of the bail \n18 U.S.C. S 3142(c)(1)(8)(xii). \nation regarding the value of the assets \nher than an approved surety and the \ngainst the surety's property; such \nshall have sufficient unencumbered \nbond; \nIn United States v. Nebbia , 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second \nCircuit observed that a district court ma y reject a surety \"'Ulf the court lacks \nconfidence in the surety's purpose or abi lity to secure the appearance of a \nbailed defendant.'\" Id. at 304. Thus, if indicated, the AUSA sh ould \nrequest the court to examine whether the defendant's proposed surety is \nsufficiently reliable and solvent. Depen ding on the evidence produced at the \nNebbia hearing, the court could reject the prop osed surety. \nD. The Defendant's Failure to Appear \nIf the court releases the defendant pending trial on an unsecured \nappearance bond, a secured appearance bon d, or a surety bond, and the defendant \nthereafter fails to appear for a judicial proceeding, the government should move \nfor and \"the district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.\" Fed. \nR. Crim. P. 46(e)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. 5 3146(d) (\"judicial officer \nmay \n. . declare any property designate d [as bail] to be forfeited \nto the United States\"). To be useful, th e declaration of forfeiture must be \nfollowed by the entry of a civil judgment in favor of the government. But if the \ndefendant surrenders himself or is arrest ed and dragged in by his surety(( FN6J] \nbefore entry of the judgment, \"(t]he court may direct that [the] forfeiture be \nset aside in whole or in part, upon such conditions as the court may impose.\" \nFed. R. Crim. P. 46(e)(2). If the defend ant does not reappear, \"the court\n... [truncated, 2756 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/10 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=10]", "char_count": 2756}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 9 of 22 \nexonerated by a deposit of cash in the am ount of the bond or by a timely \nsurrender of the defendant into custody.\" \nFed. R. Crim. P. 46(f). \nThe defendant's failure to appear h as serious nonfinancial consequences as \nwell. Once the defendant is apprehended, he could be made \"subject to a \nrevocation of release, an order of detent ion, and a prosecution for contempt of \ncourt.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a). In addition, he could be prosec uted for the \nseparate offense of bondjumping. \nSee id. § 3146. \nR. Temporary Detention for Revocation of Conditional Release or Deportation \nTemporary detention is a limited pe riod \nbusiness days -- that can be ordered only in \nTemporary detention \"shall\" be ordered if \n* the defendant is on release pending \nor federal) that involves a felony; \nexecution of sentence or pending ap \nprobation or released on parole in \nof detention -- \nno more than 10 \ncertain limit ed circumstances. \ntrial in another criminal case (state \non release pending imposition or \npeal in another criminal case; on \nanother criminal case, and \n* \"the person may flee or pose a dang er to \ncommunity.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3142(d)(1)(A), \nTemporary detention \"shall\" also be order ed if \nany other person or the \n(2). \n* the defendant is neither a U.S. cit izen nor a permanent resident alien \n(i.e. someone with a \"green card\"), and \n* \"the person may flee or pose a dang er to any other person or the \ncommunity.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3142(d)(1)(B), (2). \nDuring the period of temporary detention, the AUSA must \nnotify the appropriate court, proba \nlocal law enforcement official, or \nImmigration and Naturalization Sery \nto take such person into custody du \ntreated in accordance with the othe \nnotwithstanding the applicability o \nrelease pending trial or deportatio \ntion or parole official, or State or \nthe appropriate official of the \nice. If the official fails or declines \nring that period, such person shall be\n... [truncated, 2337 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/11 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=11]", "char_count": 2337}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 10 of 22 \norder that the defendant \npending further judicial \ndefendants. \nF. Detention \nbe released (wit h or without conditions) or detained \nproceeding based on the criteria applicable to ordinary \n1. General ly \nAlthough there is a general presump tion in favor of pretrial release, the \n1984 Act provides that the magistrate jud ge \"shall\" order that the defendant be \ndetained pending trial \n[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to t \n[magistrate judge] finds that no co \nwill reasonably assure the appearan \nsafety of any other person and the \nhe provisions of [section 3142(f)1, the \nndition or combination of conditions \nce of the person as required and the \ncommunity. \n18 U.S.C. 5 3142(e). Thus, a defendant may be detain ed because he \nrepresents an unacceptable risk of flight or an unacceptable danger to \nspecific individuals or to the community at large. The AUSA should make clear \nto the court which basis for detention th e government is relying on, or that it \nis relying on both. \n2. Risk of Fl ight \nThe 1984 Act authorizes the court t o order pretrial detention if there is \n\"a serious risk that the [defendant] will flee.\" 18 U.S.C. 5 3142(f)(2)(A). \nThe government must estab sh risk of fli ght by a preponderance of the evidence. \nSee, e.g., United States \nMercedes , \nF.3d \n, \n(2d Cir. \nIt\n2001) (\"The government re ins the ultima to burden of persuasion by the lesser \nstandard of a preponderance \nthe eviden ce that the defendant presents a risk \nof flight.\"); United States \nGebro , 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) \n(per curiam) (\"On a motion f r pretrial d etention, the government bears the \nburden of showing by a preponderance of t he evidence that the defendant poses a \nflight risk, and by clear and convincing evidence tir \nt the defendant poses a \ndanger to the community.\"); see also United States \nHazime, 762 \nF.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985) (\"Nor has the government distinguished between flight \n... [truncated, 2303 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/12 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=12]", "char_count": 2303}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 11 of 22 \nif the judicial officer finds that \nthe person committed an offense for \nof ten years or more is prescribed \nU.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled \nU.S.C. 951 et seq.), the Maritime D \n1901 et seq.), or an offense under \nfirearm in relation to crime of vio \n956(a) (conspiracy to kill, kidnap, \n[terrorism across international bou \nStates Code. \n18 U.S.C. 5 3142(e). \nthere is probable cause to believe that \nwhich a maximum term of imprisonment \nin the Controlled Substances Act (21 \nSubstances Import and Export Act (21 \nrug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. \nsection 924(c) (using or carrying \nlence or drug trafficking crime), \netc. in a foreign country), or 2332b \nndaries) of title 18 of the United \nThe principal risk -of-flight considerations are whether the def endant (1) \nhas substantial ties to the local communi ty (employment, spouse, children, \nownership of business, real estate, or of her nonportable assets, etc.); (2) has \nfailed to appear in court in another crim inal case; (3) has a genuine incentive \nto flee (high likelihood of conviction, e xposure to long prison term, likelihood \nof bad collateral consequences in other c riminal cases, fear of retribution from \nvictims, etc.), and (4) has a mental dise ase or defect (too drunk, drug -addled, \nparanoid, schizoid, etc. to control own b ehavior). See 18 U.S.C. 5 \n3142(g). \n3. Dangerous ness \nThe 1984 Act authorizes the court t o order pretrial detention on the basis \nof dangerousness if (1) the defendant is charged with a \"crime of violence,\"( EN7) \na capital offense, or a drug offense carr ying a maximum term of imprisonment of \n10 years or more, and (2) \"no condition or combination of \nconditions or [pretrial release] will rea sonably assure . . . the safety of any \nother person and the community.\" 18 U.S. C. SS 3142(e), (f). The \ngovernment must establish the defendant's dangerousness \"by clear and convincing \nli\nidence.\" Id. 5 \n... [truncated, 2667 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/13 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=13]", "char_count": 2667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 12 of 22 \nThe Act creates a rebuttable presum \non dangerousness in two situations. The \nfinds that there is probable cause to bel \nthe charged offense and the charged \nmaximum term of imprisonment of ten \nControlled Substances Act (21 U.S.0 \nSubstances Import and Export Act (2 \nDrug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. \nunder section 924(c) [using or carr \nof violence or drug trafficking cri \nkidnap, etc. in a foreign country], \ninternational boundaries] of title \n18 V.S.C. S 3142(e). \nThe second situation giving rise t \ndangerousness, also described in Section \nwhen it is determined that a person \noffense has in the past been convic \nwhile on pretrial release [i.e., a \ncapital offense, or drug offense ca \nof 10 years or more). Such a histo \nmitigating information, a rational \nposes a significant threat to commu \ntrusted to conform to the requireme \nption in favor of detention based \nfirst is when the judicial officer \nieve that the person committed \noffense is an offense for which a \nyears or more is prescribed in the \n. 801 et seq.), the Controlled \n1 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), the Maritime \nApp. 1901 et seq.), or an offense \nying firearm in relation to crime \nme], 956(a) [conspiracy to kill, \nor 2332b [terrorism across \n18 of the United States Code. \no a rebuttable presumption of \n3142(e), is \ncharged with a seriously dangerous \nted of committing another serious crime \nfederal or state \"crime of violence,\" \nrrying a maximum term of imprisonment \nry of pre-trial criminality is, absent \nbasis for concluding that a defendant \nnity safety and that he cannot be \nnts of the law while on release. \nS. Rep. No. 98-225, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, \n3202. See 18 U.S.C. S 3142(e). This rebuttable presumption doe s not \narise, however, if the period beginning w ith the date of defendant's prior \nconviction or the date of his release fro m imprisonment for that conviction, \nwhichever is later, and t\n... [truncated, 2342 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/14 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=14]", "char_count": 2342}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 13 of 22 \n• \nThe 1984 Act requires that the dete ntion hearing be held \"immediately upon \nthe person's first appearance before the judicial officer,\" id. § \n3142(f), but it also entitles the governm ent to a continuance of the hearing for \nat least one but no more than three busin ess days, and entitles the defendant to \na continuance of at least one but no more than five business days, id. \n§ 3142(f)(2). \"(Nor good cause,\" the magi strate judge may grant either \nparty a longer continuance. \nId. \"During (the] continuance, (the \ndefendant) shall be detained . . . .\" \nId. CFN8l \nHowever, once the \ndetention hearing begins, the defendant \" may be detained pending \ncompletion of the hearing.\" \nId. \nIn practice, the magistrate judges \ncontinuances to the government only if th \nestablishing a basis for detention author \ncontinuances that are granted are usually \ngovernment fails to make an adequate prof \nthe detention hearing immediately and rel \nof the hearing. \nin our district usually grant \ne AUSA makes a factual proffer \nized by the 1984 Act, and the \nfor only one or two days. If the \nfer, the magistrate judge may well start \nease the defendant pending completion \n\"The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not \napply to the presentation and considerati on of information at la detention) \nhearing.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Thus, hearsay is admissible. \nSee \nalso Fed. R. Evid. 1101(6)(3) (FRE do not app ly to \"proceedings with respect \nto release on bail or otherwise\"). \nWith respect to due process, the 19 84 Act provides: \nAt the hearing, such person has the \nand, if financially unable to obtai \ncounsel appointed. The person shal \ntestify, to present witnesses, to c \nthe hearing, and to present informa \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). \nThe government's presentation of ev \ntestimony of the case agent (who is the g \nand/or a proffer of evidence made by the \nautomatically include the report o\n... [truncated, 2632 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/15 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=15]", "char_count": 2632}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 14 of 22 \nany. Although a witness's prior statemen is are not required to be \ndisclosed until after the witness testifi es on direct examination, see \nFed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(a), the magistrate judge will likely be irritated if the \ngovernment fails to disclose witness stat ements before the hearing begins. \n2. \nCriteria for Pretrial Rel ease or Detention \nThe Act sets forth the criteria by which the court (usually the magistrate \njudge) must decide the question of pretri al release or detention. Section \n3142(g) provides that the court \nshall . . . take into account t he available information concerning \n(1) The nature and circumstances \nthe o ffense charged, including \nIf \nwhether the offense is a crime of \niolence or involves a narcotic drug; \n(2) \n(3) \nthe weight of the evidence aga inst the person; \nthe history and characteristic s of the person, including \n(A) the person's character, physical and m ental condition, family \nties, employment, financial re sources, length of residence in the \ncommunity, community ties, pas t conduct, history relating to drug or \nalcohol abuse, criminal histor y, and record concerning appearance at \ncourt proceedings; and \n(B) whether, at the time of th \nperson was on probation, on pa \ntrial, sentencing, appeal, or \nunder Federal, State, or local \ne current offense or arrest, the \nrole, or on other release pending \ncompletion of sentence for an offense \nlaw; and \n(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the com - \nmunity that would be posed by the person' s release. \n18 U.S.C. S 3142(g). \n3. Content of Release or \nIf at the conclusion of the hearing \nreleased pending trial, the order \"shall \nthat sets forth all the conditions to whi \nDetention Order \nthe court orders \n. . . include \nch the release is \nthat the defendant be \na written statement \nsubject, in a manner \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/olc/usabook/desk./07desk.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA0019\n... [truncated, 2005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/16 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=16]", "char_count": 2005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 15 of 22 \nsufficiently clear and specific to serve as a guide for the person's conduct.\" \n18.U.S.C. S 3142(h)(1). \nIf, instead, the court orders that the defendant be detained pending trial, \nthe order \"shall . . . include writte n findings of fact and a written \nstatement of the reasons for the detentio n.\" Id. S 3142(i)(1); \nsee also Fed. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) (\"The district c ourt must state in \nwriting, or orally on the record, the rea sons for an order regarding the release \nor detention of a defendant in a criminal case.\"). \n4. Reopening the Dete ntion Hearing \nA detention \nhearing may \nofficer, at \ninformation \nhearing and \nbe reopened before or a (ter a determination by the judicial \nany time before trial i f the judicial officer finds that \nexists that was not kno wn to the movant at the time of the \nthat has a material bea ring on the issue whether there are \nconditions of release that will rea sonably assure the appearance of such \nperson as required and the safety o f any other person and the community. \n18 U.S.C. 5 3142(f). \"The judicial officer may at an y time amend the order \n(of release on conditions] to impose addi tional or different conditions.\" \nId. S 3142(c)(3). \nH. Review of Release/Detention Order by District Judge, Court of Appeals \nDetention hearings in this district are invariably conducted by magistrate \njudges. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c) (at in itial appearance, \"magistrate judge \nshall detain or conditionally release the defendant\"); 28 U.S.C. S \n636(a)(2) (conferring on magistrate judge s \"power to . \n. issue orders \npursuant to section 3142 of title 18 conc erning release or detention of \npersons pending trial\"). A magistrate ju dge's order of pretrial release or \ndetention must be reviewed by a district judge if eithe r party moves \nfor such review. See 18 U.S.C. SS 3145(a), (b). If the \nmagistrate judge enters an order of relea se, \"(1) the attorney for the \nGovernment\n... [truncated, 2501 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/17 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=17]", "char_count": 2501}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 16 of 22 \ndetermined promptly.\" \nId. \nIf the AUSA believes that a magistr \nshould be reviewed by a district judge, s \nappropriate district judge immediately to \ncharging instrument is a complaint, the r \nSee E.D. Mich. Local Crim. R. 57.2, Local \ninstrument is an indictment, the reviewer \nwas assigned, or if that judge is unavail \nsee E.D. Mich. Local R. 77.2(b). \nate judge's order of pretrial release \nhe should contact the court clerk of the \nschedule the review hearing. If the \neviewer is the presiding district judge. \nR. 77.2(a). If the charging \nis the district judge to whom the case \nable, the presiding district judge, \nThe fact that under the 1984 Act th e government has the right to \nhave a magistrate judge's order of releas e reviewed by a district judge, \nsee 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), implies that the magistrate judg e's order \nli \nof release sho d be stayed pending revie w of the order by a district judge. In \nUnited States \nHuckabay, 707 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1989), the ma gistrate \njudge ordered pretrial release but detain ed the defendant pending review by a \ndistrict judge, explaining that \"'an appe \nafter a motion for detention has been fil \nstatutory implication, authorizes the jud \njudge] to stay the release order to allow \n(i.e., the district judge] to pass upon t \nThe district judge agreed, observing that \nthe district court could frustrate the ve \n37. If the magistrate judge refuses to s \nshould request a stay from the district j \nThe AUSA should make sure that the \ntape from the hearing before the magistra \njudge's order of release, and a copy of t \nAgency. The government's motion for revi \n\"shall be determined promptly\" by the dis \nSome district judges will conduct the hea \nfor another day or two. The AUSA should \nhearing before the magistrate judge (afte \nChief). Some judges will not conduct the \navailable. \nal of the magistrate's release order \ned at the initial appearance, by \ni\n... [truncated, 3108 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/18 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=18]", "char_count": 3108}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 17 of 22 \nwriting, or orally on the record, the rea sons for (that] order.\" Fed. R. App. \nP..9(a)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1). \nIf the district judge issues an or der of pretrial release, the government \nmay appeal the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. \nSee 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c); Fed. R. App. P. 9(a). The AUSA should \ncontact her supervisor and the Appellate Chief immediately to discuss this \noption. A government appeal of an order of release, like its appeal of any other \norder or judgment of the district court, must be approved by the Appellate Chief, \nthe United States Attorney, and the Solic itor General of the United States. \"The \nappeal should be determined promptly.\" 1 8 U.S.C. § 3145(c); see also \nFed. R. App. P. 9(a)(2). \nIII. Release or Detention Pending :wool tion or Execution of Sentence \nOnce a defendant has been convicted , the 1984 Act \ntoward detention. It provides: \nThe judicial officer shall order th \ndetained, unless the judicial offic \nevidence that the person is not lik \nsafety of any other person or the c \n3142(b) or (c). If the judicial off \njudicial officer shall order the re \nsection 3142(b) or (c). \ntilts the playing field \nat (a convicted defendant] . . \nbe \ner finds by clear and convincing \nely to flee or pose a danger to the \nommunity if released under section \nicer makes such a finding, such \nlease of the person in accordance with \n18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). In practice, the government, at least in this \ndistrict, often permits a convicted defen dant to remain free pending the \nimposition of sentence or the execution o f sentence following its \nimposition.(FN10] This generally occurs in cases where a defendant on pretrial \nrelease pleads guilty, or where a defenda nt on pretrial release is convicted at \ntrial and the AUSA is not really concerne d about the risk of flight or danger to \nothers posed by the defendant. Of course , the AUSA should\n... [truncated, 2582 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/19 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=19]", "char_count": 2582}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 18 of 22 \n(A)(i) \n(B) \nthe judicial officer finds ther e is a substantial likelihood \nthat a motion for acquit tal or new trial will be granted; or \n(ii) \nan attorney for the Gove rnment has recommended that no \nsentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and \nthe judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the \nperson is not likely to flee o r pose a danger to any other person or \nthe community. \n18 U.S.C. S 3143(a)(2). \nIV. Release or Detention Pending Appeal \nThe 1984 Act sets forth a presumpti on of detention when a defendant who has \nbeen sentenced to a term of imprisonment files an appeal. See 18 U.S.C. \nS 3143(b). Ordinarily, the presumption is rebuttable, and the burden is on \nthe defendant to establish by clear and c onvincing evidence that he should be \nreleased pending appeal. \nSee id. S 3143(b)(1) (defendant must show \nthat he is not likely to flee or pose a d anger to any other person or the \ncommunity, and that the appeal will likel y result in the reversal of his \nconviction or the vacation of his prison term). \nIf, however, the defendant has \nbeen convicted of and sentenced for a \"c rime of violence,\" a capital offense, \nor a drug offense carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more, \nthe presumption of detention is irrebutta ble. See id. 5 3143(b)(2). \nI. Release or Detention of Arrestees Oth er than Ordinary Defendants \nA. Probationers and Supervised Rel \nA defendant arrested for a violatio \n\"may be released pursuant to Rule 46(c) p \nR. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(1). Rule 46(c) says \naccordance with 18 U.S.C. S 3143.\" Fed. \ngoverns the release or detention of convi \nor execution of sentence. \nSee supra pp. \nB. Material Witnesses \nn of probation or supervised release \nending the revocation hearing.\" Fed. \nthat release or detention \"shall be in \nR. Crim. P. 46(c). Section 3143(a) \ncted defendants awaiting the imposition \n17-18. \nA provision of the 1984 A\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/20 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=20]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 19 of 22 \nU.S.C. S 3144, who are individuals whose presence at trial \"may become \nimpracticable to secure . . . by subpoena .\" Many material witnesses are aliens \nwhose whereabouts at the time of trial wi 11 be a foreign country or unknown. \nBasically, a material witness may be acre sted on a material witness complaint and \nwarrant issued by the court, and then det ained until his testimony can be secured \nby deposition. Std. ; Fed. R. trim. p. 15(a); see also, \ne.g., Torres-Ruiz \nUnited States District Court , 120 F.3d 933 934 -\n36 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). \nC. Aliens \nAliens may be subject to \"temporary detention\" for up to 10 days to allow \nfor the notification of INS and the defen dant's transfer to INS for \nadministrative deportation proceedings. \nSee 18 U.S.C. SS \n3142(d)(1)(B), (2); supra p. 9. \nVI. Additional Resources \n• \nAnnual Review of Criminal Procedure (Part II: Preliminary \nProceedings (Bail) , Georgetown Law Journal. \n• \n27 Moore's Federal Practice ch \n646 (3d ed., looseleaf service \nupdated annually). \n3A Charles Alan Wright, Federa 1 Practice and Procedure SS \n761-778 (2d ed. Supp. 2001). \n• \nDavid Marshall Nissman, Proving Federal Crimes ch. 17 (2001). \n• \n3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Crim inal Procedure ch. 12 (2d ed. 1999). \nFN 1. Still, under the 1966 Act district tour is effectively ordered pretrial \ndetention based on dangerousness by order ing pretrial release with bail set \nin an amount clearly beyond the defendant 's means (e.g., $ 500,000), a \npractice specifically prohibited by the 1 984 Act. See 18 U.S.C. \n3142(c)(2) (\"The judicial officer may not impose a financial \ncondition that results in the pretrial de tention of the person.\"). \nFN 2. \"personal recognizance. \nThe release of a defendant in a \ncriminal case in which the court takes th e defendant's word that he or she \nwill appear for a scheduled matter or whe n told to appear.\" Black's Law \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usa\n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/21 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=21]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 20 of 22 \nDictionary 1278 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999). \"release on \nrecognizance. The pretrial release of an arrested per son who promises, \nusu. in writing but without supplying a a urety or posting bond, to appear \nfor trial at a later date. \n-- Also termed release on own \nrecognizance.\" Id. at 1292. \nFN 3. If real property is offered as collater al, the AUSA must be satisfied \nbased on a review of deeds, mortgages, li ens, and appraisals that the owner \n(whether the defendant or someone else) h as sufficient equity in the \nproperty to back the amount of the bond. \nThe office's Asset Forfeiture Unit \ncan assist the AUSA in making this inquir y. The AUSA should also thoroughly \nexamine or cross-examine anyone with an ownership interest in the property \nabout several matters, including her will ingness to lose her interest in the \nproperty if the defendant fails to appear ; her knowledge of the defendant's \ncriminal activity; her involvement with t he defendant in criminal activity, \nif any, and her own criminal record and a ctivity, if any; and her knowledge \nof the existence of assets owned by the d efendant from which she might \nexpect repayment in the event of forfeitu re of collateral. Such questioning \nmay lead to surprising and helpful inform ation, especially when defense \ncounsel fails to thoroughly prepare the w itness. \nIn the rare case where the real pro \nvaluable and \"clean\" to serve as collater \ndefense counsel to jointly seek the appro \nthe charges are contained in a complaint, \nto whom the case was assigned if the char \nperty in question is sufficiently \nal, the AUSA should simply agree with \nval of the presiding district judge if \nor the approval of the district judge \nges are contained in an indictment. \nFN 4. \"surety (shuur( -1)1-tee). 1. A person who is primarily liab le for the \npayment of another's debt or the performa nce of another's obligation. . . .\" \nBlack's Law D\n... [truncated, 3010 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/22 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=22]", "char_count": 3010}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Desk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 21 of 22 \nBLick's Law Dictionary 169 (Bryan A. Garn er ed., 7th ed. 1999). \nFN 6. The 1984 Act empowers sureties to arres t a fugitive defendant. \nSee 18 U.S.C. 5 3149 (\"A person charged with an offense, who is \nreleased upon the execution of an appeara nce bond with a surety, may be \narrested by the surety, and if so arreste d, shall be delivered promptly to a \nUnited States marshal and brought before a judicial officer.\"). \nFN 7. \"Crime of violence\" is defined at 18 U. S.C. S 3156(a)(4). The \ncircuits are split as to whether the crim e of being a felon in possession of \na firearm, id. S 922(9)(1), is a \nrime of violence\" under the \n1984 Act. Compare United States \nDillard , 214 F.3d 88 (2d \nCir. 2000) (FIP \"crime of violence ) with United States . \nli\nLane, 252 F.3d 05 (7th Cir. 2001) (FIP not \" crime of violence\"), and \nUnited States \nSingleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same). The \nSixth Circuit as not yet addressed the i ssue in a published opinion. \nFN 8. This brief detention is often referred to as \"temporary detention,\" \nwhich is a term of art in the 1984 Act, see 18 U.S.C. S 3142(d) \n(caption), that actually refers to an ent irely different kind of detention. \nSee id. (providing for detention of up to 10 day s of either a \ndefendant who is on release in connection with another criminal case or a \ndefendant who is an alien, and who \"may f lee or pose a danger to any other \nperson or the community\"). \nFN 9. Although 1(tihe Sixth Circuit has not a ddressed this question,\" \nUnited States \nYamini , 91 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127 (S.D. Ohio 20 00), \nthe great weig I t of authority holds that the district judge's standard of \nreview of a magistrate ju e's order of p retrial release or detention is de \nnovo.. See United Sta s \nLeon , 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. \n1985); United fates \nBe ker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1394 (3d Cir.1985); \nIr\nUnited \nates \nClar , 865 F.2d 1433, 1436 (4th Cir.1989); United \nStates \nF\n... [truncated, 2709 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/23 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=23]", "char_count": 2709}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Sixth Circuit Criminal Dcsk Book Chapter 7. Bail and Detention \nPage 22 of 22 \ndifferent from or an adoption of th e findings of the magistrate.\" Thus, \nwhile the district courts are not r equired to engage in a plenary \nprocedure pursuant to 5 3145(b), the circuit courts that have \naddressed the standard of review ag ree that some independent review is \nrequired. \n91 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (citations omitted , brackets in original). \nFN 10. The imposition of sentence occurs at th e sentencing hearing. The \nexecution of sentence, by contrast, \"comm ences on the date the defendant is \nreceived in custody awaiting transportati on to, or arrives voluntarily to \ncommence service of sentence at, the offi cial detention (read penal or \ncorrectional] facility at which the sente nce is to be served.\" 18 U.S.C. \n3585(a). \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/ole/usabook/desk/O7desk.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191611\n", "char_count": 905}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Chapter 17 \nBail and Detention \n17.01 General provisions \n17.02 Bail Reform Act \n17.03 Categories \n17.04 Personal recognizance \n17.05 Conditional release \n17.06 Eligibility for release - factors \n17.07 Temporary detention orders \n17.08 Detention \n17.09 Bail application following detention \n17.10 Breach of condition of bond \n17.11 Defendant's appeal of detention order \n17.12 Miscellaneous sections \n17.01 \nGeneral provisions \nThe Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution \nprovides that le)xtessive bail shall not be required . . .\" U.S. COMET. \nAMEND. VIII. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this \namendment to prohibit the imposition of excessLve bail without creating \na right to bail in criminal cases. See United States' Salerno. 481 U.S. 739, \n754.55 (1987)(\"Eighth Amendment does not grant absolute right to \nbail\"). The subject of bail and detention also implicates the Fourteenth \nAmendment's Due Process Clause, and requires that laws imposing \npretrial detention \"servea compelling governmental interest', Salerno, 481 \nU.S. at 752, and \"the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment\". \nThe principal source of this chapter is the Criminal Resource \nManual of the United States Attorney's Manual § 26. \n17.02 \nBail Reform Act \nIn federal criminal proceedings, release and detention \ndeterminations are governed by the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. \n§§ 3141.3156 (1990). These sections contain specific guidelines that \n'judicial officers\" must follow in considering whether a defendant should \nbe detained or released pending federal criminal proceedings. \nCh. 17 Bail and Detention \n543 \nEFTA00191612\n", "char_count": 1643}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Title 18, United States Code, Section 3141(a) gives 'judicial \nofficers' authority to make determinations regarding bail in all stages of \na criminal case, up to and including the trial stage. The term 'judicial \nofficers' is defined in Tide 18, United States Code, Section 3156, along \nwith other terms relevant to the matter of bail in criminal cases. Once a \ndefendant has been convicted of the federal charges, Title 18, United \nStates Code, Section 3141(b) vests authority with district judges and the \nappellate courts to make bail determinations pending the imposition or \nexecution of sentence, or pending appeal of the same. \nTitle 18, United States Code, Sections 3152 through 3154 \npertain to the administration and the supervision authority of pretrial \nservices officers in the federal criminal system. Section 3154 specifically \nempowers pretrial services officers with the authority to collect \ninformation from defendants and other sources relative to the matter of \nbail. Pretrial services officers are authorized to make recommendations \nas to whether a defendant should be detained or released, including \nspecific recommendations regarding conditions of release. 18 U.S.C. § \n3154(1). Pretrial services officers are also authorized to establish facilities \nfor and conduct the supervision of defendants released under the \nprovisions of Section 3142. \n17.03 \nCategories \nTide 18, United States Code, Section 3142 defines the categories \nof \"release and detention\" a defendant may be subject to and contains the \nrules under which the court and parties must proceed relating to bail \nmatters. In that regard, Section 3142(a) states \"that upon the appearance \nbefore a judicial officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial \nofficer shall make a determination regarding bail status of the defendant, \nand shall enter an order designating a defendant's custodial status' under \none of four categories: \n(1) \nreleased on personal recognizance or upon execution of \nan unse\n... [truncated, 2392 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/26 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=26]", "char_count": 2392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "17.04 \nPersonal recognizance \nTitle 18, United States Code, Section 3142(b) requires a judicial \nofficer to order the pretrial release of a defendant on \"personal \nrecognizance\" or upon the defendant's execution of an \"unsecured \nappearance bond\" in an amount specified by the court. A Section \n3142(b) release order must be conditioned on a defendant's agreement to \n\"not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release.\" \nIf, however, the judicial officer determines that the release of a defendant \non \"personal recognizance\" or \"unsecured appearance bond\" could not \n\"reasonably assure\" the defendantt appearance at court proceedings, or \nwill \"endanger the safety of any other person or the community\", then \nthere is no obligation to order release. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(b) and \n3142(c). In this event, the judicial officer must follow the provisions of \nTitle 18, United States Code, Section 3142(c). \n17.05 \nConditional release \nOnce a judicial officer has made the determination that a \ndefendant does not qualify for release under Section 3142(6), then the \njudicial officer must follow Section 3142(c). When structuring the \nrelease of a defendant under Section 3142(c), the judicial officer must \norder that the defendant 'hot commit a Federal, State, a Local crime \nduring the period of release. 18 U.S.C. § 3 I 42(c)( I )(A). In addition, the \njudicial officer must impose the least restrictive condition or combination \nof conditions necessary to \"reasonably assure\" the defendant's appearance \nas required and to \"reasonably assure\" the safety of any person and the \ncommunity\". \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). \nAn illustrative list of \nconditions is set forth in § 3142(c)( I )(B)(i)-(x iv) which gives the judicial \nofficer authority to impose conditions not specifically enumerated so long \nas the same serve the purposes set out in § 3 I 42(c)(1)(B). It is important \nto note that \"Section 3142 speaks only of conditions that will \n\"reasonably\" assure appearance, not\n... [truncated, 2487 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/27 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=27]", "char_count": 2487}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "17.06 \nEligibility for release - factors \nWhen making a determination regarding the eligibility of a \ndefendant for pretrial release (whether personal recognizance unsecured \nappearance bond, or release on conditions), the judicial officer must \nconsider the factors listed in Section 3142(g), including: \n(1) \nthe nature and circumstances of the offense (in particular \nwhether it is an offense which is violent or nonviolent in \nnature, or involves narcotics); \n(2) \nthe weight of the evidence against the person; \n(3) \nthe history and characteristics of the person --\n(A) \ncharacter -- including physical and mental \ncondition), family ties, employment, finandal \nresources, length of time in the community, \ncommunity ties, past conduct history relating to \ndrug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, record of \ncourt appearances; and \n(B) \nwhether, at the time of the current offense or \narrest, the person wason probation, on parole,or \non other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, \nor completion of sentence for an offense under \nFederal, State, or local law; and \n(4) \nthe nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or \nto the community that would be posed by the person's \nrelease. \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) \nIn addition to considering evidence of the factors set forth above, \nthe court may upon its own motion, or upon the motion of the \ngovernment attorney, conduct an inquiry into the source of any property \nto be designated for potential forfeiture or offered as collateral to secure \nany bond. 18 U.S.C. § 3I42(g)(4). If the court determines that any such \ncollateral or property, because of its source, will not reasonably assure the \nappearance of the defendant as required, the designation or use of the \ncollateral or property as security for a bond shall be refused. 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3 I 42(g)(4). \n17.07 \nTemporary detention orders \nTitle 18, United States Code, Section 3142(d) requires a judicial \nofficer to enter an order of temporary detention in cases where a factual \n... [truncated, 2072 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/28 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=28]", "char_count": 2072}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "(1) \nthe defendant: \n(A) \nis, and was at the time the offense was \ncommitted, on \n(i) release pending trial for a felony under Federal. \nState, or local law; \n(ii) release pending imposition or execution of \nsentence, appeal of sentence or conviction, or \ncompletion of sentence, for any offense under \nFederal, State, or local law; a \n(iii) \nprobation or parole for any offense under \nFederal, State, or local law; OR \n(8) \nis not a citizen of the United States or lawfully \nadmitted for permanent residence, as defined in \nsection 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and \nNationality Act (8 U.S.C. 110I(a) (2); and \n(2) \nthe defendant may flee or pose a danger to any other \nperson or the community. \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(d) \nThe formula for calculating the 10 day temporary detention \nperiod is set forth in Section 3142(d). At the time the 10 day order is \nentered, the judicial officer must direct the attorney for the government \nto notify the appropriate \"authorities\" of the defendant's status. In the \nevent that the \"notified authority declines to take the defendant into \ncustody. then the judicial officer must make an independent \ndetermination regarding bail under the provisions of Sections 3142(b), \n3142(c), and 3142(e)(if the government moves for detention). \n17.08 \nDetention \nThe Bail Reform Act requires the pretrial detention of a defendant \nonly if a judicial officer determines that no conditions or combination of \nconditions exist whi \nwill \nI\n\"reasonably assure the appearance of the \nperson\", United States \nXidam , 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(per \ncuriam , and \"the safety of any other person and the community.\" United \nStates I Rodriguez. 897 F. Supp. 1461, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1995); IS U.S.C. \n§ 3142(c). \nCases Which Qualify For Detention Hearings: Section \n3142(f) defines specific situations under which a judicial officer may hold \na detention hearing. Those situations are as follows: \n( I) \nUpon the motion of the government attorney, in a case \nthat involves: (a) a cr\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/29 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=29]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "an offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment \nis 10 or more years as prescribed by the Controlled \nSubstances Act; or (d) any felony if the person has been \nconvicted of two or more offenses described in \nparagraphs (a) through (c) or comparable state offenses. \n(2) \nUpon the motion of the government attorney or on the \ncourt's own motion, in a case that involves: (a) a serious \nrisk of flight; or (b) a serious risk that the defendant will \nobstruct justice or threaten a witness. \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 \nSection 3142(f) \"does not authorize a detention hearing in t \nabsence of one of the six situations set forth above.\" United States. \nButler, 165 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. Ohio 1996). Thus, the government may \nnot request a detention hearing only on the allegations of danger to the \ncommunity or another person. \nThe \"government is required to \ndemonstrate that there are grounds for a hearing under the specific \nprovisions of either 3142(f)(1) or (f)(2).\" Butler, 165 F.R.D. at 71. \n\"When there exists one or more grounds for holding a hearing under those \nprovisions, the government may proceed on the theory of risk of flight \nand/or danger to the community or any other person.\" Id. Section \n3142(f) may fairly be interpreted as authorizing pretrial detention \"only \nupon proof of a likelihood of flight, a threatened obstruction of justice or \na danger of recidivism in one or more of the crimes actually s \nified by \nthe bail statute.\" Butler, 165 F.R.D. at 71 (quoting United Sta\n r \nHinder, \np \n797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986) and eirg United States I yrd, 969 \nF.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992); United States \nPlinf, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. \n1988)). \nWhen the court has determined that a detention hearing is \nwarranted, it may consider evidence relating to a defendant's danger to \nthe community. Detention considerations are then guided by the factors \nset forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and the specific consideration of \"the \nnature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the comm\n... [truncated, 2789 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/30 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=30]", "char_count": 2789}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "history, has not been deterred from the commission of crime by \nprior convictions and appears to be involved in ongoing drug \noffenses. \n165 F.R.D. at 72. \nTiming Of Detention Hearing: Title 18, United States Code, \nSection 3 I 42(f)(2) contains specific guidelines regarding the timing of \ndetention hearings. Ideally, the hearing is supposed to take place \nimmediately upon the defendant's first appearance before the judicial \nofficer. However, given the fact that a defendant may lack representation \nat this initial appearance, the detention hearing is not Ikely to go forward \nunless the court has made other arrangements for the defendant to be \nrepresented by counsel. Section 3142(f)(2) also permits a 3 day delay of \nthe detention hearing upon the motion of the government attorney. A \ndefendant may request a continuance of up to 5 days under this section. \nfor good cause shown. Between the time the detention motion is filed \nand the actual detention hearing (up through the court's ruling on the \nmotion for detention), the defendant will remain in the custody of the \nUnited States Marshals Office. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2). A hearing may \nbe reopened before or after the court's ruling on a detention motion, at \nany time before trial if the judicial officer makes a factual finding that \ninformation exists that was not previously known at the time of the \nhearing and that the information is material on the issue of whether there \nare conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the \ndefendant and the safety of any other person and the community. \nDetention Hearings May Proceed By Way of Proffer; Rules \nof Evidence Do Not Apply: \"Detention hearings are an informal \nproceeding, and the evidence presented is not governed by the Federal \nRules of Evidence.\" United States I Duncan, 897 F. Supp. 688, 690 \n(N.D.N.Y. 1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (2) . The governmeitsa proceed \nin a detention hearing by way of proffer. United States I \n39 Fed. \nAppx. 278, 278-78\n... [truncated, 2954 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/31 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=31]", "char_count": 2954}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "(3d Cir. 1986).\" Smith, 79 F.3d at 1210 also citing United States \nHurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985)( purpose of pretrial \ndetention hearing is not to \"rehash . . . probable cause\" but to provide \nopportunity for detainee ir show no risk of flight or danger to \ncommunity); United States \nWilliams, 798 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D.D.C. \n1992). \"A right to require the government to produce its witnesses \nagainst [a defendant] would complicate the hearing to a degree out of \nproportion to the liberty interest at stake - viz. the interest in remaining \nfree until trial, for what is by statute a period of limited duration.\" Smith, \n79 F.3d at 1210: see also Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, a seq. \nApplication of the Rebuttable Presumption: Title 18, United \nStates Code, Section 3142(e) contains three categories of criminal \noffenses that give rise to a rebuttable presumption that \"no condition or \ncombination of conditions\" will (I) \"reasonably assure\" the safety of any \nother person and the community if the defendant is released; or (2) \n\"reasonably assure\" the appearance of the defendant as required and \n\"reasonably assure\" the safety of any other person and the community if \nthe defendant is released. These three categories are: \n(e) \n... a judicial officer finds that: \n(1) \nthe person has been convicted of a Federal offense that is \ndescribed in subsection (f)(1) of t his section, or of a State \nor local offense that would have been an offense \ndescribed in subsection (0(1) of this section if a \ncircumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had \nexisted; \n(2) \nthe offense described in paragraph one of this subsection \nwas committed while the person was on release pending \ntrial for a Federal, State, or local offense; and \n(3) \na period of not more than five years has elapsed since the \ndate of conviction, or the release of the person from \nimprisonment, for the offense described in paragraph (1) \nof this subsection, whichever is later. \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)\n... [truncated, 2761 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/32 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=32]", "char_count": 2761}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "1201, 1591, 2241, 2242, 2244(a)(1), 2245, 2251, 2251A, 2252(a)(I ), \n2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)( I ), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(3), \n2252A(a)(4), 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425 of this title. \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). \nThe rebuttable presumption relating only to the safety of any \nother person and the community pertains to those cases meeting the \ncriteria of Section 3142(e)(1)-(3). It is important to rote, that all 3 of \nthese conditions must be met for the proper application of the rebuttable \npresumption of \"danger to the community.\" \nThe rebuttable presumption relating to both \"risk of flight' and \n\"danger to the community\" pertains to those cases where the judicial \nofficer fords there is probable cause to believe that the defendant \ncommitted: (1) a drug offense (as defined under Title 21) when the \nmaximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more; or (2) an offense \nunder Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c). 18 U.S.C. § \n3142(e). \nThe indictment alone is sufficient to raise the rebuttable \npresumption that no cond ition (or combination of conditions) will ensure \nthe defendant's reappearance for trial and that no conditions of release \ni\nwill ensure the safety of the \nmmunity. See, e.g., Smith, 79 F.3d at \n1210-1211 citing United StatesDillon, 938 F.2d 1412 (1st Cir. 1991); \nSuppa, 799 F.2d at 119; United taus, Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 n.7 \n(7th Cir. 1986); Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 147i-79; United States `Contreras, \n776 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985). nited Stata Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th \nCir. 1985); United States \nMauro, 648 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.D.C. \n1986); see also United States \nTedder, 903 F. Supp. 344, 345 (N.D.N.Y. \n1995). \nBurden of Proof At Detention Hearing: In a pretrialdetendon \nhearing, the government's burden is to establish by clear and convincing \nevidence that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety iaf \nthe community. Rodriguez, 897 F. Supp. at 1463 citing United States \nOrta, 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Un\n... [truncated, 2851 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/33 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=33]", "char_count": 2851}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "there are no such conditions by a \"preponderance of the evidence.\" See \nUnited States I Tedder, 903 F. Supp. 344, 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)citing \nUnited States v. Martin 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3I42(c). It is not necessary that the government prove both flight risk \nand danger to the community to warrant detention. See United States'. \nFlora, 856 F. Supp. 1400, 1401 (ED. Cal. 1994). \nRequirements For The Contents Of Release and Detention \nOrders: Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(h) lists the \nrequirements for the contents of a \"release order.\" Title 18, United States \nCode, Section 3142(g) lists the requirements for the contents of a \n\"detention order,\" including the requirement of \"written findings of fact \nand a written statement of the masons for detention.\" \n17.09 \nBail application following \ndetention \nWhen a defendant moves for release on bail following pretrial \ndetention, the court must consider three factors: \"(1) the length of the \npretrial detention; (2) the extent to which the prosecution is responsible \ni\nfor the delay of the trial; and (3) the strength of t e evidence upon which \nthe pretrial detention was based.\" tired States \nMilian, 4 F.3d 1038, \n1043 (2d Cir. 1993); United States \nO'Neill, 52 F. Supp. 2d 954, 960 \n(ED. Wis. 1999)(to get to first base on this issue, the defendant must \nshow that either the prosecution or the court has unnecessarily delayed \nin bringing the case to trial—maybe the prosecutor is stalling because he \nrealizes his case is so weak that pretrial detention is the only punishment \nin fact he can impose on the dekndant). \nRegarding the length of pretrial detention, there is no doubt that \nthe longer the pretrial detention the more lately the denial of due process. \nTypically, this f or weighs in favor of the moving dekndant. See, e.g., \nUnited States I \nGonzales-Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 341 (2d Cir. \n1986)(\"detention that has lasted for fourteen months and, without \nspeculation, is scheduled to la\n... [truncated, 2630 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/34 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=34]", "char_count": 2630}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "continuance, discovery disputes, complexity of the case, plea discussions, \nand other matters relating to the progress (or lack thereof) of the case. \nRegarding the reasons for the pretrial detention, the court will \nexamine the findings from the detention hearing. \n17.10 \nBreach of condition of bond \nTitle 18, United States Code, Sections 3146 through 3148 \ndescribe the penalties a defendant may be subject to for: (I) failure to \nappear at any proceeding as required (Section 3146); (2) committing an \noffense while on pretrial release (Section 3147); and (3) violating any \ncondition of pretrial release (which includes the sanction of bond \nrevocation)(Section 3148). In addition, Title 18, United States Code, \nSection 3149 empowers a surety with arrest authority over offenders, and \nrequires that the surety promptly deliver the offender to the custody of \nthe United States Marshal for proceedings under Section 3148. In this \ninstance, judicial officers are also bound by Federal Rule of Criminal \nProcedure 46. \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(e) provides that \"[t]he \ncourt must declare the bail forfeited if a condition of the bond is \nbreached.\" FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(f)( 1 ). This la \nage is broad, and \nreaches any condition of release. See United States' Ggante, 166 F.R.D. \n3, 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 \nI  \ndoes ot supersede \nRule 46(f). Gigante, 166 F.R.D. at 4 (ling United States \nVaccaro, 51 \nF.3d 189 (9th Cir. 1995); United States \nDunn, 781 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. \n1986); and by way of implication Unit States' Dudley, 62 F.3d 1275, \n1278 (10th Cir. 1995); Oiled States \nPatriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 793 (1st \nCir. 1991); United States \nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1987). \n\"[There is no conflict between Rule 46(f) and the Bail Reform Act; the \nRule and the Act are complementary and form a unified system dealing \nwith pretrial release.'\" Giganu, 166 F.R.D. at 6 quoting Vaccaro, 51 F.3d \nat 192. \n17.11 \nDefendant's appeal of detention \norder \nWhen\n... [truncated, 2394 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/35 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=35]", "char_count": 2394}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985); see also U ted States ' King, 849 F.2d 485, 489-91 \n(11th Cir. 1988); United States \nWilliams, 753 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. \n1985). 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)-(c). \n17.12 \nMiscellaneous sections \nOther provisions of Title 18 are relevant to matters concerning \nrelease and detention in criminal cases. For example, Section 3143 \ncontains the framework for release or detention of a defendant pending \nsentence or appeal. Likewise, Section 3144 pertains to the release or \ndetention of a material witness. Finally, Sections 3150 and 3151 discuss \nthe applicability of the Bail Reform Act to those State cases which are \nremoved to Federal Court, and the issue of forfeited bail. \n554 \nProving Federal Crimes \nEFTA00191623\n", "char_count": 736}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 1 of 12 \nUSABOok :> Crimes > Narcotics > Federal Narcotics Prosecutions > Chapter 26 \nprey I next I help I download \nChapter 26 \nBail and Detention \nBarry Wiegand \nAssistant United States Attorney \nDistrict of District of Columbia \n26.1 \nIntroduction \n26.2 \nDetention for serious drug crimes \n26.3 \nFirst appearance \n26.4 \nStandard of proof \n26.5 \nDetention hearing \n26.6 \nRebuttable presumptions \n26.7 \nTemporary detention \n26.8 \nOther bases for denying bail \n26.9 \nNebbia hearings \n26.10 Resources \n26.11 Acknowledgments \n26.1 Introduction \nWhether a defendant is detained without bail pending trial often profoundly affects \nthe course of a drug prosecution. For example, pretrial detention or release influences \nwhether a defendant decides to co-operate with the government, as well as the calculation \nof whether to plead guilty or go to trial. Moreover, Congress has paid special attention to \nserious drug offenders in the law of pretrial detention, placing much stricter limitations on \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/cousa/ole/usabook/drug/26drug.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191624\n", "char_count": 1129}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 2 of 12 \ntheir right to bad, and presuming that most should be detained pending trial. \nFederal law of pretrial detention, release, and bail is set forth in the Bail Reform Act of \n1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156. The most important provisions, which govern \nwhen a defendant may be held without bail pending trial, are set forth in § 3142(e) \n(detention), § 3142(f) (detention hearing), and § 3142(g) (factors to be considered in \ndetermining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the \nappearance of the defendant and the safety of the community). \n26.2 Detention for serious drug crimes \nwestlaw query 18 +S 3142(F)(1)(C) \nNearly all defendants charged with serious drug crimes may be detained pending trial \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), which permits the government to move for the pretrial \ndetention of any defendant charged with a federal drug crime for which the maximum \npenalty is more than ten years in prison. In practice, this means that any defendant is \nsubject to pretrial detention if charged with the manufacture, distribution, or possession \nwith intent to distribute of heroin, cocaine powder, crack cocaine base, methamphetamine, \nphencyclidine, or any other drug classified as a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled \nsubstance, as these crimes all have maximum penalties of 20 years in prison under \n21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and § 960(b)(3). Defendants conspiring or attempting to commit \nthese offenses are punishable to the same extent under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 963, and \nsimilarly may be held without bail pending trial under § 3142(f). \n• Maximum penalty. Section 3142(f)(1)(C) specifically refers to violations of \"the \nControlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances \nImport and Export Act (21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law \nEnforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. § 1901 et seq.).\" Under this section, it is the \nmaximum penalty that mu\n... [truncated, 2276 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/38 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=38]", "char_count": 2276}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 3 of 12 \ndistribute marijuana are not subject to pretrial detention unless the amount involved \nis greater than 50 kilograms, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (less than 50 kilograms of \nmarijuana subject to sentence of not more than five years), or the defendant is \ncharged with a \"schoolhouse,\" \"playground,\" or \"public housing\" offense, in violation \nof 21 U.S.C. § 860, under which such violations are subject to twice the maximum \npunishment authorized under § 841(b). \n• PCP. Most statute books list phencyclidine (PCP) under Schedule III of the Controlled \nSubstances Act, where it originally was classified. However, PCP has been reclassified \nas a Schedule II drug, subject to maximum penalties of 20 years in prison under 21 \nU.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and § 960(b)(3), so that almost any felony federal offense \ninvolving PCP would be a \"detainable\" crime. See 43 Fed. Reg. 3359-60 (January 23, \n1978) (Final rule transferring phencyclidine to Schedule II from Schedule III, effective \nFebruary 24, 1978). \n26.3 First appearance \nA motion for pretrial detention is to be made at a defendant's first appearance, which \nnormally is presentment on a complaint in a case founded upon an arrest on probable \ncause, or an arraignment on a grand jury original indictment. Although the statute \ncontemplates an immediate hearing on the detention motion, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), in \ncommon practice, the government is accorded up to three working days after the first \nappearance for the hearing to be held under the continuance provision of § 3142(f). \nDuring this period, the defendant must be held without bond. The \"shall\" language of the \n§ 3142(f) indicates that the court must grant a motion for a hearing on the motion for \npretrial detention, and lacks discretion to deny it outright. \nNormally, when a defendant is arrested in a district other than where the prosecution \nwill occur, the first appearance is deemed to take place when the defenda\n... [truncated, 2452 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/39 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=39]", "char_count": 2452}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 4 of 12 \nnot required to request detention in district where defendants were arrested and initially \nappeared, but could do so when defendants first appeared in charging district; \"first \nappearance\" for p rposes of § 3142(f) is not necessarily the same as \"initial appearance\"). \nCf. United States \nEvans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1235-38 (9th Cir. 1995) (while defendant was \nentitled to detention hearing before magistrate in arresting district, only district court in \ncharging district had authority to review the order). \nPractice note. At \"removal\" proceedings, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 40, \nor any other similar hearing following an arrest outside the prosecuting district, \nthe prosecutor should make clear on the record that detention will be sought and \ntake any other necessary steps to ensure that the defense has no colorable basis \nlater to claim that there was a failure t \neet the \"\nof\nfirst appearance\" provision of \n§ 3142(f). See generally United States \nValenzuela-Verdigo, 815 F.2d 1011, \n1013-16 (5th Cir. 1987) (detention hearing, although not held until 18 days after \narrest, was not untimely where prosecutor in arresting district had requested \npretrial detention and hearing date was set but subsequently delayed with \napparent agreement of parties due to transfer of prisoner to charging district and \nschedule of defendant's counsel). However, failure to comply with the \"first \ni\nappearance\" provision does not necessarily bar the court om detaining the \ndefendant after the detention hearing. See United States \nMontalvo-Murillo, \n495 U.S. 711, 716- 17 (1990) (\"Neither the timing requirements nor any other \npart of the Act can be read to require, or even suggest, that a timing error must \nresult in releai of a person who should otherwise be detained.\"). See also \nUnited States \nMoncada-Pelaez, 810 F.2d 1008, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1987) \n(where defendant was temporarily detained under § 3142(d), hearing could be \nhe\n... [truncated, 2403 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/40 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=40]", "char_count": 2403}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 5 of 12 \nassure either the defendant's appearance in court or the safety of the community or any \nindividual. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In other words, the key detention issue is whether a \ndefendant's release poses such a danger to the community—or any specific person, such \nas a witness—or such a risk of flight, that he should be held in jail pending trial. \n• Safety. Section 3142(f) provides that the government must prove \"by clear and \nconvincing evidence\" that no conditions of release will assure the safety of the \ncommunity or any individual. \n• Appearance. Circuit Courts of Appeals have held the government must prove by a \npreponderance of the evidence that no conditions of release will assur the \ndefendant's appearance in court as required. See, r., United States \nCisneros, \n328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th \nr.\ni \n2003); United States \nXulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. \nCir. 1996); Ur(1ed States \nKirk, 992 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir.1993)(unpublished order); \nUnited States \nDillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1416 (1st Cir. 19911 United States v. \nAraneda, 899 .2d 368, 370 (5th Cir 1990); United States \nKing, 849 F.2d 485, \nii \n489 (11th Cir. 988); United States! Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1986); \nUnited States \nChimurenga, 760 F. d 400, 405-06 (2d . . 1985); United States I. \nPortes, 786 F. d 758, 765 (7thtir. 1985); United States \nOrta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 \n(8th Cir. 1985); United States \nMotamedi, 767 F.2d 140 , 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). \n26.5 Detention hearing \nwestlaw query 18 +S 3142(F) /P 26.2 OR JENCKS \nAt a detention hearing, \"the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal \ntrials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.\" \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). However, the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, does apply at pretrial \ndetention hearings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 46(j) (Rule 26.2 generally applies to a \ndetention hearing under § 3142) and Rule 26.2 (production of witnesses' statements). \nT\n... [truncated, 2343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/41 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=41]", "char_count": 2343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 6 of 12 \ndefendant's detention hearing follows an indictment, the government may proceed solely \nby proffer without the need to call a witninause the indictment itself establishes \nprobable cause. See, \ng., United States\n} \n39 Fed.Appx. 278, 278-79 (6th C \n2002); United States \nSmith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.1996); United States\nTrosper, 809 F.2d 110 , 111015th Cir. 1987); United States \nVargas, 804 F.2d 1 , 163 \nst Cir. 1986); United States \nSuppa, 799 F.2d 115, 117 (3d Cir. 1116); United States \nDominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 n. 7 (7th Cir 1986); United States \nContreras, \n76 F.2d 51, i \n(2d Cir. 1985); United States I Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985); \nUnited States \nHurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985). \nPractice notes. \n1. In some instances, when proceeding by proffer, it may be tactically adroit to bring to \nthe hearing a government witness, such as the supervising case agent, and make \nthat witness available to the court or defense counsel if either wishes to obtain \nadditional evidence or information. A witness thus being called by the court or \ndefense counsel is not subject to the requirements of the Jencks Act. See Fed. R. \nCrim. P. Rule 26.2 (a). \n2. In hearings at which the government will proffer evidence derived from intercepted \ncommunications, for example, from court-authorized \"wiretaps,\" there is a \nrequirement under \"Title III,\"18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522, more particularly § 2518(9), for \nten-days' notice to the defendant. This can conflict with the three-day continuance \nlimit under § 3142(f), which defense counsel may try to employ to preclude the \nproffer of evidence based upon wiretaps. Section 2518(9) itself provides for a waiver \nby the court of the ten-day period upon finding that it is not possible to furnish the \ninformation ten days before the hearing and that the delay will not be prejudicial. If \nthe defendant insists on ten-days notice, this could constitute \"good cause\"\n... [truncated, 2258 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/42 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=42]", "char_count": 2258}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 7 of 12 \nwestlaw query 18 i-S 3142(E) \nThe most important section of the Bail Reform Act in drug prosecutions, after \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), is 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). This section provides for a rebuttable \npresumption that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably \nassure the safety of the community where there is a showing of probable cause that: \n(1) the defendant has committed a drug crime for which pretrial detention is \nauthorized; that is, a violation of the Controlled Substances Act with a maximum \nterm in prison of ten or more years, as well as crimes under the other two \nfederal drug laws referred to in § 3142(f)(1)(C); \n(1) the defendant has committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): using or \ncarrying a firearm during and in relation to, or possessing a firearm in \nfurtherance of, a drug-trafficking crime; and \n(1) the defendant is a \"released\" or \"recidivist\" offender subject to a \npresumption applying to defendants who have recently committed detainable \ncrimes while on pretrial release. \nAs noted above, an indictment itself constitutes a finding of probable cause. \nA second rebuttable presumption attaches to defendants accused of crimes \nidentified in (1) and (2) above, that no condition or combination of conditions \nwill reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. § 3142(e). \nNote. Although probable cause to believe that a defendant has \ncommitted an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) crime gives rise to the presumptions, \nit is not obvious that a § 924(c) offense alone allows a § 3142(f) \nmotion for pretrial detention. Given that committing a § 924(c) \noffense raises presumptions favoring detention, it would be a statutory \nanomaly if the charge did not authorize pre-trial detention under \n§ 3142(f). Since a § 924(c) crime is not itself a violation of the \nControlled Substances Act, if it is \"detainable,\" it either must be (A) as \na crime of violence under § 3142(f)(1)(\n... [truncated, 2113 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/43 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=43]", "char_count": 2113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 8 of 12 \nmaximum sentence of life imprisonment under § 3142(f)(1)(B). For \npurposes of bail, crimes of violence are defined in § 3156(a)(4), and it \nappears that § 924(c) would only qualify under § 3156(a)(4)(B), as a \nfelony that, \"by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical \nforce against the person or property of another may be used in the \ncourse of committing the offense.\" Similarly, § 924(c)'s penalty \nprovisions generally speak of mandatory minimum sentences, rather \nthan explicitly authorizing a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. \nNevertheless, § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii) does prescribe life imprisonment for a \ndefendant convicted of the offense under certain circumstances. \nMoreover, Amendment 642 to the U.S. Sentencing Commission \nGuidelines Manual, which took effect November 1, 2002, reflects a \ndecision to treat a § 924(c) offense as a \"life crime\" for purposes of the \ncareer offender sentencing enhancement. See Amendments to the \nGuidelines Manual, Supplement to Appendix C, 277-78 (November 1, \n2002) amendment 642, \"Reason for Amendment\"). See also United \nStates \nWoodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1049 (11th Cir. 2002). In the great \nbulk of situations, this is only of academic concern, but the anomaly \ncan arise when a defendant is charged with a crime involving less than \n50 kilograms of marijuana and a § 924(c) offense. As the marijuana \ncharge is not a detainable offense (because the maximum penalty is \nfive years in prison), a pretrial detention motion can only be made if \nthe § 924(c) offense is an independent basis for pretrial detention. This \nalso arises when thetnderlying drug-trafficking crime involves \nSchedule III, IV, or \ncontrolled substances (which are not subject to a \nmaximum punishment of imprisonment for ten years or more). \n26.7 Temporary detention \nwestlaw query 18 +5 3142(D)(1)(A) \nAnother key provision of the Bail Reform Act is 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d), which authorizes \nperiods of temp\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/44 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=44]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 9 of 12 \noffense while op some form of judicial supervision, such as parole, probation, release \npending sentencing, or pretrial release in a felony case. See § 3142(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Most \nforeign nationals who do not have a \"green card,\" that is, who are not lawfully admitted for \npermanent residence, are also subject to a ten-day hold. See § 3142(d)(B). The purpose \nof the temporary detention is to give supervising authorities—parole board, probation \nofficer, trial judge, or the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly \nINS)—a chance to issue a warrant for the defendant. See § 3142(d). A motion for a ten-\nday hold imposes a duty on the government to notify the supervising authority of the \ndefendant's new charge. See § 3142(d). \nPractice notes. \n• When the government seeks both a detention hearing after a three-day continuance, \n§ 3142(f), and also temporary detention, § 3142(d), the court may effectively \ncombine the two matters and set a consolidated hearing within the ten-day period, \nbut later than the three days permitted for a strictly pretrial detention hearing. Or the \ncourt may construe the time limits more narrowly and require a detention hearing in \nthree days, even though the defendant will nevertheless remain jailed after the three \ndays elapse pursuant to the ten-day hold. Under either view, however, ten-day holds \ndo not \"tack,\" and a defendant who satisfies more than one ground for temporary \ndetention under § 3142(d) may only be detained for a total of ten days. \n• Section 3142(d) requires two findings for temporary detention: (a) that the defendant \nis on some form of release or not a lawful U.S. resident, and (b) that the defendant \nmay be a danger to the community or a risk of flight. As a result, some judges may \nconclude that they have discretion to deny a motion for temporary detention, even \nwhen it is clearly established that a defendant is on parole, probation, or pretria\n... [truncated, 2564 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/45 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=45]", "char_count": 2564}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nPage 10 of 12 \n26.8 Other bases for denying bail \nEven though a serious narcotics charge itself is sufficient for pretrial detention, \nemploying one or more of the other five bases for denying bail can bolster the \ngovernment's case for detention. Consequently, sound litigating tactics suggest moving for \npretrial detention on every applicable ground available under § 3142(f): \n1. Where there is a serious risk that a defendant might try to obstruct justice, § 3142(f) \n(2)(B), for example, by attempting to influence, intimidate, or harm a witness or \njuror. This is a valuable additional ground upon which to seek pretrial detention, and \nis often available in drug cases—it focuses the Court's attention on a threat to a \nspecific, live person, rather than on the more generalized notion of community safety; \n2. Where a defendant is also charged with a crime of violence, § 3142(f)(1)(A)), as \noften is the case in RICO and CCE prosecutions based upon narcotics conspiracies; \n3. Where a defendant is a serious risk of flight, § 3142(f)(2)(A), there is no drawback to \nspecifically seeking detention on this ground, in addition to relying on the \npresumption that drug defendants are a risk of flight; \n4. Where a defendant is also charged with an offense for which the maximum sentence \nis life imprisonment or death, § 3142(f)(1)(B); and \n5. Where the \"recidivist\" provision of § 3142(f)(1)(D) authorizes pretrial detention if a \ndefendant has previously committed two or more \"detainable offenses\"; that is, \ncrimes which themselves would have permitted a pretrial detention motion under \n§ 3142(f)(1). As fairly few defendants have extensive federal criminal records, this \nprovision also incorporates state and local convictions that would have been \ndetainable had they been subject to federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(D). \nAs a result, a defendant with two or more serious state drug felonies or crimes of \nviolence (or one of ea\n... [truncated, 2207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/46 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=46]", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nrage i i kit IL \nPractice note. When litigating a pretrial detention motion, the legislative history of \nthe 1984 Bail Reform Act is a fertile source of authority. For example, it confirms the \nargument that the law reflects a congressional intent to detain defendants who \ncommit crimes while on pretrial release or who are recidivist offenders. See S.Rep. \nNo. 98-225, at 307 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. Among its useful \nlanguage is: \nThe Committee also notes, with respect to the factor of community ties, \nthat it is aware of the growing evidence that the presence of this factor \ndoes not necessarily reflect a likelihood of appearance, and has no \ncorrelation with the question of the safety of the community. . . . [T]he \nCommittee wishes to make it clear that it does not intend that a court \nconclude that there is no risk of flight on the basis of community ties \nalone. . . .\nId., 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3207. \nUnder current law, consideration of a defendant's criminal history is \nconfined to his record of convictions. While a prior arrest should not be \naccorded the weight of a prior conviction, the Committee believes that it \nwould be inappropriate to require the judge in the context of this kind of \nhearing to ignore a lengthy record of prior arrests, particularly if there were \nconvictions for similar crimes. . . . In any event, independent information \nconcerning past criminal activities certainly can, and should, be considered \nby a court. \nId. at 3206 n.76 (citations omitted). \n26.9 Nebbia hearings \nIf a monetary or property bond is set, the prosecution may request the court to order \nthat—before the release of the defendant—a Nebbia hearing be held to determine whether \nthe collateral for the court (or the collateral provided the bail bondsman) is tainted. See \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/cousaJole/usabook/drug/26drug.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191634\n", "char_count": 1941}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Federal Narcotics Prosecutions - Chapter 26 \nrage IL 01 IL \n1\n18 U.S.C. § 3 \n2(g)(4); United States, Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). See also \nUnited States \nPatel, 1995 WL 55737 (N.D. III. 1995) (unpublished memorandum \nopinion and or er) (notwithstanding the tax returns and testimony tendered by the \ndefense, the defense failed to convincingly establish that the properties offered as security \nfor the bond \"were purchased solely with legitimate funds\"). Nebbia-type hearings are \nparticularly important when someone other than the defendant is posting the collateral, as \nthey present an opportunity for the judge to establish on the record that the sureties are \nbona fide and understand the risks th\n are undertaking, such as potential loss of their \nc\nproperty. See generally United tates I Noriega-Sarabia, 116 F.3d 417, 420-21 (9th Cir. \n1997). See also United States \nHammond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1166-67 (E.D.Wis. \n2002) (sufficiency of the secure y offered). \n26.10 Resources \nThe main treatise on federal detention and bail law is: Hon. John L. Weinberg, Federal \nBail and Detention Handbook (2003), which is updated regularly. Another source collecting \ndecisions on detention cases is: Propriety of denial of pretrial bail under Bail Reform Act, \n75 A.L.R. Fed. 806. Links to relevant internal DO) monographs and memoranda appear on \nthe USABook Bail and Release topic page at \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/ole/tables/subject/bai I. htm. \n26.11 Acknowledgments \nThis Chapter was adapted and updated from material originally written by then Senior \nTrial Attorney Robert Lipman, NDDS, for the 1999 edition of Federal Narcotics \nProsecutions. \nhttp://10.173.2.12/usao/cousa/ole/usabook/drug/26drug.htm \n4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191635\n", "char_count": 1748}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nvs. \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nDefendant. \nNotice of Appeal From Magistrate's \nOrder Denying Pre-Trial Detention \nComes now the United States of America, by and through its undersigned Assistant United \nStates Attorney, and files this Notice of Appeal from the Order of United States Magistrate Judge \n, U.S. District Court for the \nDistrict of \n, entered \non April \n, 2008, which denied the United States' request for pre-trial detention as to defendant \nJeffrey Epstein. \nUnited States Magistrate Judge  \n set a $ \n cash bond, with the \nfollowing conditions: \n. The United States gave notice \nof its intent to appeal the bond order and asked the Magistrate Judge to stay execution of the bond \npending the Court's determination of this appeal. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion and the \ndefendant remains in custody. \nPursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), if \"a person is ordered released by a magistrate judge, or \nby a person other than a judge of a court having original jurisdiction over the offense . . . the attorney \nfor the Government may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion \nEFTA00191636\n", "char_count": 1229}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "for revocation of the order or amendment of the conditions of release.\" Accordingly, the United \nStates hereby files this emergency motion with the District Judge assigned to the case for immediate \nrevocation of the Magistrate Judge's Order. \nTHE CHARGES IN THE INDICTMENT \nOn April \n, 2008, a Grand Jury sitting in the Southern District of Florida returned a \ntwenty-nine-count indictment charging defendant Jeffrey Epstein' with one count of conspiracy to \nuse a means of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, or entice nineteen minors to engage in \nprostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; eight counts of knowingly, in and affecting commerce, \nrecruiting, enticing, and obtaining eight minors to engage in commercial sex acts, in violation of 18 \nU.S.C. § 1591(a)(1); twelve substantive counts of using a means of interstate commerce to persuade, \ninduce, or entice twelve minors to engage in prostitution or other criminal sexual activity, in \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); one count of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce for the \npurpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e); and four counts \nof traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a person \nunder 18 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Jane Does #1 through #19 were all \nminors at the time of their involvement with defendant Epstein. Jane Doe #11 was a resident of New \nYork; the remaining Jane Does were all residents of Palm Beach County, Florida, at the time of their \ninvolvement with defendant Epstein. \nCount 1 carries a statutory maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment. Counts 2 \nthrough 10 each carry a statutory maximum sentence of forty years' imprisonment. Counts 11 \nthrough 23 each carry a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment up to \n'Epstein is named as a defendant in twenty-seven counts. \n2 \nEFTA00191637\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "a maximum of thirty years' imprisonment. Counts 24 and 26 through 29 each carry a maximum of \nthirty years' imprisonment. \nTHE FACTS OF THE OFFENSE \nThe investigation of Jeffrey Epstein initially was undertaken by the City of Palm Beach \nPolice Department in response to a complaint received from the parents of a 14-year-old girl, S. G.,2\nfrom Royal Palm Beach. When S. G. and another girl began arguing at school because the other girl \naccused S. G. of being a prostitute, one of the school principals intervened. The principal searched \nS. G.'s purse and found $300 cash. The principal asked S. G. where the money came from. \ninitially claimed that she earned the money working at \"Chik-Fil-A,\" which no one believed. \nthen claimed that she made the money selling drugs; no one believed that either. \nfinally \nadmitted that she had been paid $300 to give a massage to a man on Palm Beach Island. \nparents approached the Palm Beach Police Department (\"PBPD\") about pressing charges. \nPBPD began investigating the recipient of the massage, Jeffrey Epstein, and two of his \nassistants, Sarah Kellen and Nadia Marcinkova. PBPD identified approximately 27 girls who went \nto Epstein's house to perform \"sexual massages\" (not including one licensed massage therapist) or \nwho recruited girls to do the same. The girls' ages ranged from 14 years' old to 23 years' old. Some \ngirls saw Epstein only once and some saw him dozens of times. The \"sexual massages\" performed \nalso varied. Some girls were fully clothed while they massaged Epstein; some wore only their \nunderwear; and some were fully nude. During all of these massages, Epstein masturbated himself \nand he would touch the girl performing the massage, usually fondling their breasts and touching their \n2S.G. currently is not one of the Jane Does referenced in the indictment. \nf7) rAta are vAL slahLity. rAcxyjmumo, Euro( vttnuenurvt4 \nc_t- \nftAA -New- \ndinctia achn\nol If\\Jft \n&Fria \nmu) co.yr \nsCrAjta4Attm ster \nEFTA00191638\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "vaginas - either over their clothing or on their bare skin. Epstein often used a vibrator to masturbate \nthe girls and digitally penetrated a number of them. For the girls who saw him more often, Epstein \ngraduated to oral sex and vaginal sex. Epstein sometimes brought his assistant/girlfriend, Nadia \nMarcinkova, into the sexual activity. \nOn October 18, 2005, PBPD obtained a search warrant with the assistance of the Palm Beach \nCounty State Attorney's Office (\"PBSAO\"). By this time, PBSAO had already been contacted by \nEpstein's cadre of lawyers. When PBPD arrived at Epstein's home two days later (10/20/05) to \nexecute the search warrant, they found several items conspicuously missing. For example, computer \nmonitors and keyboards were found, but the CPUs were gone. Similarly, surveillance cameras were \nfound, but they were disconnected and the videotapes were gone. Nonetheless, the search did \nrecover some evidence of value, including message pads showing messages from many girls over \na two-year span. The messages show girls returning phone calls to confirm appointments to \"work.\" \nMessages were taken by Sarah Kellen, Nadia Marcinkova, and Adriana Ross. The search also \nrecovered numerous photos of Epstein sitting with naked girls whose ages are undetermined. \nPhotographs taken inside the home show that the girls' descriptions of the layout of the home \nand master bedroom/bathroom area are accurate. PBPD also found massage tables and oils, the high \nschool transcript of one of the girls, and sex toys. \nIn sum, the PBPD investigation showed that girls from a local high school would be \ncontacted by one of Epstein's assistants to make an appointment to \"work.\" \nUp to three \n4 \nEFTA00191639\n", "char_count": 1720}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "appointments each day would be made. The girls would travel to Epstein's home in Palm Beach \nwhere they would meet Epstein's chef and Epstein's assistant—usually Kellen—in the kitchen. The \nassistant normally would escort the girls upstairs to the master bedroom/bathroom area and set up \nthe massage table and massage oils. The assistant would leave and Epstein would enter the room \nwearing a robe or a towel. He would remove the clothing and lie face down and nude on the \nmassage table. Epstein would then instruct the girl on what to do and would ask her to remove her \nclothing. After some time, Epstein would turn over, so that he was lying face up. Epstein would \nmasturbate himself and fondle the girl performing the massage. When Epstein climaxed, the \nmassage was over. The girl was instructed to get dressed and to go downstairs to the kitchen while \nEpstein showered. Epstein would pay the girl—usually $200—and if it was a \"new\" girl, would ask \nfor the girl's phone number to contact her in the future. Girls were encouraged to find other girls to \nbring with them. If a girl brought another girl to perform a \"massage,\" each girl would receive $200. \nThe PBPD investigation consists primarily of swom taped statements from the girls. When \nPBPD began having problems with PBSAO, they approached the FBI. The investigation was \nformally presented to FBI and to me after PBSAO \"presented\" the case to a state grand jury and that \ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Epstein with three counts of solicitation of prostitution. \nThe State of Florida has since dismissed its charges after the United States initiated \nprosecution. \nARGUMENT \nThe defendant was arrested in the Northern District of Texas and, today, had a bond hearing. \nThe United States sought to have the defendant detained pending trial based upon the presumption \n5 \nEFTA00191640\n", "char_count": 1867}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "of detention as well as the defendant's risk of flight and danger to the community. \nThis is a case where detention is presumed, both as to risk of flight and as a danger to the \ncommunity. The law regarding this presumption is as follows: \nWhere the Court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed one \nof the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), [which includes the violations of 18 \nUSC 2242 and 2243 as charged by the grand jury]' \na statutory rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or combination of \nconditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the \nsafety of the community. Assuring a criminal defendant's appearance at trial is a \nlegitimate government objective. Detaining adults who prey on children for the \nadult's sexual gratification or for the production of child pornography is also a \nlegitimate government objective. One of the fundamental duties of government is \npublic safety, including protecting children from sexual predators. . . . Once it is \ndetermined that the presumption applies, the defendant bears a limited burden of \nproduction to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence he does not \npose a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Once a defendant has met his \nburden of production relating to these two factors, the presumption favoring detention \ndoes not disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be considered among those \nweighed by the district court. \nUnited States,. Abaci, 350 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). \nht determining how much weight to accord the presumption after the defendant has come \nforward to meet his burden of production, the Second Circuit explains: \nA judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has \ncome forward with rebuttal evidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some \nweight by keeping in mind that Congress has found that these offenders [who fall \nwithin the presumpt\n... [truncated, 2644 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/54 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=54]", "char_count": 2644}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "narcotics defendants). \nIn United States'. Sciacca one of the district judges in the Southern District of Florida \nsummarized the Eleventh Circuit's approach to the analysis of the presumption as follows. Once it \nis determined that the statutory presumption applies based upon the crime charged, then \n\"the defendant carries the burden of production to come forward with evidence to \nrebut the presumption.\" United State v. Ouartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 916 (11th Cir. \n1990). Although the statutory presumption places a burden of production on a \ndefendant, the burden of persuasion concerniig the dangerousness [or risk of flight) \nremains on the government. United States King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. \n1988). .. . The kind of evidence which a defendant must produce to satisfy his burden \n1\nof production must \"suggest that he . . . is] either not dangerous or not likely to flee \nif turned loose on bail.\" United States . Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. \n1985). If the defendant produces such evidence, the presumption does not disappear \nbut \"remains in the case as an evidentiary finding militating against release, to be \nweigh[ed] alor with other evidence relative to factors listed in section 3142 (g). \nUnited States . King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 1988). \nSciacca (unpublished opinion), Court File No. 03-80164-Cr-Hurley, at pp. 4-5 (S.D. Fl. Feb. 25, \n2004). \nHere, the defendant's blatant disregard of the order of the Florida court regarding his contact \nwith the victim shows his continued dangerousness. In addition, there is evidence that he is having \n\"romantic\" chats with other minors, including one located in Texas. \nFurthermore, in considering a defendant's risk of flight, the Court must consider the \ndefendant's ties to the community where the prosecution occurs, not merely his ties to the United \nStates at large or the district in which he is arrested. See, e.g., United States'. Adipietro, 773 F. \nSupp. 1270 (W.D. Mo. 1991). The only tie that the defe\n... [truncated, 2267 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/55 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=55]", "char_count": 2267}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "will be facing on federal charges also are evidence of an incentive to flee. Count 1 of the indictment \ncarries a five year mandatory minimum sentence, up to a maximum of 30 years, and Count 2 carries \na maximum of 30 years. Both also carry a recommended supervised release term of life. \nThe United States Magistrate Judge in the Northern District of Texas considered these factors \nand determined that a 512,000 cash bond was sufficient to secure the safety of the community in the \nSouthern District of Florida and to secure the defendant's appearance at trial. \nFor the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court revoke the \norder of the Magistrate Judge and order the defendant detained pending his intial appearance in the \nSouthern District of Florida. \nRespectfully submitted, \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nBy: A. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nFlorida Bar # 0018255 \n500 Australian Avenue, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \n(561) 820-8711/561 820-8777 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by facsimile this 21st \nday of April, 2006, to Heidi Perlett, Esq. Counsel for Defendant. \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \n8 \nEFTA00191643\n", "char_count": 1249}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY \n9 \nEFTA00191644\n", "char_count": 50}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Memorandum \nSubjai \nThird Supplement to Prosecution Memorandum: \nOperation Leap Year: United States'. Jeffrey Epstein. et al. \nDale \n2/19/08 \nTo: \nRobert Senior, Chief, Criminal Division \nRolando Garcia, Deputy Chief, Criminal Division \nKaren Atkinson, Chief, Northern Region \nFrom: \ncc: \nA. Marie Villafafia \nDrew Oosterbaan \nMyesha Braden \nINTRODUCTION \nThis third supplement summarizes the changes to the indictment and prosecution \nmemo since the first presentation in May 2007. The most significant changes are the \nexclusion of some victims and the inclusion of newly discovered victims. The order of the \nindictment also has been changed. \nFor the reasons set forth below, a number of girls who were originally considered for \nthe indictment are being excluded at this time. Some may be re-added, but, for strategic \nreasons, I believe that this indictment should focus on victims who are unknown to Epstein's \ncounsel. Of the nineteen victims listed in this indictment, eleven were not part of the State \ninvestigation. Only one of the girls who testified in the state grand jury is included in our list. \nWe believe that approximately eight of these girls are unknown to the defense. \nI. VICTIMS DELETED FROM THIS INDICTMENT \nA. \nPersons Recruited b \nR. — \nG. \nP. \nL. \nMyesha Braden and I have discussed the possibility of removing \nR. and her \nrecruits entirely from the indictment because of the amount of press coy \nthat \nhas \nreceived over her statement to police that she was \"like Heidi Fleiss.\" \nhas been very \ni\nunwilling to speak to us and, even after assurances that she wo \ntreated as a victim, she \ninsisted on full immunity before she would meet. Excluding also removes \nthe ammunition about Detective Recarey and alleged misrepresentations of \nEFTA00191645\n", "char_count": 1780}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "statements to Recarey. \nalso was the person who instructed the girls to say they were \n18. The evidence related to girls outside her group about knowledge of age is stronger and \nwill weaken their defense that Epstein had a rule that all of the girls had to be over 18. \nBy removing \nand treating her \nnindicted co-conspirator, we also make it \neasier to introduce discussions between \nand the other defendants and \nstatements to others under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. \nApplying this approach would result in the potential removal of seven victims ( \nplus six others). I have removed six for the following reasons: \nFirst, I have L-111 • ved \nG. \nwas 14 years' old when she was brought to \nM\nin's home by\nR., one of the Epstein's main recruiters. At \ninstruction, \nlied to Epstein about her age—telling him that she was an eighteen-year-old senior at \nWellington High \nI. In her statements to the Palm Beach Police Department and the \nstate grand jury, \nadmitted that\npain masturbated in her presence and placed a \nmassager/vibrator on her vagina. In M \nstatement to\nhurtled& after leaving \nEpstein's home, and in her statement to the FBI and AUSA Villafafta, \nadmitted that \nEpstein digitally penetrated her. Epstein's criminal activity came to light when \nstepmother learned of a fight between \nand a friend at school over $300 cash found in \npurse. \ncooperated with the Palm Beach Police and made recorded telephone \ncalls with \nto set up a second \"massage\" with Epstein. Handwritten notes were found \nin Epstein's trash confirming this second meeting. \nDespite all of this corroborating evidence, \nis not being included (for now, at \nleast) because her father, and ste mother have filed a civil suit against Epstein seeking \"in \nexcess of 50 million dollars.\" \nfather is represented by Jeff Herman. \nfather \nalso has been in frequent contact with the journalist at \"Vanity Fair\" magazine, and, as \nmentioned in the original pros memo, he has a prior federal fraud convicti\n... [truncated, 2734 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/59 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=59]", "char_count": 2734}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "and \nwere brought by \nand their aerSrnents were made \nbetween Kellen and \nperformed one massage and \nperformed two. \nFor both girls, Epstein masturbated and tried to touch them but they refused. With \nS., Epstein became upset that she wouldn't engage in more sexual activity and he told \nnot to bring her back. Because of the highly probatiuS of this testimony related to \nEpstein's intent (i.e., no sex/no money), I believe that \ntestimony will be admitted \nunder Rule 404(b). \nIM L. has been identified as the plaintiff in the second civil lawsuit filed against \nEpstein by Jeff H\nShe was 16 aid \nwhen she first went to Epstein's home and\nwasrecruited by \nL., one of \nfriends. \nL. only went to Epstein's \nhome once, never told Epstein her age, and was never contacted directly by any of the \ndefendants. \ncontribution to the indictment is outweighed by the presence of the \ncivil suit, so she has been removed. \nis another girl whom \nEpstein's home. She has admitted to pr \ng massages and that Epstein touched her reas \nand attempted to touch her vagina. \ndenies any additional sexual activity. \nrecruited one other girl,  I., when  was 17. Shas \nin Venezuela and has \nnot responded to efforts to contact her. The concern with \nis that she will never \ncompletely admit to the sexual activity that occurred. Phone records show that \nspoke \nwith Sarah Kellen and Nadia Marcinkova more than 60 times. Yet \ninsists that she \nnever provided massages fully nude and Epstein never digitally penetrated her, touched her \nvagina, or used the massager/vibrator on her. From all of the evidence, it is highly unlikely \nthat Epstein would have allowed \nto return so frequently without increasing the level \nof sexual activity. As one of the other girls reported, \nreputation at school was that \nshe \"was a virgin the day she graduated.\" I believe that it will be too difficult for her to give \nup that persona and admit to everything that happened. \nrecruited. \nwas 16 when she first went to \nwill still remain\n... [truncated, 2465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/60 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=60]", "char_count": 2465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "The one \nrecruit whom I have kept in the indictment is \nZ. She is \ncurrently attending Lynn University on a soccer scholarship. The documentary evidence \nrelated to \nis strong — numerous message pads, including one saying that \nwill be lat \nof soccer practice, car rental records, 156 calls with Sarah Kelle \nwith Adrian Ross, 13 calls to Epstein's house, and 20 calls to Epstein's Palm Beach \nproperty manager. Epstein also gave \na vibrator and lingerie for her 18th birthday. \nAlthough I never intended to use \nM. as a witness, I did refer to her as one of \nthe Jane Does in the indictment in connection with a massage that she gave together with \nL. ( \ncan testify as an eyewitness.) In light of the outcry from Epstein's \nattorneys that \ndoes not consider herself a victim, I have used her initials instead. \nII. \nVICTIMS ADDED TO THIS INDICTMENT \nA. a\nl H. (Jane Doe #41. \nC. (Jane Doe #5), and \nP. (Jane Doe #61 \nJane Does #4 and #5 traveled to Epstein's home together while they were students at \nWellington High School. Both had heard at the school that you could get money for \nmassaging Epstein. When they arrived at Epstein's home, they were met by Kellen, who \ntook them on a tour of the house before leading them to Epstein's bedroom. Both sat on the \ncouch until Epstein arrived. He arrived shortly thereafter and took a shower. Before he \nstepped into the shower, Epstein told the girls to get undressed. Jane Doe #4 removed her \ntop and pants; Jane Doe #5 only removed her top. \nAfter the girls massaged his back and legs, Epstein turned over and began \nmasturbating. Epstein tried to reach down Jane Doe #5's pants, and she backed away. \nEpstein then instructed Jane Doe #4 to play with his nipples while he masturbated. After he \nejaculated, Epstein told the girls to get dressed. He paid each girl $200. \nAfterwards, Kellen attempted to contact Jane Doe #5 multiple times to set up \nappointments, but she refused. Jane Doe #4 returned, and on her second visit she massaged \nEpstein\n... [truncated, 2370 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/61 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=61]", "char_count": 2370}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Jane Doe #4 recruited Jane Doe #6. On one occasion in the Spring of Jane Doe #6's \njunior year, when Jane Doe #6 was 16 years old, she and Jane Doe #4 went to Epstein's \nhouse together. Epstein asked Jane Doe #6 what high school she went to and Jane Doe #6 \nanswered Palm Beach Central High School. Jane Doe #4 took Jane Doe #6 upstairs and told \nher to remove her clothing. Both girls were wearing only their panties when Epstein entered. \nEpstein laid down and both girls began massaging him. Epstein then asked Jane Doe #4 to \nleave. After she left, Epstein began masturbating and grabbing Jane Doe #6, touching her \nall over. When Jane Doe #6 pulled away, Epstein would grab her and pull her closer. \nEpstein both digitally penetrated Jane Doe #6 and placed the vibrator/massager on her \nvagina. Jane Doe #6 was paid $200, but cannot remember who handed the money to her. \nJane Doe #6 never returned, but Jane Doe #4 went a few more times. Jane Doe #4 \nexplained that Kellen would always call to set up the appointments. \nJane Does #4, #5, and #6 are all referenced in the overt acts section of the indictment. \nThe only telephone contact initiated by Epstein's group that resulted in sexual conduct was \nbetween Jane Doe #4 and Kellen, so Jane Doe #4 is the subject of one of the substantive \nenticement counts. Also, because Jane Doe #4 told Epstein her true age, I have added a \nsubstantive sex trafficking charge related to Jane Doe #4. \nB. \nad.\n)\nJa e Doe ii8 \nJass.pae #8 was recruited by \nin approximately July 2004, when Jane Doe #8 \nwas 17. \ntold Jane Doe #8 that she knew a \"filthy rich guy\" who would pay girls $200 \nto $300 for giving a massage. \ntook Jane Doe #8 to Epstein's home in a taxi. Epstein \ntook a shower before starting the massage and instructed Jane Doe #8 to remove her shirt. \nEpstein began masturbating and rubbed Jane Doe #8's vagina over her panties before pushing \nthe underwear aside to stroke her vagina. Epstein told Jane Doe #8, \"this is normal \nnothing's wron\n... [truncated, 2640 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/62 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=62]", "char_count": 2640}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "• substantive counts of travel in interstate commerce to engage in illicit sexual activity. \nC. \nB. (Jane Doe #11l\nJane Doe #11 is the first fully-identified New York high school girl. She only \nprovided one massage, but became a recruiter for Epstein. Jane Doe #11 first went to \nEpstein's home towards the end of her junior year, when she was seventeen years old. After \nthat first massage, Epstein told Jane Doe #11 that he would pay her to bring more girls. \nJane Doe #11 implicates two other Epstein assistants — Lesley Groff and Cecilia \nSteen. We had anticipated that Groff would be a witness, not a target. When the agents went \nto Groff's house to interview her, she went upstairs, claiming she needed to change her \nbaby's diaper. While upstairs, she called Epstein, causing Epstein to re-route his flight to \ntake Kellen and Marcinkova back to his island. (They were scheduled to fly to New Jersey, \nwhere the agents had planned to serve Kellen and Marcinkova with target letters.) After this \nmeeting with Groff, Epstein's team began negotiating in earnest to end this investigation. \nFBI New York agents are interviewing several girls identified by Jane Doe #11. At \nthis time, we do not have Lesley Groff's phone records, so we do not have sufficient \nevidence to charge her. She is referred to by her initials in the indictment, and we will \nhopefully be ready to charge her when we supersede the indictment. \nJane Doe #11 is referenced in the overt acts but is not part of any substantive counts. \nD. \nM \nA. (Jane Doe #18) and \nH. (Jane Doe #19) \nJane Doe #18 was recruited by her brother's friend, Tony \n(referred to in \nindictment as \"A.F.\"). Figueroa also was the former boyfriend \n(Jane Doe #1). \nFigueroa recruited several girls to Epstein's home includin \nR. Jane Doe #18 \nattended R2 al Palm Beach High School with =and \nrecruits. Jane Doe #18 \nknew that = \nand the other girls were going to Epstein's house, but they did not know \nabout Jane Doe #18. \nFigueroa told Jane Doe #\n... [truncated, 2446 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/63 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=63]", "char_count": 2446}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "#18 over to a couch, forcibly pushed her panties aside, and digitally penetrated her, without \nher consent. Jane Doe #18 is still traumatized by this event. She reports that she went \nthrough a period of using drugs, but now she is clean and is studying to be a nurse. Jane Doe \n#18 is only about five feet tall and looks barely eighteen now. She is very concerned about \nher family finding out about what happened to her, but she is strongly committed to Epstein's \nprosecution. \nWhat seems most devastating to Jane Doe #18 is that she returned to Epstein's house \nafter the forcible digital penetration and brought her friend, Jane Doe #19. Jane Doe #19 \nmassaged Epstein's back and legs. When he turned over, Epstein asked Jane Doe #19 to \nremove her shirt. She refused and he became upset and ended the massage. Epstein then \nsent for Jane Doe #18 and reprimanded her for not telling Jane Doe #19 that she would have \nto perform the massage topless. \nWhen Jane Does #18 and #19 left, they called the Royal Palm Beach Police \nDepartment, who referred them to the Palm Beach Police. Jane Does #18 and #19 spoke \nwith someone there and reported what happened. After much searching, the Palm Beach \nPolice Department was able to locate a report of this call. The report contains Epstein's \nname and address and the names of both girls and describes Epstein as paying $200 for a \nmassage. The girls complained that Epstein insisted that they take off their tops and pants, \neven though he knew that they were 17. The date of the report is March 5, 2004, less than \ntwo weeks after Jane Doe #18's eighteenth birthday, and when Jane Doe #19 was seventeen \nyears old. [NB: The police report describes a pattern of activity, including dates when Jane \nDoe #18 was seventeen years old.] Neither Jane Doe #18 nor #19 ever returned to Epstein's \nhome. \nAlthough we have not yet obtained Jane Doe #18's telephone records, we were able \nto identify her telephone number, and there are twenty telephone calls th\n... [truncated, 2786 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/64 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=64]", "char_count": 2786}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "III. \nOTHER CHANGES TO INDICTMENT \nThe overt acts are now organized by victim, or if a group of victims are related, then \nby group, followed by a separate listing of Epstein's travel to Palm Beach. This should make \nthe indictment much easier to follow. I also have selected telephone calls that are more \nclosely linked to the dates of the sexual activity rather than focusing exclusively on calls near \nflights. The number of overt acts has not significantly decreased for the following reason. \nFirst, as an initial filing, the included overt acts provide a complete picture of Epstein's \nbehavior. The Grand Jury's determination that there is probable cause to believe that all of \nthe acts were committed should help persuade the Magistrate Judge and the District Judge \nthat Epstein is a danger to the community and that the evidence against Epstein is strong. \nSecond, there are cases that suggest that, when a certain number of overt acts are charged in \na conspiracy count, but the Government seeks to introduce a large number of uncharged overt \nacts, those uncharged acts can serve as a variance from/amendment to the Indictment. One \nof those cases was argued by Gerald Lefcourt — one of Epstein's attorneys. For those \nreasons, I have kept most of the overt acts from the original indictment (excluding those \nrelated to the Jane Does who have been dropped from the indictment) and have added acts \nrelated to the new Jane Does. I still plan to supersede the indictment with information about \nadditional Jane Does from New York or elsewhere and with potential money laundering \ncounts and computer-related counts when those phases of the investigation are completed. \nAt the time I supersede, the overt acts can be reduced. \nThe counts have been reorganized based upon discussions with Myesha Braden from \nthe Child Exploitation Section. She believes that our strongest counts are the child sex \ntrafficking violations (18 U.S.C. § 1591). I have moved those counts forward in the \nindi\n... [truncated, 2025 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/65 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=65]", "char_count": 2025}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Page 1 of 14 \nwesflaw. \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nC \nU.S. it DiVarco \nD.C. .,1985. \nUnited States District Court, N.D. Illinois, \nEastern Division. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, \nJoseph DiVARCO, et al., Defendants. \nNo. 84 CR 507. \nFeb. 6, 1985. \nAfter conviction by jury on all counts in \nwhich each defendant was named in indict-\nment, Government moved for detention of \neach of them pursuant to Bail Reform Act, \nclaiming each of them was likely to pose \ndanger to safety of other persons or com-\nmunity if released. Defendants moved for \nrelease from detention, launching number \nof constitutional attacks on statute. The \nDistrict Court, Shadur, J., held that: (1) \nBail Reform Act did not violate Eighth \nAmendment's proscription on excessive \nbail; (2) Act did not violate due process on \nground it was vague or lacked standards; \n(3) Act did not violate equal protection; (4) \ndetention pending sentencing did not viol-\nate defendants' right to counsel; and (5) ap-\nplication of law to defendants did not con-\nstitute ex post facto violation. \nMotions for release on bail denied. \nWest Headnotes \n[II Bail 49 E\n52 \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k50 Amount of Bail \n49k52 k. Excessive Bail. Most \nCited Cases \nProvision of Bail Reform Act which im-\nPage 1 \nposes upon defendant burden of showing \nby clear and convincing evidence that he is \nnot likely to pose danger to safety of other \npersons or community if released on bail \ndoes not violate Eighth Amendment pro-\nhibition \non \nexcessive \nbail. \nU.S.C.A. \nConst.Amend. 8; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(a). \n[2] Bail 49 ec.39 \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k39 k. Nature and Scope of Rem-\nedy. Most Cited Cases \nAlthough statute requiring that presentence \nconvicted defendant establish by clear and \nconvincing evidence that he is not likely to \npose danger to safety of other persons or \ncommunity if released under Bail Reform \nAct did not specify procedures to be fol-\nlowed,\n... [truncated, 2948 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/66 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=66]", "char_count": 2948}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nprecise content by giving examples or by \nestablishing laundry list. \nHI Constitutional Law 92 €=)889 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92VI Enforcement of Constitutional \nProvisions \n92VI(A) Persons Entitled to Raise \nConstitutional Questions; Standing \n92VI(A)10 Due Process \n92k888 Criminal Law \n92k889 k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \n(Formerly 92k42.1(3)) \nDefendants challenging provision of Bail \nReform Act requiring that presentence con-\nvicted defendant establish by clear and \nconvincing evidence that he is not likely to \npose danger to safety of other persons or \ncommunity if released on bail could not \nchallenge constitutionality of statute on \nground that term \"danger' lacked meaning \nas to them, where defendants were tied by \ntestimony to gangland-type assassinations \nand with potential for retaliation against \nwitnesses. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(b, c), \n3143(a). \n[5] Bail 49 E=49(4) \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k49 Proceedings to Admit to Bail \n49k49(3) Evidence \n49k49(4) \nk. \nPresumptions \nand Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases \nBail 49 €=.49(5) \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k49 Proceedings to Admit to Bail \n49k49(5) k. Hearing and Determ-\nination. Most Cited Cases \nCourt assured both adequate notice of al-\nPage 2 of 14 \nPage 2 \nlegations against defendants and ample op-\nportunity for meaningful defense to Gov-\nernment's motion for detention of defend-\nants on ground defendants were likely to \npose danger to safety of other persons or \ncommunity if released, where court im-\nposed burden of going forward at hearing \non Government and accorded each defend-\nant and his counsel as much time as they \nfound necessary to deal with Government's \ncharges. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(b, c), 3143(a). \n[6] Bail 49 C=49(3.1) \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k49 Proceedings to Admit to Bail \n49k49(3) Evidence \n49k49(3.1) \nk. \nIn \nGeneral. \nMost Cited Cases \n(Formerly 49k49(3)) \nRules of evi\n... [truncated, 2818 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/67 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=67]", "char_count": 2818}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \n181 Constitutional Law 92 41:=3797 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92XXVI Equal Protection \n92XXVI(F) Criminal Law \n92k3797 k. Bail. Most Cited Cases \n(Formerly 92k250.2(1)) \nBail 49 €=,42 \n49 Bail \n4911 In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k41 Right to Release on Bail \n49k42 k. In General. Most Cited \nCases \n(Formerly 92k250.2(1)) \nWhere occasion for court's present determ-\nination was not offense leading to convic-\ntion but postconviction threat to safety \nposed by defendants, and class defined by \nCongress as all convicted defendants who \nrepresented such societal threat bore most \ndirect imaginable nexus to remedy of de-\ntention pending sentencing, Bail Reform \nAct's failure to distinguish between those \nwho pled guilty and those convicted after \ntrial, between those convicted of misde-\nmeanors and those convicted of felonies, \nand between those convicted of nonviolent \nand those convicted of violent offenses \nraised \nno \nequal \nprotection \nproblems. \nU.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; 18 U.S.C.A. § \n3143. \n19] Bail 49 E:=039 \n49 Bail \n4911 In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k39 k. Nature and Scope of Rem-\nedy. Most Cited Cases \nCourt may structure conditions of .presen-\ntence detention so as to preserve rights of \ndefendant to appeal and to present mean-\ningful defense; thus, statute which provides \nfor detention of defendant who is con-\nPage 3 of 14 \nPage 3 \nvicted but not yet sentenced unless he es-\ntablishes by clear and convincing evidence \nhe is not likely to pose danger to society or \nothers does not implicate defendant's Sixth \nAmendment right to counsel. U.S.C.A. \nConst.Amend. 6; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(b, \nc), 3143(a). \n[101 Constitutional Law 92 C=2790 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92XXIII Ex Post Facto Prohibitions \n92XXIII(A) Constitutional Prohibi-\ntions in General \n92k2790 k. Punishment in Gener-\nal. Most Cited Cases \n(Formerly 92k203) \nAbsent \"punishment,\" there is no ex\nst \nfacto problem. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § \npo9, \ncl.\n... [truncated, 2808 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/68 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=68]", "char_count": 2808}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Page 4 of 14 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nduct but at protecting society generally, \nand its individual members particularly, \nfrom reasonably predictable future con-\nduct; thus, where jury had already found \nbeyond reasonable doubt that defendants \nhad committed crimes, application of stat-\nute to them did not constitute impermiss-\nible ex post facto law. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. \n1, § 9, cl. 3; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143. \n*1031 Judith Dobkin, John Scully, Sp. At-\ntys., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Chicago, Ill., for \nplaintiff. \nElliot Samuels, I. \nP. Lynch, Chicago, \nIll., Joseph M. \nrata, Wheaton, Ill., for \ndefendants. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND OR-\nDER \nSHADUR, District Judge. \nOn January 9, 1985 each of Joseph Di-\nVarco (\"DiVarco\") and Ronald Ignoffo \n(\"Ignoffo\") was convicted by a jury on all \ncounts in which he was named in the in-\ndictment in this case. On January 10 the \ngovernment moved for the detention of \neach of them pursuant to the Bail Reform \nAct of 1984 (the \"Act\"), 18 U.S.C. § \n3143(a) (\"Section 3143(a)\"),Fm claiming \neach of them (though not any of their four \nconvicted codefendants) was likely to pose \na danger to the safety of other persons or \nthe community if released pursuant to Sec-\ntions 3142(b) or (c). \nFN1. All other citations to Title 18 \n(as amended by the Act) will also \nsimply take the form \"Section-.\" \nCitations to the Act's internal num-\nbering will take the form \"Act §-.\" \n*1032 This Court immediately conducted a \ndetention hearing (the \"Hearing\") on Janu-\nary 10 and 11. At the conclusion of the \nHearing as to Ignoffo, this Court found he \nPage 4 \nhad not shown by clear and convincing \nevidence that he was not likely to pose \nsuch a danger. Accordingly Ignoffo was \nordered detained in accordance with Sec-\ntion 3143(a) P4 DiVarco's hearing was \nnot concluded because his doctors recom-\nmended he be hospitalized.no However, \ngiven \nthe \ntestimony \nto \nthis \npoint \n(iimplicating DiVarco not only in the gang-\nland-ty\n... [truncated, 3406 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/69 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=69]", "char_count": 3406}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nSection 3143(a). For the reasons stated in \nthis memorandum opinion and order, their \nmotions are denied. \nChanged Standards Under the Act \nTwo of this Court's colleagues have re-\ncently dealt with the constitutionality of \nother bail provisiox of the Act: Judge Hart \nin United States \nHazzard, 598 F.Supp. \n1442 (N.D.Ill.19 ) (pretrial detentio \nand Judge Getzendanner in United States\nCirrincione, 600 F.Supp. 1436, (ND.I\n1985) (detention after sentencing and \npending appeal, based on the likelihood of \nreversal on appeal). Though the constitu-\ntional considerations in those situations are \nobviously related to the considerations ap-\nplicable to the present question, the distinc-\ntions among the several situations make \nneither of the earlier analyses controlling \nhere. \nHere we deal with already-convicted but \nnot-yet-sentenced defendants, as to each of \nwhom the decision of detention or release \nis based on whether he \"is not likely to ... \npose a danger to the safety of any other \nperson or the community if released\" (Sec-\ntion 3143(a)). Just such a likelihood of \ndanger was an established basis for deny-\ning bail under former law, 18 U.S.C. § \n3148 (repealed by Act § 203(a)): \nA person ... who has been convicted of an \noffense and is either awaiting sentence or \nsentence review under section 3576 of this \ntitle or has filed an appeal or a petition for \na writ of certiorari, shall be treated in ac-\ncordance with the provisions of section \n3146 [establishing conditions of release] \nunless the court or judge has reason to be-\nlieve that no one or more conditions of re-\nlease will reasonably assure that the person \nwill not flee or pose a danger to any other \nPage 5 of 14 \nPage 5 \nperson or to the community. If such a risk \nof flight or danger is believed to exist ... \nthe person may be ordered detained. \nPre-Act law also imposed the burden of es-\ntablishing the absence of such danger on \nthe convicted \n... [truncated, 3652 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/70 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=70]", "char_count": 3652}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Page 6 of 14 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nAct has now changed the burden on the \nconvicted defendant (both pre-sentence and \npost-sentence) to one of \"clear and convin-\ncing evidence.\" FM\nFNS. Thus the shift from old 18 \nU.S.C. § 3148 and Rule 9(c) to Sec-\ntion 3143(a) involves two changes: \n1. from \"the judge has reason to \nbelieve that no ... conditions of re-\nlease will reasonably assure that \nthe person will not ... pose a \ndanger....\" to \"the judicial officer \nfinds ... that the person is not \nlikely to ... pose a danger....\"; and \n2. from \"the burden of establish-\ning ... rests with the defendant\" to \n\"the judicial officer finds by clear \nand convincing evidence....\" \nIt is always difficult to convert the \nsemantics \nof \nsuch \ndifferently \nstated standards into a quantified \ncomparison. Here the \"reason to \nbelieve\" test in the first pairing \nmight \narguably be viewed as \nharder for a defendant to over-\ncome than its \"finds not likely\" \ncounterpart. \nConversely \n\"clear \nand convincing\" is plainly a more \ndifficult burden for the defendant \nthan a mere preponderance. Thus \n(with factors that might be per-\nceived as pointing in different dir-\nections) the overall effect of the \nchanges is not as obvious as it \nmight seem at first blush. For pur-\nposes of this opinion, however, it \nwill be assumed a defendant is \nworse off under the Act than un-\nder the old law. \nConstitutional Considerations \"a \nPage 6 \nFN6. All the detention provisions \nof the Act have been drawn from \nthe corresponding provisions of the \nDistrict \nof \nColumbia \nCode \n(Sections \n23-1321 \nto \n23-1327), \nwhere they have been in effect since \nenactment \nof \nthe \nDistrict \nof \nColumbia Court Reform and Crim-\ninal Procedure Act of 1970. Section \n3143(a) \nis \na \ncounter-pan \nof \nD.C.CT § 23-1325(b). In United \nStates \nEdwards, 430 A.2d 1321 \nC.1 1) (en bane) the District of \nColumbia Court of Appeals dealt \nwith the constitutionality of various \nof those provision\n... [truncated, 3245 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/71 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=71]", "char_count": 3245}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nthose cases where it is proper to grant bail. \nWhen this clause was earned over into our \nBill of Rights, nothing was said that indic-\nated any different concept. The Eighth \nAmendment has not prevented Congress \nfrom defining the classes of cases in which \nbail shall be allowed in this country. \nThere is room for debate on that score in \nL\nthe pre-conviction co ext, fueled in part \nby a dictum in Stack \nBoyle, 342 U.S. 1, \n4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L. . 