{"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_count": 106, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00173373", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00173373.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED/MOM \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n, having been duly sworn by Supervisory \nSpecial Agent (SSA) \nfollowing statement to \n01/26/2024, \nand \nand \nand \nand \n., hereby make the \non \non 08/08/2024, \non 10/07/2024, whom I know \nto be SSAs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), \nassigned to the Inspection Division (INSD) at the time of my \nstatement. My attorney, Richard J. Roberson, Jr., was present \nduring my statement all occasions, via telephone. This statement \ntook place over a three-day period. The statement initiated on \n01/26/2024, and again on 08/08/2024, after additional \nallegations were added: \nI entered on duty (EOD) on 02/21/2006, as an Intelligence \nAnalyst (IA). I EOD on 10/08/2008, as a Special Agent (SA) and I \nam currently assigned to the New York Field Office (NYFO) in \nthat capacity. \nI understand that this is an internal investigation \nregarding an allegation that Special Agent \nimproperly stored digital evidence at his residence in violation \nof 1.6- Investigative Deficiency- Improper Handling of Property \nin the Care, Custody, or Control of the Government. On \n10/30/2023 the following expanded allegations were added: \nSpecial Agent \nimproperly handled, documented, \nand stored digital evidence and failed to secure CSAM within \npolicy, resulting in a cyber intrusion in violation of 1.6-\nInvestigative Deficiency- Improper Handling of Property in the \nPage 1 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173373\n", "char_count": 1452}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n(9\n4 Care, Custody, or Control of the Government and 5.17- Security \nViolation- Failure to Secure sensitive Equipment/ Materials. On \n02/07/2024 the following expanded allegations were added: \nSpecial Agent \nexceeded the limits of his \nauthority by contracting an outside company to develop computer \nsoftware on behalf of the FBI in violation of 2.6 Misuse of \nPosition and 5.23 Violation of Miscellaneous Rules/Regulations. \nI have been further advised of my rights and \nresponsibilities in connection with this inquiry as set forth on \na \"Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide \nInformation\" form FD-645 which I have read and signed. I \nunderstand from my review of the FD-645 that should I refuse to \nanswer or fail to reply fully and truthfully during this \ninterview, I can expect to be dismissed from the rolls of the \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nFBI. \nI have been advised by INSD not to provide the details of a \nwhistleblower complaint I have filed with the Department of \nJustice in which I assert that these allegations are some of \nmany retaliatory actions taken against me by the FBI that stem \nfrom a 2023 cyber intrusion of the NYFO's child exploitation \nforensic lab. While I will not go into details, I believe this \nis important to mention here given the very genesis of these \nallegations were derived from a directive to make me a scapegoat \nfor the intrusion. I am happy to elaborate if requested, but in \nsum I was retaliated against for my having made numerous \nprotected disclosures over the years that went unaddressed,l0 \nPage 2 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173374\n", "char_count": 1630}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n8 \nwhich likely would have prevented the intrusion from happening. \nWhen the intrusion occurred, these disclosures, which I made \nagain, caused FBI Executive Management (EM) to fear \nrepercussions of their own failure to address the issues I \npresented before an incident like the intrusion could occur. I \nhave proof upon proof that I was then targeted by FBI management \nas an attempt to make it appear that I and my squad mates were \nresponsible. I know that INSD is in possession of the first of \nmy submitted whistleblower complaints, but there are several \nother amendments as well as supporting documents that I can \nprovide upon request. \nI am currently assigned to CT-25, a Domestic Terrorism \nsquad, but assigned to an Enterprise Investigation that is a \nhybrid of Domestic Terrorism and Child Exploitation squad. I was \nassigned to squad CY-3 in May 2010 and officially named on the \nsquad in July 2010. This was when the FBI's child exploitation \nprogram was referred to as \"Innocent Images\" and fell under the \nCyber Division, while Squad. C-20 was the Human Trafficking (HT) \nsquad at the time. I believe it was 2015 when Violent Crimes \nAgainst Children (VCAC) and HT programs were combined under the \nFBI's Criminal Division, which led to the merger of the \nviolations in the NYFO under squad C-20. The squad is split and \nhas the HT side and the VCAC side, and I was a VCAC Agent. \nAgents primarily work their assigned viol\n tions, but we come \nQ9 1)\ntogether as a squad for operations. \nPage 3 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//F0130 \nEFTA00173375\n", "char_count": 1600}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \n01/26/2024 \n0  \nNew York, NY \nI have been with the FBI for over 18 years, having spent \nthe last 16 years as an Agent. I have been one of the FBI's \nleading Agents in Child Exploitation investigations and to this \nday, I believe that I am one of, if not the only, Court-\ncertified expert witness for the entire FBI for child \nexploitation. I have personally accounted for over 60 arrests, \n150 search warrants, and have been responsible for rescuing \nseveral hundreds of children. As is elaborated on in my \nCurriculum Vitae, which I have provided to INSD and has been \nintroduced to certify me in Court as an expert witness, I also \nhave received numerous awards and accolades, including but not \nlimited to being a two-time recipient of the FBI's Medal of \nExcellence and the Southern District of New York's (SDNY) \nprestigious McCabe Award. I have an incredible reputation around \nthe FBI and am seen as one of the hardest working and driven \nAgents in the FBI. In demonstrating the support I received, \nafter the intrusion when FBI Headquarters (HQ) had begun its \nefforts to retaliate against me, the NYFO went to great lengths \nto push-back. Now retired Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) \ndefied orders from Assistant Directors (AD) and \nthe Deputy Director (DD) to have me punished. This defiance led \nthe DD to order charges against me, and months later I received \nthe first of the referenced charges. The NYFO however still \nshowered me with their support, with \nsinging my \nPage 4 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173376\n", "char_count": 1555}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \ne:yraises to \none \" \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n, stating that he would rather have \nthan 10 other Agents. The NYFO also nominating \nme for the second of the FBI Medal of Excellence awards I would \nreceive in December 2023. Just months ago, in 2024, I was \nnominated for, but did not receive, the Director's Award, \nhowever at the same time I was nominated for an award from the \nFederal Law Enforcement Foundation and on 10/22/2024, I was \ninformed I am receiving it. \nI can expand at length on the accolades and praise I have \nreceived from Agents, Analysts, management, HQ, Assistant United \nStates Attorney's (AUSA's), local law enforcement, and more over \nthe years. Even despite my current situation I continue to \nreceive praise