{"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_count": 93, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00187391", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00187391.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "404 \n27 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nprocess, messenger service, transportation, \nand deposition transcripts). The Second Cir-\ncuit, however, has disallowed reimbursement \nfor computer research on the grounds that it \n\"is merely a substitute for an attorney's time \nthat is compensable under an application for \nattorneys' fees and is not `a separately tax-\nable cost.\" United Stalest Merritt Meridi-\nan Const. Corp, 95 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. \n1996); see also LeBlanc—Sternben I Fletch-\ner, 143 F.34 748, 763 (2d Cir.I998). There-\nfore, I will not allow plaintiffs attorney to be \nreimbursed $125.13 for her computer re-\nsearch time. \nAccordingly, plaintiffs attorney is entitled \nto an award of costs in this case in the \namount of $3,525.86. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs mo-\ntion for attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to \n42 U.S.C. § 1988, is granted in part, and \nplaintiffs attorney, Margaret Somerset, is \nawarded $94,738.16. That sum shall be paid \nwithin forty-fwe (45) days of the entry of this \norder. \nIT IS SO ORDERED. \nUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, \nI \nJeffrey E. EPSTEIN, Ivan S. Fisher, Ellyn \nBank, Debra Elise Cohen, Diane Fisher \nd/b/a the Fisher Group Fisher & Softer \na/k/a Fisher & Sophir, \nD. Ger-\nzog, Robert lleilbrun, Suzanne McDer-\nmott, Christopher II. Martin, Jesse Sie-\ngel a/k/a Jessie Siegel, Siegel, Martin & \nIleilbrun, Ron Softer, and Carmen Tau-\nsik, Defendants. \nNo. 96 CIV. 8307(DC). \nUnited States District Court, \nS.D. New York. \nMarch 31, 1998. \nFederal \ngovernment, \nas \nlandlord, \nbrought proceeding to evict tenants from \nbuilding. Government moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment. The District Court, Chin, J., \nheld that: (1) lease unambiguously provided \nthat written consent to sublease was re-\nquired, precluding claim that government \norally consented to sublease; (2) court could \napply federal common law to question of \nwhether landlord's consent to sublease was \nsubject to requirement that it not be unrea-\nsonably \n... [truncated, 3277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/0 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=0]", "char_count": 3277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "6. Federal Courts ea413 \nFederal court could apply federal com-\nmon law, as opposed to state law, to determi-\nnation of rights under real property lease \nwith government as landlord. \n7. Federal Courts ea413 \nLaw of New York, rather than federal \ncommon law, would be applied to question \nwhether consent of government, as landlord, \nto tenant's sublease of premises was subject \nto requirement that it not be unreasonably \nwithheld; there was no body of federal com-\nmon law governing question and no pressing \nneed for national uniformity calling for cre-\nation of such law, while state law of landlord \nand tenant was well developed and parties \nprobably entered into lease believing state \nlaw would apply. \n8. United States ea70(7) \nUnder New York law, there was no re-\nquirement that consent of federal govern-\nment, as landlord, to sublease not be unrea-\nsonably withheld; there was no provision to \nthat effect in lease, and under those circum-\nstances consent could be withheld for any \nreason or no reason. \nMary Jo White, United States Attorney, \nby Serene K. Nakano, Assistant United \nStates Attorney, New York City, for the \nUnited States. \nWachtel & Masyr, LLP, by Steven J. Co-\nhen, New York City, for Jeffrey E. Epstein. \nGage & PayRs, by G. Robert Gage, Jr, \nEllen J. Casey, New York City, for Ivan S. \nFisher, Diane Fisher, Fisher & Softer. \nEllyn Bank, New York City, pro se. \nDebra Elise Cohen, New York City, pro \nse. \nD. Gerzog, New York City, pro \nse. \nRobert Heilbrun, New York City, pro se. \nI. The additional defendants are Ellyn Bank. De-\nbra Elisa Cohen• Diane Fisher dAda The Fisher \nMa\nsher & Soifer a4/a Fisher & Sophir, \nD. Gerzog, Robert Heilbrun. Suzanne \nMcDermott, Christopher H. Martin. Jesse Siegel \nwlr/a Jessie Siegel, Siegel• Martin & Heilbrun, \nU.S. I. EPSTEIN \n405 \nale ss27 F.Suppld 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) \nSuzanne McDermott, New York City, pro \nse. \nChristopher H. Martin, New York Defend-\ners Service, New York City, pro se. \nJessie Siegel, New York City, p\n... [truncated, 3770 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/1 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=1]", "char_count": 3770}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "406 \n27 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \ncause it breached an implied covenant of \ngood faith and fair dealing by unreasonably \nwithholding written consent to Epstein's re-\nquest to sublet to Fisher. \nBecause I fmd as a matter of law that (1) \nthe lease unambiguously required the prior \nwritten consent of OFM for Epstein to sublet \nor assign the premises, thereby rendering \nany alleged oral consent invalid, and (2) OFM \nwas entitled under the lease to unreasonably \nwithhold its written consent to Epstein's re-\nquest to sublet to Fisher, the Government's \nmotion for partial summary judgment on its \nclaim for ejectment is granted as against all \ndefendants. \nBACKGROUND \nA. The Facts \nThe premises at 34 East 69th Street in \nManhattan (the \"Premise?) were once the \nresidence of the former Deputy General Con-\nsul of Iran. When the United States severed \ndiplomatic ties with Iran in 1980, the Deputy \nGeneral Consul vacated, but the Premises \nremained the property of Iran. The Govern-\nment, through the Secretary of State, was \nentrusted with the care and maintenance of \nthe Premises under the Foreign Missions Act \n(\"FMA\"), 22 U.S.C. § 4305(c), and the Vien-\nna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. \n24, 1963, art. 27(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 \nU.N.T.S. 261, a multilateral treaty entered \ninto by the United States and Iran, among \nother nations. \nIn 1992, OFM entered into a two-year \nlease with Epstein, to run from February 1, \n1992 through January 31, 1994. The agreed \nrent was $15,000 per month. Pursuant to \nthe lease's Use Clause, only Epstein, his \nfamily, servants, or approved subtenants or \nassignees could occupy the premises, Under \nthe Assignment and Sublease Clause, Ep-\nstein was required to obtain prior written \nconsent of OFM to assign or sublet the \nPremises. \nThe lease contained no clause \nprohibiting OFM from unreasonably with-\nholding its consent to a sublet or assignment. \nOn August 28, 1992, OFM and Epstein \nextended the lease for three more years, to \nJanuary\n... [truncated, 4296 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/2 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=2]", "char_count": 4296}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Jeffrey Schantz, Epstein's transaction coun-\nsel, on April 19, 1996, OFM orally consented \nto Epstein's request to sublet the Premises \nto Fisher. The same day, Epstein wrote \nback, requesting \"written confirmation\" of \nOFM's alleged approval. By letter dated \nApril 26, 1996, OFM formally responded to \nEpstein's request, In this letter, Thomas E. \nBurns, a representative of OFM, informed \nEpstein of OFM's intention to lease the \nPremises to Galines beginning February 1, \n1997 in the event that Epstein decided not to \nrenew the lease and occupy the premises \npersonally, and denied Epstein's request to \nsublet the Premises to Fisher. OFM's stat-\ned reasons for the denial were to (1) \"mini-\nmize any difficulties in turning over the \nhouse to the tenant we have selected should \nMr. Epstein decide not to reoccupy the \npremises under the new lease,\" and (2) \"mini-\nmize the potential for damage to the premis-\nes from a short-term tenant occupancy.\" \n(Schantz Aft, Exh. D). OFM did, however, \ngrant Epstein permission to sublet the Prem-\nises to Calines for the remainder of 1996. \nOn May 3, 1996, Epstein again wrote to \nOFM, formally exercising his right of first \nrefusal, believing such right to have been \ntriggered by the April 12, 1996 letter agree-\nment between OFM and Cannes. Thereaf \nter, on May 7, 1996, Epstein and Fisher \nentered into a sublease agreement at a rental \nprice of $20,000 per month, despite OFM's \nexpress denial of Epstein's request for per-\nmission to sublet to Fisher. Fisher claims to \nhave entered into the sublease agreement \nbased on Epstein's representations that the \nsublease was approved by the State Depart-\nment and that Epstein had properly exer-\ncised his right of first refusal to renew the \nlease. The original sublease was to com-\nmence May 7, 1996 and terminate on January \n31, 1997. In the event that Epstein's lease \nwith OFM was extended, and the new rent \nunder that lease did not exceed $20,000 per \nmonth, the sublease would be automatically\n... [truncated, 4556 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/3 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=3]", "char_count": 4556}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "408 \n27 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nswear under oath that he never orally ap-\nproved the sublet to Fisher. Fisher con-\ntends that he offered to continue paying rent \ndirectly to OFM rather than to Epstein, an \noffer to which the Government never re-\nsponded. At that time, Fisher stopped pay-\ning rent to Epstein pursuant to the sublease. \nB. Prior Proceedings \n1. The Original Actions \nThe Government commenced this action \nagainst Epstein and Fisher in October of \n1996. It seeks a declaration by the Court \nthat it is entitled to exclusive possession of \nthe Premises and that it is entitled to have \nEpstein and Fisher ejected therefrom be-\ncause Epstein's lease was properly terminat-\ned as of August 23, 1996. In addition, the \nGovernment seeks dismissal of Fisher's first \nand second counterclaims, which seek equita-\nble relief against the Government.' Finally, \nthe Government demands back rent from \nEpstein and/or Fisher. \nIn February of 1997, Epstein commenced a \nholdover proceeding in the Civil Court of the \nCity of New York against Fisher for nonpay-\nment of rent under the terms of the sublease. \nFisher removed the state court action to this \nCourt. \nThe Government moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment on its claim for ejectment of \nEpstein and Fisher. In addition, it sought \nan order requiring Epstein and Fisher to pay \ninto an escrow fund $15,000 per month from \nAugust 23, 1996 to the date this action is \nfinally decided. Epstein cross-moved against \nFisher to remand its holdover action to state \ncourt, and Fisher cross-moved against Ep-\nstein for consolidation of the holdover action \nwith the pending federal action. \n2. In its first counterclaim, Fisher seeks a declara-\ntion that the sublease is valid and that Fisher is \nlawfully entitled to full possession and use of the \npremises. In its second counterclaim, Fisher \nseeks a declaration that the sublease was auto-\nmatically renewed for a five-year term. com-\nmencing January 31, 1997, because Epstein \nproperly \n... [truncated, 4541 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/4 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=4]", "char_count": 4541}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "U.S. I EPSTEIN \n409 \nCI144027 F.3059.241 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) \nof the lease, that that could constitute a \nwaiver in light of the very clear nonwaiver \nclause in the lease.\" (Tr. at 39). I reserved \ndecision, however, on the following issues: \n(1) whether the lease unambiguously re-\nquired that OFM's consent to an assignment \nor sublet be in writing, in which case Massey \ncould not have orally consented, as a matter \nof law, to Epstein's sublet of the Premises to \nFisher, (2) whether OFM was permitted un-\nder the lease to unreasonably withhold con-\nsent to Epstein's consent to a sublet to Fish-\ner, or whether it was bound by an implied \nobligation of good faith and fair dealing, and \n(3) whether, assuming the latter, OFM in fact \nwithheld its consent unreasonably. \nFinally, I ordered Epstein to pay into an \nescrow fund eight days worth of the $15,000 \nrent for the month of August 1996 and an \nadditional $15,000 for September 1996 (be-\ncause OFM had already accepted his tender \nof rent through August 23, 1996, and Epstein \nhad collected rent from Fisher through Sep-\ntember 30, 1996). Additionally, I ordered \nFisher to pay into the fund $15,000 per \nmonth, beginning October 1, 1996 to date, \nand continuing for each month thereafter. \n2. The Government's Addition of the \nSubtenants as Defendants \nIn the course of discovery on its claims for \nrelief against Epstein and Fisher, the Gov-\nernment learned that Fisher had further sub-\nlet the Premises to the Subtenants, also with-\nout the prior written consent of OFM. The \nGovernment then sought leave to amend the \ncomplaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil \nProcedure 15 to name the Subtenants as \nadditional defendants in the action. I grant-\ned the Government's motion on the record at \nthe December 17, 1997 oral argument. The \nGovernment thereafter filed a second amend-\ned complaint and served a copy on each of \nthe Subtenants. \nIn an effort to settle the case, I held a \nconference on January 28, 1998. At the con-\nclusion o\n... [truncated, 4353 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/5 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=5]", "char_count": 4353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "410 \n27 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nfavor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. \n2506. \nAs the Supreme Court stated in \nAnderson, \"If the evidence is merely color-\nable, or is not significantly probative, sum-\nmary judgment may be granted.\" Id at \n249-50, 106 S.CL 2506 (citations omitted). \nWith these standards in mind, I turn to the \nGovernment's motions for partial summary \njudgment. \nB. The Government's Motion for Partial \nSummary Judgment against Epstein \nand Fisher \n1. Whether the Lease Permitted Oral \nConsent to a Proposed Sublet or As-\nsignment \nEpstein and Fisher contend that summary \njudgment should be denied because there \nexists a genuine issue of material fact as to \nwhether OFM orally consented to Epstein's \nrequest to sublet the Premises to Fisher. \nThe Government, on the other hand, argues \nthat the lease unambiguously required that a \nsublet or assignment of the Premises be ap-\nproved in advance in writing, and that, there-\nfore, even if OFM did orally consent, such \nconsent was invalid as a matter of law. \n11-31 In contract disputes, the Court be-\ngins by examining the language of the con-\ntract itself to determine the parties' intent. \nStroll I \nEpstein 818 F.Supp. 640, 643 \n(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 9 FM 1637 (2d Cir.1993). \nIf the agreement sets forth the parties' in-\ntent clearly and unambiguously, the Court \nneed look no further. See Sterling Drug Inc. \nBayer AG, 792 F.Supp. 1357, 1366-66 \n(S.D.N.Y.1992), red in part, remanded in \npart, 14 F.3d 738 (2d Cir.1994). Whether the \ntext of an agreement is ambiguous or unam-\nbiguous is a matter of law to be decided by \nthe Court. Sterling Drug, 792 F.Supp. at \n1366. A contract is not deemed ambiguous \nunless it is reasonably susceptible of more \nthan one interpretation, and the Court makes \nthis determination by reference to the con-\ntract alone. Banque Ambe et Internationale \nD'Investissement I. Maryland Nat'l Bank, \n67 F.3d 146, 162 (2d Cir.1995). \n141 The lease clearly provides that Ep-\nstein was requir\n... [truncated, 4262 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/6 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=6]", "char_count": 4262}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "U.S. \nEPSTEIN \n411 \nch.. 27 F.Suppld 404 (5.D.N.Y. 1991) \ncontained no provision prohibiting OFM from \nof landlord and tenant. Powers t United \nunreasonably withholding such written con-\nsent. \nThe Government, relying on New York \nlandlord-tenant law, asserts that it was enti-\ntled to withhold its consent to Epstein's pro-\nposed sublet to Fisher for any reason, or for \nno reason at all. Epstein and Fisher, howev-\ner, disagree. They contend that, because the \nGovernment is a party to the lease, interpre-\ntation of the lease is governed by principles \nof federal common law, not New York State \nlaw. Pursuant to federal common law of con-\ntracts, Epstein and Fisher continue, the lease \nbetween OFM and Epstein contains an im-\nplied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, \nciting Neal & Co. t! United States, 36 Fed. \nCl. 600 (1996), re \n121 F.3d 683 (Fed.Cir. \n1997). The requirement of good faith and \nfair dealing, they argue, prohibits OFM from \nwithholding consent unreasonably. OFM's \nrefusal to consent to Epstein's proposed sub-\nlet of the Premises to Fisher, they contend, \nwas motivated by its desire to enter into a \nlease with Galinas at a higher rent beginning \nFebruary 1, 1997. Such conduct was unrea-\nsonable, they argue, and, therefore, OFM \nbreached the implied covenant of good faith \nand fair dealing in the lease. \n(6,7) I conclude that New York landlord-\ntenant law rather than general federal con-\ntract principles should apply. As a threshold \nmatter, although I agree as a policy matter \nthat federal law should apply, there is no \nfederal statutory or common law governing \nlandlord-tenant \nrelations. \nFederal \nlaw \nshould apply because the United States is a \nparty. I have jurisdiction over this action \nbased on 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and the FMA 22 \nU.S.C. § 4301 et seq. The subject matter of \nthis action is a landlord-tenant dispute, how-\never, and while application of federal law is \nappropriate in federal question cases where \napplicable federal substantive law \n... [truncated, 4788 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/7 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=7]", "char_count": 4788}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "412 \n27 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nconflict between the Federal Circuit and the \nSeventh Circuit concerning \"whether federal \ncommon law or state law applies to the inter-\npretation of Postal Service Leases?' Kerin \nUnited States Postal Sera, 116 F2d 988, \n990 (2d Cir.1997). On the one hand, the \nFederal Circuit has held that federal law \napplies to resolve disputes between the Unit-\ned States and its lessors or tenants. See. \ne.g., Forman I United States, 767 F.2d 875, \n879-80 (Fed. ir.1985); 6 Kelley \nUnited \nState* 19 CI.Ct. 155, 162 (1989). \nOn the \nother hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that \nstate substantive law governs in landlord-\ntenant disputes involving the Government. \nSee Powers \nUnited States Postal Sett, 671 \nF.2d 1041,1043-46 (7th Cir.1982).. \nThe Second Circuit in Kerin did not reach \nthe issue of whether federal common law or \nstate law applied because, in that case, feder-\nal law and state law led to the same result. \nSee Kerin, 116 F.3d at 991. I agree with the \nSeventh Circuit's conclusion, for two reasons. \nFirst, although Epstein and Fisher argue \nthat a federal rule should be created to pro-\nmote the creation of a uniform body of law in \nlandlord-tenant disputes involving the Gov-\nernment, there is no \"distinct need\" for a \nnationwide legal standard or a uniform na-\ntional rule. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 Ill \nS.Ct, 1711. Landlord-tenant law traditional-\nly has been a matter of state law. There is \nno compelling reason to disrupt expectations \nthat tenants and landlords may have under \nstate law merely because they are entering \ninto a lease with the federal government. \nCourts have long held that, \"[albsent control-\nling federal legislation or rule of law, ques-\ntions involving real property rights are de-\nplies to the interpretation of a lease to which the \nGovernment is a party. Id. at 990-91. \n5. While the Forman court stated that federal law \ngoverns in landlord-tenant disputes involving the \nGovernment, it nevertheless relied on s\n... [truncated, 4732 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/8 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=8]", "char_count": 4732}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "U.S. ■ EPSTEIN \n413 \nCIO: as 27 F.Survad 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) \neminent scholars and practitioners. It is \nnot to be expected that the federal courts \nwould do a very good job of devising a \nmodel code of landlord-tenant law, since \nthey have very little experience in land-\nlord-tenant matters; and though eventual-\nly some body of law would emerge it would \nnot in all likelihood be a uniform body, \nbecause there are [thirteen] federal cir-\ncuits and the Supreme Court could be \nexpected to intervene only sporadically \n• • (Vie do not have to balance compet-\ning federal and state interests in this case \nafter all. The overriding federal interest \nhere is in certainty of right and obligation \nflowing from conformity to known law; the \nstate interest is in offering its landlords a \nlike certainty. These interests converge in \nfavor of adopting . .. state law rather than \nfederal common law. \nPowers, 671 F.2d at 1045-46. This reasoning \nis quite convincing, particularly in a case \nsuch as this, where the Government and \nEpstein, in all likelihood, \"entered [a) legal \nrelationship with the expectation that their \nrights and obligations would be governed by \nstate-law standards.