{"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_count": 23, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00190116", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00190116.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "LAW of riccs Of \nGERALD B. LEpcouErr, P.C. \nA PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION \n148 EAST 78\" STREET \nNEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT \nlefccitul@letcourtlaw corn \nSHERYL E. REICH \nNideilkOuNsw.com \nRENATO C. STABILE \nstablefcaurlaw.com \nFAITH A. FRIEDMAN \nflriolmsnalccostlawcom \nBY FEDERAL EXPRESS \nJuly 6, 2007 \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq., First Assistant United States Attorney \nMatthew Menchel, Esq., Chief, Criminal Division \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \n99 NE 4'h Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \nAndrew Lourie, Deputy Chief, Northern Region \nA. Marie Villafafia, Assistant United States Attorney \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \n500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, Florida 33401 \nJeffrey Epstein \nDear Messrs. Sloman, Menchel and Lourie and Ms. Villafafia: \nTELEPHONE \n(alai 737-0400 \nFACSIMILE \n1212)124384192 \nWe write as counsel to Jeffrey Epstein to follow-up on our meeting on June 26, \n2007. We thought the meeting was extremely productive and appreciate your giving us \nthe opportunity to engage you on the facts, law and policy that will inform any decision \nyou make on how and whether to proceed. \nI. \n18 U.S.C. §2422(b) Has No Applicability to the Facts Here. \nEven assuming the facts as you believe them to be, as demonstrated below, a \nprosecution under 18 U.S.C. §2422(b) would violate the explicit terms of the statute, pose \ninsurmountable constitutional barriers, and be unprecedented, unwise, and utterly \ninappropriate. This statute, with its mandatory minimum sentence' was designed to reach \n' The statute in effect during the events at issue carries a mandatory five-year period of \nincarceration. The current ten-year mandatory minimum was instituted in 2006. \nEFTA00190116\n", "char_count": 1793}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "LAW Or•ICC, Or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 2 \nthose who deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally target and exploit children through \nthe interact. Though the literal language may superficially apply to a wider variety of \nbehaviors, we submit that the statute cannot properly be used to prosecute what have \ntraditionally been viewed as state offenses, even if some facility or means of interstate \ncommerce can be said to have been used by someone at some point during the course of \nevents. \n1. \nCongress's Purpose \nSection 2422(6), the so-called \"Internet Luring Statute\", addresses online \nenticement of children. The subsection was included in Title I of the \nTelecommunications Act of 1996, entitled \"Obscenity and Violence\", after the Senate \nJudiciary Committee held a hearing regarding child endangerment via the internet. See \nH.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 193 (1996), quoted in United States' Searcy, 418 F.3d \n1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005); see also K. Seto, \"Note: How Should Legislation Deal with \nChildren and the Victims and Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?\" 9 Cardoso Women's L.J. 67 \n(2002). \nIn enacting the statute, Congress recognized that young people were using the \ninternet in ever-increasing numbers, and it was proving to be a dangerous place. \nAccording to a DOJ study, one in five youths (aged 10 to 17) had received a sexual \napproach or solicitation over the internet in the previous year. One in 33 had received an \n\"aggressive sexual solicitation\", in which a predator had asked a young person to meet \nsomewhere or called a young person on the phone. U.S.D.O.J., Office of Justice \nPrograms, OVC Bulletin,\" Internet Crimes Against Children\" (12/2001); \nwww.oip.usdoj.gov/ovc/aublications/bulletons/intemet  \" 2 2001/intemet _2_01_6.htm I. \nCongress saw that, with so many children online,\n... [truncated, 2671 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/1 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=1]", "char_count": 2671}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "I...my °Final. \nOF \nGERALD B. LEFCOLTRT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafana, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 3 \n§3299.2 The law was named in memory of Adam Walsh who, 25 years earlier, had been \nabducted from a department store and was later found murdered, and whose parents had \nbecome advocates for missing children. In his signing statement, President Bush noted \nthat it increased federal penalties for crimes against children, imposing \"tough mandatory \nminimum penalties for the most serious crimes against our children.\" 2006 \nU.S.C.C.A.N. S35, 2006 WL 3064686 (emphasis added). The five-year mandatory \nminimum it replaced was itself established as part of the PROTECT Act of 2003, another \nlaw designed to strengthen the government's ability to deal with certain dangerous sexual \npredators who exploited children in ways the states had been unable to address fully.3\n2. \nGeneral Overview \nIt must be remembered that §2422(b), by using the phrase \"any sexual activity for \nwhich any person can be charged with a criminal offense\", in some sense incorporates \nall the sex offense laws of all 50 states, in all their variety and in all their ambiguity. This \nin itself raises questions of the utmost seriousness, implicating fairness and the due \nprocess clause. It also constitutes an extreme example of federal pre-emption, or, more \nprecisely, the wholesale annexation of the enforcement responsibility of each of the 50 \nstates' sex-related crime statutes — whether felony, misdemeanor or violation — wherever \nthere has been use of the