1 (1951) (decided \nthe same term as Carlson ) (emphasis in \noriginal): \nFrom the passage of the Judiciary Act of \n1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91, to the present Federal \nRules \nof \nCriminal \nProcedure, \nRule \n46(a)(1), federal law has unequivocally \nprovided that a person arrested for a non-\ncapital offense shall be admitted to bail. \nThis traditional right to freedom before \nconviction permits the unhampered prepar-\nation of a defense, and serves to prevent \ni m\nthe infliction of puni \nent prior to con-\nviction. See Hudson \nParker, 156 U.S. \n277, 285 [15 S.Ct. 45 , 453, 39 L.Ed. 424] \n(1895). Unless this right to bail before trial \nis preserved, the presumption of inno-\ncence, secured only after centuries of \nstruggle, would lose its meaning. \n1\nFor an extended discussion of e issues in \nthis area, see United States \nEdwards, \n430 A.2d 1321, 1325-31 (D. .1981) (en \nbanc). \nBut even the Stack dictum addresses the \npre -conviction, not post -conviction, de-\nfendant. As for the latter category of of-\nfender Justice Douglas, scarcely a foe of \ncivil liberties, spoke to the issue ' his ca-\npacity as Circuit Justice in Carboi United \nStates, 82 S.Ct. 662, 666, 7 L. \n.2d 769 \n(1962): \nPage 7 of 14 \nPage 7 \nIf, for example, the safety of the com-\nmunity would be jeopardized, it would be \nirresponsible judicial action to grant bail. \nAccord, Harris k United States, 404 U.S. \n1232, 1235-36, \n2 S.Ct. 10, 13-14, 30 \nL.Ed.2d 25 (1971) (Dol las, J., Circuit \nJustice); and see Rus\n... [truncated, 3425 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/72 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=72]", "char_count": 3425}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Page 8 of 14 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n• \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nBoth DiVarco and Ignoffo advance a pot-\npourri of challenges to the procedure under \nthe Act. None is persuasive, and none calls \nfor more than brief discussion.\" \nFN8. True enough, just last year tj \nSupreme Court said in Scholl \nMarlin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S.\n2403, 2410, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984): \nIn Bell i Wolfish, 441 U.S. [520], \nat 534 \n15, 99 S.Ct. [1861], at \n1871 n. 15 [60 L.Ed.2d 447 \n(1979) ], we left open the question \nwhether any governmental object-\nive other than ensuring a detain-\nee's presence at trial may constitu-\ntionally justify pretrial detention. \nBut Scholl itself upheld in due \nprocess terms (at least as to juven-\niles) a system of pretrial deten-\ntion predicated on \"the combined \ninterest in protecting both the \ncommunity and the juvenile him-\nself from the consequences of fu-\nture criminal conduct....\" When \nthe detained person has already \nbeen tried and found guilty of an-\nother crime (as have DiVarco and \nIgnoffo), the powerful considera-\ntion of the presumption of inno-\ncence (which undergirds all our \nconcerns about pretrial detention, \nviewed as punishment, see Stack, \n342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3) loses \nits force. It would be a mistake to \ncarry over to the present situation, \nin undiluted form, the troubled ju-\ndicial soul-searching about pretri-\nal detention-a soul-searching that \nhas expressed itself in a continu-\ning \ndue \nprocess \ndialogue \n(contrast, for example, the major-\nity and dissenting opinions in both \nScholl and Bell ). \nPage 8 \n*1035 [2][3][4][5][6][7] Though they call \non such pejorative rubrics as vagueness \nand lack of standards, DiVarco and Ignoffo \nattack Section 3143 in both procedural and \nsubstantive due process terms. It is true the \nstatute does not specifically prescribe the \nprocedures to be followed. But its require-\nment of a judicial officer's \"find[ing] by \nclear and convincing evidence\" necessarily \nconnotes a hearing, and \n... [truncated, 3448 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/73 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=73]", "char_count": 3448}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "602 F.Supp. 1029 \n• \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \ntential danger to other persons or the com-\nmunity. That triggers the need for a judicial \ndetermination of the issue, and hence a \nhearing. \n2. By its very nature, such \"danger\" can \ntake a number of forms. Nothing requires \nCongress to substitute the particular for the \ngeneric-to give the term more precise con-\ntent by giving examples or by establishing \na laundry list. Certainly DiVarco and Ig-\nnoffo, tied by testimony to gangland-type \nassassinations (and with their potential for \nretaliation against witnesses here), cannot \nclaim the concept of danger to others or the \ncommunity is devoid of content in their \ncases. That would follow a fortiori from \nsuch cases as Provenzano, 605 F.2d at \n95-96. And as to what constitutes a \n\"sufficient showing\" of the likelihood of \nsuch danger, that is no different from any \nother factual determination courts are regu-\nlarly called upon to make. \n3. By imposing the burden of going for-\nward at the Hearing on the government and \nby according to each defendant and his \ncounsel as much time as they found neces-\nsary to deal with the government's charges, \nthis Court assured both adequate notice of \nthe allegations against the defendants and \nample opportunity for a meaningful de-\nfense. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1339-41. \n4. Even in full-blown criminal trials, the \nSixth Amendments Confrontation Clause \nposes the only constitutional objection to \nhearsay evidence. And it has always been \ntrue of bail hearings, including those res-\nulting in detention, that the rules of evid-\nence do not limit the conduct *1036 of the \nhearing. Hearsay may be considered, with \nthe judge applying his or her experience as \na factfmder to decide the extent to which it \nis to be credited or discredited because of \ninsufficient reliability. In fact the catchall \nPage 9 of 14 \nPage 9 \nprovision of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) and \n804(bX5) (which some thoughtful academ-\nicians and courts have sugge\n... [truncated, 3725 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/74 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=74]", "char_count": 3725}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Page 10 of 14 \n• \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n' 602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nconvicted of felonies, and between those \nconvicted of nonviolent and those con-\nvicted of violent offenses raises equal pro-\ntection problems. DiVarco puts related is-\nsues in a different way: Section 3143's pre-\nsumption against all convicted defendants-\nregardless of their offenses or back-\ngrounds-bears no rational relationship to \nlegitimate governmental interests of pro-\ntecting the community (including other \npersons). \n[8] Of course the distinctions between of-\nfenders made by Ignoffo cut against rather \nthan for him, except the comparison based \non the nonviolent nature of the offenses of \nwhich he has been convicted. That fact-that \nhe is on the wrong side of two of the three \ncomparisons-creates standing questions as \nto his ability to raise such other claims. But \neven apart from that, what both Ignoffo \nand DiVarco gloss over is that the occasion \nfor this Courts present determination is not \nthe offense leading to the conviction but \nthe post-conviction threat to safety posed \nby the defendant.iNii That is the class \nCongress has defined-all convicted defend-\nants who represent such a societal threat-\nand that class bears the most direct imagin-\nable nexus to the remedy: detention \npending sentencing. There can be no quar-\nrel with the rationality of that classification \nfor Equal Protection Clause purposes.\"4,2\nFN11. This distinction is touched \non more fully in the ex post facto \ndiscussion later in this opinion. \nFN12. That rational distinction also \ndemolishes DiVarco's suggestion of \ndiscriminatory \nenforcement \nbased \non the government's having sought \ndetention of DiVarco and Ignoffo \nbut not of their four codefendants \n(as to whom the government said it \nhad \nno \ninformation \nindicating \nPage 10 \ndanger to other persons or to the \ncommunity). \n4. Effective Assistance of Counsel \n[9] DiVarco says detention pending sen-\ntencing effectively negates his right to ap\n... [truncated, 3614 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/75 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=75]", "char_count": 3614}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Page 11 of 14 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n• \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \npronouncement on the clause, Weaver \nGraham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 96 , \n965, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), a defendants \npunishment has been increased by the new \nlaw: \nThe presence or absence of an affirmative, \nenforceable right is not relevant, however, \nto the ex post facto prohibition, which for-\nbids the imposition of punishment more \nsevere than the punishment assigned by \nlaw when the act to be punished occurred. \nCritical to relief under the Ex Post Facto \nClause is not an individual's right to less \npunishment, but the lack of fair notice and \ngovernmental restraint when the legislature \nincreases punishment beyond what was \nprescribed when the crime was consum-\nmated.FNI3\nFN13. Other facets of Ex Post Facto \nClause coverage, such as its prohib-\nition of (1) retrospective changes in \nconduct giving rise to criminal pen-\nalties and (2) the elimination of de-\nfenses available when the crime was \ncommitted, are plainly not in issue \nhere. \nIt is true Weaver, id. at 29, 101 S.Ct. at 964 \nalso speaks in terms of the challenged law \n\"disadvantag[ing] the offender affected by \nit.\" But that characterization alone is over-\nsimplistic, for the Supreme Court itself has \nconsistently \ntaught \nnot \nevery \n\"disadvantage\" is vulnerable under the \nClause, and the core inquiry remains the \n/\nretro \nive increase in punishment. As De-\nVeau \nBraisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 \nS.Ct. \n46, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) \nput it: \nThe mark of an ex post facto law is the im-\nposition of what can fairly be designated \npunishment for past acts. The question in \nPage 11 \neach case where unpleasant consequences \nare brought to bear upon an individual for \nprior conduct, is whether the legislative \naim was to punish that individual for past \nactivity, or whether the restriction of the \nindividual comes about as a relevant incid-\nent to a regulation of a present situation.... \nJust last Term the Supreme Court h\n... [truncated, 3525 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/76 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=76]", "char_count": 3525}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Page 12 of 14 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \ncordance with due process of law. \nNot every disability imposed during pretri-\nal detention amounts to \"punishment\" in \nthe constitutional sense, however. Once the \nGovernment has exercised its conceded au-\nthority to detain a person pending trial, it \nobviously is entitled to employ devices that \nare calculated to effectuate this detention. \nTraditionally, this has meant confinement \nin a facility which, no matter how modem \nor how antiquated, results in restricting the \nmovement of a detainee in a manner in \nwhich he would not be restricted if he \nsimply were free to walk the streets \npending trial. Whether it be called a jail, a \nprison, or a custodial center, the purpose of \nthe facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of \nchoice and privacy are inherent incidents \nof confinement in such a facility. And the \nfact that such detention interferes with the \ndetainee's understandable desire to live as \ncomfortably as possible and with as little \nrestraint as possible during confinement \ndoes not convert the conditions or restric-\ntions of detention into \"punishment.\" \nThis Court has recognized a distinction \nbetween punitive measures that may not \nconstitutionally be imposed prior to a de-\ntermination of guilt and regulatory re-\nstraints that may. \nA court must decide whether the disability \nis imposed for the purpose of punishment \nor whether it is but an incident of some \nother legitimate governmental purpose.... \nAbsent a showing of an expressed intent to \npunish on the part of detention facility of-\nficials, that determination generally will \nturn on \"whether an alternative purpose to \nwhich [the restriction] may rationally be \nconnected is assignable for it, and whether \nit appears excessive in relation to the al-\nPage 12 \ntemative purpose assigned [to it].\" \nWhat is at work under Section 3143 is not \npunishment for past conduct but the pro-\ntection of society generally, and its indi-\n\n... [truncated, 3725 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/77 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=77]", "char_count": 3725}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Page 13 of 14 \n• 602 F.Supp. 1029 \n602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nother than \"punishment.\" Absent punish-\nment there is no ex post facto problem. \nHere, by comparison, a Jury has already \nfound beyond a reasonable doubt that Di-\nVarco and Ignoffo have committed crimes. \nSurely society cannot be less entitled to \nprotect itself and its members against what \nthis Court has found the likelihood of real \ndangers-dangers that would be posed by \nthe continued enlargement of convicted de-\nfendants \nIgnoffo \nand \nDiVarco \nMIS\npending their sentencing. \nFN15. This does not of course im-\nply an ultimate finding as to Di-\nVarco. Because the statute places \nthe burden on him, and because the \nevidence during the Hearing to this \npoint demonstrates a real probabil-\nity of his posing a danger to the \nsafety of others, his release pending \ncompletion of the Hearing would be \nimproper. \nConclusion \nSection 3143 is not vulnerable to constitu-\ntional onslaught, either on its face or as ap-\nplied to DiVarco and Ignoffo.m, Both \ntheir motions for release on bail pending \nsentencing are denied. \nFN16. After this opinion was com-\npleted (and indeed signed and ready \nfor issuance), this Court learned of \nthe very recent decisions by three \nCourts of Appeal reaching a result \nopposite to that of Judge Get-\nzendanner's Cirrincione opinion in \nthe post-appeal situation covered \n3143(b). United States)! \nn e States \nand other \n753 F.\n \nPowell \n19, (3d Cir. 198 \nconsolidated c es (8th Cir.) (order \nissued; opinion to follow); United \nStates' Affleck, No. 84-2630 (10th \nPage 13 \nCir.) (same). In addition, on January \n26 our own Court of Appeals \nentered \nan \nunpublished \norder \n(non-citeable and non-precedential \nunder Circuit Rule 35) affirming \nJudge Kanne's decision rejecting \npost facto attack in United States \nMolte, \nHCR 83-36-33 \nJan. 9, 1985). In accordance with \nthe Ashwander principles referred \nto earlier in the text, this Court of \ncourse continues to express no \nopi\n... [truncated, 3018 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/78 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=78]", "char_count": 3018}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Page 14 of 14 \n• 602 F.Supp. 1029 \n' 602 F.Supp. 1029 \n(Cite as: 602 F.Supp. 1029) \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nPlaintiff, \n1 \nJOSEPH DiVARCO, et al., Defendants. \nNO. 84 CR 507 \nDETENTION ORDER \nOn January 9, 1985 following a jury trial, \nJoseph DiVarco (\"DiVarco') was con-\nvicted on all counts in the indictment in \nwhich he was named in this case. On Janu-\nary 10 the government moved for Di-\nVarco's detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § \n3143(a). This Court immediately com-\nmenced a detention hearing (see 18 U.S.C. \n§ [3142] (1)), found that the government \nhad presented credible evidence that estab-\nlished prima facie (though this Court has \nnot at this time definitively found) that Di-\nVarco was likely to pose a danger to the \nsafety of other persons or the community if \nreleased pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(b) \nor (c) and that DiVarco had not yet estab-\nlished by clear and convincing evidence \nthat he was not likely to pose such danger, \nand therefore ordered DiVarco detained \npending completion of the hearing. Such \ncompletion of the hearing was not feasible \nat that time, in part because DiVarco's \ncounsel advised that DiVarco's doctors had \ndirected his hospitalization to avoid the \npossibility of his contracting pneumonia. \nIn accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) \nthis Court hereby orders that DiVarco be \ncommitted to the custody of the Attorney \nGeneral for confinement at Bethany Meth-\nodist Hospital pending imposition of sen-\ntence, upon the following conditions: \nPage 14 \n1. DiVarco shall be allowed monitored vis-\nits from his immediate family (his wife, \ntheir children and their children's spouses). \nAll such visits are to be prearranged \nthrough the United States Marshal's Ser-\nvice. \n2. DiVarco's attorneys (ium Lynch, \nJoseph Laraia and Jacqueli \ner) and \nhis doctors shall have unlimited, unmon-\nitored access to him. \n3. United States Probation Officer Rhoda \nMichaels shall have unmonitored access to \nDiVarco by prearranged appointment. \n4. DiVarco shall b\n... [truncated, 2714 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/79 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=79]", "char_count": 2714}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "I \nPage 1 of 6 \nWestlaw. \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n(Cite as: 611 F.Supp. 860) \nH \nU.S., Rourke \nD.C. a.,1985. \nUnited States District Court,E.D. \nNortfolk Division.. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, \nv. \nJohn ROURKE, et al., Defendants. \nCrim. No. 84-94-N. \nJune 21, 1985. \nOn defendant's motion for bail pending ap-\npeal, the District Court, Doumar, J., held \nthat: (1) defendant was not entitled to bail \npending appeal; (2) Bail Reform Act of \n1984 is not an ex post facto law; and (3) no \nmanifest injustice resulted in ordering de-\nfendant to begin serving his sentence \npending appeal. \nMotion denied. \nWest Headnotes \n111 Bail 49 O=>44(1) \n49 Bail \n491I In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k41 Right to Release on Bail \n49k44 Pending Appeal or Other \nProceeding for Review \n49k44(1) k. In General; Con-\nditions. Most Cited Cases \nAbsent showing by clear and convincing \nevidence that defendant was not likely to \nflee, defendant was not entitled to bail \npending appeal. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(b). \n[2] Bail 49 C=39 \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k39 k. Nature and Scope of Rem-\nPage 1 \nedy. Most Cited Cases \nConstitutional Law 92 c€7 .2810 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92MII Ex Post Facto Prohibitions \n92XXIII(B) Particular Issues and \nApplications \n92k2809 Criminal Proceedings \n92k2810 k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \n(Formerly 92k199) \nBail Reform Act of 1984 [18 U.S.C.A. § \n3143] is not an ex post facto law. U.S.C.A. \nConst. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. \n[3] Bail 49 €=,44(1) \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k41 Right to Release on Bail \n49k44 Pending Appeal or Other \nProceeding for Review \n49k44(1) k. In General; Con-\nditions. Most Cited Cases \nNo manifest injustice resulted in ordering \ndefendant, who had been admitted to bail \nbefore effective date of Bail Reform Act of \n1984 [18 U.S.C.A. § 3143], to begin \nserving his sentence pending appeal, under \nrationale that even under Bail -Reform Act \nof 1966 release on bail was modifiable and \nnever a vested right, o\n... [truncated, 2559 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/80 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=80]", "char_count": 2559}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "611 F.Supp. 860 \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n(Cite as: 611 F.Supp. 860) \nMEMORANDUM ORDER \nDOUMAR, District Judge. \nOn March 14, 1985, the defendant, John \nRourke, was convicted of 21 U.S.C. § 963 \n(conspiracy to import cocaine) and 21 \nU.S.C. § 952(a) (importation of about 691 \npounds of cocaine). Following the jury ver-\ndict of guilty and an evidentiary hearing, \nthe Court ordered that Rourke, an accom-\nplished pilot and the aviation consultant to \na drug nng, be detained. ending sentencing \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 3143 a) of the Bail *861 \nReform Act of 1984. \ne Court now de-\nclines to modify that judgment for the reas-\nons which follow. \nFollowing the preparation of a pre-sentence \nreport, the Court sentenced Rourke on May \n3, 1985 to concurrent imprisonment terms \nof fourteen (14) years on both counts. \nRourke now moves for bail pending appeal \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) as he remains \nincarcerated under the sentence imposed on \nMay 3, 1985. Rourke argues that (1) the \nBail Reform Act of 1984 is an ex post facto \nlaw as applied to him and (2) that the stat-\nute does not apply retroactively to a de-\nfendant like Rourke admitted to bail prior \nto the Act's passage. \nI. \nLaying aside constitutional analysis and \nquestions of retroactivity, the relevant \nsubsections of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 \nread as follows: \n§ 3143. Release or detention of a defend-\nant pending sentence or appeal. \n(a) \nRELEASE \nOR \nDETENTION \nPENDING SENTENCE.-The judicial of-\nficer shall order that a person who has been \nfound guilty of an offense and who is wait-\ning imposition or execution of sentence, be \nPage 2 of 6 \nPage 2 \ndetained, unless the judicial officer finds \nby clear and convincing evidence that the \nperson is not likely to flee or pose a danger \nto the safety of any person or the com-\nmunity if released pursuant to section \n3142(b) or (c). If the judicial officer makes \nsuch a finding, he shall order the release of \nthe person in accordance with the provi-\nsions of section 3142(b) or (c). \n(\n... [truncated, 3367 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/81 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=81]", "char_count": 3367}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "611 F.Supp. 860 \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n(Cite as: 611 F.Supp. 860) \nat trial and at a post-verdict evidentiary \nhearing led the Court to find that clear and \nconvincing evidence of Mr. Rourke's return \nfor sentencing was wholly lacking. Actu-\nally, much evidence to the contrary was re-\nvealed. Rourke himself is a pilot who has \nmaneuvered planes in and out of the United \nStates at will and his family continues to \nown an aviation business. He was in poor \nfinancial condition. Rourke testified that he \nhad received communications and threats \nof an undisclosed nature, from other fugit-\nive co-defendants involved in the smug-\ngling venture. These continuing commu-\nnications particularly troubled the Court. \nOn April 17, 1985, the Fourth Circuit ruled \nthat Rourke's appeal of his post-verdict but \npre-sentence detention was \"premature \nsince the appellant has not yet be \nsen-\ntenced.\" United States of America I gp John \nRourke, No. 85-5101 (4th Cir. April 17, \n1985). \nFollowing his sentencing on May 3, 1985, \nRourke renewed his motion in this Court \nfor bail pending appeal to allow his release \nfrom detention at least until the Fourth \nCircuit acted. The motion is now brought \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 3143(6) (Release or De-\ntention Pending Appeal), whereas prior to \n*862 sentencing the relevant subsection \nwas \n3143(a) \n(Release \nor \nDetention \nPending Sentencing). \nSubsection (a) requires the Court to detain \nthe defendant unless clear and convincing \nevidence shows that the defendant will not \nflee or pose a danger to safety of any other \nperson or the community. The Court found \nsuch evidence lacking on March 14, 1985. \nSubsection (b), relevant after sentencing, \nplaces a greater burden upon the convicted \nand sentenced defendant. The defendant is \ndetained unless the Court finds that both § \nPage 3 of 6 \nPage 3 \n3143(bX1) and (b)(2) are met. Clearly, if \nthe burden of proof of either subsection is \nnot met, the defendant is detained. \n[11 There have been numerous recent cir-\nc\n... [truncated, 3653 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/82 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=82]", "char_count": 3653}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Page 4 of 6 \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n(Cite as: 611 F.Supp. 860) \nvisions of section 3146 [18 USCS § 3146] \nunless the court or judge has reason to be-\nlieve that no one or more conditions of re-\nlease will reasonably assure that the person \nwill not flee or pose a danger to any other \nperson or to the community. If such a risk \nof flight or danger is believed to exist, or if \nit appears that an appeal is frivolous or \ntaken for delay, the person may be ordered \ndetained.... \n18 U.S.C. § 3148 (repealed). As the Sev-\nIc\nth Circuit stated recently in United States \nMolt, 758 F.2d 1198 (1985) (Posner, J.): \nT]he change in the standard for bail \npending appeal is not an ex post facto law. \nEven though it may work to the disadvant-\nage\np \nf \nof a defendant, a procedural clinge is \nnot ex ostacto ',\"citing Dobbert\nFlor-\nida, 432 U.S. 282, 293, 97 S.Ct. 2290, \n2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977); g  e e.g., \nUnited States ex rel Massarella \nElrod, \n682 \nF.2d \n688, \n689 \n(7th \nrr.1982) \n(extending the statute of limitations); Dunn \nv. Maggio, 712 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (5th \nCir.1983) (per curiam) (repealing pardon \nstatute). It appears that the recent circuit \ndecisions construing the Bail Reform Act \nof 1984 are in acc \nwith the view, see, \ne.g. United States \nCrabtree, 754 F.2d \n1200, 1201-02 45 \n• 1985) (one judge); \nUnited States I \n753 F.2d 19, 21 \n(3rd Cir.1985). \necourt follows these \ncases and rejects the ex post facto claim. \nRourke also claims that the Bail Reform \nAct of 1984 is a prospective law, inapplic-\nable to those admitted to bail prior to its ef-\nfective date on October 12, 1984. \nThe Supreme Court has ruled that federal \ncourts must apply the law in effect at the \ntime it renders a decision, unless such a de-\nPage 4 \ncision would result in manifest injustice or \nwhere legislative history or statutory *8 \ndirection is to the contrary. Bradley\nRichmond School Board, 416 U.S. 69 , \n711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 4 \n(1974); See National Posters, Inc.\nN. L\n... [truncated, 3696 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/83 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=83]", "char_count": 3696}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "611 F.Supp. 860 \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n(Cite as: 611 F.Supp. 860) \nto bail before the Act's effective date. \nHowever, after its effective date, and be-\nfore trial, the government moved for his \ndetention under the \"dangerous\" defendant \nprovisions of the new Act. See18 U.S.C. § \n3143(a). The district Court affirmed the \nU.S. Magistrate, who refused to revoke bail \nunder the Bail Reform Act of 1984, and the \nFirst Circuit reversed. \n[3] The First Circuit in Zannino noted that \neven under the prior Bail Reform Act of \n1966, bail terms were \"subject to review \nwhen changed circumstances require that \nthe release be reappraised.\" Zannino, \nsupra, at 55. The Court cited 18 U.S.C. § \n3146(e), repealed by18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), \nwhich reads in part: \nA judicial officer ordering the release of a \nperson on any condition specified in this \nsection may at any time amend his order to \nimpose additional or different conditions of \nrelease. \nId. Although Rourke is a sentenced and \nconvicted defendant unlike Zannino, who \nwas a pre-trial defendant, Rourke was \nequally subject to the repealed subsection \nabove by virtue of repealed § 3148, which \nstates that those \"awaiting ... sentence re-\nview ... shall be treated in accordance with \nthe provisions of section 3146 unless [there \nexists] a risk of flight or danger is believed \nto exist, or if it appears that an appeal is \nfrivolous or taken for delay....\" The Zan-\nnino court went on to state: \nThus the release on bail allowed under the \n1966 Act was not an absolute grant; de-\nfendants were given notice that a change in \nconditions or terms could bring about the \nrevocation of the release. That statute, fur-\nthermore, created no expectation that con-\nditions would not change. \nWhat has actually occurred with the pas-\nPage 5 of 6 \nPage 5 \nsage of the pretrial detention provision \nmay be considered a statutorily mandated \nchange in those conditions.... We hold that \ndefendants released under the 1966 Bail \nAct must show their continued elig\n... [truncated, 3727 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/84 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=84]", "char_count": 3727}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "• 611 F.Supp. 860 \n, • \n611 F.Supp. 860 \n(Cite as: 611 F.Supp. 860) \nchallenge and a \"retroactivity\" attack on \nthe Bail Reform Act of 1984, by pre-trial \ndetainees alleged to have committed crimes \nprior to the Act's passage. In another case, \nthe First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected \nthe \"retroactivity\" argument with respect \nto one charged before the new Act was ef-\nfective and who tought pre-trial release. \nSee United States \nAngiulo, 755 F.2d 969, \n973-74 (1st Cir.19 ). \nThe Court therefore holds that the Bail Re-\nform Act of 1984 is not an ex post facto \nlaw as applied to Rourke; that the Act is in-\ntended to apply to pending criminal matters \nsuch as the mstant case and that a convic-\ntion by a jury is a substantial change in \nstatus of the defendant. Rourke shall re-\nmain incarcerated pending appeal. \nIT IS SO ORDERED. \nD.C. 1\n.,1985. \nU.S. \nRourke \n611 .Supp. 860 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 6 of 6 \nPage 6 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?utid=%7bFEDF5709-3AEA-41774-8619-... 4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191672\n", "char_count": 1094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "U.S. v. GAVIRIA \n667 \nChou1123 Fad 667 (11th Cir. 1987) \nsarial role has long been well established. \nWe agree with the district court that peti-\ntioner's present claim is merely a variation \nof law that was well established at the time \nof the 1983 proceedings. The ends of jus-\ntice can provide no exception in this case to \nthe application of the abuse of the writ \ndoctrine. The trial attorney could not pre-\nvent Ritter from testifying. Ritter's testi-\nmony—which admitted all of the relevant \nfacts, evidenced no remorse, affirmatively \nsought the death penalty, and threatened \nharm to the jurors should they fail to re-\nturn a death sentence—would have under-\nmined any defense which the attorney \nmight have presented. Under these cir-\ncumstances, we are confident that the \n\"ends of justice\" concept does not warrant \nan exception to the abuse doctrine. \nIII. Conclusion \nAlthough we GRANT the petition to pro-\nceed in forma pauperis, since both claims \nraised by petitioner are barred by the \nabuse of the writ doctrine, and since this \nissue would not be debatable among jurists \nof reason, we conclude the petitioner's ap-\nplication for a certificate of probable cause \nshould be DENIED. \nAccordingly, petitioner's emergency mo-\ntion for a stay of execution is DENIED. \nUNITED STATES of America, \nPlaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nJorge Enrique GAVIRIA and Jose Elkin \nEcheverry, Defendants-Appellants. \nNo. 87-6517. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nEleventh Circuit. \nSept. 3, 1987. \nUnited States District Court for the South-\nern District of Florida, No. 87-303-CR-\nLCN, Lenore Carrero Nesbitt, J., affirmed, \nand defendants took further appeal. The \nCourt of Appeals, Hatchett, Circuit Judge, \nheld that (1) Government could proceed at \npretrial detention hearing by way of prof-\nfer of evidence; (2) defendants' right to call \nadverse witnesses was conditional; and (3) \ndefendants were not entitled to de novo \nhearing before district court. \nAffirmed. \n1. Criminal Law 4=D1158(1) \nCourt o\n... [truncated, 3335 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/86 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=86]", "char_count": 3335}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "668 \n828 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nLeon B. Kellner, U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., \nfor plaintiff-appellee. \nAppeal from the United States District \nCourt for the Southern District of Florida. \nBefore RONEY, Chief Judge, FAY \nand HATCHET?, Circuit Judges. \nHATCHET?, Circuit Judge: \nJorge Enrique Gaviria and Jose Elkin \nEcheverry appeal the decision of the dis-\ntrict court imposing pretrial detention pur-\nsuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). We affirm.' \nFACTS \nOn April 30, 1987, Jorge Enrique Gaviria \nand Jose Elkin Echeverry were arrested \nand charged with several Title 21 narcotics \noffenses. The government requested tem-\nporary detention of Gaviria and Echeverry \npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d) after deter-\nmining that they were in the United States \nillegally. \nOn May 6, 1987, a United States Magis-\ntrate conducted a pretrial detention hearing \npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and ordered \npretrial detention of Gaviria and Echever-\nry' \nThe magistrate based the pretrial de-\ntention order on risk of flight and dangers \nposed to the community as authorized by \n18 U.S.C. § 9142(e). Gaviria and Echever-\nry requested a review of the magistrate's \norder and a de novo hearing before the \ndistrict court, alleging that (1) the magis-\ntrate erroneously permitted the govern-\nI. This matter came to the court as a \"Motion for \nBail Pending Trial.\" We noted that 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3145 provides for an appeal from a pretrial \ndetention order. Under our rules and operating \nprocedures. a single judge may determine a mo. \ntion for bail pending appeal, but a panel must \ndetermine an appeal pursuant to 18 US.C. \n§ 3145. \n2. Title 18 US.C. § 3142(f) provides, in pertinent \npart, that: \nThe judicial officer shall hold a hearing to \ndetermine whether any condition or combina-\ntion of conditions set forth in subsection (c) \nof this section will reasonably assure the ap-\npearance of the person as required and the \nsafety of any other person and the communi. \nment to proceed by proffering evidence at \nt\n... [truncated, 4012 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/87 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=87]", "char_count": 4012}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "U.S. v. GAVIRIA \n669 \nCite am US F.2d 667 111th Clr. 1987) \nI. \nGaviria and Echeverry contend that the \nmagistrate committed error by allowing the \ngovernment to proceed by proffer at the \npretrial detention hearing and by improper• \nly precluding defense counsel from calling \nas a witness the government's case agent \nwho was present at the detention hearing. \nThe district court, citing a decision of the \nThird Circuit, United States v. Delker, 757 \nF.2d 1390 (3d Cir.I985), stated that \"the \nmagistrate did not err in allowing the \ngovernment to proceed by proffer during \nthe pretrial detention hearing. Nor did the \nmagistrate err in the defendants' request \nto call the case agent as a witness on their \nclients' behalf under section 3142(gX2) of \nthe Bail Reform Act.\" We agree. \nAlthough this circuit has not expressly \naddressed the issue of whether the govern-\nment at a pretrial detention hearing may \nproceed solely by proffer, the court in \nDelker stated that \nthe 'procedural requirements for the pre-\ntrial detention hearing set forth in sec-\ntion 3142(0 are based on those of the \nDistrict of Columbia statute which were \nheld to meet constitutional due process \nrequirements in United States v. Ed-\nwards,' 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C.App.1981) (en \nbane), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 \nS.Ct. 1721, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982). S.Rep. \nNo. 225, 98th Cong. at 1st Sees. at 22 \n(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code \nCong. & Adm.News at 25 (Supp. 9A). \nDelker, 757 F.2d at 1396. In Edwards, the \nDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals held \nthat \"the information presented to the judi-\ncial officer by either the government or \nthe defense may be by proffer. . . .\" Ed-\nwards, 430 A.2d at 1334. In Edwards, the \ncourt continued by stating that \nThe legislative history of the statute \nconfirms Congress' intent that the infor-\nmation upon which the judicial officer \nmakes his findings need not be sworn \ntestimony, and that the hearing is not \ndesigned to afford defendants a dis-\ncovery device. \n... [truncated, 4278 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/88 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=88]", "char_count": 4278}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "670 \n828 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nof witnesses who are called by the \ngovernment. Section 1322(0(4) gives the \naccused the right 'to present witnesses in \nhis own behalf,' but the House report \nstates that the accused has only a condi-\ntional right to call adverse witnesses: \nHe may not, of course, call witnesses \nwho ordinarily would be expected to tes-\ntify for the government at trial, unless \nhe can proffer to the court in reason-\nable detail how he expects their testimo-\nny to negate substantial probability. \nEdwards, 430 A.2d at 1884 (original empha-\nsis). We agree that the defendant in a \npretrial detention hearing has only a condi-\ntional right to call adverse witnesses. We, \nhowever, do not adopt the procedural \nguideline under Edwards requiring the de-\nfendant to initially proffer to the court in \ndetail how an adverse witness's testimony \nis expected to negate substantial probabili-\nty as a prerequisite to calling such witness. \nThe legislative history compels a finding \nthat the judicial officer presiding at the \ndetention hearing is vested with the discre-\ntion whether to allow defense counsel to \ncall an adverse witness with or without an \ninitial proffer of the expected benefit of the \nwitness's testimony. \nMoreover, as the \ncourt in Edwards noted, \"[t]he related trial \nright of compulsory process, as provided by \nthe sixth amendment, guarantees that the \ndefendant may compel the attendance of \nwitnesses in his favor.\" Edwards, 430 \nA.2d at 1338 (emphasis added). \nH. \n(41 Gaviria and Echeverry next contend \nthat the district court erred in failing to \nconduct a de novo hearing to fully review \nthe magistrate's detention order which was \nbased merely on proffers of evidence. The \ndistrict court's order, however, expressly \nstates that it affirmed the magistrate's or-\nder after reviewing \"the Government's and \nDefendants' Memorandum of Law and the \ntranscript of the proceedings before the \nMagistrate, in accordance with U.S. v. Hur-\ntado, 779 F.2d 14\n... [truncated, 3549 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/89 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=89]", "char_count": 3549}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "Page 1 of 13 \nwestjaw. \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \nC U.S. A Angiulo \nC.A. ass.,1985. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,First Cir-\ncuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, \nv. \nGennaro J. ANGIULO, Defendant, Appel-\nlant. \nNo. 84-1745. \nHeard Jan. 10, 1985. \nDecided Feb. 25, 1985. \nAn accused sought release from pretrial \ndetention. The United States District Court \nfor the District of Massachusetts, David S. \nNelson, J., applying the Bail Reform Act of \n1984, ordered that accused remain in cus-\ntody. Accused appealed on ground that the \nBail Reform Act did not apply to one like \nhim whom Government had charged before \nAct took effect. The Court of Appeals, \nBreyer, Circuit Judge, held that standards \nof the Bail Reform Act were applicable to \none who was incarcerated and seeking re-\nlease when Act became law. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnotes \n(11 Bail 49 C=39 \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k39 k. Nature and Scope of Rem-\nedy. Most Cited Cases \nStandards of the Bail Reform Act were ap-\nplicable to one who was incarcerated and \nseeking release when Act became law. 18 \nU.S.C.A. § 3141 et seq. \n[2J Bail 49 0=49(3.1) \nPage 1 \n49 Bail \n4911 In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k49 Proceedings to Admit to Bail \n49k49(3) Evidence \n49k49(3.1) k. In \nGeneral. \nMost Cited Cases \n(Formerly 49k49(3)) \nDistrict court could rely on evidence ob-\ntained by electronic surveillance, legality \nof which accused challenged, in consider-\ning whether to grant bail under Bail Re-\nform Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3141 et seq. \n131 Bail 49 €=49(3.1) \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k49 Proceedings to Admit to Bail \n49k49(3) Evidence \n49k49(3.1) \nk. In \nGeneral. \nMost Cited Cases \n(Formerly 49k49(3)) \nMaterials under seal offered legally suffi-\ncient basis for district court to conclude un-\nder the Bail Reform Act that no condition \nor combination of conditions imposed on \nrelease of accused would reasonably assure \nsafety of any other person and the com-\nmunity. 18 U.S.\n... [truncated, 2597 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/90 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=90]", "char_count": 2597}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Page 2 of 13 \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \nBREYER, Circuit Judge. \nThe district court, applying the Bail Re-\nform Act of 1984, found that the release of \nGennaro Anguilo from pretrial detention \nwould put at risk the \"safety\" of the com-\nmunity, and it ordered that he remain in \ncustody. Anguilo appeals, on the ground \nthat the new Bail Reform Act does not ap-\nply to one like him whom the government \nhad charged before the new Act took ef-\nfect. Since we do not agree with this claim, \nsince Anguilo makes no significant consti-\ntutional challenge to the new statute on this \nappeal, and since we find that the district \ncourt's order has sufficient evidentiary sup-\nport, we affirm the district court's decision. \nI \nThe basic procedural facts are the follow-\ning. On September 19, 1983, a grand jury \ncharged appellant with several serious fed-\neral crimes. On September 20, the govern-\nment brought appellant before a magistrate, \nwho ordered him held without bail lest he \nflee the jurisdiction-a decision that the dis-\ntrict court affirmed. In early January, 1984, \nthis court upheld the lawfulness of appel-\nlant's pretnal confinement, finding the \nevidence of risk of flight sufficient to make \nthis a \"rare case of extreme and unusual \nl e\ncircumstances that justifies pretrial \nten-\ntion without bail.\" United States \nAn-\nguilo, No. 83-1965 (1st ir. Jan. 5, 984), \nquoting United States \nAbrahams, 575 \nF.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.), cer. *970 denied,439 \nU.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 85, 58 L.Ed.2d 112 \n(1978). \nDuring 1984 appellant first asked the ma-\ngistrate and then twice asked the district \ncourt to reconsider his circumstances. See \nBail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. former \n§§ 3146(d) and 3147(a). On October 9, \n1984, the district court wrote that it was \nPage 2 \n\"prepared to order\" that appellant be re-\nleased under conditions \"tantamount to \nhouse arrest\"; and, it asked the government \nto suggest appropriate safeguards. In re-\nTonse, the government noted that th\n... [truncated, 3516 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/91 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=91]", "char_count": 3516}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "Page 3 of 13 \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(ate as: 755 F.2d 969) \nFirst, courts often turn to various \"canons\" \nof construction to interpret statutes that are \nsilent or ambiguous. See generally, e.g., C. \nSands, Statutes and Statutory Construction \n(4th ed. 1984); R. Dickerson, The Inter-\npretation and Application of Statutes \n(1975). One such canon, relevant here, in-\nterprets new statutes and other new law to \nreflect an intent to apply to cases in the \nprocess of being decided at the time the \nnew law takes effect. This canon, or prin-\nciple, is reflected in Chief Justice Mar-\nshall's well known statement that, \nif subsequent to the judgment and before \nthe decision of the appellate court, a law \nintervenes and positively changes the rule \nwhich governs, the law must be obeyed.... \nUnited States t Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 \nCranch) 102, \n9, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801). This \nprinciple is embodied in the Supreme \nCourts holding that a new law applies to a \ncase in progress unless applying it \"would \nresult in manifest injustice or there is stat-\nutory direction or illative history to the \ncontrary.\" Bradley \nRichmond School \nBoard, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, \n2016, 40 L.Ed.2 \n476 (1974); New Eng-\nland Power Co. \nUnited States, 693 F.2d \n239, 244 (1st Cir.982). The case before us \nis one that was pending on October 12. The \ndistrict court had not reached a final de-\ncision about appellant's application for re-\nlease. Since nothing in the new Bail Re-\nform Act or its legislative history says that \nthe Act does not apply, Bradley requires us \nto look to the \"justice\" or \"injustice\" of the \nnew Act's application. \nWe do not believe it \"unjust\" to apply the \nnew Act to those, like appellant, who were \nin custody on October 12, 1984, because \nthose then in custody are unlikely to have \nrelied to their detriment upon the continued \nPage 3 \napplication of prior law. In this respect \nthere is an important difference between \npersons in custody on October 12 and those \nfree o\n... [truncated, 3819 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/92 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=92]", "char_count": 3819}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Page 4 of 13 \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \ntheir legal advisors often refer to well es-\ntablished interpretive principles when pre-\nparing statutory language. A court decision \nconsistent with such a principle is more \nlikely. than its opposite to reflect what con-\ngressional staffs, advisors, witnesses, in-\nterest groups, and legislators themselves \nbelieve will occur despite a legislative his-\ntory that is silent. (In fact, silence may re-\nflect an absence of controversy, not con-\ngressional indifference to the result.) At the \nsame time consistent judicial adherence to \ninterpretive principles eases the task of \ndrafting legislation by pointing to likely fu-\nture interpretive results without requiring \nstatutory language on every point. These \npractical \ninstitutional considerations as \nwell as legal theory recommend adherence \nto Bradley's interpretive rule here. \nSecond, a consideration of the new Act's \nbasic purposes suggests that legislators, \nwith those purposes in mind, would likely \nfavor the Act's application to those in cus-\ntody. CI Mayburg I Secretary of Health \nand Human Services, 740 F.2d 100, 104-07 \n(1st Cir.1984). The Act has at least two ob-\njectives. On the one hand, it seeks to pre-\nvent the \"arbitrary use of high money bail \nas a way to assure a defendant's incarcera-\ntion.\" S.Re(i. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st \nSess. 9-10 1983) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-\nmin.News 184 pp. 1, 11, 12 (\"It has been \nsuggested that pretrial detention under\" \nthe former Bail Act \"is often the result of \nintentional imposition of excessively strin-\ngent release conditions, and in particular \nhigh money bonds\"). See Hearings before \nthe Subcommittee on the Constitution of \nthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th \nCong., 1st Sess. 100, 181, 216-17 (1982). It \ntherefore states explicitly what the prior \nstatute said implicitly, that a \"judicial of-\nficer may not impose a financial condition \nthat results in the pretrial detention of any \nPage 4 \nperson.\"\n... [truncated, 4052 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/93 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=93]", "char_count": 4052}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Page 5 of 13 \n' \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \nto a judicial proceeding already in pro-\ngress. \nIn sum, principles of statutory construction \nresting upon fairness and consideration of \nthe statute's purposes both suggest that \nCongress intended the statute to apply in \ncases like the one before us. \nWe next consider four arguments to the \ncontrary. First, Anguilo points to § 3142(0 \nof the new Act. That section says that the \nmagistrate or judge will decide whether to \ndetain or to release a defendant after a \n\"detention hearing\" which \nshall be held immediately upon the per-\nson's first appearance before the judicial \nofficer unless that person or the attorney \nfor the government seeks a continuance \n[for a maximum of five days and two \ndays respectively]. \nAnguilo points out that this detention \nhearing \ncould \nnot \nhave \nbeen \nheld \n\"immediately\" in the case of a person first \ndetained before the provision became law \n(October 12, 1984). He concludes from this \nfact that the new law was not meant to ap-\nply to such a person. \nThis conclusion, however, rests too much \nupon too little. The object of § 3142(0's \nquoted language is to guarantee a speedy \nbail determination, to prevent the magis-\ntrate or judge from ordering the defendant \ntemporarily detained (seel 8 U.S.C. § \n3142(d)), and then holding the key \"deten-\ntion\" hearing at some much later time. \nS.Rep., supra, at 21-22. The language does \nnot say that if, for some special reason, one \ncannot hold the key hearing \"immediately,\" \nthe entire Act no longer applies. Nor does \nit forbid application of the Act's standards \nat other hearings, say those at which a ma-\ngistrate reconsiders previously ordered in-\nPage 5 \ncarceration. \nWe concede that the way in which § \n3142(c) is to be applied seems slightly con-\nfusing because of an odd procedural omis-\nsion in the new Act. Congress apparently \nhas not enacted an explicit procedural \ncounterpart to § 3146(d) of the former \n1966 Act, which \n... [truncated, 3743 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/94 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=94]", "char_count": 3743}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \nyoke bail'); United States !Black 543 \nF.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.1976) IT]he same \nstatute which explicitly empowers the dis-\ntrict court to impose conditions upon re-\nlease pending appeal, implicitly empowers \nthe court to make such adjustments in those \nconditions as circumstances may necessit-\nate.\"). We conclude that the proceeding un-\nder review is properly characterized from a \nprocedural perspective as such a reconsid-\neration by the district court of its prior de-\ntention order. Regardless, this procedural \nproblem does not help appellant, for the \nquestion remains what standards Congress \nintended a magistrate or court to apply at a \nreconsideration hearing. And for the reas-\nons previously stated, we believe that Con-\ngress wanted (or would have wanted) the \nnew Act's standards applied to one then be-\ning held in custody. \nSecond, the parties point to three recent \ncases deciding similar issues. T \ngovern-\nment notes that in United States \nPayden, \n598 F.Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y.198 , the dis-\ntrict court upheld application o the new \nlaw to a defendant arraigned before Octo-\nber 12. Appellant notes that in two other \ncases the courts denied application of the \nnew Act to persons arraigned before its en-\nacting. In the first of these, however, the \nEleventh Circuit refused per curiam to ap-\nply the new law to persons whose \"release \nwas ordered by the district court before the \nF\nw law became effective.\" United States \nFernandez-Toledo, 749 F.2d 703 (11th \nir.1985) (per curiam). The court ruled the \nnew statute inapplicable because, in its \nview, defendants \"right to bail had already \nvested.\" It treated the appellants as if they \nwere persons free on bail before October \n12. In doing so, it treated them as outside \nthe rationale of this opinion. See pp. \n970-971, supra. And, we therefore do not \nconsider it as conflicting. \nPage 6 of 13 \nPage 6 \nIn United States )1 Mitchell, 600 F.Supp. \n164 (D.Ca1.1985 , a Calif\n... [truncated, 3960 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/95 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=95]", "char_count": 3960}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "' \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \nswer the applicability question. Rather, one \nmust look beneath the word to the func-\ntional considerations that it embodies. And, \ndoing so, for reasons stated at pp. 970-971, \nleads us to conclude that the new Act ap-\nplies here. \nFourth, appellant argues that his case ought \nto be considered like that of a person re-\nleased, not a person in custody, for, he \nsays, the district court had ordered him re-\nleased before October 12. As a practical \nmatter, however, appellant had not been re-\nleased. As a formal matter, the court had \nmade no final decision to release him. \nRather, the new Act became law and was \n*974 brought to the attention of the district \ncourt while it was in the midst of deciding \nwhat to do with appellant's motion for re-\nlease. The court had not ordered appellant's \nrelease. On October 9, the court said it was \n\"prepared\" to do so; it later characterized \nits decision as \"tentative\"; and it spoke in \nits October 23 memorandum of its previous \n\"intention.\" On January 9, 1985, the court \ncharacterized its decision as one made in \nongoin motion for modific-\nation.\ni\nresponse to an \nUnited States \nZannino, Cr. No. \ni\n83-235-N, slip op. at \nn. 1 (D.Mass. Jan. \n9, 1985). Moreover, a release order by the \ndistrict court would have been appealable \nunder § 3145, and therefore not \"final\" in \nthis additional sense. Thus, both formal \nand practical considerations require us to \ntreat this case as one involving the applica-\ntion of the new Bail Act's standards to one \npresently in custody. And for the reasons \nstated, the Act's new standards apply. \nIII \n[2] Appellant argues that, even if the new \nAct applies, the government has not proved \nby the \"clear and convincing\" evidence \nthat the Act requires that he poses a danger \nPage 7 of 13 \nPage 7 \nto \"the safety of any other person and the \ncommunity.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(£). He first \nclaims that the district court could not rely \non the evidence obtain\n... [truncated, 3850 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/96 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=96]", "char_count": 3850}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Page 8 of 13 \n• \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(ate as: 755 F.2d 969) \nthe risks appellant poses to others in the \ncommunity are precisely the same whether \nor not he is detained. In any event, we are \nunwilling to assume it meant this in the ab-\nsence of a showing in the record that the \ncourt focused directly on the issue that ap-\npellant's counsel now raises. \nAgain we note that appellant does not now \nchallenge the basic constitutionality of the \nnew Act's \"dangerousness\" provisions. On \nthe basis of our resolution of the issues he \nhas presented to us on this appeal, we be-\nlieve the district court's decision is legally \ncorrect, and that decision is \nAffirmed. \nAPPENDIX \n18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 , 3145 \n\"§ 3142 . Release or detention of a de-\nfendant pending trial \n\"(a) In General.-Upon the appearance be-\nfore a judicial officer of a person charged \nwith an offense, the judicial officer shall is-\nsue an order that, pending trial, the person \nbe-\n\"(1) released on his personal recogni-\nzance or upon execution of an unsecured \n*975 appearance bond, pursuant to the \nprovisions of subsection (b); \n\"(2) released on a condition or combin-\nation of conditions pursuant to the provi-\nsions of subsection (c); \n\"(3) temporarily detained to permit re-\nvocation of conditional release, deporta-\ntion, or exclusion pursuant to the provi-\nsions of subsection (d); or \nPage 8 \n\"(4) detained pursuant to the provisions \nof subsection (e). \n\"(b) Release on Personal Recognizance or \nUnsecured Appearance Bond.-The judicial \nofficer shall order the pretrial release of the \nperson on his personal recognizance, or \nupon execution of an unsecured appearance \nbond in an amount specified by the court, \nsubject to the condition that the person not \ncommit a Federal, State, or local crime dur-\ning the period of his release, unless the ju-\ndicial officer determines that such release \nwill not reasonably assure the appearance \nof the person as required or will endanger \nthe safety of any other person or\n... [truncated, 3181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/97 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=97]", "char_count": 3181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "• \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \npose a danger to the safety of any other \nperson or the community; \n\"(B) maintain employment, or, if un-\nemployed, actively seek employment; \n\"(C) maintain or commence an educa-\ntional program; \n\"(D) abide by specified restrictions \non his personal associations, place of \nabode, or travel; \n\"(E) avoid all contact with an alleged \nvictim of the crime and with a potential \nwitness who may testify concerning the \noffense; \n\"(F) report on a regular basis to a des-\nignated law enforcement agency, pretri-\nal services agency, or other agency; \n\"(G) comply with a specified curfew; \n\"(H) refrain from possessing a fire-\narm, destructive device, or other dan-\ngerous weapon; \n\"(I) refrain from excessive use of al-\ncohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or \nother controlled substance, as defined \nin section 102 of the Controlled Sub-\nstances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), without a \nprescription by a licensed medical prac-\ntitioner; \n\"(J) undergo available medical or \npsychiatric treatment including treat-\nment for drug or alcohol dependency, \nand remain in a specified institution if \nrequired for that purpose; \n\"(K) execute an agreement to forfeit \nupon failing to appear as required, such \ndesignated property, including money, \nas is reasonably necessary to assure the \nappearance of the person as required, \nPage 9 of 13 \nPage 9 \nand post with the court such indicia of \nownership of the property or such per-\ncentage of the money as the judicial of-\nficer may specify; \n\"(L) execute a bail bond with solvent \nsureties in such amount as is reasonably \nnecessary to assure the appearance of \nthe person as required; \n\"(M) return to custody for specified \nhours following release for employ-\nment, schooling, or other limited pur-\nposes; and \n*976 \"(N) satisfy any other condition \nthat is reasonably necessary to assure \nthe appearance of the person as re-\nquired and to assure the safety of any \nother person and the community. \nThe judicial offic\n... [truncated, 2860 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/98 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=98]", "char_count": 2860}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "Page 10 01'13 \n• \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \n\"(iii) probation or parole for any of-\nfense under Federal, State, or local law; \nor \n\"(B) is not a citizen of the United \nStates or lawfully admitted for perman-\nent residence, as defined in section \n101(0(20) of the Immigration and Na-\ntionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)); and \n\"(2) the person may flee or pose a \ndanger to any other person or the com-\nmunity; \nhe shall order the detention of the person, \nfor a period of not more than ten days, ex-\ncluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, \nand direct the attorney for the Government \nto notify the appropriate court, probation or \nparole official, or State or local law en-\nforcement official, or the appropriate offi-\ncial of the Immigration and Naturalization \nService. If the official fails or declines to \ntake the person into custody during that \nperiod, the person shall be treated in ac-\ncordance with the other provisions of this \nsection, notwithstanding the applicability \nof other provisions of law governing re-\nlease pending trial or deportation or exclu-\nsion proceedings. If temporary detention is \nsought under paragraph (1)(B), the person \nhas the burden of proving to the court that \nhe is a citizen of the United States or is \nlawfully admitted for permanent residence. \n\"(e) Detention.-If, after a hearing pursuant \nto the provisions of subsection (0, the judi-\ncial officer finds that no condition or com-\nbination of conditions will reasonably as-\nsure the appearance of the person as re-\nquired and the safety of any other person \nand the community, he shall order the de-\ntention of the person prior to trial. In a \ncase described in (f)(1), a rebuttable pre-\nsumption arises that no condition or coin-\nPage 10 \nbination of conditions will reasonably as-\nsure the safety of any other person and the \ncommunity if the judge finds that-\n\"(1) the person has been convicted of a \nFederal offense that is described in sub-\nsection (0(1), or of a State o\n... [truncated, 3586 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/99 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=99]", "char_count": 3586}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "Page 11 of 13 \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \nother person and the community in a case-\n\"(1) upon motion of the attorney for the \nGovernment, that involves-\n\"(A) a crime of violence; \n\"(B) an offense for which the maxim-\num sentence is life imprisonment or \ndeath; \n\"(C) an offense for which a maximum \nterm of imprisonment of ten years or \nmore is prescribed in the Controlled \nSubstances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), \nthe Controlled Substances Import and \nExport Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or \nsection 1 of the Act of September 15, \n1980 (21 U.S.C. 955a); or \n\"(D) any felony committed after the \nperson had been convicted of two or \nmore prior offenses described in sub-\nparagraphs (A) through (C), or two or \nmore State or local offenses that would \nhave been offenses described in sub-\nparagraphs (A) through (C) if a circum-\nstance giving rise to Federal jurisdic-\ntion had existed; or \n\"(2) Upon motion of the attorney for \nthe Government or upon the judicial of-\nficer's own motion, that involves-\n\"(A) a serious risk that the person \nwill flee; \n\"(B) a serious risk that the person will \nobstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, \nor threaten, injure, or intimidate, or at-\ntempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, \na prospective witness or juror. \nThe hearing shall be held immediately \nupon the person's first appearance before \nthe judicial officer unless that person, or \nthe attorney for the Government, seeks a \nPage 11 \ncontinuance. Except for good cause, a con-\ntinuance on motion of the person may not \nexceed five days, and continance on mo-\ntion of the attorney for the Government \nmay not exceed three days. During a con-\ntinuance, the person shall be detained, and \nthe judicial officer, on motion of the attor-\nney for the Government or on his own mo-\ntion, may order that, while in custody, a \nperson who appears to be a narcotics addict \nreceive a medical examination to determine \nwhether he is an addict. At the hearing, the \nperson has the right to\n... [truncated, 3419 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/100 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=100]", "char_count": 3419}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "Page 12 of 13 \n• \n' \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \na narcotic drug; \n\"(2) the weight of the evidence against \nthe person; \n\"(3) the history and characteristics of \nthe person, including-\n\"(A) his character, physical and men-\ntal condition, family ties, employment, \nfinancial resources, length of residence \nin the community, community ties, past \nconduct, history relating to drug or al-\ncohol abuse, criminal history, and re-\ncord concerning appearance at court \nproceedings; and \n*978 \"(B) whether, at the time of the \ncurrent offense or arrest, he was on pro-\nbation, or parole, or on other release \npending trial, sentencing, appeal, or \ncompletion of sentence for an offense \nunder Federal, State, or local law; and \n\"(4) the nature and seriousness of the \ndanger to any person or the community \nthat would be posed by the person's re-\nlease. In considering the conditions of re-\nlease described in subsection (c)(2)(K) or \n(cX2)(L), the judicial officer may upon \nhis own motion, or shall upon the motion \nof the Government, conduct an inquiry \ninto the source of the property to be des-\nignated for potential forfeiture or offered \nas collateral to secure a bond, and shall \ndecline to accept the designation, or the \nuse as collateral, of property that, be-\ncause of its source, will not reasonably \nassure the appearance of the person as re-\nquired. \n\"(h) Contents of Release Order.-In a re-\nlease order issued pursuant to the provi-\nsions of subsection (b) or (c), the judicial \nofficer shall-\n\"(1) include a written statement that \nPage 12 \nsets forth all the conditions to which the \nrelease is subject, in a manner suffi-\nciently clear and specific to serve as a \nguide for the person's conduct; and \n\"(2) advise the person of-\n\"(A) the penalties for violating a con-\ndition of release, including the penalties \nfor committing an offense while on pre-\ntrial release; \n\"(B) the consequences of violating a \ncondition of release, including the im-\nmediate issuance \n... [truncated, 3142 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/101 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=101]", "char_count": 3142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "Page 13 of 13 \n• \n755 F.2d 969 \n755 F.2d 969 \n(Cite as: 755 F.2d 969) \n\"(4) direct that, on order of a court of \nthe United States or on request of an at-\ntorney for the Government, the person \nin charge of the corrections facility in \nwhich the person is confined deliver the \nperson to a United States marshal for \nthe purpose of an appearance in con-\nnection with a court proceeding. \nThe judicial officer may, by subsequent or-\nder, permit the temporary release of the \nperson, in the custody of a United States \nmarshal or another appropriate person, to \nthe extent that the judicial officer determ-\nines such release to be necessary for pre-\nparation of the person's defense or for an-\nother compelling reason. \n\"(1) Presumption of Innocence.-Nothing in \nthis section shall be construed as modify-\ning or limiting the presumption of inno-\ncence. \n\"§ 3145. Review and appeal of a release \nor detention order \n\"(a) Review of a Release Order.-If a person \nis ordered released by a magistrate, or by a \nperson other than a judge of a court having \noriginal jurisdiction over the offense and \nother than a Federal appellate court-\n\"(1) the attorney for the Government \nmay file with the court having original \njurisdiction over the offense, a motion for \nrevocation of the order or amendment of \nthe conditions of release, and \n\"(2) the person may file, with the court \nhaving original jurisdiction over the of-\nfense,*979 a motion for amendment of \nthe conditions of release. \nThe motion shall be determined promptly. \n\"(b) Review of a Detention Order.-If a per-\nson is ordered detained by a magistrate, or \nPage 13 \nby a person other than a judge of a court \nhaving original jurisdiction over the of-\nfense and other than a Federal appellate \ncourt, the person may file, with the court \nhaving original jurisdiction over the of-\nfense, a motion for revocation or amend-\nment of the order. The motion shall be de-\ntermined promptly. \n\"(c) Appeal From a Release or Detention \nOrder.-An appeal from a\n... [truncated, 2469 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/102 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=102]", "char_count": 2469}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "Page 1 of 10 \nw estlaw\n761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nH \nU.S. II. Zannino \nC.A. (Mass.),1985. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,First Cir-\ncuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, \nAppellant, \nv. \nIlario M.A. ZANNINO, Defendant, Ap-\npellee. \nNo. 85-1070. \nArgued March 8, 1985. \nDecided May 3, 1985. \nUnited States appealed from an order of the \nUnited States District Court for the District \nof Massachusetts, David S. Nelson, J., \ndenying its motion to revoke bail of de-\nfendant and to detain him pursuant to the \nBail Reform Act. The Court of Appeals, \nTorruella, Circuit Judge, held that provi-\nsions of Bail Reform Act on pretrial deten-\ntion and bail revocation were applicable to \na defendant released on bail before effect-\nive date of Act where defendant's expecta-\ntion of remaining free on bail was both \nminimal, in view of emphatic statement of \nmagistrate, upon both granting motion for \nbail under earlier law and denying Govern-\nments motion for revocation of bail, that \nhe found defendant to be a danger to com-\nmunity and that he would detain defendant \nif he had a legal mechanism by which to do \nso, and outweighed by public interest in \nprotection from demonstrably dangerous \ndefendants. \nReversed. \nBreyer, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed \nan opinion. \nWest Headnotes \nPage 1 \nBail 49 C=39 \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k39 k. Nature and Scope of Rem-\nedy. Most Cited Cases \nProvisions of Bail Reform Act on pretrial \ndetention and bail revocation were applic-\nable to a defendant released on bail before \neffective date of Act where defendant's ex-\npectation of remaining free on bail was \nboth minimal, in view of emphatic state-\nment of magistrate, upon both granting mo-\ntion for bail under earlier law and denying \nGovernment's motion for revocation of \nbail, that he found defendant to be a danger \nto community and that he would detain de-\nfendant if he had a legal mechanism by \nwhich to do so, and outweighed by public \ninterest i\n... [truncated, 2896 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/103 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=103]", "char_count": 2896}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nMassachusetts of its motion to revoke the \nbail of defendant/appellee Ilario M.A. Zan-\nnino and to detain him, after hearing, pur-\nsuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, spe-\ncifically \n18 \nU.S.C. \n§ 3142(e) \nand \n3148(b).FN1 \nFNI. Section 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) \nprovides: \nDETENTION.-If, after a hearing \npursuant to the provisions of sub-\nsection (f), the judicial officer \nfinds that no condition or combin-\nation of conditions will reason-\nably assure the appearance of the \nperson as required and the safety \nof any other person and the com-\nmunity, he shall order the deten-\ntion of the person prior to trial. In \na case described in (t)(1), a rebut-\ntable presumption arises that no \ncondition or combination of con-\nditions will reasonably assure the \nsafety of any other person and the \ncommunity if the judge finds that-\n11) the person has been con-\nvicted of a Federal offense that is \ndescribed in subsection (f)(1), or \nof a State or local offense that \nwould have been an offense de-\nscribed in subsection (f)(1) if a \ncircumstance giving rise to Feder-\nal jurisdiction had existed; \n\"(2) the offense described in para-\ngraph (1) was committed while \nthe person was on release pending \ntrial for a Federal, State, or local \noffense; and \n\"(3) a period of not more than five \nyears has elapsed since the date of \nconviction, or the release of the \nperson from imprisonment, for the \nPage 2 of 10 \nPage 2 \noffense described \nin \nparagraph \n(1), whichever is later. Subjject to \nrebuttal by the person, it shall be \npresumed that no condition or \ncombination of conditions will \nreasonably assure the appearance \nof the person as required and the \nsafety of the community if the ju-\ndicial officer finds that there is \nprobable cause to believe that the \nperson committed an offense for \nwhich a maximum term of impris-\nonment of ten years or more is \nprescribed in the Controlled Sub-\nstances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et \nseq.), the Controlled Sub\n... [truncated, 3057 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/104 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=104]", "char_count": 3057}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "Page 3 of 10 \n761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nbefore the judicial officer who \nordered the release and whose or-\nder is alleged to have been viol-\nated. The judicial officer shall \nenter an order of revocation and \ndetention if, after a hearing, the \njudicial officer-\n\"(1) finds that there is-\n\"(A) probable cause to believe \nthat the person has committed a \nFederal, State, or local crime \nwhile on release; or \n\"(B) clear and convincing evid-\nence that the person has violated \nany other condition of his release; \nand \n\"(2) fords that-\n\"(A) based on the factors set forth \nin section 3142(g), there is no \ncondition or combination of con-\nditions of release that will assure \nthat the person will not flee or \npose a danger to the safety of any \nother person or the community; or \n\"(B) the person is unlikely to \nabide by any condition or combin-\nation of conditions of release. \nIf there is probable cause to be-\nlieve that, while on release, the \nperson \ncommitted \na \nFederal, \nState, or local felony, a rebuttable \npresumption arises that no condi-\ntion or combination of conditions \nwill assure that the person will not \npose a danger to the safety of any \nother person or the community. If \nthe judicial officer finds that there \nare conditions of release that will \nassure that the person will not flee \nor pose a danger to the safety of \nPage 3 \nany other person or the com-\nmunity, and that the person will \nabide by such conditions, he shall \ntreat the person in accordance \nwith the provisions of section \n3142 and may amend the condi-\ntions of release accordingly.\" \n*54 On September 19, 1983, a federal \ngrand jury returned a twenty count indict-\nment against Zannino and six others. The \ncharges related to murders, gambling, and \nother illegal acts. When first brought be-\nfore the magistrate on September 20, 1983, \nZannino was ordered held without bail on \nthe grounds that no conditions of pretrial \nrelease would reasonably assure his ap-\npearance at trial. E\n... [truncated, 3284 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/105 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=105]", "char_count": 3284}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 106, "text_content": ".761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nder the 1984 Act was grounds for revoca-\ntion of bail. 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b) (1984). \nThe magistrate denied the motion, finding \nthat the 1984 Act did not apply to pending \ncases in which the defendant was already \nreleased on bail. In his order, however, he \nonce again reiterated his conclusion that no \ncondition or combination of conditions \ncould reasonably assure the safety \"of any \nother person\" or the community in the ab-\nsence of Zannino's pretrial detention. The \nmagistrate's denial was thereafter affirmed \nby the district court and the government \nappealed. Thus, the specific issue before us \nis \nwhether \nSections \n3142(e), \nwhich \nprovides for the pretrial detention, and \n3148(b), which provides for bail revoca-\ntion, apply to a defendant released on bail \nprior to the effective date of the 1984 en-\nactmentsim \nFN2. Inasmuch as the constitution-\nality of a retrospective application \nof the 1984 Act is not now being \nchallenged, the case must turn on \nthe intent of Congress. \nThe Supreme Court has held that the feder-\nal courts must apply the law in effect at the \ntime it renders its decision, unless doing so \nwould result in manifest injustice *55 or \nwhere there is clear statutory direction or \ngislative history to the contrary. Bradley \nRichmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, \n11, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, \nL.Ed.2d 476 \n(1974). See United States \nGennaro J. \nAngiulo, 755 F.2d 969, 970 1st Cir.198 \n(Breyer, J.); New England \nower Co.\nUnited States, 693 F.2d 239, 244 (1st \nCir.1982). Furthermore, and more to the \npoint, it is clear that the conditions under \nwhich a defendant is originally released on \nbail are subject to review when changed \ncircumstances require that the release be \nreappraised. \nPage 4 of 10 \nPage 4 \nThat the decision releasing Zannino was \nnot unalterable and, even as originally is-\nsued, was subject to revision at any time \nprior to trial, is particularly, evidenced by \nthe text of the section \n... [truncated, 3718 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/106 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=106]", "char_count": 3718}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "Page 5 of 10 \n761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \na stronger argument to support his conten-\ntion that the pretrial detention provisions \ndid not apply to his case. Id. By positing \nthis hypothetical, we were not creating a \nhard and fast rule. Closer examination, \nwithin the context of an actual case and \ncontroversy, does not support this excep-\ntion to the retroactivity of the new Act. \nSection 3146(e) of the 1966 Act clearly \nstates that conditions of the release can be \nchanged, and that the inability to meet such \nconditions could require the return to cus-\ntody. Thus the release on bail allowed un-\nder the 1966 Act was not an absolute grant; \ndefendants were given notice that a change \nin conditions or terms could bring about \nthe revocation of the release. That statute, \nfurthermore, created no expectation that \nconditions would not change. \nWhat has actually occurred with the pas-\nsage of the pretrial detention provision \nmay be considered a statutorily mandated \nchange in those conditions. That is, under \nSection 3142(e) of the 1984 Act, for a de-\nfendant to be eligible for pretrial bail, he \nmust be able in certain instances to rebut \nthe presumption that no condition or com-\nbination of conditions will reasonably as-\nsure the safety of \"any other person and the \ncommunity.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). We hold \nthat defendants released under the 1966 \nBail Act must show their continued eligib-\nility for bail by meeting the newly imposed \nconditions if this issue is affirmatively \nraised by the Government. \nMoreover, in the case at bar, Zannino had \nfurther indication of possible revocation of \nbail in that the magistrate, upon both grant-\ning the motion for bail and denying the \ngovernment's motion for revocation of bail, \nemphatically stated that he found the ap-\npellee to be a danger to the community and \nthat, had a legal mechanism by which he \nPage 5 \ncould detain Zannino existed, he would \nhave done so. This clearly constituted no-\ntice*56 to \n... [truncated, 3873 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/107 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=107]", "char_count": 3873}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n' \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \npriate decisions regarding the release of \nsuch defendants.\" This is strong talk, \ncouched in a sense of legislative urgency. \nIt is inconceivable to us that, in the face of \nsuch concerns, the Congress meant for the \ncourts to temporize in the application of the \npretrial release provisions of the 1984 Act \nby interdicting the use of such detention \npowers in any suitable case, whether or not \nthe accused had previously been released \nunder the more relaxed criteria of the 1966 \nAct. The legislative history, fairly read, \nrepresents a clear statutory directive favor-\ning applicability of the new pretrial release \nscheme across the board. Indeed, the basic \npurposes of the new Act, as we delineated \nthem in Angiulo, at 971-972, lead to the \nsame conclusion. \nThe statistics cited by our dissenting broth-\ner are similarly unconvincing. The small-\nness of the potentially affected group is \ntransmutable: it can be used just as power-\nfully to argue for, as against, the applicab-\nility of the 1984 Act. Neither this conten-\ntion nor its corollary-ease in judicial ad-\nministration-therefore cuts much ice. Even \na single dangerous defendant left free to \nwreak havoc under circumstances where \npretrial detention is constitutionally per-\nmissible and legally appropriate is one \nmenace too many; and, if the price of pro-\ntecting the public is more work for already \novertaxed judges, it is a small price to pay \nfor the wellbeing of the community. \nFinding that, under the circumstances of \nthis case, the defendant's expectation to re-\nmain free on bail is minimal, and is clearly \noutweighed by the public interest in protec-\ntion from demonstrably dangerous defend-\nants and that his professed reliance on lim-\nitless future liberty up to the date of his tri-\nal was, in these circumstances, unjustified, \nwe conclude that under the Bradley and \nPage 6 of 10 \nPage 6 \nNew England Power Co. standards, Sec-\ntions 3142(e) and 3148(b) a\n... [truncated, 3887 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/108 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=108]", "char_count": 3887}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "Page 7 of 10 \n761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nThe decision of the district court is re-\nversed. \nBREYER, Circuit Judge (dissenting). \nThe issue in this case is whether the provi-\nsion of the new Bail Act that provides for \ndetention of \"dangerous\" persons, 18 \nU.S.C. § 3142(0, applies to a person \nalready released on bail the day the new \nAct was passed (October 12, 1984). This \ncourt has previously suggested (though it \ndid not expressly hold) that Congress did \nnot intend this provision of the Act to \nsla\nap-\nply, in a sense \"retr ctively,\" to those \npersons. United States \nAnguilo, 755 F.2d \n969, 970 (1st Cir.198 . I believe the sug-\ngestion is correct for the following reasons. \nFirst, it is \"manifestly unfair\" to apply the \nnew detention provision to those released \nb ore \non bail b ore the new law was passed. See \nBradley \nRichmond School Board, 416 \nU.S. 69 , 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 \nL.Ed.2d 476 (1974). Magistrates and \njudges specifically gave those defendants \ntheir provisional freedom. The defendants \nin all likelihood relied on the fact that (in \nthe absence of misbehavior) they would re-\nmain free to prepare their trial defense, to \ninterview witnesses, to consult with their \nattorneys. Trials, for most members of this \nclass, must be imminent. Application of the \nnew standard to members of this class \nthreatens to interfere severely with ongoing \ndefense preparations, not only because it \nmay place a defendant behind bars just be-\nfore trial, but also because even appearance \nat a bail revocation hearing, at this stage in \nthe new Act's life, involves briefing and ar-\nguing a host of novel and difficult legal is-\nsues, threatening significantly to divert \ncounsel's and client's attention and energies \naway from the trial on the merits nearly at \nhand. This burden, along with the likely \nsurprise, adds up to a serious, adverse in-\nPage 7 \nI\nterference with a settled expec lion. That \nmeans \"unfairness.\" See Myers \nHawkins, \n362 So.\n... [truncated, 3854 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/109 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=109]", "char_count": 3854}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "Page 8 of 10 \n'761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \n(11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (holding that \nsuch persons have rights that have \"vested\" \nand that \"it would be manifestly unjust\" to \nply the new Act to them); United States \nMitchell, \n600 \nF.Supp. \n164 \n.D.Ca1.1985) (\"Congress apparently did \nnot contemplate that individuals released \npursuant to [the old Act] would be subject \nto sanctions gilder [the new Act].\"); see \nUnited States I Payden, 759 F.2d 202 (2d \nCir.1985) (reversing district court decision \nordering detention, under provisions of the \nnew Bail Act, of defendant whose release \nhad been ordered pursuant to provisions of \nthe old Bail Act). Even were I less con-\nvinced of the correctness of Anvil°, I \nwould hesitate to create a split in the cir-\ncuits over this particular legal issue. \nFourth, there is additional support in the \nlanguage of the new Bail Act itself. The \nnew Act does not contain a provision that \nallows the government to recall a defend-\nant solely for the purpose of applying the \nnew, stricter standard of release. The new \nAct (like the old) does provide for recon-\nsideration and modification of release con-\nditions, see§ 3142(c) (allowing imposition \nof \"additional or different conditions of re-\nlease\"), but this provision does not author-\nize a \"modification\" that changes a release \norder into an unconditional detention or-\nder. The new Act also permits the govern-\nment to seek bail revocation, see§ 3148, \nbut only if the government can show that \nthe defendant has violated his release con-\nditions. Of course, there is substantial au-\nthority for the proposition that courts have \nan \"inherent power\" to revoke bail when \nnecessary to insure the defendant's appear-\nance \n'\n or to protect the integrity o he judi-\ncial process. See, e.g., Carbo \nUnited \nStates, 82 S.Ct. 662, 667-69, 7 L. \n.2d 769 \n(Douglas, Circuit Justice) (prof tion of \nwitnesses) (1962); Fernandez \nUnited \nPage 8 \nStates, 81 S.Ct. 642, 5 L.Ed.2d 683 (19\n... [truncated, 3937 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/110 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=110]", "char_count": 3937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "Page 9 of 10 \n761 F.2d 52 \n• \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nerns that circumstance or person, whether \nor not the new law \"expressly\" repeals the \nold law as of a certain date. Thus, for ex-\nample, Congress has repealed the Youth \nCorrections Act as of October 12, 1984, \nsee*59Pub.L. No. 98473, Title II, § \n218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (1984), but, \nas the Department of Justice has recog-\nnized, it may be unconstitutional under the \nex post facto clause to apply certain por-\ntions of Congress's substitute to certain de-\nfendants who committed crimes prior to \nthat date. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Hand-\nbook on the Comprehensive Crime Control \nAct of 1984 and Other Criminal Statutes \nEnacted by the 98th Congress 32 (1984). \nAs to those persons, the Department says, \n1\nthe old (repealed) law wi still apply. Id. \nSee also United States \nRomero, 596 \nF.Supp. 446 (D.N.M.1984 . A similar ap-\nproach in this case is in accord with well \nestablished lel \nprecedent. See, \ne.g., \nUnited States \nPayden, supra (holding \nthat defendant's bail status should be de-\ntermined under provisions of old Bail Act, \neven after its repeal, where bail application \nhad first been considered under provisio \nof old Act); United States Gypsum Co. . \nUhlhorn, \n232 \nF.Supp. \n994, \n1 \n(E.D.Ark.1964), aff'd,366 F.2d 211 (8th \nCir.I966), cert. denied,385 U.S. 1026, \nS.Ct. 753, 17 L.Ed.2d 674 (1967); State\nMcMillin, 150 Cob. 23, 370 P.2d 435 \n1962) (en bane); In re Opinion of the \nJustices, 1 N.H. 563, 198 A. 249 (1938); \nWaddell \nMamat, 271 Wis. 176, 72 \nN.W.2d 7 \n(1955); see generally82 C.J.S. \nStatutes § 435 at 1010-11 (1953). Thus, to \nhold that Congress did not intend to apply \nthe \"dangerous person\" provision retroact-\nively does not create a legal vacuum. \nThe government also argues that it is not \nunfair to apply the new provision to this \nparticular defendant because he did not in \nPage 9 \nfact rely upon guarantees of continued \nfreedom. It does not make sense here, \nhowever, to appl\n... [truncated, 3924 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/111 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=111]", "char_count": 3924}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "Page 10 of 10 \n'761 F.2d 52 \n761 F.2d 52 \n(Cite as: 761 F.2d 52) \nFinally, the majority points to a provision \nin the former 1966 law that allows a magis-\ntrate to impose \"additional or different con-\nditions of release\" upon a person free on \nbail. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § \n3146(e), repealed by Bail Reform Act of \n1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). The majority \nthinks the existence of this provision \nmakes it more fair to apply the new law \nretroactively to those already free on bail. \nI \ndisagree, basically because a new \n\"release' condition seems to me very dif-\nferent from an unconditional detention or-\nder. \nFor the foregoing reasons, I believe Con-\ngress did not intend the \"dangerous person \ndetention\" provision of the new Bail Act \nto apply to those already free on bail on \nOctober 12. \nAnd, I would affirm the judgment of the \ndistrict court. \nC.A.).(Mass.),1985. \nU.S. \nZannino \n761 .2d 52 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 10 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?utid=%7bFEDF5709-3AEA-4F74-8619-... 4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191699\n", "char_count": 1108}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "Page 1 of 24 \nWestlaw. \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nU.S. It Affleck \nC.A. ,1985. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Tenth Cir-\ncuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-\nAppellee, \nv. \nGrant C. AFFLECK, Defendant-Appellant. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-\nAppellee, \nv. \nFrank KOWALIK, Jr., Defendant-Appel-\nlant. \nNos. 85-1009, 84-2600. \nMay 24, 1985. \nDefendants challenged \ndenial \nby \nthe \nUnited States District Court for the District \nof Utah, David K. Winder, J., and the \nUnited States District Court for the District \nof Colorado, Zita L. Weinshienk, J., of mo-\ntions for bail pending appeal. After panel \ndenied motions for release pending appeal, \nrehearing en banc was granted, with the \nCourt of Appeals, Holloway, Chief Judge, \nholding that: (1) Bail Reform Act section \nsetting forth standards governing release of \ndefendants on bail pending appeal applied \nto defendants even though they were con-\nvicted before effective date of the Act; (2) \napplication of the new standards to defend-\nants convicted before effective date of the \nAct did not disadvantage them in any way \nprohibited by the ex post facto clause; (3) \ntwo-step analysis for determining whether \nto grant bail pending appeal would be ad-\nopted, though with stricter interpretation of \nwhat constitutes \"substantial\" question of \nlaw or fact than that applied by the Third \nCircuit; and (4) need for a clear record at \ndistrict court hearing warranted partial re-\nPage 1 \nmand. \nCases partially remanded. \nMcKay, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed \nopinion, in which Seymour, Circuit Judge, \njoined, also filing a separate dissenting \nopinion. \nWest Headnotes \nIll Bail 49 C=.44(1) \n49 Bail \n491I In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k41 Right to Release on Bail \n49k44 Pending Appeal or Other \nProceeding for Review \n49k44(1) k. In General; Con-\nditions. Most Cited Cases \nThere is no constitutional right to bail \npending appeal. \n[2] Bail 49 C=39 \n49 Bail \n4911 In Criminal Prosec\n... [truncated, 2666 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/113 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=113]", "char_count": 2666}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nConstitutional Law 92 41:=2810 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92XXIII Ex Post Facto Prohibitions \n92XXIII(B) Particular Issues and \nApplications \n92k2809 Criminal Proceedings \n92k2810 k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \n(Formerly 92k203) \nApplication of new Bail Reform Act [18 \nU.S.C.A. § 3143(b)] standards governing \nrelease of defendants on bail pending ap-\npeal to defendants convicted before effect-\nive date of the Act did not disadvantage de-\nfendants in any way prohibited by the ex \npost facto clause, though the sentences and \nthe district court orders denying bail \npending appeal were entered after that \ndate; the Act introduced significant proced-\nural change, disadvantageous to defend-\nants, but it did not change the quantum of \npunishment \nattached \nto \nthe \ncrimes. \nU.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. \n[4] Bail 49 C=44(4) \n49 Bail \n49II In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k41 Right to Release on Bail \n49k44 Pending Appeal or Other \nProceeding for Review \n49k44(3) Grounds for Grant or \nDenial \n49k44(4) k. Substantiality \nof Grounds for Review; Delay. Most Cited \nCases \nTwo-s \nsis announced in United \ntsp\nStates I \nfor determining whether to \ngrant bail pending appeal under the Bail \nReform Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(b)] would \nbe adopted in the Tenth Circuit, with first \ninquiry \nbeing \nwhether \nappeal \nraises \n\"substantial\" question of law or fact, and, \nsecondly, whether resolution of that ques-\ntion in favor of defendant is likely to result \nPage 2 of 24 \nPage 2 \nin reversal or order for new trial of all \ncounts on which imprisonment has been \nimposed; however, Tenth Circuit will apply \nstricter interpretation of what constitutes \n\"substantiliestion of law or fact than \napplied in \n[5] Bail 49 4=.44(4) \n49 Bail \n49I1 In Criminal Prosecutions \n49k41 Right to Release on Bail \n49k44 Pending Appeal or Other \nProceeding for Review \n49k44(3) Grounds for Grant or \nDenial \n49k44(4) k. Substantiality \nof Grounds for \n... [truncated, 3049 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/114 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=114]", "char_count": 3049}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "Page 3 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \n(Formerly 110k1181.5(3)) \nNeed for a clear record at hearing in the \ndistrict court in order to resolve question \nwhether defendants were entitled to bail \npending appeal under Bail Reform Act [18 \nIJ.S.C. \nU.S.C.A. § 3143(b)] standards warranted \npartial remand for such hearings and recon-\nsideration of denials of motions for bail \npending appeal under standards adopted \nherein. \n*945 A. Brent Carruth, Carruth & Good-\nwin, Van Nuys, Cal. (Eric A. Goodwin, \nCarruth & Goodwin, Van Nuys, Cal., with \nhim on the briefs), for defendant-appellant \nAffleck. \nBrent D. Ward, U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, \nUtah (David Schwendiman, Sp. Asst. U.S. \nAtty., Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on \nthe brief), for plaintiff' appellee U.S. in No. \n85-1009. \nAlbert M. Pearson, University of Georgia \nSchool of Law, Athens, Ga., and Scott \nMcLarty, Athens, Ga. (Cecil Hartman, \nDenver, Cob., with them on the brief), for \ndefendant-appellant, Kowalik. \nThomas M. O'Rourke, Asst. \nAtty., \nDenver, Colo. (Robert N. \nU.S. \nAtty., with him on the brief), \n'ntiff-\nappellee U.S. in No. 84-2600. \nMichael L. Bender, Bender & Treece, and \nJay P.K. Kenney, Denver, Cob., were on \nthe brief in 84-2600 for amicus curiae Nat. \nAss'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers. \nBefore HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and \nSETH, BARRETT, DOYLE, McKAY, LO-\nGAN, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges rte. \nFN* Senior Circuit Judges Seth and \nDoyle, as members of the panel \nwhich initially ruled on defendants' \nmotions for release pending appeal, \nare participating in this en banc de-\nPage 3 \ntermination upon their election and \ndesignation. See28 U.S.C. § 46(c). \nHOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. \nOPINION ON REHEARING EN BANC \nThese separate appeals from the District of \nUtah and the District of Colorado present \nimportant questions under the Bail Reform \nAct of 1984 (\"Act\"), enacted as part of the \nComprehensive Crime Control Act of \n1984, Title II of Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 \nStat.\n... [truncated, 2982 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/115 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=115]", "char_count": 2982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nOn November 16, Affleck was sentenced to \nten years' imprisonment and five years' \nprobation. On November 19, Affleck filed \na notice of appeal. On November 20 the \ndistrict court, in response to Affleck's ex \nparte motion, stayed execution of the sen-\ntence upon filing of the same bond main-\ntained by Affleck during the trial. The dis-\ntrict court found that Affleck posed \"no im-\nmediate threat of fleeing during appeal and \nno immediate danger to society during that \nperiod.\" VIII R. 1438-39. \nOn November 21, the Government filed a \nmotion in the district court to reconsider its \norder staying execution of Affleck's sen-\ntence and ordering his release pending ap-\npeal, or in the alternative, to hold an exped-\nited hearing and to make the findings to \nsupport such an order as required by 18 \n§ 3143(b), as amended by the new \nAct. Section 203(a) of the Act changed the \nstandards governing release of convicted \ndefendants on bail pending appeal. \nUnder former 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146 and 3148, \nconvicted defendants were entitled to re-\nlease on bail pending appeal unless no one \nor more conditions of release would reas-\nonably assure that they would not flee or \npose a danger to any other person or to the \ncommunity, or unless their appeal was \nfrivolous or taken for purpose of delay. \nThe burden was on the Government under \nthe former law to show that the appeal was \nfrivolous and was taken for purpose of \ndelay; the defendant bore the burden of \nshowing he would not flee and was not a \ndanger to any person or the community. \nSee also former Fed.R.App.P. 9(c). The \nAct changed the criteria for release on bail \npending appeal and placed the burden on \nthe convicted defendant to prove that he \nmeets all the new criteria. Current 18 \nU.S.C. § 3143(b) provides as follows: \nPage 4 of 24 \nPage 4 \nRelease or Detention Pending Appeal by \nthe Defendant.-The judicial officer shall \norder that a person who has been fou\n... [truncated, 3780 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/116 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=116]", "char_count": 3780}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nnew criteria of § 3143(b) to deny Affleck \nbail pending appeal did not violate the ex \npost facto clause, even though he would \nhave been entitled to bail under the law in \neffect when the offenses were committed \nand when the guilty verdicts were returned. \nId. at 1491-95. \nB. Kowalik \nDefendant Frank Kowalik, Jr. was con-\nvicted in the District of Colorado on \nSeptember 19, 1984 after a jury trial of two \n*947 counts of willfully failing to file fed-\neral income tax returns in violation of \nI.R.C. § 7203. On November 14 the district \ncourt sentenced Kowalik to one year of im-\nprisonment and a $10,000 fine on each \ncount. The district court on that date also \nordered Kowalik's release pending appeal \nupon filing of a $20,000 bond. The court \nfound that Kowalik did not pose a danger \nto the community and was not likely to \nflee. I IL 123. \nAlso on November 14 Kowalik filed a no-\ntice of appeal and sought release on the ap-\npeal bond, but the magistrate concluded \nthat release was inappropriate absent find-\nings by the district court under § 3143(b). \nKowahk principally argued that he was en-\ntitled to bail pending appeal under the \nformer law. He also contended that he \nraised substantial questions likely to result \nin reversal or an order for a new trial under \nthe new Act. He argued that the trial court \nerred in its instructions because they did \nnot properly treat his defenses of not will-\nfully and knowingly intending a violation \nof the tax law, and that the instructions did \nnot properly cover the effect of evidence \nfrom his character witnesses. After a hear-\ning on November 15, the district court va-\ncated its earlier order permitting Kowalik \nto be released on bail pending appeal. The \nPage 5 of 24 \nPage 5 \ncourt found that Kowalik had established \nby clear and convincing evidence under § \n3143(b)(2) that he was not a threat to any \nother person or to the community and was \nnot likely to fl\n... [truncated, 3449 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/117 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=117]", "char_count": 3449}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nEffective Date and the Ex Post Facto \nClause \nA. Effective date \nAffleck asserts that Congress did not in-\ntend the Bail Reform Act to apply to those \nconvicted of crimes before October 12, \n1984. He relies on cases holding that other \nprovisions of the Bail Reform Act do not \napply to defendants released \nbail before \ngp\nthat date. See United States I Fernandez-\nToledo, 749 F.2d 703 (11th Cir.1985) (§ \n3731, which permits the Government to \nreal order granting bail); United States \nMitchell, 600 F.Supp. 164 (N.D.Ca1.198 \n(§ 3142, which provides for retrial deten-\ntion). But see United States I Anguilo, 755 \nF.2d \n969, \n970-74 \n(1st \nCir.1985) \n(application of pretrial detention provi-\nsions of new Act to a defendant incarcer-\nated and seeking release r October 12). \nAffleck also cites Greene \nUnited States, \n376 U.S. 149, 84 S.Ct. 615, 11 L.Ed.2d 576 \n(1964), and argues that criminal statutes \nlike § 3143(b) should not be given retro-\nspective operation where to do so would \ninterfere with antecedent rights. See also \nFernandez-Toledo, \n749 \nF.2d \nat \n705 \n(defendant released on bail prior to effect-\nive date of the Act had a vested, antecedent \nright to bail). \n*948 [1][2] We are not persuaded by these \ncases that the Act should not apply to a de-\nfendant like Affleck, convicted before Oc-\ntober 12, who seeks bail pending appeal \nafter that date. There is no constitutional \nright to bail \nending appeal. See, e.g., \nUnited States \nProvenzano, 602 F.Supp. \n230, 232 (E.D a.1985); United States a \nrel. Cameron \nNew York, 383 F.Supp. \n182, 183 (E.D. .Y.1974).ms In these cir-\ncumstances, we hold that § 3143(b), in the \nPage 6 of 24 \nPage 6 \nabsence of a showing of congressional in-\ntent to the contrary, became fully effective \non October 12 when the President ap-\nproved the Act. Section 3143(b) therefore \napplies to Affleck even though he was con-\nvicted before the effe 've date of the Act. \nSee United S\n... [truncated, 3528 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/118 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=118]", "char_count": 3528}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 9441 \nprescribed; or changes the rules of evid-\nence by which less or different testimony is \nsufficient to convig than was then \n1\nre-\nquired.\" Cummins I Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 \nWall.) 277, 325- , 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867); \nsee also Weaver \nGraham, 450 U.S. 24, \n28, 101 S.Ct. 9 , 963, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 \n(1981).\" \nFN7. The Constitution also prohib-\nits the states from passing ex post \nfacto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, \ncl. 1 (\"No State shall ... pass any ... \nex post facto Maw....\"). \nFN8. The Court has emphasized \nthat \"[t]he mark of an ex post facto \nlaw is the imposition of what can \n!\nfairly be designated \nunishment for \npast acts.\" De Veau \nBraisted, 363 \nU.S. 144, 160, 80 S. t. 1146, 1154, \n4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (plurality \n1 6\nopinion) \nmphasis added). See also \nBeazell \nOhio, 269 U.S. 167, \n169-70, \nS.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 \nL.Ed. 216 (1925) (\"[A]ny statute \nwhich punishes as a crime an act \npreviously committed, which was \ninnocent when done; which makes \nmore burdensome the punishment \nfor a crime, after its commission, or \nwhich deprives one charged with \ncrime of any defense available ac-\ncording to law at the time when the \nact was committed, is prollited as \nex post facia\"); Paschal \nWain-\nwright, 738 F.2d 1173, 1 6 n. 4 \n(11th Cir.1984) (emphasis in origin-\nal) (For ex post facto violation to \nhave occurred, \"the legislature must \nprovide punishment for past con-\nduct.\"). \nThe Court has stated that \"no ex post facto \nviolation occurs if the change effected is \nmerely procedural, and does `not increase \nPage 7 of 24 \nPage 7 \nthe punishment[,] nor change the ingredi-\nents of the offen[cJe or the ultimate facts \nnecessary to establish guilt.' \" Id. at 29 I. \n12,101 S.Ct. at 964 n. 12 (quoting Hop . \nUtah, 110 U.S. 574, 590, 4 S.Ct. 202, 21 , \n28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (brackets added to \nconform to origll quotation in Hopt )); \nsee also Dobbert ■ Florida, 432 U.S. 282, \n293, 97 S.Ct. 22 , 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 \n(\n... [truncated, 3512 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/119 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=119]", "char_count": 3512}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nbail pending appeal, one seriously disad-\nvantageous to him in that respect, but the \nstatute does not change the \"quantum of \npunishment attached to the crime.\" Dob-\nbert, 432 U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. We \nagree with other cases, which have simil-\narly held that § 3143(b) does not violate \nr\nira post facto clause. See United States \nPowell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th \n.1985) (en bane) (footnote omitted) \n(\"Admission to bail pending appeal is, for \nEx \nPost \nFacto \nClause \npurposes, \n'procedural'. It does not increase the pun-\nishment for a crime already committed, but \nsimply regulates the time at which impris-\nonment\nt\nfor that crime w' begin after con-\nviction\"); United States \nMolt, 758 F.2d \n1198, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 85) (\"We think \nthe change in the standard for bail pending \nappeal is not an ex post facto law.... [T]he \npresumption is against construing a pro-\ncedural change as an ex post facto law, and \nmust carry the day in the absence of a \nstronger showing than made in this case \nthat the change works an increase in pun-\nishment.... The change in the balance of ad-\nvantages against the defendant is too slight \nto bring the change within the scope of tT \nli\nt facto \nclause.\"); \nUnited\n States \n753 F.2d 19, 21 (3d Cir.1985) ( \ne availability vel non of bail pending \nappeal, albeit extremely important to the \nindividual involved, is a procedural issue \nrather than a type of punishment to which \nthe Ex cirst Facto Clauses apply.\"); United \nStates \nCrabtree, 754 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 \n(5th \nir.1985) (opinion of Chief Judge \nClark as a single circuit judge) (\"[ (Section \n3143(a)(I) ] is merely procedural and does \nnot alter a substantive right. [It) does not \nincrease the punishment nor change the in-\ng\nients of the offense or the ultimate \nfacts (nii:ssary to establish guilt.\"); United \nStates \nChiattello, 599 F.Supp. 970, 971 \nn. 1 \n. Ind.1985) (\"The method govern-\nPage 8 of 24 \nPage 8 \ning the \n... [truncated, 4011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/120 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=120]", "char_count": 4011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nBut it cannot be sustained without des-\ntroying the value of the constitutional \nprovision, that a law, however it may in-\nvade or modify the rights of a party \ncharged with crime, is not an ex post \nfacto law, if it comes within either of \nthese comprehensive branches of the law \ndesignated as Pleadings, Practice, and \nEvidence. \nCan the law with regard to bail, to in-\ndictments, to grand jury, to the trial jury, \nall be changed to the disadvantage of' the \nprisoner by State legislation after the of-\nfence was committed, and such legisla-\ntion not held to be ex post facto legisla-\ntion, because it relates to procedure, as it \ndoes according to [Bishop on Criminal \nProcedure]? \nAnd can any substantial right which the \nlaw gave the defendant at the time to \nwhich his guilt relates be taken away \nfrom him by a post facto legislation, be-\ncause, in the use of a modem phrase, it is \ncalled a law of procedure? We think it \ncannot. \nId. at 232, 2 S.Ct. at 452 (emphasis added). \nWe believe that Kring and its dictum re-\nspecting bail must be read in light of later \nSupreme Court opinions on the ex post \nfacto clause. In Beazell, for example, the \nCourt stated that lepcpressions are to be \nfound in earlier judicial opinions to the ef-\nfect that the [a post facto clause] may be \ntransgressed by alterations in the rules of \nevidence or procedure.\" 269 U.S. at 170, \n46 S.Ct. at 68 (citing Kraig, inter alia ). \nThe Court conceded that there \"may be \nprocedural changes which operate to deny \nto the accused a defense available at the \ntime of the commission of his offense, or \nwhich otherwise affect him in such a harsh \nand arbitrary manner as to fall within the \nPage 9 of 24 \nPage 9 \nconstitutional prohibition.\" Id. The Court \nnoted that \"[j]ust what alterations of pro-\ncedure will be held to be of sufficient mo-\nment to transgress the constitutional pro-\nhibition cannot be embraced within a for-\nmula or stated in\n... [truncated, 3721 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/121 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=121]", "char_count": 3721}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "Page 10 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \ncourt held that § 3143(b)(2) violates the ex \npost facto clause. The court reasoned that a \nsentence which begins immediately is more \nsevere than a sentence which commences \nafter an \nunsuccessful \nappeal. \nId. \nat \n1443-46. The court said that \"[w]hile the \nSupreme Court has not always been clear \non the underlying rationales for the ex post \nfacto clause, certainly one rationale is that \nan individual who acts in reliance upon the \nknown criminal penalties for his acts must \nbe punished in accordance with that reli-\nance.\" Id. at 1444. \n*951 Although we agree that the ex post \nfacto clauses protect an individual who acts \nin reliance on the known criminal penalties \nfor his conduct, we cannot accept the Cir-\nrincione court's view that § 3143(bX2) af-\nfects the punishment imposed for such con-\nduct. A convicted defendant may wish to \npostpone serving his sentence until his ap-\npeal is decided, and certainly the § \n3143(b)(2) standards for granting bail \npending appeal are \"more onerous' than \nthose under the former law. However, § \n3143(b)(2) does not in any way alter the \n\"quantum of punishment' imposed on \ncnminal defendants, or the elements and \nrequired proof of the offense, which are the \nmain focus of the Supreme Court's more \nrecent decisions. Dobbert illustrates the \nfact that significant changes, even in the \nprocedure for imposition of the death pen-\nalty, do not necessarily violate the ex post \nfacto clause. \nOur conclusion is also supported by state \ncourt decisions which have upheld changes \nin statutes governing bail pending appeal \nagainst ex post facto challenges. For ex-\nample, the Indiana Supreme Court has held \nthat a state statute denying bail pending ap-\npeal by a habitual criminal was not ex post \nfacto as applied to a defendant who com-\nPage 10 \nmitted the offense and was convicted be-\nfore the effectiv date of the statute. State \n. \nex rel. Dorton \n Circuit Co\n... [truncated, 3749 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/122 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=122]", "char_count": 3749}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "Pagc 11 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \n1781, 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983). The court \nemphasized that the statute did not \"impose \n(or increase) punishment ... or [make] \nformerly legal conduct a crime.\" Id. at \n1314.nm \nFN11. But see Greene' State, 238 \nSo.2d \n296, \n300-01 \n(Fla.1970) \n(application of bail statute to deny \nbail pending appeal from conviction \non second felony violated ex post \nfacto clauses where bail statute be-\ncame effective after commission \nsecond \nfelony); \nCunningham \nState, \n423 \nSo.2d \n5 \n(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (per curiam) \n(a post facto clause prohibited ap-\nplication of statute denying bail \npending appeal of drug trafficking \nconviction to defendant who com-\nmitted offense before \nactive date \nof statute); cf. Parker \nState, 667 \nP.2d 1272 (Alaska \nt.Ap .1983) \n(right to bail pending appeal suffi-\nciently accrued at time of offense \nunder state statute so that statute \npassed after date of offense but be-\nfore conviction which eliminated \nbail for persons convicted of certain \nEllis \nState, 544 S.W.2d 908, 911 \nfelon'\n did not apply to defendant); \n(Tenn. rim.App.1976) \n(statute \ndenying bail pending appeal to de-\nfendants convicted of possession of \ncontrolled substances with intent to \nsell had \"ex post facto overtones\" \nwhen applied to defendants who \nwere arrested after effective date of \nstatute). \nWe therefore hold that the § 3143(6)(2) \nstandards governing bail pending appeal \nare not ex post facto as applied to a defend-\nant where the offenses charged and the res-\nulting convictions occurred before the ef-\nPage 11 \nfective date of the Act, but the sentences \nand the order by the district court denying \nbail pending appeal were entered after that \ndate. \n*952 III \nInterpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) \n[4] Section 3143(b)(2) as amended by the \nBail Reform Act requires that bail pending \nappeal be denied unless the court finds that \nthe appeal \"raises a substantial question of \nlaw or fact l\n... [truncated, 3388 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/123 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=123]", "char_count": 3388}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "Page 12 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \n85-5010, slip. op. at 2 (4th Cir. March 4, \n1985) (opinion of Mumaghan, Circuit \nJud \nsingle circuit judge). We adopt \nthe \ntwo-step analysis for determin-\ning w e er to grant bail pending appeal \nunder § 3143(b), but we apply a somewhat \nstricter interpretation of what constitutes a \n\"substantial' question of law or fact, which \nwe believe the statute and its purpose re-\nquire. \nWhat constitutes a \"substantial\" question \nunder the first prong of this test must be \nconsidered in light of congressional intent. \nUnder former § 3148, bail pending appeal \nwould be denied if the appeal was \n\"frivolous.\" The new Act was mtended to \nreverse the presumption in favor of bail \npending appeal under the former law and to \nmake the standards for granting bail \npending \nappeal \nmore \nstnngent. \nSeeS.Rep.No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. \n26-27, reprinted in1984 U.S.Code Cong. & \nAd.News 3182. \n[5] Accordingly, we agree with the Elev-\nenth Circuit that \"a `substantial question' is \none of more substance than would be ne-\ncessary to a finding that it was not frivol-\nous. It is a `close' question or one that very \nwell could be decided the othe \n\" Gi-\nancola, 754 F.2d at 901. In \nthe \nThird Circuit said that a \"substan r \nues-\ntion under § 3143(6)(2) is one white \nis \neither novel, which has not been decided \nby controllaedent, or which is fairly \ndoubtful.\" \n753 F.2d at 23.F*02 We \nagree with \neventh Circuit, however, \nthat a question \"which has not been de-\ncided by controlling precedent\" may not be \n\"substantial\" under § 3143(b)(2). For ex-\nample, an issue may be \"so patently \nwithout merit that it has not been found ne-\ncessary for it to have been resolved.... Sim-\nilarly, there might be no precedent in this \nPane 12 \ncircuit, but there may also be no real reason \nto believe that this circuit would depart \nfrom unanimous resolution of the issue by \nother circuits.\" Giancola, 754 F.2d at \n901.FN13 In t\n... [truncated, 3666 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/124 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=124]", "char_count": 3666}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "Page 13 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nimprisoned that a contrary appellate hold-\ning is likely to require reversal of the \nconviction or a new trial. \nId. at 23.nm \nFN14. The Third Circuit rejected \nthe view that § 3143(b)(2) requires \nthe district court to grant bail \npending appeal only upon finding \nthat its own rulings were likely to \nbe reversed on appeal for two reas-\nons: \nIn the first place, such a reading \nwould render language in the stat-\nute \nsurplusage \nbecause \nevery \nquestion that is likely to be re-\nversed must by definition be \n\"substantial\". In the second place, \nwe are unwilling to attribute to \nCongress the cynicism that would \nunderlie the provision were it to \nbe read as requiring the district \ncourt to determine the likelihood \nof its own error. A district judge \nwho, on reflection, concludes that \ns/he erred may rectify that error \nwhen ruling on post-trial motions. \nJudges do not knowingly leave \nsubstantial errors uncorrected, or \ndeliberately \nmisconstrue \napplic-\nable precedent. Thus, it would \nhave been capricious of Congress \nto have conditioned bail only on \nthe willingness of a trial judge to \ncertify his or her own error. \nFor a similar reason, the phrase \n\"likely to result in reversal or an \norder for a new trial\" cannot reas-\nonably be construed to require the \ndistrict court to predict the prob-\nability of reversal. The federal \ncourts are not to be put in the pos-\nition of \"bookmakers\" who trade \nPage 13 \non the probability of ultimate out-\ncome. \n753 F.2d at 23; see also \nPo  slap op. at 2 n 2; Handy, \n761 F.2d at 1280; Giancola, 754 \nF.2d at 900. \nIn sum, we hold that in order to grant bail \npending appeal, a court must find that the \ndefendant has met his burden of proving by \nclear and convincing evidence that he is \nnot likely to flee or pose a danger to the \nsafety of any other person or to the com-\nmunity if released under § 3143(6)(1), and \nthat he has established under § 3143(b\n... [truncated, 2839 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/125 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=125]", "char_count": 2839}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "Page 14 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \n[6] In Affieck both the defendant and the \nGovernment agree that we should remand \nthe case to the district court to reconsider \n•• ue of bail pending appeal under the \ntwo-part standard, disagreeing only \non now to determine a \"substantial' ques-\ntion of law or fact, which we have re-\nsolved. In Kowalik, however, both the de-\nfendant and the Government apparently \nagree that a remand is not appropriate. \nKowalik argues that we should grant him \nbail pending appeal under the test he es-\npouses, while the Government argues that \nwe should deny bail under the standard it \nproposes. \nWe conclude that the proper disposition is \nto remand both cases for the district court \nto make findings and conclusions under the \nstandard for determining bail on appeal \nwhich we adopt today. The Third and Elev-\nenth\n.'\nCircuits made this \n' \nsition in \n*954Miller and Giancola. \n753 F.2d \nat 24; Giancola, 754 F. \na 901 & n. \n5.FNI6 This disposition comports with \nFed.R.App.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires that \napplications for bail pending appeal be \nmade \"in the first instance in the district \ncourt.\" Id. The rule also requires the dis-\ntrict court to \"state in writing the reasons\" \nif the court denies release pending appeal \nor imposes conditions on release. Id. The \nrule contemplates that the district court is \nin a better position to evaluate, in the first \ninstance, the propriety of granting bail \npending appeal. The rule also aids our ap-\npellate function by requiring the district \ncourt to make written findings and conclu-\nsions. \nFN16. In Polin, a single judge of \nourth Circuit \nadopted \nthe \nstandard and agreed with the \niisstricci\ncourt's \ndenial \nof \nbail \npending appeal because the defend-\nPage 14 \nant did not meet his burden of \nshowing that his appeal raised a \n\"substantial\" question. Polin, slip \nop. at 3-4. \nIn Hand \ninth Circuit adop-\nted the \nstandard and dis-\nagreed wi \ne district court's \n\n... [truncated, 3602 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/126 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=126]", "char_count": 3602}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "Page 15 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944. 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \ntion of the principal appeals in these cases. \nThe mandates for the partial remands shall \nissue forthwith. \nMcKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: \nSince our country's inception, liberty has \nheld a preeminent place in our pantheon of \nvalues. Our founding fathers took care to \npreserve it through a wealth of carefully \ncrafted constitutional safeguards. Among \nthem are the eighth amendment's proscrip-\ntion of excessive bail, the due process \nclause, and the ex post facto clause. In my \nview, the court has trivialized each of these \nsafeguards in sustaining the constitutional-\nity of the bail pending appeal provisions of \nthe Bail Reform Act of 1984, and in ap-\nproving the application of these provisions \nto defendants who were convicted of \ncrimes committed before the Act's passage. \nI believe that this is, in large measure, a \nconsequence of the court's preoccupation \nwith attempting to ameliorate the harsh ef-\nfects of these provisions. Had the court \nheld fast to the actual intent of Congress, \nthe constitutional infirmity of the statute \nwould have been readily apparent. \nWhen the standard for release of a con-\nvicted person pending appeal under 18 \nU.S.C. § 3143 was first considered by trial \ncourts and by a panel of this court, they all \nconcluded that Congress did indeed mean \nwhat it said-bail should be denied unless \nthe trial court finds: \nthat the appeal is not for purpose of delay \nand raises a substantial question of law or \nfact likely to result in reversal or an order \nfor a new trial. \n18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). \nThese early decisions took the statute to \nmean that for all practical purposes Con-\nPage 15 \ngress intended to eliminate bail pending \nappeal in all but the most extraordinary \ncases. Subsequently, the Third Circuit fab-\nricated from rules of judicial construction \nan intent that gives the appearance of signi-\nficantly ameliorating the harshness of *955 \nthe provision-\n... [truncated, 3527 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/127 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=127]", "char_count": 3527}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "Page 16 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nlikely prove to be no amelioration at all. I \nam fully satisfied that the result will be es-\nsentially the same as it would were the stat-\nute interpreted literally-the denial of bail to \nthe overwhelming majority of persons who \npreviously \nwould \nhave \nreceived \nbail \npending appeal. Such exceptions as may \nexist under the newly established standards \nwill be at best quixotic.1N1\nFN1. By my calculation, sixty-three \npercent of direct appeals handled by \nthis court in the most recent report-\ning period involved persons who \nwere free on bail pending appeal. \nThe new standards will not only \neliminate bail in the overwhelming \nmajority of those cases, but I am \nsatisfied that it will be accident \nrather than design if even a substan-\ntial majority of those cases that we \nreverse coincide with the cases in \nwhich bail pending appeal is gran-\nted. \nMore important, in sorting through the the-\noretical niceties of supposedly ameliorative \nstandards the courts have lost sight of the \nfact that the statute both as written by Con-\ngress and as rewritten by them allows for \nthe punishment of a substantial class of in-\ndividuals who have not yet been finally ad-\njudicated guilty. I am convinced that deny-\nmg bail under the test set forth in the pan-\nel's opinion is contrary to the Constitution \nof the United States. \nCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON AP-\nPEAL \nUntil recently, it might have been argued \nthat the constitutional rights that normally \nwould attend preconviction proceedings do \nnot ar mpany the appellate process. See \nRoss \nMoffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. \nPage 16 \n2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). Howevi \nthe recent Supreme Court case of Evius \nLum, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, \nL.Ed.2d \n821 \n(1985), \nhas \ndrastically \nchanged this analysis. In Evicts the Court \nfound that, where a state provides for an \nappeal as a matter of right, \"the procedures \nused in deciding appeals must comport \nwith th\n... [truncated, 3601 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/128 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=128]", "char_count": 3601}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "Page 17 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nAs \nthe \nSupreme \nCourt \nhas \nstated, \n\"[p]resent federal law has made an appeal \nfrom a district court's judgment of convic-\ntion\n'\nin a criminal case what is, ' effect, a \nmatter of right.\" Coppedge \nUnited \nStates, 369 U.S. 438, 441, 82 \n.Ct. 917, \n918, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. \nH 1291, 1294; Fed.R.Crim.P. 37(a)). The \nfederal courts have, therefore, made the ap-\npeal \"the final step in the adjudication of \nguilt or innocence' and, under Evitts, the \nfull panoply of constitutional rights applies \nuntil the conclusion of the appeal. \nTHE EIGHTH AMENDMENT \nThe traditional purpose of bail has been to \nensure the presence of the defendant at tri-\nal. Higher bail than that amount reasonably \ncalculated \nto \nfulfill \nthis \npurpose \nis \n\"excessive\" in \nlation of the eighth \namendment. Stack ■ Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5, \n72 S.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L. \n. 1 (1951). It remains \nan open question, however, whether the \neighth amendment provides a right to bail \nin cases where the defendant' not likely \nto flee. Compare Escandar \nFerguson, \n441 F.Supp. 53, 58 (S.D.Fla.1 \n7) (finding \nthat likelihood of flight is the only \nr\nconsti-\ntutionally permissible justificati \nfor deni-\nal of bail) with United States \nEdwards, \n430 A.2d 1321 \n(D.C.App.1 81), cert. \ndenied,455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1721, 72 \nL.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (upholding the denial \nof bail for the purpose of protecting the \ncommunity) T, The Supreme Court h\nexpressly reserved the question. Bell\nVol fish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n. 15, 99 S.