\" Kamen, 600 U.S. at \n98, 111 S.Ct. 1711. \nFinally, Er Win's and Fisher's reliance on \nNeal & Ca \nUnited States, 36 Fed. Cl. 600 \n(1996), alrd 121 F.3d 683 (Fed.Cir.1997), is \ntherefore misplaced. \nThere, the United \nStates Court of Federal Claims stated that \nlelvery contract, including those in which \nthe Government is a party, contains an im-\nplied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,\" \nid at 631, and from this statement, Epstein \nand Fisher extrapolate that there exists an \nimplied covenant of good faith and fair deal-\ning in the lease agreement between Epstein \nand the Government at issue here. \nThe facts of Neal & Co. are distinguish-\nable, however. Neal & Co. involved a con-\nstruction contract to build a housing project \nentered into between the Government and a \ncontractor, not a lease for\n... [truncated, 4584 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/9 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=9]", "char_count": 4584}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "414 \n27 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \n• Thus, I need not reach the issue of whether \nOFM in fact unreasonably withheld consent. \nAnd, as Fisher was occupying the Premises \npursuant to an illegal sublet, OFM was with-\nin its rights to terminate Epstein's lease. \nAccordingly, the Government's motion for \npartial summary judgment on its claim for \nejectment of Epstein and Fisher from the \nPremises is hereby granted. \nC. The Government's Motion for Partial \nSummary Judgment Against the Sub-\ntenants \nEleven of the twelve Subtenants signed a \nstipulation agreeing to be bound by the \nCourt's decision on the Government's claim \nfor ejectment against Epstein and Fisher. I \nnow grant the Government's motion for par-\ntial summary judgment against Epstein and \nFisher; hence, the motion is also granted \nwith respect to these eleven Subtenants. \nThe remaining Subtenant, Ron Softer, did \nnot sign the stipulation. He has not respond-\ned to the Government's motion because the \nmotion is not returnable until April 20, 1998. \nSofter, however, can have no greater rights \nthan Fisher. Hence, the Government's mo-\ntion is granted as to Softer as well. Of \ncourse, if Soifer believes he has some basis \nfor arguing that he has greater rights than \nFisher has, he may make a motion for recon-\nsideration within ten days hereof. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Govern-\nment's motion for summary judgment on its \nclaim for ejectment is granted as to Epstein, \nFisher, and all of the Subtenants. \nSO ORDERED. \nUNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, indi• \nvidually and on behalf of and as the suc-\ncessor in interest of Seadrift Polypropy-\nlene Company, Plaintiff, \nI \nMONTELL \nMontell Polyolefins; \nMontell North America Incorporated; \nMontell USA Incorporated; Technipol \nS.r.l.; Montedison SpA.; Montell Fi-\nnance USA, Inc.; Royal Dutch Petrole-\num Company, p.l.c.; The Shell Transport \nand Tradi \nompany, p.l.c.; Shell Pe-\ntroleum \n;\n \nThe Shell Petroleum \nCompany Limited; Shell Petroleum \nInc.; Shell Oi\n... [truncated, 3210 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/10 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=10]", "char_count": 3210}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Page I of 2 \nVVestiaw. \nPage 1 \nMaria Tankenson Hodge \nCurrent Firm Information Unknown \nhodgfranOislands.vi \nPosition: \nMember \nEducation: \nUniversity of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, Berkeley, CA, \nJ.D., Doctor of Jurisprudence \nUniversity of California, Santa Cruz, California, 1989 \nB.A.Govt., Bachelor of Arts in Government \nAdmitted: \n1971 \nCalifornia, 1972 \nVirgin Islands, 1974 \nU.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit \nU.S. Supreme Court, 1983 \nAffiliations: \nThe West Indian Company, Limited, Director, 1989 - Present \nRepresentative Clients: \nPublic Services Commission \nThe West Indian Company, Limited \nVirgin Islands Port Authority \nReferences: \nChase Manhattan Bank, N.A., St. Thomas, Virgin Islands \nKodak Corporation, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico \nPrudential Securities, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands \nWest Practice Categories: \nEstate Planning \nFamily Law \nLitigation & Appeals \nReal Estate Law \nLand Use & Zoning \n2007 Thomson/west. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Full... 5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187402\n", "char_count": 1103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Page 2 of 2 \nPage 2 \nAreas of Practice: \nGeneral Civil Litigation \nAppellate Practice \nReal Estate \nCivil Practice \nEND OP DOCUMENT \n2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv—Full... 5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187403\n", "char_count": 299}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Entity Information \nPage 1 of 1 \nNYS Department of State \nDivision of Corporations \nEntity Information \nSelected Entity Name: J. EPSTEIN & COMPANY, INC. \nSelected Entity Status Information \nCurrent Entity Name: J. EPSTEIN & COMPANY, INC. \nInitial DOS Filing Date: NOVEMBER 18, 1988 \nCounty: \nNEW YORK \nJurisdiction: \nNEW YORK \nEntity Type: \nDOMESTIC BUSINESS CORPORATION \nCurrent Entity Status: INACTIVE \nSelected Entity Address Information \nDOS Process (Address to which DOS will mail process if accepted on behalf of the entity) \nGOLD & WACHTEL, ESQS \n10 EAST 53RD STREET \nNEW YORK, NEW YORK, 10022 \nRegistered Agent \nNONE \nNOTE: New York State does not issue organizational identification numbers. \nSearch Results \nNew Search \nDivision of Corporations. State Records and UCC Home Page NYS Department of State Home Page \nhttp://appsext8.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.ENTITYJNFORMATION?p nameid=1423231&p_corpid=13073... 5/14/2007 \nEFTA00187404\n", "char_count": 955}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Entity Information \nPage 1 of 1 \nNYS Department of State \nDivision of Corporations \nEntity Information \nSelected Entity Name: JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, INC. \nSelected Entity Status Information \nCurrent Entity Name: J. EPSTEIN & COMPANY, INC. \nInitial DOS Filing Date: NOVEMBER 18, 1988 \nCounty: \nNEW YORK \nJurisdiction: \nNEW YORK \nEntity Type: \nDOMESTIC BUSINESS CORPORATION \nCurrent Entity Status: INACTIVE \nSelected Entity Address Information \nDOS Process (Address to which DOS will mail process if accepted on behalf of the entity) \nGOLD & WACHTEL, ESQS \n10 EAST 53RD STREET \nNEW YORK, NEW YORK, 10022 \nRegistered Agent \nNONE \nNOTE: New York State does not issue organizational identification numbers. \nSearch Results \nNew  Search \nDivision of Corporations,  State Records and UCC Home Page NYS Department of State Home Page \nhttp://appsezt8.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.ENTITY INFORMATION?p_nameid=1423230&p_corpid=13073... 5/14/2007 \nEFTA00187405\n", "char_count": 956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 1 of 7 \nCLOSED, STANDARD \nUnited States District Court \nEastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) \nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:02-cv-07671-CN \nSHANKS'. WEXNER et al \nDate Filed: 10/02/2002 \nAssigned to: HONORABLE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER Date Terminated: 10/21/2003 \nCause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract \nJury Demand: None \nNature of Suit 195 Contract Product \nLiability \nJurisdiction: Diversity \nPlaintiff \nNELSON SHANKS \nrepresented by JEFFREY D. HOFFERMAN \nGOLLATZ GRIFFIN & EWING PC \n4 PENN CENTER PLAZA \nSUITE 200 \n1600 JOHN FITZGERALD \nKENNEDY BOULEVARD \nPHILADELPHIA, PA 19103-2813 \n215-563-9400 \nFax: 215-665-9988 \nEmail: jhofferman®ggelaw.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nI \nDefendant\nLESLIE WEXNER \nrepresented by CHRISTOPHER J. GUITON \nDRINKER BIDDLE & REATH \nONE LOGAN SQ \n18TH & CHERRY STS \nPHILA, PA 19103 \n215-988-2546 \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nJ. FOX \nDRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP \nONE LOGAN SQ \n18TH & CHERRY STS \nPHILA, PA 19106-6996 \n215-988-2714 \nFax: 215-988-2757 \nEmail: foxlj@dbr.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nhttps://ecfpaed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DictRpt.p19.261521028494284-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187406\n", "char_count": 1238}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "• \nUnited States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 2 of 7 \nDefendant\nABIGAIL WEXNER \nH/W \nDefendant \nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN \nINDIVIDUALLY \ndoing business as \nJ. EPSTEIN AND COMPANY, INC. \nDefendant \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nrepresented by CHRISTOPHER J. GUITON \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nJ. FOX \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nrepresented by CHRISTOPHER J. GUITON \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nJ. FOX \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nrepresented by CHRISTOPHER J. GUITON \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nJ. FOX \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED \nDate Filed \n# \nDocket Text \n10/02/2002 \n1 COMPLAINT against JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE \nMAXWELL, ABIGAIL WEXNER, LESLIE WEXNER ( Filing fee $ \n150 receipt number 803892.), filed by NELSON SHANICS.(ti, ) \nAdditional attachment(s) added on 2/13/2003 (1db, ). (Entered: \n10/03/2002) \n10/02/2002 \nSummons Issued as to JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE \nMAXWELL, ABIGAIL WEXNER, LESLIE WEXNER.Four Forwarded \nTo: Counsel on 10/3/02 (ti, ) (Entered: 10/03/2002) \n12/16/2002 \n2 ORDER THAT JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN ; GHISLAINE MAXWELL ; \nABIGAIL WEXNER ; LESLIE WEXNER HAVE UNTIL 12/31/02 TO \nANSWER, MOVE, OR OTHERWISE PLEAD TO THE COMPLAINT; \nhttps://ecf.paed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.p17261521028494284-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187407\n", "char_count": 1525}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 3 of 7 \nJ. FOX WILL ACCEPT SERVICE ON BEHALF OF ALL \nDEFENDANTS ETC. SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE C. \nNEWCOMER ON 12/16/02. 12/17/02 ENTERED AND COPIES \nMAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 12/17/2002) \n12/30/2002 \n3 MOTION FOR DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(2), \nMEMORANDUM, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE FILED BY \nEPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, ABIGAIL WEXNER, LESLIE \nWEXNER..(ph, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/13/2003 (ldb, ). \n(Entered: 12J31/2002) \n01/15/2003 \n4 STIPULATION & ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL HAVE UNTIL \n1/31/03 TO FILE A RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO \nDISMISS. SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON \n1/15/03. 1/15/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED.(rv, ) (Entered: \n01/15/2003) \n02/07/2003 \n5 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL HAVE \nUNTIL 2/14/03 TO FILE A RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION \nTO DISMISS FILED IN THIS MATTER ON 12/30/02. SIGNED BY \nJUDGE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON 2/7/03.2/10/03 ENTERED \nAND COPIES MAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 02/10/2003) \n02/14/2003 \n6 REPLY filed by NELSON SHANKS to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss \npursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2), Certificate of Service. (rv, ) (Entered: \n02/18/2003) \n02/27/2003 \n7 REPLY to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by \nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, ABIGAIL \nWEXNER, LESLIE WEXNER, Certificate of Service. (ar, ) (Entered: \n02/28/2003) \n03/18/2003 \n8 OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR \nDISMISSAL. SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON \n3/18/03.3/19/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED (ph, ) (Entered: \n03/19/2003) \n04/07/2003 \n9 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,ABIGAIL WEXNER, LESLIE WEXNER'S \nANSWER IS EXTENDED TO 4/18/03. SIGNED BY JUDGE \nCLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON 4/7/03.4/8/03 ENTERED AND \nCOPIES MAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 04/08/2003) \n04/24/2003 \n10 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT ABIGAIL WEXNER AND \nLESLIE WEXNER'S ANSWER IS DUE 4/30/03. SIGNED BY JUDGE \nCLARENCE C. NEWCOMER\n... [truncated, 2413 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/17 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=17]", "char_count": 2413}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "• \nUnited States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 4 of 7 \n04/30/2003 \nIssue Joined (ph, ) (Entered: 05/01/2003) \n05/05/2003 \n12 NOTICE of Hearing: Pretrial Conference set for 5/13/2003 03:15 PM in \nJudge's Chambers, Room 13614 (13th Floor) before HONORABLE \nCLARENCE C. NEWCOMER. (mf) (Entered: 05/05/2003) \n05/19/2003 \n13 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL HAVE \nUNTIL 5/30/03 TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND \nCOUNTERCLAIMS FILED ON 4/30/03. SIGNED BY JUDGE \nCLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON 5/19/03.5/19/03 ENTERED AND \nCOPIES MAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 05/19/2003) \n05/22/2003 \n14 ORDER THAT DISCOVERY IS DUE 8/13/03; DISPOSITIVE \nMOTIONS BY 8/13/03; RESPONSES TO DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS \nBY 8/25/03; FINAL PRETRIAUSETTLEMENT CONFERENCE BY \n9/24/03 AT 11:15 A.M.; PRETRIAL MEMORANDA BY 9/17/03; \nCOUNSEL SHALL BE PREPARED FOR TRIAL BY 9/23/03. SIGNED \nBY JUDGE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON 5/22/03.5/22/03 \nENTERED AND COPIES MAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 05/22/2003) \n05/29/2003 \n15 MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM FOR FAILURE TO \nSTATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED, \nMEMORANDUM, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE FILED BY NELSON \nSHANKS.(ph, ) Modified on 5/29/2003 (ph, ). Additional attachments) \nadded on 6/16/2003 (vw, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 6/16/2003 \n(vw, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 6/16/2003 (vw, ). Additional \nattachment(s) added on 6/16/2003 (vw, ). (Entered: 05/29/2003) \n06/19/2003 \n16 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT THE TIME IN WHICH THE \nDEFENDANTS MUST SUBMIT A REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS \nMOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II OF DEFENDANTS' \nCOUNTERCLAIM, IS EXTENDED UNTIL AND INCLUDING \n6/30/03 . SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON \n6/19/03. 6/19/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED (ph, ) (Entered: \n06/19/2003) \n07/08/2003 \n17 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS MUST SUBMIT \nA REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II OF \nDEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM BY 7/14/03 ETC . SIGNED BY \nJUDGE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER ON 7/8/03.7/9/03 ENTERED \nAND COPIES MA\n... [truncated, 2713 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/18 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=18]", "char_count": 2713}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 5 of 7 \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN WITH RESPECT TO COUNT I OF THE \nCOMPLAINT (BREACH OF CONTRACT), CERTIFICATE OF \nSERVICE FILED BY NELSON SHANKS..(ph, ) (Entered: 08/13/2003) \n08/21/2003 \n21 ORDER THAT UPON CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION \nTO DISMISS AND DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE, IT IS ORDERED \nTHAT SAID MOTION IS DENIED ETC.. SIGNED BY JUDGE \nJAMES R. MELINSON ON 8/21/03.8/22/03 ENTERED AND COPIES \nMAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 08/22/2003) \n08/26/2003 \n22 PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FILED BY NELSON \nSHANICS,CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, CERTIFICATE OF \nSERVICE.(ar, ) (Entered: 08/26/2003) \n08/26/2003 \n22 ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF PLAINTIFF TO \nCOUNTERCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS LESLIE AND ABIGAIL \nWEXNER BY NELSON SHANKS, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.(ar, ) \n(Entered: 08/26/2003) \n08/26/2003 \n24 Supplement to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Against \nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein with Respect to Count I of Plaintiffs \nComplaint (Breach of Contract) filed by NELSON SHANKS, Certificate \nof Service. (ar, ) (Entered: 08/26/2003) \n08/27/2003 \n25 Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for judgment on the \npleadings as to count one - breach of contract, Certificate of service filed \nby JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN. (ph, ) Additional attachment(s) added on \n9/4/2003 (ph, ). (Entered: 08/28/2003) \n08/28/2003 \n2¢ Reply to EPSTEIN'S memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for \njudgment on the pleadings, Certificate of service by NELSON SHANKS. \n(ph, ) (Entered: 08/29/2003) \n08/28/2003 \n27 MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN \nOPPOSITION FOR VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER, CERTIFICATE \nOF SERVICE filed by NELSON SHANKS. (SEE #26).(ph, ) (Entered: \n08/29/2003) \n09/04/2003 \n28 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON \nTHE PLEADINGS WITH RESPECT TO COUNT I, THE COURT \nFINDS THAT THERE ARE FACTUAL ISSUES IN THIS CASE AS \nTO WHETHER A CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN THE \nPARTIES AND THE TERMS OF ANY SUCH CON\n... [truncated, 2500 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/19 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=19]", "char_count": 2500}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 6 of 7 \nDEPOSITIONS, MEMORANDUM, CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL, \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE filed by JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, ABIGAIL WEXNER, LESLIE WEXNER.. \n(ph, ) Additional attachments) added on 10/1/2003 (ph, ). Additional \nattachment(s) added on 10/10/2003 (ph, ). (Entered: 09/08/2003) \n09/09/2003 \n31 ORDER MOOTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL THE \nPRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND RESPONSES TO \nINTERROGATORIES ETC.. SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE C. \nNEWCOMER ON 9/9/03.9/10/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED \nAND FAXED 9/9/03(ph, ) (Entered: 09/10/2003) \n09/10/2003 \n32 Reply to defendants' motion for a protective order to quash notice of \ndepositions and supplemental memorandum of law in connection with \nplaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses, Certification of counsel, \nCertificate of service filed by NELSON SHANKS. (ph, ) Additional \nattachment(s) added on 9/18/2003 (fh, ). (Entered: 09/11/2003) \n09/18/2003 \n3 \nORDER DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS MOTION TO QUASH \nNOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS, UPON REPRESENTATION THAT THE \nPARTIES HAVE AGREED UPON THE LOCATIONS OF THE \nNOTICED DEPOSITIONS ETC.. SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE \nC. NEWCOMER ON 9/18/03.9/18/03 ENTERED AND COPIES \nMAILED (ph, ) (Entered: 09/18/2003) \n09/23/2003 \n34 ORDER THAT THE COURTS PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER IS \nAMENDED AS FOLLOWS: DISCOVERY BY 10/10/03, \nSETTLEMENT/FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ON 10/20/03 AT \n11:15; PRETRIAL MEMORANDA AND JOINT PROPOSED JURY \nINSTRUCTIONS 10/15/03; COUNSEL SHALL BE PREPARED FOR \nTRIAL ON 10/20/03 . SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARENCE C. \nNEWCOMER ON 9/23/03.9/24/03 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED \n(ph, ) (Entered: 09/24/2003) \n09/23/2003 \nSETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SET FOR 10/20/2003 11:15 AM \nBEFORE HONORABLE CLARENCE C. NEWCOMER. (ph, ) \n(Entered: 09/24/2003) \n10/21/2003 \n35 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT THE COURT DISMISS THE \nCAPTIONED MATTER, INCLUDING ALL CLAIMS AND \nCOUNTERCLAIMS, WITH PREJUDICE. . SIGNED BY JUDGE \n\n... [truncated, 2578 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/20 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=20]", "char_count": 2578}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania - Docket Report \nPage 7 of 7 \nPACER Service Center \nTransaction Receipt \n05/22/2007 18:33:24 \nPACER Login: du4480 \nClient Code: \nDescription: \nDocket Report Search Criteria: 2:02-cv-07671-CN \nBillable Pages: 4 \nCost: \n0.32 \nhttps://ecIpaed.uscourts.gov/egi-bin/DktRpt.pl?261521028494284-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187412\n", "char_count": 384}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA \nNELSON SHANKS \nPlaintiff, \nI \nLESLIE and ABIGAIL WEXNER, et al. \n• \n• \n• \n• \nCIVIL ACTION \nDefendants. \nNO. 02-7671 \nORDER \nAND NOW, this \nday of September, 2003, upon consideration of \nDefendants' Motion For A Protective Order to reschedule and relocate the depositions of \neach Defendant, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and \nthe Notices of Deposition issued are quashed without prejudice to have them rescheduled \nby agreement of the parties. \nBY THE COURT: \nClarence C. Newcomer, S.J. \nPIILIT45448611\nEFTA00187413\n", "char_count": 621}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA \nNELSON SHANKS \nPlaintiff, \n1. \nLESLIE and ABIGAIL WEXNER, et al. \nDefendants. \nNO. 02-7671 \nCIVIL ACTION \nDEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER \nTO OUASH NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS \nDefendants, by and through their counsel, hereby move this Court, \npursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2), for a protective order to reschedule and relocate the \ndepositions of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, and Abigail and Leslie Wexner, who \nreceived notices of oral deposition to be taken in the offices of Plaintiff's counsel, \nGollatz, Griffin & Ewing, located in Philadelphia, Pa.: Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine \nMaxwell, noticed for September 9, 2003; Abigail and Leslie Wexner, noticed for \nSeptember 10, 2003. \nIn support of this motion, Defendants submit the accompanying \nMemorandum of Law. \nMILITA54486 \nEFTA00187414\n", "char_count": 892}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Dated: September 5, 2003 \nJ. Fox \nAttorney Identification No. 15261 \nChristopher J. Guiton \nAttorney Identification No. 89866 \nDRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP \nOne Logan Square \n18th and Cherry Streets \nPhiladelphia, PA 19103-6996 \nCounsel for Defendants \nPHLI1145448611 \nEFTA00187415\n", "char_count": 280}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA \nNELSON SHANKS \nCIVIL ACTION \nPlaintiff, \nLESLIE and ABIGAIL WEXNER, et al. \nDefendants. : \nNO. 02-7671 \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A \nPROTECTIVE ORDER TO QUASH NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS \nWithout any consultation with counsel for Defendants to find mutually acceptable \ndates and times, on August 27, 2003, Plaintiff Nelson Shanks provided notices to \nDefendants' counsel of the oral depositions of Defendants Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine \nMaxwell, Abigail Wexner and Leslie Wexner to be taken on September 9th and 10th, 2003 \nin the offices of Gollatz, Griffin & Ewing, P.C., in Philadelphia, Pa. \nAs Plaintiff well knows, defendants Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell reside \nin the U.S. Virgin Islands, and defendants Abigail and Leslie Wexner reside in New \nAlbany, Ohio. \nWhile Plaintiff may be permitted to designate his location of choice for the \ndepositions, this Court has the power and duty under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to determine \nthe most appropriate location for each deposition. See e.g., O'Connor.. Trans Union \nCorp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6774 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1998). This Court has previously \ndetermined \"that as a general rule, if a deponent lives a substantial distance from the \ndeposing party's residence, the deposing party should be required to take the deposition at \nPIII.M4544801 \nEFTA00187416\n", "char_count": 1428}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "a location in the vicinity in which the deponent resides.