and support from all ranks and from AUSAs. Last \nmonth, in September 2024, the SDNY Project Safe-Childhood \nCoordinator (PSC) requested I assist her in providing child \nexploitation training to SDNY AUSAs. The PSC is aware I am no \nlonger on the child exploitation squad, and finds the actions \ntaken against me to be disgraceful. She also stated that despite \nit all, she considers me to be the best in the FBI. \nRegarding the allegations against me, it is my \nunderstanding that they stem, in whole or in part, from \ninterviews conducted by the FBI's INSD in March 2023. \nSpecifically, the statements I made during those interviews\n..,•)\nPage 5 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173377\n", "char_count": 1443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nppear to have been the basis for the observations outlined in \nthe subsequent INSD report, which the FBI has reported to be the \nfoundation of these charges. I have since learned that this \nreport was authored by someone two or three levels removed from \nme, relying on secondhand interpretations of my statements from \nthe notes of the interviewers. I know what I said during the \ninterviews, and the references in the INSD report do not \naccurately reflect my actual words. \nThe INSD initially published a draft report around May or \nJune 2023, which included observations closely mirroring the \nallegations against me. Both I and the NYFO leadership, \nincluding my \nobservations \ninaccuracies \nformer ADIC, \nas we believed \nwere discussed \ncountered these \nthem to be inaccurate. These \nin detail during meetings with \nand FBI EM, and we later submitted a formal written \nrebuttal. However, the final INSD report, published in July \n2023, failed to incorporate our responses. The observations \nbased on my statements were neither revised to align with my \nrebuttal nor updated to reflect supporting evidence. \nI have also learned that the interviewers themselves were \nnot provided with either the draft or final versions of the INSD \nreport, nor were the interviewers informed of the responses \nsubmitted by me or the NYFO. Instead, the report's author relied \nPage 6 of 106 \nUNCLASSITIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173378\n", "char_count": 1459}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nsolely on the interviewers' notes, which were not a verbatim \ntranscription of the interview, and the interview itself was not \nrecorded. This left critical context about my statements subject \nto the author's interpretation. Similarly, the rebuttals \nsubmitted to challenge the observations were not addressed. As a \nresult, the final report left the original observations largely \nunchanged. \nIn the interest of transparency, I am including the NYFO's \nfinal response to the INSD's draft report. This response was a \ncollaborative effort between myself, my SSA, my Assistant \nSpecial Agent in Charge (ASAC), and the NYFO's Information \nSystem Security Officer (ISSO). It was formally submitted as a \nrebuttal to the draft observations. Unfortunately, the final \nINSD report failed to incorporate these responses, leaving the \ncontested observations intact. This is deeply troubling, as the \nallegations were contested from the outset with the full support \nof the NYFO chain of command. \nAfter reviewing the draft INSD report, the NYFO was \nafforded an opportunity to respond in writing to both the INSD \n\"observations\" and \"findings\". The following is the last version \nof the NYFO's response that had been drafted by \nIII \n, and Office of the Chief Information Officer \n(OCIO) \n. In the \"NY's Clarifications to the\nPage 7 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173379\n", "char_count": 1414}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nSi \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nInspection Report's Observations\" section you will see listed \nthe \"Observation\", which was identified by INSD, then the \nsubsequent \"Clarification of Facts\", which was the NYFO's \nrebuttal to the observations. Following this section, you will \nsee the \"NY's Responses to the Inspection Report's Findings\" \nsection. Similarly, you will see listed the \"Instruction\", which \nwas identified by INSD, then the subsequent \"Response\", which \nwas the NYFO's rebuttal to the instruction. \nNY's Clarifications to the Inspection Report's \nObservations \nObservation 1: NY was operating a device \nproviding Internet access through wireless \nconnectivity in FBI secured space. \nClarification of Facts: NY received authorization \nfrom Security Division in 2018 to utilize Wi-Fi \ndevices within FBI space, as long as the device \nconnected to the Wi-Fi was 10 feet from an Enterprise \ncomputer. Regardless, because C20 did not request the \nparticular Wi-Fi modem/router which was in the lab at \nthe time of the intrusion, the wireless features were \nnever utilized and presently there are no wireless \ndevices in FBI space. \nPage 8 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nEFTA00173380\n", "char_count": 1207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nObservation 2: NY was connecting overtly and \ncovertly purchased IT on the IS. \nClarification of Facts: Axiom, Cellebrite and \nGrayKey are LE tools purchased by CACHTU and used by \nDExT examiners in the Field. CACHTU advised the field \nto utilize UCO funds to make purchases of new \nequipment to support the tools. \nObservation 3: NY was storing DE overnight in an \nunapproved storage facility. \nClarification of Facts: The previous practice \nutilized by \nwas to image the Original \nDigital Evidence on the Network Attached Storage, \nplace such in Evidence Control, and then copy the \nOriginal Imaged Evidence, creating a Master Working \nCopy. \nDuring specific times in 2020, \ncreated \na copy of specific files/documents from the Master \nWorking Copy and brought these limited working copy \nitems home via his work laptop to perform work related \ntasks. The copies he took home to work on were copies \nof copies and were limited to specific files from the \nlarger forensic images. The files/documents were not \nPage 9 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173381\n", "char_count": 1107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ncontraband, classified material, CSAM, or sensitive \nmaterial. Further, in 2020, FBI Management was \nauthorizing and encouraging employees to work from \nhome to limit the spread of COVID 19 in the office. \ndid not store any files at his house. Once \nhe completed his analysis he brought the electronic \nfiles/documents back to the office and appropriately \ndisposed of same. \nObservation 4: NY did not appropriately image DE. \nClarification of Facts: This is an issue C-20 has \nraised for years with HQ and has routinely asked for \nhard drives in order to comply with the policy, but \nhas been denied and C-20 was advised they would have \nto pay for the drives. At the same time, HQ would not \nsupply C-20 with the funds in order to purchase those \nsame hard drives. \nAdditionally, C-20 takes issue with the outdated \nprocess of creating derivative evidence onto an \nadditional hard drive. As the volume of data that is \nbeing collected has increased exponentially over time, \nthe amount and cost of using hard drives is \nimpractical and costly. C-20 suggests the use of \nPage 10 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173382\n", "char_count": 1167}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n13)  \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nservers or cloud storage as a means to store\nderivative copies of evidence, which can be reused at \nthe conclusion of an investigation and when the \nevidence (and derivative evidence) is destroyed. \nObservation 5: NY did not appropriately verify \nanalyzed images of acquired DE. \nClarification of Facts: NY in fact did \nappropriately verify analyzed imaged of acquired DE by \ngenerating an FD-302 which documented in the \nsubstantive case file as well as at 305A-HQ-1654544-\nDEXT to account for the work performed. Any issues or \ndiscrepancies would be documented in the FD-302. \nA \nhash verification log was also generated and stored \nwith the DE on the Network Attached Storage, which \ncould be accessed at any time. Going forward, the \nhash value verification log will be attached to the \nFD-302 to ensure compliance with policy. \nObservation 6: NY was not appropriately \ndocumenting and storing ELSUR records in relation to \nundercover communications. \nClarification of Facts: NY appropriately places \nOCE/UCE communications in Subfile G of the UCO, which \nPage 11 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173383\n", "char_count": 1162}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nis where CACHTU policy mandates these communications \nbe placed. \nObservation 7: NY did not document meetings \nbetween UCE/OCE and SSA every 90 days and the SAC/ASAC \nevery six months. \nClarification of Facts: While the SSA and ASAC \nmet with the OCE/UCE's connected to the UCO on a \nregular basis, primarily in the squad area and via the \nfile review and CUROC process, NY will draft ECs \ndocumenting same in accordance with policy going \nforward. \nObservation 8: NY did not utilize covert methods \nto procure covertly purchased goods. \nClarification of Facts: The items which were \npurchased are Law Enforcement only. NY was provided \nfunding from HQ via the UCO to make this purchase with \nthe understanding that it's a restricted purchase. \nGoing forward, NY will ensure if a purchase needs to \nbe made overtly, covert funding will be converted to \novert funding by an approved FBI purchaser. \nPage 12 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173384\n", "char_count": 993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nObservation 9: NY was not documenting financial \nrecords relating to IMO activity to the appropriate CE \nsubfile. \nClarification of Facts: NY submits a monthly \nBlueSlip that contains all of the financial \ndocumentation for the prior month's financial \nactivity. The same information that is required to be \nsubmitted to the CE subfile is contained in the \nBlueSlip. NY changed the individual who performs the \naccounting over time on a field office level and, \nwhile the information was recorded, it was not put \ninto the CE subfile. \nObservation 10: NY did not properly report a \nsecurity incident within SIRS. \nClarification of Facts: The incident occurred \nduring the night of Sunday, February 12, 2023. In the \nmorning of Monday, 2/13/23, \nnoticed his \nTalino was not operating correctly and began trouble \nshooting with the company and HQ. Upon determining a \npotential intrusion may have occurred, \nnotified \nand CACHTU on \n2/13/23. Following notification, \nnotified \nPage 13 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173385\n", "char_count": 1070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F0130 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \non 2/13/23. During the week of 2/13/23, \nthere were numerous meetings between NY EM, NY Cyber \nand NY CIO, among others, in coordination with HQ. \nWhen there was an understanding of what occurred, III \nsubmitted a security incident report within \nSIRS on 2/17/23. \nObservation 11: NY did not implement encryption \non devices or data on the IS. \nClarification of Facts: There are broad \ncontradicting policies as it relates to UCO IS. NY \nrequested assistance in the development and testing \nthe IS over the several years and was met with no \nresponse from OTD, CART, OCIO, and other HQ level \nentities. Going forward, recommendations from OCIO, \nOTD, etc., are being implemented. \nObservation 13: Policy regarding the requirements \nfor patching, ATO, use of an ISSO, security \nmonitoring, remote access, account management, \nmaintenance or IT hardware, use of mobile devices, and \napproval for custom HATA solutions to include \noperational security, cost efficiency, SOPs, technical \narchitecture, accounts and access, system access \nPage 14 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173386\n", "char_count": 1130}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nrecords, acquisition planning, user account \nguidelines, compliance with 0655PG, and training for \ncovert ISs is insufficient. \nClarification of Facts: NY has one ISSO, hired \nin mid-January 2023. NYO's ISSO is responsible for \nmultiples sites. It is not feasible for one ISSO to \neffectively monitor and maintain IS's within the NYO. \nIndustry standards recommend multiple individuals in \ndifferent roles with qualifying credentials to ensure \nthe integrity of IS's. \nObservation 15: NY stored CSAM from multiple \ninvestigations in an effort to identify victims across \nmultiple cases. \nClarification of Facts: As NCMEC only maintains \nthe \"MD5s\" or \"hash values\" of the CSAM, not the \nactual media itself, NY stored CSAM on the IS for \nfacial recognition and \"photo DNA.\" PG 1157PG requires \na CVIP comparison for CSAM which is facilitated \nthrough NCMEC and does not prohibit the creation of \nuse of independent ISs to store and compare CSAM \nacross multiple cases and field offices, noted in \nPage 15 of 106 \nONCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173387\n", "char_count": 1092}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ndraft INSD Report page 7. This should not be \nprohibited as it is not available through NCMEC/CVIP. \nObservation 16: NY did not follow minimal and \ncommonly accepted industry wide security practices for \nthe IS. \nClarification of Facts: As there are numerous \nconflicting policies and constantly changing guidance \nregarding the IS, as it falls under a covert network, \nNY did not willfully violate policies or accepted \nindustry wide security practices and welcomed any and \nall assistance from other field offices and HQ \nsections. \nGuidance and funding of recommended training, \ninternal and external, should be provided by HQ to \nprovide consistency of enterprise wide IS standards. \nProperly ensuring IS's are developed, maintained and \nmonitored requires hiring and retaining qualified \npersonnel such as ISSO's and ITS Network \nSpecialist/Architectures. Special Agents and non-ITS \nProfessional Staff are not technically trained and not \nequipped to act as a System Administrators \nPage 16 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173388\n", "char_count": 1084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nNYO has one ISSO with responsibilities spanning \nNYO's Headquarter City and all Resident Agencies. The \nISSO was hired and on-boarded in NYO mid-January 2023. \nNYO Security does not currently have ITS Network \nSpecialist/Architectures. NYO Security would require \na minimum of four ISSO's and five ITS Network \nSpecialist/Architectures to ensure all IS's within NYO \nhave a System Administrator and all IS's are securely \ndeveloped, maintained and monitored. NIST and other \nindustry standard best practices require designated \npersonnel outside of the operating unit to act in \nthese roles. Separation of duties is required to \nretain the integrity of the IS's. \nNY's Responses to the Inspection Report's \nFindings \nInstruction 1: ADIC NY shall ensure all \nunauthorized devices allowing Internet access through \nwireless connectivity are removed from FBI secured \nspace or disabled. \nResponse All non-approved wireless devices in FBI \nspace are disconnected. Devices approved by division(:F1\n1:?