\n1861, 1871 n. 15, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) \n(refusing to decide whether any objective \nother than ensuring the defendant's pres-\nence at trial may constitutionally justify \npretrial detention). \nPage 17 \nally been allowed in all capital \ncases, but this exception falls within \nthe traditional justification of p \nvention of flight. United States\nKennedy, 618 F.2d 557, 559 (9 \nCir.1980) (\"It has been thought that \nm\n... [truncated, 3737 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/129 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=129]", "char_count": 3737}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "Page 18 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nFN4. See Duker, The Right to Bail: \nAn \nHistorical \nInquiry, \n42 \nAlb.L.Rev. \n33, \n58-66 \n(1977) \n(finding that the English provision \ndid not limit Parliament's ability to \ndefine offenses as nonbailable). \nAlthough there have been hints to the con-\ntrary in recent Supreme Court opinions, see \n*957Carlson, 342 U.S. ft 545-46, 72 S.Ct. \nein\nat 536-37, and Sch \nMartin, 467 U.S. \n253, 104 S.C. 2403, 2 0, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 \n(1984), it would be a travesty if we glibly \nabandoned the *servations of the Supreme \nCourt in Stack \nBoyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 \nS.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L. . 1 (1951): \nFrom the passage of the Judiciary Act of \n1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91, to the present Feder-\nal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule \n46(a)(1), federal law has unequivocally \nprovided that a person attested for a non-\ncapital offense shall be admitted to bail. \nThis traditional right to freedom before \nconviction permits the unhampered pre-\nparation of a defense, and serves to pre-\nvent the infliction of punitment prior to \nconviction. See Hudson \nParker, 156 \nU.S. 277, 285, 15 S.Ct. 450, 453, 39 \nLtd. 424 (1895). Unless this right to bail \nbefore trial is preserved, the presump-\ntion of innocence, secured only after cen-\nturies of struggle, would lose its mean- ing. \nThus, in my view, the Bail Reform Act vi-\nolates the eighth amendment by allowing \nthe denial of bail on grounds unrelated to \nthe defendant's likelihood of flight. \nEven if Congress is free to define nonbail-\nable offenses, certainly the allowable justi-\nfications are limited. Justice Black, sitting \nas a Circuit Justice, stated that \"the com-\nmand of the eighth amendment that \n`excessive bail shall not be required * * * ' \nPage 18 \nat the very least obligates judges passing \nupon the right to bail to deny such relief \ny for the strongest of reasons.\" Sellers \n■ \nDinh Hung \nUnited States, \n21 L.Ed.264 (1968). See also Truon \nUnited States, --- U.S. ----, 89 S.\n... [truncated, 3687 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/130 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=130]", "char_count": 3687}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "Page 19 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \ncourt found on a sufficient record that bail \nwould ensure the presence of the defend-\nants and that neither defendant is a danger \nto the community requiring immediate isol-\nation. Thus, the only possible purpose for \ndetaining them before the guilt &tenths-\nlion is complete, as defined by Evens, is \npunitive. While this conclusion is not diffi-\ncult to divine from the face of the statute, \nCongress has made our analytic task even \neasier by explicitly stating the intent of the \nstatutory provisions governing bail pending \nappeal to be punitive. The legislative his-\ntory accompanying the Act indicates that \nCongress believed swifter punishment is a \ngreater deterrent to criminal conduct: \n\"release of a criminal defendant into the \ncommunity after conviction may under-\nmine the deterrent effect of the criminal \nlaw, especially in those situations where \nthe appeal of the conviction may drag on \nfor many months or even years.\" Senate \nReport No. 98-225 at 26, 98th Cong., 2d \nSess. (1984), U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-\nmin.News 1984, p. 3209; Senate Report \nNo. 98-147 at 562, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. \n(1983); Senate Report No. 97-317 at 15-56, \n97th Cons., 2d Sess. (1982). As the court \nD(\nnoted in its memorandu *958 opinion and \norder in United States \nCirrincione, 600 \nF.Supp. 1436, 1443 (N. . 11.1985): \nBy viewing the restrictions on release \npending appeal to be a deterrent to crime, \nCongress must have concluded that a sen-\ntence that commences immediately upon \nconviction is somehow more severe than \na sentence which commences only after \nappeal. Certainly a sentence which com-\nmences before, rather than after, appeal, \nis more certain to be served. \nIndeed, in the approximately ten percent of \nall criminal cases in which the appellate \ncourts reverse convictionspo there is a \nPage 19 \nsubstantial likelihood that persons will \nserve time in prison who would not other-\nwise have served at all, \n... [truncated, 3675 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/131 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=131]", "char_count": 3675}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nmay not constitutionally be imposed prior \nto a determination of guilt and regulatory \nmeasures that may.\" Wolfish, 441 U.S. at \n537, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. Thus, in analyzing \nthe denial of bail, \"the court must decide \nwhether the disability is imposed for the \npurpose of punishment or whether it is but \nan incident of some other legitimate gov-\nernmental purpose.\" Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at \n1873. As discussed, the legislative history \nmakes clear that the statutory restrictions \non bail pending appeal were \"imposed for \nthe purpose of punishment.\" Wolfish, 441 \nU.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. The statute \nthus violates the due process clause by im-\nposing punishment prior to a final adjudic-\nation of guilt. \nThe infirmity of the new statute has anoth-\ner dimension under the due process clause \nas well-one which stems from the critically \noverburdened state of our docket. In my \nview, the risk of erroneous deprivation of \nliberty under the new provisions will be \ngreat, for I am persuaded that in practice \nthe substance of the legal issues raised in \nthe petitions for bail pending appeal will \nreceive only slight consideration. \nWhile I have been unable to make a precise \ncalculation, such figures as are available \nsuggest that approximately sixty-three per-\ncent of all direct criminal appeals to this \ncircuit involve persons who have been \ngranted bail pending appeal. Because of the \nBail Reform Act, we have pending a large \nnumber of petitions to this court to grant \nbail pending appeal after denial by the trial \ncourt. It is quite possible that we would \nhave little difficulty continuing to work in-\nto our calendar an examination of cases \nwhere the only test for denial of bail is \nfrivolity. But the test that the majority im-\nposes ensures, as night to day, that if we \ntake our duties under Rule 9 of the Rules of \nPage 20 of 24 \nPage 20 \nAppellate Procedure seriously, we have \n*959 just added a mini-ap\n... [truncated, 3997 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/132 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=132]", "char_count": 3997}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944. 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nof the human mind. \nEX POST FACTO \nThe ex post facto clause was adopted, in \npart, to protect an individual's right to fair \nnotice when the government \"increases \npunishment beyond what was prescribed \nwhen \ncruse\ntie\nwas consummated.\" \nWeaver \nGraham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 \nS.Ct. 96 , 965, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). In \nWeaver the Court noted that two elements \nmust be present for a criminal law to be \nheld ex post facto: it must apply to acts oc-\ncurring before its enactment into law, and \nit must function to the disadvantage of the \noffender affected by it. The Supreme Court \nhas repeatedly recognized, however, that a \npurely procedural change in the law is not \nex post facto, even if a defendant is di \nvantaged thereby. See, e.g., Dobbert \nFlorida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 \nL.Ed.2d 344 (1977), reh. denied,434 U.S. \n882, 93.Ct. 246, 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977); \nBeate!! \nOhio, 269 U.S. 16;:i46 S.Q. 68, \n70 L. . 216 (1925); Hopt \nUtah, 110 \nU.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L. \n262 (1884). \nIn other cases, however, the Court has \nnoted that a procedural change may so af-\nfect substantial rights as to fall within tip \ns(\nex post facto prohibition. See, e. ., Kring \nMissouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 \n. 443, 27 \nL.Ed. 506 (1883); Thompson \nUtah, 170 \nU.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 \n.Ed. 1061 \n(1898). I need not linger long over the \nbody of law addressed to the fine distinc-\ntions between those procedural changes \nthat do affect substantial rights and those \nthat do not, however, in light of the legis-\nlative history indicating that Congress in-\ntended the provision to b \nunitive. As the \nCourt noted in Deveau \nBraisted, 363 \nU.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1154, 4 \nL.Ed.2d 1109,reh. denied,364 U.S. 856, 81 \nS.Ct. 30, 5 L.Ed.2d 80 (1960): \nPage 21 of 24 \nPage 21 \nThe mark of an ex post facto law is the \nimposition of what can fairly be desig-\nnated as punishment for past acts. The \nquestion in each case where unpleasant \nconse\n... [truncated, 3726 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/133 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=133]", "char_count": 3726}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "Page 22 of 24 \n765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \nmerely procedural will result in the same \ntrivialization of premature incarceration of \naccused persons prior to trial. I hold with \nJustice Jackson who, sitting as a circuit \njustice, said: \nIt is difficult to reconcile with traditional \nAmerican law the jailing of persons by \nthe courts because of anticipated but as \nyet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment \nto protect society from predicted but un-\nconsummated offenses is so unpreceden-\nted in this country and so fraught with \ndanger of excesses that I am loath to re-\nsort to it, even as a discretionary judicial \ntechnique.... \nWilliams \nUnited States, 184 F.2d 280, \n282-83 (2 Cir.1950). Professor Tribe has \nnoted that this approach bears a striking \nsimilarity to the exchange in Lewis Car-\nroll's Through the Looking Glass: \nThe Queen observes that the King's Mes-\nsenger is \"in prison now, being punished; \nand the trial doesn't even begin till next \nWednesday; and of course the crime \ncomes last of all.\" Perplexed, Alice asks, \n\"Suppose he never commits the crime?\" \n\"That will be all the better, wouldn't it?\" \nthe Queen replies. \nTribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive \nJustice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 \nVa.L.Rev. 371, 374 (19'70) (quoted in Ed-\nwards, 430 A.2d at 1368 (Mack, J., dis-\nsenting)). \nWhat one thinks of the role of the eighth \namendment and the due process clause in \nrestraining unjustified detention prior to \ntrial or pending appeal undoubtedly de-\npends on one's experience. From our priv-\nileged position it would be quite normal for \nus to assume that the spectre of unjustified \ndetention looms only in such countries as \nPoland or South Africa. Perhaps we would \nPage 22 \nbe more mindful of the past failings of our \nown country in this regard, and more in-\nclined to bolster the safeguards against fu-\nture lapses, if wi were of Japanese origins. \nSee Korematsu \nUnited States, 323 U.S. \n214, 65 S.Ct. 1 3, 89 L.Ed. 1\n... [truncated, 3651 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/134 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=134]", "char_count": 3651}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \ngiven to a bail decision pending appeal. I \nbelieve that circumstances could justify a \ndenial of bail where the defendant has been \nconvicted of a violent crime and has other-\nwise indicated that he is a danger to the \ncommunity. Nonetheless, I fear that the \nlanguage of the statute is sufficiently vague \nto encompass far more situations than I \nwould consider constitutional. That is not \nthe case here, however, and the proper con-\ntours of \"likely to ... pose a danger to the \nsafety of any other person or the corn-\nmumty,\"18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1), must be \nleft to the appropriate cases. \nSecond, it is unfortunate that Congress has \nchosen to limit bail pending appeal as a re-\naction to the sad state of the circuit court \ndockets. In 1979, there were 1194 appeals \nfiled in the Tenth Circuit; in 1984, there \nwere 1922. Administrative Office of the \nUnited States Courts, Federal Court Man-\nagement Statistics 11 (1984). The average \ntime it is currently taking this circuit to \nhandle a criminal appeal from the date of \nthe notice to oral argument is 368 days. \nIn a bail opinion in 1956, Justice Frank-\nfurter addressed the growing length of time \nof criminal appeals: \n\"Nothing has disturbed me more during \nmy years on the Court than the time span, \nin so many cases that come here, between \nthe date of an indictment and the final ap-\npellate disposition of a conviction. Such \nuntoward delays seem to me inimical to \nthe fair and effective administration of \nthe criminal law. I see no reason \nwhatever why we in this country cannot \nbe as expeditious in dealing with criminal \nappeals as is true of England. Applica-\ntions for appeals are heard in the English \nCourt of Criminal Appeal within eight \nweeks of conviction; in murder cases ap-\npeals `are generally before the Court not \nPage 23 of 24 \nPage 23 \nlater than three weeks after the convic-\ntion.' \" \nWard \n6United States, --- U.S. ----, 76 \nS.Ct. \n3, 1066, \n... [truncated, 3810 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/135 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=135]", "char_count": 3810}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "765 F.2d 944 \n765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \n(Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) \ndays of conviction. If at the time of oral ar-\ngument the panel determines that an issue \nis in fact *962 substantial and likely to res-\nult in reversal, it can immediately order \nthat bail be set pending the final decision \non appeal. In this manner, the court can \nameliorate the deprivation of liberty in-\nvolved where bail has been denied to a de-\nfendant whose conviction is thereafter \noverturned on appeal. \nC.A.)1,1985. \nU.S. . Affleck \n765 .2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nC 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 24 of 24 \nPage 24 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?utid=%7bFEDF5709-3AEA-4F74-8619-... 4/10/2008 \nEFTA00191723\n", "char_count": 746}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCase No: \nD \n18 U.S.C. § 371 \n18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) \n18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(e) \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(d) \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nvs. \nR \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" \nand NADIA MARCINKOVA, \nDefendants. \nINDICTMENT \nThe Grand Jury charges that: \nBACKGROUND \nAt all times relevant to this Indictment: \n1. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN employed defendants SARAH KELLEN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA to perform, \namong other things, services as personal assistants. \ndl\n4 \nEFTA00191724\n", "char_count": 675}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "2. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN employed L.G. to perform, among other \nthings, services as a personal assistant. \n3. \nDefendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and SARAH KELLEN paid T.M., H.R., and \nA.F. to pe orrn, among other things, recruiting services. \n4. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN owned a property located at 358 El Brillo Way, \nPalm Beach, Florida, in the Southern District of Florida (hereinafter referred to as \"358 El \nBrillo Way\"). \n5. \nDefendRJEFFREY EPSTEIN owned a property located at 9 East 71st Street, \nNew York, New York (hereinafter referred to as \"the New York residence\"). \n6. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN was the principal owner of JEGE, INC., a \nDelaware corporation. JEGE, INC.'s sole business activities related to the operation and \nownership of a Boeing 727-31 aircr# bearing tail number N908JE. \n7. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN served as president, sole director, and sole \nshareholder of JEGE, INC., and had the power to direct all of its operations. \n8. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN was the principal owner of Hyperion Air, Inc., \na Delaware corporation. Hyperion Air, Inc.'s soled, iness activities related to the operation \nand ownership of a Gulfstream G-1159B aircraft bearing tail number N909JE. \n9. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN served as president, sole director, and sole \nshareholder of Hyperion Air, Inc., and had the power to direct all of its operations. \nT \n2 \nEFTA00191725\n", "char_count": 1392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "10. \nPursuant to Florida Statutes Section 794.05, a \"person 24 years of age or older \nwho engages in sexual activity with a person 16 or 17 years of age commits a felony of the \nsecond degree.\" For purposes of \"this section, `sexual activity' means oral, anal, or vaginal \npenetrabby, or union with, the sexual organ of another; however, sexual activity does not \ninclude an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.\" Florida Statutes Section 794.021 states \nthat \"ignorance of the age [of the victim] is no defense,\" and that neither \"misrepresentation \nof age by [the victim] nor a bona fide belief that such person is over the specified age [shall] \nbe a defense.\" \nR \n11. \nPursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 800.04(5)(a) and 800.04(5)(c)(2), an adult \n\"who intentionally touches in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, \nor buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a person less than 16 years of age, or forces or \nentices a person under 16 years of agpcso touch the perpetrator, commits lewd or lascivious \nmolestation,\" which is a felony of the second degree if the victim is 12 years of age or older \nbut less than 16 years of age. \n12. \nPursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 800.04(6)(a) and 800.04(6)(b), an adult \n\"who [i]ntentionally touches a person under 16 yr of age in a lewd or lascivious manner \nor [s]olicits a person under 16 years of age to commit a lewd or lascivious act commits lewd \nor lascivious conduct,\" which is a felony of the second degree. \n3 \nEFTA00191726\n", "char_count": 1521}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "13. \nPursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 800.04(7)(a) and 800.04(7)(c), an adult \n\"who: (1) [i]ntentionally masturbates; (2) [i]ntentionally exposes the genitals in a lewd or \nlascivious manner; or (3) [i]ntentionally commits any other sexual act that does not involve \nactual eical or sexual contact with the victim, including, but not limited to . . . the \nsimulation of any act involving sexual activity in the presence of a victim who is less than \n16 years of age, commits lewd or lascivious exhibition,\" which is a felony of the second \ndegree. \n14. \nPursuaitio Florida Statutes Section 800.04(2), \"[n]either the victim's lack of \nchastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by [Section 800.04].\" \n15. \nPursuant to Florida Statutes Section 800.04(3), \"[t]he perpetrator's ignorance \nof the victim's age, the victim's misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrator's bona \nfide belief of the victim's age cannoVbe raised as a defense in a prosecution under [Section \nL \n800.04].\" \n16. \nPursuant to Florida Statutes Section 800.02, a \"person who commits any \nunnatural and lascivious act with another person commits a misdemeanor of the second \ndegree.\" \n17. \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN was over the age of 24 and did not have any \nmedical license. \n4 \nEFTA00191727\n", "char_count": 1308}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "18. \nDuring the period of her involvement with the Defendants, Jane Doe #4 \nattended Wellington High School and Palm Beach Central High School in Palm Beach \nCounty. \nD\nDuring the period of her involvement with the Defendants, Jane Doe #5 \nattended Wellington High School in Palm Beach County. \n20. \nDuring the period of their involvement with the Defendants, Jane Does # 6, 8 \nand 12 attended Palm Beach Central High School in Palm Beach County. \n21. \nDuring R \nperiod of her involvement with the Defendants, Jane Doe #7 \nattended William T. Dwyer High School in Palm Beach County. \n22. \nDuring the periods of their involvement with the Defendants, Jane Does # 9, \n14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 attended Royal Palm Beach High School in Palm Beach County. \n23. \nDuring the period of }fir involvement with the Defendants, Jane Doe #10 \nattended Lake Worth High School in Palm Beach County. \n24. \nDuring the period of her involvement with the Defendants, Jane Doe #11 \nattended the Professional Performing Arts School, a public high school, located in New \nYork, New York. \nF \n25. \nDuring the period of her involvement with the Defendants, Jane Doe #13 \nattended John I. Leonard High School in Palm Beach County. \n5 \nEFTA00191728\n", "char_count": 1225}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "COUNT 1 \n(Conspiracy: 18 U.S.C. § 371) \n26. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \nFrom at least as early as 2001, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, \nthrough in or around October 2005, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the Defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, \nRRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" \nand \nNADIA MARCINKOVA, \ndid knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with each other and \nwith others known and unknown to commit an offense against the United States, that is, to \nuse a facility or means of interstate Areign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, and \nentice individuals who had not attained the age of 18 years to engage in prostitution, in \nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422(b). \nPurpose and Object of the Conspiracy \n28. \nIt was the purpose and object of thEonspiracy to procure females under the \nage of 18 to travel to 358 El Brillo Way and the New York residence so that JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN could, in exchange for money, engage in lewd conduct with those minor females \nin order to satisfy JEFFREY EPSTEIN's prurient interests. \n6 \nEFTA00191729\n", "char_count": 1263}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "Manner and Means \n29. \nThe manner and means by which the Defendants and other participants sought \nto accomplish the purpose and object of the conspiracy included the following: \nD (a) \nIt was part of the conspiracy that Defendants SARAH KELLEN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" NADIA MARCINKOVA, and other \nparticipants would contact minor females via the use of cellular and other telephones to \narrange appointments for minor females to travel to 358 El Brillo Way and the New York \nresidence to allow Demme\n JEFFREY EPSTEIN to engage in lewd conduct with them. \n(b) \nIt was further a part of the conspiracy that Defendants JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, and ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" NADIA \nMARCINKOVA, and other participants would make payments to, or cause payments to be \nmade to, minor females in exchanger engaging in lewd conduct. \n(c) \nIt was further a part of the conspiracy that Defendants JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and other \nparticipants would ask females to recruit other minor females to engage in lewd conduct with \nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN. \nF \n(d) \nIt was further a part of the conspiracy that Defendants JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and other \nparticipants would make payments to, or cause payments to be made to, the recruiters for \n7 \nEFTA00191730\n", "char_count": 1384}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "bringing additional minor females to 358 El Brillo Way and the New York residence to \nengage in lewd conduct with Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN. \n(e) \nIt was further a part of the conspiracy that Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEf vould pay minor females to engage in lewd conduct with Defendant NADIA \nMARCINKOVA to satisfy Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's prurient interests. \nOvert Acts \n30. \nIn furtherance of this conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, there was \ncommitted by at leastRe of the co-conspirators herein, at least one of the following overt \nacts, among others, in the Southern District of Florida, and elsewhere: \nJane Does #1 and #2 \n(1) \nIn or around the beginning of 2001, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nengaged in sexual activity wane Doe #1, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, \nin the presence of Jane Doe #2, who was then a fourteen-year-old girl. \n(2) \nIn or around 2001, Defendant SARAH ICELLEN led Jane Doe #2 from the \nkitchen of 358 El Brillo Way upstairs to Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's bedroom at 358 \nEl Brillo Way. \n(3) \nIn or around 2001, Defendan JEFFREY EPSTEIN masturbated in the \npresence of Jane Doe #2, who was then a fourteen-year-old girl. \n(4) \nIn or around 2001, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #2, \nwho was then fourteen years' old, to pinch his nipples while he masturbated. \n8 \nEFTA00191731\n", "char_count": 1338}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "(5) \nIn or around 2001, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a payment of \n$300 to Jane Doe #2. \n(6) \nIn or around 2001, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a telephone call \ntpelephone used by Jane Doe #2 to make an appointment for Jane Doe #2 to travel \nto 358 El Brillo Way. \n(7) \nIn or around 2001, JEFFREY EPSTEIN engaged in sexual intercourse \nwith an unidentified female in the presence of Jane Doe #2, who was then a fourteen-\nyear-old girl. 17 \n(8) \nIn or around 2001, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN paid $300 to Jane \nDoe #2, who was then a fourteen-year-old girl, for allowing an unidentified female \nto perform oral sex on Jane Doe #2 in EPSTEIN's presence. \n(9) \nOn or about Mich 11, 2003, an employee of Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN prepared a written telephone message for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \nreview regarding a telephone call received from Jane Doe #2. \n(1 0) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #2 \nif she had any younger friends who wof be interested in engaging in similar \nactivities with him. \n(11) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant SARAH KELLEN took nude photographs \nof Jane Doe #2, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n9 \nEFTA00191732\n", "char_count": 1172}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "(12) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant SARAH KELLEN made a payment of \n$500 to Jane Doe #2 in exchange for posing for nude photographs. \n(13) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant SARAH KELLEN told Jane Doe #2 that \nauJant JEFFREY EPSTEIN had asked KELLEN to take nude photographs of Jane \n1.J1\nDoe #2. \n(14) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN masturbated in the \npresence of Jane Doe #2, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(15) Rr around 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a payment of \n$200 to Jane Doe #2, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(16) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a telephone call \nto a telephone used by Jane Doe #2 to make an appointment for Jane Doe #2 to travel \nto 358 El Brillo Way. \nA.\n(17) \nOn or about April 23, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #2. \n(18) \nOn or about May 2, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Janere #2. \nJane Doe #3 \n(19) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN masturbated in the \npresence of Jane Doe #3, who was then a fifteen-year-old girl. \n10 \nEFTA00191733\n", "char_count": 1135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "(20) \nIn or around 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a payment of \n$200 to Jane Doe #3. \n(21) \nOn or about October 26, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \nt le hone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #3. \n(22) \nOn or about October 30, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #3. \n(23) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN directed Jane Doe \n#3, who was thrt sixteen- or seventeen-year-old girl, to straddle an adult female and \nto touch the adult female's breasts. \n(24) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN placed a massaging \ndevice on the vagina of an adult female in the presence of Jane Doe #3, who was then \na sixteen- or seventeen-year- \ngirl. \n(25) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a payment of \n$200 to Jane Doe #3. \n(26) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN instructed Jane Doe \n#3 to rub his nipples. \nF \n(27) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN placed a massaging \ndevice on the vagina of Jane Doe #3, who was then a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old \ngirl. \n11 \nEFTA00191734\n", "char_count": 1094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "(28) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #3 \nto recruit additional females to come to 358 El Brillo Way. \n(29) \nOn or about November 8, 2004, one of Defendant JEFFREY \nEIN's employees prepared a written telephone message for Defendant \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN's review regarding a telephone call received from Jane Doe #3 \nthat read: \"I have a female for him.\" \n(30) \nOn or about January 14, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call R telephone used by Jane Doe #3. \n(31) \nOn or about January 29, 2005, one of Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \nemployees prepared a written telephone message for Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN's review regarding a telephone call received from Jane Doe #3 that read: \n\"I have a female for him.\" A \nJane Does #4. #5. and #6 \n(32) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN led \nJane Doe #4 and Jane Doe #5 to Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's bedroom at 358 El \nBrillo Way. \n(33) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nasked Jane Doe #4 about her age, and Jane Doe #4 responded with her true age. \n12 \nEFTA00191735\n", "char_count": 1105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "(34) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmasturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #4, who was then a seventeen-year-old-girl, \nand Jane Doe #5, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \nD (35) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ninstructed Jane Doe #4, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, to play with his \nnipples. \n(36) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ninstructed Jan/Zoe #4, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, to remove her \nclothing. \n(37) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nstroked the vagina of Jane Dos #L4. who was then a seventeen-year-old at. \n(38) \nIn or around theAst half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN paid \n$200 to Jane Doe #4. \n(39) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN paid \n$200 to Jane Doe #5. \n(40) \nIn or around the first half cF2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nasked Jane Doe #6 what high school she attended. \n(41) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ninstructed Jane Doe #4 to leave so that Jane Doe #6 could massage him alone. \n13 \nEFTA00191736\n", "char_count": 1156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "(42) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmasturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #6, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(43) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nB\nally penetrated Jane Doe #6, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(44) \nIn or around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nplaced a large vibrating massager on the vagina of Jane Doe #6, who was then a \nsixteen-year-old girl. \n(45) ILr around the first half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ncaused a payment of $200 to be paid to Jane Doe #6. \nJane Does #7 and #8 \n(46) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN led T.M., who \nwas then a fifteen-year-old gikand Jane Doe #7, who was then a sixteen-years-old \ngirl, from the kitchen of 358 El Brillo Way upstairs to Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN's bedroom at 358 El Brillo Way. \n(47) \nOn or about July 4, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN made one or \nmore telephone calls to a telephone used bpane Doe #7. \n(48) \nOn or about July 5, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by T.M. \n14 \nEFTA00191737\n", "char_count": 1127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "(49) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN masturbated in \nthe presence of Jane Doe #8, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(50) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN stroked the \nsicitna of Jane Doe #8, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \nL \n(51) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN paid \napproximately $200 to Jane Doe #8. \n(52) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN paid $200 to \nT.M. for recruRg Jane Doe #8 to travel to 358 El Brillo Way. \n(53) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN told Jane Doe #8 \nthat Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN would pay Jane Doe #8 if she returned with a \nfriend. \n(54) \nOn or about JuIpt5, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed one or \nmore telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane Doe #7. \n(55) \nOn or about July 15, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #8. \n(56) \nOn or about July 15, 2004,Fefendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by T.M. \n(57) \nOn or about July 16, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed one or \nmore telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane Doe #7. \n15 \nEFTA00191738\n", "char_count": 1167}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 152, "text_content": "(58) \nOn or about July 16, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by T.M. \n(59) \nOn or about July 17, 2004, one of Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \ne\nloyees prepared a written telephone message for Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN's review regarding a telephone call received from T.M. that read: \"Me & \n[Jane Doe #7] can come tomorrow any time or [T.M.] alone\". \n(60) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN masturbated in \nthe presence oRie Doe #7, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(61) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN instructed Jane \nDoe #7, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl, to rub his nipples. \n(62)...._liLaAroundiuly2444,DefendantJEFIBE \nvagina of Jane Doe #7, who Am then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(63) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a \npayment of $200 to Jane Doe #7. \n(64) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN told Jane Doe \n#7 that if she reported to anyone whatp'ad occurred at Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN's home, bad things could happen to her. \nCl. \n(65) \nOn or about July 24, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #8. \nT \n16 \nEFTA00191739\n", "char_count": 1204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "Jane Does #9 and #10 \n(66) \nOn or about July 15, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed one or \nmore telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane Doe #9. \nID (67) \nOn or about July 16, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN caused Jane \nDoe #9 to make one or more telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane Doe #10. \n(68) On or about July 17, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #9. \n(69) Ror about July 18, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #9. \n(70) On or about July 22, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #9. \n(71) \nIn or around JA2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN fondled the \nbreasts of Jane Doe #9, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(72) \nIn or around July 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN masturbated in \nthe presence of Jane Doe #9, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(73) \nIn or around July 2004, Effendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a \npayment of $200 to Jane Doe #9. \n(74) \nOn or about July 22, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #10. \nT \n17 \nEFTA00191740\n", "char_count": 1162}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "(75) \nIn or around the last half of 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nNADIA MARCINKOVA engaged in oral sex and sexual intercourse in the presence \nof Jane Doe #9, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \nD (76) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nforcibly inserted his penis into the vagina of Jane Doe #9, who was then a seventeen-\nyear-old girl. \n(77) \nIn or around the last half of2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made \na payment of \nto Jane Doe #9. \n(78) \nIn or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nrubbed the vagina of Jane Doe #10, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(79) \nIn or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made \na payment of $200 to Jane DA/10. \n(80) \nOn or about November 28, 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \narranged for one of his employees to provide an envelope filled with cash to Jane Doe \n#9. \n(81) On or about December 4, 20 \nefendant SARAH KELLEN provided \na written message to Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN regarding Jane Does # 9 and 10, \nstating: \"[Jane Doe #10] would like to work @ 4:00 pm if possible. [[Jane Doe #9] \nis scheduled for 5:00 today.] the movie is @ 7:30\". \n(82) \nOn or about December 29, 2004, Defendantr-ARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #9. \n18 \nEFTA00191741\n", "char_count": 1313}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "(83) On or about December 30, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nSARAH KELLEN caused the purchase of Broadway tickets as an eighteenth birthday \ngift for Jane Doe #9. \nD\n(84) \nIn or around the last half of 2004 or January 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN masturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #10, who was then a seventeen-\nyear-old girl. \n(85) \nIn or around the last half of 2004 or January 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN fon \ngirl. \nthe breasts of Jane Doe #10, who was then a seventeen-year-old \n(86) On or about January 14, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed one \nor more telephone calls to a telephone used byJane Doe #10. \n(87) \nOn or about JAary 27, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed one or more telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane \nDoe #10. \n(88) \nOn or about January 28, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed one \nor more telephone calls to a telephone use \nJane Doe #10. \n(89) \nOn or about February 1, 2005, Defendant NADIA MARCINKOVA \nplaced one or more telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane Doe #10. \n(90) \nIn or around February 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN caused a \npayment of $200 to be made to Jane Doe #9 for recruitinsrane Doe #16 to travel to \n358 El Brillo Way. \n19 \nEFTA00191742\n", "char_count": 1253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "Jane Doe #11 \n(91) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN told Jane Doe #11 \nthat he would pay her to find and bring him more girls. \nD\n(92) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN paid $200 to Jane \nDoe #11 for recruiting a minor female to travel to his New York home. \n(93) \nIn or around 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #11 \nwhen she would be getting more girls. \n(94) Ror about April 5, 2005, one of Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \nemployees prepared a written message for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's review \nregarding a telephone call received from Jane Doe #11 that read: \"Re does she have \nany new friends you can meet — I was away over the weekend so I have not spoken \nto anyone new. But, [unidenWied Jane Doe] will be around later today and I know \nshe really wants to work. The others should be back around Thursday. Let me know \nabout [unidentified Jane Doe].\" \n(95) \nOn or about June 22, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane \nJane Does #12 and #13 \n(96) \nOn or about August 2, 2004, an employee of Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN prepared a written telephone message for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \nreview regarding a telephone call received from T.M. antane Doe #12 that stated: \n\"They are available all weekend and maybe [Jane Doe #13] too\". \n20 \nEFTA00191743\n", "char_count": 1340}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "(97) On or about August 21, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #13. \n(98) \nIn or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nt\nay\nrbated in the presence of Jane Doe #12, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(99) \nIn or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ndigitally penetrated Jane Doe #12, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(100) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nattempted to pR a massaging device on the vagina of Jane Doe #12, who was then \na seventeen-year-old girl. \n(101) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made \na payment of $200 to Jane Doe #12. \n(102) In or around the Jest half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked \nJane Doe #12, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, about her age. \n(103) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN told \nJane Doe #12 that he would take her to Los Angeles when she turned eighteen. \n(104) In or around the last half of 2r , Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nSARAH KELLEN caused Jane Doe #12 to recruit Jane Doe #13 to travel to 358 El \nBrillo Way. \n(105) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmasturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #13, who was the\n seventeen-year-old girl. \n21 \nEFTA00191744\n", "char_count": 1338}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "(106) In or around the end of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN placed \na massaging device on the vagina of Jane Doe #13, who was then a seventeen-year-\nold girl. \n(107) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made \na payment of $200 to Jane Doe #13. \n(108) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ndigitally penetrated Jane Doe #13, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(109) R around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked \nJane Doe #13, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, about her age. \n(110) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN told \nJane Doe #13 that he wanted to take her to Paris but he could not because Jane Doe \n#13 was not yet eighteen yeapcld. \n(111) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked \nJane Doe #13 to bring her friends to his home, especially \"girls who looked like [Jane \nDoe #13].\" \nane Doe \n(112) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN led \nJane Doe #14 from the kitchen of 358 El Brillo Way upstairs to Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN's bedroom at 358 El Brillo Way. \n(113) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendantr FREY EPSTEIN asked \nJane Doe #14 to provide her telephone number. \n22 \nEFTA00191745\n", "char_count": 1265}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 159, "text_content": "(114) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ninstructed Jane Doe #14, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, to pinch his nipples. \n(115) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nrbated in the presence of Jane Doe #14, who was then a seventeen-year old girl. \n(116) In or around the last half of 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made \na payment of $300 to Jane Doe #14. \n(117) In or around the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, Defendant \nJEFFREY EPRIN digitally penetrated Jane Doe #14, who was then a seventeen-\nyear-old girl. \n(118) In or around the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, Defendant \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #14. who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, \nwhether she had any plans former eighteenth birthday and acknowledged that she had \nnot yet turned eighteen. \n(119) On or about December 23, 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ncaused a Western Union wire transfer order to be sent to Jane Doe #14. \n(120) In or around the first quarterr2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nplaced a massaging device on the vagina of Jane Doe #14, who was then a seventeen-\nyear-old girl. \n(121) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nengaged in sexual intercourse with Jane Doe #14, who sten \na seventeen-year-old \ngirl. \n23 \nEFTA00191746\n", "char_count": 1324}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 160, "text_content": "(122) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nperformed oral sex on Jane Doe #14, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(123) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nn\ne a payment of $600 to Jane Doe #14. \n(124) On or about January 8, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #14. \n(125) On or about January 9, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adriana Muc \n\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #14. \n(126) On or about January 26, 2005, one of Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \nemployees prepared a written telephone message for Defendant ADRIANA ROSS's \nreview regarding a call received from Jane Doe #14 that read: \"She is confirming for \n5:30\". \n4, \n(127) On or about January 26, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #14. \n(128) On or about February 1, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jan \n#14. \n(129) On or about March 1, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #14. \n(130) On or about March 21, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \nir\n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed a telephone calls to a telep \nused by Jane Doe #14. \n24 \nEFTA00191747\n", "char_count": 1353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 161, "text_content": "(131) On or about March 29, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #14. \nJane Doe #15 \n(132) On or about December 6, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(133) On or about December 14, 2004, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(134) IR around the first half of 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN led \nJane Doe #15 from the kitchen of 358 El Brillo Way upstairs to Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN's bedroom at 358 El Brillo Way. \n(135) In or around the first half of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ninstructed Jane Doe #15, whoics then a seventeen-year-old girl, to pinch his nipples \nwhile he masturbated. \n(136) In or around the first half of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nfondled the breasts of Jane Doe #15. \n(137) In or around the first half t2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmade a payment of $200 to Jane Doe #15. \n(138) On or about January 7, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"ADRIANA MUCINSKA,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe \n#15. \n25 \nEFTA00191748\n", "char_count": 1132}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 162, "text_content": "(139) On or about February 4, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(140) On or about February 10, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \nafiephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(141) On or about February 21, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(142) On or about February 24, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone caR a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(143) On or about March 17, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(144) On or about March 30, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(145) On or about March 31, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(146) On or about March 31, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adrian Mucinska,\" placed a telephone \nto a telephone used by Jane Doe #15. \n(147) On or about April 1, 2005, one of Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's \nemployees prepared a note for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's review that read: \n\"10:30 [Jane Doe #15]/[Jane Doe #10] on Fri around 2'Oclock\". \n(148) In or around June 2005, Defendant JEFF \nPSTErN provided Jane \nDoe #15 with a gift of a \nSecret lingerie for her eighteenth birthday. \n26 \nEFTA00191749\n", "char_count": 1353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 163, "text_content": "Jane Does #16 & #17 \n(149) In or around February 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmasturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #16, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(150) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand SARAH KELLEN caused Jane Doe #16 to place a telephone call to Jane Doe #17 \nto ask her to travel to 358 El Brillo Way. \n(151) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ncaused a pa \nto be made to Jane Doe #16 for recruiting Jane Doe #17 to travel \nto 358 El Brillo Way. \n(152) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmasturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #17, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \n(153) In or around the rst quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ninstructed Jane Doe #17, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl, to remove all of her \nclothing. \n(154) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nplaced a massaging device on the vagina Vane Doe #17, who was then a sixteen-\nyear-old girl. \n(155) In or around the first quarter of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmade a payment of $200 to Jane Doe #17, who was then a sixteen-year-old girl. \nT \n27 \nEFTA00191750\n", "char_count": 1204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 164, "text_content": "(156) In or around the first nine months of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN placed a massaging device on the vagina of Jane Doe #16, who was then \na seventeen-year-old girl. \nD\n(157) In or around the first nine months of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #16, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, how old she \nwas, and she responded that she was seventeen years old. \n(158) In or around the first nine months of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN eng \nin sexual activity with Defendant NADIA MARCINKOVA in the \npresence of Jane Doe #16, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl. \n(159) In or around the first nine months of 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN asked Jane Doe #16, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, to touch the \nbreast of Defendant NADIA NARCINKOVA. \n.41A. \n(160) On or about April 11, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, afkla \n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(161) On or about April 11, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jan \n#16. \n(162) On or about April 11, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN left a \nmessage for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN stating: \"[Jane Doe #16] can work \ntomorrow at 4pm.\" \n(163) On or about May 19, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n28 \nEFTA00191751\n", "char_count": 1346}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 165, "text_content": "(164) On or about June 30, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(165) On or about July 2, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \nrnhone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(166) On or about July 22, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(167) On or about August 18, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call tz telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(168) On or about August 19, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(169) On or about August 21, 2005, Defendant NADIA MARCINKOVA \nplaced a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(170) On or about September 3, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adriana Mucinska,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(171) On or about September 18, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephone used by J \noe #16. \n(172) On or about September 19, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN sent a \ntext message to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(173) On or about September 29, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16 \n29 \nT \nEFTA00191752\n", "char_count": 1279}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 166, "text_content": "(174) On or about September 30, 2005, Defendant ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \n\"Adrian Mucinska,\" placed a telephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(175) On or about October 1, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN left a \nn\none message for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN stating: \"[Jane Doe #15] \nconfirmed at 11 AM and [Jane Doe #16] — 4PM\". \n(176) On or about October 2, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(177) \nor about October 3, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed a \ntelephone call to a telephone used by Jane Doe #16. \n(178) On or about October 3, 2005, Defendant SARAH KELLEN left a \ntelephone message for Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN stating: \"[Jane Doe #16] will \nbe'/: hour late\". \nA \n(179) In or around the first week of October, 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN engaged in sexual intercourse with Jane Doe #16, who was then a \nseventeen-year-old girl. \n(180) In or around the first weekr\n,\n October, 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN made a payment of $350.00 to Jane Doe #16, who was then a seventeen-\nyear-old girl. \n(181) In or around the first week of October, 2005, Defendant JEFFREY \nEPSTEIN provided a gift of \nSecret lingerile Jane Doe #16 for her \neighteenth birthday. \n30 \nEFTA00191753\n", "char_count": 1252}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 167, "text_content": "Jane Does #18 and #19 \n(182) In or around the last half of 2003, Jane Doe #18 was approached by A.F. \nand was asked whether she would be willing to provide a massage to Defendant \nrfREY EPSTEIN in exchange for $200. \n(183) In or around the last half of 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked \nJane Doe #18 to provide her telephone number. \n(184) On or around August 27, 2003, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone caR a telephone used by Jane Doe #18. \n(185) In or around the last half of 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nmasturbated in the presence of Jane Doe #I8, who was then a seventeen-year-old-girl. \n(186) On or around November 16, 2003, Defendant SARAH KELLEN placed \na telephone call to a telephonxed by Jane Doe #18. \n(187) In or around the last half of 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ndigitally penetrated Jane Doe #18, who was then a seventeen-year-old-girl. \n(188) In or around the last half of 2003, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked \nJane Doe #18 to recruit other females to \nto 358 El Brillo Way. \n(189) On or about March 5, 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN asked Jane \nDoe #19, who was then a seventeen-year-old girl, to leave when she refused to \nremove her shirt. \nT \n31 \nEFTA00191754\n", "char_count": 1207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 168, "text_content": "(190) On or about March 5, 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN verbally \nreprimanded Jane Doe #18 for bringing Jane Doe #19 to 358 El Brillo Way when she \nwas not willing to undress for him. \nThe Defendants' Travel \n(191) On or about March 11, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey, to \nPalm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, \nInc. \nR \n(192) On or about May 1, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from New York, New York to Palm \nBeach County, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(193) On or about Max 14, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Canada to Palm Beach \nCounty, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(194) On or about June 11, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nSARAH KELLEN traveled from Chicag \nlinois to Palm Beach County, Florida \naboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(195) On or about June 20, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nNADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Palm Beach \nCounty, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned b\nGE, INC. \n32 \nEFTA00191755\n", "char_count": 1268}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 169, "text_content": "(196) On or about July 4, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Aspen, Colorado to Palm \nBeach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \nD\n(197) On or about July 16, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to \nPalm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, \nInc. \n(198) ir \nabout July 22, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from the U.S. Virgin Islands to \nPalm Beach County, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(199) On or about August 19, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nNADIA MARCINKOVA trasfilte_d from Van Nuys, California to Palm Beach County, \nFlorida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(200) On or about August 25, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Ecuador to Palm \nBeach County, Florida aboard the Boeing  727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(201) On or about October 2, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from the U.S. Virgin Islands to \nPalm Beach County, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \nT \n33 \nEFTA00191756\n", "char_count": 1310}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 170, "text_content": "(202) On or about October 29, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nNADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach \nCounty, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \nD\n(203) On or about November 10, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nSARAH KELLEN traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, \nFlorida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(204) On or about November 18, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELRN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and NADIA \nMARCINKOVA traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, Florida \naboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(205) On or about December 3, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, and ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" traveled from \nA \nNew York, New York to Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft \nowned by JEGE, INC. \n(206) On or about December 13, 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN \ntraveled from the U.S. Virgin Islands to \n1m Beach County, Florida, aboard the \nGulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(207) On or about December 17, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nNADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach \nCounty, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned b\nperion Air, Inc. \n34 \nEFTA00191757\n", "char_count": 1354}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 171, "text_content": "(208) On or about January 1, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Anguilla, British West Indies \nto Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion \nTh ine. \n(209) On or about January 6, 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN traveled \nfrom Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Gulfstream \naircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(210) (or \nabout January 14, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and NADIA \nMARCINKOVA traveled from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Palm Beach County, \nFlorida, aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(211) On or about wary 19, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and NADIA \nMARCINKOVA traveled from New York, New York to Palm Beach County, Florida \naboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(1 \nOn or about February 3, t05, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Columbus, Ohio, to \nPalm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(213) On or about February 10, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriant ucinska,\" and NADIA \n35 \nEFTA00191758\n", "char_count": 1297}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 172, "text_content": "MARCINKOVA traveled from New York, New York to Palm Beach County, Florida, \naboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by JEGE, \n(214) On or about February 21, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nn\nAH KELLEN, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from the U.S. Virgin \nIslands to Palm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned by \nJEGE, INC. \n(215) On or about February 24, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH ICEL \ni, and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled from Teterboro, New \nJersey to Palm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by \nHyperion Air, Inc. \n(216) On or about March 4, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adrl@rta Mucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled \nfrom New York, New York to Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 \naircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(217) On or about March 18, 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN traveled \nfrom New York, New York to Palm Beach ounty, Florida aboard the Boeing 727 \naircraft owned by JEGE, INC. \n(218) On or about March 31, 2005, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN traveled \nfrom New York, New York to Palm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Boeing 727 \naircraft owned by JEGE, \n36 \nEFTA00191759\n", "char_count": 1184}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 173, "text_content": "(219) On or about May 19, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH \nKELLEN, and ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" traveled from \nTeterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Gulfstream aircraft \nr)e d by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(220) On or about June 30, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nSARAH KELLEN traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, \nFlorida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(221) Rot . about July 22, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nSARAH KELLEN traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, \nFlorida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(222) On or about August 18, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"A \nMucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled \nfrom Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream \naircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(223) On or about September 3, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinsr\" traveled from the U.S. Virgin Islands \nto Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Hyperion \nAir, Inc. \n(224) On or about September 18, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, and ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adria\n ucinska,\" traveled from \n37 \nEFTA00191760\n", "char_count": 1298}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 174, "text_content": "Westchester County, New York to Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream \naircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \n(225) On or about September 29, 2005, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nD\nIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA traveled \nfrom Teterboro, New Jersey to Palm Beach County, Florida aboard the Gulfstream \naircraft owned by Hyperion Air, Inc. \nAll in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. \nCOUNTS 2 THROUGH 10 \nRSex Trafficking: 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)) \n31. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n32. \nOn or about the dates enumerated as to each count listed below, the exact dates \nbeing unknown to the Grand Jury, in \nm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida, \nand elsewhere, the Defendants listed below did knowingly, in and affecting interstate and \nforeign commerce, recruit, entice, provide, and obtain by any means a person, that is, the \nperson in each count listed below, knowing that the person had not attained the age of 18 \nyears and would be caused to engage in a com+cial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § \n1591(c)(1): \nCount \nDate(s) \nMinor Involved \nDefendants) \n2 \n2001 - 2004 \nJane Doe #2 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \n*RAH KELLEN \n38 \nEFTA00191761\n", "char_count": 1302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 175, "text_content": "Count \nDate(s) \nMinor Involved \nDefendant(s) \n3 \nJanuary 2004 \nthrough \nJuly 2004 \nJane Doe #4 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \n4 \nID\nthrough \nJuly 2004 \nDecember 29, \n2004 \nJane Doe #9 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \n5 \nJuly 2004 \nthrough \nJanuary 31, 2005 \nJane Doe #10 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \n6 \nMi - 004 \nApril 2, 2005 \nJane Doe #12 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \n7 \nAugust 2004 \nthrough \nMay 27, 2005 \nJane Doe #13 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nNovember 2004 \nJanc Docdtl4 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \n8 \nthrough \nMarch 2005 A \nSARAH KELLEN \nADA,A.JA lass \n9 \nDecember 2004 \nthrough \nJune 5, 2005 \nJane Doe #15 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nADRIANA ROSS, \na/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska\" \n10 \nFebruary 2005 \nthrough \nfirst week of \nOctober 2005 \nJane Doe #16 \nF \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nADRIANA ROSS, \na/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska\" \nNADIA MARCINKOVA \nAll in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1) and 2. \nT \n39 \nEFTA00191762\n", "char_count": 950}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 176, "text_content": "COUNT 11 \n(Sex Trafficking: 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2)) \n33. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \nD From at least as early as in or about 2001 through in or about October 2005, \nthe exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern \nDistrict of Florida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nSARAH KELLEN, \nITRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" \nand \nNADIA MARCINKOVA, \ndid knowingly benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a \nventure, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(3), which had engaged in an act described in \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), that is, the recruiting, enticing, providing, and obtaining \nby any means a person, in or affecting interstate commerce, knowing that the person or \npersons had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial \nsex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1); in violation of Title 18, United States Code, \nSections 1591(a)(2), 1591(b)(2), and 2. \nCOUNT 12 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n35. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n40 \nEFTA00191763\n", "char_count": 1281}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 177, "text_content": "36. \nFrom in or around the spring of 2003 through on or about October 2, 2005, the \nexact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District \nof Florida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nD \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #3, who was a person who had not attained the age of \n18 years, to engage ingstitution and in a sexual activity for which a person can be charged \nwith a criminal offense, that is violations of Florida Statutes Sections 800.04(5)(a), \n800.04(6)(a), and 800.04(7)(a); in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) \nand 2. \nA COUNT 13 \n(Enticement qfkMinor 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n37. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n38. awn in or around Jameapy.20044ffetegh.inertnettediuly 2004, the exact dates \nbeing unknown to the Grand July, in Palm Beach Tiinty, in the Southern District of Florida, \nand elsewhere, the defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \nT \n41 \nEFTA00191764\n", "char_count": 1174}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 178, "text_content": "did use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe MI who was a person who had not attained the age of \n18 years, to engage in prostitution; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b)ranel 2. \nCOUNT 14 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n39. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \nQty_, \n- 200-4 \nCon\" \n44,revr an or ArOUrOl \n40. \nIn or argd July 2004the exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in \nPalm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \ndid use a facility or means of inteAse commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #a who was a person who had not attained the age of \n18 years, to engage in prostitution; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT I, \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n41. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \nT \n42 \nEFTA00191765\n", "char_count": 1214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 179, "text_content": "42. \nFrom in or around July 2004 through on or around December 29, 2004, the \nexact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District \nof Florida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nD \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #9, who was a person who had not attained the age of \n18 years, to engage institution and in a sexual activity for which a person can be charged \nwith a criminal offense, that is a violation of Florida Statutes Section 794.05; in violation of \nTitle 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT 16 \n \n(EirtWelifertilltlitinor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n43. \nParagraphs 1 through \nf this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n44. \nFrom in or around July 2004 through on or about January 31, 2005, the exact \ndates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nF \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #10, who was a person wThad not attained the age \n43 \nEFTA00191766\n", "char_count": 1314}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 180, "text_content": "of 18 years, to engage in prostitution; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT 17 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \nD\nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n46. \nFrom in or around the middle of 2004 through on or about April 22, 2005, the \nexact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District \nof Florida, and elsewg, the defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH ICELLEN, \nIll \nLLJC a Iaidl I y \nGLJtate \nIce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane DA12, who was a person who had not attained the age \nof 18 years, to engage in prostitution; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT 18 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 1 \n.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n47. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n48. \nFrom in or around August 2004 through on or about May 27, 2005, the exact \ndates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach Countyin.the Southern District of \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \n44 \nEFTA00191767\n", "char_count": 1232}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 181, "text_content": "JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuaderuce and entice Jane Doe #13, who was a person who had not attained the age \nof 18 years, to engage in prostitution; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT 19 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n49. \nParagrarit 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n50. \nFrom in or around November 2004 through in or around March 2005, the exact \nes being un \nry, in raim tseacwLounry, m the southernistncto \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the defendaA \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN)\nend \nS ARA \nL\nI-14 EL EN, \nAbe Am \ngeSS, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #14, who v.F a person who had not attained the age \nof 18 years, to engage in prostitution and in a sexual activity for which a person can be \ncharged with a criminal offense, that is a violation of Florida Statutes Section 794.05; in \nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2. \nT \n45 \nEFTA00191768\n", "char_count": 1200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 182, "text_content": "COUNT 20 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n51. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \nID\nFrom in or around December 2004 through on or about June 5, 2005, the exact \ndates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, and \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #15, who was a person who had not attained the age \nof 18 years, to engage in prostituti7it violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT 21 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n53. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein.\n1U \n54. \nFrom in or around February 2005 through in or around the first week of \nOctober 2005, the exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in \nthe Southern District of Florida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \n46 \nEFTA00191769\n", "char_count": 1199}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 183, "text_content": "JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" \nand NADIA MARCINKOVA, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuadL induce or entice Jane Doe #16, who was a person who had not attained the age of \n18 years, to engage in prostitution and in a sexual activity for which a person can be charged \nwith a criminal offense, that is a violation of Florida Statutes Section 794.05; in violation of \nTitle 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2. \nR \nCOUNT 22 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n55. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n56. \nFrom in or around Feb ary 2005 through in or around April 2005, the exact \ndates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, and \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \" \nana Mucinska,\" \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #17, who was a person who had not attained the age \nof 18 years, to engage in prostitution; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections \n2422(b) and 2. \n47 \nEFTA00191770\n", "char_count": 1309}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 184, "text_content": "COUNT 23 \n(Enticement of a Minor: 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) \n57. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \nD\nFrom in or around August 2003 through in or around February 2004, the exact \ndates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of \nFlorida, and elsewhere, the defendants, \nR \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nand \nSARAH KELLEN, \ndid use a facility or means of interstate commerce, that is, the telephone, to knowingly \npersuade, induce and entice Jane Doe #18, who was a person who had not attained the age \no \n➢Gars, tv\nsigag... iii proaattiau,l, m vrolatiuI \nuI \n, Um \n2422(b) and 2. \nCOUNT 24 \n(Conspiracy to Travel: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e)) \nc, 8eetiuns \n59. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as fully set for the herein. \n60. \nFrom at least as early as 2001 through in or around October 2005, the exact \ndates being unknown to the Grand Jury, the Defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nSARAH KELLEN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucii \nand \nNADIA MARCINKOVA, \n48 \nEFTA00191771\n", "char_count": 1134}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 185, "text_content": "did knowingly and willfully conspire with each other and with others known and unknown \nto travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as \ndefined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with another person, in violation of Title 18, United States \nCode, S\non 2423(b); all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(e). \nCOUNT 25 \n(Facilitation of Unlawful Travel of Another: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(d)) \n61. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n62. \nFrom Mast as early as in or about 2001 through in or around October 2005, \nthe exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern \nDistrict of Florida, and elsewhere, the Defendant, \ndid, for the purpose of commercial aAntage or private financial gain, arrange and facilitate \nthe travel of a person, that is Defendant Jeffrey Epstein, knowing that such person was \ntraveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as \ndefined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f); in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(d). \nCOUNTS 26 THRDUGH 29 \n(Travel to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)) \n63. \nParagraphs 1 through 25 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by \nreference as though fully set forth herein. \n64. \nOn or about the dates enumerated as to each courted below, from a place \noutside the Southern District of Florida to a place inside the Southern District of Florida, the \n49 \nEFTA00191772\n", "char_count": 1570}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 186, "text_content": "Defendant(s) listed below traveled in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in \nillicit sexual conduct as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(0, with a person under 18 years of age, \nthat is, the person(s) listed in each count below: \nCoin \nDate(s) \nMinor( ) Involved \nDefendant(s) \n.._./-\n26 \n7/16/2004 \nJane Doe #7 \nJane Doe #8 \nJane Doe #9 \nJane Doe #10 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nNADIA MARCINKOVA \n27 \n3/31/2005 \nR \nJane Doe #14 \nJane Doe #15 \nJane Doe #16 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nADRIANA ROSS, \na/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska\" \n28 \n9/18/2005 \nJane Doe #16 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nADRIANA ROSS, \na/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska\" \n.-\n29 \n9/29/05 \nJae Doe #16 \nA \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nSARAH KELLEN \nADRIANA ROSS, \na/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska\" \nNADIA MARCINKOVA \nAll in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2423(b) and 2. \nUpon conviction of the violation alleged in ount 1 of this indictment, the defendants, \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and \nNADIA MARCINKOVA, shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, \nla \nwhich constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the i • \ntion. \n50 \nEFTA00191773\n", "char_count": 1185}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 187, "text_content": "Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461; Title 18, United States Code, \nSection 981(a)(1)(C); and Title 21, United States Code, Section 853. \nIf the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or \nomission\" the defendants, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH ICELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, \na/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA, \n(1) \ncannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; \n(2) \nhas been transferred or sold to, or deposited with a third person; \n(3) \nhas bee-Raced beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; \n(4) \nhas been substantially diminished in value; or \n(5) \nhas been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided without \ndifficulty; \nit is the intent of the United States, p \nuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), \nto seek forfeiture of any other property of the defendants up to the value of the above \nforfeitable property. \nAll pursuant to Title 28 United States Code, Section 2461; Title 18, United States \nCode, Section 981(a)(1)(C); and Title 21 United rues Code, Section 853. \nFORFEITURE 2 \nUpon conviction of any of the violations alleged in Counts 12-29 of this indictment, \nthe defendants, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana \nMucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA, shall forfeit to the U \nStates any property, real \nor personal, constituting or traceable to gross profits or other proceeds obtained from such \n51 \nEFTA00191774\n", "char_count": 1446}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 188, "text_content": "offense; and any property, real or personal, used or intended to be used to commit or to \npromote the commission of such offense, including but not limited to the following: \na. \nA parcel of land located at 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, Florida \n33480, \nding all buildings, improvements, fixtures, attachments, and easements found \ntherein or thereon, and more particularly described as: \nBeing all of Lot 40 and the West 24.3 feet of Lot 39, El Bravo Park, as \nrecorded in Plat Book 9, Page 9, in the records of Palm Beach County, Florida \nand \nBEING that prlion lying West of Lot 40, El Bravo Park, in Section 27, \nTownship 43 S%,111, Range 43 East, as recorded in Plat Book 9, Page 9, Public \nRecords of Palm Beach County, Florida, being bounded on the West by the \nWest side of an existing concrete seawall and the northerly extension thereof \nas shown on the Adair & Brady, Inc., drawing IS-1298, dated March 25, 1981, \nand bounded on the East by the shoreline as shown on the plat of El Bravo \nPark, and bounded on the North and South by the Westerly extensions of the \nNorth and South lines icspectively of Lot 40, containing 0.07 acres7more or \nless. \nA \nPursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253. \nIf any of the forfeitable property described in the forfeiture section of this indictment, \nas a result of any act or omission of the defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, \nADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana Mucinska,\" \nADIA MARCINKOVA, \n(a) \ncannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; \n(b) \nhas been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third person; \n(c) \nhas been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; \n(d) \nhas been substantially diminished in value; or \n52 \nEFTA00191775\n", "char_count": 1721}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 189, "text_content": "(e) \nhas been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without \ndifficulty; \nit is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253(o), \nto seekfojeiture of any other property of said defendant up to the value of the above \nforfeitable property. \nPursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253. \nFORFEITURE 3 \nUpon convictire any of the violations alleged in Counts 2-11 of this indictment, \nthe defendants, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, SARAH KELLEN, ADRIANA ROSS, a/k/a \"Adriana \nMucinska,\" and NADIA MARCINKOVA, shall forfeit to the United States any property, real \nor personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission \nof such violation; and any property real or personal, constituting or derived from any \nproceeds that such person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation, \nincluding but not limited to the following: \na. \nA parcel of land located at 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, Florida \n33480, including all buildings, improvements, fi \ns, attachments, and easements found \ntherein or thereon, and more particularly described as: \nBeing all of Lot 40 and the West 24.3 feet of Lot 39, El Bravo Park, as \nrecorded in Plat Book 9, Page 9, in the records of Palm Beach County, Florida \nand \nBEING that portion lying West of Lot 40, El Bravo \n, in Section 27, \nTownship 43 South, Range 43 East, as recorded in Plat Bo k 9, Page 9, Public \nRecords of Palm Beach County, Florida, being bounded on the West by the \n53 \nEFTA00191776\n", "char_count": 1546}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 190, "text_content": "West side of an existing concrete seawall and the northerly extension thereof \nas shown on the Adair & Brady, Inc., drawing IS-1298, dated March 25, 1981, \nand bounded on the East by the shoreline as shown on the plat of El Bravo \nPark, and bounded on the North and South by the Westerly extensions of the \nNorth and South lines respectively of Lot 40, containing 0.07 acres, more or \nless. \nKant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594(b). \nA TRUE BILL. \nFOREPERSON \nR \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nA. MARIE VILLAFA&A \nASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nF \nT \n54 \nEFTA00191777\n", "char_count": 599}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 191, "text_content": "U.S.1 HARVEY \n1441 \nClio as MO ►\nMg (Irk Clf. 1989) \n7201,' and one count of filing a false \nincome tax return in April of 1981, a viola-\ntion of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).1 The govern-\nment alleges that Harvey kept millions of \ndollars derived from his lucrative drug \ndealings in a bank account in the Cayman \nIslands. In his individual income tax re-\nturn for the year 1980, however, Haney \ndenied that he had any proprietary interest \nin, or authority over, any bank account \noutside the United States\" Harvey also \nfailed to report the interest income he al-\nlegedly earned on his Cayman Islands ac-\ncount on his individual income tax returns \nfor the years 1978 to 1982. \nHarvey filed a motion In the district \ncourt on June 2, 1986 in which he alleged \nthat the government had informally grant. \ned him use immunity in return for his coop-\neration in a drug investigation in 1980. \nHarvey sought a pretrial hearing to require \nthe government to prove that the evidence \nit proposed to use at trial was derived from \na legitimate source independent of the im-\nmunized testimony, as Kastigar p. United \nStates, \nU.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1663, 82 \nLEd.2d \n(1972), required. The immuni-\nty agreement was never reduced to writ-\ning, but Harvey was able to point to a \nI. Title 26 U.S.C. 3 7201 provides in part as fol. \nlows: \nAny person who willfully attempts in any \nmanna to evade or defeat any tax imposed by \nthis title or the payment thereof shall, in addi-\ntion to other penalties provided by law, be \nguilty of a felony and, upon conviction there-\nof, shall be fined \nor imprisoned not more \nthan 5 years, or both. together with the costs \nof prosecution. \nThe fine for a violation of section 7201 commit• \nted before September 3. 1982 is an amount not \nmore than $10,000. For violations committed \nafter that date, Congress has increased the po \ntential penalty to not more than 8100,000. Tax \nEquity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, \nPub.L No. 97-248, § 329, 96 Stat 324, 617-18 \n(1982). \n2. Ti\n... [truncated, 4657 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/191 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=191]", "char_count": 4657}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 192, "text_content": "1442 \n889 FEDERAL REPORTER, 241 SERIES \n\"slam dunk\" to use the evocative words of \nHarvey's lawyer at the time. Making the \nbest of the situation, Harvey decided to \ncooperate with the government. \nAlthough the United States Attorney in \nthe Southern District of Alabama did not \nneed any of the testimony Harvey offered, \nhis counterpart in the Southern District of \nFlorida did. Thus, Harvey was able to \nreach a three-sided agreement with the \ngovernment \nAlthough there was some \ndispute at the \"pre-Ka:tiger\" hearings \nabout the specific terms of the actual bar-\ngain struck between Harvey and the \ngovernment, the witnesses agreed that the \nUnited States Attorney for the Southern \nDistrict of Alabama offered to dismiss the \nindictment pending in that district in return \nfor Harvey's cooperation with an investiga-\ntion that the United States Attorney for \nthe Southern District of Florida was con-\nducting. The United States Attorney for \nthe Southern District of Florida sent sever-\nal Drug Enforcement \nAdministration \n(\"DEA\") agents to Alabama where they \ninterviewed Harvey. Apparently Harvey \nmet his side of the bargain, and the United \nStates Attorney dismissed the indictment \nagainst Harvey in the Alabama quaalude \ncase. \nThe testimony differed sharply as to any \nfurther elements of the agreement. After \nweighing all the evidence, the magistrate \nfound that in addition to agreeing to drop \nthe Alabama indictment, the government \n4. Under the net worth method the government \nestablishes the taxpayer's total assets and liabili. \nties at the beginning ol the year and compares \nthem with the taxpayer's assets and liabilities at \nthe end of the year. If the excess of assets over \nliabilities increases during the year the increase \nis taxable unless the taxpayer can show that the \nincrease represents nontaxable income. See, \nas.. Holland v. United Slates. 34$ U.S. 121. 75 \nS.Ct. 127, 99 LEd. 150 (1954) (approving net \nworth method of reconstructing taxable income \nunder pr\n... [truncated, 4822 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/192 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=192]", "char_count": 4822}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 193, "text_content": "U.S.1 HARVEY \n1443 \natom 119 \nMI Matte Ha) \nfied that he told the grand jury that the \nFor the purposes of this appeal the \nprobable source of Harvey's income was \nhis drug-related activities. \nThe magistrate did not allow the govern-\nment to show that it had derived the evi-\ndence it presented to the grand jury—or \nthat it intended to introduce at trial—from \nlegitimate independent sources. The hear-\ning transcript, currently under seal, reveals \nconclusively that Snyder began to testify \nabout the trail that led to Harvey's Cayman \nIslands bank account, but upon the objec-\ntion of Harvey's counsel, the magistrate \nstopped Snyder from testifying further. \nThe magistrate considered such informa-\ntion irrelevant to the \"pre-Kostipar\" hear-\ning; instead, the magistrate reasoned that \nwhether the government derived the infor-\nmation leading to the indictment from inde-\npendent sources was properly a matter \nonly for a true Kastigar hearing. \nWith the findings of fact set out, the \nmagistrate then made a \"Finding of Law\" \nin which she concluded that the information \nconcerning Harvey's drug activities and re-\nlated financial dealings formed the basis \nfor the tax indictment and was \"inextrica-\nbly tied\" to the information that Harvey \nhad revealed to the DEA agents in 1980. \nEven though she had refused the govern-\nment the opportunity to demonstrate that \nthe evidence against Harvey came from • \nsource independent of the immunized testi-\nmony, the magistrate concluded that the \nevidence presented to the grand jury was \n\"tainted.\" The magistrate further conclud-\ned that the indictment violated the grant of \nimmunity extended to Harvey and recom-\nmended that the district court dismiss the \nindictment. \nThe district court reviewed the record de \nnovo and agreed with the magistrate's fac-\ntual finding that the government had ex-\ntended both use and transactional immuni-\nty to the appellee. The district court dis-\nmissed the indictment with prejudice. \nl\nye that It derived t\n... [truncated, 4251 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/193 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=193]", "char_count": 4251}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 194, "text_content": "1444 \n869 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nU.S. 267, 92 S.Ct 496, 30 LEd.2d 427 \n(1971) (plea agreement); In re Arnett, 804 \nF.2d 1200 (1111 Cw.1986) (plea agreement); \nRowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. \n1982) (immunity) United States v. Weiss, \n599 F.2d 780, 737 (6th Cir.1979) (immunity) \n(Tuttle, J.) ('lle protect the voluntariness of \na waiver of fifth amendment rights, where \na plea, confession, or admission is based on \na promise of a plea bargain or immunity, \nthe government must keep its promise.\"). \nSee also Plaster a. United States, 789 F2d \n289 (4th Gir.1986) (Immunity); Johnson v. \nLuntpkin, 769 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1985) (plea \nagreement); United States v. Carter, 454 \nF.2d 426, 427 (4th Cir.1972) (in bane) (immu-\nnity) (\"if the promise was made to defen-\ndant as alleged and the defendant relied \nupon it in incriminating himself, the \ngovernment should be held to abide by its \nterms\"). This is true because by entering \ninto a plea agreement the defendant for-\ngoes his important constitutional right to a \njury trial, or by testifying under a grant of \nimmunity he forgoes his fifth amendment \nprivilege. In either case courts will en-\nforce the agreement when the defendant or \nwitness has fulfilled his side of the bar-\ngain. \n121 Although federal law no longer pro-\nvides for formal, statutory grants of trans-\nactional immunity' a prosecutor may, as in \nthis case, informally grant transactional \nimmunity to a witness in return for his \ncooperation in a criminal case. Similarly, \nalthough 18 U.S.C. H 6002-6003 provide \nfor court-supervised grants of use immuni-\nty, prosecutors may extend such immunity \ninformally as well. Harvey did not receive \na formal (statutory) grant of transactional \nor use immunity, yet because due process \nrequires us to enforce the government's \nagreement with Harvey, we apply the same \nrules and method of analysis to an informal \ngrant of use or transactional immunity as \nwe would to a formal grant' E.g., United \n7. As a part of the\n... [truncated, 4331 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/194 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=194]", "char_count": 4331}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 195, "text_content": "US... HARVEY \n1445 \nells QOM rid 1434 (Inbar. 1949) \nonstrated that he testified under a grant of \nIV. TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY \nuse immunity, the burden shifts to the \nprosecution which then has \"the affirma-\ntive duty to prove that the evidence it pro-\nposes to use is derived from a legitimate \nsource wholly independent\" of the testimo-\nny given under the grant of immunity. See \nBraswell v. United States, — US. —, \n108 S.Ct. 2284, 2295, 101 LEd.2d 98 (1988); \nKastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct at 1666. \nSee also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm.; \n378 U.S. 52, 79 n. 18, 84 S.Ct. 1694, 1609 n. \n18, 12 LEd.2d 678 (1964). \nThe government contends that it derived \nthe evidence it used to secure Harvey's \nindictment by the grand jury and the evi-\ndence it intended to use at trial, from an \nindependent source. \nIn essence, the \ngovernment claims that while investigating \nsomeone else the Criminal Tax Division of \nthe Justice Department came upon a trail \nof evidence that led to Harvey's bank ac-\ncount in the Cayman Islands. \nAs we noted above, the record reveals \nthat the magistrate did not permit the \ngovernment to show the independe \nsources of its evidence against flame \nThe magistrate recommended that the i \ndictment be dismissed after having con-\nducted only the \"pre-iCastipar\" hearing. \nSimilarly, the district court dismissed the \nindictment in part because it believed that \nall of the government's evidence was given \nunder the 1980 grant of immunity. Yet \nsuch a conclusion was premature without \ngiving the government the opportunity to \nmeet its burden under Kastigar of proving \nthe independent source of its evidence. \nFor the same reason, any conclusion that \ntainted evidence sufficient to justify dis-\nmissing the indictment was presented to \nthe grand jury was also premature because \nthe government may have been able to \ndemonstrate that the evidence was not \ntainted at all. \n9. Transactional immunity statutes typically pro. \naided that \"no person shall be prosecuted or\n... [truncated, 4249 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/195 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=195]", "char_count": 4249}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 196, "text_content": "1446 \n869 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nty to crime.\" Id. at 142, SS S.Ct. at 228. \nInstead, the Court reasoned that a grant of \nimmunity \"should be construed, so far as \nits words fairly allow the construction, as \ncoterminous with what otherwise would \nhave been the privilege of the person con-\ncerned.\" t, \n33 S.Ct. at 228. See alto \nShapiro \nUnited States, 335 U.S. 1, 19, \n68 S.Ct. \n6, 1385, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) \n(following rule of construction of Mike). \nMore recently, in Kastigar, the Court up-\nheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. \n6002 on the ground that use immunity \n\"is coextensive with the scope of the privi-\nlege against self-incrimination, and there-\nfore is sufficient to compel testimony over \na claim of the privilege.\" 406 U.S. at 453, \n92 S.D.. at 1661. \nThe Court noted in Kastigar that trans- \nactional immunity is broader than the fifth \namendment privilege because it provides \nfor full immunity from future prosecution, \nwhile the fifth amendment privilege \"has \nnever been construed to mean that one who \ninvokes it cannot subsequently be prose-\ncuted.\" Id. Yet the Court has never indi-\ncated that transactional immunity is in any \nother respect broader than the fifth amend-\nment privilege. Thus, transactional immu-\nnity and use immunity are coterminous \nwith the fifth amendment privilege in all \nrespects other than their effect on the \ngovernment in the future. A grant of use \nimmunity prohibits the government from \nusing evidence disclosed either directly or \nderivatively, while a grant of transactional \nimmunity prohibits the government from \nprosecuting the witness at any time with \nrespect to the incriminating matters the \nwitness disclosed. \nAlthough Kastipar and Hake were cases \nin which the witness refused to testify, and \nthus the Court had to look to the scope of \nthe fifth amendment privilege in order to \ndetermine whether the proffered immunity \nsufficed to displace that privilege, we be-\nlieve the same principles apply to the case \nto. We\n... [truncated, 4428 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/196 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=196]", "char_count": 4428}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 197, "text_content": "U.S. \nHARVEY \nCas al Mr \n1431 filth Cur. lass) \nIn Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. \nthe general rule that the fifth amendment \n39, 88 S.Ct. 69'7, 19 L.Ed.20:1 889 (1968) the \nSupreme Court held that the fifth amend-\nment privilege was not entirely inapplicable \nto prospective acts. The petitioner in Man \nchetti was convicted of violating provisions \nof a statute that required professional \ngamblers to register annually with the In-\nternal Revenue Service and pay an occupa-\ntional tax. The Court, overruling a prior \ncase that had upheld the very same statute, \nUnited Stain v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 \nS.Ct. 510, 97 LEd. 764 (1953), held that the \npetitioner's assertion of his fifth amend-\nment privilege in refusing to comply with \nthe statute provided a complete defense to \nhis prosecution for failing to register and \npay the occupational tax.\" \nMarchetti explicitly rejected the notion \nthat the fifth amendment privilege offers \nprotection only as to past and present acts. \n390 U.S. at 53, 88 S.Ct at 705. Instead, \nthe Court emphasized that \"R)he central \nstandard for the privilege's application has \nbeen whether the claimant is confronted by \nsubstantial and 'real,' and not merely tri-\nfling or imaginary, hazards of incrimina-\ntion.\" Id., 88 S.Ct. at 705. Relying on this \nstandard, the Court held that the hazards \nof incrimination created by the registration \nand occupational tax provisions as to fu-\nture acts were not \"trifling or imaginary\" \nbecause prospective registrants could rea-\nsonably expect that compliance with these \nprovisions \"may serve as decisive evidence \nthat they have in fact subsequently violat-\ned state gambling prohibitions.\" Id, 88 \nS.Ct. at 706. \nAlthough application of this standard \nproved favorable to the petitioner in Mar-\nchetti, the Court stressed that this would \nnot usually be the case, as prospective acts \n\"will doubtless ordinarily involve only spec-\nulative and insubstantial risks of incrimina-\ntion.\" Id. at 54, 88 S.Ct. at 70\n... [truncated, 4470 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/197 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=197]", "char_count": 4470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 198, "text_content": "1448 \n889 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nused to incriminate him in a prosecution for \na different type of criminal act that he may \ncommit in the future. \nAccordingly, the \ncourt held that the defendant's testimony \nunder an informal grant of use immunity \nabout his involvement in a drug ring did \nnot prevent the government from indicting \nhim for subsequently manufacturing a gun \nsilencer, even though the district court \nfound that the defendant's immunized testi-\nmony had helped lead to the indictment on \nthe gun charge. See also United States \nGallo, 859 F.24 1078, 1088 (24 Cir.19 \n(Van Crasfeiland, J., concurring) (\"Licens-\ning and taxing statutes aside, the only haz-\nards of incrimination that are likely to be \nconsidered substantial and real are those \nwhich relate to existing or pant misdeed or \na continuing course of criminal activity.\"). \nC. \nWhen we apply these principles to the \ncase at hand, we see that the information \nHarvey revealed to the DEA agents in Sep-\ntember of 1980 could not have created sub-\nstantial and real hazards that it would in-\ncriminate him for tax crimes he later alleg-\nedly committed in April of 1981, 1982 and \n1983. \nCounts three through five of the \nindictment charged Harvey with evasion of \nincome taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and \n1982, offenses that could not have occurred \nuntil April of 1981, 1982, and 1983, when \nHarvey filed his tax returns for the preced-\ning years.\" Furthermore, the crime of \nwillfully filing a false tax return for income \nearned in 1980, as charged in count six of \nthe indictment, could not have occurred \nuntil April of 1981 when Harvey filed the \nallegedly fraudulent return.\" Thus, al-\nthough the crimes charged in counts three \nand six of the indictment related to Har-\nvey's 1980 taxes, the immunity granted in \n12. See Sansorrejl United States, 380 U.S 343, \n351, 85 act. 1 \n1010, 13 LEd.2d 882 (1965) \n(violation of 26 U.S.C. 17201 does not occur \nuntil the defendant commits an affirmative act \nconstitu\n... [truncated, 4386 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/198 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=198]", "char_count": 4386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 199, "text_content": "U.S. I HARVEY \nDuo sal* ?id 14.19 (11thClr. teem \nimmunity does not alter the independent \nunderstanding it is possible to apply \nduty Harvey had to report his income accu- \ncorrect analysis to the case at hand. \nrately. \nWe must reject Harvey's argument that \nthe 1980 grant of transactional immunity \nsomehow shielded the Cayman Islands \nfunds themselves from the reach of the tax \nlaws.\" There is no such thing as in rem \nimmunity. Harvey became immune from \nprosecution for those transactions about \nwhich he testified, but the money he dis-\nclosed did not somehow partake of this \nimmunity. The grant of transactional im-\nmunity the government extended to Har-\nvey in 1980 does not prohibit prosecution \nfor tax violations he allegedly committed in \nthe years following that grant of immunity. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the reasons we have stated above, \nwe REVERSE the decision of the district \ncourt and REMAND for proceedings con-\nsistent with this opinion. \nCLARK, Circuit Judge, dissenting: \nThe majority has written a well reasoned \nopinion on the scope of formal statutory \nimmunity. Insofar as the court holds that \nunder a formal grant of immunity, an indi-\nvidual is shielded from prosecution only to \nthe extent of his Fifth Amendment privi-\nlege, I believe it correctly states the law. \nUnfortunately, this case does not involve \nformal statutory• immunity. Instead, this \ncase involves an agreement between the \ndefendant and the prosecutor in which the \nprosecutor agreed not to prosecute the de-\nfendant in return for his cooperation. Not \nonly does the majority fail to recognize the \nfundamental difference between the two \nforma of immunity, it assumes that the \nsame rules apply to formal and informal \nimmunity. Since the same principles do \nnot apply, i dissent. To understand why \nthe analysis of the majority is erroneous, it \nis necessary to understand the various \nforms of \"immunity.\" \nOnly with that \nIS. Whether Harvey himself reasonably believed \nthis is a matter for the jur\n... [truncated, 4052 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/199 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=199]", "char_count": 4052}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 200, "text_content": "1450 \non FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \non his Fifth Amendment privilege against \nself-incrimination. \n18 U.S.C. § 6003(a). \nThe statute authorizes the granting of \n\"use\" and derivative use immunity. \n18 \nU.S.C. § 6002. Several points are notewor-\nthy. First, a United States Attorney does \nnot have the power to grant formal immu-\nnity. Instead, he must first subpoena a \nwitness and if the witness invokes the Fifth \nAmendment privilege, the prosecutor must \nobtain approval by the Attorney General or \nDeputy Attorney General and then request \nthe court to order the witness to testify. \n18 US.C. § 6003.' Second, the statute only \nauthorizes use immunity, not transactional \nimmunity. Third, since formal immunity is \ngranted to overcome a witness' invocation \nof the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme \nCourt has held that the scope of the immu-\nnity granted must be as broad as the privi-\nlege. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at \n1859. \nDue to the cumbersome requirements of \nobtaining properly authorized statutory im-\nmunity, U.S. Attorneys often make infor-\nmal agreements with individuals in return \nfor their cooperation. See United States a \nQuatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 45 (3d Cir.) (Al-\ndisert. J., dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. \n954, 100 S.Ct 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980). \nThe agreements are perfectly analogous to \nplea agreements: an individual with valu-\nable information bargains with the prosecu-\ntor with respect to pending charges in re-\nturn for that individual's cooperation. A \nusual condition of cooperation is that the \nindividual not be subject to prosecution for \nany of the information he provides. See id \nA prosecutor's power to grant informal \nimmunity derives from his inherent discre-\ntion over prosecuting cases; just as a pros-\necutor has the discretion to plea bargain, \nhe has the discretion to grant an individual \nimmunity from prosecution. We have held \nthat \"due process requires the prosecutor's \npromise to be fulfilled.\" Rowe ro. Gr(05n, \n676 F.2d 524, 52\n... [truncated, 4348 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/200 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=200]", "char_count": 4348}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 201, "text_content": "the Fifth Amendment. \npointed out, \nunder the self-incrimination clause of the \nfilth amendment, evidence of guilt in-\nduced by a government promise of immu-\nnity is 'coerced' evidence and may not be \nused against the accused. For purposes \nof compelling testimony which otherwise \nwould be privileged by the fifth amend-\nment, all that is constitutionally required \nis a grant of use immunity. However, in \norder to wore testimony, evidence or \nother cooperation from a potential \ncriminal defendant, a prosecutor may \nsee fit to promise complete immunity \nfrom prosecution. \nRowe, 676 F.23 at 627 (emphasis added). \nRowe holds that the government must of-\nfer at least use immunity when an individu-\nal is induced to cooperate, but that there is \nno Limit to what the defendant can demand \nin return for his cooperation. See Quota-\nmain, 613 F.28 at 45 (Aldisert, 3., dissent-\ning) (\"(71The United States Attorney is at \nliberty to impose conditions that usually \nrelate to testifying or providing certain in-\nformation. For his part the ... informant \noften imposes conditions of his own, usual-\nly relating to agreements not to prosecute \nbut often covering other matters as \nwell[.]\"). If the potential informant de-\nmands too much, the government may de-\ncide that the information is not worth the \nprice or the government can always sub-\npoena the potential informant to testify \nbefore a grand jury or at the trial thereby \nensuring that the informant is only granted \nuse immunity. This discussion illustrates \nthat the scope of an informal grant of \nimmunity depends on the bargain struck. \nThe majority therefore is incorrect to \nassume the same principles apply to deter-\nmining the scope of formal and informal \nimmunity. In determining that the Fifth \nAmendment defines the scope of a grant of \ninformal immunity, the majority ignores \nthe cited quotation from Rowe. The only \ncase the majority cites as support for its \n2. In 1965, the state Attorney General agreed not \nto prosecute R\n... [truncated, 4386 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/201 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=201]", "char_count": 4386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 202, "text_content": "1452 \n869 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nment is ambiguous, the ambiguity \"should \nbe resolved in favor of the criminal defen-\ndant\" Rowe, 676 F.2d at 626 n. 4 (ambi-\nguity over whether Attorney General's \npromise bound future Attorney General \nwas resolved in favor of the defendant); \nsee In re Arnett, 804 F.2d at 1203 (govern-\nment breached the agreement when it \nsought forfeiture of defendant's farm since \nwritten agreement ambiguous as to wheth-\ner government would seek forfeiture of \nproperty and government could not satisfy \nheavy burden of proving defendant under-\nstood government reserved right to seek \nproperty forfeiture): United States v. (Mi• \nchat!) Harvey, 791 F.2d at 301 (imprecision \nin terms of written agreement construed \nagainst the government). \n11 \nIn this case, Harvey was not granted \nformal statutory immunity. He was never \ncalled to testify and never invoked his Fifth \nAmendment privilege. If he had been \ngranted statutory immunity, a discussion \nof the scope of Harvey's Fifth Amendment \nprivilege would be relevant. Instead, Har-\nvey bargained with the government. In \nreturn for the information he provided, the \ngovernment agreed to drop the charges \nagainst him in Mobile and agreed not to \nprosecute him for any crimes related to the \ninformation he gave. There is no doubt \nthat Harvey entered an agreement with the \ngovernment and that he performed his side. \nThe crux of this case, therefore, depends \non an interpretation of the agreement not \nto prosecute. \nThe magistrate reconstructed the agree-\nment and found that Harvey had been \ngranted both \"transactional\" and \"use\" im-\nmunity for the information he provided. \nThe magistrate also determined that Har-\nvey had told the government about the \nCayman Islands funds. The majority ap-\nparently takes comfort from this finding, \nstating \"we are working solely with the \nfamiliar categories of transactional and use \nimmunity, and do not face any different \n'species' of immunity—e.g., an express \nagre\n... [truncated, 4277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/202 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=202]", "char_count": 4277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 203, "text_content": "U.S. I \nHARVEY \n1453 \nMarlin \nfilthCU. 1119) \nspite the majority's wishful thinking, we \nare dealing with an agreement not to prose \ncute. \nIn this case, the government never wrote \ndown the terms of the agreement. Addi-\ntionally, there is no record of the informa-\ntion Harvey provided. Clearly the written \nterms of the agreement would be the start-\ning place for determining the scope of im-\nmunity Harvey was granted. Due to the \ngovernment's gross negligence, however, \nwe are forced to reconstruct the terms of \nthe agreement' In order to do so, the \ncourt must look to the testimony of those \ninvolved in negotiating the agreement to \ndetermine what Harvey believed the agree-\nment provided and whether Harvey's ex-\npectations were reasonable. \nJerry Harvey testified that the govern-\nment \"agreed nothing I ever give (sic] \nthem would be used against me, nor would \nany U.S. Attorney's Office seek to prose-\ncute me for anything; that I was just get-\nting a clean walk, and I should stay on the \nGovernment's \nside \nand \nhelp \nthem.\" \nRecord Vol. 8, Tab 72 at 14. Harvey's \nattorney, Tom Haas, testified that \"the \nunderstanding I had with \ngent] \nwas that nothing that Je \nHa\nto \nthem, or any agent on\nnt \nwould ever at any time be used against \nJerry \nHarvey.\" \nId. \nat \n15. \nThis \ntestimony supports Harvey's argument \nthat he believed he was immune from any \nprosecution related to the information he \ngave. Significantly, no testimony by either \nof the prosecutors involved in the negotia-\ntions rebutted Harvey's broad interpreta-\ntion of the agreement. In response to a \nquestion by the court, the U.S. Attorney \nfor the Southern District of Alabama, Wil-\nliam Kimbrough, testified that Harvey was \n3. I emphasize this point because the majority \nsuggests. supra at 1442-1443, that the only prob. \nlea is that \n• \nrecord of the informauon \nIS \nprovided by \nWhile that omission is \nImportant. it is\n problematic (and ulti. \nmately decisive in my mind) that there is no \nrecord of the te\n... [truncated, 4418 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/203 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=203]", "char_count": 4418}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 204, "text_content": "1454 \n889 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \ngovernment had no authority to enter the \nagreement as Haney perceived it because \nit granted immunity for future crimes, it is \nnot persuasive. Pint, it is not apparent \nthat Harvey would know that the govern-\nment did not have the power to enter the \nagreement as he perceived it. Second, that \nargument ignores the possibility that the \ngovernment may have lead Harvey to be-\nlieve (or at least contributed to his misun-\nderstanding) that the agreement offered \nsuch immunity. Finally, this court has nev-\ner refused to enforce a plea agreement just \nbecause the government made a bad deal. \nI would therefore hold that the govern-\nment agreed that it would not prosecute \nHarvey with respect to the Cayman Islands \nfunds and that Harvey believed that he \nwould not be prosecuted for failing to re-\nport the interest on the Cayman Islands \nfunds. This does not mean that Harvey \nwas immunized from declaring the interest. \nQuite the contrary, I believe that Harvey \nwas required to pay taxes on the interest \nand that the government may collect those \nback taxes. It may not, however, crimi-\nnally prosecute Harvey for failing to re-\nport his interest I also do not believe that \nthe agreement forever insulates Harvey \nfrom criminal prosecution for failing to re-\nport his taxes. Because the government \nfailed to provide any evidence to disbelieve \nHarvey's view of the agreement, it is ap-\nparent that the indictment entered against \nHarvey on November 25, 1985 for the fret \ntime put Harvey on notice that his under-\nstanding of the agreement conflicted with \nthe government's view. After that point, it \nbecame unreasonable for Harvey to believe \nthe agreement provided such broad immu-\nnity. \nIII \nIn conclusion I wish to emphasize that \nthis case presents unique facts and con-\ncerns which fortunately are of infrequent \noccurrence. The concern of the majority is \nthat my view provides carte blanche au-\nthority to U.S. Attorneys to enter into plea \n\n... [truncated, 4321 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/204 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=204]", "char_count": 4321}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 205, "text_content": "U.S.I HARVEY \n1455 \nOa elbrt r \n(What 11909) \nHarvey's due process rights not to be \nprosecuted pursuant to the government's \nagreement are violated by the majority's \nreversal of the district court's dismissal of \nthe tainted indictment. \nAPPENDIX \nThe following are excerpts from the \nmagistrate's report. (Record, Vol. 8, Tab \n72). \nTom Ham [Harvey's attorney] and \nWilliam Kimbrough, who was at the time \nof the agreement the U.S. Attorney in \nthe Southern District of Alabama, testi-\nfied the deal negotiated with Harvey was \nthat Haney would not be prosecuted for \nanything about which he told the Govern-\nment nor would anything he said be used \nagainst him. \nQ. by Leonard Sands \nA. by Tom Haas \nQ. What was the bargain that was ulti-\nmately struck with the two of them? \nA. Once it had been understood that he \nmight be able to supply these things, the \nunderstanding I had with Ruddy and Bil-\nly was that nothing that Jerry Harvey \nsaid to them, or any agent on the \nGovernment would ever at any time be \nused against Jerry Harvey. \nQ. And what does that mean, \"would \never be used against Jerry Harvey? \nA. That he wouldn't be prosecuted on \nthe basis of what they found out from \nhim. \nQ. What instructions or advice did you \ngive Jerry Haney prior to his attending \nthis meeting at the Sheraton? \nA. Well, I told him just what I just said, \nand I remember that Jerry was very \nskeptical about that He didn't seem to \ntrust anybody, and maybe he didn't trust \nme either. Really, he didn't know me' \nanything about me. I was a small town \nlawyer in a small town to him, and I \ndon't recall who had referred him to me. \nI usually try to find that out, particularly \nin drug cases, because I don't want to \nget in a situation where I am getting \npaid by somebody else. \nI 'mow that he was skeptical. I know \nhe didn't trust anybody, and I had to \nliterally force him to comply. I said, \"I \nknow these people, U.S. Attorney, and \nAssistant U.S. Attorney.\" I said, \"I \nwould stake my life on t\n... [truncated, 3584 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/205 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=205]", "char_count": 3584}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 206, "text_content": "1456 \n869 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nAPPENDIX—Continued \nbody in Mobile, Alabama, pursuant to \nthis agreement, and this letter, and your \nunderstanding of this, could you prose-\ncute him for that murder? \nTHE WITNESS: 1 don't know. I prob-\nably •ouldn't have. \nTHE COURT: Could you use his state-\nment or facts that he gave you in the \nstatement in building of the murder \nease?\nTHE WITNESS: No, because it would \nbe derived from the statement he gave. \n• \n• \n• \n• \n• \nQ. by Leonard Sands \nA. by Jerry Lee Harvey \nQ. As a result of those conversations, \nwas it your understanding you had an \nagreement with the U.S. Attorneys Of-\nfice in the Southern District of Alabama? \nA. I knew I did. Mr. Kimbrough, and \nMr. Fevre told me, and Tom Haas told \nme. \nQ. What did they tell you your deal \nwas? What were you supposed to do? \nA. I was supposed to tell them every-\nthing I knew about drug trafficking, peo. \nple involved, how it took place, what hap-\npened to the funds, how you would reg-\nister airplanes fictitiously. Anything I \nknew from 1975, and everything I had \ndone from '75 up to the present time. \nQ. And what was the Government's ob-\nligation to you in return for your cooper-\nation? \nA. They agreed nothing I ever give \nthem would be used against me, nor \nwould any U.S. Attorney's office seek to \nprosecute me for anything; that I was \njust getting a clean walk, and I should \nstay on the Government's side and help \nthem. \nThe best that can be said as a summa-\nry of the evidence or statement made by \nHarvey to the Drug Enforcement Agents \nat that meeting is that Harvey told them \nall about his drug dealings in which he \nhad been involved prior to his arrest in \nJune of 1980, and including the arrest of \n1980. This Court specifically finds from \nthe facts adduced at the hearing that the \ndefendant Harvey also divulged to the \nDrug Enforcement Administration his fi-\nnanci►l dealings with respect to his it \nlegal drug deals. \nHATCHETT, Circuit Judge, \ndissenting. \nI join Judge\n... [truncated, 2993 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/206 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=206]", "char_count": 2993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 207, "text_content": "Page 1 of 3 \nWestlaw. \nCJS INJUNCTION § 281 \n43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 281 \nCorpus Juris Secundum \nDatabase updated December 2007 \nPage I \nInjunctions \nBy John Bourdeau, J.D., Nicole D. Fox, J.D., John R. Kennel, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group, Charles \nJ. Nagy, J.D., Thomas Muskus, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D. \nIV. Subjects of Protection and Relief \nH. Criminal Acts, Conspiracies, Prosecutions, and Judgments \n2. Criminal Proceedings, Prosecutions, and Judgments \nTopic Summary References Correlation Table \n§ 281. When injunctive relief available \nWest's Key Number Digest \nWest's Key Number Digest, Injunction C=105(1) \nThere are circumstances under which the courts properly make exceptions to the general rule that equity will \nnot interfere with criminal process by entertaining actions for injunction in advance of criminal prosecutions. \nAn injunction to restrain a criminal prosecution may issue where a statute authorizes such relief,[FNI] and \napart from statute, there are circumstances under which courts properly make exceptions to the general rule that \nequity will not interfere with criminal processes by entertaining actions for injunction in advance of criminal \nprosecutions.[FN2] More specifically, an injunction to restrain a criminal prosecution lies where it is shown that \nthe prosecution is for the sole purpose of unlawfully taking property, destroying the business of the plaintiff,[FN3] \nor will result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff,[FN4) and the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.[FN5] \nFurthermore, there must be a grave danger of impending or imminent injury to the person or property rights; a mere \nthreat or bare fear of such injury is not sufficient.[FN6) \nSo long as the court has jurisdiction and the case is not moot,(FN7] the grant or denial of an injunction is a \nmatter for the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion according to the circumstances and exigencies of \neach particular case.[FN8] It is dependent on the \n... [truncated, 2915 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/207 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=207]", "char_count": 2915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 208, "text_content": "Page 2 of 3 \nOS INJUNCTION § 281 \n43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 281 \nsuit for injunction.[FN16] \nPage 2 \nSuit relating to same matters pending in equity. \nAnother exception to the general rule is that a court of equity will restrain a criminal prosecution begun while \nthere is pending in equity a suit to try the same right between the same parties.[FN17] It has been stated that this \nrule is limited to cases where the parties sought to be enjoined have as plaintiffs submitted themselves to the court \nin the equity proceeding.(FN18] The suit must be pending in equity when the injunction is sought,(FN19) and the \nsubject matter of the two proceedings must be identical.[FN20] \nIt has been broadly stated that equity will enjoin a criminal proceeding if necessary to prevent a multiplicity of \nsuits.[FN21] Furthermore, in some cases an exception to the general rule denying injunctive relief has been made \non the ground that the prosecutions sought to be enjoined were vexatious and oppressive.[FN22] \n[FN1] Neb.—Webber'. City of Scottsbluff, 141 Neb. 363, 3 N.W.2d 635 (1942). \n[FN2] Ga.—Sarrio \nGwinnett County, 273 Ga. 404, 542 S.E.2d 485 (2001). \n[FN3] Ark.-Billy/Dot, Inc. \nFields, 322 Ark. 272, 908 S.W.2d 335 (1995). \nGa.—Sarrio \nGwinnett County, 273 Ga. 404, 542 S.E.2d 485 (2001). \n(FN41 U.S.-Scolaro I. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 946 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1996). \nGa.—Sarrio \nGwinnett County, 273 Ga. 404, 542 S.E.2d 485 (2001). \n(FN5] U.S.—Metro Medical Supply, Inc. \nShalala, 959 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). \nGa.—Sarrio \nGwinnett County, 273 Ga. 404, 542 S.E.2d 485 (2001). \n(FN6) U.S.—Gersten \nRundle, 833 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Fla. 1993), affd, 56 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir. 1995). \nGa.—Sarrio \nGwinnett County, 273 Ga. 404, 542 S.E.2d 485 (2001). \n[FN7] Ark.—Dickey \nSignal Peak Enterprises, 340 Ark. 276, 9 S.W.3d 517 (2000). \nTenn.-Storey'. Nichols, 49 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). \n[FN8] Wyo.—Nation \nGiant Dmg Co., 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1964). \n[FN9] N.Y.