\" First Fidelity Bancorporation!\". \nNational Union Fire Ins. Co. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3367 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1992). \nPursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2), defendants seek an order that would protect \nthem from the undue burden and expense of traveling to Philadelphia for these \ndepositions; defendants Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Mawell will submit to a deposition \nin the Virgin Islands; and defendants Abigail and Leslie Wexner seek an order that would \nprotect them from being forced to travel from New Albany, Ohio to Philadelphia for their \ndepositions. \nUnder the circumstances, the Notice served on August 27, 2003 requiring each of \nthe defendants to fly to Philadelphia is unreasonable and unduly burdensome. As the \nCourt well knows, the basis for asserting jurisdiction over these defendants does not \ninclude any instance when any of them visited Pennsylvania. It was Plaintiff who \ntraveled to New York and Ohio in connection with this matter. Accordingly, if these \ndepositions are to proceed, they should occur at the locations of the defendants. It is far \nless dislocating for Plaintiff's lawyer to travel to take these depositions in the Virgin \nIslands and Ohio than it would be to force four people to take the time required to travel \nto Philadelphia. \nAlthough Plaintiff had earlier expressed a commitment to working out a schedule \nthat is convenient to all parties, Plaintiff has unilaterally scheduled the depositions with \nno regard to the inconvenience it may impose on the parties to be deposed. Such conduct \nis in direct contrast with the manner in which Defendants have attempted to depose \nPlaintiff. \nPEILM454486 \nEFTA00187417\n", "char_count": 1721}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "For example, Defendants noticed the deposition of Plaintiff Nelson Shanks for \nJune 9, 2003. Immediately thereafter, Defendants agreed with Plaintiff to postpone that \ndate so that the parties could come to a mutually agreeable date for the deposition. \nPlaintiff still, nearly three months later, has yet to agree to a date in which Shanks can be \ndeposed, but has instead unilaterally designated September 9th and 10th in Philadelphia as \nthe time and place for Defendants' depositions. Defendants object to these depositions \nbeing taken in Philadelphia given the difficulty for these individuals to make \narrangements to be deposed miles away from their respective residences. \nBased upon Plaintiff's recent reluctance to discuss, much less honor, any mutual \nagreements, Defendants ask this Court to quash Plaintiff's Notice of Depositions and \ngrant this protective order, rescheduling the depositions for a date and time that is \nsuitable for both the Defendants and Plaintiff, and relocating the depositions from \nPhiladelphia to the U.S. Virgin Islands for Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell; and New \nAlbany, Ohio for the Wexners. \nAccordingly, this Court should grant Defendants' motion for a protective order \nand quash the depositions of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, and Abigail and Leslie \nWexner, without prejudice to have them rescheduled at a convenient location. \nCONCLUSION \nFor all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the \nCourt grant its Motion for a Protective Order or such other relief as the Court deems \nappropriate. \nPFILM45448611 \nEFTA00187418\n", "char_count": 1599}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Dated: September 5, 2003 \nJ. Fox \nAttorneyIdentification No. 15261 \nChristopher J. Guiton \nAttorney Identification No. 89866 \nDRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP \nOne Logan Square \n18th and Cherry Streets \nPhiladelphia, PA 19103-6996 \nAttorneys for Defendants \nPHLM45448611 \nEFTA00187419\n", "char_count": 279}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI, Christopher J. Guiton, hereby certify that on this 51h day of September \n2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion for a \nProtective Order and accompanying Memorandum of Law to be served as follows: \nVIA HAND DELIVERY \nJeffrey Hofferman, Esquire \nGollatz, Griffin & Ewing, P.C. \nFour Penn Center, Suite 200 \nPhiladelphia, PA 19103 \n(Attorney for Plaintiff) \nDated: September 5, 2003 \nBy: \nChristopher J. Guiton \nPFILITS4544861I \nEFTA00187420\n", "char_count": 502}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA \nNELSON SHANKS \nPlaintiff; \nLESLIE and ABIGAIL WEXNER, et al. \nCIVIL ACTION \nDefendants. \nNO. 02-7671 \nCERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH EFFORTS \nTO RESOLVE DISCOVERY DISPUTES \nBEFORE FILING MOTION \nJ. Fox, Esquire, hereby certifies that he is counsel for \nDefendants and that prior to filing Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order to \nreschedule and relocate the depositions of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, and \nAbigail and Leslie Wexner, he engaged in good-faith efforts with Plaintiff's counsel, \nJeffrey Hofferman, to resolve this dispute. He wrote Mr. Hofferman a letter requesting \nrescheduling. Mr. Hofferman did not bother to respond to the letter. \nDated: September 5, 2003 \nJ. Fox \nCounsel for Defendants, \nPFILIT1454486\\ I \nEFTA00187421\n", "char_count": 830}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs \nPage 1 of 2 \nI/II.CA 11OIIIC \nBUCille“ LICCIISC \nOperalers License \nIiumtl CerMlextions \nCommoner Minim \nCommisshmer Robertson \nAhem the DIA 'A \n'business Starch \nBusiness License Search \nBusiness Name Search \nCategoaA,2 \nNew Business istings \nImage for Premium Listings \nRecords per page: \nrir-3 \nFound 34 Records \nReco1 rd2!14tlic)180 \nEnter Business Name (use fewer letters for more results) \n'financial \nSearch \n--Bookkeeping Services--\nDEPAUL FINANCIAL SERVICES \n340492-1829 \nFREDERIKSTED, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2020117-2006 \nWINSLOW & WINSLOW FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. \n940-713-9713 \nFREDERIKSTED, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2025606-2006 \n--Business & Management Consulting--\nBARRY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC \nSt. Thomas \nLicense #: 1-2025931-2007 \nEMAX FINANCIAL GROUP \n340 719-4600 \nChristiansted, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2030892-2007 \nFINANCIAL TRUST COMPANY, INC. \n340-775-2525 \nSt. Thomas \nGote1a) Roc \nChr \nCro \nPhone: (: \nFax: (3' \nAdminish \nSt. Joh \nPhone: (: \nFax 0' \n- • i \nProp. & Po \nI Sub P \nThon \nPhone: (: \nFax (3' \nhttp://www.dlca.gov.vi/bussearch.asp?norecs=10&name=financial \n5/14/2007 \nEFTA00187422\n", "char_count": 1164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs \nPage 2 of 2 \nLicense #: 1-2021802-2006 \nGLOBAL FINANCIAL STRATEGIES, LLC \nSt. Thomas \nLicense #: 1-1004878-2007 \nGOLDEN EAGLE FINANCIAL, LLLP \n340-774-2273 \nSt. Thomas \nLicense #:1-2013600-2006 \nGULFSTREAM FINANCIAL, LLC \nSt. Thomas \nLicense #: 1-2028797-2007 \nHORIZON FUEL AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT \n340-719-7915 \nChristiansted, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2030321-2007 \nHORIZON FUEL AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, \nLIMITED LIABILITY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP \n340-719-7915 \nCHRISTIANSTED, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2020644-2006 \nFound 34 Records \n1234 Next \nRecords ] to 10 \nOfficial Website of the USVI Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs \nWebmastering by Vastimaging \nSite Last Updated May 19, 2003 \nhttp://www.dlca.gov.vi/bussearch.asp?norecs=10&name=financial \n5/14/2007 \nEFTA00187423\n", "char_count": 828}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Page I of 2 \nWestlaw. \nNot Reported in F.Supp. \nPage I \nNot Reported in F.Supp., 1998 WL 67676 (S.D.N.Y.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.) \nH \nU.S.!. Epstein \nS.D. .Y.,1998. \nOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States District Court, S.D. New York. \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, \n1. \nJeffrey E. EPSTEIN and Ivan S. Fisher, \nDefendants. \nNo. 96 Civ. 8307(DC). \nFeb. 19, 1998. \nMary Jo White, United States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of New York, by Serene Nakano, \nAssistant United States Attorney, New York City, \nfor the United States. \nGage & Pavlis, by G. Robert Gage, Jr., Ellen J. \nCasey, New York City, for Ivan S. Fisher. \nMEMORANDUM DECISION \nCHIN, J. \n*I In this case, the United States (the \"Government\" \n) seeks to evict defendants Jeffrey E. Epstein and \nIvan S. Fisher from a building formerly used as a \nresidence by the Deputy Consul General of the \nIslamic Republic of Iran (\"Iran\"). After diplomatic \nand consular relations with Iran were severed in \n1980, the Office of Foreign Missions (\"OFM\") of \nthe United States Department of State took \npossession of the building pursuant to the Foreign \nMissions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. OFM \nleased the building to Epstein in 1992. Epstein \neventually \nsublet \nthe \npremises \nto \nFisher, \npurportedly without the Governments consent. \nFisher, in turn, sublet a portion of the premises to \nseveral other lawyers. \nIn 1996, the Government purported to terminate \nEpstein's lease and brought this action to evict \nEpstein and Fisher. The other sub-tenants were \nlater added as defendants. The Government also \nseeks to recover back rent from Epstein and Fisher. \nDuring discovery, \nthe \nGovernment \nrequested \nproduction of Fisher's 1996 tax return to verify the \namount of rent that he had collected from his \nsubtenants. Fisher objected to the request. At a \nconference on December 10, 1997, I overruled the \nobjection on the condition that the return be \nprotected by an appropriate confidenti\n... [truncated, 3861 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/33 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=33]", "char_count": 3861}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Page 2 of 2 \nNot Reported in F.Supp. \nPagc 2 \nNot Reported in F.Supp., 1998 WL 67676 (S.D.N.Y.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported In F.Supp.) \nrelying upon such orders will be inhibited from \nproviding essential testimony and information in \ncivil litigation, \"thus undermining a procedural \nsystem that has been successfully developed over \nthe years for disposition of civil differences.\" Id. A \nprovision that would permit the use of confidential \ninformation outside of this lawsuit would defeat the \nvery purpose of the protective order. \n*2 Second, although the Court recognizes the strong \npublic interest in obtaining all relevant evidence \nrequired \nfor law \nenforcement purposes, \nthe \nGovernment as investigator \" \n'has awesome \npowers' [that] render unnecessary its exploitation of \nthe friuts of private litigation.\" Id. (quoting GAF \nCorp. I. Eastman Kodak Co., 415 F.Supp. 129, 132 \n(S.D.N.Y.1976)). Proposed Paragraph 7(c) should \nnot be included in the protective order \"merely to \naccommodate the Government's desire to inspect \nprotected [information] for possible use in a \ncriminal [or civil] investigation.\" MartindeR 594 \nF.2d at 296; cf. id. (denying Government's order to \nmodify or vacate protective order to permit it access \nto witnesses' deposition transcripts protected by the \norder). The Government will still be able to fulfill \nits statutory obligation to enforce the law through \nordinary criminal and civil process and by taking \nadvantage of the substantial resources available to \nthe Government to investigate suspected violations \nof the law. \nThird, tax information has traditionally been treated \nas private and confidential information. Section \n6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, for example, \nspecifically prohibits any person, including an \nofficer or employee of the United States, from \" \ndisclos[ing] any return or return information \nobtained ... in any manner in connection with his [or \nher] service as such an officer or employee.\" 26 \nU.S.C. § 6103(a). Sec\n... [truncated, 3545 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/34 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=34]", "char_count": 3545}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "640 \n818 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT \ntered trade dress, in violation of 2 43(a) of \nthe Lanham Act. Hargen contends that FT \ncannot obtain relief under the Lanham Act \nbecause FT's trade dress is Ilinetionall \nIN, 111 A trade dress is functional when \nthe trade dress \"is essential to the uses or \npurposes of the article or if it affects the cost \nor quality of the article.\" Inwmxl Labs., Inc-\nIves Lobs., Inc.. 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10, \n102 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 n. 10, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 \n(1982). \nA product's trade dress must be \nviewed in its totality. te Sportsac, Ina'. K \nMart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir.1985). \nHowever, if a trade dress is found to be \nfunctional, its features may be copied even if \nconibsion would result. American Greetings \nCorp.'. Dan-Dee Onportit Ina, 807 F.2d \n1136, 1141 (3d Cir.1986). \nFT states that its packaging design was \nchosen because the design was pretty, so-\nphisticated, and showed off the novelty value \nof the deodorant stone. Rosenblatt dep. at \n520-522. FT also states that FT colored the \npackage blue because it liked that color, not \nbecause blue was a common color used in \ncosmetic packaging. Id. at 378. Moreover, \nthe evidence before us indicates FT and at \nleast one other producer of deodorant stones \npack their deodorant products in other pack-\naging besides plastic boxes. For example, \nplaintiff also packs its deodorant stone in a \nsoft plastic pouch, a triangular cardboard \nbox, a shrink-wrapped soap dish and satin \npouches of various colors. Rosenblatt aff. \n92 5, 9, 13. \nMoreover, another company, \nwhose name Rosenblatt could not recall at \nhis deposition, distributes a similar product \nin a velvet, drawstring pouch. Rosenblatt \ndep. at 379-380. This evidence suggests that \nplaintiffs packaging in this case may not be \nfunctional. \nDefendant claims that FT's packaging is \nfunctional because the packaging is allegedly \nefficient and compact, because the packaging \nallows consumers to see the product, and \nbecause the packaging is comm\n... [truncated, 3693 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/35 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=35]", "char_count": 3693}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "STROLL I EPSTEIN \n641 \nCite as /118 F.Supp. MO (S.D.N.Y. Ms) \nder contract in which second venturer re-\nleased his interest in venture. First ventur-\ner moved to dismiss or for summary judg-\nment, and second venturer cross-moved for \nsummary judgment. \nThe District Court, \nConboy, J., held that: (1) agreement under \nwhich first joint venturer agreed to return \ncapital contribution to second joint venturer \nupon return of all interests in venture by \nsecond venturer unambiguously indicated \nthat first venturer was acting solely in repre-\nsentative capacity, not personal capacity, and \n(2) modification of original joint venture \nagreement making first joint venturer per-\nsonally liable for managing affairs of joint \nventure could not be construed as imposing \npersonal liability on first joint venturer in \nevent joint venture subsequently bought out \nsecond venturer's interest. \nMotions granted in part and denied in \npart. \nI. Federal Courts .3=409 \nIn diversity action, federal court sitting \nin New York must apply New York law, \nincluding New York's choice-of-law rules. \n2. Contracts e=s144 \nUnder New York's choice-of-law rules, \nwhen court is construing meaning of con-\ntract, court should apply local law of state \nwhich has greatest interest in or most signifi-\ncant relationship to transaction and parties. \n3. Joint Adventures (1.4(1) \nNew York was state with most signifi-\ncant relationship to agreement in which one \njoint venturer agreed to return capital contri-\nbution to another venturer, and thus, New \nYork law governed meaning of agreement, in \ndiversity action; contract was executed in \nNew York and one party was New York \ncitizen. \n4. Bills and Notes o=,I47 \nContract under which one joint venturer \nagreed to return capital contribution to an-\nother venturer was not \"negotiable instru-\nment\" as it was not payable to order or \nbearer, and thus, provision of New York \nUniform Commercial Code governing inter-\npretation of negotiable instruments did not \napply. N.Y\n... [truncated, 3774 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/36 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=36]", "char_count": 3774}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "642 \n818 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT \ndence of agent's intent to substitute or add \nhis ovm personal liability for, or to, that of \nprincipal. \n12. Evidence e=384 \nIf contract is unambiguous on its face, \nextrinsic evidence may not be presented to \ncreate ambiguity, under New York law. \n13. Joint Adventures d=.4(1) \nModification of original joint venture \nagreement making first joint venturer per-\nsonally responsible for managing affairs of \njoint venture could not be construed as im-\nposing personal liability on first joint ventur-\ner in event of joint venture subsequently \nbuying out second venturer's interest in ven-\nture. \n14. Evidence ca384 \nWhere parties have expressed their \nagreement in unambiguous and integrated \nwriting, New York's parol-evidence rule op-\nerates to exclude evidence of all prior and \ncontemporaneous negotiations or agreements \noffered to contradict or modify terms of writ-\ning. \n15. Evidence ca397(2) \nWriting is \"integrated\" for purpose of \nNew York's parol-evidence rule if it com-\npletely and accurately embodies all mutual \nrights and obligations of parties. \nSee publication Words and Phrases \nfor other judicial constructions and def-\ninitions. \n16. Evidence c=.397(1) \nEvidence that first joint venturer orally \npromised to personally repay second ventur-\ner's capital contribution contradicted unam-\nbiguous terms of integrated written agree-\nment entered by first venturer in his repre-\nsentative capacity, and thus was inadmissible \nunder New York's parol-evidence rule. \n17. Joint Adventures e=.4(1) \nAlleged partial payment or promise to \npay personally by first joint venturer after \n1. As this Court will consider matters extrinsic to \nthe complaint. we will treat defendant Epstein's \nmotion to dismiss as a motion for summary judg-\nment. See Fcd.R.Civ.P. 12(b). \nexecution of agreement under which second \njoint venturer's capital contribution was to be \nreturned by venture could not make first \nventurer personally liable under such con-\ntract. \nIS. Co\n... [truncated, 3621 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/37 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=37]", "char_count": 3621}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "STROLL I EPSTEIN \n643 \ncarnets F.Supp. 440 (00N.Y. 19931 \nvember 1984 contract unambiguously indi- \nF.Supp. at 1366. A contract is ambiguous if \ncams the parties' intention that Epstein was \nacting solely in a representative capacity \nwhen he agreed to return Stroll's capital \ncontribution in the joint venture.3\nI.4-8) \"Under New York law,' ... the \nCourt must look first to the parties' written \nagreement to determine the parties' intent \nand [must' limit its inquiry to the words of \nthe agreement itself if the agreement sets \nforth the parties' intent clearly and unambig-\nuously? Sterling Drug Inc. \nBayer AG, \n792 F.Supp. 1357, 1365 (S.D.NN.1992). See \nalso Chimart Associates I Paul, 66 N.Y.2d \n570, 498 N.Y.S2d 344, 34, 489 N.E.2d 231, \n233 (Ct.App.1986) (Where a contract is un-\nambiguous on its face, the Court may not \nconsider evidence extrinsic to the contract to \ndetermine the parties' intent). Whether a \ncontract is ambiguous is a matter of law to be \ndetermined by the Court. Sterling, 792 \nIn a diversity action, a federal court sitting in \nNew York must apply New York law, Including \nNew York's choice of law rules. I & B Schoen-\nfeld Fur Merchants. Inc I Kilbourne & Donahue, \nInc.. 704 F.Supp. 466, 4.68 (S.D.N.Y.1989). See \nKlaxon Co. \nSte for Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. \n487. 