\nPage 17 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173389\n", "char_count": 1093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F000 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nhead and the AD of SecD will remain operational only \nduring mission critical needs at this time. \nCommunication regarding the prohibited use of \nwireless devices within FBI space has and will \ncontinue to be disseminated on a regular basis. \nSignage is in place referencing policies prohibiting \nthe use of wireless devices in FBI space. For \nexample, signs are posted in each elevator bank of 26 \nFederal Plaza. \nAll owners of overt and covert portable \nelectronic devices (PED's) are required to register \ndevices with NYO's Security unit whereupon the user \naccepts the terms of use for said devices. The terms \nof use include but are not limited to the prohibited \nuse of wireless connectivity to include radio \nfrequency connections such as Wi-Fi and cellular based \nMi-Fi within FBI space. \nNYO's Security unit has engaged with NYO's \nTechnically Trained Agents to begin routine sweeps \nwithin NYO's space to identify active RF's. If RF \ndevices are identified without a waiver authorizing \nPage 18 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173390\n", "char_count": 1093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nuse by NYO's Division Head and the AD of SecD, the \ndevice will be disabled and/or removed from FBI space. \nInstruction 2: ADIC NY will ensure overtly and \ncovertly purchased IT is not used on the same IS. \nResponse: \nWhile this is a HQ driven process, as \nCACHTU purchases Axiom, Cellebrite and GrayKey \ndirectly from the vendor on behalf of the Field Office \nand provides these tools to the Field, NY is in \ncontact with CID to ensure IT meets this requirement, \nor a waiver is granted. \nInstruction 3: ADIC NY will ensure evidence is \nstored in a safe, secure, and approved manner. \nResponse: II =Ilk refutes the assertion he \ntook home and stored DE at his house. NY will ensure \nthat appropriate policies related to storage of \nevidence are followed. \nInstruction 4: ADIC NY will ensure compliance to \napplicable policy when creating and maintaining \nderivative DE. \nResponse: NY has consulted with CART and \nconsistent with CART SOP and PG, the underlining \nPage 19 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173391\n", "char_count": 1060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//Fou0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nelectronic device, as well as the Master Copy, will be \nentered into evidence as a 1B. A further additional \ncopy will be made as a working copy on which the \nactual forensic work will be performed. NY will \nengage with CACHTU to obtain the appropriate funding \nrequired to obtain the required portable electronic \nstorage devices to house the increased numbers of \ncopies. Further, NY is working with NY Evidence and \nthe Laboratory Division's Field Evidence Program to \nobtain authorization for standalone storage devices to \nbe classified as an appropriate Evidence Control Room \nto house Derivative Evidence. The standalone storage \ndevice would contain the same Derivative Evidence \nwhich would otherwise be copied onto hard drives and \nphysically checked into evidence. The storage device \nwould be secured with sufficient user credentials and \nmaintain access logs. The Derivative Evidence would \nstill require an evidence submission to generate 'Bs \nfor the Derivative Evidence. At the conclusion of the \ncase, this Derivative Evidence can be deleted and the \nspace made available for new Derivative Evidence to be \nstored, rather than continuously purchase new hard \ndrives only to have them destroyed at the conclusion \nof an investigation. \nPage 20 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nCl\nEFTA00173392\n", "char_count": 1351}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nRecommendation 5: ADIC NY will ensure compliance \nto applicable policy when creating and maintaining \nderivative DE. \nResponse: NY performs post examination reviews \nand documents them via an FD-302. A hash verification \nlog is also created. \nInstruction 6: ADIC NY will ensure compliance \nwith requirements to document ELSUR records in \naccordance with applicable policy. \nResponse: NY ELSUR stated any communications that \noccur via a covert platform (i.e an OCE/UCE cellular \nphone) is not ELSUR evidence. \nInstruction 7: ADIC NY will ensure compliance \nwith requirements to document meetings between \nundercover personnel and the appropriate SAC/ASAC and \nSSA. \nResponse: NY will document meetings held with the \nSSA/OCE and SAC or ASAC/OCE and place in the \nappropriate subfile of the UCO via an EC. \nPage 21 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \na \nEFTA00173393\n", "char_count": 904}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nInstruction 8: ADIC NY will ensure compliance \nwith requirements to employ covert methods to obtain \ngoods when using confidential funding. \nResponse: NY will ensure compliance with \nrequirements for making covert purchases. NY Security \nhas implemented approval processes for the purchase of \nIT equipment. A review of the equipment and purchase \nmethod will be conducted and approved appropriately. \nNY CSO is now a member of the UCO local review board \nto ensure all policy is adhered to when purchasing, \nimplementing and utilizing overt/covert electronic \ndevices and IS technology. \nInstruction 9: ADIC NY will ensure compliance \nwith requirements to maintain and document financial \nrecords related to UCO activity. \nResponse: NY will ensure that all financial \ndocumentation will be placed in the CE subfile. \nInstruction 10: ADIC NY shall ensure compliance \nwith security incident reporting requirements to \nreport security incidents within SIRS. \nPage 22 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173394\n", "char_count": 1052}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "DNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nResponse: NY will work with the NY CSO to ensure \nall security incidents are reported within the \nprescribed time frame per policy. \nInstruction 11: ADIC NY shall ensure compliance \nwith encryption requirement for the IS. \nResponse: \nWhile this does not apply to the UCO, \nNY will ensure compliance with encryption policy as \napplicable. NY0 Security has engaged with OLIO to \ndevelop secure network protocols based on industry \nstandards such as NIST to include encryption at rest \nand encryption in transit. \nRecommendation 15a: ADIC NY should no longer \nmaintain a set of CSAM for independent analysis \noutside of the CV/P approved hash based searching \ntools. \nResponse: \nNY fulfills its requirements to submit \nimages of CSAM to NCMEC via the CVIP. \nAfter the final INSD report came out, I was advised that \neceived a call from IIIIIIIIIIlla \n111.