—Weiss\n... [truncated, 2488 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/208 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=208]", "char_count": 2488}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 209, "text_content": "Page 3 of 3 \nC.IS INJUNCTION § 281 \nPage 3 \n43A C.J.S. Iniunctions § 281 \n[FN11] U.S.—Metro Medical Supply, Inc. \nShalala, 959 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). \n[FN12] U.S.-U.S.'. Hasiwar, 299 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). \n[FN13] N.Y.-Simonsonil Cahn, 33 A.D.2d 790, 307 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Degn 1969), ordcr affd, 27 \nN.Y.2d I, 313 N.Y.S.2d 9 , 261 N.E.2d 246 (1970). \n[FN14] U.S.—Younger 1 Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971). \n[FNIS] U.S.—New Am. Library of World Literature I. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823, 52 Ohio Op. 289, 67 Ohio \nL. Abs. 143 (N.D. Ohio 1953). \n[FN16] U.S.—Algs, Inc. \nCrosland, 327 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1971), order af d, 459 F.2d 1038 (5th \nCir. 1972). \n[FN17] U.S.—Packard 1 Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596 (1924). \n[FN18] Fla.—Gulf Theatres'. State ex rel. Ferguson, 133 Fla. 634, 182 So. 842 (1938). \n[FN191 U.S. Hartirader 1. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 19 S. Ct. 119, 43 L. Ed. 399 (1898). \n[FN20] Fla.—Coleman \nGreene, 136 Fla. 276, 186 So. 541 (1939). \n[FN21] Pa.—Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals \nBravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. \n350, 237 A.2d 342 (1968). \n[FN22] Ala.—Quinnelly I. City of Prichard, 292 Ala. 178, 291 So. 2d 295 (1974). \nC 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govi. alorks. \naS INJUNCTION § 281 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nC 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=... \n12/27/2007 \nEFTA00191796\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 210, "text_content": "STOLT-NIELSEN, S.A.' U.S. \n177 \nCIleas443 F.3d 177 Ordar. 3006) \nCount Three is ripe for federal adjudica-\ntion, and the District Court's dismissal on \nthis ground will be reversed. We reserve \njudgment on whether a claim upon which \nrelief can be granted has been stated. \nThe facial SDP and EPC challenges to the \nOrdinance and the SDP challenge to appel-\nlees' obstructive course of conduct prior to \nthe enactment of the Ordinance are ripe \nfor review. The complaint states a facial \nSDP claim upon which relief can be grant-\ned as to the Ordinance, and a SDP claim \nas to appellees obstructive course of con-\nduct, and the order of the District Court \ndismissing those claims on this ground will \nbe reversed. The complaint fails to state \nan EPC claim, and the order of the Dis-\ntrict Court dismissing on this ground will \nbe affirmed. To the extent that the Dis-\ntrict Court dismissed the SDP, EPC, Tak-\nings and Tortious Interference claims \n(Counts One through Four) against the \nindividual defendants on the ground of ab-\nsolute legislative immunity, the order of \nthe District Court will be vacated, and we \nwill remand for findings consistent with \nthis opinion. To the extent the District \nCourt accorded the individual defendants \nlegislative immunity as to appellants' SDP \nclaim attacking defendants' pre-Ordinance \nconduct under Blanche Road the order of \nthe District Court will be reversed. The \norder of the District Court granting sum-\nmary judgment on Counts Four and Seven \nwill be affirmed as to all appellees, except \nStern, with respect to whom the order will \nbe reversed. The District Court's dismiss-\nal of Count Five on statute of limitations \ngrounds will be affirmed,' and the order \ndismissing Count Six will be vacated. The \ncross-appeal will be dismissed. \nIn sum, the following claims survive: a \nsubstantive due process facial challenge to \nthe Ordinance; a substantive due process \nchallenge to appellees' obstructive course \nS. Appellants have not argued that t\n... [truncated, 3244 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/210 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=210]", "char_count": 3244}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 211, "text_content": "178 \n442 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \n1. Federal Courts er•754.1, 814.1 \nDistrict court's grant or denial of per-\nmanent injunction is reviewed for abuse of \ndiscretion, while its underlying legal con-\nclusions are reviewed without deference. \n2. Federal Courts e=.776 \nDistrict \ncourt's \ndetermination of \nwhether potential criminal defendant's co-\noperation agreement with government has \nbeen breached Ls legal conclusion, re-\nviewed de novo. \n3. Injunction e=105(I) \nAlthough court generally lacks juris-\ndiction to enjoin criminal prosecution, ex-\nception exists when necessary to avoid \nchilling effect on First Amendment or sim-\nilar constitutional rights. U.S.C.A. Cont. \nAmend. 1. \n4. Criminal Law e=42.5(3), 273.1(2) \nGovernment must adhere strictly to \nterms of agreements made with defen-\ndants, including plea, cooperation, and im-\nmunity agreements, to extent they require \ndefendants \nto \nsacrifice \nconstitutional \nrights. \n5. Injunction e=,105(1) \nDistrict court lacked authority to en-\njoin indictment of corporation and officer \nfor antitrust violations, despite claim that \nindictment would violate terms of immuni-\nty agreement entered into as part of gov-\nernment's corporate leniency program; \nthough agreement may have been defense \nto conviction, it was not defense to indict-\nment \n6. Equity 4=46 \nSuit in equity does not lie where there \nis plain, adequate and complete remedy at \n• Then Judge. now Justice. Alito heard oral an \ngumcnt in this case but was elevated to the \nUnited States Supreme Court on January 31. \n2006. This opinion is filed by a quorum of \nthe panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). \nlaw that is as complete, practical and effi-\ncient as that which equity could afford. \nR. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen-\neral, Scott D. Hammond, Mahn Del shim, \nDeputy Assistant Attorneys General, John \nP. Fonte, John J. Powers, III, (Argued), \nUnited States Department of Justice, Anti-\ntrust Division, Washington, D.C., Robert \nE. Connolly, Antonia R. Hill, Wendy B. \nNorm\n... [truncated, 3122 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/211 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=211]", "char_count": 3122}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 212, "text_content": "STOLT-NIELSEN, S.A. \nU.S. \nace al 442 F.341177 (3rdC1r. \nsuch a ease and therefore reverse the Dis-\ntrict Court's judgment to the contrary. \n1. \nA. Background \nAppellee Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., through its \nsubsidiary Stolt-Nielsen Transportation \nGroup Ltd. (collectively \"Stolt—Nielsen\" or \nthe \"Company\"), is a leading supplier of \nparcel tanker shipping services. In March \n2002, Stolt—Nielsen's general counsel, Paul \nO'Brien, resigned. According to a com-\nplaint O'Brien filed against Stolt-Nielsen \nin Connecticut Superior Court in Novem-\nber 2002, and a subsequent article in The \nWall Street Journal, O'Brien advised his \nsuperiors of illegal collusive trading prac-\ntices between Stolt-Nielsen and two of its \ncompetitors, and resigned after the Com-\npany failed to take action to resolve the \nproblem. On receiving O'Brien's Novem-\nber 2002 complaint, Stolt-Nielsen hired \nJohn Nannes, a former Deputy Assistant \nAttorney General in the Antitrust Division \nat the U.S. Department of Justice, to con-\nduct an internal investigation of possible \nantitrust violations by the Company and \nadvise it regarding any criminal liability. \nOn November 22, 2002, Nannes met \nwith the chairman of Stolt-Nielsen's tank-\ner division, Samuel Cooperman. Cooper-\nman informed Nannes that O'Brien \n\"raisledl some antitrust concerns\" in early \n2002, and that in response Stolt-Nielsen \nrevised its antitrust compliance policy and \ndisseminated it to its employees and com-\npetitors. \nCooperman also told Nannes \nthat he believed an internal investigation \nwould demonstrate that the Company was \nin violation of federal antitrust laws and \nasked Nannes about the possibility of le-\nniency from the Department of Justice. \nWith Cooperman's permission, Nannes \nspoke with an Antitrust Division official \nlater that day to inquire about amnesty if \nStolt-Nielsen were to admit its violations, \n179 \nand the Government informed him that an \ninvestigation had already begun. \nSpecifically, Nannes inquired about pos-\n\n... [truncated, 3749 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/212 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=212]", "char_count": 3749}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 213, "text_content": "180 \n442 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nantitrust policy that were implemented in \nresponse to O'Brien's concerns. During \nthe ensuing investigation, Nannes learned \nthat between 1998 and 2001 a Stolt—Niel-\nsen executive, Andrew Pickering, ex-\nchanged customer allocation lists with two \nof Stolt—Nielsen's competitors, presumably \nfor the purpose of apportioning customers \namong the companies and restraining com-\npetition. In January 2003, Pickering's \nsuccessor, appellee Richard Wingfield, \nprovided Nannes with four such lists, \nwhich confirmed that Stott-Nielsen had in-\ndeed engaged in illegal anticompetitive be-\nhavior. \nNannes promptly turned these \nlists over to the Government, which en-\ntered into a Conditional Leniency Agree-\nment (the \"Agreement\") with Stolt-Niel-\nsen on January 16, 2003. \nUnder the terms of the Agreement, the \nGovernment agreed \"not to bring any \ncriminal prosecution against [Stott-Niel-\nsen] for any act or offense it may have \ncommitted prior to the date of this \n[Agreement] in connection with the anti-\ncompetitive activity being reported.\" This \npromise was, of course, subject to Stolt-\nNielsen's strict compliance with the afore-\nmentioned conditions, \"[Aubject to verifi-\ncation [by the Government! and subject to \n[Stott-Nielsen's) full, continuing and com-\nplete cooperation.\" The Agreement fur-\nther stated: \nIf the Antitrust Division at any time \ndetermines that [Stott-Nielsen] has vio-\nlated this Agreement, rig shall be \nvoid.... Should the Antitrust Division \nrevoke the conditional acceptance of \n[Stott—Nielsen) into the Corporate Le-\nniency Program, the Antitrust Division \nmay thereafter initiate a criminal prose-\ncution against [Stott—Nielsen], without \nlimitation. Should such a prosecution be \ninitiated, any documentary or other in-\nformation provided by [Stoll-Nielsen), \nas well as any statements or other infor-\nmation provided by any current or for-\nmer director, officer, or employee of \n[Stott-Nielsen) to the Antitrust Division \npur\n... [truncated, 3666 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/213 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=213]", "char_count": 3666}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 214, "text_content": "STOLT-NIELSEN, SA.' US \naleas442 FM 177 (2rdC1r. 2e06) \nseveral months after O'Brien raised his \nconcerns to Cooperman in early 2002. \nThe Government concluded that Stolt-\nNielsen, and Wingfield in particular, con-\ntinued to collude unlawfully with competi-\ntors until November 2002. Based on this \ninformation, the Government informed \nNannes on April 8, 2003 that it was sus-\npending Stolt-Nielsen's obligations under \nthe Agreement and considering withdraw-\ning the grant of conditional leniency en-\ntirely because the Company did not take \n\"prompt and effective action to terminate \nits part in the anticompetitive activity be-\ning reported upon discovery of the activi-\nty,\" as required by the Agreement. One \nof Wingfield's subordinates, Bjorn Jansen, \nthen admitted that the anticompetitive \nagreement between Stolt-Nielsen and its \ncompetitors was still in place in the fall of \n2002, despite having told Nannes that \nsuch conduct ceased in March 2002 once \nthe Company learned of O'Brien's allega-\ntions and issued its new antitrust policy. \nIn June 2003, the Government concluded \nthat Wingfield had not fulfilled his obli-\ngations under the Agreement because he \nnever informed the Government that his \nunlawful communications with Stolt-Niel-\nsen's competitors did not cease in March \n2002 when Stolt-Nielsen issued its new \nantitrust policy. On June 24, 2003, the \nGovernment charged Wingfield by criminal \ncomplaint with violating the Sherman Act, \n15 U.S.C. § I. The Government withdrew \nits grant of conditional leniency to Stolt-\nNielsen on March 2, 2004, and announced \nthat it intended to indict the Company and \nWingfield for violations of the Sherman \nAct.I \nI. Although the Government \"charged\" Wing-\nfield by criminal complaint in June 2003. it \ncould not prosecute him without an indict-\nment. See 1 Charles Alan Wright, Fed. Prac-\ntice & Procedure § 121, at 518 (3d ed. \n1999) (-Although a criminal proceeding may \n181 \nD. District Court Proceedings \nShortly before the Gover\n... [truncated, 3741 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/214 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=214]", "char_count": 3741}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 215, "text_content": "182 \n442 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nan issue appropriate for consideration be-\nfore indictment \"because if an indictment \nwere later determined to have been \nwrongfully secured, it would be too late to \nprevent the irreparable consequences.\" \na at 560. The Court further found that \nthe Agreement did not specify a discovery \ndate and instead granted amnesty for ac-\ntivity before January 15, 2003, the date on \nwhich it was signed. Indeed, it found that \n\"the date when (Stott-Nielsen] ended its \nparticipation (in the conspiracy] was never \nclearly established,\" id at 662 n. 10, and \ntherefore, in light of the Agreement's inte-\ngration clause, \"DOJ, especially because it \ndrafted the agreement, cannot depend \nupon a tacit understanding of what it con-\ntends was meant Ito be the discovery date] \nbut was not memorialized in the integrated \nagreement.\" Id at 562. The Court con-\ncluded: \nThe agreement immunizes [Stolt-\nNielsen] from prosecution for activity \nprior to January 15, 2003. Now DOJ \ncontends the activity had to have \nstopped at an earlier unspecified date \nthat is not set forth in the agreement. \nHad it wanted to fix the date sometime \nbefore January 15, 2003, it could have \nreplaced the words \"to the date of this \nletter\" with the earlier date it now con-\ntends the parties contemplated. \n... [The Government's] goals (in con-\ncluding the Agreement with Stott-Niel-\nsen] were to pursue [Stolz-Nielsen's] co-\nconspirators and break up the conspira-\ncy. It got what it had bargained for in \nthe agreement.. .. \nNow that it has \nreceived the benefit of the bargain, DOJ \ncannot prosecute the party that incrimi-\n2. The District Coun had jurisdiction over this \ncase under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. as it is a civil \naction arising under the laws of the United \nStates. \nOur jurisdiction arises under 28 \nnated itself when it delivered the evi-\ndence DOJ used to accomplish its goals. \nId \nE. Appeal \nOn appeal, the Government contends \nthat the District Court erred in two re-\nspects. \n... [truncated, 3374 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/215 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=215]", "char_count": 3374}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 216, "text_content": "STOLT-N1ELSEN, S.A. I US. \n183 \nCliess412 1,3d 171 (3rdC1r. 2006) \n111. \n(31 The Supreme Court has observed \nthat the executive branch \"has exclusive \nauthority and absolute discretion to decide \nwhether to prosecute a case,\" United \nStates v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. \n3090, 41 L.Ed2d 1039 (1974), and the Gov-\nernment therefore argues that courts lack \njurisdiction to enjoin a criminal prosecu-\ntion. See United States v. Cox, 342 F2d \n167, 171 (5th Cir.1965) (en bane) (\"It fol-\nlows, as an incident of the constitutional \nseparation of powers, that the courts are \nnot to interfere with the free exercise of \nthe discretionary powers of the attorneys \nof the United States in their control over \ncriminal prosecutions.\"). \nThere is an exception to this general \nrule, however, in order to avoid a chilling \neffect on constitutional rights. See Dom-\nbrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87, 85 \nS.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed2d 22 (1965) (recogniz-\ning that the threat of criminal prosecution \ncreates the potential for a serious chill \nupon First Amendment rights); Hynes a \nGrimes Packing Co., 887 U.S. 86, 98-99, 69 \nS.Q. 968, 93 L.Ed. 1231 (1949) (recogniz-\ning that the threat of prosecution may \ndeny fishermen the right to earn a liveli-\nhood); Truax v. Raich, 289 U.S. 88, 88-89, \n86 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915) (recognizing \nthat the threat of prosecution may lead to \nan unconstitutional denial of the right to \nearn a livelihood and to continue employ-\nment). The Supreme Court has typically \napplied the exception in the First Amend-\nment context, and in such cases has recog-\nnized, \n[al criminal prosecution under a stat-\nute regulating expression usually in-\nvolves imponderables and contingencies \nthat themselves may inhibit the full ex-\nercise \nof First \nAmendment \nfree-\ndoms. ... The assumption that defense \nof a criminal prosecution will generally \nassure ample vindication of constitution-\nal rights is unfounded in such cases.... \n(\\Vie have not thought that the improba-\n... [truncated, 4102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/216 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=216]", "char_count": 4102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 217, "text_content": "184 \n442 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nenjoin a federal criminal prosecution in \norder to avoid the filing of an indictment. \nThe District Court relied on a Seventh \nCircuit case, United States v. Meyer, 167 \nF.3d 1067 (7th Cir.1998), as authority for \nconducting a pre-indictment review of the \nAgreement before us. See Stolt-Nielsen, \n852 F.Supp2d at 560-61. In Meyer, the \nSeventh Circuit stated, in dicta, that \"the \npreferred procedure, absent exigent cir-\ncumstances, would be for the government \nto seek relief from its obligations under \nthe immunity agreement prior to indict-\nment. Since the government is required \nto obtain a judicial determination of a de-\nfendant's breach prior to trial, it is but a \nde minimis inconvenience for the govern-\nment to secure that determination pre-\nindictment\" 157 F.3d at 1077. \nWe have no quarrel with the Seventh \nCircuit's observation that, in many circum-\nstances, a pre-indictment determination of \nthe parties' obligations under an immunity \nagreement might be useful. We point out, \nhowever, that no federal court (including \nthe Seventh Circuit) has held that a pre-\nindictment determination is constitutional-\nly required. Indeed, notwithstanding its \ndicta regarding the \"preferred procedure,\" \nthe Meyer Court held the defendant was \nconstitutionally \"entitled to a judicial de-\ntermination of his breach before being de-\nprived of his interest in the enforcement of \nan immunity agreement,\" and that this \n\"interest\" was in not being convicted, rath-\ner than not being indicted Id. at 1076-\n77.' As the Court noted, \"a post-indict-\nment evidentiary hearing on the defen-\ndant's alleged breach was sufficient to sat-\nisfy due process.\" Id at 1076 (citing \nUnited States v. Verrusio, 803 F2d 885, \n889 (7th Cir.19136)). \n(51 Other immunity agreements that \nhave promised not to charge or otherwise \n3. In keeping with the case law discussed be: \nlow, the Seventh Circuit reached this conclu-\nsion despite the (act that the immunity agree-\nment\n... [truncated, 4415 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/217 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=217]", "char_count": 4415}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 218, "text_content": "STOLT-NIELSEN, SA. \nU.S. \n185 \nClicas442 Pad 177 Pratte. \nCircuit noted in Denver, in the absence of \na chilling effect on constitutional rights, \nthe adversary system \"afford(s) defen-\ndants, after indictment, a federal forum in \nwhich to assert their defenses—including \nthose based on the Constitution. Because \nthese defendants are already guaranteed \naccess to a federal court, it is not surpris-\ning that subjects of federal investigation \nhave never gained injunctive relief against \nfederal prosecutors.\" 822 F2d at 69-70.6\nAlthough this interpretation of agree-\nments \"not to prosecute\" may seem coun-\nterintuitive, it comports with the federal \ncourts' general reluctance to recognize a \nright not to be indicted or tried in the \nabsence of an express constitutional (or \nperhaps statutory) command. In the con-\ntext of interlocutory appeals challenging \ntion against (a state's) good-faith attempts to \nenforce it.\" a \"showing of bad faith (or) \nharassment\" might \"justify federal interven-\ntion\"); see also Howard W. Brill, Equity and \nthe Criminal Law, 2000 Ark. L. Notes I, 3-4 \n(noting that state courts have sometimes used \ninjunctions to prevent bad-faith prosecutions. \nsuch as those brought solely to \"harass and to \nretaliate for the exercise of constitutional \nrights,- or where the prosecutor charges con-\nduct that is not illegal). As our precedent \nmakes clear, however, in the absence of a \nstate prosecution. federal-state abstention \ndoctrine is irrelevant and Younger does not \napply. Pic-A-Siate Pa., Inc.' Reno, 76 F.3d \n1294. 1300 (3d Cir.1996). Moreover, even if \nthe principles of Younger or the willingness of \ncertain state courts to entertain injunctions \nagainst bad-faith or illegal prosecutions could \nbe applied to a federal prosecution, we per-\nceive no bad faith on the part of the Govern. \nmcnt in this case; rather, the parties are \nengaged merely in a good-faith dispute over \nthe meaning of the Agreement. \n3. We note that the District Court's finding \nt\n... [truncated, 4523 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/218 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=218]", "char_count": 4523}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 219, "text_content": "186 \n442 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \ntrial on the charge against him,\" it neces-\nsitates an exception to the \"firm congres-\nsional policy against interlocutory or \n'piecemeal' appeals.\" Id at 656, 659, 97 \nS.Q. 2034. Likewise, the Speech and De-\nbate Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, 6, el. \n1 (\"[F]or any speech or debate in either \nHouse, [members of Congress) shall not \nbe questioned in any other Place.\"), has \nbeen construed \"to protect Congressmen \nnot only from the consequences of litiga-\ntion's results but also from the burden of \ndefending themselves,\" thus allowing in-\nterlocutory appeals from denials of claims \nof immunity under that Clause. Helstoski \nv. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508, 99 S.Ct. \n2445, 61 L.Ed2d 80 (1979) (internal quota-\ntion marks omitted). \nOur case is not an interlocutory appeal, \nbut the Supreme Court's cases in that field \nare instructive because they reinforce the \nnarrowness of a defendant's ability to chal-\nlenge the Government's decision to pursue \na prosecution. Just as the authority to \nenjoin criminal enforcement of a law regu-\nlating speech is grounded in the overriding \nneed to avoid a chilling effect on the exer-\ncise of core constitutional rights, so too \ndoes the right not to be prosecuted recog-\nnized in Abney and Helstoski stem from \nexpress textual commands in the Constitu-\ntion that prohibit any interference with the \nrights against double jeopardy or of mem-\nbers of Congress to speak freely in legisla-\ntive session. \nIn other contexts, however, courts have \nrefused to allow interlocutory appeals to \nstop prosecutions. See, e.g., United States \nv. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, \n268, 102 S.Ct 8081, 73 L.Ed2d 754 (1982) \n(per curiam) (holding that a vindictive \nprosecution claim may not be raised in an \ninterlocutory appeal to stop an ongoing \nprosecution, but rather may only be raised \nafter the defendant has been convicted, \nbecause \"reversal of the conviction and ... \nthe provision of a new trial free of prejudi-\nc\n... [truncated, 3928 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/219 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=219]", "char_count": 3928}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 220, "text_content": "STOLT-NIELSEN, SA. \nU.S. \nOtems442 Fid 177 (3rdar. \n1 \nment.\"),I But their contention that the \nimmunity they purportedly received under \nthe Agreement precludes an indictment in \nthe first place is belied by precedent, and \nwe see no compelling reason to reach a \ndifferent result in this case. \n• \n* \n• \n• \n• \n• \n[61 \"[Al suit in equity does not lie \nwhere there is a plain, adequate and com-\nplete remedy at law ... !that is) as com-\nplete, practical and efficient as that which \nequity could afford.\" Terrace v. Thomp-\nson, 263 U.S. 197, 214, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 \nL.Ed. 255 (1923). Here, Stolt-Nielsen and \nWingfield have a practical and efficient—\nand indeed complete—legal remedy avail-\nable to them, i.e., access to a federal forum \npost-indictment in which they may assert \nthe Agreement as a defense. Separation-\nof-power concerns thus counsel against us-\ning the extraordinary remedy of enjoining \nthe Government from filing the indict-\nments. Although courts have carved out a \nnarrow exception to this rule in those \n6. In our view, the pretrial determination ap-\nproved by the Seventh Circuit in Meyer does \nnot conflict with the observations of the Fifth \nand Eighth Circuits that non-prosecution \nagreements of the sort involved in this case \nprotect against the risk of conviction and pun-\nishment. not trial. See Bailey. 34 F.3d at 691; \nBird, 709 F.2d at 392. For one thing, Bailey \nand Bird concerned attempted interlocutory \nappeals from district court denials of post• \nindictment claims that immunity agreements \nbarred conviction, and as such were not con• \ncerned with the timing of the claims in the \ndistrict court. In any event, it is not in the \ninterest of defendants or the Government. \nonce an indictment has been issued, to pro-\nceed with a trial before determining whether \nan immunity agreement bars conviction. We \ntherefore agree with the Seventh Circuit that \na pretrial hearing is appropriate in these \ncircumstances. We note, however, that this \ntiming is not essen\n... [truncated, 4096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/220 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=220]", "char_count": 4096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 221, "text_content": "188 \n442 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nEarle B. GREGORY; Ken Blinko; Bet-\nty C. Coley; Vicki Grainger; Ethel E. \nGraves; Becky Haitian; John S. Hal-\nsall, Ill; Jerry F. McDaniel; Veronica \nT. McDaniel; \nLaverne McKenzie; \nMarianne McKenzie; Nathan J. Neely; \nZevie ti. Neely; Sulina Prather, Ka-\nthryn Roddey; Gina Tibbs; John A. \nTibbs; John C. Tibbs; Brenda D. \nWatts; Gerald D. Watts; C. Ann \nWilliams; Henry M. Williams, \nWesley L. Williams, Jr.; Grant \n; \nTom Moore; Anna Nunnery; Charles \nShope; Penelope Shope; Kathy An-\nnette Wood; Sam Jones Wood; Ruth \nAnn M, Plaintiffs-Appellees, \nFINOVA CAPITAL CORPORATION, \nDefendant-Appellant. \nNo. 05-2118. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nFourth Circuit. \nArgued Feb. 2, 2006. \nDecided March 14, 2006. \nBackground: Noteholders filed class ac-\ntion securities fraud suit against now-\nbankrupt issuer's principal lender. The \nUnited States District Court for the Dis-\ntrict of South Carolina, G. Ross Anderson, \nJr., J., certified class, and lender appealed. \nHolding: The Court of Appeals, Luttig, \nCircuit Judge, held that class action was \nnot superior method for fair and efficient \nadjudication of controversy. \nReversed. \nKing, Circuit Judge, concurred in part, \ndissented in part, and filed opinion. \nnate its part in the anticompetitive activity \nbeing reported upon discovery of the activi-\n1. Federal Courts @'817 \nDistrict court's class certification deci-\nsion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. \nFed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A. \n2. Federal Civil Procedure 4=172 \nParty seeking class certification bears \nburden of proving entitlement to same. \nFed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A. \n3. Federal Civil Procedure e=187 \nClass certification of noteholders secu-\nrities fraud claims against now-bankrupt \nissuer's principal lender was abuse of dis-\ncretion, absent showing that class action \nwas superior method for fair and efficient \nadjudication of controversy; same claims \nwere already pending against lender in \nbankruptcy adv\n... [truncated, 2784 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/221 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=221]", "char_count": 2784}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 222, "text_content": "Page 1 of 2 \nwestlaw\nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 1113646 (M.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: 2007 WL 1113646 (M.D.Pa.)) \nOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States District Court, \nM.D. Pennsylvania. \nMichael Curtis REYNOLDS, Petitioner \nJohn GURGANUS, Prosecutor, Respondent. \nCivil No. 4:CV-07-675. \nApril 12, 2007. \nMichael Curtis Reynolds, Scranton, PA, pro se. \nDennis Pfannenschmidt, U.S. Attorneys Office, \nHarrisburg, PA, for Respondent. \nMEMORANDUM \nJAMES F. McCLURE, JR., United States District \nJudge. \nBackground \n*1 Michael Curtis Reynolds (\"Petitioner\"), an \ninmate presently confined in the Lackawanna \nCounty Prison, Scranton, Pennsylvania initiated this \npro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant \nto 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Reynolds' petition is \naccompanied by an in forma pauperis application. \nFor the reasons set forth below, Reynolds' petition \nwill be dismissed as meritless. \nNamed as sole Respondent is Assistant United \nStates Attorney John Gurganus of the Middle \nDistrict of Pennsylvania. This is the latest in a series \nof civil rights complaints and habeas corpus \npetitions filed by Reynolds which challenge the \nlegality of his ongoing federal criaiinal prosecution \nin this district. See United States I Reynolds, Case \nNo. \n3:05-CR-493. \nAUSA \nGurganus \nis \nthe \nprosecuting attorney. In his petition, Reynolds \nreasserts his previous claims that there has been a \nviolation of his speedy Dial rights and perjured \nPage I \ntestimony was presented before the grand jury. As \nrelief, Reynolds seeks reversal of his federal \ncriminal charges and release. \nDiscussion \nRule 4 (\"Preliminary Consideration by the Judge\") \nof the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the \nUnited States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254 \n(1977) (applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule \n1(b)) permits summary dismissal of i§ 2241 habeas \ncorpus petition.. See, e.g., Patton \nFenton, 491 \nF.Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D.Pa.1979). A judge may\n... [truncated, 3635 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/222 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=222]", "char_count": 3635}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 223, "text_content": "Page 2 of 2 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 1113646 (M.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: 2007 WI, 1113646 (M.D.Pa.)) \nadditional defenses/arguments before the judge \npresiding over his ongoing federal criminal \nproceedings. \nFN I. Petitioner's federal criminal trial is \npresently scheduled for May 29, 2007. \n*2 Furthermore, even if convicted of the pending \nfederal criminal charges, the appropriate avenue for \nReynolds to pursue his present arguments would be \nvia a direct appeal, and if not successful therein, to \nthen seek collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. \nAs Petitioner has been previously told, it is simply \nnot appropriate for this Court to entertain his claims \nof speedy trial violation and perjured grand jury \ntestimony via a pre-trial federal habeas corpus \npetition. If Reynolds wishes to pursue his present \narguments, he must do so in his ongoing federal \nprosecution, or thereafter before the Court of \nAppeals. The petition for writ of habeas corpus will \nbe denied. An appropriate Judgment will enter. \nORDER \nIn \naccordance \nwith \nthe \naccompanying \nMemorandum, IT IS HEREBY \nORDERED \nTHAT: \n1. Petitioner is granted leave to proceed in forma \npauperis for the sole purpose of the filing of this \naction. \n2. Reynolds' habeas corpus petition is DENIED. \n3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. \n4. Based on the Court's determination herein, there \nis no basis for the issuance of a Certificate of \nAppealability. \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 1113646 \n(M.D.Pa.) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nID 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. \nPage 2 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstreantaspx?svr-Full&prft—HTMLE8ant=FederalGo... 12/27/2007 \nEFTA00191810\n", "char_count": 1721}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 224, "text_content": "Page 1 of 2 \nWestlaw. \n173 Fed.Appx. 840 \nPage I \n173 Fed.Appx. 840, 2006 WL 592928 (C.A.D.C.) \n(Cite as: 173 Fed.Appx. 840) \nH \nMiranda I. Gonzales \nC.A.D.C.,2006. \nThis case was not selected for publication in the \nFederal Reporter.Please use FIND to look at the \napplicable circuit court rule before citing this \nopinion. District of Columbia Circuit Rule 28(c). \n(FIND CTADC Rule 28.) \nUnited States Court of Appeals,District of \nColumbia Circuit. \nManuel A. MIRANDA, Appellant \nv. \nAlberto GONZALES, et al. Appellees. \nNo. 05-5066. \nFeb. 16, 2006. \nRehearing En Banc Denied May II, 2006. \nBackground: \nPlaintiff \nfiled \ncomplaint \nfor \ninjunctive and declaratory relief, seeking prevention \nof any criminal investigation related to past conduct \nas Senate aide and to immunize him from future \nprosecution. United States District Court \nfor \nDistrict of Columbia dismissed complaint, and \nplaintiff appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals held that: \n(1) plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief, and \n(2) denial of request for declaratory judgment was \nnot abuse of discretion. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnote \nIII Injunction II  f)105(1) \nInjunction \n21211 Subjects of Protection and Relief \n2121I(H) Matters Relating to Criminal Acts \n212k105 Criminal Prosecutions \n212k105(1) k. In General. Most Cited \nCases \nPlaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief to \nprevent criminal investigation related to past \nconduct as Senate aide and to immunize him from \nfuture prosecution; if indicted, plaintiff could \nprotect his rights under First Amendment and raise \ndefense under Speech and Debate Clause of federal \ncriminal procedure rules. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I \nFed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 12(b), 18 U.S.C.A. \n121 Declaratory Judgment 118A C=84 \n118A Declaratory Judgment \nI ISAR Subjects of Declaratory Relief \n118A11(A) Rights in General \n118Ak84 k. Criminal Laws. Most Cited \nCases \nDenial of request for declaratory relief with respect \nto complaint to prevent criminal investigation into\n... [truncated, 2895 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/224 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=224]", "char_count": 2895}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 225, "text_content": "Page 2 of 2 \n173 Fed.Appx. 840 \n173 Fed.Appx. 840, 2006 WL 592928 (C.A.D.C.) \n(Cite as: 173 Fed.Appx. 840) \nthe United States District Court for the District of \nColumbia and on the briefs by counsel. For the \nreasons set forth below it is \nORDERED that the judgment from which this \nappeal has been taken be affirmed. Miranda \nappeals the district court's dismissal of his \ncomplaint to enjoin any criminal investigation \nrelated to his past conduct as a Senate aide and to \nimmunize him from future prosecution. It is \nwell-settled, however, that a court will not act to \nrestrain a criminal prosecution if the moving party \nhas an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer \nirreparable injury if denied equitable relief. See \nDeaver I Seymoj, 822 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C.Cir.1987) \n(citing Younger \nHarris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.O. \n746, 27 L.Ed.2 \n669 (1971)). The district court \ncorrectly held that, if indicted, Miranda can protect \nhis rights under the First Amendment and Speech or \nDebate Clause pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal \nRules of Criminal Procedure. F.R.Crim. P. 12(b) \n(2005) (upon indictment, defendant may raise by \nmotion defense based on \"defects in the institution \nof the prosecution\"). See also Deaver, 822 F.2d at \n70 (\"existence of Rule 12(b)( (3) ] suggests that \nappellant's constitutional challenge is not to be \nraised in a preindictment civil injunctive action\"). \n[1] Miranda argues that without injunctive relief his \nFirst Amendment right will be \"chilled\" and that the \nchilling constitutes a special circumstance that \n*84 \nhim to injunctive\n2\nentitles \nrelief under \nDombrowski \nPfister. 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.O. \n1116, 14 L.E . \n! 2d 22 (1965). As the district court \npointed out, however, injunctive relief is not \nappropriate unless \nthe \nparty seeking it can \ndemonstrate that his \"First Amendment interests \n[are] either threatened or in fact being impaired at \nthe time relief us] sought.\" Joint Appendix 66 \n(quoting Wagner \nus\nTaylor, 836 F.2d 566, 576 n. 76 \n\n... [truncated, 4416 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/225 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=225]", "char_count": 4416}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 226, "text_content": "IN RE SEIZURE OF ALL FUNDS \n577 \nClterst4 F35 S77 (2550r. 1995) \ndismiss the complaint for lack of subject \nmatter jurisdiction. \nIn re the SEIZURE OF ALL FUNDS IN \nACCOUNTS IN the NAMES REGISTRY \nPUBLISHING, INC., Sterling Who's \nWho, Inc., Who's Who of Retailers, Inc., \nWilliam's Who's Who, Inc., Who's Who \nExecutive Club, Bruce Gordon, Who's \nWho Worldwide Registry, Inc., Publish-\ning Ventures, Inc., including but not \nlimited to Marine Midland Bank Ac-\ncount Nos. 018-78090-3, 018-78047-4, \n018-78044-0, 018-78055-6, 018-78153-6, \n018-78173-0, Sterling National Bank & \nThat Company of New York Account \nNos. 036-79716-07, 031-13410-01, 031-\n43102-01, Republic National Bank for \nSavings Account No. 2601001775, and All \nFunds Traceable Thereto. \nBruce GORDON, Who's Who Worldwide \nRegistry, Inc., Sterling Who's Who, Inc., \nRegistry Publishing, Inc., William's \nWho's Who, Inc., Who's Who Executive \nClub, Publishing Ventures, inc., Who's \nWho of Retailers, Inc., Petitioners-Ap-\npellees, \nv. \nUNITED STATES of America, \nRespondent-Appellant. \nNo. 474, Docket 95-6119. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nSecond Circuit. \nArgued Aug. 81, 1996. \nDecided Oct. 17, 1996. \nGovernment appealed from order en-\ntered in the United States District Court for \nthe Eastern District of New York, Arthur D. \nSpat J., 887 F.Supp. 436, vacating ex parte \nseizure warrant authorizing seizure of funds \nbelonging to companies and their founder \nthat were allegedly proceeds of mail and wire \nfraud scheme involving companies' sales of \nmemberships in various \"who's who\" regis-\ntries. The Court of Appeals, Milton Pollack, \nSenior District Judge, sitting by designation, \nheld that (1) remand was required for con-\nsideration of new evidence to determine ex-\nact nature of bargain between companies and \nmembers and thus whether salesmen's repre-\nsentations to members were material, and (2) \ndistrict court lacked authority to enjoin gov-\nernment from mailing additional question-\nnaires to members to obtain\n... [truncated, 3270 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/226 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=226]", "char_count": 3270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 227, "text_content": "578 \n68 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nto enter into with company. 18 U.S.C.A. \n1811. \n6. Forfeitures 0 ,5 \nDetermination that probable cause did \nnot exist to believe that companies and their \nfounder had committed mail or wire fraud in \nconnection with sales of memberships in com-\npanies' \"who's who\" registries, and thus that \ncompanies' funds were not subject to seizure, \nhad to be remanded for reconsideration of \nnature of bargain between companies and \nmembers in light of members' responses to \ngovernment questionnaires, and thus wheth-\ner salesmen's representations could be con-\nsidered material misrepresentations; while \ndistrict court concluded that bargain between \ncompanies and members entailed purchase of \nmembership in registry and companies mak-\ning available other services or products, new \nevidence showed that members had bar-\ngained to join exclusive registries that would \nprovide opportunities for networking among \nprominent group of individuals, and thus reg-\nistries more exclusive in nature than ones \nwhose members were merely culled from \nmailing lists. 18 U.S.C.A. if 981, 1341, 1343. \n7. Constitutional Law ew73 \nInjunction ta.106(1) \nIn context of government's investigation \nof alleged mail and wire fraud scheme, and \neffort to seize funds as proceeds of those \nschemes, district court lacked authority to \nenjoin government from mailing additional \nquestionnaires to purported \nvictims of \nscheme to obtain further evidence of proba-\nble cause; as incident to separation of pow-\ners, court may not interfere with free exer-\ncise of discretionary powers of attorneys of \nUnited States in their control over criminal \nprosecutions. \nBarbara Underwood, Assistant United \nStates Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Zachary W. \nCarter, United States Attorney for the East-\nem District of New York, Deborah B. \nZwany, Arthur P. Hui, Sarah J. Lum, Gary \nR. Brown, Assistant United States Atter-\n•7he Honorable Milton Pollack of the United \nStates District Court for the Southern \n... [truncated, 3899 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/227 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=227]", "char_count": 3899}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 228, "text_content": "IN RE SEIZURE \nacesees F.341 577 \ntential customers either by telephone or by \nsending solicitation letters through the mail. \nThe salespersons explained to potential cus-\ntomers that, upon becoming a member, they \nwould receive a registry containing biograph-\nical data and addresses of all members, a \npersonalized plaque, and a camera-ready \nlogo. In addition, customers were told that, \nas members, they could purchase a CD-\nROM version of the registry, a subscription \nto Tribute, a magazine containing profiles of \nother members, a credit card, and discounted \ntelephone and travel services. The salesper-\nsons also stressed that membership was ex-\nclusive and prestigious, and that membership \nwould provide valuable networking opportu-\nnities. As a result of their sales efforts, the \nCompanies had acquired more than 60,000 \nmembers by the end of 1994. \nIn July of 1991, based on complaints re-\ngarding the Companies' business practices \nreceived from the New York State Depart-\nment of Law, the New York State Consumer \nProtection Board and the Better Business \nBureau, the United States Postal Inspection \nService commenced an investigation into \nGordon and the Companies. The investiga-\ntion culminated in a complaint and affidavit \n(the \"Complaint\"), sworn to by Postal Inspec-\ntor Martin T. Biegelman. In the Complaint, \nBiegelman alleges that the Companies' bust-\nness operations constitute a \"telemarketing \nboiler room\" operation using \"high pressure \ntelephone sales pitches that misrepresent the \nidentity of the Company and the nature of its \nproducts in order to defraud customers into \npurchasing one of the Company's 'Who's \nWho' directories and other products.\" lie-\ngelman contends that the Companies' sales-\npersons made fraudulent representations re-\ngarding the nomination and selection process \nfor membership in the registries, the pres-\ntige of the registries, free placement in the \nregistries, the identity of other members of \nthe registries, the usefulness of the r\n... [truncated, 4616 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/228 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=228]", "char_count": 4616}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 229, "text_content": "580 \n68 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nrepresentations did \"not constitute a scheme \nor artifice to defraud, either singly or in the \naggregate.\" In addition to vacating the sei-\nzure warrant, the district court vacated the \nTRO against the government. \nThe government then moved for a stay of \nthe release of the seized funds. On June 7, \n1995, the district court granted a temporary \nstay pending application to this court for a \nfurther stay. On the same day, the govern-\nment filed a Notice of Appeal of the district \ncourt's May 30 Order. On June 9, the court \nreleased $220,000 of the seized funds. On \nJune 26, 1995, we denied the government's \nmotion for a stay, pending appeal to this \ncourt, of the partial release of seized funds \ngranted by the district court. In re AU \nFunds in Accounts in Neonate Registry Pub. \nlislting, Inc., 58 F.3d 855 (24 Cir.1996). \nSince the district court's May 30, 1995 \nvacatur of the TRO, the government has \nredesigned its questionnaire in order to gen-\nerate from the registry members information \nregarding the materiality of the misrepresen-\ntations. The government now has mailed \nover 49,000 questionnaires to the members, \nand has received approximately 7000 re-\nsponses. The government has moved in this \nco\nor permission to supplement the rec-\nord\nth the responses to these question-\nnaires or, in the alternative, for remand to \nallow the district court to consider whether \nits order should be modified in light of these \nquestionnaires. \nDISCUSSION \nI. Probable Cause \n(1) In order to seize property under 18 \nU.S.C. § 981, the government must demon-\nstrate that there was probable cause to be-\nlieve that the property is subject to forfei-\nture. Marine Midland Bank N.A. v. Unit-\ned States 11 P.M 1119, 1124 (2d Clr.1993). \nIn the context of the seizure of bank accounts \nallegedly forfeitable under f 981, \n(p)robable cause is established if the gov-\nernment can show that it has reasonable \ngrounds, more than mere suspicion, to be-\nlieve that,\n... [truncated, 4248 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/229 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=229]", "char_count": 4248}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 230, "text_content": "IN RE SEIZURE OF ALL FUNDS \n581 \nCheat' IF-Id 171 (Saar. I 1724) \nfound in sales tactics that misrepresent the \nusefulness of an Item. Id at 1180. We \nasserted that: \ncases sustaining convictions for mail fraud \nhave involved sales tactics and representa-\ntions which have tended to mislead the \npurchaser, or prospective purchaser, as to \nthe quality or effectiveness of the thing \nbeing sold, or to mislead him with regard \nto the advantages of the bargain which \nshould accrue to him. Thus claims or \nstatements in advertising may go beyond \nmere puffing and enter the realm of fraud \nwhere the product must inherently fail to \ndo what is claimed for it. And promotion \nof an inherently useful item may also be \nfraud when the scheme of promotion is \nbased on claims of additional benefits to \naccrue to the customer, if the benefits as \nrepresented are not realistically attainable \nby the customer. \nId (internal quotations omitted). According-\nly, in order for sales tactics to rise to the \nlevel of mail fraud, misrepresentations must \nbe material to the bargain that the customer \nis induced to enter into with the company. \nSee id at 1182. \nIn Regent, we held that the particular mis-\nrepresentations made by the salespersons \nwere not material to the nature of the bar-\ngain between the companies and the custom-\ncm. Id In that case, customers bargained \nfor office stationery, and, although misrepre-\nsentations were made by the stationery com-\npanies in order to gain the attention of the \ncustomers, the customers received the prod-\nucts for which they had bargained. Id at \n1180. Accordingly, such false claims were \nnot material to the bargain between the cus-\ntomers and the companies. \nWe affirmed the conviction for mail fraud \nin United States v. Rota 66 F2d 741 (2d \nCir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 654, 62 S.Ct. 679, \n76 L.Ed. 1289 (1932), involving a scheme to \nsell worthless land. Although the victims of \nthe scheme did not prove that they had \nsuffered any loss, this court he\n... [truncated, 4340 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/230 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=230]", "char_count": 4340}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 231, "text_content": "582 \n68 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nIn making this determination, the district \ncourt largely relied on our description of \nfraudulent sales tactics in Regent and found \nthat the sales tactics used by the Companies \ndid not amount to mail fraud. Although the \ncourt determined that some of the Compa-\nnies representations were \"false or deceiv-\ning,\" it found that these representations were \n\"not material to the bargain struck between \nthe membership purchaser and the Compa-\nny.\" The court stated that the representa-\ntions were \"not directed at 'the quality, ade-\nquacy or price of the goods,' nor (did) they \nconcern facts 'essential in deciding whether \nto enter the bargain.'\" Furthermore, the \ncourt found that the members \"received ex-\nactly what [they] paid for when they pur-\nchased a membership,\" and that there was \nnot a \"discrepancy between benefits reason-\nably anticipated because of the misleading \nstatements and the actual benefits which the \ndefendant delivered, or intended to deliver\" \nAccordingly, the court determined that the \ngovernment had not shown that it had proba-\nble cause to believe that the Companies had \ncommitted mail or wire fraud. \nAlthough the court concluded that the \nCompanies' misrepresentations were not ma-\nterial to the bargain between the Companies \nand the members, we think that the court did \nnot flatly evaluate the true nature of the \nbargain. The members had bargained with \nthe Companies to join exclusive registries \nthat would provide opportunities for net-\nworking among a prominent group of individ-\nuals. \nAlthough the members did obtain \nmembership in \"selective\" registries, they \nhad bargained to join registries of a more \nexclusive nature than ones whose members \nmerely were culled from mailing lists. As a \nresult, this may be a different situation than \nthat presented in Regent, where the consum-\ners received the products for which they had \nbargained. In the present case, membership \nin the registries may not have provided t\n... [truncated, 4333 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/231 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=231]", "char_count": 4333}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 232, "text_content": "U.S.' NELSON \ncite as 68 F \n593 (9nd Cir. 1993) \nfurther findings and reconsideration in actor- \njustice to grant transfer. \ndance with the foregoing. \n§ 6032. \nUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, \nI \nLemrick NELSON, Jr., Defendant-\nAppellee. \nNo. 421, Docket 95-1271. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nSecond Circuit. \nArgued Aug. 29, 1996. \nDecided Oct. 17, 1996. \nThe United States District Court for the \nEastern District of New York, David G. \nTrager, J., denied government's motion to \ntransfer juvenile for adult prosecution. Gov-\nernment appealed. The Court of Appeals, \nMiner, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) juvenile's \nage at time of transfer proceeding should \nhave been considered; (2) district court \nshould have assumed juvenile committed of-\nfense charged in information and not exam-\nined strength of government's evidence; (3) \njuvenile's conviction as adult for actions after \nalleged offense should have been considered; \n(4) \"glimmer of hope\" test for rehabilitation \nwas explicitly rejected; and (5) finding re-\ngarding availability of programs designed to \ntreat juvenile's behavioral problems was in-\nadequate. \nVacated and remanded. \n1. Infants 4=68.7(2) \nJuvenile alleged to have committed act \nafter 16th birthday which, if committed by \nadult, would be felony that is crime of vio-\nlence may be proceeded against as adult \nwhere district court, after transfer motion by \nAttorney General, finds it is in interest of \n583 \n18 U.S.C.A. \n2. Infants .068.7(3) \nBurden is on government to establish \nthat transfer of juvenile to adult status is \nwarranted, as there is presumption in favor \nof juvenile adjudication. 18 U.S.CA § 5032. \n3. Infants .2=68.7(2) \nIn determining whether transfer of juve-\nnile to adult status would be in interest of \njustice, district court must consider, and \nmake findings in record regarding, statutory \nfactors of juvenile's age and social back-\nground, nature of offense alleged, nature and \nextent of any prior delinquency record, pres-\nent ps\n... [truncated, 3409 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/232 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=232]", "char_count": 3409}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 233, "text_content": "372 \n945 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2c1 SERIES \n723, 79 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984) (listing alterna-\ntive methods of exhausting federal consti-\ntutional issues in state court without spe-\ncifically referring to them in constitutional \nterms). Instead, they need only present \nthe substance of a federal constitutional \nclaim to the state courts in order to ex-\nhaust the issue and preserve it for review \nin a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Pi-\ncard V. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S.Ct. \n509, 513, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). When a \nfederal habeas petitioner presents what \namounts to \"a mere variation in the same \nclaim rather than a different legal theo-\nry....\" Wilk. v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 38 \n(7th Cir.1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1086, \n101 S.Ct. 874, 66 L.Ed.2d 811 (1981), he has \npresented the state courts with the sub-\nstance of his claims and thus has properly \nexhausted them. In Hutchins v. Wain-\nwright, 715 F.2d 512 (11th Cir.1983), cert. \ndenied, 465 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct 1427, 79 \nL.Ed.2d 751 (1984), we concluded that a \npetitioner who had challenged the admis-\nsion of certain out-of-court statements on \nstate hearsay grounds had adequately \npresented and preserved a federal constitu-\ntional claim concerning the violation of his \nSixth Amendment right to confront the wit-\nnesses against him. \n(III To the extent that defendant's con-\nstitutional claim is based on the failure of \nthe Florida court to follow Florida law, \npetitioner presented both the state and fed-\neral courts with the identical claim, namely \nthat he had been convicted despite the pros-\necution's failure to demonstrate each ele-\nment of the offense. In both forums, the \nonly question is whether all of the elements \nof sexual battery under Florida law have \nbeen demonstrated in this case. CI Lani-\ngan v. Maloney, 853 F.2d 40, 44-46 (1st \nCir.1988), cert. denied, 488 US. 1007, 109 \nS.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 780 (1989) (objection \nto reasonable doubt instruction in state \ncourt sufficient to exhaust constitutional \ncl\n... [truncated, 3693 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/233 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=233]", "char_count": 3693}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 234, "text_content": "KEN \nCF. es 945 F \nT.1\n2\n1. Grand Jury 32.33 \nInjunction 4=.105( 1 ) \nTargets of federal grand jury investi-\ngation involving inquiry about whether \nthey and their companies had participated \nin criminal offenses involving distribution \nof prescription drugs without prescription \nand distribution of unapproved new drugs \nwere not entitled to enjoin grand jury pro-\nceedings or to secure advisory opinion from \nFood and Drug Administration with respect \nto whether their activities were illegal. \nFederal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, \n§ 305, 21 U.S.C.A. § 335. \n2. Federal Civil Procedure e=2840\nAppeal from district court's denial of \nsuit to enjoin grand jury proceedings in-\nvolving plaintiffs and seeking advisory \nopinion from Food and Drug Administra-\ntion with respect to whether plaintiffs' ac-\ntivities were illegal was frivolous justifying \nimposition of economic sanctions including \nreasonable attorneys fees and double costs. \nMichael PIIMMO, Zuckerman, Speeder, \nTaylor & Evans, Humberto J. Pena, Guy A. \nBasco, Miami, Fla, for plaintiffs-appel-\nlants. \nRichard Essen, Essen & Essen, P.A., \nNorth Miami Beach, Fla., for William Fa-\nloon. \nDexter W. Lebtinen, U.S. Atty., Miami, \nFla., Barbara K. Bisno, Ant. U.S. Atty., \nDeborah S. Smolover, U.S. Dept. of Justice, \nJacqueline H. Eagle, Office of Consumer \nLitigation, U.S. Dept of Justice, Washing-\nton, D.C., for defendants-appellees. \nAppeal from the United States District \nCourt for the Southern District of Florida. \nBefore KRAVITCH and EDMONDSON, \nCircuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior Circuit \nJudge. \nPER CURIAM: \nThis is a frivolous appeal from the dis-\ntrict court's denial of plaintiffs' suit to en-\njoin the United States Attorney from con-\nducting a grand jury proceeding involving \nthe plaintiffs. On or about April 9, 1990, \nappellants were advised by letter that they \nBENSON \n373 \nOlds Ct. 1991) \nwere targets of a federal grand jury inves-\ntigation. The investigation involved an in-\nquiry about whether plaintiffs and \n... [truncated, 3971 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/234 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=234]", "char_count": 3971}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 235, "text_content": "374 \n945 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \ntration with respect to whether their activi-\nties were illegal. The court was obviously \ncorrect in dismissing the complaint. With-\nout getting into a lengthy history of the \nstatute, suffice it to say that it was enacted \non June 30, 1906. The law has been twice \ninterpreted by the United States Supreme \nCourt to deny the relief sought by appel-\nlants here. First, in United States v. Mor-\ngan, 222 U.S. 274, 32 S.Q. 81, 56 L.Ed. 198 \n(1911), the Court closed its opinion with the \nfollowing sentence: \nThere is nothing in the nature of the \noffense under the pure food law, or in \nthe language of the statute, which indi-\ncates that Congress intended to grant \nviolators of this act a conditional immuni• \nty from prosecution, or to confer upon \nthem a privilege not given every other \nperson charged with a crime. \nThe Supreme Court confirmed this holding \nin United States v. Dotterweieh, 320 U.S. \n277, 64 S.Ct... 134, 88 L.F.d. 48 (1943). \n121 Appellants cite no authority to sup-\nport the appeal of the district court order \nto this court and, of course, they have \nnone. The arguments being without argu-\nable merit, economic sanctions are in order•\nincluding reasonable attorneys fees and \ndouble costs. Upon receipt of the mandate, \nthe district court, after hearing, should de. \ntermine the amount. See Hopson v. Fisch-\nbeck, 758 F.2d 579 (11th Cir.1985). \nAFFIRMED. \nH. POWELL. Plaintiff-\nAppellant, \nI \nUNITED STATES of America, \nDefendant-Appellee. \nNo. 90-6034. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nEleventh Circuit. \nOct. 22, 1991. \nMember of Church of Scientology filed \ncomplaint against Internal Revenue Service \n(IRS) seeking tax refunds on grounds that \nIRS inconsistently administered charitable \ndeductions for quid pro quo payments to \nreligious organizations. The United States \nDistrict Court for the Southern District of \nFlorida, No. 90-8271—CIV4LK, James Law-\nrealty Ring, J., granted a motion to dismiss. \nChurch member appealed. Th\n... [truncated, 3433 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/235 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=235]", "char_count": 3433}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 236, "text_content": "Page 1 of I \nWestlaw. \nAMJUR INJUNCTION § 180 \nPage I \n42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 180 \nC \nAmerican Jurisprudence, Second Edition \nDatabase updated November 2007 \nInJunsaggs \nRichard B. Gallagher, J.D., Timothy M. M, J.D., Gary A. Hughes, J.D, Steven \nD. Najarian, J.D., Jeffrey A. Schafer, J.D., and Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D. \nIII. Kinds of Rights Protected and Matters Controllable \nG. Acts of Public Bodies or Officials \n3. Enforcement of Statutes, Ordinances, or Administrative Orders \nb. Types of Laws \nTopic Summary; Correlation Table; References \n§ ISO. Criminal or penal statutes--Grand jury proceedings \nA grand jury cannot be enjoined from conducting lawful investigations and deliberations.[FN351 Thus, targets \nof a federal grand jury investigation involving an inquiry about whether they and their companies had participated \nin criminal offenses involving the distribution of prescription drugs without a prescription and distribution of \nunapproved new drugs were not entitled to enjoin grand jury proceedings or to secure an advisory opinion from \nFood and Drug Administration with respect to whether their activities were illegal. (F/436] The target of a federal \ngrand jury investigation had an adequate remedy at law for any irregularity in the investigative process and was not \nentitled to injunctive relief to prevent the grand jury from returning an allegedly tainted indictment.[FN371 \n(FN35) Ex pane Jones County Grand Jury, First Judicial Dist., 705 So. 2d 1308 (Miss. 1997). \n[F1436) Kent I. Benson, 945 F.2d 372 (11th Cir. 1990. \n[F1437) Blalock LU.S.,\n refill; denied, 856 F.2d 200 (11th Cr. 1988) and \n(distingured by, \nestin \nMcDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1991)) and (disagreed with on other grounds \nby, Finn \nSchiller, 72 F.3 1182 (4th Cir. 1996)). \n0 2007 Thomson/West \nAMJUR INJUNCTION § 180 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. \nhups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstreantaspx?sv—Full&prft=HTMLE8cmt=FederalGo... 12/27/2007\n... [truncated, 2015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/236 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=236]", "char_count": 2015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 237, "text_content": "US. I BURZYNSKI CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE \n1301 \ndose 819 Fad 1301 (331. CAr. 1987) \nEDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge, con-\ncurring: \nI write separately to emphasize what I \nbelieve is most salient in the majority's \ncareful exposition of 28 U.B.C. §§ 2680(a) \nand (h): these sections of the FTCA must \nbe harmonized. In achieving harmony, a \ntask made no simpler by Congress's drafts-\nmanship and the sketchy legislative history \nof the law enforcement proviso, it is not \nnecessary to conclude with the majority \nthat \"even Divots and Collinsville would \nnot pass muster\" if the law enforcement \nproviso, § 2680(h), is subject to the discre-\ntionary function exception, § 2680(a). As \nthe majority elsewhere observe, this court \nhas held that violations of agency regula-\ntions do not fall within the discretionary \nfunction exception so as to immunize the \nfederal government from tort liability. \nSee, e.g., Collins v. United States, 783 \nF.2d 1225 (5th Cir.1986). \nWhat I believe will require particular \nsensitivity in this task of statutory con-\nstruction is preserving prosecutorial and \ndiscretionary law enforcement immunity. \nCompare Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d \n243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 841, 88 \nS.Ct. 76, 19 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967) (decisions on \nwhen, where and against whom to prose-\ncute are discretionary under § 2680(a)); \nCray v. Beg 712 F.2d 400, 505 (D.C.Cir. \n1988) (\"Although the concepts of 'discre-\ntion' in official immunity law and under the \nFTCA are not of identical scope, they are \nsimilar and may have a common origin\"). \nIn law enforcement, while the opportunities \nfor government abuse abound, the incen-\ntive for oppressive use of FTCA lawsuits is \npowerful and pervasive. What better way \nto \"get even\" with one's accuser than t\nfile suit against the government on account \nof hi investigatory conduct? Such law-\nsuits are hardly less deleterious to consci-\nentious law enforcement than are actions \nseeking to impose personal liability, be-\ncause they \n... [truncated, 3723 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/237 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=237]", "char_count": 3723}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 238, "text_content": "1302 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \ncriminal search warrant, physician filed \ncounterclaim seeking damages, injunctive \nrelief, and contempt orders against Govern-\nment and certain FDA employees. \nThe \nUnited States District Court for the South-\nern District of Texas, Gabrielle K. Mc-\nDonald, J., dismissed counterclaims, and \nappeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, \nAlvin B. Rubin, Circuit Judge, held that: \n(1) claims under Federal Tort Claims Act \nrequired, as jurisdictional prerequisite, ad-\nministrative review; (2) employees involved \nin obtaining criminal search warrant were \nentitled to immunity from common law and \nconstitutional tort claims; (3) physician and \npatients were not entitled to return of \nseized patient records; (4) physician and \npatients were not entitled to injunction \nagainst use of records; (5) physician and \npatients were entitled to develop facts to \nsupport their claim to injunctive relief with \nrespect to Government's allegedly provid-\ning insurance companies with false and \nmisleading information; and (6) Govern-\nment complied with obligations under per-\nmanent injunction and, thus, it and its em-\nployees were not in contempt. \nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and \nremanded. \n1. Federal Civil Procedure em1957 \nDistrict court did not, in electing not to \nrestate, in its dismissal order, legal analy-\nsis it had already set forth in denial of \npreliminary motions for a temporary re-\nstraining order, return of property, and \ncontempt, conduct trial on merits, much \nless impermissibly consolidate trial with \nhearing on preliminary motions. \n2. Federal Civil Procedure .3251836 \nOrder denying preliminary motion for \na temporary restraining order, return of \nproperty, and contempt, and order dismiss-\ning action, taken together, adequately \npresented full review of actions taken by \ndistrict court and its reasons therefor; dis-\ntrict court elected not to restate in its dis-\nmissal order legal analysis it had already \nset forth in its denia\n... [truncated, 4002 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/238 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=238]", "char_count": 4002}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 239, "text_content": "U.S. v. BURZYNSICI CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE \ncmurn FM 1301 (31bar. 19.7) \nmg them from liability for their acts with \n13. Injunction 0.106(1) \nrespect to constitutional tort claims of phy-\nsician and patients; employees followed es-\ntablished constitutional procedures and vio-\nlated no norms of clearly established law. \nConstAmends. 4, 5, 8. \n9. Searches and Seizures wo.26. 160 \nWitnesses 4=0212 \nPatients had no legitimate expectation \nof privacy in records maintained by physi-\ncian that could be asserted against criminal \nsearch warrant and, thus, no standing to \nseek return of records; under Texas law, \nseizure pursuant to search warrant issued \nas part of criminal investigation was ex-\nempt from physician-patient privilege. \nVernon's Ann.Texas Civ.St. art. 44956, \n§ 5.08(6) (Repealed); Fed.Rules Cr.Proc. \nRule 41(e), 18 U.S.C-A. \n10. Searches and Seizures 4=450 \nPhysician and patients alleged no basis \non which it could be found that seizure of \npatient-treatment records pursuant to crim-\ninal search warrant was unlawful, such as \nwould entitle them to obtain return of \nrecords. FecLRules Cr.ProcSule 41(e), 18 \nU.S.C.A. \n11. Injunction O.105(1) \nDistrict court could not enjoin Govern-\nment in its use of patient-treatment records \nseized, pursuant to criminal search war-\nrant, from physician's business, absent alle-\ngation of any improper use of seized \nrecords by Government \n12. Injunction O.105(1) \nGovernment would not be enjoined \nfrom communicating with \nphysician's \npresent and former patients and their in-\nsurance carriers, in connection with seizure \nof patient-treatment records pursuant to \ncriminal search warrant, in that such in. \njunction would interfere with free exercise \nof discretionary powers of attorneys of the \nUnited States in their control over criminal \nprosecutions; injunction would have imped-\ned or totally frustrated Government's abili-\nty to pursue its investigation of, among \nother things, interstate distribution of anti-\nneoplastons, fr\n... [truncated, 4006 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/239 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=239]", "char_count": 4006}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 240, "text_content": "1304 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nFDA, and misled audience by asserting \ncharges still subject to investigation. \n18. Injunction 4=223 \nFDA advised physician of its position \nwith respect to manufacturing practices of \nresearch institute and, thus, was in compli-\nance with terms of permanent injunction; \naccordingly, Government and employees \ncould not be in civil contempt \nChristian P. Di Ferrante, John T. John-\nson, Calvin, Dylewski, Gibbs, Maddox, Rus-\nsell & Verner, Houston, Tex., for Burzynski \nCancer Research Institute. \nMargaret A. Harris, Stuart M. Nelkin, \nNelkin & Nelkin, Houston, Tex., for Juan-\nice Kuharzyk, etc., et al. \nGerald C. Kell, Atty., U.S. Dept of Jus-\ntice, Office of Consumer Lit, Washington, \nD.C., Linda M. Cipriani, Asst. U.S. Atty., \nHenry K. Oncken, U.S. Atty., Frank A. \nConforti, James R. Gough, Met U.S. Ate \ntys., Houston, Tex., for the U.S. \nAppeals from the United States District \nCourt for the Southern District of Texas. \nBefore RUBIN, FtANDALL, and \nJOHNSON, Circuit Judges. \nALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge: \nArmed with a search warrant, the \ngovernment seized a doctor's patient-treat-\nment records during an investigation to \ndetermine whether the doctor had violated \ncriminal fraud statutes and a criminal stet-\nute forbidding the interstate shipment of \ndrugs that had not been approved by the \nFood and Drug Administration. The doc-\ntor and some of the patients, as inter-\nvenors, sought to have the records re-\nturned and to obtain damages and other \nrelief by filing a counterclaim in a previous-\nly pending civil action filed by the govern-\nment to enjoin interstate distribution of the \ndrug. The district court properly held that \nthe doctor and his patients have failed to \nestablish any basis entitling them to a hear-\nt. 21 US.C. § 301, et seq. (1982). \n2. 21 US.C. § 321(p). \ning on the validity of the search warrant or \nany grounds for finding that the seizure of \nthe records was unconstitutional. \nWe \ntherefore affirm its dismiss\n... [truncated, 3862 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/240 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=240]", "char_count": 3862}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 241, "text_content": "U.S. I. BURZYNSKI CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE \n1305 \nChew 019 Fad 1301 (kb Clr. 1987) \ngood-manufacturing procedures, ordering \nter to make copies. On the advice of his \nthe FDA in turn to act promptly on their \nsubmission for approval. The order, how-\never, expressly allowed Dr. Burzynski to \ncontinue manufacturing and prescribing \nthe drug in Texas. The court expressly \nretained continuing jurisdiction to enforce \nor modify its order. \nTwo years later, in July 1985, as part of \na criminal investigation based on a referral \nfrom the FDA to the Department of Jus-\ntice, the government applied for and ob-\ntained a warrant to search an office com-\nplex that, as the warrant stated, housed the \nadministrative offices of Dr. Burzynski and \nthe Burzynski Research Institute, Ince \nrated, a separate legal entity from Bum \nski Cancer Research Institute, which h \nbeen a defendant in the civil action. The \napplication for the warrant was supported \nby the affidavit of FDA Compliance Offi-\ncer, Kenneth P. Ewing. Ewing stated that \nthe application was based on FDA inspec-\ntions and investigations of Dr. Burzynski \nand the Institute, information supplied by \ninsurance companies that had received \nclaims from Dr. Burzynski, information \nsupplied by the surviving spouse of one of \nDr. Burzynslci's patients, and information \nsupplied by confidential informants. \nIn terms set forth in full in the footnote,' \nthe warrant authorized a search for and \nseizure of records and other property that \nreflected distribution of antineoplastons \noutside the State of Texas and other \nrecords that would show the antineopla-\nstens had been and were being distributed \nin interstate commerce in violation of Title \n21, United States Code S31(d), the court \ninjunction, and Title 18, United States \nCode, Sections 286, 287, 871, 401, 1001, \n1841, and 1505. During the search Dr. \nBurzynaki's employees were allowed to \ntake records to a commercial copying cen-\n4. Records and other property. including anti. \nn\n... [truncated, 4465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/241 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=241]", "char_count": 4465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 242, "text_content": "1806 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nsal for failure to state a claim for which \nrelief could be granted or, in the titans-\ntive, for summary judgment In a brief \norder, which referred to the evidence ad-\nduced in the earlier hearing on the motion \nfor a temporary restraining order, the \ncourt dismissed the counterclaims. \nII. \n[11 Dr. Burzynski and the patients con-\ntend that the district court impermissibly \nconsolidated the hearing on the motions for \nTRO, return of property, and contempt (the \npreliminary motions) with trial on the mer-\nits of their counterclaims. The simple fact \nis that no such consolidation occurred. At \nthe close of the hearing on the preliminary \nmotions, the district court orally denied \nthose motions. Thereafter, the court en-\ntered a nine-page order setting forth its \nfindings with respect to the preliminary \nmotions and its legal basis for denying \nthose motions. Subsequent to the hearing \non the preliminary motions, the govern-\nment filed its motion to dismiss for failure \nto state a claim or, alternatively, for sum-\nmary judgment on all of the counterclaims. \nIn an order separate from the order deny-\ning the preliminary motions, the district \ncourt dismissed the counterclaims. \nThe district court did state in the later \norder that, because the issues raised in the \ncounterclaims \"raise legal questions which \nwere decided against the Defendants and \nIntervenors (Dr. Burzynski and the pa-\ntients] in the hearing of October 23, 1985\" \n(the hearing on the preliminary motions), it \nwould not repeat its discussion of those \nissues. in other words, the district court \nsimply elected not to restate in its dismissal \norder legal analysis it had already set forth \nin its denial of the preliminary motions. In \ndeciding, based on that legal analysis, to \ndismiss the counterclaims, the district court \ndid not conduct a trial on the merits, much \nless impermissibly consolidate trial with \nthe hearing on the preliminary motions. \n5. 731 Fid 281, 28\n... [truncated, 4146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/242 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=242]", "char_count": 4146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 243, "text_content": "B. Claims Against Individual \nGovernment Employees \nIn seeking monetary damages against \nthe government employees as individuals, \nDr. Burzynski and the patients asserted \nboth common law tort claims and claims \nunder the Constitution. All of the dam-\nages claims asserted against individual \ngovernment employees related to and arose \nout of the application for and execution of \nthe criminal search warrant for Dr. Bur-\nzynski's business premises, and all are \nbarred by immunity doctrines. \n1. Waiver of immunity Defenses \n(41 Dr. Burzynski and the patients con-\ntend that the government cannot rely on \nimmunity defenses for the individuals \nnamed as defendants because such affirma-\ntive defenses may not be raised by means \nof a motion to dismiss or for summary \njudgment \nThe circuit courts disagree \nwhether the affirmative defenses listed in \nFed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) must be asserted in the \ndefendant's answer or may be raised for \nthe first time in a motion to dismiss or \nother diapositive motion.* In Funding \nSystems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, a panel of \nthis court stated that a defendant may \nraise an affirmative defense by a motion \nfor summary judgment only when that mo-\ntion \"is the initial pleading tendered by \n[the] defendant.\" 11 \nAlthough the rule \nquoted above suggests that any prior \npleading will defeat the defendant's right \nto raise an affirmative defense in a summa-\nry judgment motion, in the context of the \ndecision as a whole it becomes apparent \nthat the Funding Systems opinion was re-\nferring only to pleadings responsive to the \nsubstantive issues charged. The Funding \nSystems decision itself specifically noted \nthat the defendant in that case had failed \n& Gregory v. Mitchel( 634 F.2d 199. 203-04 (5th \nCir.1981). \n9. See C. Wright \nand Pnxedure 11277, \npare Williams \nand A. \nFederal Practice \na \n29 (1969). Com-\nMurdoch, 330 F.2dt  741 (3d \nM 530 F.2d 91, 96 (5th Cir.1976). \nCir.1964); Continental Collieries, Inc. \n11. Id \nrr, \n130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.1942) with\n... [truncated, 4176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/243 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=243]", "char_count": 4176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 244, "text_content": "1308 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \n2. Common Law Tort Claims \n(6) Federal employees are absolutely \nimmune from common law tort suits for \ndamages arising out of the performance of \neither mandatory or discretionary acts that \nare, as the Supreme Court stated in Barr \nMatteo, \"within the outer perimeter of the \n(employees.) line of duty.\" 12 This immuni-\nty extends even to allegedly malicious \nacts.\" \n171 It is difficult to sort out the com-\nmon law claims of Dr. Burzynski and the \npatients from their constitutional claims. \nReading the counterclaims as broadly as \npossible, however, it. appears that, with re-\nspect to the application for and execution \nof the search warrant, Dr. Burzynski as-\nserted common law claims for abuse of \nprocess and for some type of tortious inter-\nference with his relationship with his pa-\ntients, while the patients asserted a com-\nmon law claim for abuse of process. \nEwing's duties as a compliance officer \nwith FDA included reviewing investigative \nrecords of FDA and other evidence gath-\nered by FDA to determine whether there \nwere apparent violations of the FDC Act or \nother laws, making recommendations for \nappropriate civil or criminal legal action, \nconducting investigations, and collecting of \ninformation and samples. FDA compliance \nofficers and investigators also are re-\nquired, in conjunction with a United States \nMarshal, to execute criminal search war-\nrants. Moreover, Ewing was the person \nwithin FDA chiefly responsible for the in-\nvestigation of Dr. Burzynski. \nActing upon information gathered in the \ncourse of previous FDA investigations of \nDr. Burzynski and others, and upon infor-\nmation supplied to him by named individu-\nlif\nd confidential informants, Ewing, \nand other federal employees pur-\nl?, Ban v. Maned, 360 US. 564, 575, 79 S.Ct. \n1335. 1341, 3 L.Edld 1434 (1959). Accord Ev-\nan v. Wright 582 F.2.<1 20, 21 (sth Or.19711). \n13. Barr, 360 U.S. at 575.79 SQ. 1341; Nortaenj \nMcShane, 332 F.2d 855.858 (5th ar.I964), \n... [truncated, 3966 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/244 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=244]", "char_count": 3966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 245, "text_content": "U.S. I BURZYNSKI CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE \n1309 \nOn 819 12.241 2301 (560. 1W) \nand the burden of defending themselves \nagainst, alleged violations of constitutional \nrights. As first formulated in Butz v. Zoo-\nnomou, qualified immunity had both an \nobjective and subjective element the feder-\nal official was entitled to immunity if then \nwere reasonable grounds to believe that \nthe challenged conduct did not violate a \nconstitutional right (the objective element) \nand the official undertook the challenged \nconduct in a good-faith belief that the con-\nduct was valid (the subjective element).\" \nOn further consideration, however, the \nCourt in Harlow v. Fitzgerald stated, \n\"[t]he subjective element of the good-faith \ndefense frequently has proved incompatible \nwith our admonition in Butz that insub-\nstantial claims should not proceed to tri-\nal.\"\" Therefore, the Court eliminated the \nsubjective element of the qualified immuni-\nty defense. Government officials perform-\ning discretionary functions, it held, are \nshielded from liability for civil damages \nwhenever their conduct does not violate \ndearly established statutory or constitu-\ntional rights of which a reasonable person \nwould have known? \nReading Dr. Burzynski's counterclaim \nmost broadly, it appears to allege that Ew-\ning violated the fourth amendment by ob-\ntaining the criminal search warrant for Dr. \nBurzynski's business premises \"to accom-\nplish purposes outside the proper scope of \na search warrant,\" i.e., \"for the apparent \nulterior purpose of forcing [Dr. Burzynski] \nout of business.\" The government con-\ntends, however, that the warrant was is-\nsued by an independent judicial officer, the \nUnited States Magistrate, and that under \nthis court's decision in Jureczki v. City of \nIt 438 U.S. at 495-98, 507. 98 S.Ct. at 2905-07, \n2911. \n19. Maslow v. Flegerald. 457 US. 800, 815-16, \n102 5.O. 2727, 2737. 73 LEdid 396 (1982). \n20. 457 US. at 817-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-38. See \noho David v. &hew, 468 US. 181 104 5\n... [truncated, 4313 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/245 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=245]", "char_count": 4313}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 246, "text_content": "1810 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES \n\"was not supported by affidavits and evi-\ndence sufficient to establish probable \ncause.\" Based on no more than this unsup-\nported charge, and despite the admonition \nof the Supreme Court in Franks v. Dela-\nware\" that to mandate an evidentiary \nhearing such a charge must also assert \ndeliberate falsehood or reckless disregard \nfor truth and must be accompanied by an \noffer of proof, the district court allowed a \nlengthy cross-examination of Ewing re-\ngarding his affidavit Nonetheless, the dis-\ntrict court found no basis even to proceed \nwith a hearing on the validity of the search \nwarrant, much less to justify a finding that \nthe warrant was not validly supported. In \nthis circuit, once a government employee \nhas asserted qualified immunity and estab-\nlished that the allegedly tortious acts were \nundertaken within the scope of his discre-\ntionary authority, the burden shifts to the \nparty seeking damages to show that quali-\nfied immunity does not bar recovery? Dr. \nBurzynski has failed to suggest any factual \nbasis upon which a trier of fact could find \nthat probable cause was lacking or that \nagent Ewing's action in seeking the search \nwarrant was objectively unreasonable. \nTherefore, the individual defendants were \nentitled to have those charges against them \ndismissed. \nIn addition, both Dr. Burzynski and the \npatients asserted constitutional claims with \nrespect to the government employees' exe-\ncution of the warrant Both Dr. Burzynski \nand the patients challenged the warrant as \noverly broad (not properly limited in scope), \nDr. Burzynski alleging a fourth amend-\nment violation and the patients a fifth \namendment violation. Additionally, the pa-\ntients alleged that seizure of their medical \nrecords was unreasonable, in violation of \nthe fourth amendment, and infringed their \nconstitutional rights to privacy, to life, and \n26. 438 US. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674. 2684, 57 \nLEd.2d 667 (1978). \n27. See SaWane v. Cana. 684 F.2\n... [truncated, 4333 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/246 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=246]", "char_count": 4333}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 247, "text_content": "US. I. BURZYNSKI CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE \nCanaan Fad 1301 (StaCtr. 1987) \ncopying. As the district court determined \nBoth the patients and Dr. Burzynski ac-\nbelow, the patients have shown no basis to \nbelieve that \"an opportunity would not be \nmade available to [Dr. Burzynski] to secure \na copy of those documents in sufficient \ntime to treat his patients effectively....\" \nIn sum, the federal employees involved \nin obtaining the warrant for the search of \nthe business premises occupied by Dr. Bur-\nzyriski and in executing that warrant fol-\nlowed established constitutional proce-\ndures. They violated no norms of clearly \nestablished law. As federal agents per-\nforming discretionary functions within the \nscope of their duties, they were entitled to \nqualified immunity shielding them from lia-\nbility for their acts. The district court's \ndismissal of the constitutional claims \nagainst the federal employees was there-\nfore proper. \nIV. Injunctive Relief \nThe counterclaims requested injunctions \nrequiring return of the records seized pur-\nsuant to the search warrant, prohibiting \nuse of the seized records by the govern-\nment, prohibiting government contact with \npatients and their insurance carriers, pro-\nhibiting the government from interfering \nwith Dr. Burzynski's treatment of the pa-\ntients with antineoplastons, and prohibiting \nthe government from disseminating alleg-\nedly false or misleading information re-\ngarding antineoplastons. \nA. Return of the Seized Records \nFed.R.Crim.Proc. 41(e) provides the ave-\nnue by which a person may obtain return \nof property seized by the government. Be-\ncause neither Dr. Burzynski nor the pa-\ntients stated any basis for a finding that \nthe records were illegally seized and the \npatients did not even allege a basis for \nfinding that were entitled to lawful posses-\nsion of the records, the district court was \nrequired to dismiss the injunctive claims \nfor return of the records, whether under \nRule 41(e) or its general equity jurisdi\n... [truncated, 4206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/247 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=247]", "char_count": 4206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 248, "text_content": "1312 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \ngue that their sole challenge to the warrant \nauthorizing the seizure was to the face of \nthe warrant, not the supporting affidavit \nYet the only specific deficiency alleged by \nthe patients was that the warrant autho-\nrized the seizure of virtually all medical \nrecords at the Institute while the support-\ning affidavit stated that patients' true \nhome addresses were recorded only on pa-\ntient billing and insurance records. The \npatients' argument rests on the premise \nthat the only purpose of the warrant was \nto \"ascertain evidence of interstate ship-\nment of antineoplastons.\" The warrant \nwas sought, however, to authorize the sei-\nzure of evidence of numerous criminal of-\nfenses in addition to interstate distribution \nof antineoplastons. Since the seized medi-\ncal records were relevant to all of those \npossible violations the warrant was facially \nvalid, and the patients stated no basis for \nthe district court to find seizure of the \nmedical records unlawful, a prerequisite to \nmandating their return.\" \nUnlike the patients, Dr. Burzynski did \nattack the affidavit supporting the war-\nrant. However, he neither alleged nor \nproved a single fact on which the district \ncourt could have found the affidavit defi-\ncient and the resulting warrant and seizure \nunlawful. \nB. Use of the Seized Records \n[11) Both the patients and Dr. Burzyn-\nski seek to enjoin the government from \nproviding the records seized pursuant to \nthe search warrant to any other agents or \nagencies of the United States Government \nor to any commercial entity or to any other \nentity or person. While not alleging any \nbasis to believe that the government had \nmade improper use of the seized records or \nwas likely to do so, Dr. Burzynski and the \npatients sought an injunction that, if grant, \ned, would have totally prevented the \ngovernment from pursuing its criminal in-\nvestigation of Dr. Burzynski insofar as the \n34. Fed.R.O1m.P. 41(e). \n35. United States v. Co.t, 3\n... [truncated, 4127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/248 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=248]", "char_count": 4127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 249, "text_content": "U.S. I BURZYNSKI CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE \n1313 \nateas5M F.2d 1301 (Mbar. 1987) \nwould obviously have interfered with \"the \nfree exercise of the discretionary powers of \nthe attorneys of the United States in their \ncontrol over criminal prosecutions.\"\" \nD. Alleged Interference with Treatment \nof Patients and Dissemination of \nFalse Information \nDr. Burzynski and the patients also \nasked the district court to enjoin the \ngovernment from interfering with Dr. Bur-\nzynsid's treatment of the patients with an-\ntineoplastons, both intrastate and inter \nstate. \n[IS) The interference alleged included \nthe seizure of patient records pursuant to \nthe search warrant, the refusal of the FDA \nto grant investigational new drug status \n(IND) to the form of antineoplastons Dr. \nBurzynski is currently using, and the dis-\nsemination of false or misleading informa-\ntion about Dr. Burzynski and his treatment \nto insurance companies and current or pro-\nspective patients. Many of these claims \nare patently groundless. Just as the alle-\ngations of unlawful seizure of patient \nrecords cannot support injunctive relief re-\nquiring return of the seized records, they \ncannot form a cognizable basis for claiming \nthat the government has or would interfere \nimpermissibly with Dr. Burzynski's treat-\nment of patients solely within the State of \nTexas. There simply has been no genuine \nissue of such a threat raised. \n[141 Similarly, neither Dr. Burzynski \nnor his patients have alleged facts suggest-\ning that the FDA has acted improperly by \ndenying antineoplaston AIO IND status. \nAlthough, in his brief before this court, Dr. \nBurzynski contends that he has never ar-\ngued that he is entitled to IND status for \nhis new drug but only that the FDA has \ntreated his application differently than oth-\ner IND applications, the language of his \ncounterclaims belles that assertion. In his \ncountercomplaint, Dr. Burzynski asserted \n38. United Stara, Cox, 342 Fld at 171. \n39. See Rutherford \nAmerican Medical As\n... [truncated, 4153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/249 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=249]", "char_count": 4153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 250, "text_content": "1314 \n819 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2c1 SERIES \nunsupportable. The patients asserted that \nthey should be free to obtain antineopla-\nstens interstate because of \"the unavaila-\nbility of any other treatment that would be \neffective in treating their cancer.\" Similar \nclaims were raised and rejected in United \nStates v. Ruthinfordu \nAs in the present case, the plaintiffs in \nRutherford wore cancer patients, alleged \nto be terminally ill, desiring treatment with \nan unapproved drug, and arguing that the \nrestrictions on interstate distribution of \nnew drugs imposed by the Act should not \nbe allowed to interfere with their access to \nthe drug. The Supreme Court rejected the \npatients' claims. The Court agreed with \nFDA that the new drug approval provisions \nof the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act spe-\ncifically applied to the situation presented. \n(171 In one respect, however, the fact \nthat Dr. Burzynski and his patients were \ndenied any opportunity for discovery has \nunfairly prejudiced their opportunity to al-\nlege facts in support of counterclaims that \nmay entitle them to relief. The district \ncourt found that at least two statements \nmade by Ewing in response to inquiries \nabout Dr. Burzynski and his treatment \nwere \"near to inappropriate,\" exceeded \n\"his duties and responsibilities as an officer \nof the FDA,\" and misled his audience by \nasserting, as established fact, charges still \nsubject to investigation. The district court \nalso noted that, by showing that such state-\nments were made to at least one insurance \ncompany, Dr. Burzynski and his patients \ndemonstrated that \"the above conduct has \nhad an impact on their ability to treat pa-\ntients because over fifty percent of [the \nInstitute's] income is derived from insur-\nance payments.\" Whether additional ex-\namples of such questionable conduct exist \nand, if so, in numbers justifying injunctive \nrelief can only be discerned through dis-\ncovery. The claim seeking an injunction to \nstop the government from disseminating \nfa\n... [truncated, 4127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/250 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=250]", "char_count": 4127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 251, "text_content": "OWENSBY & KM \nClue ims119 Pad \nfor the damages and injunctive claims of \nDr. Burzynski and the patients formed the \nbasis of their requests to bold the govern-\nment and its employees in civil contempt \nDr. Burzynski and the patients apparently \ndo not appeal from the dismissal of their \ncivil contempt claims. Their briefs to this \ncourt assign no error to the dismissal of \nthose claims. But, even if they do appeal \nthis ruling, the requests for a finding of \ncivil contempt were also without founda-\ntion, and the district court's dismissal of \nthose claims was proper. \nThe permanent injunction, of which the \ngovernment and its employees were alleged \nto be in contempt, imposed no restrictions \nor obligations on the government or its \nemployees, except that FDA was directed \nto review, evaluate, and appraise the manu-\nfacturing practices of the Burzynski Re-\nsearch Institute and promptly advise Dr. \nBurzynski of any violations of current good \nmanufacturing practices. \nAlthough nei-\nther Dr. Burzynski nor the patients raised \nthat issue in their counterclaims as a basis \nfor a contempt citation or any other relief, \nthe issue was raised at the hearing on Dr. \nBurzynski's motion for a temporary re-\nstraining order. However, as the record \nshows, FDA has advised Dr. Burzynski of \nits position with respect to his manufactur-\ning practices, and so is in compliance with \nits obligations under the permanent injunc-\ntion. \nVI. \nThe patients who appear in this suit are \nin a critical plight They seek any treat-\nment that offers them the slightest hope, \nfor they think it better to exhaust any \npossibility than to resign themselves to a \nfate that seems otherwise certain. The \nFDA has been assigned the duty of protect-\ning such desperate persons from deception, \nabuse, and exploitation and of assuring \nthat the treatment they are given is safe \nand effective. It cannot perform these \ntasks if those professing to offer new cures \nrefuse to work with the system and obey \nthe law\n... [truncated, 3473 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/251 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=251]", "char_count": 3473}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 252, "text_content": "OLAGUES v. RUSSONIELLO \n791 \nate u770 F24 791 (INS) \neither a clear probability or well-founded \nfear of persecution. The applications for \nwithholding of deportation and political \nasylum were properly denied. \nDENIED. \nJose J. OLAGUES, on Behalf of himself \nand all others similarly situated, \nPlaintiffs-Appellants, \nU \nJoseph P. RUSSONIELLO, individually \nand In his capacity as United States \nAttorney for the Northern District of \nCalifornia, et al., Defendants-Appellees. \nJose J. OLAGUES, on Behalf of himself \nand all others similarly situated; His-\npanic Coalition for Human Rights, Chi-\nnese for Affirmative Action, and San \nFrancisco Lation Voter Registration \nEducation Project, Plaintiffs-Appel-\nlants. \nJoseph P. RUSSONIELLO, individually \nand in his capacity es Untied States \nAttorney for the Northern Ca; O'Mal-\nley, William A., individually and in his \ncapacity as District Attorney for Con-\ntra Costa County; Underwood, Lon, in-\ndividually and in his capacity as regis-\ntrar of voters for Contra Costa County; \nSmith, Arlo, individually and in his ca-\npacity as District Attorney for San \nFrancisco County, et aL, Defendants-\nAppellees. \nNos. 82-4427, 83-2581. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nNinth Circuit. \nArgued and Submitted Sept. 12, 1984. \nDecided Sept. 3, 1986. \nCitizen and organizations promoting \nvoting rights of Americans with ethnic \nbackgrounds sued for damages and declar-\natory injunction relief arising from a pre-\nliminary investigation into possible viola-\ntions of the Voting Rights Act. The Unit-\ned States District Court for the Northern \nDistrict of California, Spencer Williams and \nStanley A. Weigel, M., dismissed injunction \nclaims and granted summary judgment in \nfavor of the United States Attorney and \ncounty officials. Appeal was taken. The \nCourt of Appeals, Wallace, Circuit Judge, \nheld that (1) the citizen did not have stand-\ning to challenge the investigation, but the \norganizations did; (2) there were no ex-\ntraordinary circumstances to\n... [truncated, 3181 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/252 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=252]", "char_count": 3181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 253, "text_content": "792 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES \n4. Federal Courts iag 3.20 \nAction challenging investigation by \nUnited States Attorney as to whether reg-\nistered voters were American citizens was \nnot rendered moot by Attorney's termi-\nnation of investigation where Attorney ter-\nminated investigation solely because it \nfailed to produce evidence supported any \nfurther investigative activities, Attorney \nargued vigorously that his actions were \nlawful and there was no showing that in-\nvestigation conducted in same manner \nagainst same groups would not recur. \nU.S.C.A. Const Art. 3, § I et seq. \n5. Injunction es.114(2) \nCitizen did not have standing to seek \nto enjoin prosecutorial activities concerning \nwhether noncitizens were registered to \nvote where possibility that voter registra-\ntion records would again be scrutinized was \nentirely speculative and no official action \nwas taken other than verifying citizenship \nstatus of voters. \n6. Injunction 4=114(2) \nOrganizations which conducted voter \nregistration drive among ethnic groups had \nstanding to challenge investigation into \nwhether registered voters were citizens \nwhere they alleged that their voter regis-\ntration and education efforts had been hin-\ndered as direct result of challenged investi-\ngation, organizations asserted that both \nthey and their members were threatened \nwith possible prosecution, interests orga-\nnization sought to protect were \"germane\" \nto their purposes and relief sought did not \nrequire participation of individual members \nin suit U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq. \n7. Injunction '126 \nAlthough case may not be moot, plain-\ntiff still has burden of showing that eq-\nuitable relief is necessary and mere possi-\nbility of future injury is insufficient to en-\njoin official conduct. \n8. Federal Courts 42414 \nThere must be strong showing of \nabuse of discretion to overturn denial of \ninjunctive relief against official conduct. \n9. Injunction *0,110 \nDistrict court had jurisdiction over \ncomplaint seeki\n... [truncated, 3690 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/253 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=253]", "char_count": 3690}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 254, "text_content": "OLAGUES v. RUSSONIELLO \n793 \nOle as 770 F2d 791 (1985) \ning bilingual ballots was reasonably limited \nligation into citizenship status of those vote \nin both its scope and its use of classifies- \nera where there was no intent to intimidate \nlions. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. \nvoters. \n17. Injunction *' 18t78 \nOrganizations which conducted voter \nregistration drives among ethnic groups \nwere not entitled to preliminary injunction \nagainst United States Attorney's investiga-\ntion into possible voter fraud resulting \nfrom registration of noncitizens. \n18. Declaratory Judgment 4=s5 \nDecision whether to grant declaratory \nrelief is within sound discretion of district \ncourt. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202. \n19. Declaratory Judgment u=s4 \nDeclaratory relief may be appropriate \neven when injunctive relief is not. 28 U.S. \nCA. §§ 2201, 2202. \n20. Declaratory Judgment s=r84 \nOrganizations which conducted voter \nregistration drives among ethnic groups \nwere not entitled to declaratory judgment \nagainst investigation of citizenship status \nof recently registered foreign-born voters \nseeking bilingual ballots where organiza-\ntions were not generally hindered from \npursuing their lawful voter registration ac-\ntivities at time of imminent criminal prose-\ncution. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202. \n21. Injunction 4..105(1) \nWhere county officials forwarded \nnames of recently registered foreign-born \nvoters who requested bilingual ballots at \nspecific request of United States Attorney, \nwho was investigating possible voter fraud, \nthere was no basis for injunction against \ncounty officials which would, in effect, en-\njoin United States Attorney from pursuing \nhis investigation. \n22. Elections 0012(4) \nThere was no violation of Voting \nRights Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(b); Voting \nRights Act of 1965, §§ 11(b), 208, as \namended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 19731(b). 1973aa-\nla) in county officials' conduct of forward-\ning names of recently registered foreign-\nborn voters who requested bilingual ballots \nto United St\n... [truncated, 3732 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/254 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=254]", "char_count": 3732}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 255, "text_content": "794 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nlions claim violations of their rights under \nthe Act and the first, fifth, fourteenth, and \nfifteenth amendments to the Constitution. \nThe district court dismissed the injunctive \nclaims on the ground that it lacked jurisdic-\ntion to enjoin an investigation by the Unit-\ned States Attorney. The district court also \ngranted summary judgment in favor of the \nUnited States Attorney and the state offi-\ncials on the remaining claims. We have \njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \n1291. \nand we affirm. \nIn March and April of 1982, United \nStates Attorney Russoniello received infor-\nmation from the Santa Clara County district \nattorney indicating that a substantial num-\nber of foreign-born individuals who had \nrecently registered to vote were not United \nStates citizens. The information was con-\ntained in a study of recent voter regis-\ntrants whose primary language was not \nEnglish. Many of the noncitizen regis-\ntrants apparently believed or were told that \nthey were entitled to vote on the basis of \nmarriages to United States citizens or a \nlong period of residence in the United \nStates. Russoniello also was informed that \nthe Spanish translation of the voter regis \nt-ation form erroneously stated that regis-\ntrants \"should be\" a United States citizen, \nrather than stating one \"must be\" a citizen. \nRussoniello then sent a letter on April \n19, 1982, to law enforcement officers and \nvoter registrars in nine local counties with-\nin his jurisdiction requesting their coopera-\ntion in obtaining a sampling of names from \nvoter registration lists in order to deter-\nmine whether the improper registration \nproblem noticed in Santa Clara County was \nmore widespread. The letter requested the \nforwarding of 25 names, randomly select-\ned, of recently registered, foreign-born vot-\ners who requested bilingual ballots. The \nletter indicated that upon receipt of the \nsampling, the names would be forwarded \nto the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-\nvice \n... [truncated, 4105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/255 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=255]", "char_count": 4105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 256, "text_content": "OLAGUESI \ncite es \n(1953) (W.T. Grant). Voluntary cessation \nof the challenged activity by the official is \ninsufficient to render a case moot if \"the \nlegality of the challenged practices\" is still \nin dispute because \"(t)he defendant is free \nto return to his old ways.\" Id. at 682, 78 \nS.Ct. at 897. See Allee v. Medrono, 416 \nU.S. 802, 810-11, 94 S.M. 2191, 2197-98, 40 \nL.Ed.2d 566 (1974); Waning a HeImerich \n& Pare, Ina, 823 U.S. 87, 43, 65 S.Ct. 11, \n14, 89 LEd. 29 (1944); Pomerantz v. \nCounty of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288, \n1291 (9th Cir.1932) (claim is moot if subse-\nquent \"events have completely and irrevo-\ncably eradicated the effects of the alleged \nviolation\"). Moreover, a case or controver-\nsy for purposes of article III may also \nremain live following cessation of the chal-\nlenged activity if the actions are capable (1) \nof repetition and (2) of evading review. \nSee, e.g., Super Tire Engineering Co. v. \nMcCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122, 94 S.Ct. 1694, \n1698, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). \nFinally, the \nexistence of \"a public interest in having the \nlegality of the practices settled ... mili-\ntates against a mootness conclusion.\" \nW.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. at 897 \n(emphasis added). \nlel Applying this framework to the \ncase before us, we fmd several factors \npointing toward the continuing existence of \na case or controversy for purposes of eval-\nuating plaintiffs' equitable claims. First, \nthe United States Attorney did not volun. \ntarily cease the challenged activity because \nhe felt that the investigation was improper. \nRather, Russoniello terminated the investi-\ngation solely because it failed to produce \nevidence supporting any further investiga-\ntive activities. Russoniello has at all times \ncontinued to argue vigorously that his ac-\ntions were lawful. \nSecond, there has been no showing that \nan investigation conducted in the same \nmanner against the same groups would not \nrecur. Although Russoniello and the state \nofficials point out that the Director \n... [truncated, 4331 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/256 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=256]", "char_count": 4331}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 257, "text_content": "796 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nthese alleged unlawful procedures, how-\never, one would first have had to violate \nsome law and then have been arrested. \n414 US. at 4%, 94 S.Ct. at 676. The \nSupreme Court found that plaintiffs failed \nto show any case or controversy because it \npresumed that plaintiffs would obey the \nlaw, and therefore they never would be-\ncome subject to any unlawful procedures in \nthe future. Id. at 497, 94 S.Ct- at 676. \nUnlike the situation before us, the O'Shea \nplaintiffs did not claim any constitutional \nright to act as they had prior to their \narrest See id at 498, 94 S.Ct. at 677. In \nLyons, the plaintiff challenged the use of \nchokeholds by Los Angeles police on arres-\ntees. The Court again held that there was \nno case or controversy for equitable relief \nbecause whether Lyons would again be ar-\nrested and subjected to a chokehold a sec-\nond time was purely speculative. See 461 \nU.S. at 105-06. 103 S.Ct at 1667. \nHere, Olagues and the organizations \nclaim that the actions of the officials have \ninterfered with their constitutionally pro-\ntected first amendment activities in reg-\nistering voters. Unlike °Shea and Lyons, \nneither Olagues nor the organizations had \nto break any law in order to be subjected to \nalleged unlawful conduct by the officials. \nCertainly the legality of the investigation \nat issue remains in dispute; both sides \ncontinue forcefully to advocate their posi-\ntions. Rusaoniello has never seriously at-\ntempted to make any showing that the \nchallenged investigative techniques will \nnever be employed again; rather, he vigor-\nously defends his investigative tactics. \nThus, he fails to meet his \"heavy burden\" \nof showing mootness. \nW.T. Grant, 345 \nU.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct at 897. \nIII \nWe next examine the standing of Ola-\ngues, a foreign-born citizen who requested \nbilingual election materials, and the orga-\nnizations, which claim that the challenged \ninvestigatory activities will \"effectively \ndeny their right to partici\n... [truncated, 4076 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/257 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=257]", "char_count": 4076}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 258, "text_content": "(1978); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, \n50-64, 91 S.Ct. 746, 763-55, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 \n(1971) (Younger). In order to harmonize \nthese conflicting strains of precedent aris-\ning in this particular factual circumstance, \nwe find it necessary to focus on the nature \nof the relief sought by Olagues. \nHere, Olagues is not seeking any affirm-\native injunctive relief in order to permit \nhim to vote, such as demanding that he be \nlisted as an eligible voter. Rather, he \nseeks to enjoin prosecutorial activities \nwhich are focused on persons other than \nhimself. Moreover, it does not appear that \nOlagues has demonstrated that he would \nsuffer irreparable harm without equitable \nrelief. Unlike the organizations, who al-\nlege that their current voter registration \nefforts are being hindered by the fear that \nthey may possibly be subject to a similar \ninvestigation in the future, the possibility \nthat Olagues's voter registration records \nwill be scrutinized again is entirely specula-\ntive. Olagues thus faces the brinier of \nLyons, which emphasizes that the irrepara-\nble harm showing is \"a requirement that \ncannot be met where there is no showing of \nany real or immediate threat that the plain-\ntiff will be wronged again.\" 461 U.S. at \n111, 103 S.Ct. at 1670. \nUnder these circumstances, we conclude \nthat Olagues has failed to overcome the \nprudential limitations on standing that are \nparticularly important when evaluating \nclaims for equitable relief regarding a crim-\ninal investigation. The injuries he alleges \nare insufficient to warrant such an intru-\nsive remedy. Since he is a citizen, it cannot \nbe seriously contended that Olagues has \nbeen or will be denied his right to vote as a \nresult of an examination of public records. \nNo official action has been taken against \nhim, other than verifying his citizenship \nstatus along with those individuals who \nwere initially identified as improperly reg-\nistered. The principal claim of present in-\njury is that the investigation has ha\n... [truncated, 4390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/258 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=258]", "char_count": 4390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 259, "text_content": "798 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \n1926, 48 LEd.2d 450 (1976) (Simon); \nWorth o. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. \n2197, 2211, 45 LEd.2d 843 (1976) (Worth ); \nNAACP v. Sutton, 371 U.S. 416, 428, 83 \nS.Ct. 828, 335, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Under \ncertain circumstances, an association may \nalso be entitled to seek redress of injury to \nits members. See, e.g., Runt a Wash-\nington State Apple Advertising Commis-\nsion, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct 2434, 2440, \n58 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (Hunt k Simon, 426 \nU.S. at 40, 96 S.Ct. at 1925; Worth, 422 \nU.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct at 2211; Sierra Club \nv. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, \n1868, 81 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (Sierra Club). \nIn Hunt, the Supreme Court established a \nthree-part test to determine whether an \nassociation has standing: (1) either the \ngroup or its members must have suffered \nsome direct, cognizable injury; (2) the In-\nterests the group seeks to protect must be \n\"germane to the organization's purpose\"; \nand (3) the claim or relief sought must not \nrequire the participation of the individual \nmembers in the suit. 432 U.S. at 348, 97 \nS.Q. at 2441. A mere \"abstract concern,\" \nSimon, 426 U.S. at 40, 96 S.Ct. at 1925, or \n\"special interest\" in a public issue, Sierra \nClub, 405 U.S. at 739, 92 S.Ct. at 136$, \nhowever, is legally insufficient to confer \nstanding. \nThe organizations claim standing on two \ngrounds. First, they assert a direct injury: \ntheir voter registration and educational ef-\nforts have been hindered as the direct re. \nsuit of the challenged investigation, in vio-\nlation of their first amendment and associa-\ntional rights. They claim that the investi-\ngation has discouraged members from par-\nticipating in their asaociational activities \nand that it will lead to disclosure of orga-\nnizational membership, thus undermining \ntheir voter education and registration ef-\nforts. Because the investigation involved \nquestioning of voter registrants as to who \nhad assisted them in registering, they con-\ntend,\n... [truncated, 4409 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/259 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=259]", "char_count": 4409}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 260, "text_content": "OLAGUES v. RUSSONIELLO \n799 \nast as 7701,14 Al (19IS) \nthe prosecution or threat of prosecution of \nthe mere possibility of future injury is in-\nits members. See Alice a Medrano, 416 \nsufficient to enjoin official conduct More-\nU.S. 802, 82940 & n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2207 \nover, there must be \"a strong showing of \n& n. 6, 40 Ltd.2d 666 (1974) (Burger, J., \nabuse\" of discretion to overturn a denial of \nconcurring in part and dissenting in part). \nsuch relief. Id. We also keep in mind the \nIn the case before us, the organizations' \nSupreme Court's admonition that any in-\nvoter education and registration efforts are \njunction regarding government functions is \nunquestionably protected from unwarrant- \ngenerally only permitted in \"extraordinary \ned interference by prosecutorial officials; \ncircumstances,\" Rizzo v. Goods, 423 U.S. \nwhether the investigation actually involved \n362, 379, 96 S.Ct 598, 608, 46 L.Ed2d 661 \nany unwarranted intrusions into their sato- \n(1976), as officials should be given the \nciational activities solely affects the merits \n\"widest latitude\" possible while performing \nof their claim, not their standing. More- \ntheir official duties. Id at 3'78, 96 S.Ct. at \nover, unlike Olagues, members who partici- \n607. \npated in the organizations' counseling ac-\ntivities and voter registration drives are \npotential targets of future prosecutions. \nThus, the bar to invocation of federal equi-\nty jurisdiction faced by a plaintiff who is \nnot being prosecuted or threatened with \nprosecution is not applicable. See Linda \nR.& v. Richard O, 410 US. 614, 93 S.Ct \n1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 586 (1973); Younger a \nHarris, 401 U.S. 87, 91 S.Ct 746, 27 \nL.Ed.2d 669 (1971). \nThe next inquiry is whether the interests \nthe organizations seek to protect are \"ger-\nmane\" to the purposes of the organiza-\ntions. Hunt, 432 US. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at \n2441, \nWe conclude that they are. The \norganizations' activities are centered on \nvoter education and registration. Such ac-\ntivities are direc\n... [truncated, 4306 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/260 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=260]", "char_count": 4306}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 261, "text_content": "800 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES \nway which encroaches on the prerogatives \nof [a prosecutor] unless there is a clear \nbasis in fact and law for doing so,\" because \nof separation of powers constraints), cart \ndenied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct 72, 54 \nLEd.2d 83 (1977) (Charism). \n(11) The organizations alleged that the \nUnited States Attorney lacked a reasonable \nbasis for initiating the investigations. The \ndistrict court should therefore have deter-\nmined whether any extraordinary circum-\nstances were present. Because we may \naffirm the district court's ruling on any \nbasis fairly presented b \nrd, how-\never, see Keniston v. \n717 F.2d \n1295, 1300 n. 3 (9th Cir.1983), we consider \nwhether there were extraordinary circum-\nstances, Jets, 578 F.2d at 845, present re-\nquiring injunctive relief. We conclude that \nno extraordinary circumstances are sug-\ngested in the rti, \nas indicated in our \ndiscussion in Part \nBecause we hold that \ninjunctive relief would not be appropriate, \nwe need not determine whether, as Olagues \nand the organizations claim, an action for \nsuch relief may lie against federal officials \nunder the Act itself. \nOther courts have been equally reluctant \nto intrude into the sphere of prosecutorial \nauthority. See Reporters Committee for \nFreedom of the Press v. American Tele-\nphone & Telegraph, 693 F.2d 1030, 1065 \n(D.C.Cir.1978) (\"Only the most extraordi-\nnary circumstances warrant anticipatory \njudicial involvement in criminal investiga-\ntions.\"), cert denied, 440 U.S. 949, 99 S.Ct. \n1431, 59 LEcI2d 639 (1979) (Reporters \nCommittee); LaRouche v. Webster, 566 \nFSupp. 415, 417 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (\"party \nseeking to enjoin a criminal investigation \nbears an almost insurmountable burden\") \n(LaRouche); accord In re Grand Jury of \nthe Southern District of Alabama, 508 \nF.Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.Ala.1980); In re \nGrand Jury Subpoena to Central States, \n225 F.Supp. 928, 925 (N.D.III.19t34). \nOnly one court has actually found the \npresence of sufficiently extraordin\n... [truncated, 4360 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/261 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=261]", "char_count": 4360}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 262, "text_content": "OI.AGUES \nate as \nmade no showing of future investigatory \nmisconduct, an injunction with respect to \nfuture investigations was also denied. Id. \nat 419. 'As to the fear that first amend-\nment rights were being chilled, the court \nemphasized that the \"compelling govern-\nmental interest in investigating possible\" \ncrime overrode such interests and that \"the \nmore asking of material questions does not \nconstitute a First Amendment violation.\" \nId. at 418. See also Jona v. Unknown \nAgents of the Federal Election Commis-\nsion, 613 F.2d 864, 877-78 (D.C.Cir.1979) \n(reasonable questioning by Commission \nagents about campaign contributions does \nnot chill first amendment rights), cert. de-\nnied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1019, 62 \nL.Ed.2d 755 (1980). \nReporters Committee involved \ntwo \nnewspapers which sought injunctive and \ndeclaratory relief from a telephone compa-\nny policy of providing toll call records to \nlaw enforcement officials, claiming first \nand fourth amendment violations. \nThe \ncourt held that the first amendment provid-\ned no additional \"shield\" respecting privacy \ninterests beyond the fourth amendment's \nprotection in the context of a good faith \ncriminal investigation. 593 F.2d at 1054-\n55, 1058. The court emphasized the \"par-\nticularly heavy burden\" on plaintiffs de-\nmanding equitable relief in such circum-\nstances dictated by separation of powers \nconcerns, id. at 1065, and that mere specu-\nlation as to irreparable harm would not \nsuffice. Id. at 1067. In order to meet the \nburden, plaintiffs would have to establish \n\"a clear and imminent threat of future \n[prosecutorial] misconduct\" /d. at 1071. \nPlaintiffs urge that the preliminary in-\nvestigation in this case should be reviewed \nby this court with \"heightened scrutiny\" \nbecause it focused on a \"suspect class\" and \nbecause a fundamental right is burdened. \nWe disagree. \n[12) Initially, the organizations argue \nthat a classification based on an individu-\nal's choice of language is a form of discrim-\ninat\n... [truncated, 4289 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/262 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=262]", "char_count": 4289}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 263, "text_content": "802 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nnizations' request therefore urges us \"to \nextend its most exacting scrutiny to review \n[government action] that allegedly discrimi-\nnates against a large, diverse, and amor-\nphous class, unified only by the common \nfactor\" of language. San Antonio School \nDistrict v. Rodrigues, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 \nS.Ct. 1278, 1293, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). We \nagree that within a society \"of multitudi-\nnous origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and \ncultures, ... (i)t would hardly take extraor-\ndinary ingenuity for a lawyer to fmd 'insu-\nlar and discrete' minorities at every turn in \nthe road.\" Sugarman v. nougat:, 113 \nU.S. 634, 657, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2865, 37 \nL.Ed.2d 853 (1973) (Rehnquist, .1., dissent-\ning). We therefore decline to equate one's \nchoice of language with one's race or na-\ntional origin, classification on the basis of \nwhich would require exacting scrutiny. \n(131 Heightened scrutiny is also appro-\npriate if a fundamental right is burdened, \nand voting is considered a fundamental \nright. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. \n330. 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 81 L.Ed.2d 274 \n(1972). It is difficult to see how any \"bur-\nden\" was placed on anyone's right to vote, \nhowever, since no individual citizen was \ndenied his right to vote. Russoniello's pre-\nliminary inquiry was aimed at ferreting out \npotential voting fraud, in order to enhance \nthe right to vote of those who qualified. \nindividual citizens who were initially identi-\nfied as not qualified thereafter were only \nthe subject of narrowly confined, noncoer-\ncive follow-up interviews probing potential-\nly unlawful activities of others. Even if we \nconstrue this as a \"burden,\" it is a burden \nthat all citizens must be asked to bear \nwhen they are potential witnesses to un-\nlawful conduct. \n(141 The organizations' first amend-\nment claims are equally lacking in sub-\nstance. \nWhatever incidental burden (if \nany) on their associational rights which \nmay have occurred must give way to the \ngovernme\n... [truncated, 4401 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/263 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=263]", "char_count": 4401}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 264, "text_content": "ner of the investigation subsequently un-\ndertaken. But ours is not the role of a \n\"super prosecutor\" empowered to monitor \nall prosecutorial activities on a day-to-day \nbasis, absent compelling, extraordinary cir-\ncumstances. Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1312-13. \n(171 We only hold that on the facts of \nthis case, no such extraordinary circum-\nstances exist warranting intrusion into the \nactions of the executive branch. This is \nnot to say that the organizations' charges \nare not serious; we reach this conclusion \nonly after careful scrutiny of the record \nbefore us. We are compelled, however, to \nrefrain from injecting ourselves into the \nmidst of what essentially was only an em-\nbryo of an investigation. A narrowly fo-\ncused preliminary inquiry using public \nrecords was undertaken in order for the \nUnited States Attorney to determine \nwhether a problem even existed. Without \nthe ability to make such a narrow inquiry, \nin the face of a study indicating potentially \nsignificant voter registration problems, the \nUnited States Attorney would be deprived \nof the information he needs to perform his \nduties. The organizations would have us \neither forbid any preliminary investigation, \nor mandate one of significantly broader \nscope. But matters such as the scope of a \npreliminary investigation are delegated to \nthe sound discretion of the executive \nbranch. \nVI \n(181 The organizations also sought de-\nclaratory relief. The district court dis-\nmissed this claim without elaborating its \nreasons. The decision whether to grant \ndeclaratory relief is within the sound dis-\ncretion of the district court. See, e.g., Doe \no. Callinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1024-25 (9th \nCir.1981). \n(191 Declaratory relief may be appropri-\nate even when injunctive relief is not. See \nSteffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469, 94 \nS.Ct. 1209, 1220, 89 L.Ed.2d 506 (1974) \n(Mesabi). There is a considerable differ-\nence between ordering a government offi-\ncial to conduct his activities in a certain \nmanner, and simply p\n... [truncated, 4262 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/264 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=264]", "char_count": 4262}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 265, "text_content": "804 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nhis conduct is lawful, and therefore may \nnot be interfered with by state or federal \nofficials. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 478, 94 \nS.Ct. at 1225 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). \nDeclaratory relief thus provides an \"alter \nnative to pursuit of the arguably illegal \nactivity.