496, 6 S.Ct. 1020. 1021. 85 L.Ed. 1477 \n(1941): see also Erie R. Co.)! Tompkins, 304 U.S. \n64. 78. 58 SO. 817, 822. \nLEd. 1188 (1938). \nUnder New York's choice of law rules, when a \ncourt Is construing the meaning of a contract. \nthe Court should \"apply the local law of that \nstate which has the greatest interest in or the \nmost significant relationship to the transaction \nand the parties.\" See Thar Fund. Inc. !Ins. Co. \nof N. Am., 580 Kid 1158. 1162 (2d i, 1978). \ncat denied, 440 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 1226. 59 \nL.Ed.2d 461 (1979). In the present action, the \nstate with the most significant relationship to the \ntransaction is New York: the contract being sued \nupon was executed in Ncw York\n... [truncated, 5468 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/38 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=38]", "char_count": 5468}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "644 \n818 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT \ncontract in a representative capacity. In one \nsentence, the contract states that the Novem-\nber 1984 contract shall consist of terms and \nconditions verbally agreed upon on Septem-\nber 10, 1984. In an adjacent sentence, the \ncontract states that the following agreement \nwas reached on September 10, 1984: \"in \nyour capacity as both an officer of Intercon-\ntinental Asset Group and as agent for the \njoint venture you verbally agreed to accept \nmy rescission of my acquisition of the joint \nventure ab initio, and my tender to you of all \nmy interests in the venture and you are to \nreturn all amounts contributed by me to the \nventure. . . .\" (emphasis added). \nRead to-\ngether, these two sentences clearly indicate \nthat the November 1984 contract was execut-\ned by Epstein in his representative capacity. \nStroll asserts that the above-quoted sen-\ntence demonstrates that Epstein acted in a \nrepresentative capacity only when he agreed \nto accept Stroll's demand for rescission, and \nthat Epstein personally agreed to buy out \nStroll's interest in the venture. \nWe find \nStroll's interpretation of this \nsentence \nstrained and unreasonable as there is noth-\ning in the sentence to indicate that the \nphrase \"in your capacity as ... an officer .. . \nand as agent. ...\" does not apply to the \nentire sentence. \nIn an attempt to establish Epstein's per-\nsonal liability, Stroll points to selected phras-\nes of the contract which use personal pro-\nnouns to refer to Epstein (e.g.. \"I hereby \naccept your demand for rescission and tender \nupon the terms and conditions contained \nherein.\"). However, the very first time the \ncontract uses a personal pronoun to refer to \nEpstein, the contract states, \"in your capaci-\nty as both an officer of Intercontinental As-\nS. Under New York 1:O111ITIOll law. an agent for u \ndisclosed principal will not be held personally \nliable \"'unless there is clear and explicit e‘ \n(fence of the agent's intention to substitute or \nsuperadd \n... [truncated, 4744 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/39 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=39]", "char_count": 4744}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "STROLL I \nCite asaii F.Supp. \nhave known\" Epstein was acting in a repre-\nsentative capacity, the failure of Epstein's \nsignature to meet the technical requirements \nof a representative signature is insufficient to \nrender the contract ambiguous as to the par-\nties' intent. \nBased on the above analysis, the Court \nconcludes that the November 1984 contract, \nwhen read as a whole, is unambiguous on its \nface and indicates the parties' intention that \nEpstein was acting in a representative capac-\nity when he agreed to return Stroll's capital \ncontribution. \nStroll, however, seeks to introduce extrin-\nsic evidence to generate ambiguity in the \ncontract. Specifically, Stroll seeks to intro-\nduce a prior written contract executed by \nStroll. I.A.G., and Epstein on June 18, 1982. \nStroll argues that an interpretation of the \nNovember 1984 contract as imposing person-\nal liability on Epstein would be consistent \nwith Epstein's assumption of personal liabili-\nty under the June 1982 contract. \n(121 As noted above, if a contract is un-\nambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence may \nnot be presented to create an ambiguity in \nthe contract. Therefore, Stroll cannot intro-\nduce the June 1982 contract to create an \nambiguity in the November 1984 contract. \n(131 However, even if we consider the \nJune 1982 contract, our conclusion that the \nNovember 1984 contract is unambiguous and \ndoes not establish personal liability remains \nunchanged. The June 1982 contract is a \nmodification of Stroll and I.A.G.'s original \njoint venture agreement, with one of the \nmodifications making Epstein personally re-\nsponsible for managing the affairs of the \njoint venture. The contract makes no men-\ntion of any future refund of Stroll's capital \ncontribution, or of a buy out in the event of a \nrescission. \nThe relevant provisions of the June 1982 \ncontract are: \nThe purpose of this letter is to ... modify \ncertain provisions of the Joint Venture \nagreement which will continue to be opera-\ntive. \n6. The\n... [truncated, 4198 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/40 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=40]", "char_count": 4198}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "646 \n818 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT \nId. at 476-478. Moreover, even the plaintiff \ndoes not contest that the November 1984 \ncontract is a complete integration. \nStroll seeks to introduce evidence that dur-\ning the September 10, 1984 meeting at the \noffice of Stroll's attorney. Epstein orally \npromised to personally repay Stroll's capital \ncontribution. In addition, Stroll seeks to in-\ntroduce evidence that at the November 15, \n1984 meeting, Epstein took Stroll aside and \norally reiterated his personal promise to re-\nturn Stroll's capital contribution. However, \nthe evidence Stroll seeks to present directly \ncontradicts the unambiguous terms of the \nNovember 1984 contract. \nThe contract \nstates that, \"loin September 10, 1984, you \n[Epstein] and I (Stroll) met in the law office \nof Henry M. Grannan... . \nDuring the \ncourse of this meeting, in your capacity as \nboth an officer of Intercontinental Asset \nCroup and as an agent for the joint venture \nyou verbally agreed to accept my rescission \n... and my tender to you of all my interests \n. . . and you are to return all amounts con-\ntributed by me. . ..\" (emphasis added). \nMoreover, the November 1984 contract \nstates that the terms of the November 1984 \ncontract are the same as those agreed upon \nat the September 10, 1984 meeting. There-\nfore, because the evidence Stroll seeks to \npresent contradicts the unambiguous terms \nof the integrated November 1984 contract, \nthis evidence is inadmissible under the parole \nevidence rule. \nC. Subsequent Conduct \n(171 Stroll asserts that in May 1988, Ep-\nstein made a part payment on the debt of \n$10,000. by personal check. Stroll also as-\nserts that in September 1991, Epstein prom-\nised to pay him $75,000 from a fee Epstein \nwas expecting to receive. Epstein concedes \n7. In order to establish that there is a genuine \nissue of material fact. Stroll may introduce eve. \ndente of conduct subsequent to the November \n1984 contract either to establish that a nation \noccurred, or to show that. at so\n... [truncated, 4498 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/41 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=41]", "char_count": 4498}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Page 1 of 5 \nVVestlaw. \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nPage I \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 1343018 (E.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nC \nShanks ! Wexner \nE.D.Pa., 003. \nOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. \nUnited States District CourtE.D. Pennsylvania. \nNelson SHANKS, Plaintiff, \nLeslie and Abigail WACNER, h/w, Jeffery E. \nEspstein, individually, and cl/b/a .1. Epstein and \nCompany, inc., and Ghislaine Maxwell, Defendants. \nNo. Civ.A. 02-7671. \nNEWCOMER, I. \nMarch 18, 2003. \nOPINION \nI. Introduction \n*1 This case arises out of a contract dispute?\" \nThe Plaintiff claims that the Defendants contracted \nwith him to paint a family portrait of Abigail \nWexner and her three children. The Plaintiff alleges \nthat the Defendants breached this contract by \nrefusing to pay for the portrait after it was \ndelivered. Currently before the Court is the \nDefendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal \nJurisdiction. For the following reasons the Motion \nwill be denied. \nFN1. The Defendants deny that a contract \nwas ever formed. For purposes of this \nMotion only we will accept that there was \na contract between the two parties. \nII. Legal Standard for Personal Jurisdiction \nAs a federal court sitting in diversity, our personal \njurisdiction inquiry is two-fold. First, we must \ndecide whether the Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute \nauthorizes jurisdiction over the Defendants, and \nsecond, we \nmust decide \nwhether exercising \njurisdiction over these Defendants satisfies the Due \nProcess Clause of the Constitution. \nVetrotex \nCertainteed Corp. \nConsolidated Fiber and Glass \nProducts Co., 25 -F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir.1996). \nBecause the Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute is \ncoextensive with the Due Process Clause, however, \nthe decisive issue is whether exercising personal \njurisdiction over the Defendants offends due \nprocess. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5322(b) (West \n2003). \nThere are two requirements to satisfy due process in \nthe personal jurisdiction context. Fir\n... [truncated, 3615 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/42 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=42]", "char_count": 3615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Page 2 of 5 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 1343018 (E.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nFN2. The Plaintiff makes two claims in \nthis \ncase, \nbreach of contract \nand \npromissory estoppel. The Court will not \nengage in a specific jurisdiction analysis \nfor each of the Plaintiffs two claims. Both \nclaims center on essentially the same \nevents and circumstances, and therefore, \nthe \nconsiderations \nfor \njurisdictional \npurposes are identical. See Remick \nManferdy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (200 \n(claim specific analysis is only required \nwhen there are different jurisdictional \nconsiderations). \niI. Procedure for Determining Minimum Contacts \nWhen a Defendant moves for dismissal under \n12(6)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction the burden \nr\nshifts to the party s king to impose jurisdiction. \nProvident Nat. Bank \nCalifornia Fed. Say. &Loan \nAss'n, 819 F.2d 434 3d Cir.1987). In response to a \n12(6)(2) motion, a party must make a prima facie \nshowing that minimum contacts warranting personal \njurisdiction exist.FN3 Mellon Bank (East) PSFS \nNat. Ass'n I. Farina, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d \nCir.1992). \nFN3. The Court notes that although a \nPlaintiff need only make a prima facie \nshowing of jurisdiction to defeat a motion \nunder Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(bX2), a Plaintiff \nhas to establish personal jurisdiction by a \npreponderance of the evidence at trial. \nCarteret Saving Bank I. Shushan, 954 \nF.2d \n141, \n146 \n(3d \nCir.1992). \nThe \nDefendants need not do anything to \npreserve their right to raise personal \njurisdiction again at trial. \niq The law in the Third Circuit, however, is not \nclear as to what a Court should consider in deciding \nwhether the Plaintiff has met this burden. Two lines \nof cases differ as to whether affirmative proof of \nminimum contacts is required, or if the Plaintiff can \nmerely rely on contacts alleged in his pleadings. \nSeveral cases have stated that a plaintiff cannot rely \non the bare pleadings alone, but must sustain his \n\n... [truncated, 4302 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/43 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=43]", "char_count": 4302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Page 3 of 5 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 1343018 (E.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \njurisdiction on their own, but if considered in \nconjunction with assertions made in the Complaint \nwould satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. If \nthe Court were to follow the Time Share approach \nof requiring competent evidence of all jurisdictional \nfacts, this Court would have to dismiss the \nPlaintiffs case. If the Court followed the procedure \nof Carteret of accepting factual allegations in the \nComplaint, than jurisdiction has been established. \nBecause the Defendants did not attempt to \ncontrovert any of the allegations in the Plaintiffs \nComplaint, this Court finds that the most fair \nprocedure is to accept them as true for the purpose \nof this Motion. This aparoach is followed in several \nother circuits. Brown \nFlowers Industrir, Inc., \n688 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.1982); Turnock \nCope \n816 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir.1987); Dowless \nWarren-Rupp Houdailles Inc., 800 F.2d 131 \n1307 \n(4th \nCir.I986); \nBehagen I. \nAmateur \nBasketball AssW of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th \nCir.1984); Jet Charter Service, Inc. I. Koeck, 907 \nF.2d 1110, 1111 (11th Cir.1990). While this \nprocedure places a burden on the party challenging \njurisdiction to at least question the allegations of \njurisdictional facts, this burden is consistent with \nthe other requirements placed on Defendants \nbringing a 12(bX2) motion. When a complaint is \nfiled there is no affirmative duty to plead personal \njurisdiction because it is assumed that personal \njurisdiction \nexists. Stirling \nHomex \nCorp. \nI. \nHomasote Co., 437 F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir.1971). It is \nincumbent on a party to raise the lack of personal \njurisdiction. See Zelson \nThomforde, 412 F.2d 56 \n(3d Cir.1969) (district court cannot raise personal \njurisdiction seta sponte ). Further, if a party wishes \nto challenge personal jurisdiction of a Court he \nmust do so at the responsive pleading stage or he \nwill ha\n... [truncated, 4801 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/44 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=44]", "char_count": 4801}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Page 4 of 5 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 1343018 (E.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \nIV. Analysis of minimum contacts \nBased on the above facts it is clear that the \nDefendants did have sufficient minimum contacts to \njustify \npersonal \njurisdiction. \nThe \nDefendants \nreached out to a Pennsylvania resident to have him \npaint the portrait. Jurisdiction is proper when \nparties \"reach out beyond one state and create \ncontinuing relationships and obligations with the \ncitizens of another state.\" Burger King Corp. I. \nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 256 (1985). In cases \nwhere a out-of-state resident contracts with a forum \nresident, whether the out-of-state resident initiated \nthe rel onship is crucial. See Vetrotex Certainteed \nCorp. \nConsolidated Fiber, 75 F.3d 147 (3d \nCir.199 ). \nSimply initiating a contractual relationship with a \nPennsylvania resident, however, is not the only \ncontact in this case which goes towards establishing \npersonal jurisdiction. Indeed, the Defendants also \nengaged in crucial communications about the \nperformance of the contract directed at the state of \nPennsylvania. See Grand Entm't Group, Ltd. I. Star \nMedia Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir.1993) \n(mail \nand \ntelephone \ncontacts \nmay \nsupport \njurisdiction). These contacts cannot be dismissed as \nmere informational contacts, rather some of them go \nto the heart of the transaction. Specifically, the May \n16, 2000, letter from the Defendants finalized the \nprice of the portrait. These contacts evidence a \nconscious decision by the Defendants to do business \nwith a Pennsylvania resident operating in the \nCommonwealth of Pennsylvania. \nPerhaps the most meaningful contact occurred when \nthe portrait was delivered to the Defendants' agent \nwithin the state of Pennsylvania. This delivery is \ncrucial to the breach of contract claim because \ndelivery of the portrait was necessarily an implied \ncondition of the contract. Not only is it significant \nto\n... [truncated, 4778 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/45 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=45]", "char_count": 4778}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Page 5 of 5 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d \nPage 5 \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 1343018 (E.D.Pa.) \n(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) \non the Defendants to convince the Court that these \nprinciples will be offended by this Court's exercise \nof jurisdiction. Mesalic \nFiberfloai Corp., 897 \nF.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir.I \n). We conclude that the \nDefendants cannot meet this burden. The interests \nof both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the \nPlaintiff are substantially forwarded by hearing the \ncase in this Court. The Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania \nresident, should be able to seek a remedy in his \nhome state. It is certainly no more unfair for the \nPlaintiff \nto \nbring \nthe \nDefendants \ninto \na \nPennsylvania court, than it would be to force the \nPlaintiff to travel to Ohio in search of a remedy. \nMoreover, Pennsylvania has an interest in assuring \nthat its residents have a convenient forum to remedy \nbreaches of contracts, particularly when it appears \nthat the vast majority of the contract was performed \nwithin the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the Court \nsees no reason why exercising jurisdiction over the \nDefendants would violate traditional notions of fair \nplay and substantial justice. \nVI. Conclusion \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Defendants Motion \nto Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is \ndenied. An appropriate order will follow. \nE.D.Pa.a003. \nShanks I. Wexner \nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 1343018 \n(E.D.Pa.) \nEND OF DOCUMENT \nO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. \nhttps://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Fullkiti=1&prft=HTMLE&fn=_top... 5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187437\n", "char_count": 1633}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs \nPage I of 2 \nDLCA Home \nOusiness License \nfax' Operators License \nBum' Certifications \nConsumer Affairs \nCommissioner Robertson \nAbout the OLCA \nBusiness Search \nBusiness License Search \nBusiness Name Search Category A-Z New Business Listings \nAbout \nlinaefelidl'iblititifli Listings \nRecords per page: ricr \nFound 34 Records \nErcy 12 4 Next\nRecords 21 to 30 \nEnter Business Name (use fewer letters for more results) \n'financial \nSearch \n--Collection Agency--\nPROGRESSIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. \n866-484-0204 \nSt. Thomas, USVI 00803, St. Thomas \nLicense #:0-1002135-2006 \n—Consultant - Tax--\nWINSLOW & WINSLOW FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. \n940-713-9713 \nFREDERIKSTED, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2025606-2006 \n--Development & Sale of Own Property--\nCARB3BANK FINANCIAL GROUP \nSt. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2006639-2005 \n--Fiduciary Service—\nANTILLES FINANCIAL GROUP, LLLP \nSt. Croix \nLicense #:2-2022028-2006 \nFINANCIAL TRUST COMPANY, INC. \n340-775-2525 \nPhor4c (. \nFax: (34\nProp & Pn \nI Sub a \nSt 'Mon \nPhone: C \nFax:01\nhttp://www.dlca.gov.vi/bussearch.asp?a=name&name=financial&norecs=10&dir=3&islan... 5/14/2007 \nEFTA00187438\n", "char_count": 1163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs \nPage 2 of 2 \nSt. Thomas \nLicense ti: 1-2021802-2006 \n--Gasoline Station--\nGREEN CAY MARINA \nSt. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2024637-2006 \n--Holding Company--\nPARTICLE FINANCIAL, LLLP \nSt. Thomas \nLicense #: 1-1003805-2006 \n--Hotel & Guest House B 40-99 beds--\nTAMARIND REEF HOTEL \nCSTED, St. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2024547-2006 \n--Marinas--\nGREEN CAY MARINA \nSt. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2024637-2006 \n--Rental of Commercial Space--\nGREEN CAY MARINA \nSt. Croix \nLicense #: 2-2024637-2006 \nFound 34 Records \nPrey 12 3 4 Next \nRecords 21 to 30 \nOfficial Website of the USVI Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs \nWebmastering by Vattimaging \nSite Last Updated May 19, 2003 \nhttp://www.dlca.gov.vi/bussearch.asp?a=name&name=financial&norecs=108tdir=3&islan... 5/14/2007 \nEFTA00187439\n", "char_count": 818}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "$DNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 1 of 5 \nCLOSED \nU.S. District Court \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley Square) \nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:02-cv-05332-SITS \nCitibank, N.A.I Epstein, et al \nAssigned to: Judge Sidney H. Stein \nDemand: $0 \nCause: 28:1391 Personal Injury \nPlaintiff \nCitibank, N.A. \nDefendant \nJeffrey IC Epstein \nDefendant \nFinancial Trust Company, Inc. \nDate Filed: 07/11/2002 \nDate Terminated: 07/26/2005 \nJury Demand: None \nNature of Suit: 190 Contract Other \nJurisdiction: Diversity \nrepresented by Marshall H. Fishman \nKramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel, \nL.L.P. \n919 Third Avenue \nNew York, NY 10022 \nWIRty \nrepresented by Gerald B. Lefcourt \nLaw Office Gerald B. Lefcourt \n148 East 78th Street \nNew York, NY 10021 \nIma\n...o®lefcourtlaw.