\n1\nwho were accusing me of making statements to the effect of \nhaving no regard for following policy. This is of course \nPage 23 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED/MOOD \nEFTA00173395\n", "char_count": 1067}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F000 \ncategorically false and thankfully \nmuch, especially when neither AD could or would provide any \ndetails regarding the allegations such as who heard it, where it \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nbelieved as \nwas documented, or why it was only then being addressed. \nHowever, in response, I submitted the following: \n\"Bosses, \nRegarding the assertion that I made a statement indicating \nI would violate policy for the sake of an operation is a \nutter non-sense. Furthermore it is a gross miss-\ninterpretation of the conversation that was had and quite \nfrankly an insult to my character and integrity. Aside from \nlacking context, the choice of words used is blatantly \nmisleading. \nI'm happy to provide as much context as needed, but in \nshort I have never, and would never, jeopardize any \ninvestigation (or my career) by intentionally violating \npolicy. What I have done, and would do, is anything to save \nthe life of a child. What I said that has been \nmisconstrued, was that I would do anything to save the life \nof a child, and that if I were to ever violate policy or \nthe law, it would ONLY be because there was an imminent \n(taj \nthreat to life in which a clear and articulable except \nwould apply. \nPage 24 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173396\n", "char_count": 1272}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI stand by that statement and take great pride in my \nknowledge of both the law and policy as it pertains to our \ninvestigations and operations. If requested, I can provide \nseveral examples of having to act under the emergency \nexception clause, which have all been justified. If \nrequested, I can also provide examples of times in which I \ndidn't, even though doing so would have been easier for the \n\"operation\". \nI could write a novel defending myself, my words, and my \nintentions; and will if requested. For now I'm relying on \nmy 15 years as an Agent with outstanding PARs, numerous \nawards and accolades, my contributions to policy revisions, \nand my reputation to satisfy any concern that may exist.\" \nI believe Digital Extraction Technician (DExT) training was \nopened to VCAC Agents in 2012. Int \nwas my instructor \nfor DExT. As of 2023, I knew Ledford was a Unit Chief (UC) and \nled the Cyber Action Team (CAT). I believe at least three or \nfour of us initially received DExT training in approximately \n2012, but I think all of us working Innocent Images/VCAC on the \nsquad were eventually trained. However, once the child \nexploitation program moved from the Cyber Division to the \nCriminal Division, that changed. The funding we received through \nthe Criminal Division was significantly less than what we \nreceived through Cyber Division, so the DExT program was no \nPage 25 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED/At/OO \nEFTA00173397\n", "char_count": 1476}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n( i\n)  longer able to put on as many classes and certify as many people \nas it had before. By the time of the intrusion that forms the \nbasis of this internal inquiry, only about half of the \"child \nexploitation\" Agents on my squad were DExT certified. This is \nwhile we were still with CY-3. \nWe got certified because the Computer Analysis Response \nTeam (CART) was long overburdened, and not familiar with the \nnuances of the child exploitation violation, such as the types \nof programs used by offenders, the vernaculars, etc. It was also \nknown, and something I witnessed personally, that due to the \nreliance on CART and how long it would take for them to prepare \na case for review, \"hands-on\" offenders were not being arrested \nin a timely manner. This resulted in the continuation of child \nvictimization at the hands of the offenders the FBI was actively \ninvestigating. This was around the same time Agents working \nother violations began to also see an increase in the collection \nand reliance upon digital evidence in their cases. As DExTs, we \nwere encouraged, and in some cases I believe required, to assist \nCART with their backlog by conducting DExT extractions for other \nsquads. The other reason was to eliminate the lag time in \nsearching evidence and identifying contact offenders (offenders \nwho physically exploited or physically assaulted children) \nsooner. \nVCAC investigations are different than most other FBI \ninvestigations since, in VCAC investigations, a search warrant \nis generally executed in the early stages of an investigation, \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 26 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173398\n", "char_count": 1660}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//POU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nand the evidence needed to arrest and charge an offender is \nusually derived from the materials seized during the execution \nof a search warrant. Whereas other squads, generally speaking, \nexecute search warrants at the culmination of their \ninvestigations. \nwas a UC of the Crimes Against Children Human \nTrafficking Unit (CACHTU) at FBI HQ and eventually an ASAC at \nNYFO. He was a huge proponent of DExT. Being DExT trained \nallowed us to conduct our own data extractions faster, but more \nimportantly, it allowed for a faster and more efficient way of \nidentifying \"contact\", or \"hands-on\", offenders and, thus, \nrescue child victims of sexual abuse before they could be \nfurther victimized. \nAfter becoming DExT certified, we received DExT equipment \nthat allowed us to image, process, and better review the digital \nfiles. The DExT training allowed us to better use FBI analytical \nprograms to review digital evidence. Being DExT certified \nallowed us to assist CART by offering an alternative for other \nsquads to use for data extractions. At the time, CART was not \nlocated in NYFO Headquarters City (HQC). CART was located in \nMoonachie, New Jersey. It could take an hour to get to the CART \nlab from the NYFO. CART evidence reviews needed to take place \nthere and it could take all day. CART eventually moved to NYFO, \nHQC. \nThe volume of data extractions we took on lessened the \nburden on CART. At least in New York, CART only had one or two \nPage 27 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173399\n", "char_count": 1550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "ONCLASSIF/ED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nexaminers who could handle data extractions immediately, and \nalmost certainly none who could respond after hours or on \nweekends. \nSince we dealt with child victims, it was, and is, \nimperative that the digital evidence be processed immediately. \nIn nearly every child exploitation investigation the digital \nevidence is quite literally the evidence to prove the crime and \nwithout a prompt review, there is no probable cause to effect an \narrest, putting the lives of child victims in continued danger. \nIt is that very risk, the risk of continued abuse, that has \nprompted the FBI to enact new policies requiring expeditious \ninvestigation into allegations of child exploitation. This \nincludes the expeditious review of evidence. \nPrior to the DExT training, triaging electronic media on \nthe site of a search warrant was not really a practice. We had \nto take digital evidence back to the office to view it and we \nrelied more on the post-search interview. After a search, we had \nto go back and arrest an offender once we found the evidence. \nThis made for a significantly more dangerous arrest because the \noffenders knew we were coming. There was also the potential for \noffender suicide. We had three offender suicides that I can \nrecall. There was also concern, based on it having actually \nhappened, that during the time it took the FBI to review seized \nmaterial, the offenders were continuing to engage in the sexual \nexploitation of minors. The DExT program sought to remedy thi \nproblem by expediting the time it took to conduct forensic \n(SC/) \nPage 28 of 106 \nUNCIASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173400\n", "char_count": 1656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nCE\n:) \nreviews, thereby expediting our ability to rescue affected \nchildren.