\" Id. at 480, 94 S.Ct. at 1226. \nHere, however, there is no claim seeking a \ndeclaration that the organizations' voter \nregistration activities are lawful. Rather, \nthey seek a declaration that the govern-\nment's activities are unlawful. Thus, the \norganizations are not seeking any alterna-\ntive to being forced to continue arguably \nlawful conduct with the fear of imminent \ncriminal prosecution. E.g., Doran v. Sa-\nlem Inn, Inc, 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, \n45 L.FA 9d 648 (1975). \nIn these circumstances, we hold that the \ndistrict court's denial of declaratory relief \nwas not an abuse of discretion. The orga-\nnizations were not generally hindered from \npursuing their lawful voter registration ac-\ntivities at the risk of imminent criminal \nprosecution, unlike the restaurant owners \nin Doran. Declaratory relief in this action \nwould raise the same concerns regarding \ninterference with the activities of prosecut-\ning officials that we pointed out in our \ndiscussion of injunctive relief. \nVII \n[211 The separation of powers concerns \nwith regard to equitable relief against a \nUnited States Attorney are absent when \nexamining the appropriateness of equitable \nrelief against the county officials. But \nsimilar considerations of restraint in order-\ning such relief arise out of principles of \ncomity and federalism, as emphasized in \nLyons, °What, and Younger. \"[RJecogni-\ntion of the need for a proper balance be-\ntween state and federal authority counsels \nrestraint in the issuance of injunctions \nagainst state officers engaged in the ad-\nministration of the \nStates' \ncriminal \nlaws....\" Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112, 103 \nS.Ct. at 1670, citing O'Shea, 414 U.S,„ at \n499, 94 S-Ct. \n... [truncated, 4171 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/265 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=265]", "char_count": 4171}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 266, "text_content": "OLAGUES J RUSSONIELLO \nOw as 770 Fad Al (1ims) \n544, 555, 89 S.Ct. 817, 826, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 \n(1969), private litigants are held to have an \naction against state officials for declarato-\nry and injunctive relief under section 5 of \nthe Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. \nThe Act, however, does not specify any \nstatutory damage remedies. No case has \nbeen cited nor have we found one in which \ndamages were recovered. In determining \nwhether to construe an implied cause of \naction, the principal focus must be on con-\ngressional intent. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, \nFenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cumin, 456 U.S. \n353, 877, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1838, 72 L.Ed.2d \n182 (1982). The Act itself limits the recov-\nery of any fine for criminal sanctions to \n85,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-3. The \nlegislative history nowhere suggests any \naction for damages, but instead observes \nthat a private litigant is entitled to \"the \nsame remedy\" as the Attorney General, as \nwell as attorneys' fees as in 42 U.S.C. \n44 1981-1988. S.Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., \n1st Sess. 89-48, reprinted in 1975 US. \nCode Cong. & Ad.News 774, 806-10. That \nhistory points out that title sole conse-\nquence\" of the provision for a private \ncause of action under the Act \"is to broad-\nen the scope of equitable relief which may \nbe requested\" to include the \"special reme-\ndies\" specified in the Act. Id. at 49, re-\nprinted in 1976 U.SCode Cong. & Ad. \nNews at 816 (emphasis added). \nMoreover, Supreme Court precedent sug-\ngests that private plaintiffs are limited to \ndamage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. \nSee Smith v. Allieright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 \nS.Ct. 767, 83 L.Ed2d 987 (1944 In Smith, \nplaintiffs were awarded damages for viola-\ntion of their voting rights under 8 U.S.C. \n§ 81 (now echoed in 42 U.S.C. § 1978), in a \nsuit under 8 U.S.C. § 48 (now codified at 42 \nU.S.C. § 1983). Equitable relief suffices to \nfulfill the purpose of the statute, which is \nto ensure the right to register and vote at \nthe polls. See, ag., Webber v. White, 422 \nF.Supp. 416\n... [truncated, 4281 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/266 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=266]", "char_count": 4281}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 267, "text_content": "806 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \ndescribed as a purely administrative act. \nThe Third Circuit has highlighted this as-\npect of a prosecutor's duties: \nWe recognize that the decision of the \nAttorney General, or a prosecuting attor-\nney, to initiate a prosecution is not made \nin a vacuum. On occasion, the securing \nof additional information may be neces-\nsary before an informed decision can be \nmade. To grant a prosecuting attorney \nabsolute immunity over his decision to \ninitiate a prosecution while subjecting \nhim to liability for securing the informa-\ntion necessary to make that decision \nwould only foster uninformed decision-\nmaking and the potential for needless \nactions. We believe the right to make \nthe decision without being subject to suit \nmust include some limited right to gather \nnecessary information. \nForsyth v. Illeindienet, 599 F.2d 1203, \n1215 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. \n913, 101 S.Ct. 3147; 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1981). \nWe need not determine whether the dis-\ntrict court erred in denying absolute immu• \nnity, because we agree that all those sued \nare entitled at least to qualified, good faith \nimmunity. The controlling standard is \"the \nobjective reasonableness of an official's \nconduct, as measured by reference to clear \nly established law.\" Harlow v. Fitzgerald, \n457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.CL 2727, 2738, 73 \nLEd.2d 896 (1982). Moreover, summary \njudgment is encouraged as an appropriate \ntool to \"avoid excessive disruption of \ngovernment\" Id. \nUnder this objective standard, all the of-\nficials are entitled to immunity. The coun-\nty officials did no more than submit infor-\nmation in the public record to the United \nStates Attorney at his request, with some \nlater, voluntary interviews of those voters \nwhose citizenship the INS was unable to \nascertain. Such actions do not violate any \n\"clearly established\" rights. Examining \ninformation in the public record violates no \none's rights. The Northern District Di-\nrector of the INS, David Iichert,\n... [truncated, 4182 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/267 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=267]", "char_count": 4182}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 268, "text_content": "OI.AGUES \naka* \nstandards (section VI), and that the plain-\ntiffs have no claims under the Voting \nRights Act (sections VII and VIII). \nI \nwould remand on the injunction and one \nVoting Rights Act claim, and reverse the \ndenial of a declaratory judgment which pro-\nvides that the investigation violated the \nEqual Protection Clause. For clarity and \nbrevity, I will limit my comments on this \ncomplex case to these issues. \nStanding should not be denied to Ola-\ngues. Neither rationale employed by the \nmajority is convincing. \nThe prudential \nanalysis speaks of \"equitable relief\" but \nthen considers solely the request for an \ninjunction, ignoring the declaratory relief \nsought. The majority concedes that Ola-\ngues has alleged an injury, but then cate-\ngorizes the harm as \"subjective\" an \nfore nonjusticiable under Laird v. \n408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 LEd. \n(1972). \nYet Lairs( recognizes that when \nthe complainant is subject to the challenged \nexercise of government power, whereby \nthe government improperly imposed an aft \nfirmative obligation likely to have a deter-\nrent effect on the exercise of his rights, \nLamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. \n301, 308, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 1497, 14 LEd.2d \n398 (1965), the requirements of standing \nare met. Laird, 408 U.S. at 11-13, 92 S.Ct. \nat 2324-25 (citing Lamont). \nOlagues satisfies the requisites of stand-\ning under the very case upon which the \nmajority relies. See McMichael v. County \nof Napa, 709 F.2d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. \n1983). The burden which Olagues alleges \nupon his exercise of the franchise—that his \nrequest for a bilingual ballot triggered an \ninvestigation of him by the INS, the FBI. \nand the United States Attorney, and an \ninterview with the local District Attorney \nat which he was to prove his citizenship—is \nt. See Ritto v. Goode 423 is. 362. 379. 96 5.O. \n5911. 608, 46 LEdld 561 \n976) (federalism \nsues in injunction of municipal police); lea \nCastings:1a, 578 F.741 842. 845 (9th Clr.1978)\nimmediate controversy \n... [truncated, 4501 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/268 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=268]", "char_count": 4501}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 269, "text_content": "808 \n770 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \n\"reasonable basis\" standard. Pollard, 283 \nFSupp. at 258; Reporters Committee, 693 \nF2d at 1064. See also Bran:burg v. \nHayes; 408 U.S. 665, 699-01, 707-08, 92 \nS.Ct. 2646, 2665-66, 2669-70, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 \n(1972). \nThe organizations alleged that the Unit. \ned States Attorney lacked a reasonable ba-\nsis for initiating the investigations. The \ndistrict court should have made a finding \non this issue. See La Rouen* v. Webster, \n566 F.Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Pol-\nlard, 283 F.Supp. at 258. The relief sought \nby the organizations was not anticipatory, \nsince the investigation presented a current \ncase or controversy. CI Jett v. Castane-\nda, 678 F.24 842, 845 (9th Cir.1978) (no case \nor controversy); Reporters Committee, \n593 F.2d at 1065. The denial of the prelimi-\nnary injunction should be affirmed, there-\nfore, only if the organizations failed to \nshow that the investigation was not reason-\nable or initiated in bad faith. The question \nshould be remanded. \nContrary to the majority's view, declara-\ntory relief raises different concerns than an \ninjunction. To quote one case cited by the \nmajority, \"critical distinctions make declar-\natory relief appropriate where injunctive \nrelief would not be.\" Steffel v. Thompson, \n415 US. 452, 481, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1226, 39 \nL.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concur-\nring). The majority echoes the mistake of \nthe panel which was reversed in Strife! for \nholding that a failure to demonstrate irrep-\narable injury precluded the granting of de-\nclaratory relief. Id at 471-72, 94 S.Ct. at \n1221-22. It reasons that where injunctive \nrelief is inappropriate, declaratory relief \nshould also be denied, because \"an award \nof declaratory relief in favor of the orga-\nnizations could later provide grounds for \nseeking injunctive relief against the same \nofficials should the organizations believe \nthey are again the targets of a similar \ninvestigation.\" This concern is misplaced, \nbecause an injunction s\n... [truncated, 4190 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/269 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=269]", "char_count": 4190}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 270, "text_content": "to vote. Precedent does not define \"bur-\nden\" so narrowly, however. See, e.g., Har-\nper a Virginia Board of Election& 383 \nU.S. 663, 66647, 86 S.Ct 1079, 1081, 16 \nL.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (poll tax constitutes bur-\nden). Nor is \"denial\" of the right to vote \nthe only behavior prohibited under the Void-\ning Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (\"no \nvoting qualification or prerequisite to vot-\ning, or standard, practice, or procedure ... \nto deny or abridge ...\"); 42 U.S.C. \n§ 1978i(b) \n(\"intimidate, \nthreaten, \nor \ncoerce\"). \nThe opinion states that \"it is difficult to \nsee how any 'burden' was placed,\" but I do \nnot share this difficulty. An investigation \nby the FBI and INS and a summons to the \ndistrict attorney to prove one's citizenship, \nas I noted above concerning the injury to \nOlagues, constitutes a burden on the exer-\ncise of the right to vote in this case The \nimpact of the investigation on the class \nwent beyond any ordinary inconvenience \ncaused to witnesses. These individuals are \nnot fluent in English, are new to this coun-\ntry, and through their recent acquisition of \ncitizenship have experienced the INS bu-\nreaucracy, which misrepresented the citi-\nzenship status of more than half of those \ninvestigated. When a citizen's request for \na bilingual ballot—which is specifically \nmade available by Congress to eliminate \nvoting discrimination against those more \ncomfortable in another language, Chinese \nfor Affirmative Action v. Lequennec, 580 \nF.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1978), ctn. denied, \n439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1047, 59 L.Ed.2d 90 \n(1979)—triggers such consequences, a bur-\nden has been imposed. The Voting Rights \nAct forbids intimidation of voters, and in \nmy view this investigation intimidated \nthose foreign-born, recently registered vot-\ners who requested bilingual ballots. \nHaving examined the character of the \nclassification in question and the impor-\ntance of the individual interests at stake, \nIllinois State Board of Elections a So-\ncialist Workers Party, \n... [truncated, 3668 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/270 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=270]", "char_count": 3668}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 271, "text_content": "PENTHOUSE INTERN, LTDJ McAULIFFE \n925 \nMesas 702 rid elts (t \nRB., 429 F2d fir (10th Cir.1970), and more \n•\nnay by the Fourth Circuit, Air Transit \nNLRB, 879 F2d 1101 (4th Cir.1982), \nBoard sought to impose the same infes-\ntation on the Eleventh Circuit. The effort \nis to no avail. \n[24] We hold that the daily lessees are \nindependent contractors and not employees \nof the Company and \ncontrary finding of \nthe Board is unsup \nby substantial \nevidence. N.LR.B. \nBeaton, Inc., 502 \nF2d at 1222 The \ndoes not support \n\"two fairly conflict' \nviews,\" NLRB v. \nUnited Insurance Co., 890 U.S. at 260, 88 \nS.Ct at 992, but only one: the daily lessees \nare independent contractors. A fortiori the \nannual lessees, over whom the Company \nconcededly exercises even less control and \nwho have a greater investment and entre-\npreneurial interest in the taxicabs than the \ndaily lessees also are independent contrac-\ntors.' Accordingly, the enforcement of the \norder of the Board is DENIED. \nPENTHOUSE INTERNATIONAL, LTD.. \nPlaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nHinson HeAULIFFE, Individually and as \nSolicitor General for the County of Ful-\nton, State of Georgia, Defendant-Appel-\nlant \nNo. 81-7426. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nEleventh Circuit. \nApril 11, 1983. \nOpinion on Granting of Rehearing En \nBanc June 30, 1983. \nOwner of rights to film brought suit to \nenjoin county prosecutor in Georgia from \n4. Haring reached this result It Is unnecessary \nfor us to reach the Issue of whether the annual \nlessen are supervisors because. as Independent \ncontractors, they do not qualify as employees \nprosecuting or threatening to prosecute, un-\nder Georgia obscenity statute, any person \nexhibiting the film. The United States Dis-\ntrict Court for the Northern District of \nGeorgia at Atlanta, Richard C. Freeman, J., \ndenied permanent injunction but granted \ndeclaratory relief in favor of the plaintiff. \nOn appeal by the county prosecutor, the \nCourt of Appeals, Tjoflat, Circuit Judge, \nheld that: (1) injunctive re\n... [truncated, 3470 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/271 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=271]", "char_count": 3470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 272, "text_content": "926 \n702 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \ncriminal statutes, and, absent prosecutorial \nmisconduct, no constitutional claim exists to \nrelieve burden on those innocent persons of \ndefending valid criminal prosecutions. \n4. District and Prosecuting Attorneys sag \nProsecutor was well within his discre-\ntion in threatening to prosecute persons as-\nsociated with showing of film, in that rea-\nsonable prosecutor could have believed \nthere was probable cause that those in-\nvolved in exhibition of such film would be \nviolating Georgia obscenity statute as con-\nstitutionally applied. O.C.GA. § 16-12-80; \nU.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. \n5. Courts *408(7) \nThough county prosecutor threatened \nto enforce valid criminal statute against \nbehavior falling within ambit of statute, in \nsense that reasonable prosecutor could have \nbelieved there was probable cause that \nthose who would be involved in exhibition \nof film would violate Georgia obscenity \nstatute as constitutionally applied, owner of \nrights to film was not entitled to ruling \nfrom federal district court that film was \nnot obscene unless it was proved that film \nwas not obscene as matter of federal consti-\ntutional law regardless of factual context in \nwhich movie was shown. 0.C.GA. §§ 16-\n12-80, 16-12-30(b); U.S.C.A. ConatAmend. \nI. \nGeorge Weaver, Atlanta, Ga., for defend-\nant-appellant. \n• Honorable Seybourn H. Lynne, U.S. District \nJudge for the Northern District of Alabama, \nsitting by designation. \n1. Jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. \n+ 1343(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), through \nwhich 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976) is Implemented \n2. Penthouse makes no attack on the facial \nlidity of the Georgia obscenity statute. In \nsuch an attack would be frivolous because that \nstatute amlickly incorporates the constitution-\nal standards emanated In Miller v. California, \n413 U.S. 15, 90 SAX 2807. 37 LE424 419 \n(1973). Ga.Code S 18-12-80 (1980). \nWe recognize that Penthouse ntr cross-ap-\npealed the district court's denial \nInjunctive \nrel\n... [truncated, 4221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/272 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=272]", "char_count": 4221}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 273, "text_content": "PENTHOUSE INTERN, LTD.\n MeAULIFFE \n917 \naussialridin \nreverse the district court's grant of Pent-\nhouse's prayer for declaratory relief and \nremand this claim because the court erred \nin proceeding to a determination of the \nobscenity vel non of \"Caligula.\" \nThe anew° of Penthouse's complaint is \nthat McAuliffe is infringing on Penthouse's \nfirst amendment rights by threatening to \nprosecute persons involved in the showing \nof \"Caligula.\"' Penthouse alleges that it \ncannot obtain an exhibitor in Fulton County \nbecause of McAuliffe's threats of prceecu-\ntion.\" To remedy this infringement, Pent-\nhouse seeks two remedies: an injunction \nagainst prosecution or threats thereof, and \na declaration that \"Caligula\" is not obscene. \nCareful analysis reveals that these two rem-\nedies are in fact based on separate causes of \naction. \nso different from that of the lower court that \nwe believe we are compelled to state them. \n4. Penthouse's complaint desalbes the threats \nas follows: \nDefendant McAuliffe's Conduct \n16. \nDefendant McAuliffe has publicly an-\nnounced that he considers Caligula to be ob \nscene by commencing a lawsuit In United \nStates District Court for the Southern Die \nIlia of New York in the name and style: \nMorality in Media, Inc., individually, and \nMorton A. Hill, S.), for himself and all others \nsimilarly (ski sltuatect and Hinson McAu-\nliffe, In his official capacity as Solicitor Gen-\neral of Fulton County, Georgia,lisr\nelf and \nall others shags* (sk) situated \nOne Mo-\ntion Picture Film Entitled \n,\" a rex \nEdward R. Korman, in his official capacity as \nUnited States Attorney for the Eastern Dia-\ntrice of New York; and Benjamin R Chianti \nin his official capacity as Attorney General of \nthe United Staten Civil Action No. 80-0840 \n(hereinafter the \"Southern District of New \nYork Lawsuit\"). Defendant McAuliffe, \nlegedly In his capacity as Solicitor General of \nFukon County, Georgia, and as Part of the \nSouthern District of New York Lawsuit, \ncaused to be Issued\n... [truncated, 4872 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/273 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=273]", "char_count": 4872}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 274, "text_content": "928 \n702 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES \n\"Caligula\" would be violating the Georgia \nobscenity statute as constitutionally ap-\nplied, because \"Caligula\" is so clearly not \nobscene, the requisite objective bad faith \nwould be shown. \n(2,3) We base this reasoning on several \npremises. \nOur initial and most basic \npremise is that obscenity is not \nunder the first amendment. See \nCalifornia, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 93 S.1111, \n2614, 37 LEd2r1 419 (1978). Thus, states \nsuch as Georgia are free to enact statutes \nmaking the exhibition of obscene matter \ncriminal. See GaCode § 16-12-80 (1980). \nOur second premise is that states may en-\nforce their valid criminal statutes within \nconstitutional limits. They may also charge \ncertain public officials, such as McAuliffe, \nwith the responsibility of enforcing such \nlaws. Our third premise is that it is funda-\nmental that some innocent persons may be \ncharged with violating criminal statutes, \nand that absent prosecutorial misconduct, \nno constitutional claim exists to \nthe \nburden on those innocent personsillend-\ning valid criminal prosecutions. We believe \nthe validity of these three premises is be-\nyond question. We believe also that these \npremises lead inescapably to the conclusion \nthat law enforcement officials must be al-\nlowed the discretion in good faith to do all \nthat is reasonably necessary to their func-\ntion of enforcing valid laws, and that the \nfirst amendment contemplates no other re-\nsult \n[4] We hold that McAuliffe was well \nwithin his discretion in threatening to pros• \necute persons associated with the showing \nof \"Caligula.\" Having viewed \"Caligula,\" \nit is clear to us that a reasonable prosecutor \ncould have believed there was probable \ncause that those who would be involved in \nthe exhibition of \"Caligula\" in Fulton Coun-\nty, Georgia, would be violating the Georgia \nobscenity statute as constitutionally ap-\nplied. Regardless of the obscenity vel non \nof the movie, it cannot be contended that \nthe movie is so dearly\n... [truncated, 4343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/274 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=274]", "char_count": 4343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 275, "text_content": "PENTHOUSE INTERN., LTD.1 McAULIPPE \n929 \nate as Mead \n(1 \nplaint would be that regardless of the fac-\ntual context in which the movie is shown, \nthe movie is not obscene as a matter of law. \nThus, there is nothing to prevent a federal \ncourt from recognizing such a cause of ac-\ntion. \nWe believe the above analysis is consist-\nent with and supported by a 'somewhat \nanalogous to this one, Stahl \nThompson, \n415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct 1209, \nEd.2d 505 \n(1974). In Steffel the Supreme Court held \nthat a valid claim for declaratory relief was \nstated when the complaint alleged threats \nof prosecution under a facially valid crimi-\nnal trespass statute against conduct argu-\nably protected under the first amendment \nA cognisable claim was stated because a \nfederal court could determine as a matter \nof law whether such threats violated the \nplaintiff's constitutional rights. No factual \nissues needed resolution; a pure question of \nlaw was presented. Because such a ques-\ntion was presented, no prohibitive problems \nof federalism or case or controversy arose. \nSteffel would have been a much different \ncase had it been disputed whether the plain-\ntiffs would make a \"knowing° entry upon \nthe defendant's land within the meaning of \nthe state trespass statute. Problems of fed-\neralism and case or controversy would have \nthen arisen. The same problems arose in \nthis case when the district court determined \nthe obscenity vet non of \"Caligula.\" The \ncourt had to determine the following hypo-\nthetical factual issues under the Georgia \nobscenity statute: \nwhether the future \nshowing of \"Caligula\" would predominantly \nappeal to the prurient interest of the local \ncommunity; whether the showing would be \npatently offensive to that community; and \n7. Because these questions must be resolved as \na matter of law, a Jury has no role In these \ndeterminations. \n& We bold only that the district court cannot \ndecide the question of the obscenity of \"Caligu-\nla\" as a matter of state law. We remand the \n... [truncated, 4863 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/275 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=275]", "char_count": 4863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 276, "text_content": "930 \n702 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIFS \nIt is conceded that Penthouse demon-\nstrated a genuine threat of enforcement of \nthe Georgia statute. Clearly there is a dis-\npute as to whether this statute may be \napplied to \"Caligula.\" McAuliffe believes \n\"Caligula\" is obscene; Penthouse does not. \nThus there is • case or controversy within \nthe meaning of Article III of the Constitu-\ntion and the Federal Declaratory Judgmet \nAct, 23 U.S.C. Sec. 2201. Septum, Inc. \nKeller, 614 F2d 456 (5th Cir.1980). \nSynthesising the averments of the com-\nplaint, the consolidated pre-trial order, the \ntrial transcript, and the May 16, 1981 order \nof the court, it is at once apparent that the \ngravamen of the claim asserted by Pent-\nhouse is that \"Caligula\" is protected by the \nFirst Amendment as applied to the States \nthrough the Fourteenth Amendment. Con-\ncededly obscene material is not protected \nMiller established a three-prong contermi-\nnous test to determine obscenity vet non \nwhich Georgia incorporated in its statute. \nIf \"the average person, applying contem-\nporary community standards would (not] \nfind that (\"Cards\"), taken as a whole, \nappeals to the prurient interest,\" the First \nAmendment insulates it from the applica-\ntion of the Georgia statute. Appeal to the \nprurienp interest is a question of fact. \nSmith \nUnited States, 431 U.S 291, 301, \n97 S.CC 1766, 1766-61, 52 L.Ed.2d 824 \n(1977). \nIt would be anomalous to suggest that it \nis possible to adjudicate the question of \nwhether material is obscene under the \nGeorgia statute without resolving at the \nmine time whether such material is protect-\ned by the First Amendment within the Mil-\nler definition of obscenity since out of the \nfacts the law arises. Both the advisory jury \nand the court found seated that, applying \ncontemporary community standards,Cali-\ngula does not appeal to the prurient inter-\nest \nA careful review of the Court's instruc-\ntions to the jury reveals that its definition \ntel t,\nof the prurient in \nwas in acco\n... [truncated, 4241 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/276 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=276]", "char_count": 4241}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 277, "text_content": "MAJtTRI v. UNITED STATES \n469 \nCite as 431 F.25 Oa (1970) \n/\nthese \ns from a case of smuggling in \nWalden \nUnited States, 5th Cir. 1969, \n417 F.2 698. We repeat that distinc-\ntion here. Leary, Marchetti and Grosso \nheld invalid under the fifth amendment \nstatutes which required an individual to \npay federal taxes on activities that the \nState had declared illegal, and which \ntherefore would subject the individuals \nto prosecution under state laws. In the \npresent case, however, if the appellants \nhad declared and invoiced the heroin and \nmarihuana at the International border, \nthey would not, at that point, have been \nvulnerable to prosecution, either Fed-\neral or State, because they would have \ncomplied with the Federal law and would \nnever have reached the United States \nwithre drugs in their possession. See \nRule \nUnited States, 6th Cir. 1966, 862 \nF.2d 15. \n[3] Secondly, appellants urge that \nthey could not have unlawfully trans-\nported and concealed the marihuana and \nheroin beyond the primary border check-\npoint because they only proceeded be-\nyond that point, where they had failed \nto declare the contraband, to the sec-\nondary checkpoint at the direction of the \ncustoms authorities. This point, too. \ncontrolled by our decision in Walden \nUnited States, supra, where we held \nwhen a defendant enters custom's pri-\nmary inspection station and fails to de-\nclare and invoice marihuana at the first \nopportunity, he is in violation of the law. \n[4] Finally, it is argued that the dis-\ntrict court should have permitted the \njury to pass on appellants' assertions \nthat they are sincere followers of the \nMoslem or Islamic religion, which sanc-\ntions the use of heroin and marihuana. \nAppellants claim that failure to admit \nthis evidence violates their first amend-\nment right to freedom of religion. \ndisposed of this question in Leary \n. \nUnited States, 6th Cir. 1967, 383 F. \n861, 859-862, reversed on other grounds, \n896 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.24 \n67 (1969), where \n... [truncated, 3637 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/277 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=277]", "char_count": 3637}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 278, "text_content": "470 \n431 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES \ntrict court Ins- teed of single-judge court, \ncomplaint failed to state claim for in-\njunctive relief and did not warrant con-\nvening of three-judge court. \nAffirmed. \n1. Courts 4:w$85(1) \nWhere district court enters appeala-\nble order, review of its refusal to con-\nvene a three-judge district court lies in \nthe Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C.A. § \n2284. \n2. Courts 4=0101 \nIn determining substantiality of \nclaimed constitutional question \nupon \nwhich request for three-judge district \ncourt is based, the district court makes a \njudicial decision and district court must \nlook beyond prayer for relief to the sub-\nstantive allegations of the complaint. 28 \nU.S.C.A. § 2284. \n3. Injunction 4m105(1) \nWhile activities protected by First \nAmendment are common bases for in-\njunctive relief against actual or threat-\nened criminal prosecution, they are not \nthe only activities worthy of such pro-\ntection in appropriate circumstances and \nare not the sine qua non for injunctions \nagainst criminal prosecutions: U.S.C.A. \nConst. Amend. 1; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2281, \n2282, 2284. \n4. Courts em101 \nWhere only allegation advanced by \nplaintiffs in support of \ninjunction \nagainst pending federal criminal prose-\ncution for using extortionate means to \ncollect or attempting to collect exten-\nsions of credit was inconvenience of the \ntrial and preference for civil remedy be-\nfore three-judge district court instead of \nsingle-judge court, complaint failed to \nstate claim for injunctive relief and did \nnot warrant convening of three-judge \ncourt. 18 U.S.CA. O 891, 892, 894; 28 \nU.S.C-A. §§ 2282, 2284. \n5. Courts Sn101 \nDistrict court should judiciously and \ncautiously screen applications for three-\njudge panels. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1; \n28 U.S.C-A. §§ 2281, 2282, 2284. \n8. Courts 1=0101 \nSingle-judge district court may ad-\njudicate claim for declaratory relief if \nthe court has subject matter jurisdic-\ntion. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202. \n7. Courts \nWhere single-ju\n... [truncated, 3519 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/278 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=278]", "char_count": 3519}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 279, "text_content": "MAJURI v. UNITED STATES \n471 \nPun 431 Fin 40 (1970) \nGarth for pretrial motions, and he di-\nrected a time schedule for the orderly \nfiling, briefing and argument of such \nmotions. In the criminal case the de-\nfendants have filed a motion to dismiss \nso much of the indictment as charges \nthem with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 891, \n892. and 894, on the ground that those \nsections of Title 18 were enacted by \nCongress without constitutional authori-\nty and in violation of the Ninth and \nTenth Amendments to the United States \nConstitution. Their contention is that \nCongress is without power to prohibit \nIntrastate loansharking. \nAppellants' motion to dismiss the \nloansharking counts of the indictment is \nstill pending and undecided in the dis-\ntrict court, solely because of the pen-\ndency of the civil action in which this \nappeal arises. On March 80, 1970, ap-\npellants filed a complaint alleging the \nfact of indictment Grim. No. 545-69, \nand: \n4. Plaintiffs alleged that Sections \n891, 892, and 894 of Title 18, United \nStates Code, are repugnant to the 9th \nand 10th Amendments to the United \nStates Constitution, in that they are \nvague, speculative, and do not charge \nan offense cognizable under the Unit-\ned States Constitution. \n5. Plaintiffs allege that unless the \ndefendants are restrained from en-\nforcement of these provisions, the \nplaintiffs will suffer severe and irrep-\narable harm, as more fully set forth in \nthe affidavits attached hereto. \nAppendix at 19. \nIn the affidavits referred to, Majuri and \nCaruano allege their indictment, that \nthey have been arrested, and that they \nare free on substantial bail awaiting \ntrial. They also allege: \n8. As a consequence of the same, \nthey have already expended, and will \nbe in the future obliged to expend, \ngreat sums of money, as well as to un-\nI. United Stater v. Ports. 428 F.24 1078 \n(2 Cir., May 1. 1970) : United States v. \nBlancoriod, 4 \nF2d 384 (7 Cir. 1970);\nUnited States \nCurcio. 810 F.Supp. 881 \ndergo grave person\n... [truncated, 3865 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/279 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=279]", "char_count": 3865}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 280, "text_content": "472 \n431 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nless, that the constitutional issue was at \nleast sufficiently substantial to be be-\nyond the province of a single judge. On \nthe second issue, however, it held that \nthe complaint failed to allege facts suffi-\ncient to invoke traditional equitable ju-\nrisdiction. Therefore, it denied injunc-\ntive relief, denied appellants' motion to \nconvene a three-judge court, and dis-\nmissed the complaint. \nAppellants filed notices of appeal and \non May 19, 1970, applied to a panel of \nthis court for injunctive relief pending \nappeal and for a stay of the judgment of \nthe district court. The panel ordered an \naccelerated briefing schedule and re-\nferred those motions to the panel which \nwould hear argument on the merits. \n[1] Although it was not always so= \nit is now clear that, at least in cases \nwhere, as here, the district court enters \nan appealable order, review of a refusal \nrii\nto convene a th \n-judge court lies in \nthis court. Gunn \nUniversity Commit-\ntee, 899 U.S. 383, 0 S.Ct. 2013, 26 i \nEd2d \n684 \n(1970); \nMengelkoch \nIndustrial Welfare Commission, 3 \n1\nU.S. 88, 89 S.Ct 60, 21 L.Ed.2d 215 \n(1968); Wilson \nCity of Port La-\nvaca, 391 U.S. 35 , 88 S.Ct. 151 20 L. \nEd.2d 636 (1968); SchaeAmen \nArne-\nbergb, 887 U.S. 427, 87 S.Ct. 1 \n, 18 L. \nEd.2d 865 (1967); Buchanan \nRhodes. \n885 U.S. 3, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 \n.Ed.2d 9 \n(1966); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor \nCorp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. \n1294, 8 L.Ed2d 794 (1962). Since in \nthis case we affirm that refusal, we \nneed not now decide whether or not \nthere is jurisdiction in the court of ap-\npeals to grant preliminary injunctive re-\nlief pending appeal, or equivalent prelimi-\nnary relief within the federal judicial \nsystem by way of mandamus pending ap-\npeal, or mandamus relief in the absence \nof an appealable orders \n2. Stratton! St. Lads 8. W. Ry., 282 U.S. \nDI 51 S. . 8. 75 L.Ed. 135 (1930), Ex \nparte Metropolitan Water Co.. 220 U.B. \n599, 9 \n.Ct. 600, 55 L.Ed. 575 (1911); \nMiner \n\n... [truncated, 4015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/280 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=280]", "char_count": 4015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 281, "text_content": "MAJUB1 I. UNITED STATES \n473 \nCla 44 481 rid KO (1070) \nSupreme Court the intention, in the \nlege that they should be free to continue \nsame sentence of Idlewild Bon Voyage \nLiquor Corp. v. Epstein, supra 870 U.S. \nat 716, 82 S.Ct. at 1294, to distinguish be-\ntween the district court's role in deter-\nmining substantiality of a constitutional \nquestion and its role in determining the \nexistence of a ground for equitable re-\nlief. Both decisions are judicial rather \nthan ministerial. Both require that the \ndistrict court look beyond the prayer for \nrelief to the substantive allegations of \nthe complaint. \nAppellants suggest, however, that the \ndecision as to substantiality of the fed-\neral constitutional question is \"jurisdic-\ntional\", at least in non-diversity cases, \nwhereas a decision that the complaint \nfaith to state a claim for equitable relief \nis a decision \"on the merits\" and hence \none which by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2284 \na single judge may not make. But it \nseems to us that a decision that a \nclaimed question of constitutional law is \ninsubstantial is even more clearly on the \nmerits, and such decision is now a firm-\nly established duty of a single district \ncourt judge. A finding of insubstantial-\nity of the constitutional question is, \nmoreover, one involving a more sophisti-\ncated judgment than that required to de-\ntermine whether or not a complaint \nstates a cause of action for injunctive \nrelief. Over recent history far greater \ngrowth and change has taken place, and \nundoubtedly will continue to take place, \nin federal constitutional law than in the \nlaw of equitable remedies. \nWe agree, therefore, that it was the \ndistrict court judge's duty to examine \nthe complaint for substantive allegations \nwhich would support a claim for injunc-\ntive relief, and not to look merely at the \nprayer for relief and the conclusive alle-\ngation of irreparable injury. \nAppellants are not faced with the \nchoice of committing a violation of the \ncriminal statute in order\n... [truncated, 4178 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/281 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=281]", "char_count": 4178}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 282, "text_content": "474 \n431 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES \n[5] What is here approved is a judi-\ncious screening by the district courts of \napplications for \nthree-judge \npanels. \nThat screening should be done cautious-\nIY, of course, because of the procedural \nand jurisdictional morass into which liti-\ngants may be led by these troublesome \nthree-judge court statutes. 28 U.S.C. Of \n2281, 2282, and 2284. But the role of \nthe single district judge should be more \nthan a conditioned reflex to such an ap-\nplication, especially now that the Su-\npreme Court has provided for judicial re-\nview in the circuit courts of appeals at \nleast when an appealable order has been \nentered' In most if not all cases, refusal \nto convene a three-judge court will be \naccompanied by the denial of a prelimi-\nnary injunction and hence will be ap-\npealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964). \n[8, 7] One other problem remains. \nThe district court not only denied appel-\nlants' motions to convene a three-judge \ncourt and to grant a preliminary injunc-\ntion, but also dismissed the complaint. \nOn another record the latter step might \nwell be questionable, since it would dis-\npose, without hearing, of a possible \nclaim for declaratory relief. See Note, \nThe Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and \nDeclaratory Judgments in Constitutional \nLitigation, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1870 (1970). \nSuch relief, assuming subject matter ju-\nrisdiction, would be available from a sin-\ngle judge. But the Declaratory Judg-\nment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964), \nis limited in operation to those cases \nwhich would be otherwise within the ju-\nrisdiction of the federal courts. Juris-\ndiction in this case depends upon 28 U. \nS.C. § 1331 (1964), and there is no alle-\ngation in the complaint or affidavits of \nthe requisite jurisdictional amount. The \nsituation might be different if the suit \nchallenged a state statute and jurisdic-\ntion were asserted \ner 28 U.S.C. \n1343 (1964). Hague \nC. I. 0., 807 U. \nS. 496, 518, 69 S.Ct. \n, 83 L.Ed. 1423 \n4. See cases cited at 4\n... [truncated, 3165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/282 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=282]", "char_count": 3165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 283, "text_content": "WALLACH I CITY OF PAGEDALE \n671 \nate as 976 V.24671 (1967) \nallowance during the four year protec-\ntive period. \nSouthern did not offer or advise Shep-\npard of other railroad employment upon \nhis release following the change in \nA&EC ownership. Soon after his dis-\ncharge, Sheppard learned from an inde-\npendent source of an open job as spike \npuller with an A&EC labor gang out of \nMorehead City. lie had worked out of \nNew Bern while a diesel mechanic's help-\ner. \nSouthern admits that Sheppard \nsought and obtained the open position on \nhis own initiative. Sheppard's new em-\nployment required different skills ti an \nhis old job and paid him a lower \nage \nrate. \nSheppard was discharged from the \nnew position as spike puller after only a \nweek because of his intemperate pro-\ntest tt when asked to assist in lifting a \nhalf-ton motor car from the tracks. \n[4) We believe the district court was \ncorrect in treating Sheppard's employ-\nment as a spike puller \"in a manner as \nif [he] • \n• \n• \nhad found work with \nan employer totally unrelated to rail-\nroading.\" \" It was, therefore. unneces-\nsary to determine whether Sheppard's \nsecond dismissal was for good cause. \n(5) We interpret the \"Oklahoma \nconditions\" to mean that an employee is \nnot \"retained\" in a position—and thus \ndisplaced as opposed to dismissed—un-\nless retained at the instance of the rail-\nroad. We think that displacement con-\nditions should not be substituted for \ndismissal conditions except where an \nemployee receives an offer from the rail-\nroad to continue in or return to a new \nposition for which he is qualified. Shep-\npard's second discharge may or may not \nhave resulted from his inability to per-\nform the new work he attempted. Such \ninability could well account for insub-\nordination and intemperance of lan-\nguage. We need not decide—because he \nwas not notified by the carrier of a posi-\ntion \"the duties of which he [was] • \n• \nII. He said: \"Walt a God damn minute.\" \n12. Sheppard 1 28outhern Ry. Co, 258 F.\n... [truncated, 3465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/283 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=283]", "char_count": 3465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 284, "text_content": "672 \n376 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d BERMS \nwas properly dismissed for lack of ju-\nrisdiction where plaintiff did not, by his \npleadings or in any other manner, meet \nthe burden resting upon him to establish \nfederal jurisdiction. \nAffirmed. \nSee also 264 F.Supp. 271. \n1. Injunction 4=1106(1) \nCourts of equity do not ordinarily \nrestrain criminal prosecutions. \n2. Injunction 4=106(1) \nNo person is immune from prosecu-\ntion in good faith for his alleged crim-\ninal acts, and imminence of prosecution \neven though alleged to be in violation of \nconstitutional guarantees is not ground \nfor equity relief since lawfulness or con-\nstitutionality of statute or ordinance on \nwhich prosecution is based may be deter-\nmined as readily in criminal case as in \nsuit for injunction. \n3. Courts e=t08(7) \nWhere threatened criminal prosecu-\ntion is by state officers for alleged vio-\nlations of state law, the state courts are \nfinal arbiters of meaning and application \nof state law, subject only to review by \nUnited States Supreme Court on federal \ngrounds appropriately asserted. \n4. Constitutional Law 45 236(3) \nConferring of discretionary power \nupon administrative board to grant or \nwithhold permission to carry on trade or \nbusiness properly subject to regulation \nunder police power does not violate \nFourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. \nAmend. 14. \nt Courts 4=280.2 \nFederal courts have only that ju-\nrisdiction which Congress, acting within \nthe limits of the Constitution, confers \nupon them. \n6. Federal Civil Procedure 4=4742 \nCivil rights action was properly dis-\nmissed for lack of jurisdiction where \nplaintiff did not, by his pleadings or in \nany other manner, meet the burden rest-\ning upon him to establish federal juris-\ndiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343. \nRichard Wallach, Wellston, Mo., made \nargument pro se and filed brief pro se. \nPaul J. Boll, St. Louis, bfo., for ap-\npellee and filed typewritten brief. \nBefore VAN OOSTERHOUT, MAT-\nTHES and LAY, Circuit Judges. \nVAN OOSTERHOUT, Cir\n... [truncated, 3684 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/284 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=284]", "char_count": 3684}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 285, "text_content": "WALLACH v. OITT OP PAGEDALE \n673 \ncit. as 3143 F 2d VI MCI \nThe complaint is confusing, ambigu-\nous, redundant, vague, and, in some \nrespects, unintelligible. \nIt is also \nhighly argumentative.\" 369 F.2d 57, \n58. \nWe went on to state that the pleadings, \neven if given a liberal interpretation, do \nnot state a cause of action against the \ndefendants within the jurisdiction of the \nfederal court, setting forth the basis for \nsuch conclusion and supporting author-\nities. The complaint now before us is \nmuch more extensive than the former \ncomplaint but in our view It is in great-\ner violation of Rule 8 than the complaint \npreviously considered. \nPlaintiff in his present voluminous, \nrepetitious, confusing and argumentative \ncomplaint asserts that he acquired real \nestate in an unincorporated area in St. \nLouis County which was zoned as heavy \nindustrial property upon which he was \npermitted to and did establish a junk \nyard and automobile wrecking yard in \nconformity with the St. Louis County \nzoning ordinance adopted in 1946. It is \nthen asserted that plaintiff's property \nwas maliciously and illegally annexed to \nthe city of Pagedale but no substantial \nlegal grounds are asserted to support the \nclaim of invalid annexation. Plaintiff \nnext asserts in a highly inflammatory \nmanner that numerous zoning and licens-\ning ordinances were passed by the city \nof Pagedale both before and after the \nannexation in violation of numerous \nrights guaranteed plaintiff by the Con-\nstitution. Some of such ordinances are \ncited by number and excerpts of part of \nthe ordinances are set out. \nAs shown by the complaint, Ordinance \nNo. 88 passed by the city before the an-\nnexation provides for the zoning of the \ncity but specifically carries a provision \nreading: \n\"The lawful use of land, buildings \nand structures existing at the time of \nthe adoption of this ordinance may be \ncontinued, although such use does not \nconform to the provisions thereof, but \nif such non-conforming use is disc\n... [truncated, 4087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/285 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=285]", "char_count": 4087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 286, "text_content": "674 \n376 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2/1 SERIES \ning generally to the state courts the \ntrial of criminal cases arising under \nstate laws, subject to review by this \nCourt of any federal questions in-\nvolved. • • \n• \n\"It is a familiar rule that courts of \nequity do not ordinarily restrain aim-\ninal prosecutions. No person is im-\nmune from prosecution in good faith \nfor his alleged criminal acts. Its im-\nminence, even though alleged to be in \nviolation of constitutional guarantees, \nis not a ground for equity relief since \nthe lawfulness or constitutionality of \nthe statute or ordinance on which the \nprosecution is based may be deter-\nmined as readily in the crimin \nas in a suit for an i \nnction. \n& Farnum Mfg. Co. \n[City of \nAngeles, 189 U.S. \n[23 S.Ct 498, \n47 L.Ed. 778) ; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 \nU.S. 240 [46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927]. \nWhere the threatened prosecution is \nby state officers for alleged violations \nof a state law, the state courts are the \nfinal arbiters of its meaning and ap-\nplication, subject only to review by this \nCourt on federal grounds appropriate-\nly asserted. Hence the arrest by the \nfederal courts of the processes of the \ncriminal law within the states, and the \ndetermination of questions of criminal \nliability under state law by a federal \ncourt of equity, are to be supported \nonly on a showing of danger of ir-\nreparable injury 'both great and im-\nmediate.'\" \nSee Outdoor American Corp.) City of \nPhiladelphia, 3 Cir., 333 F.2d \n3, 965. \nNo extraordinary circumstances are \nalleged in our present case which would \nwarrant a departure from the rule just \nstated. On oral argument, it developed \nthat plaintiff appealed from his convic-\ntion and that such appeal is still pending. \nWe cannot ascertain from the com-\nplaint the precise basis or the legal \ngrounds upon which plaintiff claims that \na license was denied to him to operate \nhis junk yard in violation of his con-\nstitutional rights. Plaintiff quotes part \nof Ordinance No. 23 relating to licensing \n\n... [truncated, 3900 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/286 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=286]", "char_count": 3900}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 287, "text_content": "UNITED STATES I OUSTER CHANNEL WINO CORPORATION \ncut so 370 F.34 475 (1$47) \nI\nYork ex rel. Lieberman \nVan De \nCarr, 199 U.S. 662, 26 S. 1 144, 60 \nUNITED STATES of America, \nL.Ed. 305 (1905); and that ordi- \nAppellee, \nnances validly prohibiting the opera-\ntion of certain businesses without first \nobtaining municipal permission do not \ndeprive one of his property without \ndue process of law nor den \nequal protection of the law, \nCity of St. Louis, 194 U. \nS.Ct. 673, 48 j.Ed. 1018 (1904).\" \nIn Garfinkle \nSuperior Court of New \nJersey, 3 Cir.. 78 F.2d 674, the court \nin affirming the dismissal of an action \nbased on violation of federal constitu-\ntional rights concluded, \"His stated fun-\ndamental facts, irrespective of their \nfantastic nature, certainly do not show \nclearly and distinctly that this suit is \nbased on a federal question.\" What was \nsaid there is fully applicable here. \n[5] Federal courts have only that ju-\nrisdiction which Congress, acting with-\nin the limits of the Constitution, confers \nupon them. \n\"The party invoking the district \ncourt's original jurisdiction has the \nduty of affirmatively alleging juris-\ndiction; and, if his allegations are \nproperly controverted, the burden of \nestablishing jurisdiction. Lack of fed-\neral jurisdiction may be raised by mo-\ntion or in the responsive pleading. \nAnd 'whenever it appears by sugges-\ntion of the parties or otherwise that \nthe court lacks jurisdiction of the sub-\nject matter, the court shall dismiss \nthe action.' \" 1 Moore's Federal Prac-\ntice\nI\n 2d Ed. 110.60 [4]. \nSee McNutt \nGeneral Motors Accept-\nance Corp., 2 \nU.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. \n780, 80 L.Ed. 1136. \nFederal Rules of \nCivil Procedure No. 8(a) (1). \n[6] Defendants have by motion at-\ntacked the jurisdiction of the federal \ncourt to hear this case. Plaintiff has not \nby his pleadings or in any other manner \nmet the burden resting upon him to es-\ntablish federal jurisdiction. \nThe judgment dismissing the petition \nwithout prejudice for the lack of \n... [truncated, 3636 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/287 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=287]", "char_count": 3636}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 288, "text_content": "APPEAL \nCite as 300 \ninal judgment, it is not unlikely that ap-\npellees would have attempted to prepare \nthemselves with evidence relating to the \ndisputed amount. That the appellant's \nrepresentation in its pre-trial memoran-\ndum evidenced its understanding of its \nburden is confirmed by the fact that it \ndid indeed undertake to offer proof in \nthe presentation of its case in chief. It \nis essential to the orderly disposition of \nlitigation that parties, as well as courts, \nbe able to rely on procedural courses \nwhich have been clearly defined and es-\ntablished in properly conducted pre-trial \nproceedings. \n(9) The entire record supports the \nDistrict Court's conclusion that the bur-\nden of proof in this case rested upon \nappellant. It had agreed to meet it, and \nit did not do so. The judgment is \nAffirmed. \nMmHg PITCH \nIn the Matter of the Testimony of PhWip \nKilter, Sr., Before the United States \nGrand Jury-65 GJ 2013. \nAppeal of Phillip KITZER, Sr. \nNo. 15650. \nUnited States Court of Appeals \nSeventh Circuit. \nNov. 18, 1966. \nPetition seeking relief for allegedly \nwrongful transmission of testimony, \ngiven to Grand Jury In Illinois, to Grand \nJury in Minnesota. The United States \nDistrict Court for the Northern District \nof Illinois, Eastern Division, William J. \nCampbell, Chief Judge, entered judg-\nment dismissing the petition without a \nhearing, and petitioner appealed. \nThe \nCourt of Appeals held, inter alia, that \nOF EITZER \n677 \nF.2d ar7 MN) \ndenial of request for order suppressing \nevidence consisting of testimony al-\nlegedly \"tainted\" on theory that such \ntestimony to Grand Jury in Illinois was \nwrongfully transmitted to Grand Jury in \nMinnesota was properly denied without \nhearing, absent allegations which had not \nbeen concluded by Minnesota court's de-\nnial of petitioner's motion to dismiss \nMinnesota indictment. \nAffirmed. \n1. Injunction 4=105(1) \nMandamus t=01 \nDistrict court was without jurisdic-\ntion to control discretionary actions of \nAttorney Ge\n... [truncated, 3165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/288 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=288]", "char_count": 3165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 289, "text_content": "678 \n369 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nPER CURIAM. \nPetitioner Phillip Kitzer, Sr., contends \nthat he was denied due process in viola-\ntion of the Fifth Amendment of the Con-\nstitution because the district court denied \nhim a hearing before entering judgment \ndismissing his sworn petition. We have \nconsidered the briefs and the record in \nthe light of the oral arguments made in \nthis court, and we affirm the judgment. \nThe substance of the petition is that \nKitzer gave certain testimony to the \nGrand Jury in the Northern District of \nIllinois, Eastern Division, on the promise \nof the Assistant United States Attorney \nthat he would not be named in any indict-\nment based upon that testimony; that \nnotwithstanding the promise, the testi-\nmony given was transmitted without au-\nthority of a court order to a Grand Jury \nin Minnesota in violation of Fed.R. \nCrim.P. 6(e); that the subsequent or-\nder of the District Court for the North-\nern District of Illinois authorizing trans-\nmission of that testimony to the Minne-\nsota Grand Jury was entered without \nknowledge of the broken promise to \nKitzer and without knowledge that the \ntestimony had already been sent to Min-\nnesota; and that by virtue of the \"tainted \ntestimony\" petitioner was indicted by the \nMinnesota Grand Jury following the \nbreach of the promise of the Assistant \nUnited States Attorney. \nThe relief prayed was an order direct-\ning the Attorney General of the United \nStates to move the Minnesota District \nCourt to dismiss the indictment or, al-\nternatively, for an order restraining fur-\nther proceedings in the prosecution of \nthe Minnesota indictment or an order \nsuppressing as evidence in that prosecu-\ntion the disclosures made by petitioner to \nthe Grand Jury in the Northern District \nof Illinois. \n(1] We think it is clear that the dis-\ntrict court was without jurisdiction to \ncontrol discretionary actions of the At-\ntorney General or to grant the relief ri \nquested with respect to him. Goldberg \n_Hoffman, 225 \n... [truncated, 3445 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/289 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=289]", "char_count": 3445}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 290, "text_content": "32 \n951 FEDERAL REPORTER, Ed SERIES \nprosecution and trial on the earlier \ncharge of \"uttering a forged instru-\nment.\" He was subsequently found guil-\nty by a jury in the Circuit Court of the \nCity of St. Louis. \nOn December 20, 1963, under a writ \nof habeas corpus, appellant was again \nbrought before the United States Dis-\ntrict Court and, pursuant to the verdict \nof guilty returned against him on No-\nvember 6. 1063, the court sentenced him \nto two and one-half years imprisonment. \nHe was then returned to the custody \nof the State of Missouri and, on Feb-\nruary 3, 1964, pursuant to the guilty ver-\ndict in the Circuit Court of the City of \nSt. Louis on the charge of \"uttering a \nforged instrument\", appellant was sen-\ntenced to eight years imprisonment to the \nMissouri State Department of Correc-\ntions. lie was also sentenced to a con-\ncurrent term of eight years imprison-\nment on his plea of guilty to the earlier \ncharge of \"first degree robbery\". Appel-\nlant is now in the process of serving \nthese terms at the Missouri State Pen-\nitentiary. \n[1] A § 2255 motion is not available \nto attack a sentence which a prison \nhas not commenced to serve. Ellison r. \nUnited State \n263 F.2d 395 (10 Cir. \n1969); Cain \nUnited States, \n 49\n870 (8 Cir. 1 \n). In Heflin \nUnited \nStates, 868 U.S. 416, 79 S.Ct. 461, 3 \nL.Ed.2d 407 (1959), the Supreme Court \nstated that: \"Section 2255 is available \nonly to attack a sentence under which a \nprisoner is in custody.\" Id. at 418, 79 \nS.Ct. at 463. \n[2] Appellant's § 2255 motion is pre-\nmature. He is presently serving, in the \nMissouri State Penitentiary, the concur-\nrent eight year sentences imposed by the \nCircuit Court of the City of St. Louis. \nHe will not begin to serve the two and \none-half year sentence imposed by the \nFederal District Court, which he attacks \nin this § 2265 proceeding, until he has \nfinished service of the State terms. \nThe order appealed from is affirmed. \nDr. Andrew C. IVY, PlaIntiffappellant, \nI \nNicholas KATZENBACH\n... [truncated, 3773 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/290 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=290]", "char_count": 3773}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 291, "text_content": "join Attorney General and United States \nAttorney from proceeding against him in \ncriminal case and appointment of impar-\ntial medical commission to make court \nsupervised clinical teat of efficacy of \ndrug. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371, 1001, 1341; \nFederal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § \n1 et seq., 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. \n2. Injunction 4=405(1) \nMere complexity of factual issues to \nbe determined by jury in criminal case is \nnot constitutional basis for precluding \ntrial of criminal case by injunction. \nMelvin L. Klafter, Leonard R. Harten-\nfeld, Chicago, Ill., for appellant. \nEdward,. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., John \nPeter Lulinski, Thomas W. James, Asst. \nU. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., William W. \nGoodrich, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Joanne S. \nSisk. Atty., Dept. of Health, Education, \nand Welfare, Washington, D. C., for ap-\npellees. \nBefore CASTLE, KILEY, and SWY-\nGERT, Circuit Judges. \nCASTLE. Circuit Judge. \nThe plaintiff-appellant, Dr. Andrew C. \nIvy, brought suit in the District Court \nagainst Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney \nle\nneral of the United States, and Edward \n. Hanrahan, United States Attorney for \ne Northern District of Illinois, the de-\nfendants-appellees, seeking to enjoin \nthem from proceeding against him in a \npending criminal cause and for the ap-\npointment of an impartial medieal com-\nmission to make a court supervised clini-\ncal test of the efficacy of the drug Kre-\nbiozon in the treatment of cancer. Plain-\ntiff's complaint was filed subsequent to \nthe return of the indictment, but prior \nto the commencement of the criminal \ntrial! Defendants' motion to dismiss \non the ground that the complaint does \nnot state a claim on which relief can be \ngranted was allowed and the action was \ndismissed. Plaintiff appealed. \nIVY I EATZENBAOH \ndu all ti PM 32 (2165) \nThe prosecution sought to be restrained \ninvolves an indictment charging Dr. Ivy, \ntogether with three individual and one \ncorporate co-defendants, with conspiracy \nin violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. Dr. Ivy \nis\n... [truncated, 3998 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/291 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=291]", "char_count": 3998}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 292, "text_content": "34 \n351 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \narbitrarily and far beyond the exercise of \nadministrative prerogative. and has, \nthrough his agents, discouraged physi-\ncians from prescribing Krebiozen by im-\nplied threats of reprisal by medical as-\nsociations or the government, and has \nattempted to discourage patients from \nusing the drug; this conduct of the \nSecretary has caused Ivy to lose prestige \nas a professional man, and his rights to \npractice medicine, to conduct research, \nand to teach and advocate ideas have been \ninfringed; plaintiff has a legal and moral \nright to use any drug he regards as safe \nin treating cancer patients and is com-\npelled to continue to use Krebiozen, which \ncan only result in a multiplicity of civil \nand criminal actions; only a court of \nequity, and not a jury, can intelligently \ndetermine whether Krebiozen is a fake \ncancer drug and this determination can \nonly be made after a court supervised \nclinical test; and that to require plaintiff \nto defend himself in the criminal trial \nwithout a prior clinical test of the drug \nwill deprive him of due process of law. \nThe complaint asserts that the acts com-\nplained of violate rights guaranteed to the \nplaintiff by the 1st, 5th and 6th Amend-\nments to the Constitution of the United \nStates. \nThe complaint does not challenge the \nconstitutional validity of any of the stat-\nutes the indictment charges the plaintiff \nwith violating nor Is any allegation made \nthat either of the defendants sought to be \nrestrained is acting other than within the \ndiscretionary scope of his duties concern-\ning enforcement of the laws. Apart from \nthe question of the sufficiency of any of \nthe factual allegations made with respect \nto the actions and conduct of the Secre-\ntary of Health, Education, and Welfare \nto present an issue involving the infringe-\nment of any constitutional right of the \nplaintiff, we perceive no basis either from \nthe averments of the complaint or the ap-\nplicable law for imputing to the def\n... [truncated, 4134 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/292 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=292]", "char_count": 4134}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 293, "text_content": "N. L. R. B. I O. \ncite as 351 \nshould intervene to restrain a pending \ncriminal prosecution. \nconclude that \nthe rationale of Douglas City of Jean-\nnette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S. . 877, 87 L.Ed. \n1324, is applicable here, and in the lan-\nguage of Dombrowski (880 U.S. p. 485, \n86 S.Ct. D. 1120) there are \"no special \ncircumstances to warrant cutting short \nthe normal adjudication of constitutional \ndefenses in the course of a criminal \nprosecution.\" \nThe judgment order appealed from is \naffirmed. \nAffirmed. \nNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS \nBOARD, Petitioner, \nI \nC. L. FRANK, INC., Respondent. \nNo. 15054. \nUnited States Court of Appeals \nSeventh Circuit \nSept. 27, 1965. \nProceedings on petition for enforce-\nment of an order of the National Labor \nRelations Board. The Court of Appeals, \nCastle, Circuit Judge, held that employ-\ner's general manager's request that em-\nployees caucus and inform him of result \nwas reasonable method of verifying one \nemployee's statement that employees had \nchanged their minds about union repre-\nsentation; and, in context, manager's \nstatement to assembled employees with \nregard to scheduled increase in wages \nand his designation of supervisor de-\nsired by employees were, if technical vio-\nlations, so do minimis in nature as to \nafford no reasonable basis for board's \nconclusion that they resulted in dissipa-\ntion of union's majority. \nOrder accordingly. \n1. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local \nUnion 215. s/w International Brother. \nL. FRANK, INO. \n35 \nKIM 35 (1965) \nLabor Relations 4=389 \nEmployer's general manager's re-\nquest that employees caucus and inform \nhim of result was reasonable method \nof verifying one employee's statement. \nthat employees had changed their minds \nabout union representation; and, in con-\ntext, manager's statement to assembled \nemployees with regard to scheduled in-\ncrease in wages and his designation of \nsupervisor desired by employees were, if \ntechnical violations, so de minimis in na-\nture as to afford no reasonabl\n... [truncated, 3395 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/293 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=293]", "char_count": 3395}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 294, "text_content": "occasion it split up a team working on \none job to send one member of the team \nto another job, a practice as to which \nthere is no evidence whatever in the case \nat bar. Moreover, in the latter case it \nwas found that in the event extra work \nturned up in the course of a job the ap-\nplicator was not allowed to contract to \ndo it for the householder on his own ac• \ncount, as in the case at bar, but was re-\nquired to ask the taxpayer-plaintiff for \ninstructions as to how to proceed. These \nfacts, and others we might mention, dif-\nferentiate the Security Roofing case from \nthe one now before us. \nThe case at bar is consistent with the \nMetropolitan Roofing, Jagolinzer and \nAmerican Homes cases cited above and \nnot inconsistent with Security Roofing. \nA judgment will be entered affirming \nthe judgment of the District Court. \nLuther F. GRANT and Sirrka I Grant, \nPetitionersAppellees. \nUNITED STATES of America, \nDefendant.Appellant. \nNo. 344, Docket 26183. \nUnited States Court of Appeals \nSecond Circuit. \nArgued May 12. 1960. \nDecided July 28, 1960. \nAppeal by United States from order \nof the District Court for the Northern \nDistrict of New York, James T. Foley, \nJ., 186 F.Supp. 418, refusing to dissolve \norder staying United States attorney \nand all other agents and representatives \nof the United States from submitting \nevidence relating to taxpayers to a grand \njury pending determination of applica-\nGRANT I. UNITED STATES \n165 \nCite as 2n EU 165 (190) \ntion for return of books and records. \nThe Court of Appeals, Friendly, Circuit \nJudge. held that where judge signed an \nex parte order requiring United States \nattorney to show cause why taxpayer \nshould not be entitled to return of rec-\nords or papers voluntarily turned over to \nagents of Internal Revenue Service and \nstaying United States attorney and all \nother agents and representatives from \nsubmitting any evidence or information \nto grand jury pending determination of \napplication for order to suppress, and \nsubseq\n... [truncated, 3397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/294 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=294]", "char_count": 3397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 295, "text_content": "166 \n282 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES \nhearing, second order was not final and \nwas not appealable as an interlocutory \norder refusing to dissolve or modify in-\njunctions. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1292(a) \n(1): Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 65(b). 28 \nU.S.C..'. \n4. Injunction C=t105(1) \nDistrict judges do not have un-\nlimited discretion to stay government or \nits agents from presenting evidence to \ngrand jury pending a hearing on motion \nto suppress evidence and evidentiary \nhearing should not be set as a matter of \ncourse but only when petition alleges \nfacts which if proved would require \ngrant of relief. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. \nrule 41(e), 18 U.S.C.A. \nS. Searches and Seizures C•7(28) \nTaxpayers do not make a showing \nof violation of constitutional guarantees \nby alleging only that they turned over \ntheir books and records voluntarily to \nTreasury agents for examination and \nsuch books and records were found to \ncontain evidence leading government to \nassert criminal liability. \n6. Crintinal Law' <>394.6(si \nIn those cases where an evidentiary \nhearing is required on application for \norder to suppress evidence. court should \nproceed in an expeilitous manner con-\nsonant with summary character of rem-\nedy. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 41(e). \n18 U.S.C.A. \n7. Injunction C=105(1) \nPossible expiration of a period of \nlimitationiis highly relevant to the exer-\ncise of court's discretion in staying gov-\nernment or its agents from presenting \nevidence to grand jury pending hearing \non motion to supress such evidence. \nFed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 41(e), 18 U.S. \nC.A. \nS. Courts C/s404 \nAbuses of discretion by trial court \nin ordering a hearing on motion to sup-\npress evidence or in the scope or dura-\ntion of a stay pending such hearing can \nbe corrected by Courts of Appeals \nthrough issuance of mandamus. \nFed. \nRules Crim.Proc. rule 41(e), 18 U.S.C.A. \nKenneth P. Ray, Asst. U. S. Atty., \nSyracuse. N. Y. (Theodore F. Bowes. \nU. S. Atty., Northern Dist. of New York, \nSyracuse, New York, on \n... [truncated, 3814 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/295 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=295]", "char_count": 3814}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 296, "text_content": "of 20 days after the commencement of \nthe action on the ground \"that their \ntestimony is desired for use at the hear-\ning of petitioners' motion to suppress ille-\ngal evidence ° * •, and that it is \nessential that their testimony be taken \nprior to such hearing.\" \nPursuant to \nsuch leave petitioners served notice that \nthe depositions would be taken on March \n8, 1960 and a subpoena commanding a \nspecial agent to bring copies of the man-\nuals and instruction to revenue agents \nand special agents. \"all documents, \npapers, books, records, memoranda, re-\nports, diaries and objects maintained or \nobtained\" by two agents, and \"copies or \nextracts of books and papers made by \nthem as a result of examinations or in-\nvestigations\" relating to the tax affairs \nof the petitioners. \nWhen Judge Foley arrived in Syracuse \non March 1, 1960, to commence a trial \nterm, an assistant United States attor-\nney asked him to vacate the order of Feb-\nruary 2G. The judge declined to do this \nbut signed an order, supported by affi-\ndavits of the United States attorney and \ntwo revenue agents, requiring the peti-\ntioners to show cause on March 7 \"why \nan order should not be made dissolving \nthe injunction and vacating the order to \nshow catve granted by this Court on the \n26th day of February 1960.\" Petitioners \nsubmitted answering affidavits on the \nreturn day. After considering the affi-\ndavits and hearing counsel. Judge Foley, \non March 8, 1960, made a Memor•andum-\nDecision and Order, 186 F.Supp. 418. re-\nfusing to dissolve the stay (although \nmodifying it to permit the institution \nof a complaint before a United States \nCommissioner under 6531 of the Inter-\nnal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § \n6531, to toll the statute of limitations) \nand reserving decision as to vacating \nthe original order to show cause until \nthe hearing. \nFrom this the United \nStates appeals. \nWe meet at the outset the question, not \ndiscussed by the parties, whether the or-\nder is appealable. Manifestly the order \n... [truncated, 4194 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/296 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=296]", "char_count": 4194}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 297, "text_content": "168 \n282 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \norder\" did not cease to be one because it \nrestrained pending decision on a motion \nfor a preliminary injunction which was \nscheduled to be heard 28 days thence, see \n71 Harv.L.Rev. 550 (1955). \nAnd the \nThird Circuit has decided similarly with \nrespect to a stay that was to remain in \neffect until the application for the tem-\nporary injunction was heard, when the \nappeal was taken prior to the expira-\ntion of 20 dal. Pennsylvania Motor \nTruck Asen \nPort of Philadelphia \nMarine Terminal Asen, 1960, 276 F.2d \n931. Here the minimum period of re-\nstraint was 24 days, only four more than \nthe 20 permitted by Rule 65(b). a period \nthat might have been accepted by consent \nunder the express terms of the rule or \nwould undoubtedly have been shortened \nhad the court been requested to do so: \nthe order was issued without notice and \nhearing; and the judge had not made the \npreliminary determination of the rights \nof the parties required for issuance of a \ntemporary injunction. \nOn the other \nhand, as demonstrated by the order per-\nmitting petitioners to take depositions, \nthe hearing scheduled for March 21 was \nevidently intended to be the final hearing. \nso that the stay may be said to have \nperformed the traditional office of an \ninjunction pendente life, \"to preserve the \nxtatus quo pending final determination \nof the action after a full hearing.\" 7 \nMoore, Federal Practice, I; 65.04, at 1625 \n(2d ed. 1955). \nThe difficulty in resolving these con-\nflicting considerations suggests that we \nmay not be asking the right question and \nthat we ought examine a more basic one, \nnamely, whether 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) \napplies at all to preliminary stays in \nsummary proceedings to suppress illegally \nobtained evidence. This in turn requires \nanalysis of the nature of a motion to that \nend made before any criminal proceeding \nis pending. \nFed.R.Crim.Proc. 41(e) provides that \n\"A person aggrieved by an unlawful \nsearch and seizure may move the d\n... [truncated, 4142 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/297 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=297]", "char_count": 4142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 298, "text_content": "GRANT I UN \ncite as 941F \nthis species of professional disci-\npline. Thus power to entertain this \nmotion depends on the fact that the \nparty proceeded against is an attor-\nney, not that he is an official known \nas the United States attorney. It \nis further true that the right to move \ndoes not at all depend on the exist-\nence of this indictment; it might be \nmade, were no prosecution pending.\" \nSee also Co-Bart Importing Co. v. United \nStates, 1931, 282 U.S. 344, 355. 61 S.Ct. \n153.75 L Ed. 374 ; Foley v. United States, \n5 Cir., 64 F.2d 1, 3, certiorari denied, \n1933. 289 U.S. 762, 53 S.Ct. 796, 77 L.Ed. \n1505. \nWhen motions under Rule 41(e) or the \npractice preceding it are independent of \na criminal proceeding, the courts enter-\ntain appeals from final orde \ndenying \nthe return of papers, Perlman \nUnited \nStates, 1918, 247 U.S. 7, 38 \nCt. 417, \n62 L.Ed. 950; Essgee Co. \nUnited \nStates, 1923, 262 U.S. 151, 43 \nCt. 514. \n67 L.Ed. 917; Co-Bart Co. \nUnited \nStates, s ra, or granting sue \nreturn, \nBurdeau \nMcDowell, 1921, 256 U.S. 465, \ni\n41 S.Ct, \n4, 65 LEd. 1048. In contrast, \nwhen the motion is made aft \nindict-\nment,\nStates, 1929, 278 U.S. 221, 49 .Ct. 11 \n1\nneither its denial, Cogen \nUnited\n73 L.Ed. 275, nor its grant, Carroll \nUnited States, 1e\".7, 354 U.S. 397, i \nS.Ct. 1332, 1 L.E'!.2d 1442, is appealable. \nWe have found La case sustaining appel-\nlate jurisdiction from any order in such \na proceeding save a final one. \nWe do not think an order, made in the \nexercise of \"the inherent disciplinary \npower\" of the court, directing one of its \nown officers to refrain from using books \nI. The came for opplienhilliy le Hint the \naction is \"of a civil nature.\" Fol.R.Civ. \nProc. 1, sines \"Whether an action is civil \nor criminal by nature is determined by \nthe sanctions nought to be imporied,\" 7 \nMoore, Federal Practice 1 81.02. at 44. \n(2.3 ed. MI); see United States \nStangland, 7 Cir.. 1937, 242 Sid 84 , \n8-81, and does not come within any\nthe exclusion* of Rule 81. I\n... [truncated, 4332 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/298 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=298]", "char_count": 4332}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 299, "text_content": "170 \n282 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nthe return of property alleged to have \nbeen illegally seized proceeds by a ple-\nnary action under an appropria \njuris-\ndictional statute, see Goodman \nLan, \ni \n8 Cir., 1931, 48 F.2d 32; cf. Eastus \nBradshaw, 5 Cir., 94 F.2d 788, certiorari \ndenied, 1938, 304 U.S. 576, 58 S.Ct. 1045, \n82 L.Ed. 1539, such language is hardly \napt to describe a preliminary step in a \nspecial proceeding where, in the course \nof exercising its \"disciplinary powers\" \n\"summarily to determine\" what one \nits own officers should do, Go-Bart Co. i \nUnited States, supra, 282 U.S. at page \n355, 51 S.Ct. at page 157 the court in-\nstructs him, ex parte, not to take action \npending the determination that might \nimpair the court's ability to grant full \nrelief. \nSuch a proceeding normally \nwould not have the three stages—tem-\nporary restraining order, preliminary \ninjunction, and final decree—characteris-\ntic of \"a hearing in equity\": the first \nevidentiary hearing would usually be the \nlast and the proceeding would generally \nbe determined before an appeal from an \ninterlocutory order could be heard. \nThe Baltimore Contractors case itself \nteaches that not every request for an \norder containing words of restraint is \none for an injunction iithin ¢ 1292(a) \n(1). So does Fleischer \nPhillips, 2 Cir., \n264 F.2d 516, 516, certiorari denied. \n1959, 359 U.S. 1002. 79 S.Ct. 1139, 3 \nL.Ed.2d 1030, where we said, also deal-\ning with officers of the court, that \"the \nprayers for injunctive relief add nothing \nto the orders denying the motions and \nrender neither of them automatically ap-\npealable under 28 Ulf. . § 1292(a)(1).\" \nAnd United States \nRosenwasser, 9 \nCir., 1944, 145 F.2d 1015, 156 A.L.R. \n1200, held that an order suppressing evi-\ndence and restraining the United States \nfrom using copies of the seized records \nor information derived therefrom in any \nproceeding of any kind, which was not \nappealable as final because it was sought \nonly after the information ha\n... [truncated, 4288 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/299 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=299]", "char_count": 4288}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 300, "text_content": "GRANT I. UN \nCite as 2'C F \ndering a hearing or in the scope or dura-\ntion of a stay can be corrected by courts \nof appeals through the issuance of man-\ndamus. \n6 Moore, Federal Practice, 9 \n54.10 [4], at 87 (2d ed. 1955). Here. \nhowever, appellant has \nof requested \n1 \nsuch relief, see Zamore \nGoldblatt, 2 \nCir., 1953. 201 F.2d 738, t e stay was to \ncontinue only until the next motion day \nof the court in Albany, and the issue \nwould doubtless have been settled long \nago if the government had complied with \nthe order to show cause instead of taking \nthis appeal. \nThe appeal is dismissed for lack of ap-\npellate jurisdiction. \nMOORE, Circuit Judge (dissenting). \nThis appeal tests the regularity of the \nproceedings instituted by the taxpayers \n(referred to as \"the taxpayer\") to en-\njoin the United States Attorney from \nsubmitting to a Grand Jury any evidence \nof any crime whatsoever, or taking any \nother proceedings, against them. \nThe \ninjunction thus has the effect of enjoin-\ning pro Canto the Grand Jury in its time-\nhonored function of investigating crime. \nThe reason asserted in the petition sup-\nporting this drastic request is in sub-\nstance, that, although \"petitioner, either \npersonally or through employees in his \noffice, did make available to said (In-\nternal Revenue) agents all of his books, \nrecords and papers and those of his wife, \nincluding among others, daily log books, \ncheck books, bank statements, bank \nbooks, cancelled checks, stock records, \nbooks and papers,\" that he did not do so \n\"for purposes of any criminal investiga-\ntion.\" \nThe taxpayer sought a return of these \npapers and an injunction against their \nuse (and leads therefrom) by an order \nto show cause pursuant to Rule 41(e) of \nthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. \nThis Rule permits a person \"aggrieved \nby an unlawful search and seizure\" to \nmove the district court for the return of \nthe property and its suppression as evi-\ndence. Of the grounds specified in the \nRule the only one poss\n... [truncated, 4162 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/300 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=300]", "char_count": 4162}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 301, "text_content": "172 \n282 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \npointed out in Centracchio I Garrity, 1 \nCir., 1952, 198 F.2d 382, at page 385: \n\"it has long been accepted that \nwhere evidence, obtained by an un-\nconstitutional search and seizure in \nviolation of the Fourth Amendment, \nis in the hands of a United States \nattorney, a federal district court \nmay entertain and grant relief on a \npetition, filed even prior to any in-\ndictment, seeking a return of the \npapers or property unconstitutional-\nly seized and the suppression of the \nsame as evidence. (Citing cases)\" \nThis court in Lapides I United States, \n2 Cir., 1954, 215 F.2d 253, at page 254. \ndescribed a somewhat similar proceeding \nas follows: \n\"Appellant's 'motion' was in ef-\nfect a complaint initiating a civil \naction seeking suppression of evi-\ndence said to have been illegally ob-\ntained and to restrain the United \nStates Attorney from presenting \nsuch evidence to the grand jury. \nThe suit thus began before any \ncriminal proceedings by the govern-\nment against appellant had been in-\nstituted, and his appeal was there-\nfore not from an interlocutory order \nentered in the course of a criminal \nsuit. Accordingly, the order deny-\ning his motion was a final and ap-\npealable order.\" \nIf the order to show cause be tanta-\nmount to a civil action (and apparently \nthe taxpayer would so regard it by seek-\ning to avail himself of the civil deposi-\ntion rules), then the other civil rules are \nequally applicable. Federal Rules of Civ-\nil Procedure 65(b) specifically provides \nthat every temporary restraining order \n\"shall expire by its terms within such \ntime after entry, not to exceed 10 days, \nas the court fixes, unless within the time \nso fixed the order, for good cause shown, \nis extended for a like period or unless the \nparty against whom the order is directed \nconsents that it may be extended for a \nlonger period.\" \nThe language of this Rule is signifi-\ncant. The restraining power of the court \nis restricted and by the words \"shall ex\n... [truncated, 3959 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/301 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=301]", "char_count": 3959}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 302, "text_content": "GRANT v. OM \ncite vs 282 r \nUpon the appeals by the taxpayers and \nthe government in Bodkin after a stipu-\nlation by the taxpayers \"to grant the \ngovernment all the relief to which it \ncould be entitled on a successful appeal\" \nthe appeal was dismissed as moot. How-\never, the district court's judgment was \nvacated and the complaint dismissed. \nThis court specifically referred to our \nexpre \nisapproval of Bodkin in United \nStates \nSclafani, 2 Cir., 1959, 265 F.2d \n408. Examining the Bodkin case, a situ-\nwion most comparable to the present \ncase appears, i. e., a motion to suppress \nand restrain under Federal Rule of \nCriminal Procedure 41(e). depositions \nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n26. \nThe same grounds, in substance, \nwere advanced, namely, that the original \nvoluntary surrender of their books by \nthe taxpayers for tax audit became in-\nvoluntary when subsequently facts were \nthereby disclosed indicating criminal lia-\nbility. The hearing must have been in \nthe nature of a full-scale trial because \nover 1,000 pages of testimony were \ntaken. Bodkin,' expressly disapproved. \ndoes not furnish a precedent as to proce-\ndure. Lapides, as here, was a pre-indict-\nment order to show cause. As this court \non review said, \"Nothing in said order \nsuggested that the hearing thus set was \nto be a preliminary hearing only\" (215 \nF.2d 2.53, 256). Nor was any question \nthere raised as to the nature of the in-\njunctive provisions. \nAs to the substantive law, whether the \npapers on which the order to show cause \nwas granted be regarded as a Rule 41(e) \nmotion or as a complaint in a civil action \nor even as a unique hybrid, they must \npossess legal sufficiency. Giving to the \ntaxpayer's affidavit the most liberal con-\nstruction as a complaint and at the same \ntime regarding the same papers as an ap-\nplication for a preliminary injunction \npending trial and final judgment of the \nissues there tendered, it fails to meet \nthe legal requirements for suppression. \nStripped of its \n... [truncated, 4016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/302 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=302]", "char_count": 4016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 303, "text_content": "174 \n282 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES \nwould be impossible to discharge in \nfact, and would serve no useful pur-\npose.\" \nhe\nsame principle was stated in Russo \nUnited States, 2 Cir., 1957. 241 F.2d \n5 (Clark, then Chief Judge. Lumbard \nand Waterman, C. JJ.). \nThe Fourth \nCircuit rejected a taxpayer's contention \nwhich the court stated as follows: \n\"The contention seems to be that \nrevenue agents who secure the con-\nsent of a taxpayer to an examination \nof his books with intent to obtain \nevidence and use it In a criminal \nprosecution, are guilty of deceit un-\nless they divulge their purpose, and \nthat the obtaining of information in \nsuch a manner violates the Fourth \nAmendment and its introduction in \nevidence violates the Fifth Amend-\nment: and even if the examination \nis begun solely to ascertain the civil \nliability of the taxpayer and evi-\ndence of crime is unearthed, the tax-\npayer must be warned and given an \nopportunity to withdraw his con-\nsent, or all information subsequent-\nly obtained is inadmissible in \ncriminal prosecution.\" \nTurner\nUnited States, 4 Cir., 1955, 222 F. \n926. 930. \nAnd in Centracchio I Garrity, 1 Cir., \n1952, 198 F.2d 382, at page 387, the \nCourt said: \n\"On the face of the petition in the \npresent case, and certainly on the \nevidence offered by petitioner at the \nhearing before the district court, it \nis clear that the evidence in ques-\ntion did not come into the possession \nof the government officials in viola-\ntion of petitioner's rights under the \nFourth Amendment. \nHe volun-\ntarily turned over the evidence, and \nmade the disclosures, to the agents \nof the Internal Revenue Bureau, for \nthe purpose of a determination of his \nincome tax liabilities.\" \nIn conclusion I cannot reconcile the \nresult reached by the majority with the \nlanguage of the opinion. If. as they say. \n\"Our holding that the order here sought \nto be reviewed is not appealable does not \nmean that district judges have unlimited \ndiscretion to stay the government or its \na\n... [truncated, 3863 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/303 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=303]", "char_count": 3863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 304, "text_content": "LIZZA AND SONS, \nClips. an 1'. \nof his motion to dissolve it, and con-\ntrary to the provisions of Rule 52 \n(a). It is clear that an appeal \nlies from \ntemporary injunction. \nDeckert \nIndependence Shares \nCorporation, 311 U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct., \n229, 86 L.Ed. 182. The appeal at \nbar therefore may not be dismissed \nand the order restraining the de-\nfendant must be reversed.\" \nII \nInsofar as the \ncision of the Fifth \nCircuit in Connell \nDulien Steel Prod-\nucts, 5 Cir., 1957, 40 F.2d 414 (tempo-\nrary restraining order i ued after \nnotice) differs from Sims \nGreene, I \nbelieve that the Third Circuit's interpre-\ntation better follows the words and in-\ntent of the Rule.' \nFollow' g the type of relief granted \nin \nin Sims \nGreene, I would hold that the \norder of larch 8th is an order refusing \nto dissolve an injunction and hence ap-\npealable. On the appeal I would vacate \nthe stay order of February 26th as ex-\ntended in effect by the order of March \n8th. I concur with the majority in their \nviews with respect to the lack of suffi-\nciency of the petition because the law is \nclear that upon the facts therein alleged \nthe taxpayer is not entitled to an order \nof suppression. In connection with the \npre-indictment preliminary attacks upon \nevidence, which are apparently becom-\ning increasingly popular, it might be \nwell to remember the words of a distin-\nguished jurist (L. Hand, C. J.) in In re \nFried. 2 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 453, 455: \n\"It would be an intolerable burden \nupon the prosecution of crime, if it \nwere possible to test in advance the \ncompetency of evidence which an \naccused, to say nothing of a prospec-\ntive accused, might be able to show \nwas likely to be used against him. \nThe protection of the individual \nfrom oppression and abuse by the \nI. The recent ease in the nil \nCircuit. \nP ennsylvania Motor Tr. Amen \nPort of \nPhila. M. T. Asia, 3 Cir., Mk. VS F.2d \n031, is not to the contrary. There the \nD'ONFRO \n175 \nRd 175 MON \npolice and other enforcing officers is \nindee\n... [truncated, 3127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/304 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=304]", "char_count": 3127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 305, "text_content": "384 \n272 FEDERAL DEPORTEE, 24 REUSS \nUnder I.R.C.1939, § 27200(1), (f), \nand (k), 26 U.S.C.A. § 272(a) (1), (1, k), \nthe first notice of deficiency was clearly \nsufficient; and since timely filing is made \njurisdictional, the Tax Court correctly \nheld th \nit could not hear the petition. \nGalvin \nC. I. IL, 2 Cir., 239 .24 166. \nCases c ed, such as \nilek \nC. I. It, \n94 II .App.D.C. 97, \nF \n458, and \nTeel \nC. 1. R., 27 T. . \n5, affirmed 10 \nCir., 48 F.2d 749, \nnot hold to the \n1\ncon-\ntrary, while Eppleit \nII\nC. I. R., 7 Cir., 188 \nF.24 95, and Cole \n. I. ., 80 T.C. 665, \naffirmed 2 Cir., gift F.2d 13, are not in \npoint, since in each of these cases the \nfirst letter had ban sent to the wrong ad-\ndress. \nThe decision of the Tax Court Is af-\nfirmed. \nHarold R. STEINER, Appellant, \nv. \nTheodore ROOM United States Coinage. \nstoner for the Southern District of Cat \ntong* Central Division, and Robert W. \nWare, United States Marshal for the \nSouthern Disttiot of California, Appel• \ntees. \nJames B. FREW, Appellant, \nv. \nTheodore ROME, United States Contmi9 \nstoner for the Southern District of Call. \ntorn* Central Division, and Robert W. \nWare, United States Marshal for the \nSouthern District of California, Appel. \nken. \nMime. Nos. 895, 596. \nUnited States Court of Appeals \nNinth Circuit. \nNov. 5, 1958. \nAccused, who had been indicted in \nthe United States District Court for the \nEastern District of Michigan for alleged-\nt\nmailing circulars in violation of the \no.ne Mail Statute, and who had been \narrested on the indictments at their resi-\ndences in the Southern District of Cali\nforma where proceedings for their re-\nmoval were instituted before the United \nStates Commissioner, brought suits in \nequity in the United States District \nCourt for the Southern District of Cali-\nfornia against the United States Cont. \nmissioner and the United States Marshal \nto enjoin their removal. \nThe United \nStates District Court for the Southern \nDistrict of California entered orders dis-\nmissing\n... [truncated, 3485 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/305 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=305]", "char_count": 3485}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 306, "text_content": "STEIN= \nCite a. in \ntions. 18 U.S.C.A. §6 1461, 1462; U.S. \nC.A.Const. Amend. 1. \nBrock. Fleishman & Rykoff, Holly-\nwood, Cal., for appellants. \nLaughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Rich-\nard A. Lavine, Jordan A. Dreifus, Ant \nU. S. Attys., Loa Angeles, Cal., for appel-\nlees. \nBefore POPE, HAMLET and 103-\nELSCII, Circuit Judges. \nPER CURIAM. \nThe appellants have each been indicted \nin the United States District Court for \nthe Eastern District of Michigan for al-\nlegedly mailing circulars in violation of \nthe \"Obscene Mail Statute\", 18 U.S.C.A. \n1i 1461 and 1462 as amended August 28, \n1958. They were arrested upon these in-\ndictments at their residences in the \nSouthern District of California where \nproceedings for their removal were in-\nstituted before the United States Com-\nmissioner. Thereupon each of them filed \na suit in equity in the District Court for \nthe District last mentioned against the \nCommissioner and the United States \nMarshal of said District, seeking to en-\njoin their removal. The grounds stated \nfor the injunction sought were that the \ncirculars they were charged with having \ncaused to be delivered by mail in the \nMichigan district were the identical cir-\nculars which had theretofore been ad-\njudged properly mailable, and whose \nmailing was held protected by the First \nAmendment in certain actions previous-\nly brought by one Toberoff against the \nLos Angeles postmaater.1 Appellants al-\nleged in such suits in equity, that the \njudgments in the former actions had \nfinally adjudicated that the circulars were \nproperly mailable, that the indictments \nI. Appellants alleged in their respective \ncomplaints that after these lodgments \nhad beat lead& they had purchased the \nbusiness of the concern, which had bean \noperating them at the lime the post. \nmuter had attempted to atop the mann,: \nof the circulars out of width those ac-\ntions arose. We do sot' reach the 'mos-\ndon whether these Weiland were la \nF.td—te \ny. HOOKE \nS85 \n/Idea \nnow pending had been sought\n... [truncated, 4090 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/306 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=306]", "char_count": 4090}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 307, "text_content": "386 \n272 FEDERAL REPORTER, u anis \nbe, that more than one criminal prose-\ncution \nthreatened. We find no reason \nhere w \nappellants should be permitted \nto de \nfrom the ordinary rule that \nequity will not intervene in criminal \nprosecutions. \nSince a removal order is, under the \nscheme of the rules and the statutes, not \nappealable, we think it would frustrate \nthat scheme if a defendant could, as at-\ntempted here, frame an issue in equity \ndesigned to force an adjudication in his \nhome district of a defense that will be \nfully available to him at the place of the \nIndictment. The 1958 amendment of the \nstatute suggests a further reason why \nthe Congressional purpose to permit \nprosecutions at the place of receipt of the \ncirculars should not be frustrated by the \ndevice here employed. \nSee U. S. Code \nCongressional and Administrative News, \n86 Cong., Second Session, 1968, vol. 2, \np. 4012. \nThe stay is denied and the appeal is \ndlamiased. \nTrod 1'. STOCKWELL Appellant, \nv. \nBarry FRIBERG et al., Appellees. \nNo. 1.9867. \nUnited States Court of Appeals \nSixth Circuit \nDec. 14, 1959. \nAction for alleged loss of constitu-\ntional civil rights of plaintiff while in \ncustody of city police and for alleged ille-\ngal transportation of his person into an-\nother state. The United States District \nCourt for the Northern District of Ohio, \nKloeb, J., rendered judgment dismissing \ncomplaint with prejudice, and plaintiff \nappealed. The Court of Appeals, held \nthat order dismissing complaint with \nprejudice would be affirmed. \nAffirmed. \nEtall Bights t3='1,8 \nComplaint for alleged loss of consti-\ntutional civil rights of plaintiff while in \ncustody of city police and for alleged \nillegal transportation of his person into \nanother state was insufficient \nFred T. \nT. Stockwell, Toledo, Ohio, on \nbrief in pro. per. for appellant. \nWilliam D. Driscoll and Ben Neldling-\ner, Toledo, Ohio (Louis R. Young, Direc-\ntor of Law, by William D. Driscoll, Tole-\ndo, Ohio, on the brief), for appel\n... [truncated, 3187 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/307 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=307]", "char_count": 3187}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 308, "text_content": "SGO \n187 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d BEZDIS \nACKERMAN, Atty. Goo. I INTERNATION-\nAL LONOSHOREME 'S t \nWARE-\nHOUSEMEN'S UNION of an. \nit\nDEVINE., Calmly Atty. of el. \nINTERNA-\nTIONAL LONGsHOREME \n& WARE-\nHOUSEMEN'S UNION et M. (two oasis). \nI\nACKERMAN, Atty. Gee. at al. \nINTERNA. \nTIONAL LONGSHOREMEN &WARE-\nHOUSEMEN'S UNION it at. \nNos. 12300, 12301. \nUnited States Court of Apnea* \nMoth Circuit. \nFeb. 28, 1051. \nRebating Denied May 25,1951. \nTwo actions by International Longshore-\nmen's & Warehousemen's Union, a voluntary \nunincorporated aseoriation and labor union, \nand others, against Walter IX Ackerman. Jr., \nIndividually and as Attorney General of the \nTerritory of Hawaii, and others, and against \nE. B. DeeIns, Individually and as County At. \ntorney for the County of Maui, and others, to \nenjoin the prosecution of four criminal pro-\nceedings pending in the Circuit Conrt of the \nTerritory of Howell, ono for not and conspi-\nracy and three for riot. The United States \nDistrict Court for the Territory of Hawaii, \nJohn Diggs, Jr., Circuit Judge, and Delbert \nE. Metzger and George B. Harris, District \nJudges, entered final decrees granting Permit-\nneat injunctions, and Walter D. Ackerman, \nJr., and D. IL Benin, individually, and oth-\ners. appealed. The Court of anneals, Pope, \ncircuit Judge, held that Injunctions on \nground of exceptional circumstances and Ir-\nreparable Injury were Improper. \nJudgments reversed with directions. \nI. COOrts 1311,262.7(24) \nIn suit to enjoin prosecutions under \nHawaiian unlawful assembly and riot act \nand conspiracy statute against members of \nunion for alleged acts of violence during \nstrike, alleged efforts of pickets to prevent \nnonstriking workmen from entering plant, \nbeatings by pickets and assaults which al-\nlegedly prevented loading of products on \nbarges had no relation to any rights grant-\ned by the Labor Management Relations \nAct, or Civil Rights Act or to constitu-\ntional rights to free speech, press, assembly \nand peaceful picketing\n... [truncated, 4127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/308 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=308]", "char_count": 4127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 309, "text_content": "allies were invoked for minor infractions, \namong other things, did not establish lack \nof good faith on part of prosecutors. Rev. \nLaws Hawaii 1945, g 11120, 11570-11584. \n7. Courts 4b 262.6(4) \nIn suit to enjoin prosecutions under \nHawaiian unlawful assembly and riot act \nand conspiracy statute against members of \nunion for alleged acts of violence during \nstrike, where constitutionality of statutes \ncould be tested in criminal proceedings and \nthere was no evidence to support finding \nthat criminal prosecutions were not in good \nfaith, plaintiffs were not entitled to have \nprosecutions enjoined on grounds of ex-\nceptional circumstances and irreparable \ninjury. Rev.Laws Hawaii 1945, I§ 11120, \n11570-11584. \n8. Courts 4=262.8(t) \nIn suit to enjoin pending prosecutions \nunder Hawaiian unlawful assembly and \nriot act and conspiracy statute against un-\nion members for alleged acts of violence \nduring strike, where complaint contained \nno allegations to support injunction against \nfuture criminal proceedings but merely \nalleged that enforcement would deprive \nplaintiffs of their liberty and property \nwithout due process of law, that they would \nbe prohibited from exercising rights of free \nspeech, press and assemblage, and that \nunion could not function, no injunction \nshould have been granted. Rev.Laws Ha-\nwaii 1945, §§ 11120, 11570-11584. \n9. Courts 4=0508(I) \nFederal court cannot interfere in ease \nwhere proceedings are already pending 'in \nstate court. \nto. Courts st=.432 \nIt is not function of federal court of \nequity to exercise supervisory control over \naction of territorial court. \nII. Injunction 1=105(1) \nRule that equity jurisdiction does not \nextend to enjoining pending criminal \nprosecutions has no exceptions, and extra-\nordinary circumstances will not create ju-\nrisdiction. \nACKERMAN I. DITELNATIONAL LONOSEWLEXEN'S t W. UNION \nat• as tat sidle° \n12. Courts 4=262.6(l) \nInt uootloo I3.105(1) \nEquity will stay its hand with respect \nto criminal proceedings, a\n... [truncated, 3611 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/309 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=309]", "char_count": 3611}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 310, "text_content": "862 \n187 FEDERAL REPORTER, id BEELER \nPOPE, Circuit Judge. \nThese are appeals from judgments in \ntwo actions brought by the International \nLongshoremen's & Warehousemen's Un-\nion (ILWU), a labor union, and by certain \nindividual members of that union, to en-\njoin the prosecution of four criminal pro-\nceedings pending in the circuit court of \nthe Territory of Hawaii, one for riot and \nconspiracy, and three for riot. The court \nbelow entered final decrees granting per-\nmanent injunctions as prayed, against the \nAttorney General of the Territory, the \nCounty Attorney and Deputy County At-\ntorney of the County of Maui, and in one \ncase the County Chief of Police. \nThe criminal charges grew out of certain \ndisorders which occurred during separate \nstrikes by sugarworkers, and pineapple \nworkers, members of the ILWU union. \nOn the morning of October 16, 1946, during \nthe sugarworkers strike, some three to four \nhundred members of that group were in a \npicket line, four columns deep, before the \nentrance to the sugar mill of Maui Agri-\ncultural Company at Paia, on the Island of \nMaui. Five workmen employed in the mill \nappeared for the purpose of crossing the \npicket line and going to work. The same \nmen had attempted to pass through to \nwork the previous day, but had been pre-\nvented because the pickets stood shoulder \nto shoulder. \nOn the 16th a number of \npolice were on hand.' As the mill whistle \nblew the five men, escorted by the police, \nstarted toward the mill entrance. \nTwo \nhundred of the pickets converged on the \nfive men and pushed them back. Upon a \nsecond attempt to pass the five workmen and \nthe police were pushed back 10 or 12 feet \nfarther. This ended the attempts to enter \nthe mill. There is no finding that any blows \nwere struck. \nI. The opinion of the district court states \nthat at this time \"After certain prelim-\ninary conversations between members of \nthe ILWU. &intake, Joseph Kobetektite. \nand others, respecting the entry of the \nfive workmen to the m\n... [truncated, 4292 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/310 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=310]", "char_count": 4292}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 311, "text_content": "ACKERMAN y. INTERNATIONAL \ncite as in \nticipating in this affair. They also were \ncommitted awaiting action by the grand \njury. The prosecution of these defendants \nand of the other defendants similarly \nbound over, has proceeded no further by \nreason of the injunctions issued by the \ncourt below. \nThe individual plaintiffs in these actions \nare the defendants in the four criminal \nproceedings mentioned, plus two Officials \nof the union who purport to sue on behalf \nof themselves and all other members of the \nunion in the Territory. \nJudgment in No. 12301 was based upon \na complaint seeking to enjoin further \nprosecution of the proceeding in which the \nindictment was returned. The complaint in \nNo. 12300 sought similar relief in respect \nto the three proceedings in which com-\nmitments had been made. Both complaints \nallege that in furtherance of the objectives \nof the strikes, which were to obtain better \nwages, hours, and conditions of employ-\nment, the individual plaintiffs engaged in \n\"lawful, peaceful and constitutionally pro-\ntected activities of speech, press and as-\nsemblage and of peaceful picketing.\" The \nunlawful assembly and riot statute and the \nconspiracy statute are attacked as un-\nconstitutional in that they are alleged to \ndeprive plaintiffs of their rights of free \nspeech, press and assemblage and will \nsubject them to criminal prosecutions if \nthey exercise their constitutional rights. \nIt is alleged that the grand jury which \nfound the indictment was chosen and com-\nposed in an unconstitutional manner. Pray-\ner was for injunction prohibiting the en-\nforcement of the criminal statutes men-\ntioned, that prosecution of the criminal \nproceedings be enjoined, and that the stat-\nutes be held unconstitutional. \n. • \nThe trial courts recognized that the \nprayer for an injunction restraining the \nprosecution of criminal proceedings posed \nvri\nS. The case \nbeard baton the decision \nin Steinbach \nHo Bock Ka Loh Po, 336 \nU.B. 368, RP .Ct. 606, p3 IsEd. 741, b\n... [truncated, 4503 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/311 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=311]", "char_count": 4503}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 312, "text_content": "864 \n181 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d gusts \nconducted or about to be carried on there-\nunder. \nApproximately thirty thousand \nmembers of the ILWU and the union it-\nself necessarily feel the impact of the stat-\nutes as does each employer in the sugar \nand pineapple industries. All labor re-\nlations in the Islands are clouded by them. \nOn the records presently before us we \nthink it is fair to state that equable or \namicable relations betwe \nemployers and \nemployees in the Territo \nof Hawaii are \ncat \n1 \nimpossible while the \nes stand. The \nrepercussions which arise from the en-\nforcement of these statutes of the Territory \nare such as to cause great and irreparable \nharm and damage to all labor relations in \nHawaii\" \nThis portion of the opinion of the court \nwas bottomed upon the case of A. F. L \nv. Watson, 327 U.S. 532, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 \nL.Ed. 873. The trial court's opinion quoted \nfrom that case what was there said of the \nrequirement of proof of \"irreparable in-\njury which is clear and imminent\" as fol-\nlows: \"That is a strict test. But we think \nappellants satisfy it. We reach that con-\nclusion on the basis of the allegations \nconcerning the disruption of the collective \nbargaining processes and the injury to the \nunions and to the employers alike, if the \nclosed-shop agreement is outlawed. \nAs \nwe have said, it is averred that there are \nabout 500 contracts with Florida employers \ncontaining closed-shop agreements • \n0 . \n82 F.Supp. 65, 109. \nWe are unable to perceive any resem-\nblance between the facts here and those \nin A. F. I.. v. Watson, supra. \nThere \nit appeared that the plaintiff labor unions \nwere engaged in negotiating closed shop \nagreements, as they asserted they had the \nright to do by virtue of the National Labor \nRelations Act, 29 L'.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. \nand that the proceedings which the At-\ntorney General of Florida proposed to in-\nstitute against them. pursuant to the newly \nadopted Florida constitutional amendment, \nwas an imminent threat to an enti\n... [truncated, 4251 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/312 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=312]", "char_count": 4251}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 313, "text_content": "ACHESJdA1f \nINTERNATIONAL \nCite as 187 \nproceedings was not in good faith. The \ntrial court did not undertake to cite any case \nin which proof of bad faith in a criminal \nprosecution was held to establish reason \nfor departure from the ordinary rule that \na court of equity will not entertain a suit \nto enjoin criminal prosecutions. The court \nevolved its conclusion that want of good \nfaith was a sufficient reason for issuing \nsuch an injuncti n from the phraseology \nused in Douglas \nCity of Jeannette, supra, \nthat \"courts of \nuity do. not ordinarily \nrestrain criminal prosecutions. No person \nis immune from grosettaion in good faith \nfor his alleged criminal acts.\" (Emphasis \nadded.) \nThe court reasoned that in in-\nserting the words \"in good faith\" in the \nquoted language, the court was at least \nimplying that only prosecutions is good \nfaith are immune from equity injunctions, \nand hence if bad faith be shown the crimi-\nnal prosecution may be enjoined. We think \nthis purely textual analysis of the quoted \nlanguage is not warranted, for to say that \none is not immune from prosecution in \ngood faith does not imply that one is im-\nmune from prosecution in bad faith, and \nmay enforce that immunity by injunction. \nThe trial court recognized that \"the motive \nof the prosecutor is of course not relevant \nto the ordinary criminal proceeding.\" \nWe cannot bring ourselves to believe \nthat a defendant in a criminal case, who \nwould not be permitted to plead or prove \nas a defense to the charge, that the prose-\ncutor's motives were bad, could neverthe-\nless by alleging such bad faith and the \ninvalidity of the criminal statute, move \ninto a court of equity and have those issues \ntried there. No case has been called to \nour attention which has applied the trial \ncourt's theory that proof of bad faith in \nthe criminal prosecution is sufficient to \n7. 01 the contrary, compare Kentucky y. \nPowers. 201 U.S. 1, 26 8.Ce. 887, 50 L \nEd. 633. A claim of denial of constitu-\ntional rights\n... [truncated, 4550 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/313 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=313]", "char_count": 4550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 314, "text_content": "8,86 \n187 FEDERAL REPORTER, Ed SERIES \nno reasonable opportunity to test their \nrights in the criminal cases. \nFor this \nreason the threatened prosecutions there \nwere not in good faith. In those cases \ncould not be said, as it was in Douglas \nCity of Jeannette, that \"the lawfulness \nconstitutionality of the statute or ordinance \non which the prosecution is based may be \ndetermined as readily in the criminal case \nas in a suit for an injunction.\" Such, we \nthink, is the case here. \n[5-7) Furthermore, we think want of \ngood faith was not proven, and the court's \nfinding in that respect clearly erroneous. \nThe principal ground of bad faith is said \nto be that \"no one has been prosecuted un-\nder the unlawful assembly and riot act ex-\ncept in connection with labor disputes\". \nBut unless riots did occur at places and tin-\nder circumstances not involving labor dis-\nputes which called for complaints which \nthe prosecutor refused or neglected to file, \nthe quoted statement has no significance. It \nis not claimed, and there was no allegation \nor proof that there were any such unprose-\ncuted violations. The remainder of the \ncircumstances listed by the court's opin-\nion as evidence of bad faith, it seems to \nus, are no more than expressions of the \ntrial court's opinion that the prosecution \nI. The trial court's enumerstioe of the \nfacts thought to show bad faith wee as \nfollows: \"In this connection the follow. \nlag facts stems* others in the Instant \ncases are pertinent: (1) (10, the mum \narrests, and the very broad, Indeed, the \ntoo broad field, from which the police \ndrew the defendant' In the various crim• \nbud proceedings after both the Pais and \nthe Kau °Manna Harbor Incidents, demon-\nstrated by the fact that the names of six-\nteen person, were stricken out of one of \nthe complaints and that of ninety-three \n•rresta made os the Island of Cebu on \nJoly 18, 1947 only one person. viz. Mel-\nbore, was subjected to prosecution, all \nother complaints being nolle Premed; \n(b) t\n... [truncated, 4722 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/314 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=314]", "char_count": 4722}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 315, "text_content": "ACKERMAN T. INTERNATIONAL LONOSHOREMEN'S & W. UNION \n867 \nate as ter rid 100 \ndrastic penalties attached to its violation, nied. The court made no finding that fu-\nbut may, under extraordinary circumstanc- ture prosecutions were threatened. \nes, appeal to equity for relief against the \ninvasion of his property rights through the \nthreatened enforc \nnt of the statute. Ex \npane Young, 209 \n123, 28 S.Ct. 441, \n52 LEd. 714; Fenner \nBoykin, 271 U.S. \n40, 46 S.Ct. 492, 7 \nEd. 927; Terrace \nThompson [263 \nS. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15, \nLEd. 255]. He , no threat of the in-\nstitution of other criminal proceedings \nunder the act is alleged in the bill or found \nto have been made. The relief sought is \nagainst the further prosecution of the \npending case.\" \n[8] The injunctions here issued re-\nlated solely to prosecutions rhea finding.* \nThere is no injunction against any threat. \ncoed prosecutions. \nThe complaints con-\ntained no allegations to support an injunc-\ntion against future or threatened criminal \nproceedings. The only allegation of future \ndamage was that the criminal statutes \"will \ndeprive plaintiffs of their liberty and prop-\nerty without due process of law, in that \nplaintiffs will be prohibited from exercis-\ning their rights of free speech, press and \nassemblage in violation of the Fifth and \nFourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-\ntion of the United States,\" and that the \nunion could not function \"so long as the \nmembers of the said 1LWU are subject \n• \n• \n• to prosecution under statutes con-\ntaining unconstitutional limitations.\" This \nfalls far short of an allegation that these \nplaintiffs were threatened with prosecution \nunder the statutes on account of peaceful \npicketing, publicizing, bargaining, or ex-\nercising other constitutional rights and \nprivileges. This defect in the complaints \nwas called to the attention of the court and \nof the plaintiffs by motions which pointed \nout the failure to complain of threatened \nfuture action?* but the motions were de-\nS. The h\n... [truncated, 4373 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/315 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=315]", "char_count": 4373}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 316, "text_content": "868 \n187 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES \nplaintiffs have at hand full opportunity to \ntest their rights by defending in those \nproceedings. As this court said in Alesna \nv. Rice, 9 Cir., 172 Fit! 176, 377, \"Had \nthe prosecution of the information pro-\nceeded, the jury might have acquitted the \ndefendants, appellants, and the constitu-\ntional and other questions avoided. In any \nevent, the appellants had a speedy and \nsufficient remedy at law by appeal to the \nHawaiian Supreme Court, where the ap-\npellants' arguments of the two contentions \nmay have prevailed. Losing, there is the \nappeal here. In both appellate courts the \npractice gives primacy of consideration to \ncriminal appeals.\" \n(11) The rule that equity jurisdiction \ndoes not extend to enjoining pending crim-\ninal prosecutions, has no exceptions. No \nextraordinary circumstances will serve to \ncreate such jurisdiction. \n112,13) That equity will stay its hand \nin respect to criminal proceedings, always \nwhen they are pending, and ordinarily \nwhen they are threatened, is a rule of wide \nand general application under our legal \nsystem. It is a rule of the state courts in \nrespect to criminal proceedings in the as \nor other state courts. Milton Dairy Co. \nGreat Northern Ry. Co., 124 Minn. \ni t\n144 N.W. 764, 49 \nR.A.,N.S., 951; State \nex rel. Kenmore \nWood, 155 Mo. 425, \n56 S.W. 474, 48 1-. . . 596. Federal courts \napply the same rule when asked to enjoin \nI\ncriminal proceedings in he federal courts. \nArgonaut Mining Co. \nMcPike, 9 Cir., \n78 F2d 584; Whitehea v. Cheves, 5 Cir., \n67 F.24 316, 317, certiorari denied 290 U.S. \nS.C.\n.\nMedalie, 2 Cir., 71 F.2d 671, certiorari \nenied \n293 U.S. 592, 55 S.Ct. 108, 79 LEd. \n686. It is a principle expressing a sound \npolicy that the processes of the criminal \nlaw should be permitted to reach an orderly \nconclusion in the criminal courts where \nthey belong. \n[14) But when the demand for an in-\njunction is presented to a federal court, \nasking an injunction against proceedings \n\n... [truncated, 4329 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/316 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=316]", "char_count": 4329}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 317, "text_content": "BROOKS l aPENNSYLRANIA IL CO. \nsea \ntesellff Plage - '\nof an injunction in any court, territorial fittest to prevent award of summary Jude-\nlike state courts are the natural sources for meat against plaintiff. '\nthe interpretation and application of the \nAffirmed. \nacts of their legislatures and equally of the \nSee, also, 91 P.Satip. 01. \npropriety of interference by injunction. i. Federal civil preradere.4=2410 \nWe think that where equitable interference \nIn action against railroad for alleged \nwith state and territorial acts is sought in misdelivery of household goods transported \nfederal courts, judicial consideration of under straight bill of lading issued by de• \nacts of importance primarily to the people fendant and in which plaintiff was named \nof a state or territory should, as a matter of as consignor and consignee, allegation in \ndiscretion, be left by the federal courts to affidavit submitted in opposition to defend-\nthe courts of the legislating authority un- ant's motion for summary judgment, that \nless exceptional circumstances command plaintiff's contract with defendant called \na different course.\" \nfor shipment of goods to specified place \nAppellants argue that the district court in foreign country rather than to place \nwas prohibited from granting the injunc- in United States to which defendant de• \ntions by § 2283 of Title 28, relating to in- livered the goods, do not pose a genuine \njunctions \"to stay proceedings n a State issue of material fact and was insufficient \ncourt\". As we said in Alesna \nRice, su- to prevent award of summary \ni \njudgment. \npra, we find it unnecessary to c Miler this 2. Carriers 6=44 \nquestion here. \nIf plaintiff's contract with railroad \nAlesna \nRice, \nau \na, \nre.\nThe rules expressed \nBabcock I  Nob, for shipment of goods by railroad called \nsupra, and in Alta \nfor delivery at specified place in foreign \nquired the district \nto deny the in- country, but plaintiff authorized plaintiff's \njunctions prayed for. The judgments\n... [truncated, 3670 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/317 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=317]", "char_count": 3670}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 318, "text_content": "644 \n181 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 AERIES \nmotion to annul, vacate and set aside his \nsentence and to direct his immediate re-\nlease from prison. \nThere were nine counts in the indict-\nment, all charging appellant's violation of \nsection 338a, subdivision (a), of Title 18 \nUnited States Code [1948 Revised Crim• \ninal Code. 18 U.S.CA. § 876], in wilfully \nwith intent to extort money, threatening to \ninjure, and knowingly and with intent to \nextort money depositing in the United \nStates Post Office letters containing threats \nto injure the person of the addressee. \nOn motion of the United States Attorney, \nall counts of the indictment except the ninth \ncount were dismissed. The defendant was \nfound guilty on that count and was sen-\ntenced to fifteen years imprisonment The \nonly material issue before us is whether \nthe single count upon which the conviction \nrested states an offense. It is clear that it \ndoes. Even without inclusion of the first \nnumbered paragraph of the ninth count, the \noffense condemned is plainly charged, in \nthat averment is made that the defendant \n\"did, on or about the 3rd day of May, 1948, \nin the City of Canton, County of Stark, \nState and Northern District of Ohio, then \nand there knowingly and with intent to ex-\ntort money from Joe Cohen deposit and \ncause to be deposited in a Post Office of \nthe United States, to-wit, the Post Office \nat Canton, Ohio, to be sent and delivered \nby the Post Office establishment of the \nUnited States, a letter and communication \npostmarked Canton, Ohio, May 3, 1918, \naddressed to the said Joe Cohen and con-\ntaining a threat to injure the person of \nthe said addressee, • \n• \n• \nwhich letter \nand communication was then and there \nenclosed in a sealed envelope, postage pre-\npaid, a true copy of which envelope is \nmarked Exhibit \"Q\", attached hereto, and \nby reference mule a part hereof; that a \ntrue copy of said letter and communication \nis marked Exhibit \"R\", attached hereto, \nand by reference made a part hereof; th\n... [truncated, 3963 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/318 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=318]", "char_count": 3963}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 319, "text_content": "CITY OF MIAMI \nOw se ta\nfines and imprisonments under the ordi-\nnance and would allegedly suffer damage \nto \ntheir \nreputation \nU.S.C.A.Const. \nAmends. 4, 14. \n2. lelusetion 4DI0S(I) \nEquity courts do not ordinarily restrain \ncriminal prosecutions. \n3. Criminal law d=r3I \nImmunity from prosecution in good \nfaith for his alleged criminal acts is not \naccorded to any citizen or member of the \ncommunity. \n4. lajumetloa 4=105(1) \nThe imminence of a criminal prosecu-\ntion, even though alleged to be unauthorized \nand hence unlawful, is not alone ground for \nrelief in equity which exerts its extraordi-\nnary powers only to prevent irreparable in-\njury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. \n& Courts dmKeyn \nThe imminence of a criminal prosecu-\ntion, even though alleged to be unauthorized \nand hence unlawful, is not alone ground for \nrelief in a federal equity court particularly \nwhere the only threatened action is the \nprosecution in the state courts by state offi-\ncers of 'an alleged violation of state law \nwith the resulting final and authoritative \ndetermination of the disputed question \nwhether the act complained of is lawful•or \nunlawful. \nS. Ceerts 4m50$(7) \nThe federal courts are without juris-\ndiction to try alleged criminal violation of \nstate statutes. \n7. Corte 4w4$9(2)\nThe state courts are the final arbiters \nof the meaning and appropriate application \nof state statutes, subject only to review by \nthe United States Supreme Court if such \nconstruction or application is appropriately \nchallenged on constitutional grounds. \n& Coons itio508(7) \nInterference with the process of the \ncriminal law in state courts, in whose con-\ntrol they are lodged by the constitution, and \nthe determination of question of criminal \nliability under state law by federal equity \ncourts can be justified only in most excep-\n7.1.44 \ntional circumstances and upon clear show-\ning that an injunction is necessary to pre-\nvent irreparable injury. \n& Courts etri5080 \nIn the exercise of the pound dis\n... [truncated, 3635 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/319 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=319]", "char_count": 3635}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 320, "text_content": "646 \n181 FEDERAL EXPORTER 2d SERIES \nCity's Ordinance No. 3535 against Dur-\nward B. Sutton and Sarah B. Sutton, doing \nbusiness as Sutton Jewelry Company. By \nthis appeal the City contends that the Court \nerred in exercising jurisdiction, in granting \nthe injunction, and in denying the appel-\nlant's motion to dismiss. Under the facts \nof this case and the law properly ap-\nplicable thereto, we sustain the contention \nthat the Court erred in overruling the mo-\ntion to dismiss, and in granting an injunc-\ntion. \nThe complaint of the appellees, seeking \na declaratory decree and injunctive relief, \noutlined what was denominated a \"unique \nmethod of doing business and effecting \nsales\" of jewelry and other related mer-\nchandise, which while it concededly has \nsome of the features of a \"public auction\" \nsale is \"materially different from such auc-\ntion sales in important respects,\" these \nclaimed differences in law and fact being \nfully stated.' It is alleged that the appellees \nhad prepared for inaugurating the proposed \nmethod of sales by acquiring a substantial \nstock of articles, the disposal of which was \nprevented by the threat of a series of vexa-\ntious arrests, any one of which would ir-\nreparably damage the good reputation of \nthe complainants which they had enjoyed \nin the community since 1925; and that the \nthreatened and intended enforcement of \nthe ordinance had injuriously restricted \nthem in their business and resulted in a \ndiminution of their profits. \nA copy of Ordinance No. 3535 of the \nCity of Miami, attached as an exhibit to \nthe complaint, provides stringent regula-\ntions governing the sale and offer to sell \nof jewelry, watches and diamonds \"at pub-\nlic auction\" and requires the securing of a \npermit to conduct such auction; the film-\nI. It is stated in the briefs that this \nproposed plan would le operation and \nlegal effect be the same as th \nreferred \nto and upheld in Zaconick \nCity of \nHollywood, D.C., 85 F.Supp. \n, in which \nthe contentions now ur\n... [truncated, 4551 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/320 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=320]", "char_count": 4551}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 321, "text_content": "OITY OF MAXI v. 817TTON \nea \nat. as 1St lard Set \n!erred to as not applicable to the plaintiffs \nand their proposed method of conduct of \ntheir business; or if the Court holds the \nprovisions of such ordinance applicable to \nthe plaintiffs and such methods, it declare \nand decree such ordinance unconstitutional \nand enjoin and restrain the municipality \nand its officers from enforcing or attempt-\ning to enforce the ordinance during the \npendency of the cause or until the further \norder of the Court, and that upon the final \nhearing the injunction be made permanent \nEight days after the filing of the com-\nplaint the municipality 'responded with a \nmotion to dismiss on the grounds: that no \nfederal question was involved; that there \nwas no matter stated warranting injunc-\nS. \"It le Ordered and Decreed herein as \n• .follows: \n\"1. flat on the plaintiffs compliance \nwith the provisions of the paragraph \nhereof numbered 2, and the subject to \nthe provisions of the paragraph hereof \nnumbered 3. the defendant municipality. \nand each of its officers, agents, servants \nand employes be. and they hereby are, \nenjoined and restrained until the further \norder of the Court, from enforcing or at-\ntempting to enforce against the plaintiffs \nany of the provisions of that certain ordi-\nnance of the defendant municipality. to-\nwit: Ordinance #3635, dated April 7, \n1049. \n\"2. That the plaintiffs be, sod they \nhereby are, required to die herein a good \nand sufficient bond in the penal sum of \n$1000.00 with good and sufficient surety \nor sureties. Payable to the defendant. \nand conditioned that the plaintiff will pay. \nor amuse to be paid, to the defendant if \nand in the event the plaintiffs' application \nfor this injunctive order shall be later \nheld to hero been wrongful, all costs. \ndamages and expenses (including reason-\nable attorney's fees) which the defend-\nant shall pay or Incur sod which shall \nresult from, or be occasioned by, such \nwrongful application: and the injunctive \nprov\n... [truncated, 4884 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/321 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=321]", "char_count": 4884}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 322, "text_content": "848 \n181 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d BER/ES \nopposition the defendant's motion to dis-\nmiss. While for the purposes of the motion \nto dismiss, the factual allegations of the \ncomplaint may be taken as true, this is \nnevertheless not the preferable foundation \nfor the issuance of an injunction against \nthe institution of a prosecution for viola-\nlion of a municipal ordinance. Regardless \nof this, however, the facts which may be \nconsidered as thus established are insuffi-\ncient to authorize the issuance of an injunc-\ntion. The complaint fails to show \"the im-\nminence and immediacy of proposed en-\nforcement, the nature of the threats actual-\nly made, and the exceptional and irrepara-\nble injury which [the complainant] would \ni\nsustain i those threats were carried out.