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Gerald B. Lefcourt \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nDate Filed \n# \nDocket Text \n07/11/2002 \n1 COMPLAINT filed. Summons issued and Notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \n636(c). FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 444722. (jol) (Entered: \n07/16/2002) \n07/11/2002 \nMagistrate Judge Theodore H. Katz is so designated. (jol) (Entered: \n07/16/2002) \n07/11/2002 \n2 RULE 1.9 CERTIFICATE filed by Citibank, N.A. . (jol) (Entered: \n07/16/2002) \nhttps://ecf. nysd.uscourts.gov/egi-bin/DIctRpt.pl?273504181304452-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187440\n", "char_count": 1376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "SDNY CMifiCF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 2 of 5 \n07/17/2002 \n3 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons, complaint & rule 1.9 statement \nas to Jeffrey E. Epstein by first class mail on 7/15/02 . Answer due on \n8/5/02 for Jeffrey E. Epstein . (db) (Entered: 07/19/2002) \n07/17/2002 \n3 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons, complaint & rule 1.9 statement \nas to Financial Trust by Helen Kim on 7/15/02 . Answer due on 8/5/02 \nfor Financial Trust . (db) (Entered: 07/19/2002) \n07/17/2002 \n3 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons, complaint & rule 1.9 as to \nJeffrey E. Epstein by Helen Kim on 7/15/02 . Answer due on 8/5/02 for \nJeffrey E. Epstein . (db) (Entered: 07/19/2002) \n08/02/2002 \n4 ORDER, Counsel are directed to appear in courtroom 23A on 9/13/02, at \n10:30 a.m. for an initial case management conference purs. to FRCP 16 . \n( signed by Judge Sidney H. Stein ); Copies mailed. (sb) (Entered: \n08/05/2002) \n08/16/2002 \n5 STIPULATION and ORDER, that defendants' time to answer, move or \notherwise respond to the complaint in the above-captioned action is \nhereby extended to and including 9/3/02 . ( signed by Judge Sidney H. \nStein ) (dle) (Entered: 08/19/2002) \n09/03/2002 \n7 NOTICE OF MOTION (Filed on Service Date) by Jeffrey E. Epstein, \nFinancial Trust for an order, purs. to Rules 1, 12 and 13(a) of the FRCP, \ndismissing the Complaint ; or, in the alternative, for an order, the \nproceedings should be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed \naction ; Return Date 9/26/02. (reed in the night deposit box on 10/9/02 at \n5:07 p.m.) (sac) (Entered: 10/16/2002) \n09/20/2002 \n16 NOTICE OF MOTION (FILED ON SERVICE DATE) by Citibank, \nN.A., for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the FRCP on each of \nthe first and second claims for relief asserted in the complaint in this \naction . Return Date 10/11/02. Annexed affidavit of Vita Cusumano and \nthe statement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. (kw) Modified on \n10/28/2002 (Entered: 10/28/2002) \n09/30/2002 \n6 STIPULATION; defendants shal\n... [truncated, 3173 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/50 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=50]", "char_count": 3173}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 51, "text_content": ", SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 3 of 5 \naction. (rec'd in the night deposit box on 10/9/02 at 5:07 p.m.) (sac) \n(Entered: 10/16/2002) \n10/09/2002 \n9 RULE 1.9 CERTIFICATE filed by Jeffrey E. Epstein, Financial Trust. \n(rec'd in the night deposit box on 10/9/02 at 5:06 p.m.) (sac) (Entered: \n10/16/2002) \n10/09/2002 \n10 DECLARATION of Edward S. Feig by Jeffrey E. Epstein, Financial \nTrust in support Re: [7-1] motion for an order, puns. to Rules 1, 12 and 13 \n(a) of the FRCP, dismissing the Complaint, [7-2] motion for an order, the \nproceedings should be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed \naction. (reed in the night deposit box on 10/9/02 at 5:07 p.m.) (sac) \n(Entered: 10/16/2002) \n10/09/2002 \n11 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Citibank, N.A. in opposition to [7-1] \nmotion for an order, pun. to Rules 1, 12 and 13(a) of the FRCP, \ndismissing the Complaint, [7-2] motion for an order, the proceedings \nshould be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed action. (sac) \n(Entered: 10/16/2002) \n10/09/2002 \n12 AFFIDAVIT of Marshall H. Fishman by Citibank, N.A. in opposition to \n[7-1] motion for an order, purl. to Rules 1, 12 and 13(a) of the FRCP, \ndismissing the Complaint, [7-2] motion for an order, the proceedings \nshould be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed action. (sac) \n(Entered: 10/16/2002) \n10/09/2002 \n13 AFFIDAVIT of Dayle Davison by Citibank, N.A. in opposition to [7-1] \nmotion for an order, pun. to Rules 1, 12 and 13(a) of the FRCP, \ndismissing the Complaint, [7-2] motion for an order, the proceedings \nshould be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed action. (sac) \n(Entered: 10/16/2002) \n10/09/2002 \n14 REPLY MEMORANDUM by Jeffrey E. Epstein, Financial Trust in \nsupport re: [7-1] motion for an order, pun. to Rules 1, 12 and 13(a) of the \nFRCP, dismissing the Complaint, [7-2] motion for an order, the \nproceedings should be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed \naction. (reed in the night deposit box\n... [truncated, 2957 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/51 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=51]", "char_count": 2957}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 4 of 5 \nof the FRCP on each of the first and second claims for relief asserted in \nthe complaint in this action. (Rec. in the night deposit box). (kw) \n(Entered: 10/28/2002) \n10/22/2002 \n19 RULE 56.1 STATEMENT filed by Jeffrey E. Epstein, Financial Trust. \n(Rec. in the night deposit box). (kw) (Entered: 10/28/2002) \n10/22/2002 \n20 REPLY MEMORANDUM by Citibank, N.A. re: [16-1] motion for \nsummary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the FRCP on each of the first \nand second claims for relief asserted in the complaint in this action. (kw) \n(Entered: 10/28/2002) \n10/24/2002 \n21 SUPPLEMENTAL DECCLARATION of EDWARD S. FEIG by Jeffrey \nE. Epstein, Financial Trust Re: . in response to the latest mudslinging \ntactic by Citibank. (vb) (Entered: 10/29/2002) \n09/17/2003 \n22 NOTICE of attorney appearance for Jeffrey E. Epstein, Financial Trust \nby Gerald B. Lefcourt. (cd) (Entered: 09/19/2003) \n09/17/2003 \n23 STIPULATION and ORDER; that the counsel representing defendants in \nthis matter Gerald B. Lefcourt, P.C., in the place of Arent Fox Kinter \nPlotkin & Kahn, PLLC . ( signed by Judge Sidney H. Stein ) (p1) \n(Entered: 09/22/2003) \n09/17/2003 \n24 ORDER; dismissing [16-1] motion for summary judgment pursuant to \nRule 56 of the FRCP on each of the first and second claims for relief \nasserted in the complaint in this action without prejudice as moot; \ngranting [7-1] motion for an order, pun. to Rules 1, 12 and 13(a) of the \nFRCP, dismissing the Complaint, granting [7-2] motion for an order, the \nproceedings should be stayed pending the adjudication of the first-filed \naction and this action is stayed; the Clerk of Court is directed to place this \naction on the suspense calendar . ( signed by Judge Sidney H. Stein ); (p1) \n(Entered: 09/22/2003) \n12/18/2003 \n25 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 9/17/03 before Judge Sidney H. \nStein.(ml, ) Modified on 1/6/2004 (kkc, ). (Entered: 12/18/2003) \n07/26/2005 \n26 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL,\n... [truncated, 2610 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/52 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=52]", "char_count": 2610}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 5 of 5 \nliBillable Pages: 113 \nIlast: \n0.24 \nII \nhttps://eclnysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?273504181304452-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187444\n", "char_count": 194}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPagel of 14 \nCLOSED \nU.S. District Court \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley Square) \nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:96-cv-08307-DC \nUSA I Epstein, et al \nAssigned to: Judge Denny Chin \nDemand: $0 \nCause: 28:1345 USA Plaintiff \nPlaintiff \nUnited States of America \nI \nDefendant \nJeffrey E. Epstein \nDefendant\nIvan Fisher \nDate Filed: 11/04/1996 \nDate Terminated: 03/17/1999 \nJury Demand: Defendant \nNature of Suit: 230 Rent Lease & \nEjectment \nJurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff \nrepresented by M. Chinta Gaston \nMARY JO WHITE \nU.S. Attorney for SDNY \n100 Church Street \n19th Floor \nNew York, NY 10007 \nMIL \nrepresented by Steven J Cohen \nWachtel & Masyr, LLP \n110 East 59th Street \nNew York, NY 10022 \n.11111., \nrepresented by Eileen J. Casey \nGage Buschman & Pavlis \n120 West 45th Street \nNew York, NY 10036 \nL\nEY \nG. Robert Gage, Jr. \nGage Buschmann & Pavlis \n120 West 45th Street \nNew York, NY 10036 \nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.p17321462322339233-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187445\n", "char_count": 1086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 2 of 14 \nCounter Claimant \nIvan Fisher \nCounter Defendant \nUnited States of America \nCross Claimant \nIvan Fisher \nCross Defendant \nJeffrey E. Epstein \nDefendant\nEllyn Bank \nDefendant\nDebra Elisa Cohen \nDefendant \nDiane Fisher \ndoing business as \nThe Fisher Group \nDefendant \nFisher & Soifer \nalso known as \nFisher & Sophir \nDefendant \nrepresented by G. Robert Gage, Jr. \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by M. Chinta Gaston \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by G. Robert Gage, Jr. \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Steven J Cohen \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Ellen Yaroshefsky \nClayman & Rosenberg \n305 Madison Avenue, Ste. 1301 \nNew York. NY 10165 \nFax: \nEmail: ellen@elayro.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Eileen J. Casey \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl7321462322339233-L 353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187446\n", "char_count": 1001}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 3 of 14 \nGerzog \nDefendant \nRobert Heilbrun \nDefendant \nSuzanne McDermott \nDefendant \nChristopher H. Martin \nDefendant \nJessie Siegel \nalso known as \nJesse Siegel \nDefendant \nSiegel, Martin & Heilbrun \nDefendant \nRon Soifer \nDefendant\nCarmen Tausik \nTERMINATED: 08/06/1998 \nDefendant\nJohn Does 1 through 10 \nDefendant \nX Corporations 1 throught 10 \nCross_Claintant \nJeffrey E. Epstein \nCross Defendant \nrepresented by Robert Heilbrun \nSiegel & Heilbrun \n575 Madison Avenue \nNew York, NY 10022 \nRR\nIMEY \nrepresented by Robert Heilbrun \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Robed Heilbrun \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Robert Heilbrun \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Steven J Cohen \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nhttps://ectnysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.p17321462322339233-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187447\n", "char_count": 934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 4 of 14 \nIvan Fisher \nrepresented by G. Robert Gage, Jr. \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nDate Filed \n# \nDocket Text \n11/04/1996 \n1 COMPLAINT filed; Summons issued and Notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \n636(c); FILING FEE $ WAIVED (USA). (ricm) (Entered: 11/06/1996) \n11/04/1996 \nMagistrate Judge Ellis is so Designated. (ricm) (Entered: 11/06/1996) \n01/24/1997 \n2 STIPULATION and ORDER, by and between parties reset answer due \nfor 2/3/97 for Ivan Fisher .. So Ordered.... ( signed by Judge Denny \nChin ). (p1) (Entered: 01/27/1997) \n01/31/1997 \n3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to Ivan Fisher mailed on \n12/3/96 Answer due on 2/3/97 for Ivan Fisher Os) (Entered: 02/05/1997) \n02/11/1997 \n4 Affidavit of service as to Jeffrey E. Epstein by Walter Doulin, co-worker \non 1/31/97 Answer due on 2/20/97 for Jeffrey E. Epstein (Is) (Entered: \n02/13/1997) \n02/11/1997 \n4 Affidavit of service as to Jeffrey E. Epstein by mail on 2/1/97 Answer \ndue on 2/21/97 for Jeffrey E. Epstein (1s) (Entered: 02/13/1997) \n02/11/1997 \n5 AMENDED COMPLAINT by USA , (Answer due 2/24/97 for Ivan \nFisher, for Jeffrey E. Epstein ) amending [1-1] complaint ; Summons \nissued. (Is) (Entered: 02/13/1997) \n02/24/1997 \n6 Affidavit of service of Amended Complt. and Amended Summons as to \nIvan Fisher by Federal Express on 2/11/97 Answer due on 3/3/97 for Ivan \nFisher (Is) (Entered: 02/24/1997) \n02/26/1997 \n7 Affidavit of service of the amended s/c as to Jeffrey E. Epstein by \nFederal Express to Steven Cohen, Esq. on 2/13/97. Answer due on 3/5/97 \nfor Jeffrey E. Epstein. (lam) Modified on 02/26/1997 (Entered: \n02/26/1997) \n03/07/1997 \n8 STIPULATION, extending time for deft Ivan Fisher to answer the \nAmended Complaint is extended from 2/28/97 to 4/7/97 , reset answer \ndue for 4/7/97 for Ivan Fisher ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ). (kg) \n(Entered: 03/07/1997) \n03/07/1997 \n9 STIPULATION and ORDER, Extending defendant's time to answer, \nmove or otherwise respond \n... [truncated, 2550 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/57 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=57]", "char_count": 2550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 5 of 14 \ndue for 4/7/97 for Jeffrey E. Epstein ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ). \n(kg) (Entered: 04/03/1997) \n04/08/1997 \n12 ANSWER to Complaint by Jeffrey E. Epstein (Attorney Steven J. Cohen) \n(pi) (Entered: 04/09/1997) \n04/08/1997 \n13 ANSWER by Ivan Fisher (Attorney G. Robert Gage Jr.) to amended \ncomplaint; jury demand ; Firm of: Gage Buschman & Pavlis by attorney \nG. Robert Gage Jr. for defendant Ivan Fisher (Is) (Entered: 04/09/1997) \n04/09/1997 \n13 COUNTERCLAIM by Ivan Fisher against USA (Is) (Entered: \n04/09/1997) \n04/09/1997 \n13 CROSSCLAIM by Ivan Fisher against Jeffrey E. Epstein (Is) (Entered: \n04/09/1997) \n05/01/1997 \n14 STIPULATION and ORDER, extending time for deft Jeffrey E. Epstein \nto respond to deft Ivan S. Fisher's cross-claim , Response to crossclaim \ndeadline set for 5/13/97 ( signed by Judge Chin ). (kg) (Entered: \n05/01/1997) \n05/14/1997 \n15 ANSWER by Jeffrey E. Epstein to [13-1] cross claim of defendant Ivan \nS. Fisher. (ae) (Entered: 05/15/1997) \n06/28/1997 \n24 REPLY MEMORANDUM of LAW by USA re: in Support of its Motion \nfor Partial Summary Judgment and for other Relief (djc) (Entered: \n07/31/1997) \n07/14/1997 \n16 Rule 56.1(a) statement filed by Jeffrey E. Epstein (p1) (Entered: \n07/16/1997) \n07/14/1997 \n17 MEMORANDUM by Jeffrey E. Epstein in opposition to the \nGovernment? motion for partial summary judgment (p1) (Entered: \n07/16/1997) \n07/14/1997 \n18 AFFIDAVIT in opposition of Jeffrey A. Schantz Re: Plaintiffs' motion \nfor partial summary judgment (p1) (Entered: 07/16/1997) \n07/14/1997 \n19 MEMORANDUM by Ivan Fisher in opposition to Governments' motion \nfor Partial Summary Judgement (p1) (Entered: 07/16/1997) \n07/14/1997 \n20 Rule 56.1(b) statement filed by Ivan Fisher (p1) (Entered: 07/16/1997) \n21 AFFIDAVIT in opposition of Ivan S. Fisher (p1) (Entered: 07/16/1997) \n,07/14/1997 \n07/28/1997 \n22 MEMORANDUM of LAW by USA in support of its Motion for Partial \nSummary Judgment and other Relief (djc) (\n... [truncated, 2509 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/58 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=58]", "char_count": 2509}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 6 of 14 \nCourt fund within thirty days of decision on this motion monies for the \nuse and benefits of the premises known as 34 East 69th Street, NY, in the \namount of $15,000.00 per month from August 23, 1996 until the date that \nthis action is fmally determined , Return date 7/28/97; w. Rule 5 6.1 \nStatement and Declarations (djc) Modified on 07/31/1997 (Entered: \n07/31/1997) \n10/10/1997 \n26 ORDER, reset discovery due for 12/5/97 ; reset pretrial conference for \n10:00 12/5/97 ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ); Copies mailed (al) \n(Entered: 10/14/1997) \n11/12/1997 \n27 Filed Memo-Endorsement on letter to Judge Chin from Steven J. Cohen \ndated 11/10/97; the objection to production of the entire lease is \noverruled; Mr. Epstein shall produce the entire lease; if he wants, \nproduction of the lease can be subject to a reasonable confidentiality \nstipulation and order ; ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ) (Is) (Entered: \n11/12/1997) \n12/23/1997 \n28 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by USA (Answer due 1/5/98 for \nIvan Fisher, for Jeffrey E. Epstein) amending [5-1] amended complaint \na p ainst Ellyn Bank, Debra Elisa Cohen, Diane Fisher, Fisher & Soffer, \na\nl\nD. Gerzog, Robert Heilbrun, Suzanne McDermott, Christopher \n. artm, Jessie Siegel, Siegel, Martin, Ron Soifer, Carmen Talsig, John \nDoes 1 - 10, X Corporations 1-10; Summons issued. (sac) (Entered: \n12/30/1997) \n01/05/1998 \n29 Filed Memo-Endorsement on letter dated 12/30/97 from Ellen J. Casey, \ngranting parties request for additional time, until 1/7/98 to submit the \nadditional legal authorities and discovery materials ( signed by Judge \nDenny Chin ) (kw) Modified on 01/07/1998 (Entered: 01/06/1998) \n01/13/1998 \n30 STIPULATION and ORDER, reset answer to Second Amended \nComplaint due for 2/2/98 for Jeffrey E. Epstein ( signed by Judge Denny \nChin ). (emil) (Entered: 01/14/1998) \n01/20/1998 \n31 Affidavit of service of Second Amended Complaint as to Ellyn Bank by \npersonal service on 1/10/98\n... [truncated, 2916 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/59 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=59]", "char_count": 2916}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 7 of 14 \n01/20/1998 \n31 Affidavit of service of Second Amended Complaint as to Suzanne \nMcDermott by personal service on 1/10/98; Answer to Second Amended \nComplaint due on 1/30/98 for Suzanne McDermott (ae) (Entered: \n01/22/1998) \n01/20/1998 \n31 Affidavit of service as to Jessie Siegel by Pat Bowles, Secretary, \nauthorized to accept service on 1/5/98; Answer to Second Amended \nComplaint due on 1/26/98 for Jessie Siegel (ae) (Entered: 01/22/1998) \n01/20/1998 \n31 Affidavit of service of Second Amended Complaint as to Siegel, Martin \nby Pat Bowles, Secretary, authorized to accept service on 1/5/98; Answer \nto Second Amended Complaint due on 1/26/98 for Siegel, Martin (ae) \n(Entered: 01/22/1998) \n01/20/1998 \n31 Affidavit of service of Second Amended Complaint as to Ron Soifer by \nPat Bowles, Secretary, authorized to accept on 1/5/98; Answer to Second \nAmended Complaint due on 1/26/98 for Ron Soffer (ae) (Entered: \n01/22/1998) \n01/20/1998 \n31 Affidavit of service of Second Amended Complaint as to Carmen Talsig \nby Pat Bowles, Secretary, authorized to accept service on 1/5/98; Answer \nto Second Amended Complaint due on 1/26/98 for Carmen Talsig (ae) \n(Entered: 01/22/1998) \n01/22/1998 \n32 STIPULATION and ORDER, reset answer to second amended complaint \ndue for 1/30/98 for Fisher & Soffer, for Diane Fisher, for Ivan Fisher \n(signed by Judge Denny Chin). (djc) Modified on 01/23/1998 (Entered: \n01/23/1998) \n02/04/1998 \n35 ORDER, that the Clerk of the Court shall establish an interest-bearing \naccount (the \"account\") and that payment of any funds tendered pursuant \nto or in accord with this order shall be deposited by the Clerk of the \nCourt into the account and that the Clerk of the Court shall maintain the \naccount until such further order of this Court. Send $225,000.00 to Texas \nChris acct. (signed by Judge Denny Chin); Copies mailed; copy of docmt \nsent to Cashiers office (djc) (Entered: 02/23/1998) \n02/06/1998 \n33 Transcrip\n... [truncated, 2943 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/60 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=60]", "char_count": 2943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 8 of 14 \namended complaint (ae) (Entered: 03/09/1998) \n03/05/1998 \n37 CROSSCLAIMS by Jeffrey E. Epstein against Ivan Fisher (ae) (Entered: \n03/09/1998) \n03/09/1998 \n38 STIPULATION and ORDER, reset answer to second amended complaint \ndue for 2/27/98 for Jeffrey E. Epstein, for Ivan Fisher, for Ellyn Bank, for \nDebra Elisa Cohen, for Diane Fisher, for Fisher & Soffer, for Robert \nHeilbrun, for Suzanne McDermott, for Christopher H. Martin, for Jessie \nSiegel, for Siegel, Martin, for Ron Soffer, for Carmen Talsig, for John \nDoes 1 - 10, for X Corporations 1-10 ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ). \n(ae) (Entered: 03/10/1998) \n03/09/1998 \n39 Filed Memo-Endorsement on letter by Serene K. Nakano to Judge Chin \ndated 2/24/98, reset Government's motion for summary judgment filing \ndeadline for 3/13/98 ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ) (ae) (Entered: \n03/10/1998) \n03/16/1998 \n40 ANSWER by Ivan Fisher, Fisher & Soifer (Attorney Eileen J. Casey) to \namended complaint; by attorney Eileen J. Casey for defendant Fisher & \nSoifer (djc) (Entered: 03/20/1998) \n03/16/1998 \n40 AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM by Ivan Fisher: amending [13-1] \ncounter claim (djc) (Entered: 03/20/1998) \n03/16/1998 \n40 AMENDED CROSSCLAIM by Ivan Fisher, Jeffrey E. Epstein [37-1] \ncross claim (djc) (Entered: 03/20/1998) \n03/20/1998 \n41 ANSWER by Ivan Fisher to [37-1] cross claim; Finn of: Gage & Pavlis \n(cd) (Entered: 03/24/1998) \n03/24/1998 \n42 STIPULATION and ORDER, answer to the second amended complaint \ndue for 3/16/98 for Fisher & Soffer, for Diane Fisher ( signed by Judge \nDenny Chin ). (cd) (Entered: 03/25/1998) \n04/01/1998 \n43 NOTICE OF MOTION by USA for an order, purs. to Rule 56(a), \ngranting summary judgment on the second cause of action of the second \namended complaint as against defts Diane Fischer d/b/a The Fischer \nGroup and Rom Safer ; Return date 4/20/98. Declaration in support \nattached. (sac) (Entered: 04/02/1998) \n04/01/1998 \n44 MEMORANDUM by USA in support of [\n... [truncated, 2756 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/61 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=61]", "char_count": 2756}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 9 of 14 \n04/09/1998 \n47 Filed Memo-Endorsement on letter to Judge Chin front Serene K. \nNakano dated 04/02/98, the Court having already found in its March 31, \n1998 decision that (a) the rights of deendant Ron Soffer to poscnsion and \noccupancy of the premises known as 34 East 69th Street, NY, NY, can be \nno greater than those of defendant Ivan S. Fisher and (b) good and valid \nreasons exist for the Softer ejectment motion to be decided prior to the \nApril 20, 1998 return date of the motion, defendant Ron Soffer shall \nappear before the Hon. Denny Chin, United States District Judge, United \nStates Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 11A on April 10, 1998 at \n9:30 a.m., to show cause why summary judgment should not be granted \non the Governments second claim alleged against him in the second \namended complaint, which seeks an order (a)declaring that he is not \nentitled to occupy the premises; and (b) ejecting him from the premises ; \nservice of a copy of this memorandum endorsement shall be made by the \nGovenune \nattention S\non Softer by telecopying a copy to his \nand by sending a copy by Federal Express or \novernight mail to the attention of Mr. Soffer at 34 East 69th Street, NY, \nNY as soon as it is received by counsel for the Government (signed by \nJudge Denny Chin) (djc) (Entered: 04/13/1998) \n04/09/1998 \n49 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by USA re 4/7/98, memorandum \nendorsement (cd) (Entered: 04/14/1998) \n04/10/1998 \n48 ORDER that the prior orders of this Court dated 12/17/97 and 12/31/97 \nordering an interest-bearing escrow account for the deposit of certain \nmonies by dells Jeffrey E. Epstein and Ivan S. Fisher are modified to the \nextent that Fisher is ordered to deposit the sum of $15,000.00 per month \nto the Clerk of the Court by the 10th day of each month until the date that \nthis action is finally determined ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ); Copies \nmailed. Sent to Cashier's Office on 4/14/98. (emil) (Entered: 04/\n... [truncated, 3429 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/62 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=62]", "char_count": 3429}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 10 of 14 \nGovernment's motion for partial summary judgment as to (a) its first \nclaim alleged in its second amended complaint and (b) the counterclaims \nof clefts Ivan S. Fisher and Fisher & Soffer a/k/a Fisher & Sophir alleged \nin their answer to the second amended complaint (the \"Fisher \ncounterclaim\"), is granted in all respects. The Soffer ejectment motion is \ngranted as against deft Ron Soffer. Defls Jeffrey E. Epstein, Ivan S. \nFisher, Ellyn Bank, Debra Elisa Cohen, Dianeataga?