ever-present wires. To make every state sex \"offense\" involving \na person under I8 potentially into a mandatory minimum ten-year federal felony without \nany statute of limitations is certainly not what Congress had in mind when it enacted \n§2422(b). \n2 Other federal crimes with ten-year mandatory minimum involve very serious acts. Se\n... [truncated, 2612 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/2 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=2]", "char_count": 2612}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "LAW omen or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafatta, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 4 \nThe bulk importation of complex bodies of state law is highly problematic, and \nstrongly counsels that such matters should be left to the states except in those rare \ncircumstances where both a federal interest is clear and weighty, and the states are for \nsome reason incapable of acting. Like issues of family law, these issues are \nquintessentially of state concern within our federal system. \nState laws regarding both sexual activity and the age of consent to engage therein \nare hugely varied, reflecting different histories, values, politics, and personalities. See \nRichard A. Posner & Katharine B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws (1996). The \nvarious and shifting societal reasons underlying those laws, and the societal pressures \noperating in the area, where sexual mores change over time, complicate the matter even \nfurther. See generally Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (1992). The history of the \nMann Act confirms the caution with which the federal government should approach this \nentire area. For example, historically, the Act was used by some prosecutors in some \njurisdictions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we \nsubmit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, \nCrossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). \nEven where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalized, \nthe various states treat the very same conduct differently; to apply such laws selectively \nby different federal prosecutors would undermine further what uniformity does exist. In \nNew York, for example, a 50 year old man who patronizes a 15 year old prostitute is \nguilty of a Class A misdemeanor. New York Penal Law §230.04. If §2422(b) were read \nexpansively, \n... [truncated, 3075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/3 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=3]", "char_count": 3075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "LAW orriCC5 or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. EC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 5 \nperpetrator. Section 2422(b), with its ten-year mandatory minimum is far too blunt a tool \nto use in any circumstances except the narrow, clear-cut, and egregious circumstances \nCongress had in mind when it enacted this law? \nThough §2422(b) is susceptible to multiple interpretations, it was designed to \naddress a specific a problem with which Mr. Epstein's case has nothing in common. If \nstretched to reach beyond the core concern of the statute, a host of problems immediately \narise. A simple reading of the words of the statute leaves any reasonable reader with far \nmore questions than answers as to what is illegal. Any attempt to apply the statute to Mr. \nEpstein's situation highlights the many problems of vagueness, overbreadth, and simple \nincomprehensibility lurking in or just below the statute's text. \n3. \nThe Statute's Text And Its Thrust \nSection 2422(b) currently provides: \nWhoever, using the mail or any facility or means of \ninterstate or foreign commerce, or within the special \nmaritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United \nStates knowingly persuades, induces, entices or \ncoerces any individual who has not attained the age \nof 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual \nactivity for which any person can be charged with a \ncriminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined \nunder this title and imprisoned not less than ten \nyears or for life. \nThe statutory language and reported decisions confirm the statute's important, but \nnarrow, focus: the luring of children over the Internet. Unlike 18 U.S.C. §§2241 et seq., \n5 Penalties under state statutes criminalizing online enticement also vary widely. According to the \nNational Center for Missing and Exploited Children, though the offense can be a felony in all \nstates, 15 st\n... [truncated, 2329 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/4 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=4]", "char_count": 2329}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "LAW OrrICCS Or \nGERALD B. LEFCOTJRT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 6 \n§2422(b) does not establish any federal sex crimes with a minor. Section 2422's subject \nis not sex or sexual activity or face-to-face sexual exploitation of minors. Such behavior \nremains a matter of state, not federal, concern. The plain language of the statute \nmandates focus on the communication and demands that the knowing \"persuasion\", \n\"inducement\", \"enticement\" or \"coercion\" be done \"using the mail or any facility or \nmeans of interstate ...commerce\" (emphasis added). Any other reading would violate \nconstitutional principles of fair warning, notice, lenity and due process. Additionally, any \nbroader reading would violate the clearly stated intent of Congress that enacted the law \nand the President who signed it. It would also exceed the authority of Congress under the \nCommerce Clause by federalizing virtually all state sex offenses involving people under \nthe age of 18. \nSection 2422(b) defines a crime of communication, not of contact. It makes \nunlawful a narrow category of communications, ones not protected by the First \nAmendment. Both the attempt and the