\" \nE\nWatson \nBuck, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, \n966, 85 L. d. 1416 Particularly here there \nis and can be no showing of irreparable in-\njury, for there is not even a claim of in-\njury to complainants established and going \nbusiness, but merely a claim that the haz-\nards posed by the contemplated enforcement \nof the ordinance prevents complainants \nfrom embarking upon a new enterprise, \nfrom trying out, it may be said, their pro-\nposed unique method of merchandising. \nThe only loss which the complainants could \nsustain is speculative, dependent upon what, \nif any, profits they might make if they are \npermitted to begin and carry on the conduct \nof their sales in the manner which they as-\nsert is legal. They arc not disturbed in any \nfeature of their business dealings which \nthey allege they have conducted since 1925. \nSince there is no danger to their already \nestablished business, but merely apprehen-\nsion of punishment for, and prospective loss \nof profits in being prevented from, carrying \non their proposed new method of sale, the \nquestion of apprehended multiple prosecu-\ntions could only arise upon continued and \npersistent engagement in the nel business \nin disregard of the adjudications by the \nmunicipal o\n... [truncated, 4510 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/322 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=322]", "char_count": 4510}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 323, "text_content": "CITY OF ?CAM v. BUTTON \n610 \nat. se 151 P.ta 644 \n• \nviolations of state statutes. \nThe state \ncourts are the final arbiters of their mean-\ning and appropriate application, subject \nonly to review by this Court if such con-\nstruction or application is appropriately \nchallenged on consign ' nal grounds. \nrounds. Hy-\ngrade Pr\nision Co. \nFenner \nBoykin, 27 \nrman, supra; \n240, 46 S.Ct. \n492, 70 \nEd. 927. \n\"Hence interference with the processes \nof the criminal law in state courts, in whose \ncontrol they are lodged by the Constitution, \nand the determination of questions of crimi-\nnal liability under state law by federal \ncourts of equity can be justified only in \nmost exceptional circumstances, and upon \nclear showing that an injunction is neces-\nsary in order to prevent irreP \nble injury. \nCf. Hygrade \nrovision Co. \nSherman, \nsupra; Cline \nFnnk Dry \n, supra; \nSpielman Motor Sales Co. \nDodge, supra. \n1 \nAnd in the exercise of the \nand discretion, \nwhich guides the determination of courts \nof equity, scrupulous regard' must be had \nfor the rightful independence of gate gov-\nernments and a remedy infringing that in-\ndependence which might otherwise be given \nshould be withheld if sought on slight or \ninconsequential grounds. Di Giovanni v. \nCamden Fire Insurance Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, \n73, 66 5.O. 1, 5, 80 L.E 47, and cases cit-\ned.\" Sec also, Watson \nBuck, supra. \nThese principles are even more applica-\nble here where there is no substantial con-\ntention that the City Ordinance, when ap-\nplied to the subject matter which it purports \nto encompass, is unconstitutional as such, \nbut only becomes so when applied to \nthe Complainants in the conduct of their \nproposed business. \nNevertheless, under \nthese circumstances, appellees were granted \nby the issuance of the injunction, in effect, \na determination that the manner and \nmethod presented to the Court as a proposed \nplan of operation in the future was not \nwithin the terms of the ordinance, and \ntherefore that the municipali\n... [truncated, 4301 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/323 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=323]", "char_count": 4301}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 324, "text_content": "Page 1 of 3 \nWestlaw. \n137 F.2d 71 \nPage I \n137 F.2d 71 \n(Cite as: 137 F.2d 71) \nC \nSPENCE I. COLE \nC.A.4 1943. \nCircuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. \nSPENCE, Chief of Police, \nCOLE et al. \nNo. 5082. \nJuly 14, 1943. \n5. Courts 508(7) The arrest by federal courts of the \nprocesses of the criminal law within the states, and \nthe determination of questions of criminal liability \nunder state law by federal court of equity, are to be \nsupported only on a showing of danger of \nirreparable injury both great and immediate. \nAppeal from the District Court of the United States \nfor the Eastern District of North Carolina, at \nElizabeth City; Isaac M. Meekins, Judge. \nAction by Andrew E. Cole, A. K. Smith and Everett \nB. Costner against Walter W. Spence, Chief of \nPolice of Elizabeth City, N.C., to enjoin the \ndefendant \nfrom arresting or interfering with \nplaintiffs in preaching the gospel or in distributing \nbooklets, tracts and pamphlets used by them for the \npurpose of stimulating private Bible study. From a \njudgment for plaintiffs, the defendant appeals. \nReversed. \nWest Headnotes \n111 Courts 106 €508(7) \n106 Courts \n106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction \n106VII(B) State Courts and United States \nCourts \n1061(508 Injunction by United States \nCourt Against Proceedings in State Court \n106k508(2) \nRestraining \nParticular \nProceedings \n1061(508(7) \nk. \nCriminal \nProceedings. Most Cited Cases \nThat enforcement of ordinance against plaintiffs \nwould constitute a violation of their constitutional \nrights did not entitle plaintiffs to an injunction \nwhere there was no showing of such irreparable \ninjury as would warrant a court of equity in \nrestraining criminal prosecutions and there was no \nreason to think that state courts would not protect \nconstitutional \nrights of plaintiffs upon such \nprosecutions being instituted. \n121 Injunction. €105(1) \nInjunction \n21211 Subjects of Protection and Relief \n2121I(H) Matters Relating to Criminal Acts \n212k105 Criminal Prosec\n... [truncated, 2994 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/324 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=324]", "char_count": 2994}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 325, "text_content": "Page 2 of 3 \n137 F.2d 71 \nPage 2 \n137 F.2d 71 \n(Cite as: 137 F.2d 71) \n106VII(B) State Courts and United States \nCourts \n106k508 Injunction by United States \nCourt Against Proceedings in State Court \nI 06k508(2) \nRestraining \nParticular \nProceedings \n1061(508(7) \nk. \nCriminal \nProceedings. Most Cited Cases \nWhere a threatened prosecution is by state officers \nfor alleged violation of a state law, the state courts \nare the final arbiters of its meaning and application, \nsubject only to review by Supreme Court of United \nStates on federal grounds appropriately asserted. \n151 Courts 106 C=508(7) \n106 Courts \n106V1I Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction \n106VH(B) State Courts and United States \nCourts \n106k508 Injunction by United States \nCourt Against Proceedings in State Court \n106k508(2) \nRestraining \nParticular \nProceedings \n106k508(7) \nk. \nCriminal \nProceedings. Most Cited Cases \nThe arrest by federal courts of the processes of the \ncriminal law within the states, and the determination \nof questions of criminal liability under state law by \nfederal court of equity, are to be supported only on \na showing of danger of irreparable injury both great \nand immediate. \n16! Declaratory Judgment 118A Co5.1 \n118A Declaratory Judgment \n118AI Nature and Grounds in General \n118A1(A) In General \n118Ak5 Discretion of Court \n118A1c5.1 k. In General. Most Cited \nCases \n(Formerly 118Ak5, I 3k6) \nThe granting of a declaratory judgment is a matter \nresting in the sound discretion of the court. \n171 Declaratory Judgment 118A €=84 \n118A Declaratory Judgment \n118A11 Subjects of Declaratory Relief \n(i) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \n118AII(A) Rights in General \n118Ak84 k. Criminal Laws. Most Cited \nCases \n(Formerly 13k6) \nThe discretion to grant a declaratory judgment \nought not to be exercised where its only effect \nwould be to decide matters which could be better \ndecided in the criminal courts of the state in \npending actions involving identical questions as \n... [truncated, 3786 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/325 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=325]", "char_count": 3786}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 326, "text_content": "Page 3 of 3 \n137 F.2d 71 \n137 F.2d 71 \n(Cite as: 137 F.2d 71) \n(1][2][3][41[5] We may assure that the enforcement \nof the ordinance against plaintiffs under the \ncircumstances here disclosed would constitute \nviolation of their constitutional rights. Murdock\nCommonwealth of Pennsylvania, 63 S.Ct. 870, \nL.Ed \n But it does not follow that plaintiffs are \nentitled to the injunction granted them below. \nThere was no showing of such irreparable injury as \nwould warrant a court of equity in restraining \ncriminal prosecutions; and there is no reason to \nthink that the state courts would not protect the \nconstitutional \nrights of plaintiffs \nupon \nsuch \nprosecutions being instituted.*73 The case is \nclearly one for the application of the rut laid down \nby the Supreme Court in Douglas \nCity of \nJeannette, 63 S.Ct. 877, 881, 87 L.Ed \n , as \nfollows: 'It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do \nnot ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions. No \nperson is immune from prosecution in good faith for \nhis alleged criminal acts. Its imminence, even \nthough alleged to be in violation of constitutional \nguaranties, is not a ground for equity relief since the \nlawfulness or constitutionality of the statute or \nordinance on which the prosecution is based may be \nlo\ndetermined as readily . \ncriminal case as in \nsuit for an injunction. \n& Famum Mfg. Co. \nS. \nCity of Los Angel s, I \n.S. 207, 23 S.Ct. 498, \nL.Ed. 778;Fenner \nBoykin, 271 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. \n492, \n70 \nL.Ed. \n927. \nWhere \nthe \nthreatened \nprosecution is by state officers for alleged violations \nof a state law, the state courts are the final arbiters \nof its meaning and application, subject only to \nreview \nby \nthis \nCourt \non \nfederal \ngrounds \nappropriately asserted. Hence the arrest by the \nfederal courts of the processes of the criminal law \nwithin the states, and the determination of questions \nof criminal liability under state law by a federal \ncourt of equity, are to be supported only on a \nshowing of danger of irrep\n... [truncated, 3487 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/326 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=326]", "char_count": 3487}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 327, "text_content": "Page 1 of 16 \nWestlaw. \n259 F. 525 \nPage I \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nJACOB HOFFMAN BREWING CO.'. \nMIELLIGOTT \nC.A.2 1919. \nCircuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. \nJACOB HOFFMAN BREWING CO. \nv. \nMcELL1GOTT, Deputy Internal Revenue Collector, \net al. CLAUSEN-FLANAGAN BREWERY'. \nSAME. RUPPERT I. SAME. \nJune 28, 1919. \nRogers and Hough, Circuit Judges, dissenting in \nPart \nThree suits, by the Jacob Hoffman Brewing \nCompany, by the Clausen-Flanagan Brewery, and \nby Jacob Ruppert, a corporation, respectively, \nagainst Richard J. McElligott, Acting and Deputy \nCollector of Internal Revenue, and Francis G. \nCaffey, United States Attorney for the Southern \nDistrict of New York. From orders granting \npreliminary \ninjunctions (259 Fed. \n321), \nthe \ndefendants appeal. Affirmed as modified. \nWest Headnotes \nIndictment and Information 210 €=.28 \n210 Indictment and Information \n210111 Formal Requisites of Indictment \n210k27 Commencement \n210k28 k. In General. Most Cited Cases \nA criminal suit in the federal courts must be brought \nin the name of the United States and by the United \nStates attorney. \nInjunction ■x75 \nInjunction \n21211 Subjects of Protection and Relief \n212I1(E) Public Officers and Entities \n212k75 k. State or National Boards and \nOfficers. Most Cited Cases \nWhere the Internal Revenue Department refused to \nlicense or sell revenue stamps to concerns which it \nclaimed were violating the War-Time Prohibition \nAct of November 21, 1918, 40 Stat. 1046, but this \nrefusal was later abandoned, held that an acting \ndeputy collector may be enjoined from reverting to \nthe original practice of the department. \nInjunction 212 €=105(1) \nInjunction \n212H Subjects of Protection and Relief \n212I1(H) Matters Relating to Criminal Acts \n212k105 Criminal Prosecutions \n212k105(1) k. In General. Most Cited \nCases \nA federal district attorney cannot be enjoined from \ninstituting \ncriminal \nproceedings \nunder \nthe \nWar-Time Prohibition Act of November 21, 1918, \n... [truncated, 2852 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/327 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=327]", "char_count": 2852}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 328, "text_content": "Page 2 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 2 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nUnited States can only be sued by own consent. \nUnited States 393 C=125(28.1) \n393 United States \n3931X Actions \n393k125 Liability and Consent of United \nStates to Be Sued \n393k125(28) \nParticular \nDepartments, \nOfficers, or Agencies, Suits Against \n393k125(28.1) k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \n(Formerly 393k125(28)) \nA suit to enjoin a United States attorney from \ninstituting criminal proceedings under a federal \nstatute is a suit against the United States, which \ncannot be maintained unless property rights are \nthreatened with irreparable damage, and the statute \nis either unconstitutional or \nthe attorney is \ntranscending his authority under a valid statute. \n*525 Francis G. Caffey, U.S. Atty., of New York \nCity (William C. Fins. Vincent H. Rothwell, and \nCornelius J. Smyth, all of New York City, of \ncounsel), for appellants. \nRoot, Clark, Buckner & Howland, of New York \nCity (Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, both of \nNew York City, of counsel), for appellee Jacob \nHoffman Brewing Co. \nGuggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall, of New \nYork City (Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, \nboth of New York City, of counsel), for appellee \nClausen-Flanagan Brewery. \n•526 Fitch & Grant, of New York City (Elihu Root \nand William D. Guthrie, both of New York City, of \ncounsel), for appellee Jacob Ruppert. \nBefore WARD, ROGERS, and HOUGH, Circuit \nJudges. \nWARD, Circuit Judge. \nThese three cases involve the same question, and in \neach the appeal is from an order of the District \nCourt of the United States for the Southern District \nof New York restraining, pending final hearing, the \ndefendant McElligott, Acting and Deputy Collector \nof Internal Revenue of the Third District of New \nYork, from refusing to issue licenses to the \ncomplainants as brewers of beer, or to issue revenue \nstamps in respect to their beer, provided they pay or \nduly tender the taxes required by law, and \nrestraining the d\n... [truncated, 4360 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/328 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=328]", "char_count": 4360}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 329, "text_content": "Page 3 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 3 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nauthorized and directed to prescribe rules and \nregulations subject to the approval of the Secretary \nof the Treasury, in regard to the manufacture and \nsale of distilled spirits and removal of distilled \nspirits held in bond after June 30, 1919, until this \nact shall cease to operate, for other than beverage \npurposes; also in regard to the manufacture, sale, \nand distribution of wine for sacramental, medicinal, \nor other than beverage uses. After the approval of \nthis act no distilled, malt, vinous, or other \nintoxicating liquors shall be imported into the \nUnited States during the continuance of the present \nwar and period of demobilization: Provided, that \nthis provision against importation shall not apply to \nshipments en route to the United States at the time \nof the passage of this act. \n*527 `Any person who violates any of the \nforegoing \nprovisions \nshall \nbe \npunished \nby \nimprisonment not exceeding one year, or by fine not \nexceeding $1,000, or by both such imprisonment \nand fine. • • • c \nOriginally the Internal Revenue Department took \nthe position that after May I, 1919, it would not \nlicense brewers who manufactured beer with an \nalcoholic content equaling or exceeding one-half of \n1 per cent. by volume, nor sell the revenue stamps \nto be affixed to barrels of such beer; but afterwards, \nby advice of the Attorney-General, this position was \nabandoned, and the department consented to license \nbrewers and to sell them revenue stamps, even if \ntheir beer did contain an alcoholic content equaling \nor exceeding one-half of 1 per cent. by volume. \nAccordingly the complainants are not now subject \nto any forfeiture or penalty under the internal \nrevenue acts if they pay the taxes required by law. \nThe only risk they are exposed to if they continue to \nbrew beer of an alcoholic content not exceeding \n2.75 per cent. by weight is that of imprisonment for \nnot more than one year\n... [truncated, 4891 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/329 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=329]", "char_count": 4891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 330, "text_content": "Page 4 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 4 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \n'It is also argued that the only proceeding which the \nAttorney General could take to enforce the statute, \nso far as his office is concerned, was one by \nmandamus, which would be commenced by the \nstate in its sovereign and governmental character, \nand that the right to bring such action is a necessary \nattribute of a \nsovereign government. It is \ncontended that the complainants do not complain \nand they care nothing about any action which Mr. \nYoung might take or bring as an ordinary \nindividual, but that he was complained of as an \nofficer to whose discretion is confided the use of the \nname of the state of Minnesota so far as litigation is \nconcerned, and that when or how he shall use it is a \nmatter resting in his discretion, and cannot be \ncontrolled by any court. \n'The answer to all this is the same as made in every \ncase where an official claims to be acting under the \nauthority of the state. The act to be enforced is \nalleged to be unconstitutional, and, if it be so, the \nuse of the name of the state to enforce an \nunconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is \na proceeding without the authority of and one which \ndoes not affect the state in its sovereign or \ngovernmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act \nupon the pan of a state official in attempting by the \nuse of the name of the state to enforce a legislative \nenactment which is void because unconstitutional. \nIf the act which the state Attorney General seeks to \nenforce be a violation of the federal Constitution, \nthe officer in proceeding under such enactment \ncomes into conflict with the superior authority of \nthat Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of \nhis official or representative character, and is \nsubjected in his person to the consequences of his \nindividual conduct. The state has no power to \nimpart to him any immunity from responsibility to \nthe supreme authority of the United States. S\n... [truncated, 4873 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/330 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=330]", "char_count": 4873}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 331, "text_content": "Page 5 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 5 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nalcohol by weight. The question, however, is not \none of convenience or of discretion, but of the \npower of the court; and we think such an extension \nof judicial power, to meet what seems to be a hard \ncase, to the domain of the executive department and \nof the courts of common law, would be an injury to \nour system of jurisprudence still more serious. \nThis precise question was decided in accordance \nif n\nwith these views by the Circuit C \nof Appeals for \nthe Sixth Circuit in Arbuckle \nBlackburn, 113 \nFed. 616, 51 C.C.A. 122, 65 \n.R.A. 864. Judge \nDay, who as Justice Day wrote the opinion in the \nHammer Case, 247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup.Ct. 529, 62 \nL.Ed. 1101, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724, greatly relied \nupon by the complainants, and to be presently \nconsidered, said: \n'We are now dealing with an officer of a state \nproceeding under a valid law of the state, and \nwhose error lies in wrongfully construing the statute \nso as to include the complainant's product. To \nentertain the bill in this aspect would be to subvert \nthe administration of the criminal law, and deny the \nright of trial by jury, by substituting a court of \nequity to inquire into the commission of offenses \nwhere it would have no jurisdiction to punish the \nparties if found guilty. It would be the extension of \nequity jurisdiction to cases where prosecutions in \nstate courts by the state officers are sought to be \nenjoined, with a view to determining whether they \nshall be allowed to proceed under valid statutes in \nthe courts of law. We think this an enlargement of \nthe jurisdiction opposed to reason and authority. It \nis claimed, however, that conceding that a court of \nequity cannot enjoin the prosecution of criminal \noffenses, as a general thing, the rule is different \nwhen property rights are involved; and we are cited \nto cases holding that equity has jurisdiction to \nenjoin acts likely to be destructive of property \nright\n... [truncated, 4953 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/331 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=331]", "char_count": 4953}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 332, "text_content": "Page 6 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 6 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nenjoin criminal proceedings, by indictment or \notherwise, under the state law. This, as a general \nrule, is true. But there are exceptions. When such \nindictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an \nalleged unconstitutional statute, which is the \nsubject-matter of inquiry in a suit already pending \nin a federal court, the latter court, having first \nobtained jurisdiction over the subject-matter, has \nthe right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold \nand maintain such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of \n1\nall of r courts, until its duty is fully performed. \nProut \nStarr, 188 U.S. 537, 544 (23 Sup.Ct. 398, \n47 L. . 584). But the federal court cannot, of \nli \ncourse, interfere in a case where the proceedin \nwere already pending in a state court. Taylor \nTaintor, 1 \nWall. 366, 370 (21 L.Ed. 28 ; \ne\nHarkrader \nWadley, 172 U.S. 148 (19 Sup.Ct. \n119, 43 L. a . 399). \n'Where one commences a criminal proceeding who \nis already party to a suit then pending in a court of \nequity, if the criminal proceedings are brought to \nenforce the same right that is in issue before that \nilk\" \ncourt, the \nmay ent \nsuch criminal \nproceedings. \netc., Co. \nLos Angeles, 189 \nU.S. 207 (2 \nup.Ct. 498, 47 Ltd. 778). In \nDebbins I \nLos Angeles, 195 U.S. 223-241 (25 \nSup.Ct. 1 , 49 L.Ed. 169), it is remarked by Mr. \nJustice Day, in delivering the opinion of the court, \nthat 'it is well settled that where property rights will \nbe destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal \nproceedings under a void law or ordinance may be \nached and controlled by a court of equity.'Smyth \nI Ames (169 U.S. 466, 18 Sup.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. \n819), supra, distinctly enjoined the proceedings in \nindictment to compel obedience to the rate act. \n'These cases show that a court of equity is not \nalways precluded from granting an injunction to \nstay proceedings in criminal cases, and we have no \ndoubt the principle applies in a case such \n... [truncated, 4858 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/332 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=332]", "char_count": 4858}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 333, "text_content": "Page 7 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nrights involved. So in Hammer' Dagenhard, the \nmoment \nthe \nstatute \nwas \nfound \nto \nbe \nunconstitutional, and the complainant's right to \nemployment directly invaded by its enforcement, \nthe suit was necessarily found not to be against the \nUnited States, and the injunction was proper within \nthe well-established exception. The decisions in \nthese cases do not impair the general rule as to suits \nagainst the United States, or extend the exception to \nthat rule. The whole attention of the court was \ndirected to the vital question of constitutionality, \nand the fact that it did not restate well-established \nlaw does not convince us that it intended to depart \ntherefrom. \nWe are sure that the United States attorney will \nco-operate with the complainants to have the \nquestion involved determined as speedily, and in \nthe meantime with as little interference with their \nbusiness, as possible. \nBecause the suit, so far as the defendant Caffey, \nUnited States attorney, is concerned, is against the \nUnited States, and there is no *532 direct injury to \nthe complainants' property rights, and the act of \nCongress under which it is charged he is threatening \nto proceed is constitutional, and in so proceeding he \nwill not transcend his authority under the act, the \norder of the court below is modified by striking out \nthe injunction pendente lite against him, and as so \nmodified is affirmed. \nROGERS, Circuit Judge (dissenting in pan). I \nconcur in the foregoing opinion in so far as it holds \nthat the injunction cannot issue to restrain the \nUnited States attorney from instituting criminal \nprosecutions under the acts of Congress approved \nAugust 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276 (Comp. St. \n1918, Secs. 3115 1/8e to 3115 1/8r), and November \n21, 1918. The importance of this case to the \ngovernment and to the complainants, and the \nfundamental principle which is involved and which \ngoes to the jurisdiction o\n... [truncated, 4721 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/333 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=333]", "char_count": 4721}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 334, "text_content": "Page 8 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 8 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nproceedings must be identical. \nIn Maitland's Equity (page 261) that distinguished \nlegal scholar says: \n'A civil court, again, must not prohibit a man from \ninstituting criminal proceedings.' \nIn Story's Equity Jurisprudence (section 893) the \nlaw is stated as follows: \n'There are, however, cases in which courts of \nequity will not exercise any jurisdiction by way of \ninjunction to stay proceedings at law. In the first \nplace, they will not interfere to stay proceedings in \nany criminal matters or in any cases not strictly of a \ncivil nature. As, for instance, they will not grant an \ninjunction to stay proceedings on a mandamus, or \nan indictment, or an information, or a writ of \nprohibition. But this restriction applies only to \ncases where the parties, seeking redress by such \nproceedings, are not the plaintiffs in equity; for, if \nthey are, the court possesses power to restrain them \npersonally from proceeding, at the same time upon \nthe same matter of right, for redress in the form of a \ncivil suit and of a criminal prosecution. In such \ncases the injunction is merely incidental to the \nordinary power of the court to impose terms upon \nparties who seek its aid in furtherance of their rights. \nIn Eden on Injunctions, 66, it is said: \n'It is an established rule that an injunction, or any \norder in the nature of an injunction, will not be \ngranted to restrain proceedings in a criminal matter.' \nIn Kerr on Injunctions (4th Ed.p. 7), the leading \nEnglish authority on the subject, it is said: \n'The court will not interfere by injunction in \nmatters merely criminal or immoral, which do not \naffect any right to property. But if an act which is \ncriminal touches also the enjoyment of property, the \ncourt has jurisdiction, but its interference is founded \nsolely on the ground of injury to property.' \nIn High on Injunctions (section 68, 4th Ed.) it is \nlaid down that-\n'since courts of equ\n... [truncated, 4145 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/334 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=334]", "char_count": 4145}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 335, "text_content": "Page 9 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 9 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nbrought to establish their several rights. While \nthese suits were pending the plaintiffs caused the \nagents of the defendant to be indicted at the York \nsessions, where they themselves were judges, for a \nbreach of the peace, in fishing in their liberty. An \napplication for an injunction was made to the Lord \nChancellor (Hardwicke). \n'This court,' said the chancellor, 'has not originally \nand strictly any restraining power over criminal \nprosecutions. • • • If actions of trespass had been \nbrought vi et armis this court would have stopped \nthem; but though I cannot grant an injunction, yet I \nmay certainly make an order upon the prosecutors \nto prevent the proceeding on the indictment. • • • \nWhere parties submit their right to the court, they \nhave certainly a jurisdiction and may interpose.' \nIn 1751, in Montague I Dudman, 2 Ves., Sr., 396, \nLord Chancellor Hardwicke said: \n'This court has no jurisdiction to stay proceedings \non a mandamus, nor to an indictment, nor to any \ninformation, nor to a writ of prohibition, that I know \nof.' \nIn 1827, in Macaulay'. Shackell, 1 Bilges New R. \n96, 127, Lord Eldon declared that 'a court of equity \nhas no criminal jurisdiction.' \nIn 1876, in Kerr I Corporation of Preston, supra, \nwhich involved an attempt to restrain certain \ncriminal proceedings, Jessel, M.R., said: \n'Why ought a court of equity to interfere with the \nordinary proceedings of a criminal court? I am not \nI\naware that any su \npower exists. The point came \nbefore me in Saul \nBrowne, L.R. 10 Ch. 64, where \nI declined to inte ere with criminal proceedings or \n1\nto follow Lord \nrdwicke's doubtful decision in \nMayor of York \nPilkington, 2 Adc. 302. My \ndecision was appea ed from, and the Lords Justices \nthought it a right decision. With the exception of \nthat case before Lord Hardwicke, there is no \ninstance in which a court of equity has interfered in \ncriminal proceedings. I do n\n... [truncated, 4307 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/335 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=335]", "char_count": 4307}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 336, "text_content": "Page 10 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \n331, 347, 15 L.Ed. 401;Fenn I Ho X \n21 How. \n481, \n16 \nL.Ed. \n198:Thompson \nRailroad \nt\nmpanies, 6 Wall. 134, 18 L.Ed. 76 \nan Nordgi \nMorton, 99 U.S. 378, 380, 25 L.Ed. 453;Root I. \nilroad Co., 105 U.S. 189, 26 L.Ed. 975. \nThere are many decisions in the courts of this \ncountry in which the general rule has been applied \nthat in general the equity courts are without \njurisdiction to restrain criminal proceedings. In \nAttorney General'. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns.Ch. 371, \nChancellor Kent said: \n'If a charge be of a criminal nature, or an offense \nagainst the public, and does not touch the \nenjoyment of property, it ought not to be brought \nwithin the direct jurisdiction of this court, which \nwas intended to deal only in matters of civil right, \nresting on equity, or where the remedy at law was \nnot sufficiently adequate.' \nThe citations might be extended indefinitely, but \nenough has been said to show that the statements of \nthe text-writers are abundantly sustained by the \ndecisions of the courts as to what is the general rule \nas to the right to an injunction to restrain criminal \nproceedings. \nI come now to inquire under what circumstances the \nSupreme Court has recognized a right to restrain \ncriminal proceedings by injunction. \nThe question was before the court in 1887 in In re \nSawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 Sup.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed. 402. \nI shall not go into the facts that were before the \ncourt in that case, except to say that a bill was filed \npraying an injunction to restrain the mayor and \ncouncil of a city from removing a city officer for \nmalfeasance in office. The lower court granted the \ninjunction, and committed the defendants for \ncontempt in disregarding it. The Supreme Court \nheld the injunction *536 absolutely void, and that \nthe order committing defendants for contempt was \nalso void, and that defendants were entitled to their \ndischarge on habeas corpus. In the opinion, written \nby\n... [truncated, 4280 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/336 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=336]", "char_count": 4280}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 337, "text_content": "Page 11 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPagc II \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \n'Let them appear to the indictment and defend \nthemselves upon the ground that the state statute is \nrepugnant to the Constitution of the United States. \nThe state court is competent to determine the \nquestion thus raised, and is under a duty to enforce \nthe mandates of the supreme law of the land. • • * \nThat the defendants may be frequently indicted \nconstitutes no reason why a federal court of equity \nshould assume to interfere with the ordinary course \nof criminal procedure in a state court.' \nThe next case I will refer to is that of Ex parte \nYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 28 Sup.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. \n714, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 14 Ann.Cas. 764, \ndecided in 1908. This was an application for leave \nto file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and \ncertiorari in behalf of the Attorney General of the \nstate of Minnesota. The lower court had restrained \nthe Attorney General from taking any steps to put in \nforce the orders of the railroad commission of the \nstate, and certain *537 acts passed by the \nLegislature of the state fixing rates, and which \nsubjected to criminal proceedings \nthose who \nviolated the provisions of the acts and the orders of \nthe commission. It was claimed that the acts were \nunconstitutional \nas \nbeing \nconfiscatory. \nThe \nAttomey General had violated the injunction, was \nproceeded against for contempt, and was in the \ncustody of the United States \nmarshal. The \nSupreme Court held the acts unconstitutional. So \nthat the court had before it (1) an unconstitutional \nact, (2) which act was the subject of inquiry in a suit \nalready pending in a federal court, and (3) the \nintention of the state's Attorney General to enforce \nit. And it was held that under these circumstances \nthe injunction was properly issued. But the case of \nIn re Sawyer, supra, was neither overruled nor \ndoubted. In the opinion, written by Justice \nPeckham, the court, referring to the rule that a court \n... [truncated, 4710 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/337 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=337]", "char_count": 4710}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 338, "text_content": "Page 12 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 12 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nwhich enjoined its enforcement. The case added \nnothing to what was said in Ex parte Young upon \nthe subject now under consideration. It was a case \nwhere property rights would have been destroyed \nby criminal proceedings under a void law, and \ntherefore within the exceptions stated in Justice \nPeckham's opinion in the Young Case. \nIn Truax I Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 Sup.Ct. 7, 60 \nL.Ed. 131, L.R.A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, \n283, the act was unconstitutional and the Attorney \nGeneral was restrained. \nIn Philadelphia Co. idStimson, \n223 U.S. 605, 32 \nSup.Ct. 340, 56 L. \n. 570, the statute being \nconstitutional, the bill to enjoin enforcement was \ndismissed. \nDoes \nthe \nfact \nthat \nthe \nprosecuting officer \nmisconstrues a constitutional statute justify a court \nof equity in issuing an injunction to restrain him? I \nam not aware that the Supreme Court has so held. \nIn the absence of such a ruling I think the doctrine \nannounced by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the \nSixth Circuit hould be followed. It was there said \nin Arbuckle \nBlackburn, 113 Fed. 623,51 C.C.A. \n129,65 L.R.A. 864, that the jurisdiction of courts of \nequity had never been carried to that extent in \nauthoritative decisions. `On the contrary,' said \nJudge Day (afterwards Justice Day of the Supreme \nCourt), 'the Supreme Court, in more than one \ninstance, has denied such jurisdiction.' And he \nadds: 'We think this an enlargement of the \njurisdiction opposed to reason and authority.' This \nopinion was concurred in by Judge Lurton, who \nalso later became a member of the Supreme Court \nof the United States. \n1 concur also in the objection that to enjoin the \nUnited States attorney from proceeding under a \nconstitutional statute is to \njoin the United States. \nAs was said in Harkrader \nWadley, 172 U.S. 148, \n160, 170, 19 Sup.Ct. 119, 127 (43 L.Ed. 399):'In \nproceeding by indictment to enforce a criminal \nstatute the stat\n... [truncated, 4638 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/338 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=338]", "char_count": 4638}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 339, "text_content": "Page 13 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 13 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nalcohol by weight' \nThe injunction also restrains him from-\n'seizing, attempting or causing to be seized, or \notherwise interfering with the property, business, \nand affairs of said complainant for or on account of \nany such violations of the provisions of said act of \nCongress of November \n21, \n1918, or \nsaid \nproclamation of the President, or said regulations, \nupon the ground or claim that beer or malt liquor \ncontaining not to exceed two and three-quarters per \ncent. (2 3/4 p.c.) of alcohol by weight is as matter of \nfact \nintoxicating, and \nthat \nthe \nmanufacture, \nproduction, and sale of such beer or malt liquor is \nprohibited by the act of Congress of November 21, \n1918, or by the proclamation of the President \nheretofore issued under and by virtue of said act of \nCongress of August 10, 1917, or by the regulations \nof the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.' \nMcElligott is subject to the orders of the \nCommissioner of Internal Revenue. That official \nin an affidavit states that he is acting, and will \ncontinue to act, in the matters herein involved, 'in \nconformity with the advice of the Department of \nJustice.' He states: \n'That heretofore, believing that he could not \nproperly sell stamps for tax payments on beer \nillegally manufactured, and that his so doing might \nbe construed as an act on the part of the government \nsanctioning an illegal act, he instructed the collector \nof internal revenue for the Third district of New \nYork, and the collectors of internal revenue at \nPhiladelphia, Pa., Syracuse, N.Y., and Newark, \nN.J., to refuse to sell such stamps when the beer had \nbeen manufactured subsequent to December I, \n1918. But being now advised by the Department of \nJustice that if such beer is actually manufactured the \nmanufacturer is liable for the tax whether the \nmanufacture be lawful or unlawful, although in the \nlatter event such manufacturer will be subject to \npro\n... [truncated, 4691 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/339 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=339]", "char_count": 4691}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 340, "text_content": "Page 14 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPagc 14 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nthreatened to refuse to sell internal revenue stamps \nto be placed on beer or barrels of beer, and have \nbeen at all times and still am ready and willing to \nsell the brewers all such stamps as they may wish to \npurchase.' \nHe also states: \n'Affiant further says that while he held the office of \ncollector of internal revenue of the Third district of \nNew York, as aforesaid, he never did at any time \nmake any threat or threats with respect to or in any \nmanner or form as alleged in paragraph XI of the \nbill of complaint, or in any way or manner with \nrespect to the matters or things therein alleged.' \nIn view of these affidavits, I fmd no justification for \nthe issuance of an injunction against McElligott. \nThe intention to do the prohibited acts is not shown \nto exist, but is expressly shown not to exist. \nIn Real Estate Trust Co. I Hatton, 194 Pa. 449, 45 \nAtl. 379, it was held that where the defendant, by \nanswer and in open court, disclaimed any intention \nof doing the acts sought to be enjoined, a \npreliminary injunction should be denied, but that \nthe bill would be retained, with leave to the plaintiff \nto apply for an injunction if the defendant \ndisregarded his avowed intention. \nUnder the circumstances existing in this case, and in \nview of the fact that the defendant McElligott is a \nresponsible official of the government, who \ndisclaims any intention of doing the acts he is \nalleged to intend to commit, I am of the opinion that \nthe bill should be dismissed as to him, as well as to \nthe United States attorney, but for a different \nreason. As I understand, the law courts do not \ngrant injunctions to allay fears and apprehensions \nwithout evidence that there are sufficient reasons \nfor the fears and apprehensions which are alleged to \nbe entertained. It must be made to appear to the \ncourt that the acts *541 against which protection is \nasked are not only threatened, but w\n... [truncated, 4513 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/340 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=340]", "char_count": 4513}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 341, "text_content": "Page 15 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nfinal hearing upon the merits. \nThe acts of Congress now under consideration \ncontain no definition of what per cent. of alcohol \nmakes liquor intoxicating. In a number of the \nstates the statutes prohibit the use of all 'alcoholic' \nliquors for beverage purposes. In a large number \nthe standard of an intoxicating beverage is fixed at \none-half of I per cent. And for nearly 20 years the \nBureau of Internal Revenue has treated beer \ncontaining one-half of I per cent. or more of \nalcohol as a malt liquor, and the brewers of the \ncountry have acquiesced in this definition of beer. \nAnd it is not unlikely that the present Congress, in \nenacting a Prohibition Enforcement Bill, will \nundertake to define what is intoxicating liquor, and \nif it does may undertake to fix the standard at \none-half of 1 per cent. in accordance with the rule \nestablished for so many years in the Bureau of \nInternal Revenue. But, in the absence of some \ndefinitive legislation, the meaning of the term ' \nintoxicating liquors' is clearly •542 left as a \nquestion of fact, and not of law, and the courts \ncannot undertake to say, as matter of law, that \nliquor which contains 2.75 per cent. of alcohol by \nweight is not intoxicating. And neither the opinion \nof my Associates, nor the opinion of the district \njudge, contains anything to the contrary. In the \nopinion of the district judge he expressly declared ' \nthat the question whether beer having 2.75 per cent. \nof alcohol is intoxicating' was not before him for \ndecision. \nI summarize my conclusions as follows: \nI. The acts of Congress herein involved are \nconstitutional. \n2. They relate to liquors which are intoxicating. \n3. Whether liquor which contains 2.75 per cent. of \nalcohol in weight is intoxicating is a question of \nfact, which will be determined as such when the \ncase reaches final hearing, the majority of the court \nhaving decided that the bill should not be dis\n... [truncated, 4282 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/341 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=341]", "char_count": 4282}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 342, "text_content": "Page 16 of 16 \n259 F. 525 \nPage 16 \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \n(Cite as: 259 F. 525) \nin effect preventing that official from asking at the \nhands of a grand jury indictments for offenses \ncreated only by the act of November 21st itself. \n*543 Such possible indictments would not involve \npreliminary seizure of plant and tools, and they \nshould be left to their course at common law, except \nunder circumstances of extreme necessity, not here \nshown. This dissent, then, is limited to the reason \nassigned for a result to which I agree. \nC.A.2 1919. \nJacob Hoffman Brewing Co.'. McElligott \n259 F. 525, 170 C.C.A. 487 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nC 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?vr=2.0&sv=Full&rs=WLW7.11&prft=... \n12/27/2007 \nEFTA00191929\n", "char_count": 805}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 343, "text_content": "Page 7 of 10 \nF.3d \n— F.3d —, 2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d \nsufficiently analogous guideline, (to sentence the \ndefendant according to) the provisions of 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3553.\"U.S.S.G. § 2X5.I. Accordingly, under our \ncase law, the district court first had to determine \nwhether any guideline was sufficiently analogous \nbe used in sentencing Mr. Rakes. United States \nNichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1270 (10th Cir.1999). f \nmore than one sufficiently analogous guideline \ncould be found, the court then had to assess which \nqualified as the most analogous, and employ it in \nsentencing Mr. Rakes. Id. at 1271.Put another way, \nthe court first had to ask what analogous provisions \nwere within the ballpark; it then had to ask which \nrepresented the best fit. On appeal, we review the \ndistrict court's determinations on these scores de \nnovo to the extent they rest on legal bases, and for \nclear error to the extent they rest \nfactual \nfindings. Id. at 1270-71;United States 11 Fortier, \nI80 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir.1999). Because the \nparties' dispute in this case involves only an \ninterpretation of the Guidelines, our de novo \nstandard applies. \nA \nOn the first question posed by our test, we discern \nno material disagreement between the parties. We \ngenerally compare the elements of the defendant's \ncrime to the elements of federal offenses already \ncovered by specific Guidelines sections to ascertain \nwhich plausible analogies exist for sentencing. id. at \n1270.Here, the parties seem to agree that two \ncandidates emerge from this process-Sections 2A6.1 \nand 2A2.4. The offense of which the jury convicted \nMr. Rakes requires (I) two or more persons to \nconspire (2) to prevent any person from discharging \nthe duties of their office under the United States (3) \nby force, intimidation, or threat. Seel8 U.S.C. § 372 \n. Guideline 2A6.I applies to threatening or \nharassing communications, and the majority of the \noffenses covered by that section capture the threat \nand in\n... [truncated, 4593 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/343 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=343]", "char_count": 4593}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 344, "text_content": "Page 8 of 10 \nPage 8 \nF.3d —, 2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d —) \nLooking solely to the face of Count II of the \nindictment, it charged Mr. Rakes with a conspiracy \nto threaten and intimidate a federal prosecutor; \nalleged that he conspired to write a letter with \nthreatening language, listing the street on which the \nvictim \nlived; and \ncontended that \nhe or a \nco-conspirator sent the letter to the victim through \nthe mail. Guideline 2A6.I appears most analogous \nto the offense conduct charged in Count II because, \nas the district court noted, it better captures the \nelement of a letter seeking to threaten or intimidate \na public official. The majority of the 2A6.I listed \noffenses concern threats of harm. SeeU.S.S.G. § \n2A6.1. By contrast, most (though admittedly not all) \nof the offenses listed as predicates for guideline \n2A2.4 do not involve threats or intimidation and the \nconcomitant complexities and premeditation such \nactions imply, but instead concern simple assaults \nagainst officers of the United States. SeeU.S.S.G. § \n2A2.4. Accordingly, when compared against the \nindictment itself, 2A6.I appears the most analogous \nguideline. \nAn examination of all the circumstances of the case \nconfirms rather than alters this conclusion. The case \nactually proven at trial against Mr. Rakes centered \naround the threatening letter-focusing on \nhis \ninvolvement in writing the letter, addressing it, and \nconveying its threat to the victim prosecutor. \nAlthough the evidence showed that Mr. Rakes \nsought to impede the prosecution of members of the \nSoldiers of Aryan Culture, it also demonstrated that \nhe intended to accomplish this goal by means (at \nleast in the first instance) of a premeditated and \ncomparatively complex scheme of intimidation \nrather than by an act of simple assault. \nC \n•8 Mr. Rakes objects that, like 18 U.S.C. § 372, \nguideline 2A2.4 incorporates the fact that the victim \nwas a governmental officer, while guideline 2A6.I \nis not nece\n... [truncated, 4768 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/344 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=344]", "char_count": 4768}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 345, "text_content": "Page 9 of 10 \n- F.3d — \n- F.3d —, 2007 WI.. 4510264 (C.A. 10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d —) \nthe internal revenue laws, employs guideline 2.11.2, \nobstruction of justice, which is more severe th \n2A2.4. See U.S.S.G. app. A; United States \nGunwall, 1998 WL 482787, at *3 (10th Cir.I99 . \nAnd, in fact, guideline 211.2 imposes sentences \nmore akin to those found in 2A6.I, the provision \nemployed by the district court in this case. For \nexample, given Mr. Rakes's offense conduct and \ncriminal history, his 2A6.I advisory sentencing \nrange would be 63-78 months; with the same \noffense characteristics and criminal history, his \nsentencing range under 2JI.2 would be 70-87 \nmonths (as opposed to 37-46 months under 2A2.4). \nThe indictment in this case not only charged Mr. \nRakes with conspiring to threaten the prosecutor but \nalso with conspiring to impede and thwart the \nprosecution of members of the Soldiers of Aryan \nCulture, that is, impede the due administration of \nthe law. Thus, even if § 7212 were similar to the \noffense in this case, Mr. Rakes's conduct would \nlikely implicate, and be more analogous to, the \nmore severe guideline, not 2A2.4, as he urges. \n*9 Finally, Mr. Rakes contends that it was improper \nfor the district court to sentence him under \nguideline \n2A6.I, \nthreatening \nor \nharassing \ncommunications, when the court granted him an \nacquittal on mailing a threatening communication, \n18 U.S.C. § 876, which falls squarely within \nguideline 2A6.I. We have, however, already \nrejected precisely this argument in Nichols.There, \nthe jury in the Oklahoma City bombing trial \nacquitted Terry Nichols on counts of first and \nsecond degree murder, but the district court \nsentenced \nhim \nfor \nhis \ncrime \nof \nconviction-conspiring to use a weapon of mass \ndestruction-under the guideline applicable to first \ndegree murder. Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1276 n. 7. We \naffirmed Mr. Nichols's sentence under the first \ndegree murder guideline, finding that it was the \nmost analogous, an\n... [truncated, 4247 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/345 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=345]", "char_count": 4247}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 346, "text_content": "Page 10 of 10 \n— F.3d — \n-- F.3d —, 2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d —) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 10 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx7sv=Full&prft=HTMLE8cfn=_top&mt=... \n12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191933\n", "char_count": 283}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 347, "text_content": "Page 1 of 9 \nWestlaw. \n507 F.3d 1213 \nPage I \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Sett 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nC \nU.S. I. Garcia \nC.A.9 (Wash.),2007. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nAdrian GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. \nUnited States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nIvan Tortes, Defendant-Appellant. \nUnited States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nMiguel Plascencia-Alvarado, also known as Esteban \nGarcia-Morales also known as Angel Caloca, \nDefendant-Appellant. \nNos. 05-30356, 05-30391, 05-30415. \nArgued and Submitted July 25, 2006. \nSubmission Withdrawn Oct. 31, 2006. \nResubmitted Nov. I, 2007. \nFiled Nov. 19, 2007. \nBackground: Defendants pled guilty in the United \nStates District Court for the Western District of \nWashington, Marsha J. Pechman, J., to drug \nconspiracy. Defendants appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Fisher, Circuit \nJudge, held that: \n(I) it lacked jurisdiction to review sentence \nimposed within range stipulated to in defendant's \nplea agreement: \n(2) drug testing supervised release condition did not \nimpermissibly delegate authority to set maximum \nnumber of non-treatment drug tests to probation \nofficer; and \n(3) district court could impose financial disclosure \nrequirement to supervised release. \nAffirmed. \n\\Vest Headnotes \n111 Criminal Law 110 0=1026.10(4) \n110 Criminal Law \nI IOXXIV Review \n110XXIV(D) Right of Review \nI 10k1025 Right of Defendant to Review \n110k1026.10 Waiver or Loss of Right \n110k1026.10(2) Plea of Guilty or \nNolo Contendere \nII0k1026.10(4) \nk. \nIssues \nConsidered. Most Cited Cases \nCourt of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review \nsentence imposed within range stipulated to in \ndefendant's plea agreement, which was well within \nstatutory maximum, since sentence was not imposed \nin violation of law and not contingent on \nGuidelines. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a)(I); Fed.Rules \nCr.Proc.Rule 11(c)(1XC), 18 U.S.C.A. \n1\n... [truncated, 2716 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/347 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=347]", "char_count": 2716}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 348, "text_content": "Page 2 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \nPage 2 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,202. 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nThe Court of Appeals generally defers to the \ndistrict \ncourt in imposing supervised release \nconditions and reviews them for an abuse of \ndiscretion. \n141 Criminal Law 110 €='1042 \n110 Criminal Law \n1 0XXIV Review \n110XXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in \nLower Court of Grounds of Review \nI 10XXIV(E)I In General \n110k1042 k. Sentence or Judgment. \nMost Cited Cases \nWhere defendant did not object to the conditions of \nhis supervised release before the sentencing court, \nthe Court of Appeals reviews for plain error. \n151 Sentencing and Punishment 3501-1 C=1977(2) \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIX Probation and Related Dispositions \n350HIX(G) Conditions of Probation \n3501-MI964 \nParticular \nTerms \nand \nConditions \n350HkI977 Rehabilitation and Therapy \n350Hk I 977(2) k. Validity. Most \nCited Cases \nSupervised release condition that defendant submit \nto one drug test within 15 days of release from \nimprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests \nthereafter did not impermissibly delegate authority \nto set maximum number of non-treatment drug tests \nto probation officer, where government conceded \nthat probation office could conduct only the \nminimum three tests allowed for in order. \n161 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=1983(2) \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350H1X Probation and Related Dispositions \n350HIX(G) Conditions of Probation \n3501-1k1964 \nParticular \nTerms \nand \nConditions \n350HkI983 Other Particular Conditions \n350HkI983(2) k. Validity. Most \nCited Cases \nDistrict court could impose financial disclosure \nrequirement to supervised release for defendant \nwho pled guilty to drug trafficking; defendant was \ninvolved in large scale drug conspiracy as drug \nsupplier, defendant had history of drug abuse, if \ndefendant received or spent significant funds in \nsuspicious way probation office would have reason \nto bel\n... [truncated, 3758 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/348 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=348]", "char_count": 3758}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 349, "text_content": "Page 3 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nBefore: \nJ. \nCLIFFORD \nWALLACE, \nKIM \nMCLANE WARDLAW \nand RAYMOND C. \nFISHER, Circuit Judges. \nFISHER., Circuit Judge: \nThis appeal requires us to consider several \nallegations of sentencing error. Initially, we must \ndecide whether we have jurisdiction to review a \nsentence that is imposed in accordance with a plea \nagreement \nunder \nFederal \nRule of Criminal \nProcedure 11(cXIXC) and that is not contingent \nupon the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. We also \nmust determine whether a district court commits \nplain error by failing to explicitly set the maximum \nnumber of non-treatment related drug tests to which \nthe defendant will be exposed as a condition of \nsupervised release. Finally, we must evaluate \nwhether a district court commits plain error by \nimposing a financial disclosure condition on a \ndefendant who has been convicted of a drug \ntrafficking offense and has a history of drug use. \nWe hold that we do not have jurisdiction to review \na sentence within the range agreed to in a Rule II(c \nXIXC) plea agreement, and that the district court \ndid not commit plain error by imposing either \ncondition. \nI. Background \nBecause the issues on appeal are exclusively related \nto sentencing, we need not recount detailed facts of \nthe underlying criminal offenses to which the \ndefendants pled guilty. Rather, we explain only \nthose facts relevant to our resolution of the \ndefendants' allegations of sentencing error. \nAdrian \nGarcia, \nIvan \nTorres \nand \nMiguel \nPlascencia-Alvarado \nwere all involved in a \nlarge-scale drug trafficking conspiracy in the \nWestern District of Washington. After being \ncharged with various crimes, all three entered into \nRule \nII \nwritten \nplea \nagreements. \nSee \nFed.R.Crim.P. 11(cXIXC).Fm Garcia pled guilty \nto conspiracy to distribute less than 500 grams of \n*1216 cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and \n8\n... [truncated, 4441 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/349 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=349]", "char_count": 4441}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 350, "text_content": "Page 4 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nor by the United States Probation Department.\" \nMost \nimportantly, \nGarcia \nagreed \nthat \n\"the \nappropriate \nsentence of imprisonment \nto be \nimposed by the Court at the time of sentencing \nshould be within the range of twenty-four (24) to \nforty-eight (48) months,\" and Plascencia-Alvarado \nagreed that the appropriate sentence in his case was \n\"fifty-four (54) to ninety (90) months.\" In light of \nthese stipulated sentencing ranges, the parties \nacknowledged that \"the Court retains full discretion \nto impose a sentence within the range agreed to \nabove.\" (Emphasis added.) \nAt sentencing, the district court accepted Garcia's \nplea \nagreement \nand \ncalculated \nthe \nadvisory \nguidelines range.F342 In so doing, the court, over \nGarcia's objection, attributed to him \"the amount of \ncocaine that the Garcia arm of this organization was \nresponsible for,\" which was nearly five kilograms. \nThe district court also granted Garcia a three-point \nreduction for acceptance of responsibility, and \nadjusted \ndownward \nthe \nPresentence \nReport's \ncriminal \nhistory \ncalculation. \nAfter \nrejecting \nGarcia's request for a two-point reduction for his \nminor role in the offense, the district court arrived \nat a guidelines recommended range of 97 to 121 \nmonths. However, because the district court had \naccepted the plea agreement, Garcia was ultimately \nsentenced to 48 months imprisonment.FN3 Garcia \n•1217 appeals this sentence, arguing that the \ndistrict court erred in calculating the guidelines \nrange because it applied the wrong burden of proof \nwith respect to the drug quantity attributed to \nGarcia. Had the district court applied the correct \nevidentiary standard, Garcia argues, it would have \narrived at a lower guidelines calculation and he \nwould have received a 24-month sentence. \nFN2. During sentencing, the district court \nacknowledged \nthat \nits \ng\n... [truncated, 4443 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/350 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=350]", "char_count": 4443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 351, "text_content": "Page 5 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nsubmit to mandatory drug testing pursuant to 18 \nU.S.C. § 3563(aX5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)\" \n(drug testing condition); and (3) \"shall provide his \nprobation officer with access to any requested \nfinancial information, including authorization to \nconduct credit checks and obtain copies of \ndefendant's Federal Income Tax Returns\" (financial \ndisclosure condition). Although Tortes did not \nobject to these conditions at sentencing, he now \nargues that the district court erred in imposing them. \nII. Analysis \nA. Garcia and Plascencia-AlwaradomF \nFNS. \nBecause \nboth \nGarcia's \nand \nPlascencia-Alvarado's challenges implicate \nthe same dispositive issue, we address their \nclaims jointly. \n[1] As an initial matter, the government argues that \nwe lack jurisdiction to review these defendants' \nsentences because they each received a sentence \nwithin the range stipulated to in their plea \nagreemenB.FN6 That is, because the defendants \nreceived the benefit of their plea bargains, they may \nnot now challenge the sentences. \nFN6. \nNeither \nGarcia \nnor \nPlascencia-Alvarado expressly waived the \nright to appeal the district court's sentence. \nCI United States l otyce, 357 F.3d 921, \n922-23 (9th Cir. \n) (\"A defendant's \nwaiver \nof \nhis \nappellate \nrights \nis \nenforceable if the language of the waiver \nencompasses his right to appeal on the \ngrounds raised, and if the waiver was \nknowingly and voluntarily made. Plea \nagreements \nare \ncontracts \nbetween \na \ndefendant and the government, and we \ngenerally construe ambiguous language in \nfavor of the defendant.\"(internal citations \nomitted)). \n*1218 [2] 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) grants appellate \nPage 5 \ncourts limited jurisdiction to review a defendant's \niiii\nchallen \nto a dieures \nsentence. See United \nStates \nBarron- \n922 F.2d 549, 553 (9th \nCir.199 . To \nentertain \neither \nGarcia's \nor \nPlascencia-Alvarado'\n... [truncated, 3988 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/351 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=351]", "char_count": 3988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 352, "text_content": "Page 6 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \nPage 6 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nterms refers only to a plea agreement \nproviding for a specific  sentence, applies \nto cases such as this where the plea \nagreement \nprovides \nfor \na \nspecific \nsentencing range. \nSection 3742(aX1) allows us to review a sentence \" \nimposed in violation of law.\" We have held that \nwhere a defendant is given the minimum sentence \npermit \nby the statute of conviction, see United \nStates \nLittlefield 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th \nCir.199 , or a sentence within the statutory \nmaximum, see United States I Baramdyka, 95 F.3d \n840, 843-44 (9th Cir.1996), such a sentence is not \nillegal, and therefore does not violate the law. In \nthis case, our jurisdiction is not established under § \n3742(aX1) \nbecause \nboth \nGarcia \nand \nPlascencia-Alvarado received sentences well within \nthe statutory maximums. Therefore their sentences \nwere not \"imposed in violation of law.\" \nMore recently, we held that § 3742(a)(I) confers \njurisdiction to review sentences imposed within the \nadvisory \nguidelines \nrange if the \ndefendant \nchallenges the sentence as unreasonable under the § \n3553(a) factors, because unreasonable sentences \n\"imposed in violation of law.\" Unireatirares\nPlouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2006) (\" \nsentence that is within the Guidelines range ... may \nbe unreasonable and thus imposed in violation of \nlaw pursuant to § 3742(aXI).\"). Garcia and \nPlascencia-Alvarado invoke Moab to argue that \njurisdiction properly lies because their sentences \nfailed to satisfy § 3553(a) either because the \nguidelines range was improperly computed, see§ \n3553(aX4), or because the other factors were not \nproperly \nweighed. \nHowever, \nPlouffe \nis \ninapplicable to the sentences in this case. Plouffe \nconsidered only appeals of sentences imposed *1219 \nwithin and pursuant to the applicable advisory \nguidelines range. Plouffe, 445 F.3d at 1129-30. In \nreasonin\n... [truncated, 4791 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/352 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=352]", "char_count": 4791}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 353, "text_content": "Page 7 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \nPagc 7 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nFN8. Because Garcia's Rule \n1(cX1XC) \nstipulated sentence was not conditioned by \na requirement that it comport with the \nguidelines, and was not contingent upon \nthem, \nhis \nargument \nthat \nwe \nhave \njurisdiction under § 3742(aX2) must also \nfail. \nFN9. As in Pacheco-Navarette, we do not \nhere address \"whether or to what extent a \nplea agreement containing a stipulation of \na particular Guideline range or a sentence \notherwise based or contingent upon the \nGuidelines \nmust \ncomport \nwith \nthe \nGuidelines, as that situation is not before \nus.\" 432 F.3d at 971 n. 3. Furthermore, \nbecause we lack jurisdiction to review \nGarcia's \nand \nPlascencia-Alvarado's \nsentences, \nwe \ndo \nnot \naddress \nthe \napplicability of Rita \nUnited States, — \nU.S. -, 127 S.Ct \n168 L.Ed.2d 203 \n(2007), United States \nCorry, 453 F.3d \n1214 (9th Cir.2006), reh'g en bane \ngranted,462 F.\n 1066 (9th Cir.2006), or \nUnited States \nZavala, 443 F.3d 1165 \n(9th Cir.2006), reh'g en bane granted,462 \nF.3d 1066 (9th Cir.2006). \nB. Torres \nTorres challenges the district court's imposition of \nboth the drug testing and financial disclosure \nconditions. As to drug testing, Torres argues that \nthe district court erred in failing to specify the \nmaximum number of non-treatment drug tests, \n*1220 \nthereby \nimpermissibly \ndelegating \nthat \nauthort to Torres' probation officer. See United \nStates \nStephens, 424 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.2005) \n(holding that \"a probation officer may not decide \nthe ... extent of the punishment imposed,\" because \" \n[u]nder our constitutional system the right to ... \nimpose the punishment provided by law is judicial\" \n(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and \npunctuation omitted)). Torres also argues that the \ndistrict court abused its discretion in imposing the \nfinancial disclosure condition because it is not \" \nreasonably relate\n... [truncated, 4334 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/353 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=353]", "char_count": 4334}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 354, "text_content": "Page 8 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \nPage 8 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Setv. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal DA.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nas an explicit condition of [probation or \nsupervised release,' that the defendant \nrefrain from any unlawful use of a \ncontrolled substance and submit to [a] drug \ntest within 15 days of release on [probation \nor supervised release] and at least 2 \nperiodic \ndrug \ntests \nthereafter \n(as \ndetermined by the court) for use of a \ncontrolled substance. \nIn United States' Maciei-Vasquez, 458 F.3d \n994(9th Cir.2006), cert. denied,-- U.S. -, \n127 \nS.Ct. 2097, 167 L.Ed.2d 817 (2007), the defendant \nchallenged a drug testing condition of supervised \nrelease \nthat required him to \"participate in \noutpatient substance abuse treatment and submit to \ndrug and alcohol testing as instructed by the \nprobation officer.\" Id. at 996(intemal quotation \nmarks omitted). We observed that this condition \nwould be permissible if imposed incidental to a \ndrug treatment program, but would be improper \nunder Stephens if it were to be understood as \ngranting \"the probation officer authority to require \ntesting apart from any treatment program.\" Id. \nHowever, we refused to 9221 determine the \npurpose of the drug testing because the defendant \ndid not object at sentencing and could not establish \nany plain error. Id. Unlike in Mae/et-Vasquez the \ngovernment here concedes that \"the Probation \nOffice may conduct only the minimum three tests \nallowed for in the order.\" Indeed, it is clear that \ndistrict courts that seek to impose more than the \nstatutory minimum of three drug tests must \nexplicitly do so at sentencing. See United States\nLewandowski, 372 F.3d 470, 471 (1st Cir.2 \n(per curiam). Given the government's concession, \nwe construe the district court's supervised release \ncondition as implicitly limiting the maximum \nnumber of drug tests to three. Torres must submit \nto at least and at most \"one drug test within 15 days \nof release from imprisonment an\n... [truncated, 4711 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/354 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=354]", "char_count": 4711}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 355, "text_content": "Page 9 of 9 \n507 F.3d 1213 \nPage 9 \n507 F.3d 1213, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,202, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,149 \n(Cite as: 507 F.3d 1213) \nof \"the nature and circumstances of the offense and \n[his] history and characteristics\" and serves \"to \nprotect the public front further crimes.\" 18 U.S.C. § \n§ 3553(a)(I), (aX2XC). And the probation office's \nmonitoring is no greater than necessary to achieve \nthese ends. \nWe join our sister circuits in concluding that certain \ndefendants who have been convicted of drug \ntrafficking offenses may properly be required to \ndisclose the details of their personal finances as a \ncondition of *1222 supervised release. See Brown, \n402 F.3d at 137(affirming financial disclosure \ncondition imposed on defendant convicted of drug \ntrafficking in part because \"given this particular \ndefendant's personal characteristics and history, the \nfinancial disclosure requirement is an effective \nmonitoring-and \nhence \ndeterring-device\" \nand \nbecause \"monitoring [the defendant's] finances will . \n.. serve to protect the public from ' further crimes \nthe \ndefendant' \n\"); \nUnited \nStates \nAlelendez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 107 (1st Cir.200 \n(affirming financial disclosure condition imposed \non a similarly situated defendant because it is \nrelated to the characteristics of the defendant and \niii \ndeters future crimi I conduct), overruled on other \ngrounds by U.S. \nPadilla, 415 rd \n211 \n(1st\nCir.2005) (en banc ; United States \nBehler, 187 \nF.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir.1999) (affirming financial \ndisclosure condition because \"the district court \nunderstood that money and greed were at the heart \n()tithe defendant's] drug distribution offenses and \nbelieved that monitoring [the defendant's] financial \nsituation would aid in detecting any return to his \nformer lifestyle of drug distribution\"). Therefore \nthe district court did not plainly err in imposing this \ncondition. \nIll. Conclusion \nGarcia and Plascencia-Alvarado were sentenced to \na term that was within the\n... [truncated, 2818 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/355 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=355]", "char_count": 2818}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 356, "text_content": "Page 1 of 4 \nwestia,, \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 \nPage 1 \nEffective: July 27, 2006 \nUnited States Code Annotated Currentness \nTitle 42. The Public Health and Welfare \nChapter 151. Child Protection and Safety \nSu Subchapter I. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \nSit Part A. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \n• § 16913. Registry requirements for sex offenders \n(a) In general \nA sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, \nwheiroTtender is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex \noffender shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the \njurisdiction of residence. \n(b) Initial registration \nThe sex offender shall initially register--\n(I) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration \nrequirement: or \n(2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that offense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to \na term of imprisonment. \n(c) Keeping the registration current \nA sex offender shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student \nstatus, appear in person in at least I jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and inform that \njurisdiction of all changes in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry. That \njurisdiction shall immediately provide that information to all other jurisdictions in which the offender is required to \nregister. \n(d) Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section \nThe Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to \nsex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe \nrules for the registration of any such sex offenders and fo\n... [truncated, 2265 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/356 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=356]", "char_count": 2265}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 357, "text_content": "Page 2 of 4 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 \nPage 2 \n(e) State penalty for failure to comply \nEach jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall provide a criminal penalty that includes a \nmaximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the \nrequirements of this subchapter. \nCREDIT(S) \n(Pub.L. 109-248, Title I, § 113, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 593.) \nHISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES \nRevision Notes and Legislative Reports \n2006 Acts. Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S35. \nReferences in Text \nThis subchapter, referred to in subsets. (d) and (e) originally read \"this title\", meaning Title 11§ 101 et seq.] of \nPub.L. 109-248, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 590, known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which \nenacted this subchapter; for complete classification, see Short Title note set out under 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 and \nTables. \nNOTES OF DECISIONS \nCommerce clause 7 \nConstitutional delegation of authority 2 \nEx post facto 6 \nProcedural due process 3 \nRetroactive application 1 \nStanding 5 \nSubstantive due process 4 \nVenue 8 \nI. Retroactive application \nDefendant was required to register as a sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification \nAct (SORNA), regardless of whether the Attorney General had adopted required rule specifying the applicability of \n1\nthe Act to sex offenders convicted before its enactment; defe ant was required to register or update his \nregistration under the existing state law of his residence. U.S. \nHinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. \nMental Health it= 469(2) \nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act's (SORNA) requirement that sex offenders register and update their \nregistration did not apply to defendants at the time of their indictments where their convictions pre-dated SORNA \nand they were indicted after SORNA's effective date, but before the Attorney General exercised his authority under \nSORNA \n... [truncated, 2382 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/357 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=357]", "char_count": 2382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 358, "text_content": "Page 3 of 4 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 \nPage 3 \nto past offenders, and th statute required the Attorney General to animate SORNA's provisions to previously \nconvicted offenders. U.S. I. Kapp, M.D.Pa.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 536. Statutes 0= 278.29 \n2. Constitutional delegation of authority \nProvision of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) which gave Attorney General authority to \ndecide whether persons classified as sex offenders, who were unable to register, should be subject to the \nregistration requirements, was not unconstitutional, in violation of the non-delegation doctrine, as applied to \ndefendant, a previously-convicted sex offender; the delegation of authority to the Attorney General was not so \nbroad as to be violative of the non-deleglon doctrine, and defendant was not a person who was unable to register \nwithin the meaning of the provision. U.S. \nHinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 0= 433(2) \n3. Procedural due process \nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate the procedural due process rights of \ndefendant, a previously-convicted sex offender, by failing to give him actual notice that travel across state lin \nsubjected him to criminal penalties; defendant had sufficient notice that failing to register was illegal. U.S. \nHinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 0= 433(2) \n4. Substantive due process \nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not, by subjecting to the Act's requirements persons \nwho were not in fact convicted of an offense listed as a qualifying sex offense, or whose conviction was set aside, \nis \nviolate the substantive due process rights of defendant, a previously-convicted sex offender; defendant fel quarely \nwithin the category of persons required to register, and his conviction had not been set aside. U.S. \nHinen, \nW.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health C\n 433(2) \n5. Standing \nPreviously-convicted sex offender who could allege no injuries tracea\n... [truncated, 3557 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/358 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=358]", "char_count": 3557}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 359, "text_content": "Page 4 of 4 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 \nPage 4 \nFailing to register as a sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), was \ns\na continuing offense, and therefore venue was \nin prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce and \nfailing to register as a sex offender, in either \nthe state in which defendant's travel originated, or in \nTennessee, the place to which defendant changed is residicy and in which he failed to register, failure to register \ninvolved an element of interstate or foreign travel. U.S. \nHinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Criminal \nLaw 0= 113 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16913, 42 USCA § 16913 \nCurrent through P.L. 110-133 approved 12-6-07 \nCopr. (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.conn/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&pril=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=... \n12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191946\n", "char_count": 943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 360, "text_content": "Page 1 of 6 \nWestlaw. \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 \nPage I \n1> \nEffective: July 27, 2006 \nUnited States Code Annotated Currentness \nTitle 42. The Public Health and Welfare \nChapter 151. Child Protection and Safety \nSubchapter I. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \nre Part A. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \n. § 16911. Relevant definitions, including Arnie Zyla expansion of sex offender definition and \nexpanded inclusion of child predators \nIn this subchapter the following definitions apply: \n(I) Sex offender \nThe term \"sex offender\" means an individual who was convicted of a sex offense. \n(2) Tier I sex offender \nThe term \"tier I sex offender\" means a sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender. \n(3) Tier II sex offender \nThe term \"tier II sex offender\" means a sex offender other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is \npunishable by imprisonment for more than I year and--\n(A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, when committed against a minor, or an \nattempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense against a minor: \n(i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of Title 18); \n(ii) coercion and enticement (as described in section 2422(b) of Title 18); \n(iii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a)) \nof Title IS; \n(iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of Title 18); \n(B) involves--\n(i) use of a minor in a sexual performance; \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?rs=WLW7.11&destination=atp&prft=H... 12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191947\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 361, "text_content": "Page 2 of 6 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 \nPage 2 \n(ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or \n(iii) production or distribution of child pornography; or \n(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender. \n(4) Tier Ill sex offender \nThe term \"tier Ill sex offender\" means a sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more \nthan I year and--\n(A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit \nsuch an offense: \n(i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18); or \n(ii) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of Title 18) against a minor who has not \nattained the age of 13 years; \n(B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a parent or guardian); or \n(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier II sex offender. \n(5) Arnie Zyla expansion of sex offense definition \n(A) Generally \n(A) Generally \nExcept as limited by subparagraph (B) or (C), the term \" sex offense\" means--\n(i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another; \n(ii) a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor; \n(iii) a Federal offense (including an offense prosecuted under section 1152 or 1153 of Title 18) under \nsection 1591, or chapter 109A, 110 (other than section 2257, 2257A, or 2258), or 117, of Title 18; \n(iv) a military offense specified by the Secretary of Defense under section 15(aX8XC)(i) of Public Law \n105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note); or \n(I) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in clauses (i) through (iv). \n(B) Foreign convictions \n(B) Foreign convictions \nA foreign conviction is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter if it was not obtained with \nsufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the accused under guidelines or regulations \nestablished under section 16912 of this title. \n2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt\n... [truncated, 2119 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/361 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=361]", "char_count": 2119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 362, "text_content": "Page 3 of 6 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 \nPage 3 \n(C) Offenses involving consensual sexual conduct \n(C) Offenses involving consensual sexual conduct \nAn offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter if the \nvictim was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the \noffense, or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the \nvictim. \n(6) Criminal offense \nThe term \"criminal offense\" means a State, local, tribal, foreign, or military offense (to the extent specified by \nthe Secretary of Defense under section I15(a)(8XC)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note)) or other \ncriminal offense. \n(7) Expansion of definition of \"specified offense against a minor\" to include all offenses by child predators \nThe term \" specified offense against a minor\" means an offense against a minor that involves any of the \nfollowing: \n(A) An offense (unless commined by a parent or guardian) involving kidnapping. \n(B) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving false imprisonment. \n(C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct. \n(D) Use in a sexual performance. \n(E) Solicitation to practice prostitution. \n•\n \n(F) Video voyeurism as described in section 1801 of Title IS. \n(C) Possession, production, or distribution of child pornography. \n(H) Criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such \nconduct. \n(I) Any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor. \n(8) Convicted as including certain juvenile adjudications \nThe term \"convicted\" or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudicated delinquent \nas a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense and \nthe offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse (as described in \nsection 2241 of Titl\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/362 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=362]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 363, "text_content": "Page 4 of 6 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 \nPage 4 \n(10) Jurisdiction \nThe term \"jurisdiction\" means any of the following: \n(A) A State. \n(B) The District of Columbia. \n(C) The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. \n(U) Guam. \n(E) American Samoa. \n(F) The Northern Mariana Islands. \n(G) The United States Virgin Islands. \n(H) To the extent provided and subject to the requirements of section 16927 of this title, a federally \nrecognized Indian tribe. \n(II) Student \nThe term \"student\" means an individual who enrolls in or attends an educational institution, including \n(whether public or private) a secondary school, trade or professional school, and institution of higher \neducation. \n(12) Employee \nThe term \"employee\" includes an individual who is self-employed or works for any other entity, whether \ncompensated or not. \n(13) Resides \nThe term \"resides\" means, with respect to an individual, the location of the individual's home or other place \nwhere the individual habitually lives. \n(14) Minor \nThe term \"minor\" means an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years. \nCREDIT(S) \n(Pub.L. 109-248, Title I, § 11 1, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 591.) \nHISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES \nRevision Notes and Legislative Reports \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nImps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspOrs=WLW7.118cdestination=atp&prft=H... 12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191950\n", "char_count": 1381}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 364, "text_content": "Page 5 of 6 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 169 I 1 \nPage 5 \n2006 Acts. Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S35. \nReferences in Text \nThis subchapter, referred to in text, originally read \"this title\", meaning Title I (§ 101 et seq.] of Pub.L. 109-248, \nJuly 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 590, known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which enacted this \nsubchapter; for complete classification, see Short Title note set out under 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 and Tables. \nChapter 109A of Title IS, referred to in par. (5XA)(iii), is Sexual Abuse, 18 \n§ 2241 et seq. \nChapter 110 of Title 18, referred to in par. (5XA)(iii), is Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children, 18 \nU.S.C.A. § 2251 et seq. \nChapter 117 of Title IS, referred to in par. (5XA)(iii), is Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related \nCrimes, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et seq. \nSection 115 of Public Law 105-119, referred to in par. (5)(AXiv), (6), is cl. (i) of Pub.L. 105.119, Title I, § \n115(a)(8XC), Nov. 26, 1997, III Stat. 2466, which is set out as a note under 10 U.S.C.A. § 951. \nNOTES OF DECISIONS \nGenerally I \nCommerce clause 6 \nEx post facto 2 \nPolicy safety regulation 5 \nProcedural due process 3 \nSubstantive due process 4 \nI. Generally \nCongress did not impermissibly delegate its constitutional legislative duties by providing, in Sex Offender \nRegistration and Notification Act (SORNA), that Attorney General was to specify whether statute was applicable \nto offenders convicted prior to its enactment date, and prescribe rules for registration of offenders unable to comply \nI\nwith statutory requirements; \nongress was merely authorizing executive branch to give advice to courts on \nquestion of retroactivity. U.S. . Madera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Mental Health C\n 433(2) \n2. Ex post facto \nCongress did not violate ex post facto law clause of Constitution by passing Sex Offender Registration and \nNotification Act (SORNA), on grounds that registration requirements were add\n... [truncated, 3042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/364 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=364]", "char_count": 3042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 365, "text_content": "Page 6 of 6 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 \nPage 6 \nHinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 'IC= 433(2) \n3. Procedural due process \nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate procedural due process rights of \nconvicted sex offender, by not providing for notice and hearing prior to publication of his name on offender \n1\nregistry or prior to being compelled to register as offender; since all convicted offe ers were required to register, \nthere was no need for hearings to consider circumstances of individual cases. U.S. \nMadera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 \nF.Supp.2d 1257. Mental Health em\" 433(2) \nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate the procedural due process rights of \ndefendant, a previously-convicted sex offender, by failing to give him actual notice that travel across state lin \nsubjected him to criminal penalties; defendant had sufficient notice that failing to register was illegal. U.S. 115. \nHinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health e=s 433(2) \n4. Substantive due process \nSubstantive due process rights of convicted sex offenders was not violated by Sex Offender Registration and \nNotification Act (SORNA), requiring that they register and disclose their whereabouts following release. U.S. I. \nMadera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Mental Health le= 433(2) \n5. Policy safety regulation \nThere was rational public safety basis for regulation of interstate commerce, underlying Sex Offender Registration \nand \nthat released o \nnders\n1\n Notification Act (SORNA) requirements \nreport address changes to authorities, \nprecluding claim that SORNA violated Commerce Clause. U.S. \nMadera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. \nMental Health 4:\n7. 433(2) \n6. Commerce clause \nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and the federal offense it created, of failing to register \nas a sex offender (FFR), was a proper exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause; FFR had at \nlast a de minim\n... [truncated, 2506 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/365 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=365]", "char_count": 2506}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 366, "text_content": "Page 1 of 2 \nrestlaw. \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16914 \nEffective: July 27, 2006 \nUnited States Code Annotated Currentness \nTitle 42. The Public Health and Welfare \nChapter 151. Child Protection and Safety \nSubchapter I. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \n'Sit Part A. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \n§ 16914. Information required in registration \n(a) Provided by the offender \nPage I \nThe sex offender shall provide the following information to the appropriate official for inclusion in the sex \noffender registry: \n(1) The name of the sex offender (including any alias used by the individual). \n(2) The Social Security number of the sex offender. \n(3) The address of each residence at which the sex offender resides or will reside. \n(4) The name and address of any place where the sex offender is an employee or will be an employee. \n(5) The name and address of any place where the sex offender is a student or will be a student. \n(6) The license plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or operated by the sex offender. \n(7) Any other information required by the Attorney General. \n(b) Provided by the jurisdiction \nThe jurisdiction in which the sex offender registers shall ensure that the following information is included in the \nregistry for that sex offender: \n(I) A physical description of the sex offender. \n(2) The text of the provision of law defining the criminal offense for which the sex offender is registered. \n(3) The criminal history of the sex offender, including the date of all arrests and convictions; the status of \nparole, probation, or supervised release; registration status; and the existence of any outstanding arrest \nwarrants for the sex offender. \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prfeHTMLE&fn=_top&mt=... \n12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191953\n", "char_count": 1864}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 367, "text_content": "Page 2 of 2 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16914 \nPage 2 \n(4) A current photograph of the sex offender. \n(5) A set of fingerprints and palm prints of the sex offender. \n(6) A DNA sample of the sex offender. \n(7) A photocopy of a valid driver's license or identification card issued to the sex offender by a jurisdiction. \n(8) Any other information required by the Attorney General. \nCREDIT(S) \n(Pub.L. 109-248, Title I, § 114, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 594.) \nHISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES \nRevision Notes and Legislative Reports \n2006 Acts. Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S35. \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16914, 42 USCA § 16914 \nCurrent through P.L. 110-133 approved 12-6-07 \nCopr. (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nID 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhups://web2.westlaw.corn/print/pritastream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=... \n12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191954\n", "char_count": 934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 368, "text_content": "Page 1 of 2 \nWestlaw \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16915 \nPage I \nC \nEffective: July 27, 2006 \nUnited States Code Annotated Currentness \nTitle 42. The Public Health and Welfare \nChapter 151. Child Protection and Safety \n'Li Subchapter 1. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \nre Part A. Sex Offender Registration and Notification \n- § 16915. Duration of registration requirement \n(a) Full registration period \nA sex offender shall keep the registration current for the full registration period (excluding any time the sex \noffender is in custody or civilly committed) unless the offender is allowed a reduction under subsection (b) of this \nsection. The full registration period is--\n(1) 15 years, if the offender is a tier I sex offender; \n(2) 25 years, if the offender is a tier II sex offender; and \n(3) the life of the offender, if the offender is a tier III sex offender. \n(b) Reduced period for clean record \n(I) Clean record \n(I) Clean record \nThe full registration period shall be reduced as described in paragraph (3) for a sex offender who maintains a clean \nrecord for the period described in paragraph (2) by--\n(A) not being convicted of any offense for which imprisonment for more than I year may be imposed; \n(B) not being convicted of any sex offense; \n(C) successfully completing any periods of supervised release, probation, and parole; and \n(D) successfully completing of an appropriate sex offender treatment program certified by a jurisdiction or by \nthe Attorney General. \n(2) Period \nC 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&fn=jop&mt=... \n12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191955\n", "char_count": 1662}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 369, "text_content": "Page 2 of 2 \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16915 \nPage 2 \n(2) Period \nIn the case of--\n(A) a tier I sex offender, the period during which the clean record shall be maintained is 10 years; and \n(B) a tier Ill sex offender adjudicated delinquent for the offense which required registration in a sex registry \nunder this subchapter, the period during which the clean record shall be maintained is 25 years. \n(3) Reduction \n(3) Reduction \nIn the case of--\n(A) a tier I sex offender, the reduction is 5 years; \n(B) a tier 111 sex offender adjudicated delinquent, the reduction is from life to that period for which the clean \nrecord under paragraph (2) is maintained. \nCREDIT(S) \n(Pub.L. 109-248, Title I, § 115, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 595.) \nHISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES \nRevision Notes and Legislative Reports \n2006 Acts. Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S35. \nReferences in Text \nThis subchapter, referred to in subset. (b)(2XB) originally read \"this title\", meaning Title I [§ 101 et seq.] of \nPub.L. 109-248, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 590, known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which \nenacted this subchapter; for complete classification, see Short Title note set out under 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 and \nTables. \n42 U.S.C.A. § 16915, 42 USCA § 16915 \nCurrent through P.L. 110-133 approved 12-6-07 \nCopr. (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspeasv=Full8cPrft=HTMLE&fn=_totAmt=... \n12/31/2007 \nEFTA00191956\n", "char_count": 1586}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 370, "text_content": "Page 1 of 10 \nWestlaw. \nPage I \nF.3d ----, 2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d --) \nH \nU.S. I Rakes \nC.A.I0 (Utah),2007. \nOnly the \\Vestlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nJoe RAKES, Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 06-4208. \nDec. 26,2007. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted in the \nUnited States District Court for the District of Utah \nof conspiring to impede or injure an officer, and \nwas sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment, and he \nappealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Gorsuch, Circuit \nJudge, held that: \n(I) evidence was sufficient to support conviction; \n(2) court did not violate rule of criminal procedure \nrequiring court to provide the parties with any \ninformation on which it would rely in sentencing; \n(3) any violation of rule of criminal procedure \ngoverning pleas was harmless error; and \n(4) applicable sentencing guideline was guideline \nfor threatening or harassing communications. \nAffirmed. \n111 Criminal Law 110 e=0 \n110 Criminal Law \nIn assessing challenges to the sufficiency of the \nevidence to support a conviction, the court of \nappeals reviews the evidence presented de novo, \nasking whether, viewing it in the light most \nfavorable to the government, as the prevailing party, \nany rational trier of fact could have found the \nessential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable \ndoubt. \n121 Criminal Law 110 €='0 \n110 Criminal Law \nThe evidence of the existence of an agreement \nbetween defendant and another person to prevent \nthe victim, a prosecutor, from discharging her duties \nby sending her a threatening letter was sufficient to \nsupport defendant's conviction for conspiring to \nimpede or injure an officer; although coconspirator \npresented alternative and conflicting testimony \nabout nature of her involvement in alleged \nconspiracy, including statements suggesting she was \ncoerced by defendant, by voices in her head, or \nperhaps by someo\n... [truncated, 3231 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/370 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=370]", "char_count": 3231}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 371, "text_content": "Page 2 of 10 \nPage 2 \nF.3d \n2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.I0 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: -- F.3d —) \n141 Criminal Law 110 €=.0 \n110 Criminal Law \nIn prosecution for conspiring to impede or injure an \nofficer, any violation of rule of criminal procedure \ngoverning pleas in district court's failure to disclose \nat hearing at which court rejected recommended \nsentence in parties' plea agreement that court had \nreceived victim impact letter from victim in the case \nwas harmless error; after defendant learned of letter, \nhe asked court to reconsider rejection of plea \nagreement, and court denied reconsideration, stating \nit would have rejected agreement regardless of letter \nfor reasons set forth on record, including court's \nassessment that guidelines advisory sentence for \ncrime to which defendant agreed to plead guilty was \nat least double the parties' agreed sentence, and \nneither party had offered persuasive reason for such \na disparity. Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule \n11(h), \n18 \nU.S.C.A. \nI5I Sentencing and Punishment 350H €=.1) \n3501i Sentencing and Punishment \nFor \npurposes \nof defendant's \nsentencing \nfor \nconspiring to impede or injure an officer, an offense \nfor which no sentencing guidelines range was \ndesignated, most analogous guideline, and thus, \napplicable guideline, was guideline for threatening \nor harassing communications, rather than for \nobstructing or impeding an officer; indictment \ncharged conspiracy to threaten and intimidate \nfederal prosecutor by writing letter with threatening \nlanguage, listing street on which victim lived, and \nmailing letter to victim, and although defendant \nsought to impede prosecution of members of white \nsupremacy group, he intended to do so by means of \npremeditated and comparatively complex scheme of \nintimidation rather than by act of simple assault, \nand case proven at trial centered around threatening \nletter. U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.4, 2A6.1(aX1). 18 U.S.C.A. \nAppeal from the United States District Court for the \nDistrict of Utah (D.C. No. 2:05-\n... [truncated, 4191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/371 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=371]", "char_count": 4191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 372, "text_content": "Page 3 of 10 \nPage 3 \nF.3d \n2007 WL 4510264 (C.A. I0 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d \ndefendants who was known to refer to them as her \nbrothers. Ms. Dowding identified Mr. Rakes as \nbeing involved in writing or mailing the threatening \nletter, as did other witnesses, including Laura Scott \nand Doug Erten. \nThe government indicted Mr. Rakes in March 2005 \nin the District of Utah on two counts: mailing a \nthreatening communication, 18 U.S.C. § 876, and \nconspiring to impede or injure an officer, 18 U.S.C. \n§ 372. After initially pleading not guilty, Mr. Rakes \nagreed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense \nmisprision of a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 4, in exchange \nfor an agreement from the government that the \nappropriate sentence was 9 months imprisonment, \nbelow the 18 to 24 months suggested by Section \n2X4.I \nof \nthe \nadvisory \nGuidelines. \nSee \nFed.R.Crim.P. 111(c)(IXC). The court conditionally \naccepted the change of plea, subject to its receipt of \na presentence report and subsequent sentencing \nhearing. \nPrior to sentencing, the district court received a \nvictim impact letter, seel8 U.S.C. § 377I(aX4), \nfrom the victim prosecutor but did not disclose the \nexistence of the letter either to defense counsel or \ncounsel for the government. At sentencing, the \ndistrict court opened the proceeding by expressing \ndoubt about the parties' recommended sentence of \nnine months, remarking that it would like them to \nexplain how such a sentence would be justifiable \neven though it represented only half what the \nadvisory Guidelines recommended as a minimum \nsentence. \nAfter \nargument, \nthe \ndistrict \ncourt, \napparently seeing no convincing reason for a \nbelow-Guidelines \nsentence, \nreversed \nits \nprior \nconditional \napproval of the \nplea \nagreement, \nindicated its belief that a more substantial sentence \nwas merited, and explained that it was concerned \nwith \n*2 the very real victim impact presented by this \ncase. This is a serious matter. The impact on a \nrespected Assistant\n... [truncated, 4550 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/372 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=372]", "char_count": 4550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 373, "text_content": "Page 4 of 10 \n—F.3d--\n-- F.3d \n2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d —) \nsentencing, Mr. Rakes filed a motion for disclosure \nof any victim impact statements pursuant to Rule 32 \nof the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which \nthe district court granted, providing both parties the \nletter it had received from the victim prosecutor. \nBecause the district court had not disclosed the \nletter at the plea agreement stage, Mr. Rakes moved \nthe district court to reconsider the plea agreement \nand recuse itself so another judge could handle the \ninquiry. The district court denied the motion. \n*3 In preparing its presentence report, the probation \noffice encountered a different sort of complication. \nBecause Mr. Rakes's offense, conspiracy to impede \nor injure an officer, 18 U.S.C. § 372, does not have \nan assigned Sentencing Guidelines section, the \nprobation office was required to analogize to \nanother Guidelines section and ultimately chose to \nemploy Section 2A6.1(aX1), which covers certain \ncrimes \ninvolving \nthreatening \nor \nharassing \ncommunications and has a base offense level of 12. \nMr. Rakes objected, arguing that \nthe most \nanalogous guideline was Section 2A2.4, relating to \nobstructing or impeding a law enforcement officer, \nwith a base offense level of 10. The district court \noverruled Mr. Rakes's objection and, employing \nSection 2A6.1(aX I), sentenced Mr. Rakes to 63 \nmonths imprisonmentFN \nII \n[1][2] On appeal, Mr. Rakes first contends that the \ngovernment presented insufficient evidence at trial \non an essential element of his crime-namely, the \nexistence of an agreement between him and another \nperson to prevent the victim from discharging her \nduties by the use of force, violence, or intimidation. \nIn assessing such sufficiency challenges, we review \nthe evidence presented de novo, asking whether, \nviewing it in the light most favorable to the \ngovernment, as the prevailing party, any rational \ntrier of fact could have found the essential e\n... [truncated, 4730 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/373 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=373]", "char_count": 4730}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 374, "text_content": "Page 5 of 10 \nF.3d \nF.3d ---, 2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.10 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d \ntestimony beyond the pale of reason, see Parker lc \nScott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1315 (10th Cir.200 \n(distinguishing inconsistent testimony from that \nwhich is \"inherently implausible\"), but we are not \nallowed to substitute our judgment for that of the \njury when it comes to deciding which rationally \nplausible account of the facts to credit, see Young, \n486 F.3d at 666. \n*4 Though the question whether Ms. Dowding was \nworthy of belief in any of her accounts is not one \nthat can be reflexively dismissed, neither can we say \nthat no rational jury could have credited her \ntestimony that she wrote the letter willingly, with \nthe help of, or at the suggestion of, Mr. Rakes. It \nseems to us that the jury could have reasonably \nconcluded that this particular version of events was \nmore believable than Ms. Dowding's alternative \nexplanations, and that her alternative explanations \nwere calculated to minimize her own culpability and \nrationalize her willing involvement with Mr. Rakes. \nBolstering the plausibility of such a conclusion is \nthe fact that Ms. Dowding was not the sole source \nof evidence about the agreement between herself \nand Mr. Rakes. Mr. Errett, who read the threatening \nletter at Mr. Rakes's apartment, testified that Mr. \nRakes told him that he and Ms. Dowding had \nwritten the letter. Ms. Scott likewise testified that, \nafter she looked up the address of the victim at the \nlibrary, she brought it back to Mr. Rakes at his \napartment, where Ms. Dowding, under no apparent \nduress, was writing and had paper and envelopes. \nTo the extent that the jury believed either or both of \nthese \nwitnesses, \ntheir \ntestimony \ntended \nto \ncorroborate, \nand \nthus \nhelp \nmake \nrationally \nplausible, Ms. Dowding's version of the events in \nwhich she and Mr. Rakes knowingly and voluntarily \nconspired. \nWhile this case surely required the jury to pick and \nchoose among competing versions of events, with \n... [truncated, 4859 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/374 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=374]", "char_count": 4859}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 375, "text_content": "Page 6 of 10 \nPage 6 \nF.3d ----, 2007 WL 4510264 (C.A.I0 (Utah)) \n(Cite as: — F.3d \nrule, by its plain terms, was violated, or that the \nharm it seeks to avoid was implicated. In fairness to \nthe district court we must also note that, although \nthe parties did not have the victim's letter, they were \nat least on notice of its existence and could have \nsought its production. The presentence report \nprepared for the plea hearing explicitly stated, under \n\"Victim Impact,\" that \"[the victim] is preparing a \nstatement that will be submitted directly to the \nCourt.\"P.S.R. of Oct. 5, 2005 at ¶ II. \n*5 [4] Beyond Rule 32, there remains in our view a \ndistinct and even more germane question* A district \ncourt enjoys substantial discretion in deciding \nwhether to accept or reject a plea agreement under \ngule II. SeeFed.R.Crim.P. 11(O3); United States \nI Robertson, 15 F.3d 1423, 1438 (10th Cir.I995); \nUnited States I Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1461-62 \n(10th Cir.I985). But that discretion is not without \nlimit. See Robertson. 45 F.3d at 1438. While a \ndefendant has no absolute right to have his plea \nagreement accepted, in our supervisory capacity we \nhave placed some boundaries on the district court's \ndiscretion-requiring district courts, for example, to \narticulate reasons on the record if and when they \ndecide to reject such agreements in order, among \nother things, \"to insure district courts exercise \nsound judicial discretion.\"N. Though Mr. Rakes's \nbrief primarily \ndiscusses \nRule \n32, \nwe also \nunderstand him to suggest that, even if Rule 32 is \nnot implicated, a district court cannot exercise \nsound judicial discretion under Rule II in rejecting \na plea agreement when it acts on the basis of \nundisclosed evidence, and this strikes us as a very \ndifferent and more appropriately targeted question. \nThe parties, however, have directed us to no \nauthority on this issue and, at the end of the day, we \nbelieve this case is properly resolved without \nreaching it. Rule I I expr\n... [truncated, 4814 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/375 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=375]", "char_count": 4814}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 376, "text_content": "• \n1176 \n476 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nUNITED STATES of America, \nPlaintiff—Appellee, \nI \nJustin' EVANS, Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 06-10907. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nEleventh Circuit. \nJan. 30, 2007. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted in \nthe United States District Court for the \nSouthern District of Florida, No. 05-20444-\nCR-PAS, Patricia A. Seitz, J., of enticing a \nminor to engage in a commercial sex act, \nand enticing a minor to engage in prostitu-\ntion, and he appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Bow-\nman, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation, \nheld that: \n(1) even though all of defendant's conduct \ninvolving child occurred solely within \nthe state of Florida, defendant's con-\nduct satisfied interstate-commerce ele-\nment of Trafficking Victims Protection \nAct (TVPA) provision prohibiting the \nenticing of a minor to engage in a \ncommercial sex act, and \n(2) defendant's use of telephones and cel-\nlular telephones, even without evidence \nthat the calls he made were routed \nthrough an interstate system, was suf-\nficient to satisfy interstate-commerce \nelement of statute prohibiting enticing \na minor to engage in prostitution. \nAffirmed. \nI. Criminal Law 43=4139, 1149 \nA district court's denial of a motion to \ndismiss an indictment is generally re-\nviewed for abuse of discretion; however, \nwhen the motion to dismiss the indictment \nchallenges the court's subject matter juris-\ndiction, appellate court reviews de nerd \nthe district court's interpretation and ap-\nplication of the statutory provisions con-\ncerning the court's subject matter jurisdic-\ntion. \n2. Criminal Law e=,1139 \nWhether a statute is unconstitutional \nas applied is a question of law subject to de \nnovo review. \n3. Commerce e=82.6 \nInfants c=i13 \nEven though all of defendant's con-\nduct involving child occurred solely within \nthe state of Florida, defendant's conduct \nsatisfied interstate-commerce element of \nTrafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) \nprovision prohibiting the enti\n... [truncated, 3045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/376 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=376]", "char_count": 3045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 377, "text_content": "U.S. I EVANS \n1177 \nCite as 476 F.3.1 1176 (I Ithar. 2007) \n7. Commerce 4=82.10 \nProstitution ,2=15 \nDefendant's use of telephones and cel-\nlular telephones, even without evidence \nthat the calls he made were routed \nthrough an interstate system, was suffi-\ncient to satisfy interstate-commerce ele-\nment of statute prohibiting enticing a mi-\nnor to engage in prostitution. 18 U.S.C.A. \n§ 2422(b). \nFaith Mesnekoff and Richard C. Klugh, \nJr., Fed. Pub. Defenders, Jacqueline Esth-\ner Shapiro, Asst. Fed. Pub. Del., Miami, \nFL, Kathleen M. Williams, Fed. Pub. Def., \nWest Palm Beach, FL, for Evans. \nLisa T. Rubio, Dawn Bowen, Anne R. \nSchultz, Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, FL, for \nU.S. \nAppeal from the United States District \nCourt for the Southern District of Florida. \nBefore TJOFLAT, HULL and \nBOWMAN,* Circuit Judges. \nBOWMAN, Circuit Judge: \nJustin Evans appeals his convictions for \nenticing a minor to engage in a commercial \nsex \nact in violation of 18 \nU.S.C. \n§ 1591(aXl), and enticing a minor to en-\ngage in prostitution in violation of 18 \nU.S.C. § 2422(b). Evans asserts that the \ndistrict court erred in denying his motion \nto dismiss the indictment. \nSpecifically, \nEvans challenges the constitutionality of \n§ 1591(aX1) and § 2422(b) as applied to \nhis purely local actions and the sufficiency \nof the stipulated facts to satisfy the juris-\ndictional interstate-commerce elements of \nthe offenses. After review and oral argu-\nment, we affirm. \n• Honorable Pasco M. Bowman II. United \nStates Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit. \nI. \nA federal grand jury indicted Evans and \ntwo co-defendants for their roles in operat-\ning a child prostitution ring in Miami—\nDade County, Florida. Evans filed a mo-\ntion to dismiss the indictment, contending \nthat the evidence upon which the govern-\nment planned to rely would not satisfy the \ninterstate-commerce element of the stat-\nutes under which he was charged. There-\nafter, the parties agreed to proceed by \nway of a conditional guilty plea. E\n... [truncated, 3323 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/377 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=377]", "char_count": 3323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 378, "text_content": "1178 \n476 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nwhich time she was diagnosed with AIDS. \nA few days after Jane Doe's release from \nthe hospital, Evans called her on a land-\nline telephone and induced her to resume \nher work as a prostitute for him. Jane \nDoe worked for Evans until May 2005, \nwhen she was again hospitalized for AIDS \ntreatment \nThe district court determined that Ev-\nans's conduct satisfied the \"in or affecting \ninterstate or foreign commerce\" element of \n1591(a)(1) and the \"using ... any facility \nor means of interstate or foreign com-\nmerce\" element of § 2422(b). According-\nly, the district court denied Evans's motion \nto dismiss the indictment Evans appeals. \nII. \nIL 21 Generally, we review a district \ncourt's denial of a motion to dismiss an \nindictment for abuse of discretion. See \nUnited States v. Noriega, 117 FM 1206, \n1211 (11th Cir.1997), cat denied 523 U.S. \n1060, 118 S.Ct. 1389, 140 L.Ed.2d 648 \n(1998). When the motion to dismiss the \nindictment challenges the court's subject \nmatter jurisdiction, however, \"we review \nde novo the district court's interpretation \nand application of the statutory provisions \nconcerning the court's subject matter ju-\nrisdiction.\" United States v. McPhee, 336 \nFM 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.2003): see also \nUnited Stales u Drury, 896 F.8d 1303, \n1312 (11th Cir.) (applying a de novo stan-\ndard of review in determining whether the \nevidence was sufficient to satisfy the inter-\nstate-commerce element of 18 U.S.C. \n§ 1958(a)), telt denied — U.S. —, 126 \nS.Ct 336 163 L.Ed2d 48 (2005). Whether \na statute is unconstitutional as applied is \nalso a question of law subject to de nerd \nreview. United States v. Ballinger, 395 \nF.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir.) (en bane), cert. \ndenied, — U.S. -, \n126 S.Ct 368, 163 \nL.Ed2d 77 (2006). \nA. \nI3) Count One of the indictment \ncharged Evans with violating 18 U.S.C. \n§ 1591(aX1), which imposes punishment on \nanyone who \"knowingly in or affecting in-\nterstate or foreign commerce, ... recruits, \nentices,\n... [truncated, 3650 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/378 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=378]", "char_count": 3650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 379, "text_content": "US.' EVANS \ncst as 476 rid 1176 (11thar. 2007) \nCourt found that the CSA created a com-\nprehensive framework for regulating con-\ntrolled substances and that Congress had \na rational basis to conclude that intrastate \nconduct could substantially affect its abili-\nty to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at \n30, 32, 125 S.Ct. 2195. \nApplying Raich, our Court recently re-\njected arguments that purely intrastate \nconduct could not be prosecuted under the \nfederal Child Pornography Prevention Act \nof 1996 (\"CPPA\"). First, in Maxwell, we \nheld that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) was \nnot unconstitutional as applied to a defen-\ndant's intrastate possession of child por-\nnography, even though no evidence indi-\ncated that the defendant's conduct was \nlikely to impact interstate commerce. 446 \nF.3d at 1217-19. We noted that the CPPA \nis part of a comprehensive regulatory \nscheme criminalizing, inter alia, the pro-\nduction, possession, and sale of child por-\nnography and that Congress could ration-\nally conclude that the cumulative effect of \nlocal possession of child pornography \nwould substantially affect the interstate \ncommerce that Congress was seeking to \neliminate. Id at 1217-19. Similarly, in \nUnited States v. Smith, we rejected the \nargument that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) was \nunconstitutional as applied to the intra-\nstate production of child pornography. \n459 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006), \ncert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Jan. 8, \n2007) (No. 06-7780). We reasoned that \n§ 2251(a), like § 2252A(a)(5)(B), is part of \na comprehensive regulatory scheme that \ncould be frustrated by purely intrastate \nactivity considered in the aggregate. hi. \nat 1285. \nWe have no difficulty concluding that \nRaich, Maxwell, and Smith foreclose Ev-\nans's challenge to the constitutionality of \n§ 1591(a)(1) as applied to his activities oc-\nI. Section 1591 does not criminalize all acts of \nprostitution (a vice traditionally governed by \nstate regulation). Rather, its reach is limited \n1179 \ncur\n... [truncated, 3903 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/379 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=379]", "char_count": 3903}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 380, "text_content": "1180 \n476 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES \nfurnished their prostitutes with condoms \nmanufactured out of state ... supports a \nfinding that the activities of the enterprise \naffected interstate commerce\"), vacated on \nother grounds, 644 U.S. 902, 126 S.Ct. \n1617, 161 L.Ed2d 275, opinion reinstated \n412 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied —\nU.S. -, \n126 S.Ct. 591, 163 L.Ed.2d 492 \n(2005). Therefore, Evans's conduct suffi-\nciently satisfies the interstate-commerce \nelement of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and his as-\napplied constitutional challenge fails\" \nB. \nCount Four of the indictment charged \nEvans with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), \nwhich imposes punishment on anyone who, \n\"using the mail or any facility or means \nof interstate or foreign commerce, \n• • • \nknowingly persuades, induces, entices, or \ncoerces any individual who has not at-\ntained the age of 18 years, to engage in \n2. At oral argument, Evans's counsel asserted \nthat the term \"knowingly\" modifies the inter-\nstate-commerce \nelement \nof \n118 \nU.S.C. \n3 1591(a) and that the government was there-\nfore required to prove that Evans knew that \nhis actions were in or affecting interstate or \nforeign commerce. This argument was not \nmade to the district court or raised in Evans's \nbrief on appeal, and we would ordinarily \ndeem it waived. See Saranac, LLC v. City of \nNeptune Beach, 410 F.36 1250. 1256 n. 6 \n(1 I th Cir.2005) (holding that a statutory-inter-\npretation argument raised for the first time at \noral argument and not raised in the district \nI\ncourt or in ppellate briefs was waived); \nUnited States \nSilvestri. 409 F.3d 1311, 1338 \nn. 18 (11th \nir.) (\"Under the law of this \nCircuit, an issue not raised in a party's initial \nappellate brief is considered waived, and the \nparty is prohibited from raising the issue later \nin the appeal.\"), cert. denied, — U.S. —. \n126 S.Ct. 772. 163 LEd.2d 598 (2005): see \nalso Plea Agreement at 4 (-This reservation of \nthe defendant's right to appeal is limited to \narguments that ar\n... [truncated, 4369 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/380 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=380]", "char_count": 4369}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 381, "text_content": "US. I HASSOUN \nateas476 F.3d 1181 (Ilthar. 2007) \nans's use of these instrumentalities of in-\nterstate commerce alone, even without evi-\ndence that the calls he made were routed \nthrough an interstate system, is sufficient \nto satisfy § 2422(b)'s interstate-commerce \nelement. Accord United States v. Gilbert, \n181 F.3d 152, 15849 (1st Cir.1999) (citing \ncases and ruling that the intrastate use of \na telephone provides a sufficient basis for \njurisdiction based on interstate commerce \neven absent evidence that the call is routed \nthrough an interstate system); United \nStates v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th \nCir.) (\"It is well established that tele-\nphones, even when used intrastate, consti-\ntute instrumentalities of interstate com-\nmerce. \nSimilarly, cellular telephones, \neven in the absence of evidence that they \nwere used to make interstate calls, have \nbeen held to be instrumentalities of inter-\nstate commerce.\" (citations and emphasis \nomitted)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 120 \nS.Ct. 101, 145 L.Ed.2d 85 (1999). Thus, \nthe district court did not err in determin-\ning that § 2422(b) reached Evans's con-\nduct and in denying Evans's motion to \ndismiss Count Four. \nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm \nEvans's convictions. \nAffirmed. \n1181 \nUNITED STATES of America, \nPlaintiff-Appellant, \nAdham Amin IIASSOUN, Kifah Wael \nJayyousi, a.k.a. Abu Mohamed, Jose \nPadilla, a.k.a. Ibrahim, a.k.a. Abu Ab-\ndullah Al Mujahir, a.k.a. Abu Abu Ab-\ndullah the Puerto Rican, Defendants-\nAppellees. \nNo. 06-15845. \nUnited States Court of Appeals, \nEleventh Circuit. \nJan. 30, 2007. \nBackground: \nFive \ndefendants \nwere \ncharged with various crimes arising from \ntheir alleged participation in a support cell \nwith the aim of promoting violent jihad as \nespoused by a radical Islamic fundamental-\nist movement. Three of the defendants \nmoved to dismiss, on double jeopardy \ngrounds, first count of the indictment. \nwhich charged defendants with conspiracy \nto murder, kidnap, and maim outside t\n... [truncated, 2764 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/381 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=381]", "char_count": 2764}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 382, "text_content": "Page 1 of 3. \n: Westlaw \n104 Fed.Appx. 479 \nPage I \n104 Fed.Appx. 479, 2004 WL 1491625 (C.A.6 (Tenn.)) \n(Cite as: 104 Fed.Appx. 479) \nU.S. I. Kisor \nC.A.6 (Tenn.),2004. \nThis case was not selected for publication in the \nFederal Reporter.NOT RECOMMENDED FOR \nFULL--TEXT PUBLICATIONSixth Circuit Rule \n28(g) limits citation to specific situations. Please \nsee Rule 28(g) before citing in a proceeding in a \ncourt in the Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be \nserved on other parties and the Court.Please use \nFIND to look at the applicable circuit court rule \nbefore citing this opinion. Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g). \n(FIND CTA6 Rule 28.) \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nWilliam Ray KISOR, II, Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 02-5578. \nJune 22, 2004. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted in the \nUnited States District Court for the Western District \nof Tennessee of using facility or means of interstate \ncommerce to knowingly persuade minor to engage \nin prohibited sexual acts, and he appealed. \nHolding: The Court of Appeals, Forester, Chief \nDistrict Judge, held that district court did not abuse \nits discretion by refusing to ask defendant's \nproposed question during voir dire. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnotes \nJury 230 ot:=131(8) \n230 Jury \n230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and \nObjections \n230k124 Challenges for Cause \n230kI31 Examination of Juror \n230k131(8) k. Personal Opinions and \nConscientious Scruples. Most Cited Cases \nDistrict court did not abuse its discretion in \nprosecution for using facility or means of interstate \ncommerce to knowingly persuade minor to engage \nin prohibited sexual acts in declining to ask \npotential jurors during voir dire whether they \nbelieved 16-year old girl could persuade adult male \nto engage in sexual activity, even if defendant's \nintended defense was that victim persuaded him to \nengage in sexual activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422. \n•479 On Appeal from the United States District \nCour\n... [truncated, 3261 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/382 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=382]", "char_count": 3261}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 383, "text_content": "Page 2 of 3 \n104 Fed.Appx. 479 \n104 Fed.Appx. 479, 2004 WL 1491625 (C.A 6 (Tenn.)) \n(Cite as: 104 Fed.Appx. 479) \nI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND \nPROCEDURAL HISTORY \nIn October of 2000. Kisor, who was then \nthirty-two years old and lived in Wellston. Ohio. \nmet a minor female, identified as J.F., who was then \nsixteen years old and lived in Paris. Tennessee, in \nan Internet chat room. For several months, the *480 \ntwo communicated \nwith each other through \nelectronic mail, instant messages, and long distance \ntelephone \nconversations. \nMany \nof \nthese \ncommunications involved graphic descriptions of \nsexual desires and sexual role playing. Kisor does \nnot dispute the fact that he initiated some of these \ncommunications. \nOn March 13, 2001, J.F.'s mother. Donna Gay \nFrancisco, became suspicious when J.F.'s name \nappeared on her high school's daily absentee list. \nFrancisco began looking for her daughter and \neventually located her truck in front of a room at a \nlocal motel. Francisco knocked on the door of that \nroom, and Kisor opened the door wearing only his \nboxer shorts. Francisco recognized the clothes on \nthe motel room floor as belonging to J.F., and heard \nJ.F. in the bathroom. In response to Francisco's \nquestioning, Kisor admitted that he knew that J.F. \nwas only sixteen years old and that he knew that it \nwas illegal to cross state lines into the State of \nTennessee to engage in sexual activity with a minor. \nFrancisco called the police, and Kisor was arrested. \nA federal grand jury returned a two count \nindictment against Kisor, Count One charged Kisor \nwith persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing and \nattempting to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a \nminor to engage in sexual acts that constitute a \nprosecutable offense under Tennessee law 11.42 in \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).FN3 Count Two \nsought forfeiture of any instruments used by Kisor \nin committing the offense in accordance with 18 \nU.S.C. § 2253. \nFN2. \nTennessee \nCode \nAnnotated \n§ \n39-1\n... [truncated, 4315 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/383 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=383]", "char_count": 4315}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 384, "text_content": "Page 3 of 3 \n164 Fed.Appx. 479 \n104 Fed.Appx. 479, 2004 WL 1491625 (C.A.6 (Tenn.)) \n(Cite as: 104 Fed.Appx. 479) \n(6th Cir.2001). \nIII. ANALYSIS \nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in \ndeclining to ask Kisor's proposed question during \nvoir dire. \"Judges need not use every question \nsubmitted by counsel; they need only use those to \nwhich an anticipated response would afford \nbasis for a challenge for cause.\" United States\nFish. 928 F.2d 185, 185 (6th Cir.I991). \nchallenge for cause is subject to the district court's \n(\napproval and must be supported y a finding of \nactual or implied bias. Hughes \nUnited States, \n258 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.2001). \nisor's proposed \nquestion could not have been expected to elicit a \nresponse that would have provided a basis for a \nchallenge for cause because no possible answer to \nthe question would have shown actual or implied \nbias. \nKisor contends that the district court's refusal to ask \nhis \nproposed \nquestion \nprevented him \nfrom \ndiscovering whether potential jurors were biased. \nHe maintains that, because his intended defense was \nthat J.F. persuaded him to engage in sexual activity, \nit was necessary for him to discover whether \npotential jurors would be willing to find a sixteen \nyear old girl capable of such persuasion. In raising \nthis claim, Kisor presupposes that there were two \npossible outcomes at trial. First, the jury could ford \nthat he persuaded J.F. to engage in sexual activity. \nKisor does not dispute that, upon such a finding, the \njury would be required to find him guilty of the \noffense. Second, the jury could find that J.F. \npersuaded Kisor to engage in sexual activity. Kisor \ncontends that, upon such a finding, the jury would \nbe required to find him not guilty of the offense. \nKisor's argument is based upon an incorrect framing \nof the relevant possibilities at trial. Under Kisor's \nconstruct, either he persuaded J.F. or J.F. persuaded \nhim. \nThis \nflawed \nconstruct \nignores \nother \npossibiliti\n... [truncated, 3477 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/384 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=384]", "char_count": 3477}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 385, "text_content": "Page 1 of 13 \nWestlaw. \n45I F.Supp.2d 775 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nH \nUnited State District Court, \nE.D.\n,\nAlexandria Division. \nUNITED STATES of America, \n1. \nDavid A. KAYE, Defendant. \nNo. 1:06cr205 (JCC). \nSept. 6, 2006. \nBackground: Trial was held on charges of \ncoercion and enticement and of travel with intent to \nengage in illicit sexual conduct. \nHolding: The District Court, Cacheris, J., held \nthat evidence, including that defendant believed he \nwas going to engage in sexual activity with a \n13-year-old boy, established beyond a reasonable \ndoubt all elements of the charged offenses. \nOrdered accordingly. \nWest Headnotes \nIll Infants C=13 \n211k13 Most Cited Cases \nTo convict for coercion and enticement, the \nGovernment must prove the following elements \nbeyond a reasonable doubt: (1) use of a facility of \ninterstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, \ninduce, entice, or coerce; (3) a person who is \nyounger than eighteen; (4) to engage in an illegal \nsexual activity. \n18 U.S.C.A. § 2422(b). \n121 Commerce €=82.10 \n83k82.10 Most Cited Cases \n121 Infants €=;13 \n211k 1 3 Most Cited Cases \nTo convict under the statute prohibiting sexual \nabuse of children in interstate commerce, the \nGovernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt \nPage I \nthat \na \ndefendant: (1) traveled in interstate \ncommerce and (2) acted with the intent to engage in \nillicit sexual conduct. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(b). \n131 Criminal Law C=1561(1) \n1101(561(1) Most Cited Cases \nIn determining the guilt or innocence of an \nindividual under a specific statute, the court must \napply the facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt to \nthe elements of the offense; if all elements of the \noffense have been met by the Government, \ndefendant will be found guilty. \n141 Commerce €=82.10 \n83k82.10 Most Cited Cases \n141 Infants le='13 \n211k13 Most Cited Cases \n141 Telecommunications C=1351 \n372k1351 Most Cited Cases \nEvidence established beyond a reasonable doubt all \nelements of an attemp\n... [truncated, 2947 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/385 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=385]", "char_count": 2947}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 386, "text_content": "Page 2 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \n151 Telecommunications 41\n1012 \n372k1012 Most Cited Cases \n151 Telecommunications C=1350 \n372k1350 Most Cited Cases \nTransmission of communication by means of the \ntelephone or Internet constitutes the \"use of a \nfacility of interstate commerce,\" for purposes of the \nstatute prohibiting the use of facility of interstate \ncommerce to coerce and entice minors to engage in \nsexual activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422(b). \n161 Commerce €='82.10 \n83k82.10 Most Cited Cases \n161 Infants €=.13 \n211k13 Most Cited Cases \n161 Telecommunications C=1350 \n372kI350 Most Cited Cases \nUse of the Internet, particularly Internet chat rooms, \nnecessarily involves interstate communications and \ntherefore constitutes the \"use of a facility of \ninterstate commerce\" for purposes of the statute \nprohibiting the use of a facility of interstate \ncommerce to coerce and entice minors to engage in \nsexual activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422(b). \n171 Commerce 4E\n)82.10 \n83k82.10 Most Cited Cases \n171 Infants C=13 \n211k13 Most Cited Cases \n171 Telecommunications C=1351 \n372k1351 Most Cited Cases \nEvidence established beyond a reasonable doubt all \nelements of travel with intent to engage in illicit \nsexual conduct; defen \nined that he traveled \nfrom Maryland to \nand that he was \ntraveling to engage in omosexual activity with a \n\"young adult,\" and evidence, including Internet chat \nroom logs and a videotape of the defendant when he \nwas confronted at his destination, showed that he \nbelieved the individual he was to meet was a \n13-year-old boy. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423. \n*776 Peter David Greenspun, Greenspun & Mann \nPC, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant. \nPage 2 \nEdmund P. Power, United States Attorney'S Office, \nAlexandria, VA, for United States of America. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION \nCACHERIS, District Judge. \nThe matter before this Court is whether Defendant, \nDavid A. Kaye, violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) by using the Internet\n... [truncated, 3536 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/386 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=386]", "char_count": 3536}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 387, "text_content": "Page 3 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nhimself to \"REDBD\" as a thirteen- \nboy \nnamed \"Conrad\" located in Herndon, \nHis \ninternet \n\"profile\" \nstated \nthat \nhe \nwas \na \nthirteen-year-old *777 boy and his screen name \ncontained the number \"1992,\" which purports to be \nthe year in which the individual was born. \nC. During all relevant times, the screen name \n\"MadC Rad1992\" was controlled in reality by a \n26-year-old male in Florida by the name of Sean \nO'Connor, a member of an organization called \nPerverted Justice. [FN3] \nFN3. Perverted Justice is an organization \nthat is dedicated to exposing adults who \nuse the Internet to seek sexual activity with \nchildren. The modus operandi of the \norganization is to have members pose as a \nyoung children in interne* \"chat rooms\" \nand wait to be contacted by adults that \nengage them in a sexual dialogue. The \norganization \noften \ninvolves \nlaw \nenforcement \nand \nalso \nmay \npublish \ninformation about the adult, including the \nsexually explicit chat, on the Internet. \nD. In this \"chat\" conversation on August 7, 2005, \nthe following dialogue occurred between Defendant \nand MadC Rad1992: [FN4] \nFN4. Due to the informal nature of online \n\"chatting,\" \nthe \nconversations \ninvolve \nnumerous typographical errors, symbols, \nshorthand, and abbreviations. For the sake \nof intelligibility of the conversation, this \nCourt has not used \"[sic]\" to indicate every \nerror \nor \nmistake \nin \nthe \noriginal \nconversation. \nREDBD [3:50 AM]: hi \nMadC Rad1992 [04:04 AM]: yo \nREDBD [04:04 AM]: hey \nMadC Rad1992 \n[04:05 AM]: sorry u[you] \nim[instant message) me earlier I was eating a \nsnak \nMadC Rad1992 [04:05 AM]: sup \nREDBD [04:05 AM]: ok you are only 13? \nMadC Rad 992[04:05 AM]: yup 13 m[male] \nherndon u? \nPage 3 \nREDBD [4:06 AM]: you cute? \nMadC Rad1992[04:06 AM]: i have a pic[picture] \nREDBD [04:07 AM]: please \n[At this time, Mr. O'Connor sent Defendant a \nchild's picture that he downloaded from an adoption \nw\n... [truncated, 2982 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/387 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=387]", "char_count": 2982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 388, "text_content": "Page 4 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \n*778 REDBD [04:13 AM]: well i can help you \nout \nMadC Rad1992[04:13 AM]: sweet) \nREDBD [04:13 AM]: you seem sweet \n[After discussing that his father would be out of \ntown soon, but that he was not allowed to throw \nparties) ... \nREDBD [04:14 AM]: but we could still party \nREDBD [04:14 AM]: just you and me \nREDBD [04:21 AM]: maybe ill send you my pics \nREDBD [04:21 AM]: you have mail \nREDBD [04:24 AM]: you arc sweet \nREDBD [04:24 AM]: you are not a cop are you \n[Defendant and \"Conrad\" discuss the death of \nConrad's mother] ... \nREDBD [04:36 AM]: how long ago did your \nmom die? \nMadC Rad1992[04:47 AM]: 6 yrs ago \nMadC Rad1992[04:47 AM]: when l[w]as 7 \nREDBD [04:47 AM]: wow you were very young \nREDBD [04:51 AM]: soy ou [sic] in herndon \nREDBD [04:51 AM]: that far from me but you \nwould be worth it \nREDBD [04:51 AM]: you have nice dick? \nMadC Rad1992[04:51 AM]: its ok \nMadC Rad1992[04:51 AM]: its like 5\" \nREDBD [04:51 AM]: cut? \nMadC Rad1992[04:51 AM]: yep \nREDBD [04:51 AM]: nice to sulcc[sic] 5 crs \nMadC Rad1992[04:51 AM]: well tehn u'll like 2 \nsuck mine lol [laughing out loud] \nMadC Rad1992[04:52 AM]: I dont got a lot of \nhair like alot of dudes is that kewl? \nREDBD [04:52 AM]: sure \nPage 4 \nREDBD [04:52 AM]: you me aroudn your dick \nor on your body \nMadC Rad1992[04:52 AM]: both \nMadC Rad1992[04:52 AM]: none on my body \nREDBD [04:53 AM]: i love smooth men \n[Defendant and \"Conrad\" discuss the relationship \nof his father and his girlfriend] ... \nREDBD (04:56 AM]: ok \nREDBD [04:56 AM]: you hard now again \nMadC Rad1992[04:56 AM]: uhm yeah it never \nrlly left lol \nMadC Rad1992[04:56 AM]: r u ? \nREDBD [04:57 AM]: lol \nREDBD [04:57 AM]: oh yes honey \nE. During the August 7th interaction, Defendant \nspoke on the phone with a person who posed as the \nthirteen-year-old \"Conrad.\" In reality, the voice on \nthe phone was Alison Shea, a 24-year-old woman \nand also a member of Perverted Justice. Shea \n... [truncated, 3152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/388 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=388]", "char_count": 3152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 389, "text_content": "Page 5 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nMadC Rad1992[10:42 AM]: awww ok \nH. On August 16, 2005, the following dialogue \noccurred in a chat conversation between Defendant \nand MadC Rad1992: \nREDBD [04:39 PM]: let me call you soon \nMadC Rad1992 [04:39 PM]: how have you been \nREDBD [04:39 PM]: still in a meeting give me \n20 more minutes is dad home? \nMadC Rad1992[04:40 PM]: ok \nREDBD [04:40 PM]: is dad home? \nMadC Rad1992 [04:40 PM]: no \nREDBD [04:40 PM]: is he away? \nMadC Rad1992 (04:41 PM]: he will be leaving \ntomorrow \nREDBD [04:41 PM]: for how long? you will be \nalone? \nMadC Rad1992 [04:41 PM]: for until Friday or \nSat. and ya \nMadC Rad1992 [04:41 PM]: nol (no one] is \navialable to stay with me \nREDBD [04:41 PM]: yummy \nREDBD [04:41 PM]: I can stay with you \nREDBD [04:41 PM]: lol \nREDBD [04:50 PM]: what is your scheudle \ntonite and where do yolive again? \nMadC Rad1992 [04:51 PM]: Herndon man \nREDBD [04:51 PM]: can i cum[sic) over? \n[Defendant and \"Conrad\" discuss when his father \nis coming home that evening.] \nREDBD [04:52 PM]: what time does he cum[sic] \nhome tontie? \nREDBD [04:57 PM]: stats again? \nMadC Rad1992 [04:58 PM]: 5'S\" 120 lbs \nMadC Rad1992 [04:58 PM]: what \ntomorrow? cuz he leaves \nREDBD [04:57 PM]: age? \nMadC Rad1992 [04:58 PM]: u gotta work? \ndoin \nPage 5 \nMadC Rad1992 [04:58 PM]: 13 \nREDBD [04:58 PM]: im at work but could take \noff sometime but for sure after work i can \ncum[sic] over \nREDBD [04:58 PM]: you arc only 13? \nMadC Rad1992 [04:58 PM]: uhh yea \nREDBD [04:58 PM]: thats rape \nMadC Rad1992 [04:59 PM]: dood I tell ya that \nbefore \nREDBD[04:59 PM]: yes i remember \nMadC Rad1992 (04:59 PM]: oh ok \nREDBD (04:59 PM]: yes i remember \nREDBD [04:59 PM]: just that you are s000 s000 \nyoung \nREDBD [04:59 PM]: ive never been with a \nyoung man like you \nREDBD [04:59 PM]: but i would like to \n*780 MadC Rad1992 [04:59 PM]: i want 2 try \nstuff \nREDBD [05:00 PM]: i can let you try anything \nyou want \nREDBD [05:00 PM]:\n... [truncated, 2844 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/389 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=389]", "char_count": 2844}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 390, "text_content": "Page 6 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nREDBD [05:08 PM]: you just have to be very \nclean i your ass \nREDBD [05:08 PM]: no shit \nMadC Rad1992 [05:08 PM]: ohh \nMadC Rad1992 [05:08 PM]: can u show me? \nREDBD [05:08 PM]: how to clean your asshole? \nMadC Rad1992 [05:08 PM]: well \nMadC Rad1992 [05:09 PM]: i think im clean but \ni wanna make sure im doin it rite u know? \nREDBD [05:09 PM]: ok is an hlep you \n(Defendant and \"Conrad\" then discuss what time \nto meet and also arrange a quick phone call from \nDefendant to \"Conrad.\"] \nI. On August 17, 2005, the following dialogue \noccurred in a chat conversation between Defendant \nand MadC Rad1992: \nREDBD [09:53 AM]: So what the time my \nyoung sexy guy \nMadC Rad1992 (10:05 AM]: what u want me to \nwear? \nREDBD [10:05 AM]: lol \nREDBD [10:05 AM]: NOTHING. \n[Defendant and \"Conrad\" discuss what time to \nmeet as well as where the meeting will take place.] \nREDBD [10:25 AM]: sure I love to kiss have \nyou kissed many people? \nREDBD (10:25 AM]: boys or girls romantically \nMadC Rad1992 [10:25 AM]:just a girl but no \ntongue \nREDBD [10:26 AM]: tell me about that \nMadC Rad 1992 [10:26 AM]: we were at a dance \nMadC Rad1992 [10:26 AM]: and then after we \nkissd \nREDBD (10:26 AM]:did you slow dance with \nhere \nMadC Rad1992 [10:26 AM]: yeah \nREDBD [10:26 AM]: did you get hard when you \ndanced next to here \nREDBD [10:25 AM]: her \nMadC Rad1992 [10:26 AM]: yeah lol how did u \nknow? \nPage 6 \nREDBD [10:25 AM]: we all do that \nREDBD [11:36 AM]: im leaving now \n(Govt.Ex.1). \nJ. On August 17, around 12:00 PM, D \ntraveled from Maryland to •781 Herndon, \nto meet \"Conrad\" to engage in sexual activity. \nDuring this trip, Defendant made several phone \ncalls to \"Conrad\" to inform him of his location and \nthat he was \"on his way.\" (Govt.Ex.9). \nK. Defendant arrived at the address provided by \n\"Conrad\" and entered the house through the garage. \nUnbeknownst to Defendant, the house was being \nused in a cooperative \"sting\" o\n... [truncated, 3424 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/390 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=390]", "char_count": 3424}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 391, "text_content": "Page 7 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nand requested a bench trial. \nWith respect to Count I, the statute 18 U.S.C. § \n2422(b)is commonly used as a tool in the Federal \nGovernment's attempts to prevent sexual abuse of \nchildren using the Internet. The statute's text \nprovides: \nWhoever, using the mail or any facility or means \nof interstate or foreign commerce, or within the \nspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the \nUnited States knowingly persuades, induces, \nentices, or coerces any individual who has not \nattained the age of 18 years, to engage in \nprostitution or any sexual activity for which any \nperson can be charged with a criminal offense, or \nattempts to do so, shall be fined under this title \nand imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more \nthan 30 years. \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006) (emphasis added). \nThe statute's primary focus is on adults using the \nInternet to seek out and persuade minors to meet for \nthe purpose of engaging in sexual activity. The \nstatute is often used in the context of sting \noperations that involve adults posing as minors in \nan Internet \"chat session.\" Many defendants have \nchallenged this use of the statute, claiming that an \n\"actual minor\" as a victim is required. However, \nevery Court of Appeals to address this issue has \nuniformly upheld this use of the statute and that an \n\"actual minor\" is not required. [FN5] \nFN5. In fact, Defendant challenged this \nuse of the statute in this case, but the Court \ndenied his challenge and upheld the \ninterpretation that the statute does not \nrequire an \"actual minor\" in accordan \nwith precedent. See United States \nTykarsaly, 446 (3d 458 (3rd Cir.2 \n, \nUnited States \nBlazek, 431 F.3d 1104 \n(8th Cir.2005); \nsited States !Sims, 428 \nF.3d \n959-60 (10th Cir.2 5); United \nStates \nMeek, 366 F.3d 705, 717-20 (9th \nCir.2 \n); United States \nRoot, 296 F.3d \n1222, \n227-29 (11th \nir.2002); United \nStates \nFarner, 251 F.3di 510, 513 (5th \nCir.200 \n... [truncated, 4318 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/391 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=391]", "char_count": 4318}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 392, "text_content": "Page of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \napply the facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt to \nthe elements of the offense. If all elements of the \noffense have been met by \nthe Government, \nDefendant will be found guilty. This Court will \nfirst address Defendant's alleged violation of § \n2422(b) followed by Defendant's alleged violation \nof § 2423(b). \nA. Coercion and Enticement under § 2422(M \nI. \"Use of Facility of Interstate Commerce\" \n[51[6] First, the Government must prove that \nDefendant used a facility of interstate commerce. A \ntransmission of communication by means of the \ntelephone or Internet constitutes the use of a facility \nof interstate commerce. Use of the Internet, \nparticularly \nInternet \nchat \nrooms, \nnecessarily \ninvolves interstate communications and therefore \nconstitutes the \"use of \nfacility of interstate \ncommerce.\" United States \nHornaday, 392 F.3d \n1306, 1311 (11th Cir.2004). At trial, Defendant \nadmitted that he communicated with \"Conrad\" \nusing \nemail \nand \nInternet \ninstant \nmessaging. \nTherefore, Defendant used a facility of interstate \ncommerce and this element of the offense is \nsatisfied. \n2. \"To Knowingly Persuade, Induce, Entice, or \nCoerce\" \nNext, the Government must prove that Defendant \nknowingly attempted to persuade. *783 induce, \nentice. or coerce the victim. There is no definition \nfor these terms included in the statute. Generally, \ncourts have treated this element as self-explanatory \nwhile some have provided dictionary definitions \nand \nalternative \nlanguage \nto juries \nsuch \nas \n\"convinced, influenced or made the possibility more \nappealing\" an  \"to stimulate the occurrence of.\" \nUnited States \nRashkovski, VI F.3d 1133, 1137 \n(9th Cir.2002); United States \nMurrell, 368 F.3d \n1283, 1287 (11th Cir.2004). This Court rests on the \nplain meaning of the words in the statute in deciding \nwhether the Government has satisfied this element. \nThe chat log between Defendant and \"Conrad\" \n(wi\n... [truncated, 4417 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/392 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=392]", "char_count": 4417}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 393, "text_content": "Page 9 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nconsidered as inviting sexually explicit responses. \n(e.g. \"no i really want head tho\"). Furthermore, this \nCourt recognizes that Perverted Justice is an \norganization dedicated to exposing child molesters \nand clearly had a motive to \"deliver\" Defendant \nsince it was being featured on NBC Dateline, \nreceiving \n5100,000 \nfrom \nNBC. \nHowever, \nDefendant's argument proves to be unpersuasive for \nthree reasons: \nFirst, in almost any context, Defendant's language \nand actions in this case can only be regarded as an \nattempt to persuade, entice, and induce the other \nindividual to engage in a sexual activity. Defendant \nstated \"I want to suck your dick\" before any inviting \nlanguage had been received by Defendant and \nDefendant sent sexually explicit pictures soon \nthereafter. This aggressive behavior, without any \ninvitation from \"MadC Rad 1992\", would be \nconsidered *784 an attempt to persuade, induce, \nand entice. \nSecond, as discussed in the next section, Defendant \nbelieved \nthat \nhe \nwas \ninteracting \nwith \na \nthirteen-year-old boy. No degree of interest, \ncuriosity, \nor \nmutual \nenticement \nfrom \na \nthirteen-year-old is enough to find that Defendant's \naggressive language and actions arc not an attempt \nto persuade, induce, and entice the individual to \nengage in sexual activity. \nThird, \nDefendant's \nchat \nconversations \nwith \n\"Conrad\" and his testimony clearly demonstrate his \npredisposition to engaging in sexual activity with \npersons from Internet conversations, including \nthirteen-year-old males. \nTherefore, this Court finds beyond a reasonable \ndoubt that the statements and the pictures from \nDefendant to \"Conrad\" were an attempt to persuade, \ninduce, and entice the individual under screen name \n\"MadC Rad1992\" to engage in sexual activity. \n3. \"A person younger than eighteen years of age\" \nThird, the Government must prove that Defendant \nbelieved that the individual he was pe\n... [truncated, 4411 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/393 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=393]", "char_count": 4411}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 394, "text_content": "Page 10 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nwhen viewed in light of the chat log and the \nvideotape of his interview with the NBC Dateline \ncorrespondent, Defendant's statement that he was \nmeeting a young adult is not credible. Upon being \nconfronted by \nthe \ncorrespondent, Defendant's \ndemeanor, body language, and facial reaction is one \nof complete •785 and utter shock. This is followed \nby Defendant stating \"I know Fm in trouble\" and \nwhen asked \"what are you doing here\" Defendant \nsaid \"not something good.\" Defendant's behavior is \nnot consistent with his testimony that he believed he \nwas \nmeeting \na \nyoung \nadult, \nbut \ninstead, \ncorroborates the extensive chat log portraying \nDefendant's \nbelief \nthat \n\"Conrad\" \nwas \na \nthirteen-year-old boy. Second, the Court did not \nfind Defendant's testimony to be credible in its \nassessment of his veracity, demeanor, cadence, \ntenor, and inflection of his voice as well as the \nconsistency of his answers on cross examination. \nDefendant proffered expert testimony at trial to \ndiscuss the picture and voice of the person \nPerverted Justice purported to be \"Conrad.\" With \nrespect to the picture, an expert testified that the \nchild depicted in the picture emailed to Defendant \nappears to have fully developed facial features, and \naccordingly, the child depicted in the picture could \nbe \nan \neighteen-year-old \nmale. \nOn \ncross \nexamination, the expert testified that he could not \ngive the exact age of the child with any degree of \ncertainty, but, as expected, could only offer a range \nwithin which the child's age is likely to fall. The \nexpert concluded the child in the picture could be \neighteen, but he could also be much younger. \nDefense counsel argues that since the picture \ndepicts a person that could be an eighteen-year-old, \nit provides reasonable doubt with respect to \nDefendant's mental state that he believed he was \nenticing a minor for sex. This Court disagrees. \nEven if thi\n... [truncated, 4569 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/394 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=394]", "char_count": 4569}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 395, "text_content": "Page!! of 13 \n451 P.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nbelieved \nhe \nwas \n\"enticing, \npersuading, \nand \ninducing\" an individual that was thirteen years of \nage. \n4. To engage in illegal sexual activity \nFourth, the Government must prove that Defendant \nwas enticing, persuading, or inducing the minor to \nengage in illegal sexual activity, or, as the statute \nreads: \"any sexual activity for which any person \ncan be charged with a criminal offense.\" 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2422(b). \nThere is little question that Defendant intended to \nengage in sexual activity. He sent \"Conrad\" \nsexually explicit pictures and suggested numerous \nsexual \nactivities \nin \nthe \nchat \nconversation. \nTherefore, the inquiry becomes whether engaging in \nsexual activity with a thirteen-year-old boy is an alt \nthat can be charged as a crime. United States \n. \nPatten, \n397 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir.2005). This \ninclude \nstate sexual offenses. See. e.g.. United \nStates \nRayl. 270 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir.2001). \nThe Government need not prove all the elements of \nthe offense to establish a conviction under 18 \nU.S.C. § 2422(b). Instead, the Government must \nonly prove that the sexual act intended by \nDefendant would constitute a criminal offense \nunder the statute. \nThe Government alleges that Defendant' ' l\n\" \ned\nconduct was in violation of the Code of \n§ \nIli\ntaking indecent liberties with a c i \n. \nis \nstatute criminalizes sexual conduct with an \nindividual under the age of fifteen. In this case, as \nstated several times, Defendant intended to engage \nin sexual activity with a thirteen-year-old b \nconduct is clearly within the scope of the \nindecent liberties statute, and thus, chargea e as a \ncriminal offense. \nThus, \nthe Government \nhas \nsatisfied this final element of the substantive offense \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). \n5. \"Or attempts to do so\" \nDefendant has been charged with criminal attempt \nunder the statute since there was no actual minor \ninvolved and, as such, the offense was\n... [truncated, 4199 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/395 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=395]", "char_count": 4199}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 396, "text_content": "Page 12 of 13 \n451.F.Supp.2d 775 \n• 451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \nIn prosecutions under 2422(b) resulting from a \nsting operation, courts have deemed this element \nsatisfied by the presence of several facts: (1) sexual \ndialog between Defendant and the \"minor;\" (2) \nrepeated references to what would be performed \nupon meeting the minor; (3) the transmission of a \nsexually suggestive photograph; and (4) travel by \nDefen \nt to meet the minor. See, e.g., United \ndr\nStates \nMeek, 366 F.3d 705, 720 (9th Cir.2004); \nRoot, 2 6 F.3d at 1229. \nThe instant case contains all four of these \ncircumstances, any of which would likely be \nsufficient by themselves to constitute a substantial \nstep. Defendant engaged in extensive sexual dialog \nwith the minor and referenced the sexual activities \nthat \nwould occur upon meeting the minor. \nAdditionally, he transmitted pornographic images of \nhimself posing and performing sex acts. Finally, he \ndrove an \nile from Rockville, Maryland to \nHerndon, \nparked the car, walked into the \nhouse, and waited in the kitchen. From these facts, \nthere is no question that Defendant's acts constitute \na substantial step towards the commission of the \ncrime and provide significant corroboration of his \nculpability. \nIn summation, with respect to Count I, the \nGovernment has satisfied all elements required for a \nconviction under 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Specifically, \nthe Government has proven beyond a reasonable \ndoubt that (I) Defendant used a facility of interstate \ncommerce, (the intemet); (2) to attempt to \nknowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) \na person Defendant believed to be less than \neighteen years of age; (4) to engage in an illegal \nsexual activity. Additionally, Defendant possessed \nthe culpability required to complete the substantive \noffense and his actions constitute a substantial step \ntowards the completion of the offense. Therefore, \nthis Court finds Defendant guilty of violating 18 \nU.S.C. § 2422(b). \nB. Tr\n... [truncated, 4268 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/396 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=396]", "char_count": 4268}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 397, "text_content": "Page 13 of 13 \n451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n• .451 F.Supp.2d 775 \n(Cite as: 451 F.Supp.2d 775) \n(C) the penetration, however slight, of the \nanal or genital opening of another by a \nhand or finger or by any object, with an \nintent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, \nor arouse or gratify the sexual desire of \nany person; or \n(D) the intentional touching, not through \nthe clothing, of the genitalia of another \nperson who has not attained the age of 16 \nyears with an intent to abuse, humiliate, \nharass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the \nsexual desire of any person; \n18 U.S.C. § 2246 \nFNS. It is not required that Defendant \nengage in the intended illegal sex at the \ndestination, but solely that he act with the \nintent. Hersh, 297 F.3d at 1246-47. \nThis Court finds this element is satisfied since \nDefendant traveled with the intent to engage in \nsexual activity with a thirteen-year-old boy. First, it \nis unmistakable from the evidence that Defendant \nintended to engage in sexual activity at his \ndestination. In fact, Defendant admitted so at trial \nwhen testifying that he was traveling to engage in \nhomosexual \nactivity, \nwith \na \n\"young \nadult\" \nnonetheless. In light of these admissions, there is \nlittle left for this Court to decide on the issue of \nwhether Defendant intended to engage in sexual \nactivity. \nNext, this Court must decide whether this intended \nsexual activity is considered \"illicit sexual conduct\" \nwithin the meaning of the statute. As stated \npreviously in Section A.3, this Court has concluded \nbeyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant believed \nhe was enticing, inducing, and persuading an \nindividual he believed was a thirteen-year-old boy. \nThere is no evidence before the Court (nor does \ndefense counsel argue) that Defendant's mental state \nas to \"Conrad's\" age changed between the time he \nwas \"inducing, enticing, and persuading\" over the \nintemet and the time he was traveling almost \nimmediately thereafter. Defendant's mental state \nwhilst traveling is con\n... [truncated, 3438 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/397 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=397]", "char_count": 3438}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 398, "text_content": "Page 1 of 13 \nWestlaw. \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \nPage I \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \n14 \nU.S. I. Fuller \nC.A.6 (Ohio),2003. \nThis case was not selected for publication in the \nFederal Reporter.NOT RECOMMENDED FOR \nFULL--TEXT PUBLICATIONSixth Circuit Rule \n28(g) limits citation to specific situations. Please \nsee Rule 28(g) before citing in a proceeding in a \ncourt in the Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be \nserved on other parties and the Court.Please use \nFIND to look at the applicable circuit court rule \nbefore citing this opinion. Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g). \n(FIND CCM Rule 28.) \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nJames Stanley FULLER, Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 02-3303. \nOct. 9, 2003. \nDefendant appealed his conviction, by a jury in the \nUnited States District Court for the Northern \nDistrict of Ohio, John M. Manos, J., of attempting \nto entice a minor by computer or telephone to \nengage in criminal sexual activity, and related child \npornography offenses. The Court of Appeals, Guy, \nJr., J., held that: (1) electronic messages and c-mails \nwere not illegally seized; (2) apartment lessee had \nauthority to consent to warrantless search of room \nin which defendant was staying; (3) evidence was \nsufficient to support conviction for attempted \nenticement of a minor; (4) evidence was sufficient \nto \nestablish \nthat \nproduction \nof \nthe \nchild \npornography images involved use of a minor \nengaged in sexually explicit conduct; and (5) \nsentence enhancements for use of material involving \na prepubescent minor, for use of a computer in \ntransmission of the material, on basis that offense \ninvolved distribution, and on basis that offenses \ninvolved sadistic or masochistic conduct, was not \nerroneous. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnotes \n111 Telecommunications 372 C°1439 \n372 Telecommunications \n372X Interception or Disclosure of Electronic \nCommunications; Electronic Surveillance\n... [truncated, 3325 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/398 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=398]", "char_count": 3325}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 399, "text_content": "Page 2 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \n83 Commerce \n8311 Application to Particular Subjects and \nMethods of Regulation \n8311(1) Offenses and Prosecutions \n83k82.5 Federal Offenses and Prosecutions \n83k82.10 \nk. \nOffenses \nInvolving \nActivity Unlawful Under State Law. Most Cited \nCases \nInfants 211 C=.13 \n211 Infants \n21111 Protection \n21 Ik13 k. Protection of Health and Morals. \nMost Cited Cases \nEvidence was sufficient to support conviction for \nattempted \nenticement \nof a \nminor, \neven \nif \ngovernment offered no proof that victim was in fact \na minor, that any sexual activity occurred, or that \nthe necessary nexus to interstate or foreign \ncommerce existed; age of victim and fact of sexual \nactivity were immaterial inasmuch as defendant was \nonly charged with attempting to entice a minor, and \ninterstate commerce connection was established by \nindisputable evidence that defendant used both the \ninternet and the telephone in committing the \noffense. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422(6). \n151 Obscenity 281 e=12.5 \n281 Obscenity \n281k2 Power to Regulate; Statutory and Local \nRegulations \n2811:2.5 k. Particular Regulations. Most Cited \nCases \nStatute under which defendant was convicted, in his \nprosecution on three counts relating to interstate \ntransportation or transmission of images of child \npornography, was not unconstitutionally based on \nvirtual \ncomputer-generated \nimages; \nprovisions \nrequired proof that the production of the visual \nimages involved use of a minor engaged in sexually \nexplicit \nconduct. \n18 \nU.S.C.A. § 2252(aX I), \n(aX4XB). \n161 Obscenity 281 €=.17 \n281 Obscenity \n281k14 Evidence \nPage 2 \n281k17 k. Weight and Sufficiency. Most \nCited Cases \nEvidence was sufficient to establish, in prosecution \nfor three counts relating to interstate transportation \nor transmission of images of child pornography, that \nproduction of the visual images involved use of a \nminor engaged in sexually explicit\n... [truncated, 3614 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/399 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=399]", "char_count": 3614}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 400, "text_content": "Page 3 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \ncomputer in transmission of the material, was not \nerroneous even though trial court failed to make \nrequired factual findings; defendant failed to create \nany dispute of fact inasmuch as his conviction \nestablished that he transmitted child pornography by \ncomputer, and evidence at trial showed that he sent \nand downloaded child pornography. 18 U.S.C.A. § \n2252(a)(1), \n(a)(4XB); \nFed.Rules \nCr.Proc.Rule \n32(cX1), 18 U.S.C.A.; U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(bX5), 18 \nU.S.C.A. \n191 Sentencing and Punishment 350H 0=,995 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIV Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(H) Proceedings \n350HIV(H)3 Hearing \n350Hk992 Findings and Statement of \nReasons \n350Hk995 k. Necessity. Most Cited \nCases \nImposition, in sentencing on three counts relating to \ninterstate transportation or transmission of images \nof child pornography, of enhancement on basis that \noffense involved distribution, was not erroneous \neven though trial court failed to make required \nfactual findings; defendant's objections failed to \ncreate any dispute of fact inasmuch as nothing \ncontradicted evidence that he transmitted child \npornography as part of his attempt to entice a minor \ninto sexual activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(1), \n(aX4XB), \n2422(b); \nFed.Rules \nCr.Proc.Rule \n32(cX1), 18 U.S.C.A.; U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(bX2). 18 \nU.S.C.A. \n1101 Sentencing and Punishment 350H .\n;995 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIV Sentencing Guidelines \n350H11(H) Proceedings \n350HIV(H)3 Hearing \n350Hk992 Findings and Statement of \nReasons \n350Hk995 k. Necessity. Most Cited \nCases \nImposition, in sentencing on three counts relating to \ninterstate transportation or transmission of images \nof child pornography, of enhancement on basis that \noffenses involved sadistic or masochistic conduct, \nPagc 3 \nwas not erroneous even though trial court failed to \nmake required factual findings; defendant did not \ndispute \nt\n... [truncated, 4074 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/400 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=400]", "char_count": 4074}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 401, "text_content": "Page 4 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 37I, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nunder Ashcroft I Free Speech Coalition. 535 U.S. \n234. 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002), \nbecause the government failed to prove that the \ndepictions in the computer files were of actual•374 \nhuman beings. Although sometimes repetitive and \nundeveloped, defendant's pro se filings include \narguments against \nthe admission of evidence \nobtained illegally from America On Linc (AOL) or \nas a result of an illegal search of the apartment \nwhere he had been staying, and several challenges \nto his convictions on what appear to be sufficiency \nof the evidence grounds. For the reasons discussed \nbelow, we affirm defendant's convictions and \nsentence. \n1. \nDefendant came to the attention of the FBI after two \nadult \nfemales, Margaret Dudas and Marjorie \nVizurraga, reported his preoccupation with having \nsex with minors. Both women made contact with \ndefendant over the Internet through the instant \nmessaging (IM) service offered by AOL and \ncommunicated with him by e-mail and telephone \nbefore meeting him in person. \nFuller used the screen name \"Blueey0123\" to \ncommunicate with Dudas through AOL. During one \ntelephone conversation with Fuller, Dudas received \nan IM from someone using the screen name \" \nK9Teacher\" that forwarded a picture of a dog in a \nsexual position with a woman. Dudas later realized \nthat she heard the AOL chimes on Fuller's end of \nthe line each time \"K9Teacher\" communicated with \nher, but when she blocked messages from \" \nK9Teacher\" \nthe chiming stopped. Fuller met \nDudas at her home and, after consensual sex, \ncommented on a photograph of Dudas's 14-year-old \ndaughter. When Fuller asked about sex between \nDudas and her daughter and expressed interest in \nhaving sex with them both, Dudas threw him out. \nFuller communicated with Vizurraga through AOL \nusing the screen names \"Stan046\" and \"Blueey0123. \n\" Fuller, who said he trained major leag\n... [truncated, 4310 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/401 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=401]", "char_count": 4310}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 402, "text_content": "Page 5 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \nPage 5 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nbetween Fuller and Agent Liberti. \nDuring their next IM session on July 17, 2000, \nFuller told \"Peaches\" that he was in Cleveland and \nwas staying with a major league baseball player. \nHe asked about meeting with her, offered to take \ndigital pictures of her, and questioned her in explicit \nterms about her sexual activity and asked if she had \nsex with a 13•year-old girlfriend. Fuller again \nasked that she call him on his cellular telephone. \nVigneaux arranged to have Agent Libeni call a few \nhours later, posing as \"Peaches\" and identifying \nherself as \"Brianna.\" Fuller asked her age again \nand was told she was \"almost 14.\" Fuller tried to \narrange for them to meet that night, told her they \ncould have privacy, promised that they would go \nslowly, and talked explicitly about sex. \nFuller contacted \"Peaches\" by instant messaging on \nJuly 19, 2000, and suggested that they could meet \nwhile her mother was at work. He accused her of \nbeing a \"talker and not a doer.\" At the end of the \nsession, she agreed to call him 30 minutes later. \nLibeni called Fuller as agreed, telling him she could \nride her bicycle to meet him the following afternoon \nafter her mom left for work. Fuller asked about her \nmom's age, looks, and if she was dating anyone. \nHe also asked in explicit terms about specific sex \nacts; including multiple partners, domination, sex \nwith dogs, sex with other girls, and mother/daughter \nsex. When Libeni expressed interest, Fuller agreed \nto c-mail her some pictures of things they were \ntalking about. They discussed arrangements for \ntheir meeting the next day, and Liberti agreed to \ncall him as soon as her mother left for work. Fuller \nlater sent \"Peaches\" an e-mail with two pictures of \nwomen having sex with dogs. \n**3 The next morning, July 20, Fuller and 'Peaches \n\" conversed by instant messaging about where and \nwhen they would meet and w\n... [truncated, 4697 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/402 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=402]", "char_count": 4697}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 403, "text_content": "Page 6 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371. 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nshowing child pornography web sites visited by \nFuller; and photographs of Fuller and other women, \nsome taken with the digital camera seized at the \ntime of his arrest. Among the pictures found on \nFuller's computer were those that had been sent \nbetween Fuller and \"Peaches.\" \nUsing the Tanner Scale of Pubertal Development, \nDr. Douglas Rogers, a pediatric endocrinologist at \nthe Cleveland Clinic, testified that 21 pictures taken \nfrom defendant's computer depicted minor females \nat or below Tanner Stage Four (for which the \naverage age is 13), and that 13 of those pictures \nwere of females at or below Tanner Stage One (for \nwhich the average age is 10). The government also \noffered the opinion of Douglas Rehman, an expert \nin computer \nforensics and child exploitation, \nconcerning his examination of the images for \nevidence of alteration. \n\"4 Arrested pursuant to a complaint and warrant \non July 20, 2000, Fuller was detained without bond. \nAfter the indictment was filed on August 9, 2000, \nFuller was arraigned and entered a plea of not \nguilty. Defendant's retained counsel withdrew, as \ndid defendant's next two court-appointed attorneys. \nDefendant's third appointed counsel represented \nhim before trial and then served as an advisor \nduring trial because defendant had asserted his right \nto represent himself. That attorney was permitted \nto withdraw prior to sentencing, and new counsel \nserved as defendant's advisor at sentencing and filed \na brief on appeal. Timely notice of appeal was \nfiled both by Fuller and by his appointed counsel. \nA. Denial of Motion to Suppress \n[I) Fuller filed several motions to suppress \nevidence, which were denied in written memoranda \nand orders. In reviewing the denial of a motion to \nsuppress, we review the district court's factual \nfindings for clear errv- and the legal conclusions de \nnovo. United States I Atkin, 107 F.\n... [truncated, 4617 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/403 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=403]", "char_count": 4617}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 404, "text_content": "Page 7 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nOlson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d \n85 (1990). Nonetheless, a warrantless search does \nnot violate the Fourth Amendment if police have \" \nconsent to search from one who possesses common \nauthority over the premises with the absent \nn-consenting target of the search.\" United States \nt\nClutter, 914 .24 775, 777 (6th Cir.1990) (citing \nHired\nStates \nMatlock 415 U.S. 164, 169, 94 \nS.Ct. 988, 39 \n.Ed.2d 242 (1974)). The record \nsupports the district court's finding that Branyan, as \nthe lessee, had authority to consent to the search of \nthe spare bedroom.FN4\nRN14. The district court observed that \"the \nlessee's consent to the instant search of the \nspare bedroom provides an independent \ng\nreason to deny the Defendan ' \n. n to \nsuppress. See United Stain \n979 \n1\ni\n2c1 77, 79 (6th Cir.1992); unite \ntales \nClutter, 914 F.2d 775, 777 (6th \nr.1990), cert. denied,499 U.S. 947, III \nS.Ct. 1413, 113 Iird.2d 466 (1991) \n(citing United States \nMatlock, 415 U.S. \n164, 169, 94 S.Ct. 9 8, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 \n(1974)).\" \nMoreover, \neven \nif \nthe \ngovernment could not show Branyan's \nconsent was valid, a warrantless entry does \nnot violate the Fourth Amendment when it \nis based on consent from a third party \nwhom the agents reasonably believed \n(even if erroneously) to have common \nrt.over the premises. United Stater \n979 F.2)77, 79 (6th Cir.1992) \n(quoting Illinois \nRodriguez, 497 U.S. \n177, 110 S.Ct. \n93, III L.Ed.2d 148 \n(1990)). \nB. Attempted Enticement of A Minor \n**5 Count 1 of the indictment charged that between \nJuly 12 and July 20, 2000, James Stanley Fuller, \nusing facilities and means of interstate and foreign \ncommerce, that is, computerized access to the \nInternet and telephones, did knowingly attempt to \npersuade, induce, entice, and coerce an individual \nwho had not attained the age of 18 years, that is, a \nthirteen (13) year old girl, to engage in sexu\n... [truncated, 4292 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/404 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=404]", "char_count": 4292}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 405, "text_content": "Page 8 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nthe defendant had been communicating with an \nadult FBI age \nposing as a minor. See, e.g., \ni\nUnited States ■ Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11th \nCir.2002), cert. \nenied,537 U.S. 1176, 123 S.\n1006, 154 L.Ed.2d 921 (2003); United States \n. \n/111\n251 F.3d 510 (5th Cir.2001); United States \n102 F.Supp.2d 946, 948 (N.D.I11.2000). FN6\nFN6. Although not fully developed, Fuller \nalso seems to be arguing that there was \ninsufficient evidence to support a finding \nthat he believed he was communicating \nwith a minor. Fuller specifically refers to \nevidence that, during their final telephone \nconversation on July 20, Liberti indicated \nshe was \"almost 14,\" \"14 going on 18,\" \" \ngoing on 21,\" and then assented when \nFuller responded: \"That's what I want to \nhear ... you're 21 as far as I'm concerned.\" \nWhile neither party discusses \nwhether \nFuller preserved such a challenge by \nmoving for judgment of acquittal at the \nclose of the proofs, we need only examine \nthe transcripts of the IM sessions and \ntelephone calls to be more than satisfied \nthat there was sufficient evidence from \nwhich a rational trier of fact could find \nFuller believed he was communicating \nwith a minor. \nFinally, \ndefendant \nseems \nto \nargue \nthat \nthe \ngovernment failed to prove the interstate commerce \nelement of the offense because telephone calls to \nintemet service providers (ISP) made within the \ncaller's local calling area are \"local calls\" for \nreciprocal compensation arrangements under the \nTeleconun \nations Act of 1996. See Bell Ad. \nTel. Cos. \nFCC, 206 F.3d I (D.C.Cir.2000) \n(vacating F \nruling that such calls were not local \nbecause they extend beyond the ISP to out-of-state \nweb sites). The \"local call\" designation for \ncompensation purposes does not control this issue. \n**6 The statute requires that the defendant have \nused \"the mail or any facility or *379 means of \ninterstate or foreign co\n... [truncated, 4285 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/405 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=405]", "char_count": 4285}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 406, "text_content": "Page 9 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \npornography \nunder \nFerber.\" \nFree \nSpeech \nCoalition,53 \nat 1396, 122 S.Ct. 1751 \n(referencing \nA California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 \nii\nCt. 2607, \n. \nd 419 (1973), and New York \nFerber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 \n.Ed..2d 1113 (1982)). \n[5] To the extent that Fuller's claim can be \nunderstood to argue that his convictions could have \nbeen based on an unconstitutional definition of \nchild pornography, we find no danger of this was \npresented here because Fuller's convictions were for \nviolations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(aX1) and (aX4XB). \nThese sections each require proof both that \"the \nproducing of such visual depiction involves the use \nof a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct\" \nand that \"such visual depiction is of such conduct.\" \n18 \nU.S.C. \n§ \n2252(aXIXA) \nand \n(B) \nand \n2252(aX4XBXi) \nand \n(ii). \nThese \nelements \ncorrespond to the definition of child pornography \nthat predated the CPPA amendments, now found in \n18 U.S.C. § 2256(8XA), which was not invalidated \nby the Court in Free Speech Coalition. Free \nSpeech Coalition,535 U.S t 1397, 122 S.Ct. 1751; \nsee also United States \nKelly, 314 F.3d 908, \n911-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,538 U.S. 1001, 123 \nS.Ct. 1923, 155 L.Ed.2d 829 (2003). As a result, \nwe find Fuller's convictions on counts 2, 3, and 4 \nt\nwere not rendered unconstitutional \nFree Speech \nCoalition. Accord United States \nDeaton, 328 \nF.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir.2003) (upho ing conviction \nunder § 2252(aX4)(8)).FN8\nFN8. To the extent that defendant may rely \non recent cases applying Free Speech \nCoalition to child pornography convictions \nunder a related statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, \nthose cases must be distinguished because § \n2252A \nincorporates \nthe \nstatutory \ndefinition of child pornography, including \nthose provisions struck down by the \nSupreme Court, and the ju \nwas instructed \naccordingly. United States I Ellyson, 326 \nF.3d \n522 \n(4th\n... [truncated, 4370 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/406 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=406]", "char_count": 4370}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 407, "text_content": "Page 10 of 13 \n• \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nFinally, defendant relies on the statement by \nRehman, the expert in computer forensics and child \nexploitation, that: \"All of the images appear to \nhave real children in them.\" When read in context, \nhowever, and in the absence of any evidence that \nthe images were computer-generated or \"virtual\" \nchild pornography, it is clear that there was \nsufficient evidence that actual minors were involved \nin the production of the images. \nSignificantly, no contrary evidence was offered to \nsuggest either that any of the visual depictions were \ncomputer generated, or that they were not produced \nusing actual minors. Having not only heard the \nabove testimony, but also having viewed the images \nin question, the jury was in a position to draw its \nown conclusions about whether they depicted actual \nchildren. \nDeacon, \n328 \nF.3d \nat \n455 (jury's \nconclusion that real children were depicted may be \nT\nupheld even when the only evidence offered \nthe \nimages themselves); see also United States \nVig, \n167 F.3d 443, 449-50 (8th Cir.1999) \nwhere \ndefendant simply argues that images may or may \nnot be of real children, the government is not \nrequired to negate as part of its proofs the \nunsupported speculation).FN le \nFNIO. Fuller's pro se pleadings also assert \nthat the government failed to meet its \nburden of proving that he was personally \ninvolved in the production of the images. \nAs the district court observed in denying \none of defendant's motions to dismiss, \nFuller was not charged with manufacture \nor \nproduction of child \npornography, \nproscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2251, but rather \nwith transportation and possession of child \npornography \nin \ninterstate \nor \nforeign \ncommerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 \n, which does not require that the named \ndefendant be involved in any way in the \nproduction of \ne visual depiction. See \n0I \nUnited States \nTidwell, No. 89-58\n... [truncated, 4507 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/407 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=407]", "char_count": 4507}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 408, "text_content": "Page 11 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nhad just addressed each of the enhancements in turn \nand stated the basis for finding that it should be \napplied in this case. \nAt the time of sentencing, Rule 32(cX1) (2001) \nstated that: \"For each matter controverted, the court \nmust make either a finding on the allegation or a \ndetermination that no finding is necessary because \nthe controverted matter will not be taken into \naccount in, or will not affect, sentencing.\" Fig 12 •• \nBecause the purpose of the rule is to ensure that \nsentencing is based on reliable facts found by the \ncourt itself after deliberation, a court may not \nmerely summarily adopt the factual findings in the \npresentence report or simply declare that the facts \nare supported Wr a preponderance of the evidence.\" \nUnited States I Tarwater, 308 F. \n494, 518 (6th \nCir.2002) (citing United States \nCorrado, 227 \niinu\nF.3d 528, 540 (6th Cir.2000)). \n's court has \nrequired \"literal compliance\" with this nile. United \nStates I Tacker!. 113 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir.1997). \nFN12. \nThis \nprovision \nwas \nreplaced, \neffective \nDecember \n1, \n2002, \nwith \nFed.R.Crim.P. \n32(iX3) \n(2003), \nwhich \nclarifies that the sentencing court \"may \naccept any undisputed portion of the \npresentence report as a finding of fact.\" \n*382 The requirement of literal compliance, \nhowever, assumes that the objections raise a matter \nI\nwhich ' controverted. For example, in United \nStates \nTreadway, 328 F.3d 878, 885-86 (6th \nCir.200 , petition for cert. filed,No. 02-11197, — \nU.S.L.W. ---- (U.S. June 9, 2003), where the \ndefendant had not objected, orally or in writing, to \nthe drug quantity calculation, this court found \"no \nreason to require \na district court to make \nindependent findings outside the PSR when the \nfacts are undisputed.\" Id. at 886. Even an \nobjection that represents a bare denial or \"bare \nbones\" assertion of a factual dispute will not give \nrise to a\n... [truncated, 4488 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/408 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=408]", "char_count": 4488}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 409, "text_content": "Page 12 of B \n• \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nchallenging the sufficiency of the evidence to \nsupport his convictions on counts 2, 3, and 4, but \ndoes not deny that \"a computer was used for the \ntransmission of the material\" as is required for the \nenhancement under §2G2.2(bX5). \n[8) Because defendant's conviction on count 3 \nrequired \nproof \nthat \nhe \ntransmitted \nchild \npornography by computer, application of this \nenhancement for that offense cannot be contested. \nIn addition, this court has recently adopted the \nSeventh Circuit's interpretation of this enhancement \nas applying equally to material that is either shipped \nby the defendant or received by the defendant as \nlong as a computer was used for tke transmission of \nthe *383 material. United States I Boyd. 312 F.3j \n213, 216 (6th Cir.2002) (following United States \nRichardson, 238 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir.2001)). \nThe evidence at trial showed that child pornography \nwas not only sent to Liberti, but was downloaded to \ndefendant's computer from the Internet. Not only \nwas this enhancement required by the convictions \non counts 3 and 4, but defendant did not directly \ndispute the factual basis at sentencing. \n3. Distribution \nFuller objected to the enhancement under § \n262.2(bX2), which applied if the offense involved \ndistribution. \nThe \napplication notes \ndefine \" \ndistribution\" \nto \ninclude\"any \nact \nrelated \nto \ndistribution \nfor \npecuniary \ngain, \nincluding, \nproduction, transportation, and possession with \nintent to distribute.\" USSG § 2G2.2, comment. \n(n.1) (1998). Denying that he gave any visual \ndepiction to anyone, defendant also objected on the \ngrounds that there was no evidence of distribution \nfor any pecuniary gain. \n[9] Although courts have differed on the issue, this \ncourt has followed the Fifth Circuit's lead and held \nthat this enhancement encompasses distribution for \npecuniary gain, but does not exclud \nistribution for \na\n... [truncated, 4450 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/409 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=409]", "char_count": 4450}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 410, "text_content": "Page 13 of 13 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371 \n77 Fed.Appx. 371, 2003 WL 22331999 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) \n(Cite as: 77 Fed.Appx. 371) \nUnited States' Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 237-40 \n(5th Cir.2000). The term \"sadism,\" which is the \nmost relevant to this case, is defined as the \" \ninfliction of pain upon a love object as a means of \nobtaining sexual release.\" Lyckman. 235 F.3d at \n238 n. 19 (citation omitted). Construing*384 the \nterms \"sadistic conduct\" and \"other depictions of \nviolence\" in the context of cases involving child \npornography, courts have found the enhancement is \nwarranted when the offense involves the depiction \nof a sexual act that is \"likely to cause pain in one so \nyoung.\" Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 238-39. \nA number of courts have found that images \ndisplaying vaginal or anal penetration of a \nprepubescent minor by either an adult male or a \nforeign object is likely to be painful and constitutes \n\"sadistic \nct\" that justifies the enhancement. \nSee, e.g., \n312 F.3d at 126143; Parker, 267 \nF.3d at 11 \nLyckman, 235 F.3d at 238-31;1\nCanada, 110 F.3d at 264; United States \nCaldwell, No. 97-5618, 1999 WL 238655, '9 (6 \nCir. Apr.I3, 1999) (unpublished disposition). One \ncircuit has specifically held that the government \nneed not present expert medical evidence to gm&\nsuch acts would be painful to a young child. M, \n312 F.3d at 1262. \n[10) As the government aptly observes on appeal, \nthe pictures found on defendant's computer included \nimages of sexual penetration of prepubescent girls \nthat present sufficient basis to fmd the material \nportrayed images of \"sadistic conduct\" justifying \nthe 4-level enhancement.\"t\" Defendant's general \nobjection did not dispute that pictures found on his \ncomputer included images that portrayed sexual \npenetration of prepubescent girls that would likely \nbe painful. Nor did defendant present a legal \ncontroversy about the definition of sadistic conduct \nfor purposes of the enhancement. As a result, the \ndistrict court's failure to specify the reasons\n... [truncated, 3530 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/410 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=410]", "char_count": 3530}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 411, "text_content": "Page 1 of 4 \nW2stlaw. \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nPage I \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 22118983 (D.N.D.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nU.S. I. Patten \nD.N.D.,2003. \nOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States District Court,D. North \nDakota,Southeastem Division. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, \nCasey Scott PATTEN, Defendant. \nCriminal File No. C3-03-44. \nJuly 28, 2003. \nChristopher J. Lancaster, Stefanson Plambeck Foss \n& Fisher, Moorhead, MN, for Defendant. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER \nDENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND \nDENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF \nPARTICULARS \nRALPH R. ERICKSON, District Judge. \n•1 Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to \nDismiss and for Bill of Particulars (doc. # 13). The \nUnited States filed a brief in opposition (doc. # 14). \nDefendant filed a reply brief (doc. # 19). The \nUnited States then requested the leave of Court to \nfile an additional brief relating to an issue of first \nimpression (doc. # 20). The Court granted that \nrequest and accepted the United States' additional \nbrief (doc. ti 22) and allowed Defendant to file an \nadditional brief (doc. # 24). \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nOn February 16, 2003, the defendant, Casey Patten, \nlogged onto a Yahoo chat room using the screen \nname \"got2run400.\" tie had a conversation with \nsomeone using the screen name \"ndblondie2003.\" \nAt the start of the conversation, ndblondie2003 \nidentified herself as a sixteen-year-old female who \nlived in Fargo.R'n Defendant told her that he was \ntwenty-six and asked her if he was too old. \nNdblondie2003 replied that she had dated older \nguys before. \nFNI. In reality, ndblondic2003 was West \nFargo Police Officer Al Schmidt. \nDefendant then discussed sexual matters with \nndblondie2003. He asked her what sexual position \nshe preferred and what type of sexual things she \nwould allow a guy do to her. At the end of this \nconversation, Defendant asked her if she would \nwant to \"hook up sometime?\" The two then agreed \nthat they would\n... [truncated, 3303 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/411 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=411]", "char_count": 3303}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 412, "text_content": "Page 2 of 4 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 22118983 (D.N.D.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nactivity for which any person can be charged with a \ncriminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined \nunder this title and imprisoned not more than 15 \nyears, or both. \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)(1998).FN2\nFN2. The statute was amended in April \n2003 \nto add \na \nminimum mandatory \nsentence of five years and increase the \nmaximum term of imprisonment to thirty \nyears. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(bg2003). \nI. Motion to Dismiss \n\"Unless there is a stipulated record, or unless \nimmunity issues are implicated, a pretrial motion to \ndismiss an indictment is not a pemiissible vehicle \nfor addressing the sufftc ncy of the government's \nevidencc.\"United States \nDeLaurentis, 230 F.3 \n659, 660-61 (3d Cir.2 \n(citing United States\nKnox. 396 U.S. 77, 83 n. 7 (1969)). There is no \ncorollary in criminal cases to a motion for summary \njudgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules \nof Civil Procedure. Id. at 661.The government is \nentitled to present all of its evidence at trial and \nthen have its sufficiency tested by a motion for \nacquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules \nof Criminal Procedure. Id. \n*2 Defendant argues that the government lacks any \nproof on three of the essential elements of this \ncrime. First, Defendant argues that he never \nattempted to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce \nndblondie2003 into engaging in sexual activity. The \nevidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that \nshortly after finding out that ndblondie2003 was a \nsixteen-year-old female living in Fargo, Defendant \nasked if he was too old for her and then engaged in \na discussion with her about sex acts and what kinds \nof sexual things she would do with a man. \nFollowing that discussion, Defendant asked her if \nshe \nwould like to hook up. \nWhether \nthis \nconversation or other portions of the conversations \nFN3 Defendant had with ndblondie2003 prove that \nhe attempted t\n... [truncated, 4356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/412 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=412]", "char_count": 4356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 413, "text_content": "Page 3 of 4 \n• \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 22118983 (D.N.D.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nThe United States cites Kufrovich for the basic \nprinciple that the judge instructs the jury on the law; \ntherefore the judge will instruct the jury on whether \na sexual act violates the law. 997 F.Supp. at 256. \nHowever, when factual issues will determine which \n1\nlaw applies, those actual issues must be determined \nfirst, see Blome \nAerospatiale Helicopter Corp., \n924 F.Supp. 805, 14 (D.Tex.1996), and the jury is \nthe finder of fact. Assuming Defendant did intend to \nhave sex with ndblondie2003, and did intend to \nhave sex with her in Minnesota, then there is no \" \nsexual act for which any person can be charged with \na criminal offense\" because a sixteen-year-old can \nhave consensual sex with someone over the age of \neighteen in Minnesota without either of them being \ncharged with a criminal offense. The government \nwill have to produce evidence that Defendant \nintended to \nengage in a \nsexual \nact \nwith \nndblondie2003 that he could be charged with if the \nsexual act had taken place in order to satisfy this \nfinal element. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). \n*3 \nThe \ngovernment \ncites United States \nBrockdwff, 992 F.Supp. 22 (D.C.1997) and United \nStates I Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir.1978) for \nanalogous support of its argument that it does not \nhave to prove that Defendant intended to have sex \nwith a sixteen-year-old in North Dakota. Both of \nthese cases involve statutes that make the intended \nbehavior itself a federal crime. See Pelton, 578 F.2d \nat 712 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 2421 prohibits \ntransporting \nwomen \nfor prostitution, so \nthis \nprohibition is not \"keyed to the legality or illegality \nof prostitution under the law of the state where the \ntransportation ends\"); Brockdorff, 992 F.Supp. at 23 \n(quoting \n18 \nU.S.C. & \nsect; \n2423(bX1997)) \n(making it illegal for a person to travel in interstate \ncommerce for the purpose of engagi\n... [truncated, 4495 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/413 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=413]", "char_count": 4495}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 414, "text_content": "Page 4 of 4 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nPage 4 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 22118983 (D.N.D.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nD.N.D.,2003. \nU.S. \nPatten \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 22118983 \n(D.N.D.) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \n© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nlittps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=... \n12/18/2007 \nEFTA00192001\n", "char_count": 407}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 415, "text_content": "Page I of 27 \nlAreStlaw. \n504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F.3d 737) \nH \nU.S. \nSinerius \nC.A.9 (Mont.),2007. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nArthur Emil SINERIUS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 06-30327. \nArgued and Submitted March 9, 2007. \nFiled Sept 20, 2007. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted in the \nUnited States District Court for the District of \nMontana, Charles C. Lovell, J., of receipt of child \npornography and possession of child pornography, \nand he appealed his 180-month sentence. \nHolding: The Court of Appeals, O'Scannlain, \nCircuit Judge. held that defendant's prior conviction \nunder Montana law for sexual assault constituted a \nconviction relating to sexual abuse, for purposes of \nincrease of defendant's statutory mandatory minim-\num sentences. \nAffumed. \nWest Hcadnotes \nIII Obscenity 281 4 ,18.1 \n281 Obscenity \n281k I 8 Trial \n281k18.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases \nUnder categorical approach for determining the \ncharacter of a prior conviction, defendant's prior \nconviction under Montana law for sexual assault \nconstituted a conviction relating to sexual abuse, \nfor purposes of increase of defendant's statutory \nmandatory minimum sentences to 15 years for re-\nceipt of child pornography and ten years for posses-\nsion of child pornography; all conduct criminalized \nby Montana statute of conviction, which prohibited \nPage 1 \nknowingly subjecting another person to sexual con-\ntact without consent, fell within ordinary, contem-\nporary, and common meaning of term \"sexual ab-\nuse,\" and even least egregious conduct covered by \nstatute, ostensibly \"consensual\" contact between \n16-year-old offender and 13-year-old victim, cat-\negorically qualified as sexual abuse. 18 U.S.C.A. § \n2252A(b); MCA 45-5-502. \n121 Obscenity 281 e=18.1 \n281 Obscenity \n281k18 Trial \n281k18.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases \nFor purposes of \n... [truncated, 3438 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/415 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=415]", "char_count": 3438}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 416, "text_content": "504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F3d 737) \nO'SCANNLA1N, Circuit Judge: \nWe are called upon to determine whether a fed-\neral defendant's prior conviction for \"sexual as-\nsault\" under Montana state law triggers an en-\nhanced penalty under the sentencing provisions ap-\nplicable to his federal crimes. \nI \nIn 2005, Arthur Emil Sinerius, Jr. was indicted \nby a federal grand jury for receipt of child porno-\ngraphy (\"Count I\") and possession of child porno-\ngraphy (\"Count II\"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ \n2252A(aX2) and 2252A(aX5XB) respectively. Sin-\nerius subsequently pled guilty to both counts, and \nalso agreed to forfeiture of his computer pursuant to \n18 U.S.C. § 2253. The government agreed, pending \nthe determinations of the presentence investigation \nreport (\"PSR\"), to recommend a sentence at the low \nend of the advisory guideline range. \nThe PSR determined that Sinerius's base of-\nfense level was 22 and then added two levels be-\ncause the material involved a prepubescent minor \nor a minor under the age of 12, U.S.S.G. § \n2G2.2(bX2); four levels because the offense in-\nvolved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic \nconduct•739 or other depictions of violence, \nU.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(bX4); two levels because the of-\nfense involved the use of a computer, U.S.S.G. § \n2G2.2(bX6); and four levels because the offense in-\nvolved between 300 and 600 images, U.S.S.G. § \n2G2.2(bX7XC). The PSR then subtracted two levels \nbecause Sinerius's conduct was limited to the re-\nceipt of child pornography and he did not traffic in \nsuch material, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(bX1); and three \nlevels for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § \n3E1.1. Accordingly, based on Sinerius's total of-\nfense level of 29 and Criminal History Category of \nII, the PSR calculated an advisory Guidelines range \nof 97 to 121 months. However, the PSR also de-\ntermined that Sinerius's' prior conviction for sexual \nassault, in violation of \n... [truncated, 4192 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/416 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=416]", "char_count": 4192}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 417, "text_content": "504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 Fid 737) \ndue to her age.\" Subsequently, however, \nthe Montana trial judge granted the state's \nmotion in open court to amend the charge \nagainst Sinerius from \"sexual intercourse \nwithout consent (felony)\" to \"sexual as-\nsault (felony),\" in violation of Mont.Code \nAnn. § 45-5-502. The amendment was \nmade by a handwritten interlineation on \nthe information, striking out the former \ncharge and replacing it with the latter. At \nSinerius's federal sentencing hearing, the \nfederal \nprosecutor, \nwho, \ncoincidentally, \nhad also served as the state district attor-\nney in the Montana court proceedings, \nstated that this amendment only changed \nthe charged offense, not the underlying \nfacts. No transcript of the state trial pro-\nceedings is available. \nAfter Sinerius pled guilty to \"sexual assault \n(felony),\" the Montana trial judge sentenced him to \nten years imprisonment, all but 30 days suspended, \nplaced him on probation for ten years, and ordered \nhim to pay a fine, register as a sex offender, and un-\ndergo treatment. \nAt the sentencing hearing, the district court \nruled that Sinerius's Montana conviction was a pre-\ndicate offense that required the enhanced mandat-\nory minimum sentences provided by § 2252A(b) \nbecause it was an offense \"relating to ... sexual ab-\nuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or \nward.\" Relying on the prior conviction, the court \nsentenced Sinerius to •740 imprisonment of 180 \nmonths for receipt of child pornography (under § \n2252A(bX1)), and 120 months for possession of \nchild pornography (under § 2252A(b)(2)), to run \nconcurrently. The court also sentenced Sinerius to \nsupervised release for a term of life, and ordered \nhim to participate in treatment and to pay an assess-\nment. \nSinerius appeals the sentence. \nII \nPage 3 of 27 \nPage 3 \n[1] To determine whether Sinerius's conviction \nunder the Montana sexual assault statute me\n... [truncated, 3982 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/417 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=417]", "char_count": 3982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 418, "text_content": "504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F.3d 737) \nuse,\" \"sexual abuse,\" or \"abusive sexual conduct \ninvolving a minor.\" We first consider whether Sin-\nerius's conviction is an offense \"relating to ... sexu-\nal abuse.\" \nUnder the categorical approach, we follow our \ncommon practice in cases involving non-traditional \noffenses by defining the offense based on the \n\"ordinary, contemporary, \nmmon meaning of \nthe statutory words.\" See \nSolis, 447 F.3d at \n1206-07 (citation omitted) ( e ruing \"sexual abuse \nof a minor\" for purposes of the predicate offense \nunder U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2). \nWe define the term \"sexual abuse\" by coupling \nthe dictionary definition of \"abuse\" with the com-\nmon understanding of \"sexual.\" See id. at 1207; \nBaron-Medina, 187 F.3d at 1146. First, in the con-\ntext of the Sentencing Guidelines, we have defined \n\"abuse\" to mean \"misuse ... to use or treat so as to \ninjure, hurt, or damage ... to commit recent \nas-\nsault on.\" Id. at 1207; United States \nPallares-\nGalan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir.2004) \n(quoting Webster's Third New Intl Dictionary 8 (3d \ned.1981)). We have explained that this definition \n\"encompass(es) behavior that is harmful emotion-\nally and physically.\" \nSolis, 447 F.3d at 1207. \nSecond, we *741 have given the term \"sexual\" its \nordinary and commonsense meaning. See id. \nEquipped with this understanding of § 2252A(b)'s \ndefinition of a predicate offense, we next consider \nthe Montana statute under which Sinerius was con-\nvicted. \nB \nUnder the categorical approach, we look only \nto the fact of Sinerius's prior conviction and the ele-\nments of the Montana offense to determine whether \n§ 2252A(b)'s definition of \"sexual abuse\" covers \nthe full scope the conduct prohibited by the \nMontana sexual assault statute. Id. at 1206. \nPage 4 of 27 \nPage 4 \nThe Montana statute undeniably proscribes acts \nthat are \"sexual\" in nature. Mont.Code Ann. § \n45-5-502. The statute prohibit\n... [truncated, 4157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/418 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=418]", "char_count": 4157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 419, "text_content": "504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F.3d 737) \ntent, even when it is \"innocently and warmly re-\nceived ... indisputably falls within the common, \neveryday meaning of the words 'sexual' and \n'minor' \" and that such \"use of young children for \nthe gratification of sexual desires constitutes an ab-\nuse.\" 187 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis added); see also \nid. (\"The use of young children as objects of sexual \ngratification is corrupt, improper, and contrary to \ngood order. It constitutes maltreatment, no matter \nits form.\"(citations omitted) (internal quotation \nmarks omitted)). \nAs a consequence, even the least egregious \nconduct proscribed by the Montana statute, consen-\nsual sexual contact by a \n16-year-old on a \n13-year-old \nvictim, \ncategorically \nqualifies \nas \n\"sexual abuse.\" Further, because the statute re-\nquires the victim to be under 14 years of age to \nrender her consent ineffective, \nlusion is \nI \ndecisions in \nlis*742 \nouir\nso\nconsistent with o \nand United States \nBaza-Martinez, \nF.3d 1010 \n(9th Cir.2006), holding that more expansive state \nstatutes were not predicate offenses within the \ndefinition of the term \"sexual abuse of a minor.\" \nIn M\n-Solis, we held that a conviction under \na state statutory rape statute did not qualify as \n\"sexual abuse of a minor\" because the statute pro-\nhibited \"consensual penetration of a victim just un-\nder 18 years of age by a 22-year-old perpetrator.\" \n447 F.3d at 1207. We concluded that this conduct \ndid not categorically include the necessary physical \nor psychological injury required by the term \n\"abuse,\" indicating that \"prior case law-as well as \ncommon sense-suggest that, while consensual un-\nderage sex may be harmful to a young teen, it may \nnot be harmful o an older one.\" Id. at 1208 (citing \nUnited States I Melton. 344 F.3d 1021, 1028-29 \n(9th Cir.2003)) (suggesting that only in the pres-\nence of certain aggravating factors, such as incest, \nwill a \n... [truncated, 4287 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/419 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=419]", "char_count": 4287}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 420, "text_content": "504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F.3d 737) \n§ 2243 and \"abusive sexual contact\" under \n18 U.S.C. § 2244. We decline to interpret \nthese terms by cross-reference to the cited \nfederal crimes for the same reasons we de-\ncline to interpret the term \"sexual abuse\" \nin such manner. \nWe have never defined predicate sex offenses \nunder § 2252A by cross reference to the federal \nr\nprovisions Sinerius cites, nor \nany other court of \nappeals. See United States \nHubbard, 480 F.3d \n341, 348 (5th Cir.2007) (construing \"aggravated \nsexual abuse, sexual abuse, [and] abusive sexual \nconduct involving a minor\" under § 2252A(bX1) as \n\"generic offenses\"); Rezin. 322 F.3d at 447-48 \n(reaching the same conclusion in construing materi-\nally indistinguishable language in § 2252). Our \nreasons for declining to do so derive from *743 \nwell-established principles of statutory interpreta-\ntion. First, the federal crime of \"sexual abuse\" un-\nder § 2242 is not a definitional provision applicable \nto § 2252A. Section 2252A is codified in title 18, \nchapter no. The definitions applicable to chapter \n110 are located in 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Section 2242, \non the other hand, is located in chapter 109A. \nWhile Congress did not provide a specific \ndefinition of \"sexual abuse\" in § 2256, we believe \nits decision not to do so reflects Congress's intent to \ndefine \"sexual abuse\" as a generic offense, under-\nby its ordinary and common meaning, see \nSolis, 447 F.3d at 1206-07, rather than to im-\nport the elements of offenses delineated elsewhere \nin the U.S.Code. See Hubbard, 480 F.3d at 348. \nOur conclusion is strengthened by the plain \nlanguage of § 2252A. That section specifically ac-\ncounts for the federal crime of \"sexual abuse\" tin-\nder § 2242 in a separate category of predicate of-\nfenses. Section 2252A(b) requires an enhanced sen-\ntence if the defendant \"has a prior conviction under \n... chapter 109A ...or under the laws of any\n... [truncated, 4486 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/420 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=420]", "char_count": 4486}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 421, "text_content": "Page 7 of 27 \n504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F.3d 737) \nFinally, experience indicates that when Con-\ngress intends to require a state offense to be con-\ngruent to a corresponding federal offense for sen-\ntencing enhancement purposes, it will draft such a \nrequirement expressly. For example, *74418 U.S.C. \n§ 2241(c) requires a life sentence where the defend-\nant \"has previously been convicted of another Fed-\neral offense under this subsection, or of a State of-\nfense that would have been an offense under either \nsuch provision had the offense occurred in a feder-\nal prison.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (emphasis \nadded).FN4 Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(eX2XB) \ndefines a \"State sex offense\" for purposes of that \nsubsection to mean \"an offense under State law that \nis punishable by more than one year in prison and \nconsists of conduct that would be a federal sex of \nfense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3559(eX2XB) (emphasis ad-\nded). \nFN4. The phrase \"either such provision\" \nrefers to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c) and \n2243(a). United States \nEtimani, 328 F.3d \n493, 503 (9th Cir.2003). \nSinerius \ncites \nboth \n§ \n2241(c) \nand \n§ \n3559(eX2XB) as evidence that his Montana convic-\ntion is not a predicate offense \"relating to ... sexual \nabuse\" under § 212.), relying on our decision \nin United States \nEtimani, 328 F.3d 493 (9th \nCir.2003), as support. Given the material differ-\nences in the statutory language, however, Sinerius's \nreliance on Etimani is misplaced. In Etimani, we re-\nfused to qualify categorically a conviction under a \nstate statute prohibiting \"sexual contact\" as a pre-\ndicate offense under § 2241(c). The state statute \ndefined \"sexual contact\" to include touching \nthrough \nclothing, \nwhile § 2241(c) \nrequired \n\"skin-to-skin contact.\" Etimani, 328 F.3d at 503. \nBut as discussed previously, § 2241(c) ex-\npressly requires that a state predicate offense in-\nclude all the elements of a corresponding federal \ncrime; § 225\n... [truncated, 4182 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/421 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=421]", "char_count": 4182}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 422, "text_content": "504 F.3d 737 \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \n(Cite as: 504 F3d 737) \nAFFIRMED. \nC.A.9 (Mont.),2007. \nU.S. I Sinerius \n504 F.3d 737, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,330, 2007 \nDaily Journal D.A.R. 14,672 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \n4C) 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 8 of 27 \nPage 8 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&mt=FederalGov... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192009\n", "char_count": 455}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 423, "text_content": "Page 9 of 27 \nWestiaw. \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \nU.S. II. Johnson \nC.A.7 (Ind.),2007. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nV. \nCharles M. JOHNSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 06-3968. \nArgued April 10, 2007. \nDecided July 30, 2007. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted, upon a \nconditional guilty plea, following denial of his mo-\ntion to suppress, in the United States District Court \nfor the Southern District of Indiana, John Daniel \nTinder, J., of production of child pornography. De-\nfendant appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Ripple, Cir-\ncuit Judge, held that: \n(I) defendant voluntarily consented to search \nof his computer and living area; \n(2) law enforcement agents had probable cause \nto search defendant's computer and living quarters; \nand \n(3) imposition of did not violate defendant's \nFifth or Sixth Amendment rights. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnotes \nIII Criminal Law 110 C=4139 \n110 Criminal Law \nI I0XXIV Review \nI I0XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General \n110k1139 k. Additional Proofs and Trial \nDe Novo. Most Cited Cases \nThe Court of Appeals reviews a district court's nil-\nPage I \ning on a motion to suppress de novo. \n121 Criminal Law 110 4>;>11158(2) \n110 Criminal Law \n110XXIV Review \n110XX IV(O) Questions of Fact and Findings \nI1Ok1158In General \n110k1158(2) \nk. \nConclusiveness \nof \nFindings on Preliminary Proceedings in Conduct of \nTrial in General. Most Cited Cases \nBecause the voluntariness of a defendant's consent \nto search is a factual determination, the Court of \nAppeals reviews a district court's resolution of this \nquestion for clear error. \n131 Searches and Seizures 349 C=.171 \n349 Searches and Seizures \n349V Waiver and Consent \n349k171 k. In General. Most Cited Cases \nThe Fourth Amendment's prohibition against war-\nrantless searches does not apply when the defendant \nconsents \nvoluntarily to \nthe \nsearch. U.S.C.A. \nConst.Amend. 4. \n141 Searches and Seizures \n... [truncated, 2734 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/423 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=423]", "char_count": 2734}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 424, "text_content": "Page 10 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \ntotality \nof \nthe \ncircumstances. \nU.S.C.A. \nConst.Amend. 4. \n161 Searches and Seizures 349 Co180 \n349 Searches and Seizures \n349V Waiver and Consent \n349kI79 Validity of Consent \n349k180 k. Voluntary Nature in General. \nMost Cited Cases \nSearches and Seizures 349 E .183 \n349 Searches and Seizures \n349V Waiver and Consent \n349k179 Validity of Consent \n349k183 k. Knowledge of Rights; Warn-\nings and Advice. Most Cited Cases \nSearches and Seizures 349 C=184 \n349 Searches and Seizures \n349V Waiver and Consent \n349k179 Validity of Consent \n349k184 k. Custody, Restraint, or Deten-\ntion Issues. Most Cited Cases \nAmong the factors a court considers in determining \nwhether consent to search was voluntarily given \nare: (1) the person's age, intelligence, and educa-\ntion, (2) whether he was advised of his constitution-\nal rights, (3) how long he was detained before he \ngave his consent, (4) whether his consent was im-\nmediate, or was prompted by repeated requests by \nthe authorities, (5) whether any physical coercion \nwas used, and (6) whether the individual was in po-\nlice custody when he gave his consent. U.S.C.A. \nConst.Amend. 4. \n171 Searches and Seizures 349 C=181 \n349 Searches and Seizures \n349V Waiver and Consent \n349kI79 Validity of Consent \n349k181 k. Particular Concrete Applica-\ntions. Most Cited Cases \nPage 2 \n349 Searches and Seizures \n349V Waiver and Consent \n349k179 Validity of Consent \n349k183 k. Knowledge of Rights; Warn-\nings and Advice. Most Cited Cues \nDefendant voluntarily consented to a search of his \ncomputer and living area; although law enforce-\nment agents requested more than once that defend-\nant consent to search, and agents told him that they \nwould need to secure the residence until a search \nwarrant issued if he did not consent, defendant \nstated that he did not feel threatened or coerced and \nthat he understood the consent form he signed, de-\nfendant was 48 years old, he was of a\n... [truncated, 3253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/424 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=424]", "char_count": 3253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 425, "text_content": "Page 11 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \nminor victim that defendant had taken pornographic \nphotographs of her, that defendant used a silver di-\ngital camera, and that he possessed a black com-\nputer, and during the course of his conversation \nwith agents, defendant confirmed that he owned a \nsilver digital camera and black computer, and that \nhe previously lived in the same city as victim. \nU.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. \n1101 Jury 230 C=34(7) \n230 Jury \n230II Right to Trial by Jury \n230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right \n230k34 Restriction or Invasion of Func-\ntions of Jury \n230k34(5) Sentencing Matters \n230k34(7) k. Particular Cases in \nGeneral. Most Cited Cues \nImposition of mandatory minimum life sentence for \ndefendant convicted of production of child porno-\ngraphy, based on determination of the fact of a pri-\nor conviction by sentencing judge, rather than jury, \ndid not violate defendants Fifth or Sixth Amend-\nment rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 6; 18 \nU.S.C.A. §§ 2251(e), 3559(e). \n1111 Indictment and Information 210 C=113 \n210 Indictment and Information \n210V Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation \n210k113 k. Matter of Aggravation in Gener-\nal. Most Cited Cases \nJury 230 C=34(6) \n230 Jury \n230I1 Right to Trial by Jury \n230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right \n230k34 Restriction or Invasion of Func-\ntions of Jury \n230k34(5) Sentencing Matters \n230k34(6) k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \nSentencing and Punishment 350H €=>322 \nPage 3 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HI1 Sentencing Proceedings in General \n350Hll(F) Evidence \n350Hk322 k. Degree of Proof. Most Cited \nCases \nFor sentencing purposes, the fact of a prior convic-\ntion need not be found by a jury beyond a reason-\nable doubt, nor must it be alleged in the indictment. \nU.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 6. \n*537 Gayle Helart (argued), Office of the United \nStates Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Ap-\npellee. \nWilliam H. Dazey, Jr. (argued), Indiana Federal \nCommunity Defende\n... [truncated, 3505 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/425 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=425]", "char_count": 3505}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 426, "text_content": "Page 12 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F3d 536) \nthe purpose of producing any visual depiction of \nsuch conduct, shall be punished as provided under \nsubsection (e), if such person knows or has reason \nto know that such visual depiction will be transpor-\nted in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if \nthat visual depiction was produced using materials \nthat have been mailed, shipped, or transported in in-\nterstate or foreign commerce by any means, includ-\ning by computer, or if such visual depiction has ac-\ntually been transported in interstate or foreign com-\nmerce or mailed. \nFN2. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) provides: \n(e) Any individual who violates, or attempts or \nconspires to violate, this section shall be fmed un-\nder this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years \nnor more than 30 years, but if such person has one \nprior conviction under this chapter, section 1591, \nchapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under \nsection 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform \nCode of Military Justice), or under the laws of any \nState relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual \nabuse, abusive sexual contact involving a minor or \nward, or sex trafficking of children, or the produc-\ntion, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, \nshipment, or transportation of child pornography, \nsuch person shall be fined under this title and im-\nprisoned for not less than 25 years nor more than 50 \nyears, but if such person has 2 or more prior con-\nvictions under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter \n109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title \n10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military \nJustice), or under the laws of any State relating to \nthe sexual exploitation of children, such person \nshall be fined under this title and imprisoned not \nless than 35 years nor more than life. Any organiza-\ntion that violates, or attempts or conspires to viol-\nate, this section shall be fmed under this title. Who-\never, in the course of an offense under this se\n... [truncated, 4188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/426 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=426]", "char_count": 4188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 427, "text_content": "Page 13 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \nview with Mr. Johnson.\" The law enforcement \nofficers told Mr. Johnson his name had come up \nduring an investigation and read him his Miranda \nrights. Mr. Johnson and the officers each signed a \nform indicating Mr. Johnson's waiver of his Mir-\nanda rights. \nFN3. Mr. Johnson later testified that he \nnever saw the firearm. \nThe two officers then proceeded to a small bed-\nroom where they interviewed Mr. Johnson. The \ntone was conversational and, although there were \nother officers in the home, only Sgt. Hunt and \nAgent Rothrock remained in the room with Mr. \nJohnson. Mr. Johnson stated that he had lived with \nthe children who had been depicted in the photo-\ngraphs and that he had a computer in his bedroom \narea. Agent Rothrock asked if Mr. Johnson would \nconsent to a search of his bedroom area and his \ncomputer, and Mr. Johnson calmly replied that he \nwould not. Agent Rothrock then asked Mr. Johnson \nif he would continue talking; Mr. Johnson replied \nthat he would. Mr. Johnson then confirmed that he \nowned a black Dell computer and that he likewise \nowned a silver digital camera. At this point in the \nconversation, Agent Rothrock gave Mr. Johnson \nmore information about the investigation including \nthe fact that a victim had stated that he had taken \nphotos of her and that he had used a specific digital \ncamera and computer. Further, Agent Rothrock told \nMr. Johnson that some of these photos had been \nfound on the intemet. He then told Mr. Johnson that \nhe believed he had probable cause to obtain a \nsearch warrant which would allow him to search \nMr. Johnson's computer and living area. He ex-\nplained that the statement about the warrant was not \nmeant as a threat and that a magistrate judge, and \nnot he, would make the decision as to whether to is-\nsue a warrant. Agent Rothrock then told Mr. John-\nson he would have to secure the residence until the \nmagistrate judge could be contacted, which would \ninv\n... [truncated, 4385 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/427 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=427]", "char_count": 4385}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 428, "text_content": "Page 14 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \nnot seen Agent Rothrock's weapon when he came \ndown the stairs. He stated that the officers were not \nharsh or mean to hint. He also said that he under-\nstood that he was suspected of a crime and that he \nhad signed the Miranda waiver. He agreed that he \nnever felt threatened or coerced into answering \nquestions. He further stated that he was concerned \nfor the other residents of the home because Agent \nRothrock had mentioned his intent to secure the \nhome until the search warrant was issued. He \nclaimed that his consent to the search was involun-\ntary because he perceived that hardship would be-\nfall other members of the household if he persisted \nin declining consent. When he invoked his right to \ncounsel as to certain questions, he indicated that he \ndid not believe he had to answer questions on those \ntopics. He stated that he had read and understood \nthe consent to search forms and the Miranda waiver \nat the time he signed it. \nMr. Johnson's computer was found to contain \napproximately 3,700 images of child pornography \nand child erotica. The nine images of Jane Doe \nfound by the NCMEC were on the computer, and \nthe computer allowed file sharing. \nB. \nThe district court found that Mr. Johnson's con-\nsent to search his living area and computer was vol-\nuntary. The court did not believe that Agent Ro-\nthrock's statements that he would secure the home \nwhile a search warrant was obtained had overborne \nMr. Johnson's free will. The district court found \nthis consent to be voluntary because Mr. Johnson \n(1) was approximately 48 years old, had two years \nof college and had his associate's degree, (2) had \ndemonstrated computer savvy, (3) had gained and \nused managerial experience in his employment, (4) \nhad declined consent earlier in the encounter and \nstated that he did not feel threatened, (5) had con-\nsented after he was told that the process of obtain-\ning a warrant had commenced, (6) had been r\n... [truncated, 3996 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/428 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=428]", "char_count": 3996}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 429, "text_content": "Page 15 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \nconsent to the search of his bedroom area and com-\nputer was involuntary and, therefore, that his mo-\ntion to suppress evidence should have been \ngranted.FNS We review a district court's ruling on a \nmotion to suppress de novo. However, we review \nthe district coif 's factual findings for clear error. \nUnited States \nLawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859 (7th \nCir.2006). Because the voluntariness of a defend-\nant's consent to search is a factual determination, \nwe review a district court's resoluti\n of this ques-\ntion for clear error. United States I Raibley, 243 \nF.3d 1069, 1076 (7th Cir.2001). \nFNS. Mr. Johnson does not appeal the dis-\ntrict court's denial of his motion to sup-\npress statements to law enforcement offi-\ncials. He recognizes that he selectively \nwaived his Miranda rights, see United \nStates It Amara, 816 F.2d 284, 286 (7th \nCir.I98 , and that suppression of his \nstatements would have left the Govern-\nment's case largely unchanged. See Appel-\nlant's Br. at II. \n[3][4][5][6] The Fourth Amendment's prohibi-\ntion against warrantless searches does not apply \nwhen the defendant c \nnts voluntarily to the \nsearch. United States \nSandoval-Vasquez, 435 \nF.3d 739, 744 (7th Qr.2006). The Government \nbears the burden of proving that consent freely and \nvoluntarily was given. Id. Whether a defendant vol-\nuntarily consented to a search is a factual assess-\nment which tutus o \nthe totality of the circum-\nstances. Schneckloth \nBustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, \n227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 6 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). We \nmust keep in mind that \"a determination of volun-\ntariness does not ride on the presence or abre of \na single controlling factor.\" United States \nLaG-\ntone, 43 F.3d 332, 334 (7th Cir.1994) (internal cita-\ntions and quotation marks omitted). Rather, we \nmust undertake a \"careful scrutiny of all the sur-\nrounding circumstances.\" Id. (citing *542 Schneck-\nloth. 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041). Among the \nfactors we con\n... [truncated, 4389 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/429 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=429]", "char_count": 4389}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 430, "text_content": "Page 16 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(Cite as: 495 F.3d 536) \nbecame \"rightful[ly] concern[ed]\" for his family. \nId. The district court further found that this \n\"rightful \nconcern\" \ndid \nnot \namount \nto \n\"psychological pressure.\" Id. In reaching this con-\nclusion, the district court found it important that the \nauthorities had behaved professionally, that the en-\ntire incident took only twenty minutes and that the \nencounter was \"devoid of any badgering or harass-\nment.\" Id. Looking to the totality of the circum-\nstances considered by the district court, we con-\ncluded, in Santiago, that the district court's volun-\ntariness finding was not clearly erroneous. Id. Sim-\nilarly, we must conclude that Mr. Johnson's concern \nthat he might inconvenience the other residents of \nthe home was a \"rightful concern,\" but not one that \ncaused \"psychological pressure.\" \nMr. Johnson is 48 years of age and of at least \naverage intelligence. He testified at the suppression \nhearing that he understood the consent form, that he \nnever felt coerced or threatened and that he under-\nstood he was waiving his Fourth Amendment \nrights. The interview was calm and professional at \nall times. Considering the totality of the factors sur-\nrounding Mr. Johnson's consent, we certainly can-\nnot say the district court clearly erred in finding \nthat consent was voluntarily and freely given. \nB. \n[8] Even if Mr. Johnson did not consent, the \nevidence would have been othenvise*543 admiss-\nible ruder the inevitable discovery doctrine. See \nNix \nWilliams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, \n81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). This doctrine provides that, \nwhen the Government can establish by a preponder-\nance of the evidence that the information obtained \nwould have been discovered ultimately or inevit-\nably by lawful means, the deterrence rationale of \nthe exclusionary rule no longer applies and the \nevidence should be admitted. /6\"The prosecution \nmust establish that it had probable cause and prove \nthe existe\n... [truncated, 4215 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/430 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=430]", "char_count": 4215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 431, "text_content": "Page 17 of 27 \n495 F.3d 536 \n495 F.3d 536 \n(ate as: 495 F.3d 536) \ndoubt, nor must i  alleged in the indictment. Al-\nmendarez-Torres \nUnited States, 523 U.S. 224, \n246-47, 1( S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). \nApprendi \nNew Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. \n2348, 147 .Ed.2d 435 (2000), explicitly preserved \nAlmendarez-Torres, see530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. \n2348 (\"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, \nany fact that increases the penalty for a crime bey-\nond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-\nmitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable \ndoubt\") (emphasis added), although left open the \npossibility that future cases might revisit its hold-\ning, see id. at 48190, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Later cases, \nincluding Blakely \nWashington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 \nI\n.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), United States \nBooker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 I.Ct. 738, 160 \nEd.2d 621 (2005), and Shepard \nUnited States, \n544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1 1 L.Ed.2d 205 \n(2005), each have confirmed Almendr-Torres' \ncontinuing vitality. See United States \nSachsen-\nmaier, \n491 \nF.3d \n680, \n683 \n(7th \nCir.2007) \n(confirming that Almendarez-Torres remains the \ngoverning law but noting that *544 the defendant \nhad preserved the argument for consideration by the \nSupreme Court). Therefore, we cannot accept Mr. \nJohnson's claim that the district court's failure to \nsubmit this issue to the jury constitutes reversible \nerror. \nConclusion \nFor these reasons, the judgment of the district \ncourt is affirmed. \nAFFIRMED \nC.A.7 (Ind.),2007. \nU.S. I. Johnson \n495 F.3d 536 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nC 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 9 \nhups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&Prit=HTMLE&mt=FederalGov... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192018\n", "char_count": 1747}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 432, "text_content": "Page 18 of 27 \n1,M3stjaye \n491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \nH \nU.S. I. Leach \nC.A.8 (Mo.),2007. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit \nUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, \nTyler M. LEACH, Appellee. \nNo. 06-1471. \nSubmitted: Feb. 14, 2007. \nFiled: June 22, 2007. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted in the \nUnited States District Court for the Western District of \nMissouri, Howard F. Sachs, Senior District Judge, of \nknowingly using a facility of interstate commerce to at-\ntempt to persuade, induce, and entice a minor to engage \nin illegal sexual activity, and the government appealed \nhis 72-month sentence. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Smith, Circuit \nJudge, held that: \n(1) government did not breach plea agreement by \nadvocating at sentencing for application of sentencing \nguidelines offense level enhancement, and \n(2) offense level enhancement was warranted for \nhaving committed the offense subsequent to sustaining \na sex offense conviction. \nvacated and remanded. \nWest Headnotes \nIll Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=290 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HII Sentencing Proceedings in General \n350H1I(E) Presentence Report \n350Hk290 k. Successive, Supplemental and \nUpdated Report. Most Cited Cases \nSentencing and Punishment 35011 6=299 \nPage \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350H1I Sentencing Proceedings in General \n350H1I(E) Presentence Report \n350Hk299 k. Objections and Disposition \nThereof. Most Cited Cases \nGovernment's failure to timely object to original presen-\ntence investigation report (PSR) prepared for defend-\nant's sentencing for knowingly using facility of inter-\nstate commerce to attempt to persuade, induce, and en-\ntice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity did not \npreclude government from advocating at sentencing for \nsentencing guidelines offense level enhancement that \nwas not mentioned in original PSR; probation office \namended PSR more than a month before the sentencing \nhearing to include the enhancement, \n... [truncated, 3434 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/432 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=432]", "char_count": 3434}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 433, "text_content": "Page 19 of 27 \n491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \n131 Criminal Law 110 C=1139 \n110 Criminal Law \nI\n Review \n110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General \n110k1139 k. Additional Proofs and Trial De \nNovo. Most Cited Cases \nIssues regarding the interpretation and enforcement of a \nplea agreement are reviewed de novo. \n141 Criminal Law 110 C=273.1(2) \n110 Criminal Law \n110XV Pleas \n110k272 Plea of Guilty \n110k273.1 Voluntary Character \n110k273.1(2) k. Representations, Promises, \nor Coercion; Plea Bargaining. Most Cited Cases \nPlea agreements are contractual in nature, and should be \ninterpreted according to general contract principles. \n151 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=P795 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIV Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(E) Prior or Subsequent Misconduct \n350Hk795 k. Order. Most Cited Cases \nIn a case in which the defendant had pleaded guilty in \nKansas state court to attempted aggravated criminal \nsodomy with a child under age 14, but had not yet been \nsentenced for that offense when he committed the feder-\nal offense of knowingly using a facility of interstate \ncommerce to attempt to persuade. induce, and entice a \nminor to engage in illegal sexual activity, a sentencing \nguidelines offense level enhancement was warranted for \nhaving committed the offense subsequent to sustaining \na sex offense conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a), 18 \nU.S.C.A. \n*859 Philip M. Koppe, Asst. U.S. Any., argued, Kansas \nCity, MO (Bradley J. Schlozman, U.S. Atty., Cynthia L. \nPhillips, Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellant. \nStephen C. Moss, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, argued, \nKansas City, MO (Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., Fed. Public \nDefender, on the brief), for appellee. \nPage 2 \nSMITH, Circuit Judge. \nTyler Leach pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea \nagreement, to knowingly using a facility of interstate \ncommerce to attempt to persuade, induce, and entice a \nminor to engage in illegal sexual activity, in violation of \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In sentenci\n... [truncated, 3971 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/433 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=433]", "char_count": 3971}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 434, "text_content": "Page 20 of 27 \n491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \nU.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count One); traveling in interstate \ncommerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual \nconduct with another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § \n2423(b) (Count Two); and criminal forfeiture, pursuant \nto 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (Count Three). Leach entered into a \nplea agreement, pleading guilty to Count One in return \nfor the government dropping the remaining counts. In \nthe plea agreement, Leach acknowledged that he was \nsubject to a 5-year minimum and a 60-year maximum \nsentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2426(a) because his federal \n\"offense occurred after [Leach) had a prior sex offense \nconviction.\" \nThe parties stipulated in the plea agreement that: \n(1 )\"the applicable Guidelines section for the offense \nwas U.S.S.G. § 2GI.3 (Travel to engage in prohibited \nsexual conduct with a minor);\" (2) \"the base level of-\nfense is 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a);\" (3) Leach \nwas subject to a two-level enhancement pursuant to \nU.S.S.G. § 262.2(bX3XA) because the offense involved \nthe use of a computer; (4) Leach was entitled to a three-\nlevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility; (5) \n\"there [was] no agreement between the parties regard-\ning the defendant's criminal history category;\" (6) \nneither party would seek a departure from the applicable \nguidelines range; and (7) the court would detemnne the \n\"applicable criminal history category after receipt of the \npresentence investigation report.\" \nAdditionally, the plea agreement limited its scope \nto issues explicitly addressed therein and had no effect \non any unmentioned Sentencing Guidelines issues. As \nto any unmentioned issues, \"the parties were free to ad-\nvocate their respective positions at the sentencing hear-\ning.\" It is undisputed that the plea agreement was nego-\ntiated without any consideration of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. In \nfact, \nthe \ngovernment acknowledges \nthat it was \n\"completely unaware\" of the potential applicability of \nt\n... [truncated, 4729 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/434 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=434]", "char_count": 4729}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 435, "text_content": "Page 21 of 27 \n491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \nFN2. After the court ruled that § 4B1.5(a) did \nnot apply, Leach stated for the record that in \nthe event the court's decision on the enhance-\nment was overturned, his position was that the \nplea agreement prevented the government from \nadvocating for the enhancement. At no time \nduring the December 20, 2005, hearing did \nLeach assert that the government's failure to \nobject to the original PSR precluded it from ad-\nvocating for enhancement. \nThe government moved for reconsideration of the \ncourt's ruling on the § 4B1.5(a) enhancement, and the \nprobation office filed a third addendum to the PSR, sug-\ngesting that if § 4B1.5(a) did not apply, then a five-level \nenhancement under § 4B1.5(b) should apply because \nthe defendant had engaged \"in a pattern of activity in-\nvolving prohibited sexual conduct.\" If § 4B1.5(b) ap-\nplied, Leach's total offense level would increase from \n23 to 28, causing his Guidelines range to increase from \n60-63 months to 87-108 months' imprisonment. Both \nparties filed sentencing briefs regarding the applicabil-\nity of § 4B I.5(b). \nOn January 13, 2006, the court conducted Leach's \nsentencing hearing and heard arguments on both the re-\nconsideration of § 4B1.5(a) and the applicability of § \n4B1.5(b). After oral argument, the court denied the gov-\nernment's motion to reconsider its ruling on the § \n4B1.5(a) enhancement, concluding that the government \nhad no standing to seek the enhancement*862 because it \nhad failed to timely object to the original PSR.140\nMoreover, the court determined that the plea agreement \nprevented the government from advocating for the en-\nhancement. Alternatively, the court denied the motion \nto reconsider for the same reasons given in its original \ndecision-that it was unclear whether § 4B1.5(a)'s con-\nviction requirement required a defendant to have been \nsentenced on the conviction or merely adjudicated \nguilty and that the rule of lenity favored L\n... [truncated, 4465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/435 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=435]", "char_count": 4465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 436, "text_content": "491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \nthese circumstances, any possible prejudice to Leach \nfrom the government's failure to object to the original \nand fast-amended PSR was cured by the adequate op-\nportunity he w \ngiven to oppose the enhancement. See \nUnited States \nSoto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d I, 52 (1st \nCir.2004) (\"Any possible prejudice to [defendant] from \nthe government's non-compliance [with Federal Rule of \nCriminal Procedure 32] was cured by the district court's \ntwo-week continuance to give defense counsel an ad-\nequate opportunity to respondlo the government's late \nsubmission.\"); United States \nYoung, 140 F.3d 453, \n457 (2d Cir.1998) (\"The sentencing court may impose \nsentencing enhancements belatedly •863 suggested by \nthe Government and not contained in the PSR, provided \nthe defendant is afforded an adequate opportunity to re-\nspond to the Government's late submission and any re-\nvision of the PSR.\") (internal citation omitted). We hold \nthat the government's arguments for the enhancements \nwere not foreclosed. \nB. The Plea Agreement \n[2] Leach argues that the government's advocacy \nfor the § 4B1.5(a) enhancement breached the plea \nagreement. The government stipulated that Leach's base \noffense level was 24, but the enhancement, if applied, \nwould have increased Leach's offense level to 34. Leach \nfurther contends that because the plea agreement stipu-\nlated to a two-level enhancement for use of a computer, \npursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3XA), without any reference to \n§ 4B1.5 or any other enhancement, the agreement ne-\ncessarily implied that no other enhancements would be \napplied. \n[3][4] Issues regarding the interpretation and en-\nforcement of a plea agreement are reviewed de novo. \nUnited States' Martinez-Noriega, 418 F.3d 809, 811 \n(8th Cir.2005); United States' DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, \n669 (8th Cir.2004). \"Plea agreements are contractual in \nnature, and should be interpreted according to general \ncontract principles.\" DeWitt, 366 F.3d at 669.\n... [truncated, 4723 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/436 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=436]", "char_count": 4723}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 437, "text_content": "491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \nhere, made no agreement regarding the defendant's \ncriminal history category under Chapter Four of the \nGuidelines and made no reference to any potential ad-\njustment to his offense level under Chapter Four. Id. at \n810-11. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the probation \noffice prepared a PSR, which recommended that Mar-\ntinez-Noriega be assessed an offense level of 32, pursu-\nant to the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1(b)(C), be-\ncause he had two prior felony drug convictions. Id. at \n811. Martinez-Noriega objected, arguing that because \nhis plea agreement stipulated that his base offense level \nwas 20 and did not refer to § 481.1, the court was pre-\ncluded from applying the career offender guideline. Id. \nThe district court disagreed and sentenced Martinez-\nNoriega as a career offender. Id. \nOn appeal, Martinez-Noreiga argued that applica-\ntion of the career offender enhancement would render \nhis base-offense-level stipulation under § 2D1.1 mean-\ningless. He contended the existence of the specific stip-\nulation concerning the base offense level necessarily \nimplied that his offense level would be computed \nwithout regard to § 481.1. M\"We reject(ed] Martinez-\nNoriega's argument because we [found] it inconsistent \nwith the structure of the sentencing guidelines.\" Id. In \nreaching this conclusion, we explained: \nThe \"Application Instructions\" for use of the \nguidelines set forth nine sequential steps to be followed \nby the sentencing court in applying the provisions of the \nguidelines manual. The second step calls for the court to \n\"(d]etermine the base offense level ... contained in the \nparticular guideline in Chapter Two.\"USSG § 181.1(6). \nThe next three steps direct the court to apply adjust-\nments from Chapter Three of the guidelines. The sixth \nstep then states that the court should \"(d]etennine the \ndefendant's criminal history category as specified in \nPart A of Chapter Four,\" and \"fdjetermine from Part B\n... [truncated, 4739 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/437 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=437]", "char_count": 4739}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 438, "text_content": "491 F.343 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \n(a) In any case in which the defendant's instant offense \nof conviction is a covered sex crime, § 4131.1 (Career \nOffender) does not apply, and the defendant committed \nthe instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustain-\ning at least one sex offense conviction: \n(1) The offense level shall be the greater of: \n(A) the offense level determined under Chapters Two \nand Three; or \n(B) the offense level from the table below decreased by \n(i) Life. \n(ii) 25 years or more. \n(iii) 20 years or more, but \nless than 25 years. \n(iv) 15 years or more, but \nless than 20 years. \n(I) 10 years or more, but less \nthan 15 years. \n(vi) 5 years or more, but less \nthan 10 years. \n(vii) More than I year, but \nless than 5 years. \n(2) The criminal history category shall be the great-\ner of: (A) the criminal history category determined un-\nder Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal History); or (B) \ncriminal history Category'. \nU.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a).°N' \nFN4. The plea agreement stipulated that the ap-\nplicable Guidelines Manual was \"the one that \ntook effect on November 5, 2004.\" Section \n4B1.5(a) remains unchanged in the current edi-\ntion of the Guidelines Manual. \nPut simply, Leach would be subject to the § \n4B1.5(a) enhancement if: (I) his \"instant offense of \nconviction is a covered sex crime;\" (2) the career of-\nfender enhancement (§ 4B I .1) does not apply to him; \nand (3) he \"committed the instant offense of conviction \nsubsequent to sustaining at least one sex offense convic-\ntion.\" Id. Leach unquestionably meets the first two pre-\nrequisites of § 481.5(a). His \"instant offense of convic-\ntion\"-knowingly using a facility of interstate commerce \nto attempt to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity-\nPage 24 of 27 \nPage 7 \nthe number of levels corresponding to any applicable \nadjustment from § 3E1. I (Acceptance of Responsibil-\nity): \nOffense Statutory Maximum Offense Level \n37. \n34. \n32. \n29. \n24. \n17. \n12.. \nqualifies as a \"covered \n... [truncated, 3290 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/438 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=438]", "char_count": 3290}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 439, "text_content": "491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(ate as: 491 F3d 858) \nviction,\" states: \nFor purposes of this guideline, the instant offense \nof conviction must be a covered sex crime, i.e.: (A) an \noffense, perpetrated against a minor, under (i) chapter \n109A of title 18, United States Code; (ii) chapter 110 of \nsuch title, not including trafficking in, receipt of, or \npossession of, child pornography, or a recordkeeping \noffense; (iii) chapter 117 of such title, not including \ntransmitting information about a minor or filing a factu-\nal statement about an alien individual; or (B) an attempt \nor conspiracy to commit any offense described in subdi-\nvisions (AXi) through (iii) of this note. \nFN6. Although Application Note 1 to § 4B1.5, \ndefines \"minor\" as a person under the age of 18 \nand defines \"minor victim\" to include \"an un-\ndercover law enforcement officer who repres-\nented to the defendant that the officer was a \nminor,\" this court has specifically held that a \nconviction for attempted enticement of a minor \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)-Leach's instant of-\nfense of conviction-is a \"covered sex crime\" \nfor purposes of § 4B1.5 even though the inten-\nded victim was in fact an underver law en-\nforcement officer. United States \nBlazek. 