/a The Fisher \nGroup, Fisher & Soffer a/k/a Fisher & Sophir,\n D. Gerzog, \nRobert Heilbum, Suzanne McDermott, Christopher H. Martin, Jessie \nSiegel a/k/a Jesse Siegel, Siegel, Martin & Heilbrun, Ron Soffer, and \nCarmen Tausig are not entitled to occupy the premises known as 34 East \n69th, N.Y., N.Y. 10021. The Government is hereby awarded exclusive \npossession of the premises purs. to the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. \n4301 et seq. The occupants shall vacate the premises on or before 7/15/98 \nat 5:00 p.m. and deliever all keys to the premises on or before 7/15/98 at \n5:00 p.m., to the U.S. Atty's Office. The foregoing constitutes the order \nof the court purs. to Rule 54(b) of the FRCP partially adjudicating the \nclaims of the parties before this Court. The Court finds that there is no \njust reason for delay in entering judgment on the Government's claims for \nejectment and with respect to the issues of possession of the premises, for \nthese claims and issues are separate and distinct from the issues \nremaining in the case (although there would be some overlap in the \nproof). Specifically, I fmd that a delay in the the entry of judgment could \nresult in possible injustice, as defts right to have the ability now to appeal \nfrom my 3/31/98 decision, for their right to possession of the promises is \nat stake. As they are being ejected from their home (in Fisher's case) and \noffice, they should have the right to seek review promptly. The remaini\n... [truncated, 3317 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/63 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=63]", "char_count": 3317}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 11 of 14 \ntheir memorandum of law concerning any further legal authorities (ae) \n(Entered: 06/01/1998) \n05/29/1998 \n53 Letter filed by Ellen J. Casey o/b/o Ivan Fisher to Judge Chin dated \n117/98, re: in response to the government's motion for partial summary \njudgment (ae) (Entered: 06/01/1998) \n06/05/1998 \n54 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Ivan Fisher ; from [51-1] judgment order . \nCopies of notice of appeal mailed to Attorney(s) of Record: Serene K. \nNakano, Esq., fee pd., $105.00, rec # 317761 . (as) (Entered: 06/08/1998) \n07/06/1998 \n55 ORDER, pltff shall file and serve any opposition by 7/10/98; and deft \nshall file and serve her reply, if any, by 7/15/98 (signed by Judge Denny \nChin); Copies mailed. (kg) (Entered: 07/07/1998) \n07/08/1998 \n56 Filed Memo-Endorsement on letter by David Wikstrom to Judge Chin \ndated 7/5/98, counsel for defendant Ivan Fisher, requests a conference \nbefore the Court some time this week in connection with this case, and in \nparticular with the 7/15 deadline for ejection set forth in the Court's \njudgment of 5/20; Fisher may file a Rule 60(b) motion w/out a pre-\nmotion conference. He shall do so as soon as possible. The Government \nneed not respond until directed to by the Court ; In addition, if Mr. \nWikstrom is substituting for Gage & Parlis, he should submit the proper \npapers. If he is appearing as co-counsel, he should file a notice of \napperance ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ) (ae) Modified on 07/09/1998 \n(Entered: 07/09/1998) \n07/10/1998 \n57 DECLARATION in opposition by Serene K. Nakano for OtteUSA re the \nmotion by deft Suzanne McDermott for summary jdgmt. (Is) (Entered: \n07/10/1998) \n07/10/1998 \n58 GOVT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW by USA in opposition to motion of \ndeft Suzanne McDermott for partial summary jdgmt. (Is) (Entered: \n07/10/1998) \n07/27/1998 \n59 RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to Forcible eviction on 7/16/98. \nOrder left at residence. Tenants moved out & took their personal \nbelongings. \n... [truncated, 2857 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/64 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=64]", "char_count": 2857}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 12 of 14 \nJessie Siegel, Siegel, and Martin. (Attorney Robert Heilbrun) (kw) \n(Entered: 08/11/1998) \n08/26/1998 \n64 ORDER, set pretrial conference for 10:00 a.m. on 10/23/98 ; The parties \nshall have 60 days from the date of this order to complete discovery. The \ndeadline for submission of the joint pretrial order is adjourned. A new \ndeadline for submission of the joint pretrial order will be set at the \nOctober 23, 1998 conference. The Governments request for an \nadjournment of the trial on damages until after the resolution of Fisher's \nappeal to the Second Circuit will be decided at the October 23, 1998 \nconference ; The Governments response to motion reset to 9/14/98 for \n[60-1] motion for an order granting summary judgment, pursuant to Rule \n56 of the FRCP. Gerzog may submit his reply, if any, within 10 days \nthereafter ; Upon consent, the Court's escrow order is hereby amended as \nset forth in the Governments August 13, 1998 letter. (signed by Judge \nDenny Chin); Copies mailed (djc) (Entered: 08/27/1998) \n09/15/1998 \n65 Rule 56.1 statement filed by USA (djc) (Entered: 09/16/1998) \n09/15/1998 \n66 MEMORANDUM of LAW by USA in opposition to [60-1] motion for \nan order granting summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the FRCP \n(djc) (Entered: 09/16/1998) \n09/18/1998 \n67 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (kb) (Entered: 09/18/1998) \n09/22/1998 \n68 Certificate of service of Second Amended S&C as to Ivan Fisher, Diane \nFisher, Fisher & Soffer by Ellen J. Casey, atty, on 12/23/97 (sac) \n(Entered: 09/23/1998) \n09/22/1998 \n68 Certificate of service of Second Amended S&C as to Jeffrey E. Epstein \nby Steven Cohen, atty, on 12/23/97 (sac) (Entered: 09/23/1998) \n09/24/1998 \n69 NOTICE of attorney appearance for Debra Elisa Cohen by Ellen \nYaroshefsky (Is) (Entered: 09/28/1998) \n10/09/1998 \n70 Notice that the record on appeal has been certified and transmitted to the \nU.S. Court of Appeals: [54-1] appeal by Ivan Fisher on October 9\n... [truncated, 3033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/65 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=65]", "char_count": 3033}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 13 of 14 \nattorney Ellen Yaroshefsky. (bw) (Entered: 10/23/1998) \n11/09/1998 \n74 MANDATE OF USCA (certified copy) Re: Dismissed [54-1] appeal by \nIvan Fisher. It is ordered that the appeal be, and it hereby is dismissed. \n(98-6133) Carolyn Clark Campbell, Cler, USCA. (as) (Entered: \n11/09/1998) \n02/03/1999 \n75 STIPULATION and ORDER, the parties agree to settle and compromise \nthis action on the terms indicated herein. All monies deposited by the \ndefendants with the Cashier's Office of the USDC for the SDNY in this \naction, including all principal and interest accrued thereon are released to \nthe Government. The Cashier's office shall issue a check for the full \namount of the escrowed monies made payable to U.S. Attorney and shall \ndeliver the check to the U.S. Attorney's Office, do AUSA Serene IC \nNakano. The United States Dept of State shall keep the security deposit \nof Jeffrey E. Epstein in the principal amount of $12,000.00, plus all \ninterest accrued thereon ; Upon the release of the escrowed monies set \nforth in this order and the delivery of the certified check set forth herein, \nthe Government will file an order of dismissal with the Court dismissing \nthe action against all defendants except Diane Fisher dTh/a The Fisher \nGroup with prejudice and without costs, disbursement or attorney's fees. \n(signed by Judge Denny Chin). On page 8 of order remark from cashiers' \noffice states: Received check no. 492385 dated 01/29/99 in the amount of \n$335,526.17 payable to USA by Manuel Bermadez; Also received check \nno. 492386 dated 01/29/99 in the amount of $19,844.35 payable to USA \nby Manuel Mermadez. (djc) Modified on 02/04/1999 (Entered: \n02/04/1999) \n03/09/1999 \n76 Transcript of record of proceedings before Judge Chin filed for dates of \n1/12/99 (Is) (Entered: 03/15/1999) \n03/17/1999 \n77 Order of dismissal; that this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice \nagainst all defendants, except defendant Diane Fisher d/b/\n... [truncated, 2695 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/66 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=66]", "char_count": 2695}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 14 of 14 \nhttps://ecfnysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?321462322339233-L 353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187458\n", "char_count": 155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 1 of 3 \nCLOSED \nU.S. District Court \nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley Square) \nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:97-cv-01489-DC \nEpstein i Fisher, et al \nAssigned to: Judge Denny Chin \nDemand: $0 \nCause: 28:1443(1) Rent, Lease & Ejectment \nPetitioner\nJeffrey E. Epstein \nI \nRespondent \nIvan Fisher \nRespondent \nJohn Doe \nRespondent \nX Corp \nDate Filed: 03/05/1997 \nDate Terminated: 03/31/2000 \nJury Demand: None \nNature of Suit: 230 Rent Lease & \nEjectment \nJurisdiction: Federal Question \nrepresented by William B. Wachtel \nWachtel & Masyr, LLP \n110 East 59th Street \n10022 \nFax: \nEmail: wachtel®wmllp.com \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Eileen J. Casey \nGage Buschmann & Pavlis \n120 West 45th Street \nmail\n10036 \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Eileen J. Casey \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nrepresented by Eileen J. Casey \n(See above for address) \nLEAD ATTORNEY \nDate Filed \nDocket Text \n03/05/1997 \n1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL from New York Civil Court County of New \nYork; FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 282380 Index # 058689/97. \nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DIctRpt.pl?569396355749046-L_353_0-1 \n5/22/2007 \nEFTA00187459\n", "char_count": 1215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 2 of 3 \n(sac) (Entered: 03/06/1997) \n03/05/1997 \nCASE REFERRED TO Judge Chin (sac) (Entered: 03/06/1997) \n03/05/1997 \n2 NOTICE of Notice of Filing of Notice of Removal by Ivan Fisher. (kg) \n(Entered: 03/06/1997) \n03/14/1997 \n3 NOTICE OF MOTION by Jeffrey E. Epstein to remand to the Civil \nCourt, City of NY, County of NY , Return date 4/11/97 (cd) (Entered: \n03/17/1997) \n03/14/1997 \n4 MEMORANDUM by Jeffrey E. Epstein in support of [3-1] motion to \nremand to the Civil Court, City of NY, County of NY (cd) (Entered: \n03/17/1997) \n03/21/1997 \nCase accepted as related to 96 CV 8307. Notice of assignment to follow. \n(ricm) (Entered: 03/24/1997) \n03/21/1997 \n5 Notice of asgmnt to Judge Denny Chin Copy of notice and judge's rules \nmailed to Attomey—(s) of record: Eileen J. Casey, William B. Wachtel . \n(ricm) (Entered: 03/24/1997) \n03/24/1997 \n6 Case Information Statement Addendum and Case Designation to a \nMagistrate Judge filed. Case is designated to Magistrate Judge Pitman. \n(em) (Entered: 03/24/1997) \n03/28/1997 \n7 NOTICE OF CROSS MOTION by Ivan Fisher to consolidate is action \nwith the action pending in the Court entitled U.S. of America a Jeffrey \nE. Epstein and Ivan S. Fisher, #96cv8307 , Return date 4/14/97 (p1) \n(Entered: 03/31/1997) \n03/28/1997 \n8 MEMORANDUM by Ivan Fisher in opposition to [3-1] motion to \nremand to the Civil Court, City of NY, County of NY, in support [7-1] \ncross motion to consolidate thiuction with the action pending in the \nCourt entitled U.S. of America 5 Jeffrey E. Epstein and Ivan S. Fisher, \n#96cv8307 (p1) (Entered: 03/31/1997) \n04/07/1997 \n9 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Jeffrey E. Epstein in support of \nre: [3-1] motion to remand to the Civil Court, City of NY, County of NY \n(ae) (Entered: 04/08/1997) \n02/24/1998 \nPROTECTIVE ORDER, regarding procedures that will govern the \nhandling of confidential information ( signed by Judge Denny Chin ); \nCopies mailed (original in 96cv8307, doe #36) (cd) (En\n... [truncated, 2580 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/69 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=69]", "char_count": 2580}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "SDNY CM/ECF Version 3.0L - Docket Report \nPage 3 of 3 \nfiled in case #96 civ. 8307, doc. #39) (ae) (Entered: 03/11/1998) \n03/09/1998 \nTerminated documents 3-1 and 7-1 as per instruction of Judge Chin dated \n3/9/98 (emil) (Entered: 03/11/1998) \n03/24/1998 \nSTIPULATION and ORDER, reset answer to the second amended \ncomplaint due for 2/27/98 for Ms. Fisher and Fisher & Soffer ( signed by \nJudge Denny Chin ). (original fld in 96cv8307, doc #42) (cd) (Entered: \n03/25/1998) \n04/09/1998 \nFiled Memo-Endorsement on letter to Judge Chin from Serene K. \nNakano dated 04/02/98, the Court having already found in its March 31, \n1998 decision that (a) the rights of defendant Ron Soifer to possession \nand occupancy of the premises known as 34 East 69th Street, NY, NY, \ncan be no greater than those of defendant Ivan S. Fisher and (b) good and \nvalid reasons exist for the Soifer ejectment motion to be decided prior to \nthe April 20, 1998 return date of the motion, defendant Ron Softer shall \nappear before the Honorable Denny Chin, United States District Judge, \nUnited States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 11A, NY, NY on \nApril 10, 1998, 9:30 a.m., to show cause why summary judgment should \nnot be granted on the Government's second claim alleged against him in \nthe second amended complaint, which seeks an order (a) declaring that he \nis not entitled to occupy the premises; and (b) ejecting him from the \npremises ; and service of a copy of this memorandum endorsement shall \nbe made by the Government on defendant Ron Soffer by telecopying a \ncopy to his attention at lill\n. \nand by sending a copy by Federal \nExpress or overnight mat to ea ntion of Mr. Soffer at 34 East 69th \nStreet, NY, NY, as soon as it is received by counsel for the Government \n(signed by Judge Denny Chin); original document docketed in case no. \n96cv 8307, document #47. (djc) Modified on 04/13/1998 (Entered: \n04/13/1998) \n03/31/2000 \n10 ORDER; this action is hereby dismissed. ( signed by Judge Denny \nChin ); C\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/70 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=70]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. \nCITIBANK N.A. \nClle as 261 F.Supp.24 561 ID.VIren Wend. 2003) \nof time, constitute irreparable harm. De-\nng/1y, 309 F.3d at 178, quoting, inter alio, \nElrod. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. \n2673, 49 L.Ed2d 547 (1976). \nIX. Balance of Hann to Plaintiff \nVenus Harm to Defendants \n(331 Defendants will suffer• little or no \nharm if the Court grants this preliminary \ninjunction. They are not subject to crimi-\nnal prosecution under the Garb Statute, \nthere is no showing of actual or threatened \ndisruption, disturbance or other danger at \nPenns Manor in permitting plaintiff to \nwear her cross during the remainder of \nthis litigation, and as we have seen, there \nis no likelihood that defendants' permitting \nplaintiff to wear her cross visibly while at \nwork would violate the Establishment \nClause. \nX. Public Interests \n[34) Where there is no compelling \nstate interest to justify a burden on reli-\ngious freedom, \"the public interest dearly \nfavors the protection of constitutional \nrights.\" Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 178, quoting \nCouncil of Alternative Political Parties I \nHooks, 121 F.3d 876, 884 (3d Cir.1997). \nXI. Conclusion \n[351 The Court will grant plaintiffs re-\nquest for a preliminary injunction enjoin-\nI. Plaintiffs complaint also challenges the \nGarb Statute and the Religious Affiliations \npolicy under the free exercise of religion \nclauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution and \nthe newly enacted Pennsylvania Religious \nFreedom Protection Act. 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. \n§ 2401, et seq., Act of December 9. 2002, P.L. \n1701, No. 214, § 1, et seq., effective immedi• \nately. The 1895 predecessor to the current \nGarb Statute was upheld against a similar \nstate constitutional challenge by the Supreme \nCourt of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth I. \nHerr, 229 Pa. 132. 78 A. 68 (1910). and this \nCourt is not at liberty to reconsider that vin-\ntage ruling. \n561 \ning enforcement of ARIN's Religious Affil-\niations policy pending disposition of her \nrequest for a per\n... [truncated, 3441 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/71 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=71]", "char_count": 3441}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "562 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nand fraudulently induced them to borrow \nfunds to invest in collateralized bond obli-\ngation transaction managed by entity with \nwhich bank's subsidiary had investment \nbanking relationship. On bank's motions to \ndismiss and to transfer, the District Court, \nMoore, J., held that: (1) bank was subject \nto general personal jurisdiction in Virgin \nIslands; (2) fact issues remained as to \nwhether there was fiduciary relationship \nbetween bank and borrowers; and (3) bor-\nrowers failed to plead fraud with sufficient \nparticularity. \nMotions granted in part, and denied in \npart. \n1. Federal Courts o=036 \nWhen defendant moves to dismiss for \nlack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff must \nmake prima facie showing of sufficient con-\ntacts between defendant and forum territo-\nry to support in personam jurisdiction. \nFed.Rules \nCiv.Proc.Rule \n12(b)(2), 28 \nU.S.C.A. \n2. Federal Courts 6=96 \nIn evaluating motion to dismiss for \nlack of personal jurisdiction, court must \naccept all of plaintiff's allegations as true \nand construe disputed facts in favor of \nplaintiff. \nFed.Rules \nCiv.Proc.Rule \n12(b)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. \n3. Federal Courts 4=1023 \nBank and its parent company were \nsubject to general personal jurisdiction in \nVirgin Islands in borrowers' action alleg-\ning that bank officials fraudulently induced \nthem to borrow funds to invest in transac-\ntion, even if bank had closed all of its \noperations in Virgin Islands, where bank \noperated bank branches and marketed and \nprovided banking services in Virgin Is-\nlands before litigation commenced, contin-\nued to process its outstanding loans in \nVirgin Islands via its Puerto Rican offices, \nand initiated litigation in Virgin Islands, \nand officers initiated contact with borrow-\ners in Virgin Islands for loans that were \nsubject of litigation. 