substantive crime defined by §2422 are complete \nat the time when communication with a minor or purported minor takes place; the essence \nof the crime occurs before any face-to-face meeting or any sexual activity with a minor, \nand regardless of whether any meeting or activity ever occurs. \nTurning the statute on its head by first looking at the alleged sexual activities and \nthen seeking to find a mailing, a use of the wires, or the involvement of another facility or \nmeans of interstate commerce as a pretext for the invocation of federal jurisdiction would \nbe without precedent and make a narrowly-focused statute into virtually a complete \nfederalization of all state sex offenses \n... [truncated, 2777 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/5 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=5]", "char_count": 2777}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "LAW OFFICES CW \nGERALD B. LEPCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafarla, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 7 \nThe statutory language can bear no other construction. The words \"whoever, \nusing . . . knowingly persuades ...\" necessarily requires that the \"whoever\" must \"use\" \nthe interstate facility to knowingly persuade. That is, the word \"using\" is in the present, \nnot the past, tense. Thus, the \"using\" must occur at the same time as the \"persuading\". If \nthe statute meant otherwise, it could and would have been drafted differently: \"whoever \nhaving used the mail and knowingly persuades\" or \"whoever uses the mail and \nknowingly persuades\". But, as it is written, the actor must use the interstate facility to \npersuade or to entice, or to attempt to do so; use of the instrumentality cannot be \nincidental or peripheral. \nIndeed, assuming, argue ndo, that the grammar and structure of the statute would \nallow another interpretation — which we believe it does not nevertheless the obvious, \nstraightforward reading controls. Anything else would violate the rule of lenity, requiring \nstrict construction of penal statutes, as well as the requirement of fair notice guaranteed \nby the due process clause. 6 As Thomas Jefferson put it in 1823: \"Laws are made for men \nof ordinary understanding, and should therefore be construed by the ordinary rules of \ncommon sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which \nmay make any thing mean every thing or nothing, at pleasure\". \nAccording to one of the world's leading experts on grammar and specifically, the \nsyntax and semantics of verbs, these rules of \"ordinary understanding\" and \"common \nsense\" dictate that \n. . . an English speaker, reading the statute, would naturally \nunderstand it as applying only to persuasion (etc.) that is \ndone while \"using the mail\" (etc.). To understand it as \napplyin\n... [truncated, 2633 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/6 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=6]", "char_count": 2633}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "LAW orriccs or \nGERALD B. LEFEOURT, \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie ViIlafalia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 8 \nthe mail, phone, etc., would be an unnatural and \ngrammatically inaccurate reading of the language. 7\nThat the statute is so limited is also confirmed by the fact that prosecutors have \nclearly understood this limitation. After conducting extensive research, we find no case \nof a defendant being prosecuted under §2422(b) where he has used the Internet or the \ntelephone, and then, by some other means, such as personal contact, attempted to \npersuade, induce, or entice. On the contrary, all §2422(b) prosecutions we have reviewed \nare premised on a defendant's use of the intemet (or occasionally the text messaging on a \nphone) as the vehicle of the inducement. See, e.g., United States! Murrel, 368 F.3d \n1283, 1286 (11ih Cir. 2004) (government must ... prove that Murrel , using the intemet, \nacted with a specific intent to persuade a means to engage in unlawful sex). \nIn fact, we have reviewed every indictment filed in the Southern District of \nFlorida in which there is at least one allegation of a violation of §2422(b). To the extent \nthe facts could be discerned from the indictment, we found no case brought where the use \nof the means of communication was remote from the persuading, coercion, etc.*\nSuch prosecutorial restraint is in MI accord with the legislative intent, which, as \nset forth above, was to go after intemet predators who use the means of communication \nto persuade, coerce, etc. That the statute also makes reference to the mails and facilities \nor means of interstate commerce other than the Internet does not suggest that the statutory \npurpose was broader: it is a common modus operandi of intemet predators to continue to \npursue young people whom they first contact on the intemet. If the statute were read to \nmake it a crime to induce or p\n... [truncated, 2941 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/7 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=7]", "char_count": 2941}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "LAW &MCC! or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villaftuia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 9 \nin the lives of young people, de-coupling the \"persuasion/enticement\" element from the \n\"use of the interstate facility\" would make virtually any sexual activity with a minor, \nchargeable under state law, a federal offense — with no statute of limitations and a \nmandatory ten-year minimum sentence. \nIndeed, given that the interstate highway system is itself an avenue of interstate \ncommerce, United States' Home, 474 F.2d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007), allowing a \nprosecution wherever a means or facility of interstate commerce is used and a forbidden \ninducement later occurs, would mean that anyone who used the interstate