\nNYF0 SAs \n/ \n/ \n, and I were DExT trained. SA \n(aka \nIII) was also DExT trained. \nwas the last to be trained \nwhile our squad fell under Cyber Division. At the time, I was \nthe most junior Agent on the squad. Before being DExT trained, \nall of our digital evidence was submitted to CART for data \nextractions, imaging, and processing. We did have access to the \nCase Agent Investigative Review (CAIR) system, a forensic tool \nfor data review, but the program was slow, not capable of \nhandling large evidence reviews, did not work all that well, and \ndid not do what we in the child exploitation program needed it \nto do. As a result, rather than using CAIR, Agents on the squad \nopted to travel to Moonachie, New Jersey, where CART was \nlocated, to conduct their reviews on site versus over the CAIR \nnetwork. The ineffectiveness of CAIR was no secret and was \nwidely known, and one of the reasons for the creation of the \nautonomous DExT labs. \nAfter collecting digital evidence, I would enter the \ndigital evidence into the Evidence Control Unit (ECU) and get a \n1B evidence number assigned. I would then enter a CART request \nwith a description of what forensic examinations I needed to be \nperformed and information on the device that needed to be \nextracted. Then I would submit it to CART. It could take a day \nor two to get the evidence to CART and the amount of time it \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 29 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173401\n", "char_count": 1552}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "UNCLASSIPIED//FOU0 \n(!:/) \nould take CART to process the evidence varied. It could take \nweeks or months. Once it was extracted, CART would process it in \nthe Forensic Tool Kit (FTK). We could review the data on CAIR or \ngo to Moonachie to review it. Everyone on the squad, for the \nmost part, chose to go to Moonachie. CART Digital Forensic \nExaminers Stephen Flatley and Carlos Koo eventually set up a \nspot in NYFO, HQC to do data extractions. \nEven after receiving DExT training, we used CART for things \nlike very large media dumps/extractions and encrypted files. We \nalso used them to help us with understanding what some of the \ndigital evidence was. I believe CART may have provided us \ndigital copies of the data extraction and I think it may have \nbeen on DVDs. They would have been accessible on Operational \nWide Area Network (OPWAN) as well, but we did not have OPWAN and \nwould have to go to CART to access that anyway. I do not recall \nwhat we did with the copies on DVD. CART may have checked them \ninto evidence and provided a working copy. The DExT trained \nAgents would do data dumps on everything we could like hard \ndrives, loose media, and thumb drives. At this time, telephones \nthat were seized still needed to go to CART for processing. \nIn 2015, generally if it was a device we could image, we \nwould follow this process. We would use write blockers to assure \nwe did not accidentally manipulate the original data. We would \ncreate an image of our evidence; sometimes we would use another \nhard drive. We imaged and processed the data. We had some hard \ndrives, but I am not sure where they came from. I believe HQ \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 30 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED/MONO \nEFTA00173402\n", "char_count": 1717}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nD\nent us a box of hard drives. I also believe CART may have given \nus some as well. \nWe used a forensic duplicator called a TD3, and later a TX-\n1 as well as FTK Imager, to image a device onto a hard drive and \nmake the derivative evidence. We would then make a working copy \nimage off of the derivative evidence. We would then work off of \nthe working copy. \nI am 'pretty sure the derivative evidence was cataloged and \nplaced in the NYFO ECU if that was the policy, but if that was \nnot the policy we would not have done that. The DExT Program \nprovided us with Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAIDs). \nThese RAIDs were to be used to house our working copy evidence \nimages. I initially advised the interviewing SSAs, once we ran \nout of hard drives for derivative evidence, we were instructed \nto use the RAIDs and that these instructions came from either a \nsquad mate or my supervisor. This is true, as it was the SSA and \nthe case Agent for our squad's Group II whose responsibility it \nwas to request and receive funding and equipment. Any requests \nthat we needed were routed through them, and the Group II case \nAgent was also one of our DExT Agents who also faced the same \nissues of not having the hard drives to create derivative \nevidence. However, I also recall these instructions were \nprovided by HQ, either our Program Manager (PM), the DExT PM, or \nboth. This may have occurred in 2012 when I went through the \nDExT program and continued over the years. As there has been a \nrevolving door of PMs, I do not recall the names of the people I \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 31 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173403\n", "char_count": 1660}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \ng\nspoke with at the time but can provide as many names of PMs who \nI can recall had been there over the years. \nTypically, the person running a Group I or Group II \nUndercover Operation (UCO) investigation and the squad SSA would \nbe the people who communicated with HQ for resources. As an \nexample, I recall in 2015, I sent an email to SA Tommy Thompson, \nwho was the case agent of our squad's Group II, asking for some \nlarge capacity hard drives with our remaining Group II funds. \nThis was one of many requests I made, which were generally \nverbal, for equipment/resources. At the time we were still \nmerged with Cyber. When we moved to the Criminal Division, our \nfunds were nearly wiped out. Sometime thereafter, III' 'I'll \nleft NYFO and became a DExT PM at FBI HQ. She would often \ncomplain about a lack of funding. \nWhen we first became DExT trained, it was much easier to \ncomply with the policy since the size of the data was \nsignificantly smaller than it is today. For example, telephone \ndumps then often fit on a DVD, or worst case a Blu-ray DVD. \nToday, DVDs are nearly obsolete as the size of data collections \nhas become enormous, requiring large capacity hard drives which \nare more expensive and harder to get. \nTo be 100% compliant with the existing policy each year, it \nwould likely require C-20 alone to purchase over a hundred hard \ndrives, and this is just one squad in one office. To ensure that \neveryone in the FBI is compliant each year, the FBI would likely \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nhave to purchase thousands of hard drives, then do this year \nPage 32 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173404\n", "char_count": 1649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \nafter year. But the FBI does not do this and the policy it \n9) \ncreated to cover search warrants decades ago has not changed, \ndespite the fact the environment the policy applies to has. \nThis is one of the several fundamental flaws that I have \nand continue to voice. If creating derivative evidence is a \nrequirement, then why does the FBI not automatically provide the \nhard drives? How can the FBI enforce a policy without