6 \n§ 4903. \n4. Federal Courts 4=1023 \nVirgin Islands was proper venue for \nVirgin Islands borrowers' action against \nNew York bank for fraudulently induc\n... [truncated, 3420 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/72 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=72]", "char_count": 3420}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. ' CITIBANK N.A. \nClio u168 F.Suppld 561 (D.VIrgin Islands 2103) \ndence that key witnesses were unable to \ntravel to Virgin Islands. \n28 U.S.C.A. \n1404(a). \n8. Contracts €206 \nChoice of law provision in promissory \nnote did not govern borrowers' claims \nagainst lender for fraud, misrepresenta-\ntion, misinformation, and breach of fidu-\nciary duty in advising borrowers to invest \nin collateralized bond obligation transac-\ntion managed by entity with which bank's \nsubsidiary had investment banking rela-\ntionship, where borrowers' claims did not \ninvolve construction, validity, or perfor-\nmance of note. \n9. Federal Civil Procedure e=t1.831 \nIssue of whether bank adequately dis-\nclosed to investors its relationship with \nfund manager presented fact questions \nthat could not be resolved on motion to \ndismiss investors' action alleging that bank \nmisrepresented facts and fraudulently in-\nduced them to borrow funds to invest in \ncollateralized bond obligation transaction \nmanaged by fund manager with which \nbank's subsidiary had investment banking \nrelationship. \n10. Banks and Banking e=t100 \nUnder Virgin Islands law, borrowers' \nallegation that lenders failed to disclose \ntheir relationship with fund manager and \ndid not promptly assist them in under-\nstanding how to remove it as fund manag-\ner adequately alleged that lenders' fraudu-\nlent conduct caused their financial losses, \nwhere borrowers claimed that they could \nhave obtained new fund manager or re-\nduced their losses in some other fashion if \nthey had known of conflict of interest. \n11. Federal Civil Procedure c3=>1.831 \nIssue of whether lender had substan-\ntial control over borrowers' business af-\nfairs presented fact questions that could \nnot be resolved on motion to dismiss bor-\n563 \nrowers' claim against lender for breach of \nfiduciary duty by failing to disclose conflict \nof interest in connection with investment. \n12. Banks and Banking 4P0100 \nUnder Virgin Islands law, subscrip-\ntion \n... [truncated, 3376 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/73 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=73]", "char_count": 3376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "564 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nGregory H. Hodges, Dudley, Topper and \nFeuerzeig, LLP, St. Thomas, VI, for the \ndefendants. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION \nMOORE, District Judge. \nAfter careful consideration of the par-\nties' written and oral arguments, I will \ndeny the defendants' motions to dismiss \nfor lack of personal jurisdiction and to \ntransfer this case to New York. Further, I \nfind that the amended complaint adequate-\nly states claims of breach of fiduciary duty \nand negligent misrepresentation. Finally, \nI will grant the defendants' motion to dis-\nmiss Counts I, II, III, and VI for failure to \nmeet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement for \nfraud, but I will grant leave for the plain-\ntiffs to amend their pleadings. \nI. FACTUAL \nAND \nPROCEDURAL \nBACKGROUND \nIn their amended complaint, Jeffrey E. \nEpstein (\"Epsteinn and Financial Trust \nCompany, Inc. (\"Fr) (collectively \"plain-\ntiffs\") allege that Citibank, N.A. (\"Citi-\nbank\") and Citigroup, Inc. (\"Citigroup\"I \n[collectively \"defendants\"] misrepresented \nfacts and fraudulently induced them to \nborrow $10 million to invest in a venture \nmanaged by MG Global Investment Cor-\nporation (\"MG\"). The plaintiffs allege that \nthe defendants failed to disclose informa-\ntion and negligently and fraudulently mis-\nrepresented facts concerning their rela-\ntionship with MG (Counts I, II, III, IV \nand VI), that the plaintiffs detrimentally \nrelied on these misrepresentations (Counts \nI, II, III, and VI), and that the defendants \nbreached their fiduciary duty to the plain-\ntiffs (Count p. The plaintiffs seek rescis-\nsion of the promissory note and punitive \ndamages (Counts VI and VII). \n(Am. \nCompl.11 46-68.) \nIn April 1999, Dayle Davison [\"Davi-\nson\"], Vice President of Citibank in New \nYork and Epstein's private banker, and \nother Citibank employees telephoned Ep-\nstein while he was in the Virgin Islands \nand recommended that the plaintiffs invest \nthrough placement agent Salomon Smith \nBarne\n... [truncated, 3567 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/74 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=74]", "char_count": 3567}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. I. CITIBANK N.A. \nCite as 268 F.Supp.2d 561 (1).VIrsla Island* 2003) \nLion of Hypothecation Agreement and Cer-\ntain Documents Referred to Therein\" (the \n\"first Extension Agreement\"l in which \nthey reaffirmed the Amended 1999 Note in \nits entirety, the Hypothecation Agreement, \nand each document and term thereunder. \n(hd Ex. E.) Each of these documents—the \noriginal 1999 Note, the 1999 hypothecation \nagreement, the Amended 1999 Note, and \nthe first Extension Agreement—contains \nclauses stating that New York law would \ngovern the \"construction, validity, and per-\nformance\" of the 1999 Note and the \nAmended 1999 Note. (Id Ex. A at 8-9; \nEx. B at 7-8; Ex. D at 10; Ex. E at 2-3.) \nSometime in the spring of 2001, Epstein \nand FTC discovered that the MG Invest-\nment was \"suddenly and rapidly deterio-\nrating.\" (Pls.' Mem. Of Law in Opp'n to \nMot. To Dismiss, Epstein Decl. 1 20.) Ac-\ncording to the plaintiffs, FTC's advisors \ncontacted Davison and other employees of \nCitibank, and requested Citibank's help in \ncoordinating the replacement of the MG \nfund's manager. (Id 121; Schantz Decl. \n1 5.) In May 2001, Davison informed the \nplaintiffs that, in order to remove MG as \nthe fund manager, FTC would need sixty-\nsix and two-thirds percent (66% LI) of the \nvotes of income note holders. Because the \nplaintiffs did not know the identities or \nrespective percentages of ownership of the \nother income note holders, they requested \nthat Davison provide them with that infor-\nmation. The plaintiffs claim that Davison \ninitially assured them that she would pro-\nvide such information promptly, but later \ninformed them that she was having diffi-\nculty obtaining the information from SSB, \nand recommended that they seek the infor-\nI. Sometime in 2000, Davison informed Ep-\nstein about a second, similar investment fund \nto be managed by Mass Mutual Ithe \"Mass \nMutual Fund\"). On June 15, 2000. Epstein \nborrowed an additional $10 million from Citi-\nbank, that Epstein a\n... [truncated, 3924 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/75 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=75]", "char_count": 3924}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "566 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nissued an order restraining Citibank and \nCitigroup from pursuing their New York \nlawsuit pending decisions on these mo-\ntions. Financial That Ca, Inc \nCiti-\na\nN.A., Order, Civ. No2002-108 \nNov. 27, 2002). In light of subse-\nquent events, however, I sue sponte vacat-\ned this prohibition. Financial That Ca, \nInc I. Citibank, NA, Order, Civ. \nNo.2002-108 (M. Dec. 13, 2002). \nThe defendants charge that plaintiffs' \nsuit in the Virgin Islands is merely \"a \ntransparent attempt to launch a preemp-\ntive strike to hamper Citibank's efforts to \nrecover the $20 million in promissory notes \n... upon which Epstein has defaulted.\" \n(Mem. Of Law in Support of Def.'s Mot. \nTo Dismiss at 2.) The defendants move to \ndismiss this action under Federal Rule of \nCivil Procedure 12(:4(2) for lack of person-\nal jurisdiction, or alternatively, to transfer \nthis case to the Southern District of New \nYork under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Finally, \nthe defendants aver that the amended \ncomplaint fails to state a cause of action \nupon which relief may be granted under \nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) \nand does not allege fraud with the requi-\nsite particularity as required by Federal \nRule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 1 address \neach argument in turn. \nII. DISCUSSION \nA. This Court has Personal Jurisdic-\ntion over Citibank and Citigroup \nThe defendants maintain that Citibank \ndiscontinued its presence in the Virgin Is-\nlands in 1999 and that Citigroup is merely \na holding company that \"does not have and \nnever has had any assets, offices or em-\nployees in the Virgin Islands.\" In addi-\ntion, the defendants insist that the events \ngiving rise to this cause of action have no \nconnection with the Virgin Islands. (Mem. \nof Law in Support of Deft' Mot. to Dis-\nmiss at 6-9.) The plaintiffs counter that \nthe defendants are currently doing busi-\nness in the Virgin Islands and that this \nCourt has jurisdiction over the defendants \nunder the Virgin Islands' Long—Arm\n... [truncated, 3790 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/76 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=76]", "char_count": 3790}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. I CITIBANK N.A. \nGni% \nF.Suppld 561 (D.VIITIn Isliands WO/ \nWide Volkswagen Corp. 1  Woodson, 444 \nU.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 659, 62 L.Ed2c1 \n490 (1980). \n1. This Court has Personal Jurisdic-\ntion over the Defendants under the \nVirgin Islands Long-Ann Statute \nThe Virgin Islands long-arm statute, 6 \n§ 4903, provides, in relevant part: \n(a) A court may exercise personal juris-\ndiction over a person, who acts directly \nor by an agent, as to a claim for relief \narising from the person's \n(1) transacting any business in this \nterritory; \n•\n•\n•\n \n•\n \n(3) causing tortious injury by an act \nor omission in this territory; \n(4) causing tortious injury in this ter-\nritory by an act or omission outside this \nterritory if he regularly does or solicits \nbusiness, or engages in any other per-\nsistent course of conduct, or derives \nsubstantial revenue from goods used or \nconsumed or services rendered, in this \nterritory .... \n6M. \n$ 4903. Under subsection (aX1), \nthe term \"transacting any business\" can be \nsatisfied by \"only a single act which in fact \namounts to the transaction of business \nwithin a state or territory.\" Guardian \nIns. Co. I Bain Hogg Intl Ltd., Civ. \nNo.1996-180, 2000 WL 1690315, \"2-3, \n2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17184 at *8 ( \nOctober 26, 2000) (quoting Godfrey \nIn-\nternational Moving Consultants, Ina, 18 \nIS 60, 66-67 (-.1980)). It is suffi-\ncient, therefore, that Citibank entered into \na contract with a Virgin Islands resident, \nand that the defendants solicited the plain-\ntiffs—while they were in the Virgin Is-\nlands—to borrow $10 million to invest in \nthe AIG-managed fund. \n[3] With respect to the relationship be-\ntween Citibank and Citigroup and the vela-\n567 \ntionship between the defendants and the \nplaintiffs, I find that the plaintiffs have \nestablished that Citibank and Citigroup \nare sufficiently linked. For example, Gill-\ngroup's website plainly states that it does \nbusiness through Citibank and other units \nthroughout the world. In\n... [truncated, 3547 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/77 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=77]", "char_count": 3547}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "568 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nby establishing specific or general jurisdic-\ntion over a defendant. Mesalic \nFiberf-\ntoot Corp, 897 F.2d 696, 699 (3d Cir.1990). \nA court's general jurisdiction \"is based on \nthe defendant's general business contacts \nwith the forum (territory) and permits a \ncourt to exercise its power in a case where \nthe subject matter of the suit is unrelated \nto those contacts.\" Metropolitan Life Ins. \nCo. I Robertson—Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 660, \n668 (2d Cir.1996). Under this test, the \nplaintiff must establish that the defen-\ndant's contacts with the forum jurisdiction \nare \"continuous and systematic.\" Id. \nI find that this Court has general juris-\ndiction over the defendants. Citibank op-\nerated bank branches and marketed and \nprovided banking services in the Virgin \nIslands for years before and after April \n1999 and until 2002, just months before the \ncommencement of this litigation. On Jan-\nuary 31, 2002, Citibank closed its last re-\nmaining bank branch in the U.S. Virgin \nIslands, and Citibank no longer makes real \nestate-related loans in the Virgin Islands. \n(Malin Aff. 11 3-4.) Citibank, however, \ncontinues to process its outstanding loans \nhere via its Puerto Rican offices, and initi-\nates litigation in this Court. (Id. 16.) All \nof the foregoing plainly demonstrates that \nCitibank, and Citigroup through Citibank, \nhave continuously and systematically con-\nducted business in the Virgin Islands—\nincluding initiating contact with the plain-\ntiffs for the loans that are the subject of \nthis litigation—and therefore, are subject \nto this Court's general jurisdiction. See, \ne.g., Metropolitan Life In Co., 84 F.3d at \n669 (finding that \"our review of general \njurisdiction cases reveals that contacts are \ncommonly assessed over a period of years \nprior to the plaintiff's filing of the com-\nplaint\" and listing cases). Accordingly, I \nwill deny the motion to dismiss for lack of \npersonal jurisdiction. \nHaving found that minimum contacts ex-\n\n... [truncated, 3905 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/78 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=78]", "char_count": 3905}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. \nCITIBANK N.A. \n569 \nale \n268 F.Suppid $61 (D.V1rg \nIslands 2003) \nrum, they did not agree to sue or be sued \nexclusively in New York. The Amended \n1999 Note states that \nthe undersigned (Epstein) hereby irre-\nvocably submits to the jurisdiction of \nany New York state or federal court \nsitting in New York City, and the under-\nsigned hereby irrevocably agrees that \nany action may be heard and determined \nin such New York state court or in such \nfederal court. The undersigned hereby \nirrevocably waives, to the fullest extent \nhe may effectively do so, the defense of \nan inconvenient forum to the mainte-\nnance of any action in any jurisdiction. \n(Mem. In Support of Defs.' Mot. To Dis-\nmiss, Ex. D at 10.) The Amended 1999 \nNote, however, does not limit \"the under-\nsigned\" to a specific forum or bar the \nplaintiffs from suing the defendants in any \nforum having personal jurisdiction over \nthe defendants. Moreover, under the fed-\neral venue statute, a diversity case such as \nthis can be brought in a \"district where \nany defendant resides, if all defendants \nreside in the same State.\" \n28 U.S.C. \n§ 1391(a). This statute further provides \nthat \"(nor purposes of venue ..., a defen-\ndant that is a corporation shall be deemed \nto reside in any judicial district in which it \nis subject to personal jurisdiction at the \ntime the action is commenced.\" 28 U.S.C. \n1391(c). Because I have found that both \nCitibank and Citigroup are subject to this \nCourt's personal jurisdiction and are thus \ndeemed residents of the Territory for ven-\nue purposes, venue is proper in the Virgin \nIslands under section 1391(4(1). In addi-\ntion, these claims may be litigated in a \n\"district in which a substantial part of the \nevents or omissions giving rise to the claim \noccurred.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). The \nsolicitation of the plaintiffs while they were \nin the Virgin Islands and the mailing of \ndocuments to the plaintiffs constitute a \nsufficiently substantial part of the eve\n... [truncated, 3898 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/79 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=79]", "char_count": 3898}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "570 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \n(1) plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) defen-\ndant's preference; (3) where the claim \narose; (4) convenience to the parties; \n(5) convenience to witnesses—but only \nto the extent that the witnesses may \nactually be unavailable for trial in one of \nthe fora; (6) location of books and rec-\nords; (7) practical considerations that \ncould make the trial easier, more expedi-\ntious, or less expensive; (8) congestion \nof the possible fora; and (9) the familiar-\nity of the trial judge with the applicable \nstate law in diversity cases. \nSee generally Junwre I State Farm Ins. \nCo., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir.1995). \n171 Considering the totality of the cir-\ncumstances surrounding this case, I make \nthe following findings. First, Epstein and \nFinancial Trust have selected this forum, \nand they are residents of the Virgin Is-\nlands with strong ties to this community. \nEpstein owns a seventy-acre island, and he \nand Financial Trust employ some twenty \npeople. (Pls' Mem. Of Law in Opp'n to \nMot. To Dismiss, Epstein Decl. 1A 2, 4—5.) \nIt is important that local plaintiffs with \ngrievances against defendants subject to \nthis Court's jurisdiction be permitted to \nseek redress here in the Virgin Islands. \nAs already noted, no forum selection \nclause binds the parties to bring suit in \nany particular jurisdiction. \nThe defen-\ndants contacted the plaintiffs and entered \ninto negotiations concerning the MG in-\nvestment while they were in the Virgin \nIslands, and at least one agreement was \naddressed to the plaintiffs through trans-\nmission to the plaintiffs' attorneys in New \nYork, intending that it be sent to the Vir-\ngin Islands. I do not find that the defen-\ndants will suffer any great inconvenience \nby litigating this matter here. \nAs the \nplaintiffs point out, most of the documents \nneeded to try the case have already been \nfiled in this Court, and the defendants are \ncurrently litigating other cases in this \nCourt. Moreover, the defendants have\n... [truncated, 3803 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/80 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=80]", "char_count": 3803}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. I. CITIBANK N.A. \ncot as 266 F.Supp.2d 561 11).VIngla Islands 2003) \ntheir 120:0(6) motion. Their reliance on \nNew York law, however, is misplaced. In \nthe Amended 1999 Note, the parties stipu-\nlated only that \nIOUs note shall be governed by, and \nconstrued in accordance with, the laws \nof the State of New York, including \nmatters of construction, validity and per-\nformance, without giving effect to princi-\nples of conflicts of law .... \n(Mem. Of Law in Support of Defs.' Mot. \nTo Dismiss, Ex. I) at 10.) The issues \nraised by the plaintiffs, however, do not \ninvolve the \"construction, validity and per-\nformance\" of the note; rather, they involve \nallegations of fraud, misrepresentation, mi-\nsinformation, and breach of a fiduciary \nduty of the defendants in advising the \nplaintiffs about the AIG-managed fund. \nAccordingly, I find that New York law \ndoes not govern these claims, and instead \nshall look to Virgin Islands law to deter-\nmine whether the plaintiffs have stated \nclaims cognizable in this jurisdiction. \n2. New York's Martin Act Does Not \nApply to this Lawsuit \nThe defendants aver that the Martin \nAct, New York General Business section \n352 et seq., bars the plaintiffs' claims for \nnegligent misrepresentation (Count IV) \nand breach of fiduciary duty (Count l) \nbecause, under the Act, only New York \nState's Attorney General has the power to \nbring such claims resulting from the sale \n2. The Martin Act is New York's blue sky law. \nGeneral Business Law section 352-c prohibits \nvarious fraudulent and deceitful practices in \nthe distribution, exchange, sale and purchase \nof securities. The Marlin Act vests exclusive \nauthority in the New York Attorney General \nto investigate and prosecute violations of the \nAct. The Martin Act does not, however, pro-\nvide for a private cause of action. See Nairo-\nbi Holdings Ltd. \nBrown Bros. Harriman & \nCo., Civ. No.2002-1230. 2002 WL 31027550, \n•4, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16995 at •10 \n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,\n... [truncated, 3945 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/81 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=81]", "char_count": 3945}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "572 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nclosed to the plaintiffs both in the \"pitch \nbook\" and in the Offering Circular used to \nmarket the AIG investment. Accordingly, \ntherefore, the defendants assert that each \ncount of the amended complaint should be \ndismissed to the extent that it is premised \non the defendants' alleged failure to dis-\nclose the relationship between MG and \nSSB. (Mem. Of Law in Support of Defs.' \nMot. To Dismiss at 3649.) The plaintiffs \nchallenge the defendants' reliance on these \ndocuments and the propriety of consider-\ning them under Rule 12(b)(6). Alterna-\ntively, they claim that these documents \nconfirm the defendants' failure to disclose \nthe existence of a continuing investment \nbanking relationship with AIG that would \nrender the defendants unable to advise the \nplaintiffs in an impartial, objective manner. \n(Pls.' Mem. Of Law in Opp'n to Mot. To \nDismiss at 32-36.) \n(9) Although generally, a district court \nmay not consider matters extraneous to \nthe pleadings, I may consider \"a docu-\nment integral to or explicitly relied upon \nin the complaint ... without converting \nthe motion to dismiss into one for sum-\nmary judgment\" \nU.S. Express Lines \nLtd I. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d \nCir.2002) (emphasis added) (quoting in re \nBurlington Coat Factory Litig., 114 FM \n1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1991)). Because the \nparties dispute whether the document in \nquestion is the actual \"pitch book\" refer-\nenced in the amended complaint, however, \nI find that whether the defendants dis-\nclosed SSB's relationship to MG to the \nplaintiffs is a disputed fact that precludes \na Rule 12(bX6) dismissal. \n4. The Complaint Adequately Alleges \nthat the Defendants' Wrongful Con-\ndud Caused the Plaintiffs' Losses \n(10) Citibank and Citigroup argue that \nthe plaintiffs have failed to allege ade-\nquately that the defendants' actions caused \nthe plaintiffs' losses under New York law. \n(Mem. Of Law in Supp. of Defs' Mot. to \nDismiss at 40-44.) As noted above, Virgin \nIslan\n... [truncated, 3670 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/82 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=82]", "char_count": 3670}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC., CITIBANK N.A. \nclic as 268 F.Supp.2d 561 11/V1r \nIslands 2003) \nlands law, they have stated claims for \nbreach of fiduciary duty and negligent mis-\nrepresentation. They argue that the de-\nfendants owed them a fiduciary duty be-\ncause they \"cultivated a relationship of \ntrust over a fifteen-year span as their pri-\nvate banker\" and then used this trust to \nmarket new and inherently risky invest-\nment opportunities which became even \nmore risky because of defendants' tortious \nconduct. (Pls.' Mem. Of Law in Opp'n to \nMot. To Dismiss at 41-46.) \na. The Amended Complaint Adequate-\nly States a Claim for Breach of Fi-\nduciary Duty \nIn Count, of the amended complaint, \nthe plaintiffs allege that the defendants \ncultivated a relationship of trust with the \nplaintiffs over fifteen-years as their private \nbanker, and that the defendants breached \ntheir fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs \nby failing to disclose a conflict of interest \nand effectively \"forced\" the plaintiffs to \nkeep their funds in a failing investment. \nThe plaintiffs claim that the defendants \n\"served as [their] financial investment ad-\nvisor and broker, as well as providing oth-\ner financial and banking services to \n[p]laintiffs, and thereby formed a fiduciary \nrelationship with [p]laintiffs and other in-\nvestors.