highways, and \nthen, at some other time, induced a minor face-to-face to engage in forbidden activity (or \nattempted to do so), would be subject to the mandatory ten years. The complete \nfederalization of sex crimes involving children would have occurred, though there is no \nindication whatsoever that such a sea change in the federal/state balance was intended or \nis even needed. \nMoreover, such an expansive reading, even if permissible, would very likely \nexceed the Commerce Clause power as the Supreme Court presently construes it. In \nUnited States' Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-\nFree School Zones Act, holding that it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority. \nIn so ruling, the Court reaffirmed a set of fundamental principles, including that the \npowers delegated to the federal government are few and defined, and that this \n\"constitutionally mandated division of authority was adopted by the Framers to ensure \nprotection of our fundamental liberties.\" Id. at 552, quoting GregoryleAshcroft, 501 \nU.S. 452, 458 (1991). The Lopez majority concluded that the statute \nfore the Court \n\"upsets the fed\n... [truncated, 2872 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/8 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=8]", "char_count": 2872}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "LAW OffICCIP Of \nGENALD B. Lzreouu-r. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 10 \nTo the extent that §2422(b) criminalizes the use of the Internet (or telephone) by a \nsexual predator to target a vulnerable minor and to convince, or to try to convince, her to \nTyk \nengage in conductrribed by law, the statute may not be unconstitutional on its face. \nSee United States \narsky, 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006) (both §§ 2422(b) and\n2423(b) \"fall squarely within Congress's power to regulate the first two categories of \nactivities described in Lopez\"). The statute would, however, be plainly unconstitutional if \nit were applied to situations like Mr. Epstein's, where neither the telephone nor the \nintemet was used in that fashion, and where the use of the telephone was, at most, a \ntenuous link in a chain of events that may, or may not, have preceded or followed sexual \ncontact with a minor.9 In other words, if the instrumentality of commerce is not the \nvehicle used to facilitate the harm Congress is trying to address, but is simply a \n\"jurisdictional hook,\" the hook is too weakly connected to the problem (sexual crimes \nagainst minors) to sustain the statute as a proper exercise of Commerce Clause power. \nQuestions about the nature of federalism, and, specifically, just how far the \nfederal government may go into matters of traditionally state concern, will continue to \narise and will be answered case-by-case. As Justice O'Connor said in her dissent in \nGonzales 'Raid?, 545 U.S. 1, 47 (2005), \". . . the task is to identify a mode of analysis \nthat allows Congress to regulate more than nothing ... and less than everything...\" \n(O'Connor, J. dissenting). United States 1 Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005), \nillustrates the difficulty of the task. In that case, the deeply split en Banc Court \nconsidered whether and to what ext\n... [truncated, 3160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/9 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=9]", "char_count": 3160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "F \nLAW Orr.CES OP \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafta, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage II \ncommerce does not, in and of itself, end the inquiry. Where the use of such \ninstrumentality is far removed from the conduct being targeted (in the case of §2422(b), \nsexual exploitation of children), the lack of any basis for federal jurisdiction presents \nitself squarely. \nIn Mr. Epstein's case, since the crime being considered (as Congress intended) is \nthe use of the intemet by intemet predators to target and lure vulnerable children to \nengage in illicit sex, the law is arguably within Congress' Commerce Clause powers. But \nMr. Epstein's conduct would be outside the law's scope. If you were to contend that any \nuse of the telephone which is connected in any fashion to an act of sexual misconduct \nwith a minor is within the statute's scope, Congress would then have reached well into \ntraditional state spheres, and there is a powerful argument that Congress would have been \nacting in excess of its Commerce Clause authority. \nElimination of Constitutional uncertainty regarding §2422(b) depends upon \nconfining it to situations where an instrumentality of interstate commerce has itself been \nused for an immoral or injurious purpose. Statutes must be read to eliminate serious \ndoubts as to Constitutionality, as long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the \ni\nintent of Congress. United States X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994), \nciting Edward., DeBartolo_ Corp. \nFlorida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Thades \nCouncil, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). At the least, to eliminate questions as to its \nconstitutionality, §2422(b)'s reach must be limited to situations where there is a very \nclose connection between the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce and the \npersuasion or attempted persuasion that the statute makes a crime. \n\n... [truncated, 2944 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/10 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=10]", "char_count": 2944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Ls °nail \nCr \nGERALD B. Larcouirr. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Laurie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafta, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 12 \nand knowledge and, critically, that the shared intent and knowledge existed at the time of \nthe communication in question. Absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. \nEpstein had actual knowledge that the person making a telephone call would induce or \npersuade a specific underage person during the telephone call to engage in unlawful \nsexual activity or to engage in prostitution, there can be no federal crime. \nIf the telephone call in question were simply to schedule a topless massage, then \nthe call lacked the essential element of inducement, persuasion, enticement, or coercion. \nIf the telephone call in question was to schedule a topless massage (or even more) with a \nwoman whose age was not known by Mr. Epstein to be under 18, it also fails to satisfy \nthe requirements of §2422(b). If Mr. Epstein had not formed the intent to engage in \nunlawful sexual activity as of the time of the communication (even if he did form the \nintent thereafter), an essential element of the federal statute is again lacking. If the \nperson making the call had knowledge or a criminal intent or belief not fully shared by \nMr. Epstein (for example, Mr. Epstein did not know the telephone call was intended to \ninduce a minor to engage in unlawful activity), the essential element of shared intent and \nshared knowledge is again lacking.1' Finally, even if there were a call to schedule a \nsecond meeting with someone who had previously been to the Epstein residence, this call \nlacks the necessary element of persuasion, inducement, or enticing even if the person \nreceiving the call hoped or expected remuneration from the return visit. That is so \nbecause the statute focuses on the content of the communication, not on any quid pro quo \nthat occurs thereafter at a meeting\n... [truncated, 3111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/11 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=11]", "char_count": 3111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "LAW OFFICE• OF \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafana, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 13 \n1299 (11th Cir. 2003) (scienter requirement discourages \"unscrupulous enforcement\" and \nclarifies §2422(b)). Directed towards those who commit \"the most serious crimes against \nchildren,\" it cannot properly be used as a trap for the unwary, sweeping within its net all \nwho may — even unwittingly and unintentionally — communicate or otherwise interact \nimproperly with persons who turn out to be minors. \nA prosecution of Mr. Epstein would violate the teachings of Bailey and Panfil. As \nwe believe we persuaded you at the June 26th meeting, Mr. Epstein never targeted minors. \nOn the contrary, what he did — at worst — was akin to putting up a sign saying to all, come \nin if you are interested in giving a massage for $200. A few among those who accepted \nthe general invitation may have in fact been under 18 (though they lied about that age and \nsaid they were 18), but that is, at its worst, comparable to \"post[ing] messages for all \ninternet users, either adults or children, to seek out and read at their discretion,\" which the \ncourts have held does not violate §2422(b). \nThus, for this reason as well, Mr. Epstein's case is far outside the parameters of \nthe §2422(b) cases that have been prosecuted. A key factor common to cases brought \nunder §2422(b) is not present here: Prosecutions under this statute have focused on a \nsexual predator who used the intemet to identify and to communicate with a child or \npurported child (or a person with influence over such child or purported child), and did so \nwith the intent to arrange to engage in sexual activity with the child, with MI knowledge \nthat sexual activity with an individual of that age was illegal. In light of this common and \nwell-accepted understanding, the eases decided under §2422(b) take as a give\n... [truncated, 3103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/12 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=12]", "char_count": 3103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "LAW orr.CC5 or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafana, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 14 \ndefendant's §2422(b) attempt conviction was valid; it mattered not that the 14 year old \nwas really an adult FBI agent engaged in a sting operation, for the defendant \"believed \nCindy to be a minor and acted on that belief.\" 251 EM at 512. Our own survey of the \ncases brought in this district under §2422(b) confirms that prosecutions in this District \nhave also been all but limited to Internet sting cases. See Tab \"B\". \nIn the context of this standard fact pattern involving the Internet's use by \npredators, other Circuits, including the Eleventh, have been unanimous in holding that the \nnon-existence of an actual minor was of no moment; defendant's belief that he was \ndealing with a minor was sufficient to make out the crime. See United States. Root, 296 \nF.3d 1222, 122742 (11th Cir. 2002); United States' Suns, 428 F.3d 945, 959 (10* Cir. \n2005); United States' Helder, 452 F.3d 751 (8* Cir. 2006); United States\nd  Meek, 366 \nF.3d 705, 717-20 (9* Cir. 2004). Likewise, the Circuits have rejected voi for vagueness, \noverbreadth, and First Amendment challenges to the statute, brought in the context of \nthese prototypical prosecutions where the Internet was the vehicle of communication and \nenticement, and the defendant demonstrated in writing his belief that he was dealing with \n1 \na child well below the age of onsent. Eg., United States' 1)1karsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 \n(3d Cir. 2006); United States \nThomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 a Oth Cir. 2005); United \nStates' Panfil, supra, 338 F. d at 1300-01 (11* Cir. 2003).\" \nrk\n\" There are approximately two dozen Eleventh Circuit cases that include a prosecutio under \n§2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, \n364 F.3d 1300 (II d' C' . 