providing \nthe field with the ability to comply? If, in nearly every search \nwarrant executed FBI-wide electronic media is seized, resulting \nin the need for derivative evidence hard drives, why is it then \nincumbent upon each individual squad, in each office, under each \nprogram and division, to figure out a way to obtain the funding \nto purchase them? If the FBI knows hard drives cannot easily be \npurchased in bulk, and that there are security requirements on \nwhere the drives must be manufactured, why does the FBI not just \npurchase them for us rather than place that nearly impossible \nburden on us? \nIn approximately 2017 I took over as case Agent for our \nsquad's Group II. As the case Agent I was able to use Group II \nfunds to make purchases, which were obligated to us through \nCACHTU. \nI was running out of hard drive space for derivative \nevidence and of storage space in general. The PMs told us buying \nhard drives in bulk was a problem. The stores had a capacity \nlimit, but I was advised to try anyway but was not successful. I \nwould purchase the drives on Amazon, like I was instructed to do \nPage 33 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEFTA00173405\n", "char_count": 1638}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(—/li y HQ, until my covert account was shut down by Amazon since the \npurchasing of large quantities of hard drives was flagged as \nsuspicious. We were also purchasing hard drives from New Egg, \nlike we were instructed to do by HQ, specifically SSA Heath \nGraves who was the DExT PM, because they could sell bulk (10 or \nmore) hard drives, but I was later told by someone in the \nProcurement Unit we could not use New Egg. This left us with \nvery few options for buying hard drives and despite voicing \nthese issues, no one at HQ offered a solution. In speaking with \nother Agents across the FBI, I learned this was a common \nproblem. I went to CART who gave us what hard drives they could \nspare. I specifically sought assistance from senior CART \nTechnician Steven Flatley on a regular basis and aside from \nseeking his expertise, I constantly bothered him for hard drives \nand other needed items. \nIn 2017 I began to gain a voice among many FBI Child \nExploitation circles. I took over our squad's Group II UCO, and \nalmost immediately converted it into a Group I. This conversion, \nwhich allows for the use of sensitive techniques, was done due \nto my desire to enhance our undercover capabilities and increase \nour effectiveness by using some of the most robust undercover \ntechniques available at the time. While every undercover \noperation must be approved every six months in front of the \nCriminal Undercover Operations Review Committee (CUORC), because \nours was now a Group I, it also had to be presented up through \n15 \nCACHTU and approved by the AD. During the CUORC, I brought up \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 34 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FO4O \nEFTA00173406\n", "char_count": 1691}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n( i\n)the funding issues. In the funding section we discussed what we \nspent and what we anticipated to spend. During my time as the \ncase Agent for my squad's Group I, my squad's statistical \naccomplishments increased exponentially. The number of \nundercover sessions conducted by my squad increased by 198% in \nthe four years after I took over the NYFO child exploitation \nprogram compared to the four years prior. This meant an increase \nof approximately 2000 undercover sessions in the same four-year \nspan. More significantly, however, was how I tasked undercovers \nand provided direction to ensure the program worked to identify \nthe most vulnerable of the exploited children; and set out to \nrescue them. The results cannot be overstated in that the lives \nof hundreds of children were saved. While I am personally \nresponsible for saving the lives of hundreds, many hundreds, if \nnot thousands more were saved because of how I managed and \ndirected the child exploitation program. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nIn 2018 I did a five-week temporary duty assignment (TDY) \nat CACHTU. My former SSA, Sean Watson, was the UC there. My job \nwas to call every VCAC Group I and Group II UCO Case Agent and \nask questions about the issues they were having and to provide \nrecommendations on how to better the program, how CACHTU could \nbetter assist the field, things that needed improvement, etc. I \nlearned a lot about the issues affecting the entire child \nPage 35 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173407\n", "char_count": 1525}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n@I) \nxploitation program and, while there were some differences in \nthe issues facing some offices over others, there were a number \nof common issues that impacted every office. These issues \nlargely dealt with lack of guidance, direction, training, \nequipment, DExT support, funding, and personnel. I drafted a \nsummary of the calls I made and created a section for complaints \nfrom the field in reference to DExT and provided my assessment \nto CACHTU leadership. One of the many takeaways was that nearly \nevery office had different understandings of and methods of \ncomplying with policy and guidance. The lack of and often \nconflicting guidance and policy both from CACHTU and from \nindividual field office chains of command had led to each field \noffice having to adapt their ways and creating a complete lack \nof consistency across the FBI. This summary was also provided to \nthe interviewing Agents, and I can make it available to whomever \nneeds it. \nThis same assessment, as well as additional details were \nalso provided to Bryan Vorndran, who was the Deputy Assistant \nDirector (DAD) who covered child exploitation, as well as to my \nimmediate supervisor and to the supervisors/PMs at CACHTU. This \ncame as DAD Vorndran separately requested a working group of \nSubject Matter Experts (SMEs) to address the needs of the VCAC \nprogram. I explained to him how we had equipment, training, and \nguidance needs and provided my assessment both orally and in \nseveral documents. \nPage 36 of 106 \nUNCLASSIPIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEFTA00173408\n", "char_count": 1578}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nAlso in 2018, CACHTU PMs SSAs Michael Deizlak and Matthew \nChicantek were presenting to EM on the issues facing child \nexploitation investigations. SSA Deizlak and SSA Chicantek \nrequested information from me that they wanted to present. I \nemailed SSA Deizlak and SSA Chicantek, along with UC Sean Watson \nof CACHTU, the write-up I sent after my TDY as well as a \nseparate, even more detailed summary of the issues. In this \nthree-page summary I talked about the need to appropriate money \nfor equipment, as well as details regarding issues affecting the \nprogram, including the DExT, guidance, support, and more. \nOthers and I made it very clear to HQ that we did not have \nhard drives. Every now and then they would send us some and \nevery now and then they would send funds, but nothing was \nconsistent. I also informed my SSA of the need for hard drives. \nI was aware he knew we needed them and there were no funds. \nOther Agents were dealing with the same issues. It has been, and \ncontinues to be, the practice of VCAC Agents to create \nderivative copies of original evidence if derivative hard drives \nare available. However, given the long history of not receiving \neither the hard drives or the funds to purchase them, VCAC \nAgents have been left with no alternative but to store their \nderivative