\" (Am.Compl.11 10, 59-60.) \ntill In typical lender-borrower rela-\ntionships, there is a presumption that the \nparties operate at arms-length and in their \nown interest. \nJo-Ann's Launder Ctr., \nInc.'. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 854 \nF.Supp. 387, 392 (D.Vi.1994). A fiduciary \nrelationship may arise, however, depend-\ning upon the particular circumstances of \nthe financial relationship. This may occur, \nfor example, when a lender has substantial \ncontrol over the borrower's business af-\nfairs. Id. Here, the plaintiffs have alleged \nthat their relationship with Citibank and \nCitigroup was not the \"garden-variety\" at \n573 \narms-length banking relationship. They \nclaim that t\n... [truncated, 3783 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/83 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=83]", "char_count": 3783}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "574 \n268 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nto the fifteen-year relationship between \nthe defendants and the plaintiffs that is \nthe gravamen of the amended complaint. \nMoreover, Citibank is not a party to nor \ndid it sign the Subscription Agreement. I \nfind, therefore, that the Subscription \nAgreement does not dispose of the plain-\ntiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim as a \nmatter of law. \nb. The Amended Complaint Adequate-\nly States a Claim of Negligent Mis-\nrepresentation \n1131 In the Virgin Islands, the ele-\nments of negligent misrepresentation are: \n(o]ne who, in the course of his business, \nprofession or employment, or in any oth-\ner transaction in which he has a pecuni-\nary interest, supplies false information \nfor the guidance of others in their busi-\nness transactions, is subject to liability \nfor pecuniary loss caused to them by \ntheir justifiable reliance upon the infor-\nmation, if he fails to exercise reasonable \ncare or competence in obtaining or com-\nmunicating the information. \nRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 \n(1977). Count IV of the amended com-\nplaint alleges that the defendants negli-\ngently failed to disclose that they or their \naffiliates had a pecuniary interest in the \nMG investment and that the plaintiffs re-\nlied upon the information and advice pro• \nvided by the defendants to their detriment-\n(Am.Compl.11 55-56.) I find that Count \nIV thus adequately states a claim of negli-\ngent misrepresentation. \n6. The Rescission and Punitive Dam-\nages Counts are not Causes of Ac-\ntion \nThe defendants contend that this Court \nshould dismiss Counts VI and VII—for \nrescission of the note and for punitive \ndamages—because each claim seeks specif-\nic relief without asserting any claim for \nrelief. (Mem. Of Law in Supp. of Defs.' \nMot. to Dismiss at 51-52.) Whereas the \nplaintiffs, in their amended complaint, have \nset out their request for rescission of the \nAmended 1999 Note and punitive damages \nin the form of additional causes of action, I \nwill require \n... [truncated, 3582 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/84 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=84]", "char_count": 3582}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. \nCITIBANK N.A. \nCite es 268 F.Suppld 561 (13.VIrsin Islands 2003) \nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) \nrequires parties alleging fraud to describe \nthe circumstances constituting fraud \"with \nparticularity.\" Rule 9(b) requires that the \nplaintiff \"give[ J defendants notice of the \nclaims against them, provide( ) an in-\ncreased measure of protection for their \nreputations, and reduce() the number of \nfrivolous suits brought solely to extract \nsettlements.\" \nin re Rockefeller Ctr. \nProps., Inc., 311 F.3d at 215 (quoting In re \nBurlington Coat Factory Sea Litig., 114 \nF.3d at 1418). \"Rule 9(b) requires a plain-\ntiff to plead (1) a specific false representa-\ntion of material fact; (2) knowledge by the \nperson who made it that it was false; (3) \nignorance of its falsity by the person to \nwhom it was made; (4) the intention that it \nshould be acted upon; and (5) that the \nplaintiff acted upon it to his damage.\" \nShapiro I UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, \n284 (3d Cir.1992). Although the rule does \nnot require a recitation of \"every material \ndetail\" of the alleged fraud, it does require, \nat a minimum, \"that plaintiffs support \ntheir allegations of fraud with all of the \nessential factual background that would \naccompany 'the first paragraph of any \nnewspaper story'—that is, the who, what, \nwhen, where and how' of the events at \nissue.\" In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., inc., \n311 F.3d at 217 (quoting in re Burlington, \n114 F.34 at 1422). \nIn Count I, plaintiffs allege that the \ndefendants' conduct \"constituted the mak-\ning of fraudulent misrepresentations ... \nregarding the AIG Investment\" that the \ndefendants knew were materially mislead-\ning \"because of their failure to state or \ndisclose the additional or qualifying infor-\nmation regarding the investment banking \nrelationship\" of SSB with AIG. (Id. 1 46.) \nCount II vaguely states that the defen-\ndants' \"statements and conducts ... in-\ncluded the expression of opinions which \n575 \n[the defendants]\n... [truncated, 3849 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/85 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=85]", "char_count": 3849}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "576 \n263 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \ncomplaint to comport with Rule 9(b).2 See \nIn n Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Lilly., \n114 F.3d at 1434 (noting that ordinarily, \nwhen a complaint is dismissed under Rule \n9(b) for failure to plead fraud with the \nrequisite particularity, leave to amend the \ncomplaint is granted). \nIII. CONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, I will deny \nCitibank's and Citigroup's motions to dis-\nmiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, to \ndismiss for improper venue, and to trans-\nfer this matter to the United States Dis-\ntrict Court for the Southern District of \nNew York. I find that the amended com-\nplaint adequately states claims of breach of \nfiduciary duty and negligent misrepresen-\ntation, and therefore, will deny the defen-\ndants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for \nfailure to state a claim. Finally, because I \nfind that Counts I, II, III, and VI fail to \nmeet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for \nclaims of fraud, I will dismiss these claims \nand grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the \ncomplaint. \nORDER \nFor the reasons given in the Memoran-\ndum Opinion of even date, it is HEREBY \nORDERED that the defendants' motion to \ndismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction \nunder Federal Rule 12(b)(2), motion to \ndismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-\ndure 12(b)(6), and motion to transfer this \nmatter are DENIED. Counts I, II, III, \nand VI fail to meet Federal Rule of Civil \nProcedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading stan-\ndard for claims of fraud and are hereby \nDISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. \nThe plaintiffs, however, shall have THIR-\n3. Citibank and Citigroup also argue that \nCount II, alleging fraud, is impermissibly \nbased on the defendant? unspecified alleged \nfalse \"expression of opinions.\" (Mem. Of \nTY DAYS within which to file an amended \ncomplaint with respect to these counts. \nElizabeth A. REEVES, et al., Plaintiff, \nI \nST. MARY'S COUNTY \nCOMMISSIONERS, et \nal., Defendants. \nNo. CIV.A.AW—02-2449. \nUnited S\n... [truncated, 2894 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/86 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=86]", "char_count": 2894}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST COMPANY, INC. \nand Jeffrey E. Epstein, Plaintiffs, \nI \nCITIBANK, NA. and Citigroup, Inc. \nd/b/a \"Citigroup,\" Defendants. \nNo. CIV.2002-108. \nDistrict Court, Virgin Islands, \nAppellate Division, \nD. St. Thomas and St. John. \nDec. 30, 2004. \nBackground: Borrowers brought action \nagainst bank, alleging that false state-\nments or statements where material facts \nwere omitted were made by bank pursuant \nto a course of conduct to fraudulently in-\nduce them into a series of investments and \nrelated loans. Bank moved to dismiss the \ncomplaint for failure to meet heightened \npleading requirement for fraud and for \nfailure to state a claim upon which relief \ncould be granted. \nHoldings: The District Court, Moore, J., \nheld that \n(1) borrowers' specific factual allegations \nwere sufficient to plead fraud claim \nwith the requisite particularity, and \n(2) borrowers stated fraud claim against \nbank. \nMotion denied. \n1. Fraud e.,41. \nIn order to state a viable fraud claim, \nplaintiff is required to plead (1) a specific \nfalse representation or omission of materi-\nal fact (2) knowledge by the person who \nmade it of its falsity; (3) ignorance of its \nfalsity by the person to whom it was made; \n(4) the intention that it should be acted \nupon; and (6) that the plaintiff acted upon \nit to his damages. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. \nRule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A. \nFINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC..CITIBANK, NA. \n329 \nCite as331 F.5upp.2d 329 (D.VI \nIslands 2004)\n2. Federal Civil Procedure e=636 \nCourts should apply heightened plead-\ning requirement for fraud with some flexi-\nbility and should not require plaintiffs to \nplead issues that may have been concealed \nby the defendants. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. \nRule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A. \n3. Federal Civil Procedure .3=636 \nAlthough heightened pleading re-\nquirement for fraud does not require a \nrecitation of every material detail of the \nalleged fraud, it does require that plaintiffs \nsupport their allegations of fraud with all \nof the essential factual backgro\n... [truncated, 3301 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/87 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=87]", "char_count": 3301}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "330 \n351 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \ninjured. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 9(b), 28 \nU.S.C.A. \n5. Banks and Banking z=a228 \nJury question was presented as to \nwhether preliminary offering circular \n(\"pitch book\"), which was allegedly given \nto investor, disclosed ongoing business re-\nlationships between bank and company in \nwhich investor invested funds borrowed \nfrom bank, and therefore whether \"be-\nspeaks caution\" doctrine precluded inves-\ntor from stating fraud claim against bank. \n6. Banks and Banking .3=126 \nBorrowers stated fraud claim against \nbank based on allegations that false state-\nments or statements where material facts \nwere omitted were made by bank pursu-\nant to a course of conduct to fraudulently \ninduce them into a series of investments \nand related loans; claims alleging fraud re-\nlating to each investment would not be \ntreated separately since such claims were \npredicated on allegations that bank fraud-\nulently induced borrowers into believing \nthey had a preferred relationship with \nbank where bank was acting in borrowers' \nbest interest in all of their transactions. \nMaria Tankenson Hodge, Esq., Hodge & \nFrancois St. Thomas, VI, for plaintiffs. \nGregory H. Hodges, Esq., Dudley, Top-\nper and Feuerzeig, LLP, St Thomas, VI, \nfor defendants. \nMEMORANDUM OPINION \nMOORE, District Judge. \nDefendants have moved to dismiss the \nsecond amended complaint for failure to \nmeet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n9(bYs heightened pleading requirement for \nfraud and for failure to state a claim upon \nwhich relief can be granted pursuant to \nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6). \nI. Factual and Procedural History \nIn their second amended complaint, Jef-\nfrey E. Epstein and Financial Trust Com-\npany, Inc. ['FTC\") allege that Citibank, \nN.A. and Citigroup, Inc. [collectively \"Citi-\nbank\") misrepresented facts and fraudu-\nlently induced them to borrow $ 10 million \nto invest in a venture managed by AIG \nGlobal Investment Corporation [\"AIG\") \nand another $10 millio\n... [truncated, 3318 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/88 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=88]", "char_count": 3318}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. I. CITIBANK, N.A. \ncacas all F.Suppad 329 (D.Vbitin Wands 2004) \nplead (1) a specific false representation or \nomission of material fact; (2) knowledge \nby the person who made it of its falsity; \n(3) ignorance of its falsity by the person to \nwhom it was made; (4) the intention that it \nshould be acted upon; and (5) that the \nplaintiff acted upon it to his damages.\" in \nre Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., 311 F.3d \n198, 215 (3d Cir.2002). Courts should ap-\nply Rule 9(b) with some flexibility and \nshould not require plaintiffs to plead issues \nthat may have been concealed by the de-\nfendants. Rolo I. City Investing Co. Liq-\nuidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir.1998). \nAlthough the rule does not require a reci-\ntation of \"every material detail\" of the \nalleged fraud, it does require \"that plain-\ntiffs support their allegations of fraud with \nall of the essential factual background that \nwould accompany 'the first paragraph of \nany newspaper story'—that is the 'who, \nwhat, when, where and how' of the events \nat issue.\" in re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., \nInc, 311 FM at 217 (quoting in re Bur-\nlington, 114 F.3d at 1422). However, the \nThird Circuit Court of Appeals has held \nthat the \"requirements of Rule 9(b) may \nbe satisfied if the complaint describes the \ncircumstances of the alleged fraud with \n'precise allegations of date, time or place' \nor by using some means of 'injecting preci-\nsion and some means of substantiation into \ntheir allegations of fraud.'\" Board of \nTrustees of Teamsters Local 868 Pension \nFund. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 173 \nn. 10 (3d Cir.2002) (internal citations omit-\nted). \n141 Plaintiffs allege that false state-\nments or statements where material facts \nwere omitted were made pursuant to a \ncourse of conduct to fraudulently induce \nplaintiffs into a series of investments and \nrelated loans. Plaintiffs allege that Citi-\nbank's actions did not conform to the \nrepresentations in the statements, that \ndefendants were acting \n... [truncated, 3933 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/89 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=89]", "char_count": 3933}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "332 \n351 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nThe basic purpose of Rule 9(b) has been \nfulfilled—plaintiff has alleged enough in-\nformation, including specific names and \ndates, to put Citibank on notice of the \nfraudulent actions it has alleged to have \ncommitted. Moreover, since some of the \nmisrepresentations were alleged to be \nomissions, Rule 9 does not require specifi-\ncation of time, place, and nature of misrep-\nresentation for these statements; rather, it \nrequires only that the plaintiff identify the \nfacts not communicated. \nSee Golden \nTrade, S.r.L. I Jordache, 143 F.R.D. 504 \n(S.D.N.Y.1992); Coltman Transmission \nSys Inc. \nDubinsky, 95 F.R.D. 351, 353 \n(E.D.Pa.1982) (\"Conduct which never oc-\ncurred cannot be described with greater \nparticularity other than to state that it did \nnot occur.\") \nThe information contained in the second \namended complaint is enough for counts I, \nII, III, and VI to survive this motion to \ndismiss for failure to plead fraud with par-\nticularity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil \nProcedure 9(b). \nB. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \nI2(b)(6) \nThe defendants also argue that 12(b)(6) \nmandates dismissal of the complaint for \nfailure to state a claim upon which relief \ncan be granted. To the extent that plain-\ntiffs are attempting to reargue their previ-\nous motion to dismiss, I reiterate my rul-\ning that Virgin Islands law governs this \ncase, that the complaint adequately alleges \nthat the defendants' wrongful conduct \ncaused the plaintiffs' loses, and that plain-\ntiffs' claims of breach of fiduciary duty and \nnegligent misrepresentation should not be \ndismissed. \nFinancial Trust Co., 268 \nF.Supp.2d at 576. The only claims left to \nbe decided are the fraud claims. \nIn order to state a claim for fraud, the \nplaintiff must prove \"(1) a specific false \nrepresentation of material fact; (2) knowl-\nedge by the person who made it that it was \nfalse; (3) ignorance of its falsity by the \nperson to whom it was made; (4) the \nintention that it shou\n... [truncated, 3671 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/90 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=90]", "char_count": 3671}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "FINANCIAL TRUST CO., INC. I. CITIBANK, NA. \ncue al 331 F,Supp.241 329 (D.VIrrn Istinds 2004) \n[6] Plaintiffs have alleged all necessary \nelements of fraud. They have alleged that \ndefendants intentionally misrepresented \nmaterial facts, through omissions and \nstatements assuring the plaintiffs that they \nwere acting in Epstein's personal best in-\nterest. They have also alleged that the \nperson who made these misrepresenta-\ntions, Davison, knew of the relationship \nbetween MG and Citibank and that Ep-\nstein and FTC did not know of this rela-\ntionship: Finally, plaintiffs have also al-\nleged that \"but for\" defendants misleading \nstatements and omissions, plaintiff would \nnot have proceeded with their loan and \ninvestment programs and would not have \nsuffered these damages. Plaintiffs have \nthus alleged enough information to survive \na Rule 12(b)(6) motion on their fraud \nclaims. \nC. The Mass Mutual Investment \nClaims \nAlthough it is unclear from the second \namended complaint which counts concern \nthe Mass Mutual Fund, it is clear that at \nleast some of the causes of actions allege \nthat Citibank defrauded Epstein in rela-\ntion to his loans and investment in the \nMass Mutual Fund. Separately, defendants \nargue that the court should dismiss the \nclaims alleging fraud relating to the Mass \nMutual Fund for failure to plead fraud \nspecifically under Rule 9(b) and failure to \nstate a claim upon which relief can be \ngranted under Rule 12(b)(6). The plain-\ntiffs basic allegation is that \"because of \nDefendants' false assurances and omis-\nsions of true statements concerning their \nrelationship with AIG and the AIG Invest-\nment, Plaintiffs made the investment in \nthe Mass Mutual Fund and suffered signif-\nicant losses.\" (Comp1.1 65.) \n1. This opinion is supported by the structure of \nthe second amended complaint which does \nnot differentiate the counts between the Mass \n333 \nDefendants essentially argue that plain-\ntiffs loans and investment in the AIG and \nMass Mutual funds sho\n... [truncated, 3650 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/91 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=91]", "char_count": 3650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00187391", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "334 \n351 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES \nORDER \nFor the reasons given in the accompany-\ning memorandum of even date, it is hereby \nORDERED that the defendant's motion \nto dismiss is hereby DENIED. \nIn re ROYAL AHOLD \nSECURITIES & ERISA \nLITIGATION. \nNo. CIV.1:03-MD-01539. \nUnited States District Court, \nD. Maryland. \nDec. 21, 2004. \nBackground: Investors brought consoli-\ndated securities fraud actions arising out \nof an approximately $ 1.1 billion restate-\nment of earnings, together with a $24.8 \nbillion reduction in revenue, announced by \nNetherlands company involved in super-\nmarket and food service business in the \nUnited States. Named as defendants were \nthe company, its American subsidiaries, \nauditors, underwriters, and individual ex-\necutives. Defendants filed multiple motions \nto dismiss. \nHoldings: The District Court, Blake, J., \nheld that: \n(1) subject matter jurisdiction existed over \nsecurities fraud claims asserted by for-\neign purchasers of shares on foreign \nexchanges; \n(2) plaintiffs stated securities fraud claims \nagainst chief officers of Dutch compa-\nny; \n(3) allegation in complaint were sufficient \nto state market manipulation claims \nagainst chief officers; and \n(4) plaintiffs failed to state securities fraud \nclaim against auditors. \nSo ordered. \n1. Federal Courts e=.7I \nPersonal jurisdiction extends to the \nlimits of the due process clause of the \nFifth \nAmendment. \nU.S.C.A. \nConst. \nAmend. 5. \n2. Constitutional Law e=305(5) \nThere are two primary factors to con-\nsider in evaluating personal jurisdiction \nunder the due process clause of the Fifth \nAmendment: (I) whether the defendant \nhas sufficient minimum contacts with the \nUnited States and (2) whether the exer-\ncise of jurisdiction over the defendant \nwould offend traditional notions of fair \nplay and substantial justice. \nU.S.C.A. \nConst.Amend. 5. \n3. Federal Courts (1=86 \nTo satisfy the minimum contacts test \nfor personal jurisdiction over a foreign de-\nfendant, a plaintiff must demonstra\n... [truncated, 2762 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00187391/92 or ?id=EFTA00187391&page=92]", "char_count": 2762}]}