2004),judgment vacated\n... [truncated, 3455 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/13 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=13]", "char_count": 3455}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "LAW (WAIVES Or \nGERALD B. LEYCOURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafaila, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 15 \nIn light of this common and well-accepted understanding, the cases decided under \n§2422(b) take as a given that its proper application lies only where the facts demonstrate \nbeyond dispute that the defendant knows or believes the person with whom he is \ninteracting is a minor. \nThe Ninth Circuit has so held. United States' Meek 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. \n2004), held that the term \"knowingly\" refers both to the verbs — \"persuades\", \"induces\", \n\"entices\", or \"coerces\" — as well as to the object — \"a person who has not achieved the \nage of 18 years,\" citing United States  X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), and \nStaples' United States, 511 U.S. 606 1994). The Meek Court wrote: \nThe statute requires mens rea, that is, a guilty mind. The \nguilt arises from the defendant's knowledge of what he \nintends to do. In this case, knowledge is subjective — it is \nwhat is in the mind of the defendant.'\nThe very lengthy sentence under §2422(b) speaks against strict liability, \nespecially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any \nperson, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States, \nMurrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote \nthat, under the \"plain language\" of §2422(b), \"to prove an attempt the government must \nefficacy of §2422(b) would be eviscerated if a defendant could circumvent the statute simply by \ncal\nemploying an intermediary to \nout his intended objective. Id. at 1287. Fact patterns si \nar \nto Murrell's exist in United States Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1326 (116 Cir. 2004); United States \nT\nHouston, 177 Fed. A x. 57 (11`b ir. 2006); United States I Searcy, 418 F.3d 193 (116 Cir. \n2005); United States Scott, 426 F. 3d 1324 (II* Cir. 2005\n... [truncated, 2837 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/14 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=14]", "char_count": 2837}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "GERALD \nAW CW/ICC• \nB. LEFCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attomey's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 16 \nfirst prove that Murrell, using the intemet, acted with a specific intent to persuade a \nminor to engage in unlawful sex.\" 368 F.3d at 1286 (emphasis added).\" United States \nRoot. supra, 296 F.3d at 1227, follows this pattern,\nlefendant induces or entices the minor, he must intend to have sexual conduct with a \nand confirms that, at the time the \nminor or one he believes to be a minor and know that such conduct is proscribed. \n(\"Root's statement to task force agents upon his arrest confirmed that he believed he \nwould meet a 13-year-old girl for sex, which he said he knew was wrong but 'exciting\"). \nSee also United States' Rojas, 145 Fed. Appx. 647 (11d1 Cir. 2005) (unpublished). This \nmens rea requirement applies equally where the completed crime occurs.10\nFinally, actus non Tacit reum, nisi mens sit rea — the act alone does not amount to \nSP< \nguilt; it must be accompanied by a guilty mind. This principle of concurrence mandates \nthat the actus reus and the mens reus concur in time. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal \nLaw §4.1 at 217 (1997) (concurrence requirement \"means that the required culpability as \nto the element must exist at the time of the conduct constituting the offense\"); LaFave, \nSubstantive Criminal Law §3.11(a) (West 1986) (noting that Concurrence is a basic \nprinciple of criminal law and \"the better view is that there is concurrence when the \ndefendant's mental state actuates the physical conduct\"). See also United States' Bailey. \nsupra, 444 U.S. at 402. In this case, the requisite actus reus is absent; likewise the \nrequired mental state. Even if those two fatal defects could be set aside, nevertheless, \nthere was no concurrence of guilty mind and evil act, providing an additional reason why \na successful prosecution under §2422(b) c\n... [truncated, 2861 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/15 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=15]", "char_count": 2861}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "I \nt \n<Writ- CS OF \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafarla, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 17 \nthen, the statutory language does not fit: Mr. Epstein did not use any facility of interstate \ncommerce to do the forbidden act — to persuade, entice, induce, or coerce — nor did he \nattempt to do so. Others did use the telephone to make a variety of arrangements for Mr. \nEpstein's residence in Palm Beach, including getting the house ready for his arrival, \nchecking movie schedules, and making telephone calls to schedule doctor's \nappointments, personal training, physical therapy and massages. Even if Mr. Epstein \ncould be held responsible for the use of the telephone on his behalf, nevertheless, calls \nmade by others regarding massages were not the statutorily proscribed persuasions or \nenticements of a known minor to do acts known to be illegal. Within his home, even if \nMr. Epstein may arguably have persuaded or induced individuals to engage in forbidden \nconduct with him, he did not violate §2422(b). If he engaged in such persuasion or \ninducement, it occurred only face to face and spontaneously. \nIf such conduct constituted a crime, it would be a classic state offense. The state \nis the appropriate forum for addressing these issues. Though in our meeting it was \nasserted that cases under §2422(b) are often brought where there was simply use of a \ntelephone, and casual use at that, it would not from our survey appear to be so on either \ncount — that is, use of a telephone rather than the intemet, and use of the means of \ncommunication remote from the enticing, etc. This is neither the defendant, nor the \nfactual context, to break new ground. \n0. \nMr. Epstein Warrants Declination to Prosecute as Exercise of Discretion. \nWe believe strongly that no federal case would lie under the facts here. Moreover, \nas we discussed, there is a pending \n... [truncated, 2988 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/16 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=16]", "char_count": 2988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "LAW cornets OA \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafta, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 18 \ndriving a taxi cab to working as a mechanic. Any notion that he was born with a \"silver \nspoon in his mouth\" should be dismissed. \nAlthough Mr. Epstein is self-made and worked long and hard, he could not have \nachieved his successes without the personal guidance and support of others. These key \npeople first identified the promise in Mr. Epstein and brought him to Bear Stearns and \nCompany, Inc. There, starting in 1976 at the age of 23 as a floor trader's junior assistant, \nhe became in 1980 a limited partner. Among the very many benefits that his experience \nthere provided was an introduction to the people who ultimately became his clients. \nEarly in his professional career, Mr. Epstein realized the profound impact that \neven one person can have on the life of another. His gratitude for the assistance he \npersonally received, and his sense of obligation to provide similar assistance and \nguidance to others, is in large part, the motive for the primacy of philanthropy in his life \nor his particular philanthropic interests. Mr. Epstein has devoted a substantial portion of \nhis time, efforts and financial resources to helping others, both on an individual basis and \non a more far reaching scope. Mr. Epstein gives generously, of both his time and his \nfinancial resources equally to individuals whom he knows personally and well and to \nthose with whom he has had little or no personal contact. Just a few examples: \nSome time ago, the two year old son of an employee was diagnosed with retinal \nblastoma. When told, Mr. Epstein not only gave the employee unlimited time off to \nattend to his son and promised whatever financial support was needed, but Mr. Epstein \nmade the full list of his medical and research contacts available. The employee was put \nin \n... [truncated, 3165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/17 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=17]", "char_count": 3165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "LAW OrtIOCS or \nGERALD B. LEMOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafalia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 19 \nwas acquainted and assigned personnel to assist the employee with administrative and \nsecretarial needs that arose in seeking a solution to the problem. Mr. Epstein is now the \ngodfather of the employee's seven-year old twins. \nRecently, both a second employee and a consultant of Mr. Epstein each confided \nthat they and their respective spouses were experiencing similar fertility problems. \nAgain, Mr. Epstein offered to pay the uncovered medical costs. The consultant and his \nwife are now expecting their first child. The second employee continues with infertility \ntreatments. \nTwo years ago, a building workman approached Mr. Epstein with news that the \nworkman's wife needed a kidney transplant and that the workman's sister-in-law in \nColombia was a willing donor. The non English speaking workman had neither the \nfinancial resources nor the know-how to get the sister-in-law to the United States. Mr. \nEpstein arranged for immigration counsel to expedite a visa for the sister-in-law and \npurchased the plane tickets for the sister-in-law's visit to the United States. The surgery \nwas a success and both patients recovered completely. The sister-in-law flew back to \nColombia at Mr. Epstein's expense. \nMr. Epstein is a devoted advocate of personal improvement through education. \nAs a former board member of Rockefeller University, Mr. Epstein has made available \nacademic scholarships to worthy students, most of whom he has had no prior connection \nto whatsoever. In addition, Mr. Epstein covers the tuition required to send the family \nmembers of his employees to nursery, private elementary, middle and secondary schools \nand colleges. He has funded and personally encouraged continuing education programs \nfor his adult employees and professional consultants.\n... [truncated, 2725 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/18 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=18]", "char_count": 2725}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "r \nLAW OFFICES Of \nGERALD B. kurvouirr. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 20 \nmonthly with a teenage building workman whose expenses of vocational \nschool are being paid by Mr. Epstein. Each month, Mr. Epstein reviews \nthe workman's school progress and discucceq career opportunities. One of \nthe monthly reports is annexed at Tab \"D\". \n• \nIn addition, Mr. Epstein blocks out time each week to meet with young \nprofessionals to discuss their career prospects and counsel them regarding \nappropriate next steps. \nAlthough Mr. Epstein is deeply committed to helping others in very personal and \nmeaningful ways, he has also sought to use his good fortune to help others on a broader \nbasis. Mr. Epstein has sponsored more than 70 athlete wellness programs, building \nprojects, scholarship funds and community interest programs in the United States Virgin \nIslands alone. \nMoreover, Mr. Epstein has given generously to support philanthropic \norganizations across the United States and around the world, including America's \nAgenda; Robin Hood; Alliance for Lupus Research; Ovarian Cancer Research Fund; \nFriends of Israel Defense Forces; Seeds of Peace; the Jewish National Fund; the Hillel \nFoundation; the National Council of Jewish Women; and the Intrepid Fallen Heroes Fund \n— to name only a few. \nIn a feature article about Mr. Epstein in New York Magazine, former President \nClinton aptly described Mr. Epstein as \"a committed philanthropist with a keen sense of \nglobal markets and an in-depth knowledge of twenty-first-century science.