431 \nF.3d 1104, 1110 (8th Cir.2005). \nIt is undisputed that Leach committed the instant \noffense of conviction after he pleaded guilty to the Kan-\nsas offense-attempted aggravated criminal sodomy. \nHowever, sentencing on Leach's Kansas offense was \npending when the district court sentenced him on the in-\nstant offense. Thus, no final judgment of conviction had \nbeen entered on the Kansas offense. Leach contends, \ntherefore, that the Kansas offense cannot be counted as \na prior \"sex offense conviction\" for purposes of § \n4B1.5(a) because the section does not define whether \nthe term \"conviction\" requires the defendant to have \nbeen sentenced pursuant to the conviction (a final judg-\nment of conviction) or whether a \"conviction\" only re-\nquires that the def\n... [truncated, 4779 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/439 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=439]", "char_count": 4779}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 440, "text_content": "491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F3d 858) \nincoherent, prescribing that a sentence which has \nalready been imposed ... shall be 5 or 20 years longer \nthan it was\"). \nFN7. Essentially, Leach argues for one defini-\ntion of \"conviction\" the fast time it appears in \n§ 4B1.5(a)-an adjudication of guilt-and a dif-\nferent definition for \"conviction\" the second \ntime the term is used-a judgment of conviction \nrequiring a sentence to be imposed. This result \nwould go against one of the basic rules of stat-\nutory interpretation-that identical words used in \ndifferent parts of the same act or statute are \n!\nin-\ntended to have the sa e meaning. See Comm'r \nof Internal Revenue \nLundy, 516 U.S. 235, \n250, 116 5.0. 647, \n33 L.Ed.2d 611 (1996) \n(\"the normal rule of statutory construction [is] \nthat identical words used in different parts of \nthe same act are intended to have the same \nmeaning.\"). \nOur reading of the term \"conviction\" in § 481.5(a) \nas only requiring an adjudication of guilt is confirmed \nby the \"Background\" section of § 4B1.5, which states: \nThe guideline is intended to provide lengthy incar-\nceration for offenders who commit sex offenses against \nminors and who present a continuing danger to the pub-\nlic. It applies to offenders whose instant offense of con-\nviction is a sex offense committed against a minor vic-\ntim. The relevant criminal provisions provide for in-\ncreased statutory maximum penalties for repeat sex of-\nfenders and make those increased statutory maximum \npenalties available if the defendant previously was con-\nvicted of any of several federal and state sex offenses \n(see 18 U.S.C. 2247, 2426). In addition, section 632 of \nPublic Law 102-141 and section 505 of Public Law \n105-314 directed the Commission to ensure lengthy in-\ncarceration for offenders who engage in a pattern of \nactivity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of \nminors. Section 401(iX1XA) of Public Law 108-21 dir-\nectly amended Application Note 4(bXi), effective April \n... [truncated, 4279 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/440 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=440]", "char_count": 4279}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 441, "text_content": "Page 27 of 27 \n491 F.3d 858 \n491 F.3d 858 \n(Cite as: 491 F.3d 858) \nrated against a minor\" and Leach stipulated in his plea \nagreement that his maximum sentence would be \ndoubled to 60 years under 18 U.S.C. § 2426(a) because \nthe Kansas offense qualified as a prior \"sex offense con-\nviction\" against a minor, Leach essentially stipulated in \nthe plea agreement that the Kansas offense was a prior \n\"sex offense conviction\" under § 2426(bXIXA). \nBecause we find that § 4B1.5(a) applies to Leach, \nwe need not address the merits of the district court's de-\ncision regarding the inapplicability of § 4B1.5(b), as \nsubsection (b) can only apply if subsection (a) is inap-\nplicable. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b). \nIII. Conclusion \nAccordingly, we vacate Leach's sentence and re-\nmand the case for resentencing in accordance with this \ndecision. \nC.A.8 (Mo.),2007. \nU.S. I. Leach \n491 F.3d 858 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \n* 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 10 \nhups://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&mt=FederalGov... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192028\n", "char_count": 1072}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 442, "text_content": "Page 1 of 4 \nWastlaw. \nSlip Copy \nSlip Copy, 2007 WL 3273402 (W.D.Ky.) \n(Cite as: Slip Copy) \nH \nU.S. I Moore \nW.D.Ky.,2007. \nOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, \nat Louisiville. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff \nv. \nJames Terry MOORE, Defendant. \nCriminal Action No. 3:06-CR-98-S. \nNov. 5, 2007. \nJo E. Lawless, U.S. Attorney Office, Louisville, \nlilt \nlaintiff. \nJ. Bouldin, Western Kentucky Federal \nCommunity Defender, inc., Louisville, KY, for De-\nfendant. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION \nCHARLES R. SIMPSON, III, United States District \nJudge. \n*I This matter is before the court upon the mo-\ntion of the defendant, James Terry Moore \n(\"Moore\"), to reconsider this court's Memorandum \nOpinion and Order entered July 9, 2007, which con-\ncluded that Moore is subject to a mandatory life \nsentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e). Moore \ncontends that we should fmd the penalty provision \nof IS U.S.C. § 2251(e) applicable in this case and \nimpose the thirty-five year mandatory minimum \nsentence. \nIn September 2006, after having been arrested \nfor advertising and facilitating the distribution of \nchild pornography on the Internet, Moore pled \nguilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(dX1XA), \n(dX2)(B), \n2252A(aX2), (aX5X8), (b)(I), and \n03)(4 At that time the court advised Moore that \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) he faced a mandatory \nminimum penalty of thirty-five years imprisonment \nand a maximum of life imprisonment. The United \nStates now asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) man-\nPage 1 \ndates that Moore receive a life sentence. \nIn this court's Memorandum Opinion and Order \nentered July 9, 2007, we noted that Moore qualified \nfor sentencing under both § 2251(e) and § 3559(e). \nWe also noted that if irreconcilable sentencing pro-\nvisions applicable to the same offense were enacted \nsimultaneously, \"the last\norder or arrangement\nUnited States in. I Moore, Criminal Ac-\ntion No. 3:06-CR-98-S Memorandum Opinion (Jut \n9, 2007) (citi\n... [truncated, 3792 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/442 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=442]", "char_count": 3792}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 443, "text_content": "Page 2 of 4 \nSlip Copy \nSlip Copy, 2007 WL 3273402 (W.D.Ky.) \n(Cite as: Slip Copy) \nStases !Bass. 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, \n522, 30 .Ed.2d 488 (1971)). \n*2 The rule of lenity is inapplicable to this \ncase. Application of the rule is predicated on stat-\nutory, ambiguity. This court is not faced with any \nambiguity insofar as whether § 3559(e) is applic-\nable to Moore based on his current criminal con-\nduct and past criminal convictions. The plain lan-\nguage of § 3559(e) applies directly to Moore and \nmandates a life sentence. Simply because Moore's \ncriminal conduct also places him within § 2551(e) \ndoes not give rise to any ambiguity as to whether \nMoore's conduct places him within the ambit of § \n3559(e). This court is not applying the mandatory \nlife sentence of § 3559(e) based simply on a guess \nas to what Congress intended. Rather this court is \napplying the mandatory life sentence based on the \nfact that Moore's criminal conduct and past crimin-\nal convictions place him directly within § 3559(e), \nand § 3559(e) prevails over § 2551(e) because it is \nlater in order of arrangement in the Prosecutorial \nRemedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of \nChildren Today Act of 2003. Accordingly, we will \ndeny Moore's motion for reconsideration. \nA separate order will be entered herein this \ndate in accordance with this opinion. \nW.D.Ky.,2007. \nU.S. I Moore \nSlip Copy, 2007 WL 3273402 (W.D.Ky.) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nOD 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 2 \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&mt=FederalGov... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192030\n", "char_count": 1615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 444, "text_content": "Page 3 of 4 \n%€stlaw \nSlip Copy \nSlip Copy, 2007 WL 2025191 (W.D.Ky.) \n(Cite as: Slip Copy) \nH \nU.S. I. Moore \nW.D.Ky.,2007. \nOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, \nat Louisiville. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff \nv. \nJames Terry MOORE, Defendant. \nCriminal Action No. 3:06-CR-98-S. \nJuly 5, 2007. \nJo E. Lawless, U.S. Attorney Office, Louisville, \nKY, for Plaintiff. \nPatrick J. Bouldin, Western Kentucky Federal \nCommunity Defender, Inc., Louisville, KY, for De-\nfendant. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION \nCHARLES R. SIMPSON III, United States District \nJudge. \n•1 This matter is before the court upon the \nparties' briefs regarding sentencing of the defend-\nant, James Terry Moore (\"Moore\"). Moore, due to \nhis prior sex convictions involving minors, faces \nstatutory mandatory sentencing. At issue is whether \nthe mandatory life sentence provided for in 18 \nU.S.C. § 3559(e) or the thirty-five years to life \nrange contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) should \nbe applied to him. \nIn September 2006, after having been arrested \nfor advertising and facilitating the distribution of \nchild pornography on the intemet, Moore pled \nguilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(dX1XA). \n(dX2XB), \n2252A(aX2), \n(aX5XB), \n(bX I), and \n(bX2). At that time the court advised Moore that \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2259(e) he faced a mandatory \nminimum penalty of thirty-five years imprisonment \nand a maximum of life imprisonment. Now, the \nUnited States asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) man-\ndates Moore receive a life sentence. \nPage 1 \nIn short, § 2251(e) and § 3559(e) conflict, as \nMoore qualifies for sentencing under both. When \ntwo statutes conflict and cannot be reconciled, \"the \ngeneral rule of statutory interpretation is that a sub-\nsequent statutory provision prevails over a pre-\nexisting and irreconcilably conflicting provision \nwhich is not expressly repealed .\" 73 Am. Jr.2d \nStatutes § 169 (2007). This rule, however, is inap-\nplicable here given th\n... [truncated, 3720 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/444 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=444]", "char_count": 3720}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 445, "text_content": "Page 4 of 4 \nSlip Copy \nPage 2 \nSlip Copy, 2007 WL 2025191 (W.D.Ky.) \n(Cite as: Slip Copy) \nsuch, it prevails, subjecting Moore to mandatory \nlife imprisonment. Moreover, an argument exists \nthat § 2251(e) and § 3559(e) were not enacted sim-\nultaneously. This argument, if accepted, permits the \ncourt to apply the general rule of statutory construc-\ntion calling for the later enacted provision to con-\ntrol. Section 2559(e) existed at the time at the time \n§ 3559(e) was enacted. Public Law No. 108-21 \nmerely amended§ 2259(e) by raising the mandatory \nminimum sentence from thirty to thirty-five years. \nOn the other hand, Pub. Law No. 108-21 added an \nentirely new subsection to § 3559, subsection (e), \nwhich provides for mandatory life imprisonment for \nrepeated sex offenses against minors. \n*2 Accordingly, the court concludes that pursu-\nant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) Moore is subject to a \nsentence of mandatory life imprisonment for his of-\nfenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2251. It is so ordered. \nW.D.Ky.,2007. \nU.S. I. Moore \nSlip Copy, 2007 WL 2025191 (W.D.Ky.) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \n© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&mt=FederalGov . 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192032\n", "char_count": 1249}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 446, "text_content": "Page 1 of 28 \nNAkstlaw. \n496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F.3d 885) \nH \nU.S. I. Peck \nC.A.8 (lowa),2007. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, \nNicholas PECK, Appellant. \nNo. 06-4187. \nSubmitted: June 12, 2006. \nFiled: Aug. 6, 2007. \nRehearing and Rehearing En BancDenied Sept. 10, \n2007. \nBackground: Defendant pled guilty in the \nUnited States District Court for the Northern Dis-\ntrict of Iowa, Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, to sexu-\nal exploitation of a child, possession of child porno-\ngraphy, and distribution of cocaine. Defendant ap-\npealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Gruender, \nCircuit Judge, held that: \n(I) government did not breach its plea agree-\nment by advocating for sentencing enhancements; \n(2) imposition of enhancements for pattern of \nactivity and exploiting more than one minor was \nnot impermissible double counting; and \n(3) sentence of 420 months' imprisonment was \nnot unreasonable. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnotes \nII) Criminal Law 110 €=.273.1(2) \n110 Criminal Law \n110XV Pleas \n110k272 Plea of Guilty \n1 I Ok273.1 Voluntary Character \nPage 1 \n110k273.1(2) \nk. \nRepresentations, \nPromises, or Coercion; Plea Bargaining. Most Cited \nCases \nGovernment did not breach its plea agreement with \ndefendant, in which it agreed to file no additional \ncriminal charges, by advocating for sentencing en-\nhancements, where plea agreement expressly per-\nmitted government to provide all relevant informa-\ntion to probation office for use in preparing presen-\ntence report and the agreement did not contain any \nprovision regarding the advisory guidelines calcula-\ntions. \n121 Criminal Law 110 e=1030(1) \n110 Criminal Law \nI IOXXIV Review \n110XXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in \nLower Court of Grounds of Review \n110XXIV(E)1 In General \n110k1030 Necessity of Objections in \nGeneral \n110k1030(1) k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \nThe Court of Appeals can correct an error not \nraised before the district court if there is e\n... [truncated, 2677 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/446 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=446]", "char_count": 2677}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 447, "text_content": "496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F.3d 885) \n141 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=906 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350H1V Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(G) Dual or Duplicative Use \n350Hk903 Particular Cases and Problems \n350H1:906 k. Adjustments. Most Cited \nCases \nImposition of five-level enhancement for engaging \nin a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual \nconduct, after imposition of three-level enhance-\nment for exploiting more than one minor, for de-\nfendant convicted of sexual exploitation of a child \nand possession of child pornography was not im-\npermissible double counting; separate adjustments \nfor the number of minors exploited and for the fact \nthat those minors were exploited on multiple occa-\nsions were not premised on the same conduct. \nU.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.1(dX I), 4B1.5(bX1), 18 U.S.C.A. \n151 Criminal Law 110 4=1139 \n110 Criminal Law \n110XX1V Review \n1107OUV(L) Scope of Review in General \n110k1139 k. Additional Proofs and Trial \nDe Novo. Most Cited Cases \nThe Court of Appeals reviews de novo whether the \ndistrict court's application of the \nsentencing \nguidelines amounts to impermissible double count-\ning. \n161 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=.902 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIV Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(G) Dual or Duplicative Use \n350H1c902 k. Factor Taken Into Account \nby Guidelines in General. Most Cited Cases \nDouble counting occurs when one part of the \nGuidelines is applied to increase a defendant's pun-\nishment on account of a kind of harm that has \nalready been accounted for by application of anoth-\ner part of the Guidelines; such double counting is \npermissible where the Sentencing Commission in-\ntended the result and each statutory section con-\nPage 2 of 28 \nPage 2 \nterns conceptually separate notions related to sen-\ntencing. \n171 Sentencing and Punishment 35014 e=645 \n35014 Sentencing and Punishment \n350H111 Sentence on Conviction of Different \nCharges \n3501111I(D) Disposition \n350Hk645 k. Total Sentence Deeme\n... [truncated, 3322 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/447 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=447]", "char_count": 3322}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 448, "text_content": "Page 3 of 28 \n496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F.3d 885) \nShown by Record \n1101(1144.17 k. Judgment, Sentence, \nand Punishment. Most Cited Cases \nAlthough \na \nsentence \nwithin \nthe \napplicable \nguidelines sentencing range is presumed reason-\nable, the presumption may be rebutted by reference \nto the statutory sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C.A. § \n3553(a). \n110i Sentencing and Punishment 350H €=0651 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIV Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(A) In General \n350Hk651 k. Operation and Effect of \nGuidelines in General. Most Cited Cases \nA defendant must show that the district court failed \nto consider a relevant factor that should have re-\nceived significant weight, gave significant weight \nto an improper or irrelevant factor, or considered \nonly appropriate factors but nevertheless committed \na clear error of judgment, in order for his sentence \nwithin the guidelines range to be considered unreas-\nonable. \nI) Sentencing and Punishment 35011€=,373 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350H11 Sentencing Proceedings in General \n350H1I(G) Hearing \n350Hk369 Findings and Statement of \nReasons \n350Hk373 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited \nCases \nWhile the district court is not required to mechanic-\nally recite each of the statutory sentencing factors, \nit must be clear from the record that it actually con-\nsidered them in determining the appropriate sen-\ntence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a). \n•886 Anne M. Laverty, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, \nfor appellant. \nCharles J. Williams, AUSA, argued, Sean R. Berry, \nAUSA, on the brief, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellee. \nBefore MELLOY, SMITH and GRUENDER, Cir-\nPage 3 \ncuit Judges. \nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge. \nPursuant to two plea agreements, Nicholas \nPeck pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation \nof a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), one \ncount of possession of child pornography, in viola-\ntion of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a), and one count of dis-\ntribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § \n84I(a)(1). The distr\n... [truncated, 3715 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/448 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=448]", "char_count": 3715}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 449, "text_content": "496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F.3d 885) \ndigital cameras, various electronic storage devices \nincluding compact discs, a hollowed out pen con-\ntaining a white powdery residue, a digital scale \nwith a white powdery residue, and a plastic baggie \ncontaining several pills. The compact discs revealed \ndigital still and video images of Peck engaged in \nseparatesual acts with S.L., J.C., and another \nminor, \nAt least one of the \ndepicted \nPeck having sexual intercourse with \n., and sev-\neral depicted Peck engaging in sexual acts with 1.C. \nand displayed i.e.'s genitalia. \nFollowing his arrest and release, Peck twice \nsold cocaine to a confidential informant, again res-\nulting in his arrest. In this post-arrest interview, \nPeck admitted that he took the pornographic images \nof S.L. found on his laptop computer and admitted \nthat he knew S.L. was fifteen years old when the \npictures were talc \ne also admitted that he took \nnude pictures of iiknowing \nthat she was either \nfourteen or fifteen years old. \nPeck was indicted in the Northern District of \nIowa and charged with one count of sexual exploit-\nation of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 225I(a), \nand one count of possession of child pornography, \nin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a). Peck pled \nguilty to these charges pursuant to a plea agreement \n(\"first plea agreement\"). Peck was subsequently in-\ndicted in the Western District of Wisconsin and \ncharged with one count of distribution of cocaine, \nin violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The drug \ncharge was transferred pursuant to Rule 20 of the \nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the North-\nern District of Iowa, where Peck pled guilty pursu-\nant to a second plea agreement. The two cases were \nthen consolidated for sentencing. \nIn paragraph three of the fast plea agreement, \nthe Government promised that it would \"file no ad-\nditional Title 18 criminal charges based upon in-\nformation now in [its) possession.\" Paragraph five \nof the plea agreement state\n... [truncated, 4463 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/449 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=449]", "char_count": 4463}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 450, "text_content": "Page 5 of 28 \n496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F-3d 885) \nhancements. \nAt sentencing, the district court applied the en-\nhancements pursuant to § 262.1(d)(1) and § \n4B1.5(bXI), giving Peck a total guideline offense \nlevel of 42. The district court calculated Peck's \ncriminal history as a category III, which resulted in \na final advisory sentencing guideline range of 360 \nmonths to life in prison. The district court sen-\ntenced Peck to 240 months' imprisonment on the \ndrug charge and 360 months' imprisonment on the \nsexual exploitation charge, to be served concur-\nrently. The district court also sentenced Peck to 60 \nmonths on the pornography charge, to run consecut-\nively to the other sentence, for a final sentence of \n420 months' imprisonment. Peck filed a timely no-\ntice of appeal. \nII. DISCUSSION \nA. Plea Agreement \n[1][2][3] Peck argues that the Government \nbreached paragraph three of the first plea agree-\nment, but he concedes that our review of this issue \nis for plain error because he did not present this ar-\ngument to the district court. We can correct an error \nnot raised before the district court if there is \"(1) er-\nror, (2) that is plain, tut (3) that affects substantial \nrights.\" United States \nRice, 449 F.3d 887, 894 \n(8th Cir.), cert. denied,— U.S. ---, 127 S.Ct. 601, \n166 L.Ed.2d 446 (2006) (quotation omitted). \"We \nwill reverse under plain error review only if the er-\nror prejudices the party's substantial rights and \nwould result in a miscarria \nof justice if left un-\ncorrected.\" United States I McCoun, 468 F.3d \n1088, 1093 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied,— U.S. ---, \n127 S.Ct. 1866, 167 L.Ed.2d 356 (2007) (quotation \nomitted). \n*889 Paragraph three of the first plea agree-\nment states: \"The U.S. Attorney's Office for this \nDistrict will file no additional Title 18 criminal \ncharges based upon information now in [its] posses-\nsion.\" Peck concedes-as he must-that the Govern-\nPage 5 \nment has not filed any new indictment or informa-\ntion offici\n... [truncated, 4251 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/450 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=450]", "char_count": 4251}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 451, "text_content": "496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F.3d 885) \n670. \nIn contrast to the plea agreements in Fowler \nand DeWitt, the plea agreement in this case does \nnot contain any provision whatsoever regarding the \nadvisory guidelines calculations. It does contain \ngeneral language, not present in the plea agree-\nments in Fowler and DeWitt, that expressly permits \nthe Government to \"provide all relevant informa-\ntion to the probation office for use in preparing the \npresentence report.\" Peck's case, therefore, is more \nakin to our decision in United States I Stobaugh, \n420 F.3d 796 (8th Cir.2005), cert. denied,546 U.S. \n1120, 126 S.Ct. 1093, 163 L.Ed.2d 908 (2006). In \nStobaugh, the plea agreement specified certain \nguidelines calculations but also stated that the cal-\nculations \"are only estimates and do not bind the \nparties.\" Id. at 801. The agreement also contained a \nprovision stating \"that information about 'the en-\ntirety of the defendant's criminal activities' would \nbe provided to the district court and would 'not [be] \nlimited to the count to which the defendant pled \nguilty.' \" Id. Noting that the plea agreement did not \ncontain a more specific provision like that in \nDeWitt that conflicted with the Government's gen-\neral authority under the plea agreement to present \nevidence of relevant conduct, we held that there \nwas no breach. Id. at 800-01 (citing DeWitt). \n*890 As in Stobaugh, Peck's plea agreement \nlacks a specific provision that conflicts with the \ngeneral provision granting the Government express \nauthority to \"provide all relevant information to the \nprobation office for use in preparing the presen-\ntence report.\" Absent a conflicting provision, Peck \ncannot successfully challenge the Government's de-\ncision to present to the probation office and to the \ndistrict court the very information contemplated by \nparagraph seven of the first plea agreement. There-\nfore, because the Government did not file addition-\nal charges and engaged in conduct expressly \n... [truncated, 4275 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/451 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=451]", "char_count": 4275}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 452, "text_content": "496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F-3d 885) \nSection 481.5(bX1) states: \"In any case in \nwhich the defendant's instant offense of conviction \nis a covered sex crime ... and the defendant engaged \nin a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual \nconduct: (I) The offense level shall be 5 plus the \noffense level determined under Chapters Two and \nThree....\" Peck does not dispute that his conviction \nfor production of child pornography in violation of \n18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) constitutes a \"covered sex \ncrime\" and is \"prohibited sexual conduct.\" A \n\"pattern of activity\" for the purposes of § \n4B1.5(bX1) occurs when the defendant engages in \nthe prohibited sexual conduct with a minor on at \nleast two separate occasions. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 , \ncmt. n. 4(BXi). Peck also does not dispute that he \nengaged in prohibited sexual conduct with minor \nchildren on at least two separate occasions, thus \nconstituting a pattern of activity involving prohib-\nited sexual conduct. \n*891 Peck contends that the district court's im-\nposition of a five-level increase pursuant to § \n4111.5(b)(1) for engaging in a \"pattern of activity\" \nafter the imposition of a three-level, multiple-vic-\ntim enhancement under § 2O2.1(dX1) constitutes \nimpermissible double counting because both en-\nhancements are premised upon the same conduct-\nnamely, his sexual exploitation of each of the three \nminor children. Peck's characterization of the tar-\ngeted harm is too broad. \nThe application of § 262.1(dX1) punished \nPeck for exploiting three different minors, while the \n§ 4B1.5(bX1) enhancement punished him for ex-\nploiting those minors on multiple occasions. See \nUnited States \nSchmeilski, 408 F.3d 917, 920 (7th \nCir.2005) (holding that the application of both § \n262.1(d)(1) and § 4B1.5(bX1) does not constitute \nimpermissible double counting). As such, the separ-\nate enhancements for the number of minors Peck \nexploited and for the fact that Peck exploited the \nminors on multiple occasions are not premis\n... [truncated, 4345 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/452 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=452]", "char_count": 4345}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 453, "text_content": "496 F.3d 885 \n496 F.3d 885 \n(Cite as: 496 F.3d 885) \nPeck concedes that the facts considered by the \ndistrict court in reaching his sentence were \n\"doubtless 'relevant' under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\" \nand he instead argues that \"[Oven the maximum \nsentence permitted by law on the most serious \ncount, [sexual exploitation of a minor], is thirty \nyears, it is reasonable to conclude that a sentence at \nthe bottom of the 360 to life range might be appro-\npriate.\" While this argument may explain why a \ndifferent sentence would be reasonable, it fails to \nexplain*892 why the within-guidelines-range sen-\ntence \nreceived is unreasonable. See United \nStates \nBryant. 446 F.3d 1317, 1319 (8th \nCir.2 \n(noting that \"there is a range of reason-\nableness available to the district court in any given \ncase\"). Further, to the extent that this argument sug-\ngests that the district court should have run his sen-\ntence on the possession of child pornography \ncharge concurrently rather than consecutively, we \nfind it to be without merit. The district courts de-\ncision to run Peck's sentences consecutively is au-\nthorized under the guidelines and is proper under \nthis circuit's case law. SeeU.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) (\"If \nthe sentence imposed on the count carrying the \nhighest statutory maximum is less than the total \npunishment, then the sentence imposed on one or \nmore of the other counts shall run consecutively, \nbut only to the extent necessary to produce a com-\nbined sentenciequal to the total punishment.\"); \nUnited States \nThomas, 484 F.3d 542, 546 (8th \nCir.2007). \nPeck \nargues \nthat \nbecause \neach \nminor \n\"apparently may have even thought of [Peck) as \ntheir boyfriend,\" there was no evidence to support \nthe district court's conclusion that Peck \"preyed \nupon\" teenage girls for sexual relations. We reject \nPeck's argument and note that the district court's \nconclusion regarding Peck's conduct \nsupported \nby our cases. See, e.g., United States \nAbed, 350 \nF.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir.2003) (\"[W]he\n... [truncated, 3764 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/453 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=453]", "char_count": 3764}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 454, "text_content": "Page 9 of 28 \nMkstlaw. \n232 Fed.Appx. 336 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 (N.C.)) \n(Cite as: 232 Fed.Appx. 336) \nH \nU.S. I. Denkler \nC.A.4 (N.C.),2007. \nThis case was not selected for publication in the \nFederal Reporter.Not for Publication in West's Fed-\neral Reporter See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure \n32.1 generally governing citation of judicial de-\ncisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also \nFourth Circuit Rule 32.1 (Find CTA4 Rule 32.1) \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nPhillip Daniel DENKLER, a/k/a George Austin, \nDefendant-Appellant. \nNo. 06-4781. \nSubmitted: March 7, 2007. \nDecided: July 10, 2007. \nBackground: Defendant pled guilty in the \nUnited States District Court for the Eastern District \nof North Carolina, at Raleigh, James C. Dever, III, \nJ., to interstate transportation of a minor with intent \nto engage in criminal sexual activity and interstate \ntransportation of a stolen vehicle, for which he was \nsentenced to respective terms of 360 months and \n120 months. Defendant appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals held that: \n(1) victim's out-of-court statements to investig-\nators had sufficient indicia of reliability to render \nthem admissible for sentencing purposes, and \n(2) guidelines departure was reasonable in light \nof defendant's criminal history and likelihood of re-\ncidivism. \nAffirmed. \nWest Fleadnotes \nPage 1 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350HIV Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(H) Proceedings \n350HIV(H)2 Evidence \n350Hk967 k. Hearsay. Most Cited Cases \nVictim's out-of-court statements to investigators \nhad sufficient indicia of reliability to render them \nadmissible for sentencing purposes, for determina-\ntion of whether imposition of enhancement for us-\ning threats and force to engage in sex with victim \nwas warranted, in prosecution for interstate trans-\nportation of a minor with intent to engage in crim-\ninal sexual activity; victim submitted willingly to a \n... [truncated, 3427 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/454 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=454]", "char_count": 3427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 455, "text_content": "Page 10 of 28 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 (N.C.)) \n(Cite as: 232 Fed.Appx. 336) \n*337 Appeal from the United States District Court \nfor the Eastern District of North Carolina, at \nRaleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. \n(5:05-cr-00264-D). \nThomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, \nDevon L. Donahue, Assistant Federal Public De-\nfender Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. \nE. \nUnited States Attorney, Anne \nM. Hayes, \nP.  May-Parker, Assistant United \nStates Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Ap-\npellee. \nBefore WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and KING and \nSHEDD, Circuit Judges. \nAffirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. \nUnpublished opinions are not binding precedent in \nthis circuit.PER CURIAM: \n\"I Phillip Daniel Denkler pled guilty to inter-\nstate transportation of a minor with intent to engage \nin criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(a) \n(West Supp.2006) (Count One), and interstate \ntransportation of a stolen vehicle, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 \n(2000) (Count Two). He received a sentence of 360 \nmonths imprisonment on Count One and a concur-\nrent sentence of 120 months on Count Two. Denk-\nler appeals his sentence, arguing that (1) the district \ncourt erred in considering the victim's statement to \na federal agent because it lacked sufficient indicia \nof reliability to support certain fact findings that af-\nfected the sentence, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines \nManual § 6A 1.3(a), p.s. (2005); (2) the district \ncourt clearly erred in finding that the victim's abil-\nity to appraise or control the situation was substan-\ntially impaired after Denkler gave her vodka to \ndrink, USSG § 2G1.3, comment. (n.5 (BXI)); and \n(3) the district court abused its discretion by depart-\ning upward pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3, iff.,li on the \nground that criminal history category \nsubstan-\ntially under-represented the seriousness o \nS crim-\ninal history. We affirm. \nIn August 2005, after serving an eight-month \ncustodial sentence for taking indec\n... [truncated, 4376 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/455 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=455]", "char_count": 4376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 456, "text_content": "Page 11 of 28 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 (N.C.)) \n(ate as: 232 Fed.Appx. 336) \nthey ha \nvodka together, after which the vic-\ntim got' rand they had intercourse. \nAfter Denkler's guilty plea, the probation of-\nficer calculated the offense level for the sex offense \nunder U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2O1.3 \n(2005) (Transportation of Minors to Engage in Pro-\nhibited Sexual Contact with a Minor). Denkler had \n9 criminal history points, which placed him in crim-\ninal history category IV. However, because he qual-\nified for sentencing as a repeat and dangerous sex \noffender against minors, seeUSSG § ri., \n, \nhe \nwas\nplaced in criminal history category \nThe recom-\nmended advisory guideline range was 168-210 \nmonths imprisonment. \nWith advance notice to the parties, the district \ncourt decided to apply a cross reference in USSG § \n2G1.3(cX3) for offenses involving conduct de-\nscribed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a) or (b) (West 2000 \n& Supp.2006), to USSG 2A3.I (Criminal Sexual \nAbuse). The court determined that the cross refer-\nence applied because it found as a fact that Denider \nused force to engage in sexual conduct with the vic-\ntim, see§ 201.3, comment. (n.5(BXiX1)), and also \nforced her to drink vodka, which substantially im-\npaired her ability to appraise or control her conduct, \nsee id.(n.5 (BXiXIV)). The offense level calculated \nunder § 2A3.I produced a higher offense level than \n§ 2G1.3 or USSG § 4B1.5 (Repeat and Dangerous \nSex Offender Against Minors); accordingly, the \ncourt applied it. \nAt sentencing, after the FBI agent who inter-\nviewed the victim in the hospital in Des Moines \ntestified, the district court found as a fact that Den-\nkler had used force to engage in sexual conduct \nwith the victim. The court consequently determined \nthat § 2A3.1 applied and recalculated the guideline \nrange as 262-327 months. The court then departed \nupward, pursuanio USSG § 4A1.3, from criminal \nry\nhisto \ncategory \nto category VI, which i\n... [truncated, 4563 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/456 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=456]", "char_count": 4563}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 457, "text_content": "Page 12 of 28 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 (N.C.)) \n(Cite as: 232 Fed.Appx. 336) \nthong panties, black lace panties, and a sleeveless \nshirt with the phrase \"no boundaries\" on it. Denkler \nalso argues that the court ignored the fact that the \nmedical examination of the victim revealed no in-\ndication of forcible intercourse, bruises, or serious \ninjuries. He points out that the medical examination \nform states that the victim answered \"Yes,\" when \nasked whether she had \"any consensual coitus in \nthe previous 72 hours\" With respect to this ques-\ntion, the FBI agent who interviewed the victim test-\nified at sentencing that the doctor who filled out the \nform told her the question was meant to determine \nwhether there had been recent sexual activity, not \nwhether it had actually been consensual. The agent \nalso testified that the victim was cooperative with \nher and with the hospital staff, and was \"very hon-\nest and very credible.\" \nEven though authorities were unable to find \nevidence to substantiate the victim's statements, we \nconclude that her statements had sufficient indicia \nof reliability to support their probable accuracy. \nShe submitted willingly to a medical examination \nand to interviews by local and federal authorities, \nand acknowledged that she had engaged in text \nmessaging with other men. Her statement to the \nFBI agent was consistent with her previous state-\nment to local police. Therefore, the district court \ndid not err in relying on her statements. \nDenkler also contends that the district court \nclearly erred in finding that the victim's ability to \nappraise or control the situation was substantially \nimpaired after she drank alcohol because the court \nlacked the information necessary to reach that con-\nclusion. We need not decide this issue because the \ndistrict court's finding that Denkler used force \nagainst the victim to engage in sex with her was \nsupported by the victim's statement and that finding \nis suffic\n... [truncated, 4597 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/457 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=457]", "char_count": 4597}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 458, "text_content": "Page 13 of 28 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 (N.C.)) \n(Cite as: 232 Fed.Appx. 336) \nSecond, the district court considered the fact \nthat Denkler had previously been charged with stat-\nutory rape (for which the court estimated he would \nhave received a custodial sentence of at least 192 \nmonths), was permitted to plead guilty to a lesser \noffense, served a short custodial sentence, violated \nhis probation and then, after being placed on house \narrest, absconded to engage in the criminal conduct \nthat resulted in his current prosecution. The back-\nground commentary to § 4A1.3 suggests that a de-\nfendant who has a history of serious offenses for \nwhich he has received very lenient sentences may \nbe in a category that underrepresents his criminal \nhistory. The court found that Denkler fit this de-\nscription. \nLast, the court decided that category' did not \nadequately represent the likelihood that Denkler \nwould commit similar crimes in the future. The \ncourt noted that Denkler had been prosecuted for \nsexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl and \na twelve-year-old girl, and for assaulting another \nfemale.Fm The court found that Denkler's conduct \nshowed that he had no respect for the law and had \n\"a strong tendency to revert to grossly inappropri-\nate behavior toward females, particularly young \ngirls.\" The court decided that category VI best rep-\nresented his criminal history and likelihood of re-\ncidivism. \nFN1. Denkler received one criminal his-\ntory point for a sentence of 30 days cus-\ntody and 36 months unsupervised proba-\ntion after he was convicted in 2002 of mis-\ndemeanor assault on a female. \n•\"5 Denkler argues that category I adequately \naddressed his criminal history because it took into \naccount his repeated sexual offenses involving \nminors, his custodial status when he committed the \ninstant •341 offense, and the recency of the prior \nconviction, and he emphasizes that he was awarded \ncriminal history points for all h\n... [truncated, 4479 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/458 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=458]", "char_count": 4479}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 459, "text_content": "Page 14 of 28 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336 \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 (N.C.)) \n(Cite as: 232 Fed.Appx. 336) \nonment that is less than 360 months, the court reas-\nonably concluded that only the maximum sentence \nwas adequate to protect potential victims and pun-\nish Denkler for the offenses he committed. We con-\nclude that the length of the sentence was reason- able. \nWe therefore affirm the sentence imposed by \nthe district court. We dispense with oral argument \nbecause the facts and legal contentions are ad-\nequately presented in the materials before the court \nand argument would not aid the decisional process. \n**6 AFFIRMED. \nC.A.4 (N.C.),2007. \nU.S. I. Denkler \n232 Fed.Appx. 336, 2007 WL 2012431 (C.A.4 \n(N.C.)) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nei 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 6 \nImps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv-Full&prf1=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=F... \n2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192046\n", "char_count": 922}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 460, "text_content": "Page 15 of 28 \nlikksdaw. \n490 F.34 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 F.3d 641) \nU.S. I. Carter \nC.A.8 (S.D.),2007. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, \nWilliam T. CARTER, Appellant. \nNo. 05-4414. \nSubmitted: Sept. 26,2006. \nFiled: June 18,2007. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted of \nsexual abuse of a minor and related crimes, and was \nsentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. The Court \nof Appeals, 410 F.3d 1017, affirmed convictions \nbut remanded for resentencing. On remand, the \nUnited States District Court for the District of \nSouth Dakota, Charles B. Kommann, J., imposed a \n295-month sentence, and defendant appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Arnold, Cir-\ncuit Judge, held that: \n(1) defendant forfeited his Ex Post Facto \nClause argument, and \n(2) district court made adequate findings to \nsupport offense level enhancement for obstruction \nof justice based on perjury. \nAffirmed. \nBye, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part \nand concurring in the judgment. \nWest Headnotes \nill Constitutional Law 92 C=.2789 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92XXIII Ex Post Facto Prohibitions \n92XXIII(A) Constitutional Prohibitions in \nPage I \nGeneral \n92k2789 k. Penal Laws in General. Most \nCited Cases \nConstitutional Law 92 43=2790 \n92 Constitutional Law \n92XXIII Ex Post Facto Prohibitions \n92XXI11(A) Constitutional Prohibitions in \nGeneral \n92k2790 k. Punishment in General. Most \nCited Cases \nThe ex post facto clause is violated when a law de-\nfining a crime or increasing punishment for a crime \nis applied to events that occurred before its enact-\nment, to the disadvantage of the offender. U.S.C.A. \nConst. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. \n121 Criminal Law 110 tl=.1180 \n110 Criminal Law \n110XXIV Review \n11C0OCIV(T) Subsequent Appeals \nII0k1180 k. In General. Most Cited Cases \nIn defendant's appeal of sentence that was imposed \nfor sexual abuse of a minor and related crimes after \ncourt of appeals remanded his case to district court \nfor rese\n... [truncated, 2930 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/460 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=460]", "char_count": 2930}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 461, "text_content": "Page 16 of 28 \n490 F.3d 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 F.3d 641) \n110 Criminal Law \nI I0XXIV Review \n110XXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in \nLower Court of Grounds of Review \n110XXIV(E)I In General \n110k1042 k. Sentence or Judgment. \nMost Cited Cases \nDefendant forfeited his argument that district court, \nin resentencing him for sexual abuse of a minor and \nrelated offenses, violated Ex Post Facto Clause by \nusing a single, less serious offense that occurred \nafter effective date of new version of sentencing \nguidelines as ground for application of that version \nof guidelines in his sentencing for more serious of-\nfenses that occurred earlier; defendant did not raise \nthe issue at his original sentencing, on his appeal of \nthat sentence, or at resentencing after remand from \ncourt of appeals. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; \nU.S.S.G. § IB1.11(bX2), 18 U.S.C.A. \n141 Sentencing and Punishment 350H €=.996 \n350H Sentencing and Punishment \n350H1V Sentencing Guidelines \n350HIV(H) Proceedings \n350H1V(H)3 Hearing \n350H1c992 Findings and Statement of \nReasons \n350H1c996 k. Sufficiency. \nMost \nCited Cases \nIn sentencing defendant for sexual abuse of a minor \nand related offenses, district court made adequate \nfindings to support application of sentencing \nguidelines offense level enhancement for obstruc-\ntion of justice based on perjury; court stated during \nsentencing hearing that it found that defendant test-\nified falsely as to all different sexual assaults, all of \nwhich was testimony on material matters, and ad-\nded that the finding was based upon what the court \nsaw and heard at trial, and court stated that the \nevidence in defendant's case was as strong as the \ncourt had seen in any case during nine years on the \nbench and that the court would have found defend-\nant guilty in a bench trial. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 18 \nU.S.C.A. \nPage 2 \n*642 Counsel who presented argument on behalf of \nthe appellant was Jana M. Miner, AFPD, Pierre, SD. \n*643 Counsel who presented ar\n... [truncated, 3786 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/461 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=461]", "char_count": 3786}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 462, "text_content": "Page 17 of 28 \n490 F.3d 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 F.3d 641) \ntences than they would have received at the time \nthe crime was committed, violated the ex post facto \nclause applicable to the states, seeU.S. Const., art. \nI, § 10, c 1. 1. And we have held that the ex post \nfacto clause applicable to Congress is similarly vi-\nolated by retroactive application of a more ggerous \nfederal sentencing guideline. United States I Bell, \n991 F.2d 1445, 1448 (8th Cir.1993); seeU.S. Const. \nart. I, § 9, cl. 3. \nInitially, we note that since the Supreme Court \ndecided United States' Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 \nS.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621(2005), at least one of \nour sister circuits has held that the ex post facto \nclause does not apply tq. the now-advisory \nguidelines. See United States I Demaree, 459 F.3d \n791, 794 (7th Cir.2006), petition for cert. filed,No. \nco,\n06-837 \n(U.S. Dec. 11, 2006); see also United \nStates \nBarton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n. 4 (6th \nCir.2 \n. But in a case decided after Booker, we \n\"recognize[d] that 'retrospective application of the \nGuidelines implicates the a post facto clause,' \" \nthough we took into account post-offense amend-\nments to the guidelines when determining the over-\nall reasonableness of the defendant's sentence. \nUnited States I Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 894 (8th \nCir.2006) (quoting Bell, 991 F.2d at 1448). Given \nour decision in Larrabee, we will proceed to ad-\ndress Mr. Carter's a post facto claim. \nThe guidelines themselves refer to the a post \nfacto clause: under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a) and \n(b)(I), courts are directed to apply the version of \nthe guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing \nunless to do so would violate the a post facto \nclause, in which case the guidelines in effect on the \ndate of the crime should be used. The so called one-\nbook rule requires*644 that the \"Guidelines Manual \nin effect on a particular date be applied in its en-\ntirety.\" \nU.S.S.G. \n§ \n1B1.11(bX2). \nAnd \nthe \nguidelines specify that \"[i]f the defendant\n... [truncated, 4482 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/462 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=462]", "char_count": 4482}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 463, "text_content": "Page 18 of 28 \n490 F.3d 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 F.3d 641) \nated a multiple-victim requirement for an enhance-\nment under § 4B1.5(b). Then the court referred to \nthe one-book rule, see§ 1B1.11(bX2), and the need \nto use the guidelines manual in effect when the last \ncrime was committed, see§ 1B1.11(bX3). Follow-\ning these provisions, the district court applied the \nmanual that \"went into effect on November I, 2001, \nin between the defendant's offenses of conviction\" \n(though it mistakenly referred to it as the 2002, \nrather than the 2001, manual). The court found gen-\nerally that \"at least one\" of Mr. Carter's crimes oc-\ncurred after § 4B1.5(bX1) went \ninto effect \n(November 1, 2001), and it also relied on the in-\ndictment to determine that Count VII occurred after \nthat date. \nIn his first appeal, Mr. Caner maintained in his \nbrief that the district court erred by enhancing his \nsentence under § 4B1.5(b)(1)\"where the prosecu-\ntion's evidence failed to prove that any of the \ncharged offenses\" occurred after that enhancement \nwent into effect. He asserted that the \"trial testi-\nmony did not prove an offense\" after that date and \nalso contended that the district court should have \nrelied on the evidence, rather than the indictment, \nto determine when Count VII occurred. Signific-\nantly, Mr. Carter did not challenge the constitution-\nality of *645§ IB1.11 (bX2) or § 1B1.11 (b)(3) or \nthe district court's decision to calculate his sentence \nby applying only \"one book\" of sentencing \nguidelines, i.e., the one in effect when his last crime \nwas committed. And though he now contends that \nthe court should not have relied on the date of a \nlesser crime to increase his sentence for earlier \nmore serious crimes that could not be grouped with \nthe later crime, in his first appeal he mentioned \nneither the relative seriousness of the crimes nor \ntheir groupability. We rejected Mr. Carter's previ-\nous a post facto claim in Caner I, 410 F.3d at \n1027, because evidence reg\n... [truncated, 4558 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/463 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=463]", "char_count": 4558}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 464, "text_content": "Page 19 of 28 \n490 F.3d 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 F.3d 641) \nplace after November I, 2001. This is not simply a \ncase where the defendant appeals an issue that he or \nshe di not present to the district court. Cf. United \nStates \nRees. 447 F.3d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir.2006). \nHere Mr. Carter did not raise this issue at his first \nsentencing, in his appeal from that sentence, or at \nresentencing. We do not permit piecemeal appeals, \nand we choose not to afford Mr. Caner an oppor-\ntunity (unavailable to other defendants) to raise a \nnew issue at this late date merely because his case \nr\nremanded on other grounds. See United States \nPalmer, \nPalmer,\n F.3d 760, 767 (8th Cir.2002); \nsited \nStates \nMontana, 979 F.2d 136, 138 (8th \nCir.1992); United States I Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d \n1479, 1481-83 (11th Cir.1989). We conclude that \nMr. Carter has forfeited his *646 current ex post \nfacto claim, and thus we decline to address it on the \nmerits. \n[4) Mr. Carter next argues that the district court \nfailed to make adequate findings to support an ob-\nstruction-of-justice enhancement based on perjury, \nseeU.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Since Mr. Caner objected to \nthe enhancement, the court was required to \"review \nthe evidence and make independent findings neces-\nsaryis\nto \ntablish ... obstruction of justice.\" United \nStates \nDunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95, 113 S.Ct. \n1111, 1 2 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Although it is \npreferable for the court \"to address each element of \nthe alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding,\" \na finding \"that encompasses all of the factual pre-\ndicates for a fmding of perjury\" is sufficient. Id. \nWe conclude that there is no merit to Mr. \nCarter's contention that the district court did not \nmake adequate findings here. The court stated dur-\ning the sentencing hearing that it found \"that Mr. \nCaner ... testified falsely as to all these different \nsexual assaults, all of which was testimony on ma-\nterial matters.\" The judge added that he was \n\"making that fmding based u\n... [truncated, 4401 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/464 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=464]", "char_count": 4401}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 465, "text_content": "490 F.3d 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 F.3d 641) \n(8th Cir.2006). Understandably, Mr. Carter does \nnot contend here that the fmdings of the district \ncourt are clearly erroneous. \nFor all of the above reasons, we arum the \njudgment of the district court. \n*647 BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring in pan and \nconcurring in the judgment. \nI join in Part II of the majority's opinion and its \njudgment. I also agree with Part I to the extent the \nmajority recognizes Carter cannot now assert his ex \npost facto challenge because he did not raise it at \nresentencing. I write separately because I disagree \nwith the majority's view, expressed in Part I, that \nCarter could have raised the challenge at his first \nsentencing or in his appeal from that sentence. \nAt Carter's resentencing, the district court ap-\nplied the 2001 Guidelines, citing the conduct in \nCount VII (Resentencing Tr. at 34) and Count II \n(Resentencing Tr. at 39) as the basis for their ap-\nplication. Carter objected, arguing \nthe \n2000 \nGuidelines should be used but in doing so merely \n\"restate[d]\" the objection raised at the first senten-\ncing-that the Count VII conduct occurred before the \n2001 Guidelines' November 1, 2001, effective date. \nCaner did not argue at resentencing, as he does in \nthis appeal, that, regardless of when committed, the \nconduct in Count II could not be used to ap \nU.S.S.G. § 481.5(bXf ) to grouped Counts IV,\nand VI. Thus, Caner forfeited the a post fa o \nchallenge he raises for the first time in this appeal \nand, as it is committed to our discretion, the major-\nity appropriately declines to \nview the challenge \nfor plain error. See Gendron \nUnited States, 295 \nF.2d 897, 902 (8th Cir.1961) , \"The normal rule is \nthat an appellate court should not consider ques-\ntions which have not been properly raised in the tri-\nal court and upon which the trial court has had no \nopportunity to pass.\"). \nBut I am not as convinced as my colleagues it \nis reasonable to hold Carter's failure to raise his \n... [truncated, 4445 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/465 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=465]", "char_count": 4445}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 466, "text_content": "Page 21 of 28 \n490 F.3d 641 \n490 F.3d 641 \n(Cite as: 490 Fid 641) \nclient's position under the rules of the adversary \nsystem.\"); Id. Rule 1.1 (\"A lawyer shall provide \ncompetent representation to a client.\"). Even if she \nbelieved the conduct in Count II occurred after the \neffective date of the 2001 Guidelines (the opposite \nappears to be true), I do not think her candor oblig-\nation required her to hang her client. Nonetheless, I \nconcur in the ultimate outcome of this case for the \nreasons given. \nC.A.8 (S.D.),2007. \nU.S. \nCarter \n490 F.3d 641 \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nC 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nPage 7 \nhups://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Full&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top&mt=F... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192053\n", "char_count": 745}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 467, "text_content": "Page 22 of 28 \nWastlaw. \n431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 Fad 1104) \nH \nU.S. I. Blazek \nC.A.8 (lowa),2005. \nUnited States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, \nv. \nMichael David BLAZEK, Defendant-Appellant. \nNo. 05-1705. \nSubmitted: Sept. 13, 2005. \nFiled: Dec. 21, 2005. \nRehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. I, \n2006.\" \nFN• Judge Colloton did not participate in \nthe consideration or decision of this matter. \nBackground: Defendant was convicted in the \nUnited States District Court for the Southern Dis-\ntrict of Iowa, James E. Grimier, I., attempted en-\nticement of a minor for sex, travel in interstate \ncommerce to engage in prohibited sex acts with a \nminor, and two child pornography offenses. De-\nfendant appealed. \nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Loken, Chief \nJudge, held that: \n(1) evidence was sufficient to support convic-\ntion for attempted enticement of a minor for sex; \n(2) evidence was sufficient to support convic-\ntion for travel in interstate commerce to engage in \nprohibited sex acts with a minor; \n(3) prior conviction for abusive sexual contact \nwith minor was admissible; \n(4) to support conviction for traveling in inter-\nstate commerce to engage in sexual act with minor \nbetween the ages of 12 and 16 years old, govern-\nment was not required to prove that defendant knew \nspecific age of the victim or that he knew that the \nrequisite age difference existed between offender \nPage 1 \nand victim; and \n(5) convictions for attempted enticement of a \nminor for sex, and travel in interstate commerce to \nengage in prohibited sex acts with a minor were \n\"covered sex crimes,\" within meaning of senten-\ncing guideline providing for increased sentence \nupon commission of such crimes. \nAffirmed. \nWest Headnotes \nIII Criminal Law 110 C=1144.13(3) \n110 Criminal Law \n110XXIV Review \n110XX1V(M) Presumptions \n110k1144 \nFacts \nor Proceedings Not \nShown by Record \n110k1144.13 Sufficiency of \n... [truncated, 2707 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/467 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=467]", "char_count": 2707}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 468, "text_content": "431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Sere. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 F.3d 1104) \nShown by Record \n110k1144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence \n110k1144.13(6) k. Evidence Con-\nsidered; Conflicting Evidence. Most Cited Cases \nIn reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-\nport a conviction, an appellate court views the evid-\nence in the light most favorable to the government, \nresolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the gov-\nernment, and accepting all reasonable inferences \ndrawn from the evidence that support the jury's ver-\ndict. \n(21 Infants 211 0=13 \n211 Infants \n21111 Protection \n211k13 k. Protection of Health and Morals. \nMost Cited Cases \nEvidence was sufficient to prove defendant inten-\nded to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual \nactivity, as required to support conviction for at-\ntempted enticement of a minor for sex; the evidence \npresented at trial showed that the defendant en-\ngaged in explicit sexual conversations over the in-\ntemet with an undercover officer posing as a \n15-year-old male, and then arranged to meet the \nboy. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422(b). \n131 Criminal Law 110 C=1030(1) \n110 Criminal Law \n110XXIV Review \n110XX1V(E) Presentation and Reservation in \nLower Court of Grounds of Review \n110X.X1V(E)1 In General \n110k1030 Necessity of Objections in \nGeneral \n110k1030(1) k. In General. Most \nCited Cases \nA \"plain error\" is one that is clear or obvious. \nFed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C.A. \n141 Commerce 83 gE\n82.10 \n83 Commerce \n8311 Application to Particular Subjects and \nPage 23 of 28 \nPage 2 \nMethods of Regulation \n8311(3) Offenses and Prosecutions \n83k82.5 Federal Offenses and Prosecu-\ntions \n83k82.10 k. Offenses Involving Activ-\nity Unlawful Under State Law. Most Cited Cases \nInfants 211 e=13 \n211 Infants \n21111 Protection \n211k13 k. Protection of Health and Morals. \nMost Cited Cases \nEvidence was sufficient to prove that defendant in-\ntended to have sex with a minor between the ages \nof 12 and 16, as required to support conviction fo\n... [truncated, 3142 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/468 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=468]", "char_count": 3142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 469, "text_content": "431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 F.3d 1104) \nminor between the ages of 12 and 16 turns not on \nthe actual age of the intended victim, but on wheth-\ner the defendant traveled in interstate commerce \nwith the requisite criminal intent for the purpose of \nengaging in a sexual act with a minor between the \nages of twelve and sixteen. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(b). \n161 Criminal Law 110 €=369.2(5) \n110 Criminal Law \n110XVII Evidence \n110XVII(F) Other Offenses \n110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of \nOffense Charged in General \n1101:369.2 Evidence Relevant to Of-\nfense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General \n110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, \nProsecutions for \n110k369.2(5) k. Sex Offenses; \nOffenses Relating to Children. Most Cited Cases \nCharged offense of traveling in interstate commerce \nto engage in sexual act with minor between the ages \nof 12 and 16 years old was \"offense of sexual as-\nsault ,\" and thus, defendant's prior conviction for \nabusive sexual contact with minor was admissible \nin prosecution for the charged offense, under feder-\nal rule of evidence providing for admission of prior \nsexual assault offenses in sexual assault prosecu-\ntions. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(b); Fed.Rules Evid.Rule \n413(a, d), 28 U.S.C.A. \n171 Commerce 83 fe=82.10 \n83 Commerce \n831I Application to Particular Subjects and \nMethods of Regulation \n831I(J) Offenses and Prosecutions \n83k82.5 Federal Offenses and Prosecu-\ntions \n83k82.10 k. Offenses Involving Activ-\nity Unlawful Under State Law. Most Cited Cases \nInfants 211 €=.13 \n211 Infants \n21111 Protection \nPage 24 of 28 \nPage 3 \n211k13 k. Protection of Health and Morals. \nMost Cited Cases \nTo support conviction for traveling in interstate \ncommerce to engage in sexual act with minor \nbetween the ages of 12 and 16 years old, it was not \nnecessary for the government to prove that the de-\nfendant knew the specific age of the victim or that \nhe knew that the requisite age difference existed \nbetween the offende\n... [truncated, 3221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/469 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=469]", "char_count": 3221}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 470, "text_content": "Page 25 of 28 \n431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 Fid 1104) \nof a minor for sex, and travel in interstate com-\nmerce to engage in prohibited sex acts with a minor \nwere \"covered sex crimes,\" within meaning of sen-\ntencing guideline providing for increased offense \nlevel and criminal history category when defendant \ncommitted covered sex crime, the career offender \nprovision did not apply, and he committed at least \none prior sex offense; the guideline referenced a \nstatute, which specifically included defendant's of-\nfenses. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2422(b), 2243(a, b); \nU.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a). \n*1106 B. John Bums, argued, Assistant Public De-\nfender, Des Moines, IA, for appellant. \nRichard Lee Richards, AUSA, argued, Des Moines, \nIA, for appellee. \nBefore LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and \nBYE, Circuit Judges. \nLOKEN, Chief Judge. \nMichael Blazek appeals his conviction and sen-\ntence on charges of attempted enticement of a \nminor for sex, travel in interstate commerce to en-\ngage in prohibited sex acts with a minor, and two \nchild pornography offenses. He argues that the \nevidence was insufficient to convict him of the en-\nticement and travel offenses, the district court r\"\" \nerred in admitting a prior sexual assault conviction, \na jury instruction was misleading, and the court \nerred in imposing a sentence enhancement under \nU.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 for repeated sexual offenses \nagainst minors. We affirm. \nFN I. The Honorable James E. Gritzner, \nUnited States District Judge for the South-\nern District of Iowa. \nI. \nIn July 2001, Blazek entered an intemet \"male \nfor male\" chat room from his computer in Des \nMoines and then sent an instant message asking \n\"Brian\" for his age and location. Brian responded \nthat he was a 15 year old male in Chicago. Brian \nwas in fact Inspector Dan Everett of the Chicago \nPage 4 \nPolice Department posing as a teenage boy to in-\nvestigate Internet crimes against children. Blazek \nand Brian discussed their respective sexual\n... [truncated, 4126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/470 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=470]", "char_count": 4126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 471, "text_content": "431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 F.3d 1104) \n[2] Blazek argues that the evidence was insuffi-\ncient to prove he intended to entice a minor to en-\ngage in illegal sexual activity because Inspector \nEverett was the one doing the enticing. Like the \ndistrict court, we disagree. Blazek began the rela-\ntionship by contacting Brian and engaging in sexual \nconversations after learning Brian was fifteen. \nAfter extensive breaks in their communications, it \nwas usually Blazck who reestablished the intemet \nrelationship. The jury instructions included the is-\nsues of entrapment and predisposition to commit \nthe crime charged. Given the explicitly sexual talks \nthat preceded Blazek's trip to Chicago in October \n2002, a reasonable jury could find that Blazek in-\ntended to entice a minor to engage in illegal sex. \nOn appeal, Blazek argues for the first time that \nthe evidence was insufficient to convict him of at-\ntempting to entice a minor because Inspector Ever-\nett was not a minor. We review this issue for plain \nerror. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The contention is based \nr\nupon a recent \nision of the district court in \nUnited States \nfielder, No. 05.00125.01-Cr. \n(W.D.Mo. Aug. , 2005) (Judgment of Acquittal), a \nruling that is ni pending on appeal in this court, \nUnited States \nfielder, appeal docketed. No. \n05-3387 (8th Cr. Sep. 1, 2005). The decision in \n1\nfielder is inconsistent wi \nand did not cite, our de-\ncision in United States \nPatten, 397 F.3d 1100 \n(8th Cir.2005), that uphe d an attempt conviction \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) in which the enticed \n\"minor\" was an undercover police officer. Though \nthis issue was not raised or discussed in Patten, it \nwas raised and squarely rejected in United States I \n116\nMeek, \nF.3d 705, 717-20 (9th Cir.2004); United \nStates \nRoot, 296 F.11 1222, 1227-28 (11th \nCir.200 , cert. denied537 U.S. 1176, 123 S.Q. \n1006, 154 L.Ed.2d 921 (2003); and United States \nFarner, 251 F.3d 510 (5th Cir.2001). \nlip\n[3] A\n... [truncated, 4470 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/471 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=471]", "char_count": 4470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 472, "text_content": "431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 F.3d 1104) \nwith the requisite criminal intent, here, for the pur-\npose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor \nbetween the ages of twelve and sixteen. See Root. \n296 F.3d at 1231-32. At trial, Inspector Everett test-\nified that \"Brian\" told Blazek in July 2002, long \nafter their initial conversation, that he was fifteen \nand would be sixteen in January 2003. In Septem-\nber 2002, the month before the planned meeting in \nChicago, Brian again told Blazek he was fifteen. In \naddition, Postal Inspector Robert Williams testified \nthat, after Blazek's arrest, he told officers that he \nunderstood Brian was fifteen. Thus, there was suffi-\ncient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that \nBlazek traveled for the purpose of engaging in a \nsexual act with someone who was not yet sixteen \nyears old. \nII. \n[6) At trial, over Blazek's objection, the gov-\nernment introduced evidence of his 1997 conviction \nfor Abusive Sexual Contact with a Minor in viola-\ntion of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1) and testimony that \nthe conviction resulted from Blazek's fondling of \nhis eleven-year-old nephew. The district court ad-\nmitted this evidence under Rule 413(a) of the Fed-\neral Rules of Evidence, which provides that, \"[i]n a \ncriminal case in which the defendant is accused of \nan offense of sexual assault, evidence of the de-\nfendant's commission of another offense ... of sexu-\nal assault is admissible.\" Blazek argues that Rule \n413(a) does not apply because he was not charged \nwith an \"offense of sexual assault.\" Like the dis-\ntrict court, we disagree. \nRule 413(d) defines an \"offense of sexual as-\nsault\" to include any federal or state crime \"that in-\nvolved-(I) any conduct proscribed*1109 by chapter \n109A of title 18, United States Code.\"Rule 413 \ndoes not require that the defendant be charged with \na chapter 109A offense, only that the instant of-\nfense involve conduct proscribed by chapter 109A. \nHere, Count Two charged \n... [truncated, 4401 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/472 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=472]", "char_count": 4401}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 473, "text_content": "431 F.3d 1104 \n431 F.3d 1104, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Sew. 12 \n(Cite as: 431 F.3d 1104) \n14 and, as Blazek admits, correctly stated the ap-\nplicable law. The instructions as a whole were not \ninherently confusing in requiring the jury to distin-\nguish between the intent to engage in sexual acts \nwith a minor, and specific knowledge of the vic-\ntim's age. There was no abuse of discretion. \nIV. \n[9] At sentencing, the district court increased \nBlank's offense level and criminal history category \nunder U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a) (2001),”8 which ap-\nplied when \"the defendant's instant offense of con-\nviction is a covered sex crime,\" the career offender \nprovision does not apply, and the defendant com-\nmitted the instant offense \"subsequent to sustaining \nat least one sex offense conviction.\" The court then \nsentenced Blazek to 235 months in prison, the bot-\ntom of his advisory guidelines range. Blazek argues \nthat § 4B 1.5(a) does not apply and therefore his \nsentence is unreasonable. We review a challenge to \nthe district court's interpretation and application of \nthe advisory guidelines de novo and the court's fat \ntual findings for clear error. United States \nMashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir.2005). \nFN3. The Guidelines in effect when Blazek \ncommitted the offenses of conviction. \n*1110 Application note 2 to § 481.5 defined \n\"covered sex crime\" to include \"(A) an offense, \nperpetrated against a minor, under ... (iii) chapter \n117 ... or (B) an attempt or a conspiracy to commit \nany offense described \nin subdivisions (AXi) \nthrough (iii) of this note.\" Blazek's enticement and \ntravel offenses were violations of chapter 117. Ap-\nplication note 1 defined \"minor\" as a person under \nthe age of 18 but defined \"minor victim\" to include \n\"an undercover law enforcement officer who rep-\nresented to the defendant that the officer was a \nminor.\" Relying on this distinction, Blank argues \nthat he did not commit \"covered sex crimes\" be-\ncause Inspector Everett was a \"minor victim,\" not a \n\"m\n... [truncated, 3306 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/473 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=473]", "char_count": 3306}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 474, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nPage I of 7 \nSandy Berger \nFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nSamuel Richard \"Sandy\" Berger (born October \n28, 1945) served as the 19th United States National \nSecurity Advisor under President Bill Clinton from \n1997 to 2001. In his position, he helped to \nformulate the foreign policy of the Clinton \nAdministration. During this time he advised the \nPresident regarding the Khobar Towers bombing, \nOperation Desert Fox and other actions against Iraq, \nthe NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, \nresponses to the terrorist bombings of American \nembassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the \nadministration's policy of engagement with the \nPeople's Republic of China.Ell He was also one of \nthe prominent actors of the Camp David 2000 \nSummit. \nSamuel R. \"Sandy\" Berger \nNational Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton \nBorn \nOctober 28, 1945 \nSharon, Connecticut \nOccupation \nLobbyist, Financial Services industry, \nCampaign Advisor \nSpouse \nSusan Berger \nBefore joining the administration Berger had \nI Children \nThree \nworked as an international trade attorney. Currently, \nhe is chairman of an international advisory firm and chairman of the board of an international \ninvestment fund. Living in the Georgetown section of Washington, D.C., he is married to Susan Berger \nand has three children (two daughters and one son). \nIn April 2005, Berger pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of unauthorized removal and retention of \nclassified material from the National Archives in Washington. According to the lead prosecutor in the \ncase Berger only took copies of classified information and that no original material was destroyed; \nhowever, there is notable controversy and speculation that he might have removed or destroyed originals \nof other unknown documents as well. \nBerger currently serves as a foreign policy adviser to Senator Hillary Clinton in her presidential \ncampaign.(2)\nContents \n■ 1 Early life \n■ 2 Clinton administration \n■ 2\n... [truncated, 2266 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/474 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=474]", "char_count": 2266}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 475, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nPage 2 of 7 \nEarly life \nOriginally from Millerton, New York where his parents ran an Army-Navy store (and born in nearby \nSharon, Connecticut), Berger earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Cornell University in 1967 and \nhis Juris Doctor (J.D.) degree from Harvard Law School in 1971. At Cornell, Berger was a member of \nthe Quill and Dagger society with Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Hadley. Opposed to the Vietnam War, \nBerger began working for Senator \nMcGovern's presidential campaign in 1972. While there, he \nmet Bill Clinton, forming a friendship that would last for decades. Berger later urged Clinton to run for \npresident.(31\nAfter the McGovern campaign, Berger gained experience working in a variety of government posts, \nincluding serving as Special Assistant to former New York City Mayor John Lindsay and Legislative \nAssistant to former U.S. Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa and Congressman Joseph Resnick of New \nYork. He was also Deputy Director of Policy Planning for the U.S. State Department from 1977 to 1980 \nunder Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during the Carter administration J41\nAfter leaving the State Department, Berger went on to join the law firm Hogan & Hanson where he \nhelped expand the firm's international law practice. As a partner, he opened the fum's first two \ninternational offices, in London and Brussels.[3) \"Sandy Berger,\" Nancy Pelosi said in 1997 prior to \nbecoming Speaker of the House, \"was the point person at... Hogan & Hanson... for the trade office of \nthe Chinese government. He was a lawyer-lobbyist.\"(51\nClinton administration \nBerger served as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Governor Clinton during the campaign, and as \nAssistant Transition Director for National Security of the 1992 Clinton-Gore Transition. During \nClinton's first term of office (1993-1997), Berger served as deputy national security advisor, under \nAnthony Lake in the National Security Council. In Clinton's second term of of\n... [truncated, 3154 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/475 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=475]", "char_count": 3154}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 476, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nPage 3 of 7 \nlarsi \nSjelk\" \nbriefed of the espionage by the United States Department of Energy \n(DOE) in April 1996, but did not inform the president until July \n1997.171181 \nA number of Republicans, including then presidential hopeful \nLamar Alexander, called for Berger's resignation. They accused \nhim of ignoring the allegations of Chinese espionage. \"For his \nunwillingness to act on this serious matter, Mr. Berger should \nresign\", Alexander said. \"If he does not, he should be relieved of his \nduties by President Clinton.\"(91 President Clinton rejected the calls: \n\"The record is that we acted aggressively,\" Clinton said. \"Mr. \nBerger acted appropriately.\"1101\nI asked DOE to widen and deepen its investigation, to intensify as they were planning \n66 \ntheir counterintelligence efforts to brief the Congress[.] [W]ithin several weeks the FBI \nhad opened up a full investigation on the prime suspect. So I took the actions that I \nbelieve were appropriate. I get an awful lot of threat information every day. I have to \nmake a judgment as to what I brief the president on and what I don't. In 1997, when this \nwas clearly a pattern and a systemic problem, I thought it was essential for the president \n99 \nto know — Sandy Berger, May 29, 1999.(11]\nPost-government \nSand) Berger with President \nClinton and Madeleine Albright \nAfter leaving the Clinton administration, Berger became chairman of Stonebridge International, an \ninternational advisory firm he co-founded in 2001 which focuses on aiding companies in their expansion \ninto markets such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia.(41 Berger is also Chairman of the DB Zwim \nGlobal Advisory Board, an international investment fund and merchant capital provider founded in 2001 \nand with offices throughout North America, Europe and Asia. (12) Berger is an Advisory Board member \nfor the Partnership for a Secure America, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to recreating the \nbipartisan \n... [truncated, 3160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/476 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=476]", "char_count": 3160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 477, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nPage 4 of 7 \nThe National Archives building in \nWashington, DC \nWhen initially questioned by reporters, Berger claimed it was \naccidental that he put the top-secret copies in his attache-case and \nhandwritten notes in his jacket and pants pockets. He later, in a guilty plea, admitted to deliberately \nremoving the copies and cutting three up with scissors. Archive staff stated they witnessed Berger, on \nmore than one occasion, stuffing into his pants and into his jacket papers he was illegally removing.(15) \nTwo of the copies were recovered by DOJ investigators and returned to the archives. \nBerger eventually pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of unauthorized removal and retention of \nclassified material on April 1, 2005. Under a plea agreement, U.S. attorneys recommended a fine of \n$10,000 and a loss of security clearance for three years. However, on September 8, U.S. Magistrate \nJudge Deborah Robinson increased the fine to $50,000 at Berger's sentencing. Robinson stated, \"The \ncourt finds the fine [recommended by government prosecutors] is inadequate because it doesn't reflect \nthe seriousness of the offense.\"[161 Berger was also ordered to serve two years of probation and to \nperform 100 hours of community service.(17)\nCritics suggest Berger destroyed primary evidence revealing anti-terrorism policies and actions, and that \nhis motive was to permanently erase Clinton administration pre-9/11 mistakes from the public record. \nPublic statements to this effect have been made by talk-radio host Rush Limbaugh,[18] former Clinton \ncampaign advisor Dick Morris,[t91 USA Today reporter Jack Kelley,[2°I multiple times by Fox News \ncorrespondent John Gibson (the last as recently as December 20061211), and former House Speaker \nDennis Hasten (Republican-Illinois), who said: \"What information could be so embarrassing that a man \nwith decades of experience in handling classified documents would risk being caught pilfering our \n... [truncated, 4130 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/477 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=477]", "char_count": 4130}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 478, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nPage 5 of 7 \nsuccessful in actions at which he was later caught, \"nobody would know they were gone.\" It also \ncontains the FBI's statement as to why they concluded there was no exposure on those dates: \"Berger \nwas under constant supervision\".[29lin][3°) Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard Heating disputed \nthe findings of the Oversight Report and rejected the need for a polygraph since 'no new facts regarding \nlaw enforcement aspects of this investigation' had been discovered.[31)\nThe report did, however, cause the Wall Street Journal to, in January 2007, retract their initial opinion of \nthe case, saying there are substantial questions concerning the truth of Berger's statements and that other \ndocuments may have been removed. They now argue that Berger's taking of multiple copies of the same \ndocument contradict his statement that he took them only for his personal research, since they note that \nhe could have simply taken one copy.(321[15) Mr. Berger continues to insist that he took the copies of the \nsame document for personal convenience, and thought them overclassified (i.e. the information they \ncontained was not actually sensitive to national security). \nOn May 17, 2007, Berger relinquished his license to practice law as a result of the Justice Department \ninvestigation. Saying, \"I have decided to voluntarily relinquish my license.\" He added that, \"While I \nderived great satisfaction from years of practicing law, I have not done so for 15 years and do not \nenvision returning to the profession. I am very sorry for what I did, and I deeply apologize.\" By giving \nup his license, Berger avoided cross-examinination by the Bar Counsel regarding details of his thefts.133)\nSee also \n■ History of the United States National Security Council 1993-2003 \no Iraq disarmament crisis timeline 1997-2000 \n• Mary McCarthy (CIA) \nExternal links \n■ Archives Staff Was Suspicious of Berger (http://www.washingtonpost.comfac2/wp\n... [truncated, 3296 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/478 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=478]", "char_count": 3296}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 479, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipcdia, the free encyclopedia \nPage 6 of 7 \n7. \nA Genh, Jeff and Risen, James, \"China Stole Nuclear Secrets From Los Alamos, U.S. Officials \nSay\" (http://seleclnytimes.com/gst/abstract.html? \nres-FA0B17F73E5C0C7A8CDDAD0894D1494D818:n=Top%2fReference%2(Times%20Topics% \n2fPeople%2fB%2fBerger%2c%20Samuel%20R%2e), New York Times, March 6, 1999 \n8. \nA \"The White House and China\" (http://taiwansecurity.org/News/NYT-990306.htm), New York Times, \nEditorial, April 9, 1999 \n9. \nA \"Clinton's security adviser takes heat for China nuclear \nscandal\" (http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/10/nuclear.secrets.02/), CNN.com, March 11, 1999 \n10. A Gerstenzang, James and Drogin, Bob, \"Clinton Defends Response In China Espionage Case\", Los Angeles \nTimes, March 12, 1999 \n11. \nA Transcript (http://wvAv.pbs.org/newshounbb/europe/jan-june99/berger_5-27.html), NewsHour with Jim \nLehrer, PBS, May 27, 1999, Retrieved: May 27, 2006 \n12. A Schurr, Stephen, \"DB Zwirn hires Clinton aide\" (http://www.stonebridge-\nintemational.com/press/news010.html), Financial Times, March 15, 2006 \n13. A \"Sandy Berger Quits Kerry \nTeam\" (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/19/national/main630625.shtml), CBSNews.com, July 20, \n2004 \n14. A CNN.com - Sandy Berger to plead guilty on documents charge - Apr I, 2005 \n(http://edition.am.com/2005/LAW/04/01/berger.plea0 \n15. na b Smith, is Jeffrey, Berger Case Still Roils Archives, Justice Dept., Washington Post, February 21, 2007 \n(http://www.washingtonpost.cotn/svp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/20/AR2007022001344.html) \n16. A Sherman, Mark, \"Berger Pleads Guilty to Taking Materials\" (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bintarticle.cgi? \nf=/n/a/2005/04/01/national/w111624S64.DTL), Associated Press via SFGate.com, April 2, 2005 \n17. \nA a 6 Margasak, Larry, \"GOP Contradicts Justice Department\" (http://www.guardian.co.ulduslatest/story/0„-\n6334264,00.html), Associated Press, January 10, 2007 \n18. \nA \"Limbaugh: Sandy Berger incident \"far worse\" than Abu Ghraib \n(http://mediamat\n... [truncated, 4044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/479 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=479]", "char_count": 4044}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 480, "text_content": "Sandy Berger - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia \nPage 7 of 7 \n30. A Justice Dept. Conduct in Berger Case Questioned (http://reform.democrats.house.govistory.asp?ID=404), \nChairman Henry A. Waxman, August 6, 2004 \n31. \nA Letter from Department ofJustice (http://oversight.house.govidocuments/20070221164830-34067.01), \nU.S. House of Representatives, February 16, 2007 \n32. A \"The Berger Files: The Case of the Purloined Archives Gets Stranger All the \nTime\" (http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.hunl?id=110009522), Wall Street Journal, January \n13, 2007 \n33. A Clinton aide forfeits law license in Justice Probe (Imp://www.washingtontimes.cominational/20070516-\n113137-9942r.htm) \nPreceded by \nDeputy National Security Advisor \nSucceeded by \nJonathan Howe \n1993-1997 \nJames Steinberg \nPreceded by \nUnited States National Security Advisor \nSucceeded by \nAnthony Lake \n1997-2001 \nCondoleezza Rice \nRetrieved from \"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandy_Berger\" \nCategories: 1945 births I American political scandals I American criminals I Cornell University alumni I \nHarvard Law School alumni I American Jews I Jewish American politicians I Living people I United \nStates National Security Advisors I Clinton administration controversies I Clinton Administration \npersonnel \n■ This page was last modified on 6 February 2008, at 17:45. \n• All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free \nDocumentation License. (See Copyrights for details.) \nWikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia \nFoundation, Inc., a U.S. registered 501(cX3) tax-deductible \nnonprofit charity. \nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandy_Berger \n2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192067\n", "char_count": 1656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 481, "text_content": "Page 1 of 56 \nWestlaw Delivery Summary Report for VILLAFANA,MARIE 3563006 \nDate/Time of Request: \nWednesday, February 27, 2008 14:29 Eastern \nClient Identifier: \nDOJ \nDatabase: \nUS-PL-OLD \nCitation Text: \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nLines: \n2770 \nDocuments: \nImages: \n0 \nPROTECT ACT ADDS 3559(E) \nThe material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson. West and \ntheir affiliates. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192068\n", "char_count": 539}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 482, "text_content": "Page 2 of 56 \nAltiestlaw. \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nUNITED STATES PUBLIC LAWS \n108th Congress - First Session \nConvening January 7, 2003 \nCopr. © West Group 2003. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt.Works \nPage I \nAdditions and Deletions are not identified in this database. \nVetoed provisions within tabular material are not displayed \nPL 108-21 (S 151) \nApril 30, 2003 \nPROSECUTORIAL REMEDIES AND TOOLS AGAINST THE EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN TODAY ACT \nOF 2003 (PROTECT ACT) \nAN ACT To prevent child abduction and the sexual exploitation of children, and for other purposes. \nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States \nof America in Congress assembled, \nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. \n« 18 USCA § 1 NOTE » \n(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the \"Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploita-\ntion of Children Today Act of 2003\" or \"PROTECT Act\". \n(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows: \nSec. I. Short title; table of contents. \nSec. 2. Severability. \nTITLE I--SANCTIONS AND OFFENSES \nSec. 101. Supervised release term for sex offenders. \nSec. 102. First degree murder for child abuse and child torture murders. \nSec. 103. Sexual abuse penalties. \nSec. 104. Stronger penalties against kidnapping. \nSec. 105. Penalties against sex tourism. \nSec. 106. Two strikes you're out. \nSec. 107. Attempt liability for international parental kidnapping. \nSec. 108. Pilot program for national criminal history background checks and feasibility study. \nCopr. Cd West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prit=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192069\n", "char_count": 1759}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 483, "text_content": "PL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Slat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nTITLE II—INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS \nSec. 201. Interceptions of communications in investigations of sex offenses. \nSec. 202. No statute of limitations for child abduction and sex crimes. \nSec. 203. No pretrial release for those who rape or kidnap children. \nSec. 204. Suzanne's law. \nTITLE HI—PUBLIC OUTREACH \nSubtitle A—AMBER Alert \nSec. 301. National coordination of AMBER alert communications network. \nPage 3 of 56 \nPage 2 \nSec. 302. Minimum standards for issuance and dissemination of alerts through AMBER alert communications \nnetwork. \nSec. 303. Grant program for notification and communications systems along highways for recovery of abducted \nchildren. \nSec. 304. Grant program for support of AMBER alert communications plans. \nSec. 305. Limitation on liability. \nSubtitle B--National Center for Missing and Exploited Children \nSec. 321. Increased support. \nSec. 322. Forensic and investigative support of missing and exploited children. \nSec. 323. Creation of cyber tipline. \nSubtitle C--Sex Offender Apprehension Program \nSec. 341. Authorization. \nSubtitle D—Missing Children Procedures in Public Buildings \nSec. 361. Short title. \n*651 Sec. 362. Definitions. \nSec. 363. Procedures in public buildings regarding a missing or lost child. \nSubtitle E—Child Advocacy Center Grants \nSec. 381. Information and documentation required by Attorney General under Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990. \nTITLE 1V—SENTENCING REFORM \nSec. 401. Sentencing reform. \nTITLE'--OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY \nSubtitle A--Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention \nCopr. c \\Vest 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhttps://web2.westlaw.cozn/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192070\n", "char_count": 1806}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 484, "text_content": "Page 4 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPage 3 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nSec. 501. Findings. \nSec. 502. Improvements to prohibition on virtual child pornography. \nSec. 503. Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography. \nSec. 504. Obscene child pornography. \nSec. 505. Admissibility of evidence. \nSec. 506. Extraterritorial production of child pornography for distribution in the United States. \nSec. 507. Strengthening enhanced penalties for repeat offenders. \nSec. 508. Service provider reporting of child pornography and related information. \nSec. 509. Investigative authority relating to child pornography. \nSec. 510. Civil remedies. \nSec. 511. Recordkeeping requirements. \nSec. 512. Sentencing enhancements for interstate travel to engage in sexual act with a juvenile. \nSec. 513. Miscellaneous provisions. \nSubtitle B--Truth in Domain Names \nSec. 521. Misleading domain names on the Internet. \nTITLE V1--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS \nSec. 601. Penalties for use of minors in crimes of violence. \nSec. 602. Sense of Congress. \nSec. 603. Communications Decency Act of 1996. \nSec. 604. Internet availability of information concerning registered sex offenders. \nSec. 605. Registration of child pornographers in the national sex offender registry. \nSec. 606. Grants to States for costs of compliance with new sex offender registry requirements. \nSec. 607. Safe ID Act. \nSec. 608. Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act. \nSec. 609. Definition of vehicle. \nSec. 610. Authorization of John Doe DNA indictments. \nSec. 611. Transitional housing assistance grants for child victims of domestic violence, stalking, or sexual as-\nCopr. C West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhups:/Aveb2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192071\n", "char_count": 1851}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 485, "text_content": "Page 5 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108.21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nsault. \n« 18 USCA § 1 NOTE >> \nSEC. 2. SEVERABILITY. \nPage 4 \nIf any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, \nthe remainder of this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other \ncircumstances, shall not be affected by such invalidation. \nTITLE I--SANCTIONS AND OFFENSES \n« 18 USCA § 3583 » \nSEC. 101. SUPERVISED RELEASE TERM FOR SEX OFFENDERS. \nSection 3583 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--\n« 18 USCA § 3583 >> \n( ) in subsection (eX3), by inserting \"on any such revocation\" after \"required to serve\"; \n« 18 USCA § 3583 >> \n(2) in subsection (h), by striking \"that is less than the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsec-\ntion (eX3)\"; and \n« 18 USCA § 3583 >> \n(3) by adding at the end the following: \n*652 \"(k) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the authorized term of supervised release for any offense under sec-\ntion 1201 involving a minor victim, and for any offense under section 1591, 2241, 2242, 2244(a)( ), 2244(aX2), \n2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425, is any term of years or life.\". \n«\n18 USCA § 111 » \nSEC. 102. FIRST DEGREE MURDER FOR CHILD ABUSE AND CHILD TORTURE MURDERS. \nSection 1111 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--\n« 18 USCA § Ill >> \n(1) in subsection (a)--\n(A) by inserting \"child abuse,\" after \"sexual abuse,\"; and \n(I3) by inserting \"or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children;\" \nafter \"robbery;\"; and \n« 18 USCA § Ill >> \n(2) by inserting at the end the following: \n\"(c) For purposes of this section--\n\"(1) the term 'assault' has the same meaning as given that term in section 113; \nCopr. it West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhttps:/Aveb2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA0019\n... [truncated, 2005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/485 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=485]", "char_count": 2005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 486, "text_content": "Page 6 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPage 5 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Slat 650) \n\"(2) the term 'child' means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years and is--\n\"(A) under the perpetrator's care or control; or \n\"(B) at least six years younger than the perpetrator; \n\"(3) the term 'child abuse' means intentionally or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to a child; \n\"(4) the term 'pattern or practice of assault or torture' means assault or torture engaged in on at least two occa- sions; \n\"(5) the term 'serious bodily injury' has the meaning set forth in section 1365; and \n\"(6) the term 'torture' means conduct, whether or not committed under the color of law, that otherwise satisfies \nthe definition set forth in section 2340(1).\". \nSEC. 103. SEXUAL ABUSE PENALTIES. \n(a) MAXIMUM PENALTY INCREASES.—(1) Chapter 110 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—\n« 18 USCA § 2251 >> \n(A) in section 2251(d)—\n(i) by striking \"20\" and inserting \"30\"; and \n(ii) by striking \"30\" the first place it appears and inserting \"50\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2252 » \n(B) in section 2252(6)(1)—\n(i) by striking \"15\" and inserting \"20\"; and \n(ii) by striking \"30\" and inserting \"40\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2252 >> \n(C) in section 2252(bX2)—\n(i) by striking \"5\" and inserting \"10\"; and \n(ii) by striking \"10\" and inserting \"20\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2252A » \n(D) in section 2252A(bX1)—\n(i) by striking \"15\" and inserting \"20\"; and \n(ii) by striking \"30\" and inserting \"40\"; and \n« 18 USCA § 2252A >> \n(E) in section 2252A(bX2)—\nCopr. O West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192073\n", "char_count": 1696}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 487, "text_content": "Page 7 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPage 6 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \n(1) by striking \"5\" and inserting \"10\"; and \n(ii) by striking \"10\" and inserting \"20\". \n(2) Chapter 117 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--\n<< 18 USCA § 2422» \n(A) in section 2422(a), by striking \"10\" and inserting \"20\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2422 >> \n(B) in section 2422(6), by striking \"15\" and inserting \"30\"; and \n« 18 USCA § 2423 » \n(C) in section 2423(a), by striking \"15\" and inserting \"30\". \n« 18 USCA § 1591 » \n*653 (3) Section 1591(bX2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking \"20\" and inserting \"40\". \n(b) MINIMUM PENALTY INCREASES.—(1) Chapter 110 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—\n<< 18 USCA § 2251 » \n(A) in section 2251(d)—\n(i) by striking \"or imprisoned not less than 10\" and inserting \"and imprisoned not less than 15\"; \n(ii) by striking \"and both,\"; \n(iii) by striking \"15\" and inserting \"25\"; and \n(iv) by striking \"30\" the second place it appears and inserting \"35\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2251A >> \n(B) in section 2251A(a) and (b), by striking \"20\" and inserting \"30\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2252 » \n(C) in section 2252(bX1)—\n(i) by striking \"or imprisoned\" and inserting \"and imprisoned not less than 5 years and\"; \n(ii) by striking \"or both,\"; and \n(iii) by striking \"5\" and inserting \"15\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2252 >> \n(D) in section 2252(b)(2), by striking \"2\" and inserting \"10\"; \n« 18 USCA § 2252A » \n(E) in section 2252A(bXI)—\n(i) by striking \"or imprisoned\" and inserting \"and imprisoned not less than 5 years and\"; \nCopr. O West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 2/27/2008 \nEFTA00192074\n", "char_count": 1717}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 488, "text_content": "Page 8 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPage 7 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \n(ii) by striking \"or both,\"; and \n(iii) by striking \"5\" and inserting \"15\"; and \n« 18 USCA § 2252A >> \n(F) in section 2252A(bX2), by striking \"2\" and inserting \"10\". \n(2) Chapter 117 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--\n« 18 USCA § 2422 >> \n(A) in section 2422(b)—\n(i) by striking \", imprisoned\" and inserting \"and imprisoned not less than 5 years and\"; and \n(ii) by striking \", or both\"; and \n(B) in section 2423(a)--\n« 18 USCA § 2422 >> \n(i) by striking \", imprisoned\" and inserting \"and imprisoned not less than 5 years and\"; and \n« 18 USCA § 2423 >> \n(ii) by striking \", or both\". \nSEC. 104. STRONGER PENALTIES AGAINST KIDNAPPING. \n« 28 USCA § 994 NOTE » \n(a) SENTENCING GUIDELINES.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding the amendment of \nSentencing Guidelines, the United States Sentencing Commission is directed to amend the Sentencing \nGuidelines, to take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act—\n(1) so that the base offense level for kidnapping in section 2A4.1(a) is increased from level 24 to level 32; \n(2) so as to delete section 2A4.1(bX4)(C); and \n(3) so that the increase provided by section 2A4.1(bX5) is 6 levels instead of 3. \n« 18 USCA § 1201 » \n(b) MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE.--Section 1201(g) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by \nstriking \"shall be subject to paragraph (2)\" in paragraph (I) and all that follows through paragraph (2) and insert-\ning \"shall include imprisonment for not less than 20 years.\". \n« 18 USCA § 2423 >> \nSEC. 105. PENALTIES AGAINST SEX TOURISM. \n(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2423 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (b) and in-\nserting the following: \n*654 \"(b) TRAVEL WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN ILLICIT SEXUAL CONDUCT.—A person who travels in \nCopr. C West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works \nhlips://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx\n... [truncated, 2063 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/488 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=488]", "char_count": 2063}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 489, "text_content": "Page 9 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPage 8 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \ninterstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for perman-\nent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit \nsexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this tide or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. \n\"(c) ENGAGING IN ILLICIT SEXUAL CONDUCT IN FOREIGN PLACES.--Any United States citizen or ali-\nen admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct \nwith another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. \n\"(d) ANCILLARY OFFENSES.—Whoever, for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain, \narranges, induces, procures, or facilitates the travel of a person knowing that such a person is traveling in inter-\nstate commerce or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct shall be fined under \nthis title, imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. \n\"(e) ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY.—Whoever attempts or conspires to violate subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) \nshall be punishable in the same manner as a completed violation of that subsection. \n\"(f) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term 'illicit sexual conduct' means (I) a sexual act (as defined in \nsection 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act \noccurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex act \n(as defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age. \n\"(g) DEFENSE.—In a prosecution under this section based on illicit sexual conduct as defined in subsection \n(1)(2), it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant \nreasonably believed that the pers\n... [truncated, 3435 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/489 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=489]", "char_count": 3435}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 490, "text_content": "Page 10 of 56 \nPL 108.21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108.21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 9 \ntransportation of minors); \n\"(B) the term 'State sex offense' means an offense under State law that is punishable by more than one year in \nprison and consists of conduct that would be a Federal sex offense if, to the extent or in the manner specified in \nthe applicable provision of this title--\n\"(i) the offense involved interstate or foreign commerce, or the use of the mails; or \n\"(ii) the conduct occurred in any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, within the spe-\ncial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in a Federal prison, on any land or building owned \nby, leased to. or otherwise used by or under the control of the Government of the United States, or in the Indian \ncountry (as defined in section 1151); \n\"(C) the term 'prior sex conviction' means a conviction for which the sentence was imposed before the conduct \noccurred constituting the subsequent Federal sex offense, and which was for a Federal sex offense or a State sex \noffense; \n\"(D) the term 'minor' means an individual who has not attained the age of 17 years; and \n\"(E) the term 'state' has the meaning given that term in subsection (c)(2). \n\"(3) NONQUALIFYING FELONIES.--An offense described in section 2422(b) or 2423(a) shall not serve as a \nbasis for sentencing under this subsection if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that--\n\"(A) the sexual act or activity was consensual and not for the purpose of commercial or pecuniary gain; \n\"(B) the sexual act or activity would not be punishable by more than one year in prison under the law of the \nState in which it occurred; or \n\"(C) no sexual act or activity occurred.\". \n« 18 USCA § 2247 » \n« 18 USCA § 2426 >> \n(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Sections 2247(a) and 2426(a) of title 18, United States Code, are each \namended by inserting \", unless section 3559(e) applies\" before the final pe\n... [truncated, 2570 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/490 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=490]", "char_count": 2570}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 491, "text_content": "Page 11 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \n(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting \"or\" after the semicolon. \nPage 10 \n«42 USCA § 5119a NOTE » \nSEC. 108. PILOT PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS AND \nFEASIBILITY STUDY. \n(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF PILOT PROGRAM.—\n(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall \nestablish a pilot program for volunteer groups to obtain national *656 and State criminal history background \nchecks through a 10-fingerprint check to be conducted utilizing State criminal records and the Integrated Auto-\nmated Fingerprint Identification system of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. \n(2) STATE PILOT PROGRAM.--\n(A) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall designate 3 States as participants in an 18-month State pilot \nprogram. \n(B) VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATION REQUESTS.—A volunteer organization in one of the 3 States particip-\nating in the State pilot program under this paragraph that is part of the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the Na-\ntional Mentoring Partnerships, or the National Council of Youth Sports may submit a request for a \n10-fingerprint check from the participating State. A volunteer organization in a participating State may not sub-\nmit background check requests under paragraph (3). \n(C) STATE CHECK.—The participating State under this paragraph after receiving a request under subpara-\ngraph (B) shall conduct a State background check and submit a request that a Federal check be performed \nthrough the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to \nthe Attorney General, in a manner to be determined by the Attorney General. \n(D) INFORMATION PROVIDED.--Under procedures established by the Attorney General, any criminal his-\ntory record information resulting from the State and Federal check under subparagraph (C) shall be provided to \nthe State or National Cent\n... [truncated, 3243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/491 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=491]", "char_count": 3243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 492, "text_content": "Page 12 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 11 \ngraph (B) conducted through the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System of the Federal Bureau \nof Investigation. \n(B) ELIGIBLE ORGANIZATIONS.--An organization described in this subparagraph is an organization in a \nState not designated under paragraph (2) that has received a request allotment pursuant to subparagraph (C). \n*657 (C) REQUEST ALLOTMENTS.--The following organizations may allot requests as follows: \n(i) 33,334 for the Boys and Girls Clubs of America. \n(ii) 33,333 for the National Mentoring Partnership. \n(iii) 33,333 for the National Council of Youth Sports. \n(D) PROCEDURES.--The Attorney General shall notify the organizations described in subparagraph (C) of a \nprocess by which the organizations may provide fingerprint cards to the Attorney General. \n(E) VOLUNTEER INFORMATION REQUIRED.--An organization authorized to request a background check \nunder this paragraph shall--\n(i) forward to the Attorney General the volunteers fingerprints; and \n(ii) obtain a statement completed and signed by the volunteer that--\n(I) sets out the provider or volunteer's name, address, date of birth appearing on a valid identification docu-\nment as defined in section 1028 of title 18, United States Code, and a photocopy of the valid identifying docu- ment; \n(II) states whether the volunteer has a criminal record, and, if so, sets out the particulars of such record; \n(III) notifies the volunteer that the Attorney General may perform a criminal history background check and \nthat the volunteer's signature to the statement constitutes an acknowledgment that such a check may be conduc- ted; \n(IV) notifies the volunteer that prior to and after the completion of the background check, the organization \nmay choose to deny the provider access to children; and \n(I) notifies the volunteer of his right to correct an erroneous record held by the Attorney General. \n\n... [truncated, 2913 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/492 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=492]", "char_count": 2913}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 493, "text_content": "Page 13 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 12 \nprovider or volunteer unfit to provide care to children based upon criteria established jointly, the National Cen-\nter for Missing and Exploited Children, the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the National Mentoring Partner-\nship, and the National Council of Youth Sports. \n•658 (ii) CHILD SAFETY PILOT PROGRAM.--The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children \nshall convey that determination to the organizations making requests under this paragraph. \n(4) FEES COLLECTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.--The Attorney General may collect a fee which may not \nexceed 518 to cover the cost to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct the background check under para-\ngraph (2) or (3). \n(b) RIGHTS OF VOLUNTEERS.--Each volunteer who is the subject of a criminal history background check un-\nder this section is entitled to contact the Attorney General to initiate procedures to--\n(1) obtain a copy of their criminal history record report; and \n(2) challenge the accuracy and completeness of the criminal history record information in the report. \n(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--\n( I ) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to the National Cen-\nter for Missing and Exploited Children for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to carry out the requirements of this sec- tion. \n(2) STATE PROGRAM.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to the Attorney \nGeneral for the States designated in subsection (a)( I ) for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to establish and enhance \nfinger print technology infrastructure of the participating State. \n(d) FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A SYSTEM OF BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYEES AND VO-\nLUNTEERS.--\n(1) STUDY REQUIRED.--The Attorney General shall conduct a feasibility study within 180 days after the date \nof the enactment of this Act. The study shall examine, to the extent discernible, the f\n... [truncated, 3163 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/493 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=493]", "char_count": 3163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 494, "text_content": "Page 14 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 13 \ncompanies to process fingerprints and conduct background checks. \n(F) The existence of \"model\" or best practice programs which could easily be expanded and duplicated in oth-\ner States. \n(G) The extent to which private companies arc currently performing background checks and the possibility \n*659 of using private companies in the future to perform any of the background check process, including, but \nnot limited to, the capture and transmission of fingerprints and fitness determinations. \n(H) The cost of development and operation of the technology and the infrastructure necessary to establish a \nnationwide fingerprint-based and other criminal background check system. \n(I) The extent of State participation in the procedures for background checks authorized in the National Child \nProtection Act (Public Law 103-209), as amended by the Volunteers for Children Act (sections 221 and 222 of \nPublic Law 105-251). \n(J) The extent to which States currently provide access to nationwide criminal history background checks to \norganizations that serve children. \n(K) The extent to which States currently permit volunteers to appeal adverse fitness determinations, and \nwhether similar procedures arc required at the Federal level. \n(L) The implementation of the 2 pilot programs created in subsection (a). \n(M) Any privacy concerns that may arise from nationwide criminal background checks. \n(N) Any other information deemed relevant by the Department of Justice. \n(2) INTERIM REPORT.--Based on the findings of the feasibility study under paragraph (1), the Attorney Gener-\nal shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to Congress an interim report, \nwhich may include recommendations for a pilot project to develop or improve programs to collect fingerprints \nand perform background checks on individuals that seek to volunteer with organizatio\n... [truncated, 3187 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/494 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=494]", "char_count": 3187}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 495, "text_content": "Page 15 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 14 \n« 18 USCA § 2516 >> \n*660 (1) in paragraph (a), by inserting after \"chapter 37 (relating to espionage),\" the following: \"chapter 55 \n(relating to kidnapping),\"; and \n« 18 USCA § 2516 >> \n(2) in paragraph (c)—\n(A) by inserting \"section 1591 (sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion),\" after \"section 1511 \n(obstruction of State or local law enforcement),\"; and \n(B) by inserting \"section 225IA (selling or buying of children), section 2252A (relating to material constitut-\ning or containing child pornography), section 1466A (relating to child obscenity), section 2260 (production of \nsexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States), sections 2421, 2422, 2423, and \n2425 (relating to transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes),\" after \"sections 2251 and 2252 \n(sexual exploitation of children),\". \n« 18 USCA § 3283 >> \nSEC. 202. NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILD ABDUCTION AND SEX CRIMES. \nSection 3283 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: \n\"§ 3283. Offenses against children \n\"No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or phys-\nical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of \nthe child.\". \n« 18 USCA § 3142 » \nSEC. 203. NO PRETRIAL RELEASE FOR THOSE WHO RAPE OR KIDNAP CHILDREN. \nSection 3142(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—\n(1) by striking \"1901 et seq.), or\" and inserting \"1901 et seq.),\"; and \n(2) by striking \"of title 18 of the United States Code\" and inserting \"of this title, or an offense involving a minor \nvictim under section 1201, 1591, 2241, 2242, 2244(aX1), 2245, 2251, 2251A, 2252(aX1), 2252(aX2), \n2252(aX3), 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(aX2), 2252A(a)(3), 2252A(a)(4), 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425 of this title\". \n«42 USCA § 5779» \n... [truncated, 2462 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/495 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=495]", "char_count": 2462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 496, "text_content": "Page 16 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 15 \n(a) COORDINATION WITHIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE--The Attorney General shall assign an officer of \nthe Department of Justice to act as the national coordinator of the AMBER Alert communications network re-\ngarding abducted children. The officer so designated shall be known as the AMBER Alert Coordinator of the \nDepartment of Justice. \n*661 (b) DUTIES.--In acting as the national coordinator of the AMBER Alert communications network, the Co-\nordinator shall--\n(I) seek to eliminate gaps in the network, including gaps in areas of interstate travel; \n(2) work with States to encourage the development of additional elements (known as local AMBER plans) in the \nnetwork; \n(3) work with States to ensure appropriate regional coordination of various elements of the network; and \n(4) act as the nationwide point of contact for--\n(A) the development of the network; and \n(B) regional coordination of alerts on abducted children through the network. \n(c) CONSULTATION WITH FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.--In carrying out duties under sub-\nsection (b), the Coordinator shall notify and consult with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation \nconcerning each child abduction for which an alert is issued through the AMBER Alert communications net- work. \n(d) COOPERATION.--The Coordinator shall cooperate with the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal \nCommunications Commission in carrying out activities under this section. \n(e) REPORT.--Not later than March I, 2005, the Coordinator shall submit to Congress a report on the activities \nof the Coordinator and the effectiveness and status of the AMBER plans of each State that has implemented \nsuch a plan. The Coordinator shall prepare the report in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation. \n« 42 USCA \n5791a >> \nSEC. 302. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR ISSUANCE AND DISSEMINATION OF ALERTS THROUGH \nAMBER ALERT COMMUNICATIO\n... [truncated, 2843 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/496 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=496]", "char_count": 2843}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 497, "text_content": "Page 17 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30. 2003. 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \nPage 16 \nspecial needs of an abducted child (including health care needs) are disseminated to the appropriate law enforce-\nment, public health, and other public officials. \n(3) The minimum standards shall, to the maximum extent practicable (as determined by the Coordinator in con-\nsultation with State and local law enforcement agencies), provide that the dissemination of an alert through the \nAMBER Alert communications network be limited to the geographic areas most likely to facilitate the recovery \nof the abducted child concerned. \n(4) In carrying out activities under subsection (a), the Coordinator may not interfere with the current system of \nvoluntary coordination between local broadcasters and State and local law enforcement agencies for purposes of \nthe AMBER Alen communications network. \n*662 (c) COOPERATION.--(1) The Coordinator shall cooperate with the Secretary of Transportation and the \nFederal Communications Commission in carrying out activities under this section. \n(2) The Coordinator shall also cooperate with local broadcasters and State and local law enforcement agencies in \nestablishing minimum standards under this section. \n« 42 USCA § 5791b >> \nSEC. 303. GRANT PROGRAM FOR NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ALONG \nHIGHWAYS FOR RECOVERY OF ABDUCTED CHILDREN. \n(a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.--The Secretary of Transportation shall carry out a program to provide grants to \nStates for the development or enhancement of notification or communications systems along highways for alerts \nand other information for the recovery of abducted children. \n(b) DEVELOPMENT GRANTS.--\n(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary may make a grant to a State under this subsection for the development of a \nState program for the use of changeable message signs or other motorist information systems to notify motorists \nabout abductions of children. The State program shall provide for the pl\n... [truncated, 3164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/497 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=497]", "char_count": 3164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 498, "text_content": "Page 18 of 56 \nPL 108.21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: Ill Stat 650) \nPage 17 \n(E) To plan and design improved systems for communicating with motorists, including the capability for issu-\ning wide area alerts to motorists. \n(F) To plan systems and protocols to facilitate the efficient issuance of child abduction notification and other \nkey information to motorists during off-hours. \n(G) To provide training and guidance to transportation authorities to facilitate appropriate use of changeable \nmessage signs and other traveler information systems for the notification of motorists about abductions of chil- dren. \n(c) IMPLEMENTATION GRANTS.--\n(I) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary may make a grant to a State under this subsection for the implementation of a \nprogram for the use of changeable message signs or other motorist information systems to notify motorists about \nabductions of *663 children. A State shall be eligible for a grant under this subsection if the Secretary determ-\nines that the State has developed a State program in accordance with subsection (b). \n(2) ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES.--A grant under this subsection may be used by a State to support the implementa-\ntion of systems that use changeable message signs or other motorist information systems to notify motorists \nabout abductions of children. Such support may include the purchase and installation of changeable message \nsigns or other motorist information systems to notify motorists about abductions of children. \n(d) FEDERAL SHARE.--The Federal share of the cost of any activities funded by a grant under this section may \nnot exceed 80 percent. \n(e) DISTRIBUTION OF GRANT AMOUNTS.--The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, distrib-\nute grants under this section equally among the States that apply for a grant under this section within the time \nperiod prescribed by the Secretary. \n(f) ADMINISTRATION.--The Secretary shall prescribe requirements, including application requi\n... [truncated, 3066 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00191587/498 or ?id=EFTA00191587&page=498]", "char_count": 3066}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00191587", "page_number": 499, "text_content": "Page 19 of 56 \nPL 108-21, 2003 S 151 \nPL 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650 \n(Cite as: 117 Stat 650) \n«42 USCA § 5791c >> \nSEC. 304. GRANT PROGRAM FOR SUPPORT OF AMBER ALERT COMMUNICATIONS PLANS. \nPage 18 \n(a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.--The Attorney General shall carry out a program to provide grants to States for the \ndevelopment or enhancement of programs and activities for the support of AMBER Alert communications plans. \n(b) ACTIVITIES.--Activities funded by grants under the program under subsection (a) may include--\n( I ) the development and implementation of education and training programs, and associated materials, relating \nto AMBER Alert communications plans; \n(2) the development and implementation of law enforcement programs, and associated equipment, relating to \nAMBER Alert communications plans; \n(3) the development and implementation of new technologies to improve AMBER Alert communications; and \n(4) such other activities as the Attorney General considers appropriate for supporting the AMBER Alert commu-\nnications program. \n•664 (c) FEDERAL SHARE.--The Federal share of the cost of any activities funded by a grant under the pro-\ngram under subsection (a) may not exceed 50 percent. \n(d) DISTRIBUTION OF GRANT AMOUNTS ON GEOGRAPHIC BASIS.--The Attorney General shall, to the \nmaximum extent practicable, ensure the distribution of grants under the program under subsection (a) on an \nequitable basis throughout the various regions of the United States. \n(e) ADMINISTRATION.--The Attorney General shall prescribe requirements, including application require-\nments, for grants under the program under subsection (a). \n(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--(1) There is authorized to be appropriated for the Department \nof Justice $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2004 to carry out this section and, in addition, $5,000,000 for fiscal year \n2004 to carry out subsection (b)(3). \n(2) Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in paragraph (1) shall remain avai\n... 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