\" President \nClinton reached this conclusion during a month-long trip to Africa with Mr. Epstein, \nwhich Mr. Epstein hosted. The purpose of that trip was to increase AIDS awareness; to \nwork towards a solution to the AIDS crisis; and to provide funding to reduce the costs of \ndelivering medications to those i\n... [truncated, 2803 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/19 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=19]", "char_count": 2803}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "LAW Offia• or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 21 \nMr. Epstein was part of the original group that conceived the Clinton Global \nInitiative, which is described as a project \"bringing together a community of global \nleaders to devise and inclement innovative solutions to some of the world's most \npressing challenges.\" Focuses of this initiative include poverty, climate change, global \nhealth, and religious and ethnic conflicts. \nMr. Epstein has sought to improve people's lives through active participation in \nworthy scientific and academic research projects, as well. He spent hundreds of hours \nresearching the world's best scientists, and he himself studied as a Harvard Fellow in \norder to increase his own knowledge in fields that he believed could provide solutions to \nthe world's most difficult problems. He is committed to helping the right researchers find \nthose solutions, especially in the fields of medical science, human behavior and the \nenvironment. \nIn the past four years alone, Mr. Epstein has made grants to research programs at \nmajor institutions under the supervision of some of the most highly regarded research \nprofessionals and scholars in their fields, including Martin Nowak, a mathematical \nbiologist who studies, among other things, the dynamics of infectious diseases and cancer \ngenetics; Martin Seligman, known for his work on Positive Psychology — that is to say \nthe psychology of personal fulfillment; Roger Schank, a leading researcher in the \napplication of cognitive lear\na\ntin theory to the curricula of formal education; the renown \nphysicist/cosmologist \nKrauss, and many others. Institutions funded include \nHarvard University; Penn State University; Lenox Hill Hospital (New York); the \nBiomedical Research and Education Foundation; the Santa Fe Institute; Massachusetts \nInsti\n... [truncated, 3022 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/20 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=20]", "char_count": 3022}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Lew OP#'CCS or \nGERALD B. LEP'COURT. P.C. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafafia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 22 \nfive years, SRF has made 155 grants to scholars from more than 37 countries. Scholars \nare placed at host universities in a safe country. More than 87 institutions around the \nworld have hosted SRF scholars to date, including eight of the top ten universities in the \nUnited States. Most recently, SRF launched the Iraq Scholar Rescue Project to save \nscholars in Iraq, many of whom have been particularly targeted for kidnapping and death \nsince the conflict there began. Mr. Epstein is a highly valued member of the selection \ncommittee. Just a few articles mentioning these and other projects are annexed at Tab \n\"E\". \nEven a casual review of the good works large and small in which he has involved \nhimself leads one to conclude that he has a powerful instinct to help others. He does this \nnot simply because he can, but because he has a deeply ingrained desire to do so. In fact, \nhe believes that, as a result of his good fortune, he is obligated to do so. \nSince 2000, Mr. Epstein has funded educational assistance, science and research \nand community and civic activities. As you can see, his philanthropy is not limited to \nfinancial support. To the contrary, it has involved the dedication of a remarkable amount \nof his time and effort and has yielded admirable results. It is noteworthy that a majority \nof the people he has helped over the years have been those with whom he has had little or \nno contact, which further confirms that he derives no personal benefit from his good \nworks, other than the personal satisfaction derived from using his good fortune to help \nothers. \nThe sincere devotion to others evidenced by Mr. Epstein's philanthropic activities \nis no less apparent in his interpersonal relationships. Mr. Epstein has maintained both \nlong term\n... [truncated, 2939 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00190116/21 or ?id=EFTA00190116&page=21]", "char_count": 2939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00190116", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "r \ntr,t4 ornces or \nGERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. \nJeffrey Sloman, Esq. \nMatthew Menchel, Esq. \nAndrew Lourie, Esq. \nA. Marie Villafatia, Esq. \nThe United States Attorney's Office \nSouthern District of Florida \nJuly 6, 2007 \nPage 23 \nAgain, we and our colleagues thank you for your attention at the June 26 meeting. \nI welcome any questions or comments you may have and am available to discuss this and \nany other issues at your earliest convenience. \nVery truly yours, \nGam( A Lift\n---\nGerald B. Lefcourt \ncc: Lilly Ann Sanchez, Esq. \nRoy Black, Esq. \nAlan I )ershowit/ \nEFTA00190138\n", "char_count": 579}]}