evidence on local storage. I would sometimes create a \nderivative copy of the evidence on the RAID tower, as well as a \nworking copy. If the evidence was a large collection of \ndifferent computer media, it was not practical to store two \ncopies (a working copy and derivative copy) on the RAID tower \nPage 37 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173409\n", "char_count": 1704}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n( illb and I would only create one. However, I very often created \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nderivative evidence copies onto either internal or external hard \ndrives that were maintained in our lab, either as having been \nrecycled, repurposed, or acquired. Since, as discussed, we did \nnot have a surplus of hard drives nor did we often have the \nfunds to purchase them, I used ones I was able to get or hard \ndrives that had been repurposed. However, it often was the case \nwhere I maintained the derivative evidence of several \ninvestigations on a single hard drive. This was due to the \nscarce nature of the hard drives, and the fact that I did not \nwant to waste the extra storage space that was free if a \nparticular case only took up a portion of the hard drive. As \nresources were hard to come by, I maximized the resources I did \nhave. These derivative evidence hard drives were separate and \napart from the evidence copies maintained on our RAIDs or \nservers. I was not able to do this for every investigation, due \nto the limitations discussed, but when feasible it was done. \nThis was my way of going out of my way to create derivative \nevidence as often as I \nI have located some of \nmaintained in the C-20 \ncould, despite not having the resources. \nthese hard drives that are still \nlab, and photographs of them have been \nprovided to the interviewing SSAs. \nWhen I was unable to create true derivative evidence to be \nchecked into ECU or the derivative evidence \nconsidered the working copy of the evidence \nas the derivative copy. Regardless, all the \ndescribed above, I \non my RAID or server \nevidence copies had \nPage 38 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173410\n", "char_count": 1701}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "IINCLASSIFIED//FO00 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n\"hash-verification\" logs to ensure the copy was a bit-for-bit \nimage of the original. Additionally, the forensic programs we \nused were designed to prevent changes to the evidence, so there \nwas never a possibility that the evidence copies could be \naltered. \nI have various correspondence with HQ advising there was a \nlack of funding. This not only affected us getting hard drives, \nbut also various other things. Phung provided us with more RAID \ntowers for storage and instructed us to use the storage to meet \nour needs. I do not recall her exact words, but I understood her \ndirections to mean I could use the RAID towers for the creation \nof derivative and working copy evidence. \nI also learned funds were available, but not designated for \nthe purchase of the hard drives. Money was either not there or \nwas allocated to something else. I spoke with Heath Graves who \nwas the DExT PM and then Jim Harrison who is the current DExT \nPM. \nIn June 2023, I proposed an idea to SSA Seamus Clarke and \nASAC Spencer Horn regarding how to address the issue of handling \nderivative evidence since the long-standing process of using \nexternal media to store derivative evidence was no longer \npractical. \nand \nliked my idea and encouraged \nme to reach out to the ECU to find a way to pitch the idea. \nI reached out to Supervisory Administrative Specialist \n(SAS) Arlene McKenna, who oversees the NYFO ECU. SAS McKenna \nalso liked my idea and stated any changes in the evidence \nPage 39 of 106 \nIINCLASSIFIED//FOII0 \nEFTA00173411\n", "char_count": 1574}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nguidelines or policy would have to come from the Field Evidence \nProgram (FEP) of the FBI's Laboratory Division (LD). SAS McKenna \nprovided the name of the FEP's Supervisory Management and \nProgram Analyst (MAPA), Adeline Joseph, and suggested I reach \nout to her. \nOn 06/07/2023, I spoke with MAPA Joseph via FBINET Skype \ncall. I discussed with MAPA Joseph the issue with the current \nprocess, which was feasible years ago when the size of \nelectronic evidence was significantly smaller. In those days, \nderivative evidence was stored on DVDs and in extreme cases, a \nblue-ray DVD or thumb drive. However, in recent years the size \nof electronic evidence seizures has increased dramatically, \nrequiring hard drives to be able to accommodate the data. \nI explained that while I personally have never had an issue \nobtaining DVDs, I could not say the same about hard drives. I \nexplained that while the technical environment the ECU \npolicy/guidance is based on has changed, the FBI's \nguidance/policy around it has not. This has created the very \nissue which is part of this inquiry; the frequent inability to \nabide by the guidance/policy. I stated that it has become \nincreasingly difficult for the field to be in compliance with \nthe existing guidance/policy since the field no longer has the \nresources to be compliant. \nI offered to help figure out another process for \nmaintaining derivative evidence, as I believed it was a waste of \nmoney and resources to purchase expensive hard drives for \n8 \nPage 40 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173412\n", "char_count": 1601}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n( R\n)derivative evidence, which will just be checked into evidence \nuntil the conclusion of an investigation, just to then be \ndestroyed. I spoke with MAPA Joseph about creating reusable \nvirtual derivative storage that was stand-alone. I suggested the \nvirtual evidence locker could be a server, which could be \ncontrolled by the evidence units and that 1B numbers could still \nbe used and assigned to the folders of the derivative evidence \nit stored and proposed the use of an electronic chain of custody \nprocess to document the access of the electronically stored \nderivative evidence. I further suggested that since the \nderivative evidence copies were maintained electronically, there \nwould be no need to waste funds on hard drives that would just \nend up being destroyed anyway, and that at the conclusion of an \ninvestigation when the evidence is to be \"destroyed\", the media \nwould be deleted, thereby freeing up space for new derivative \nevidence. MAPA Joseph liked the suggestion and stated she would \ndiscuss it with her team, specifically her UC whose name I \ncannot recall. My SSA and ASAC, \nand \n, were \nboth aware of my idea and conversations and encouraged me to \nfollow-up with MAPA Joseph, which I did via email on 06/27/2023. \nThis email, which has since been provided to the interviewing \nSSAs, stated in part: \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n\"Hey Adeline, \nA couple weeks ago we had a discussion about \nauthorizing our lab to store DE on our servers, rather than \nPage 41 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173413\n", "char_count": 1553}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(2) \nthe repeated, costly, and wasteful process purchasing tons \nhard drives to store DE. The server, which would be secure, \ncontain access logs, and still require a 1B for the \nelectronically stored DE, would take the place of the \nphysical hard drives which would save money, time, and \neliminate the need to waste tons and tons of hard drives. \nI was wondering what you thought and if there is \nanything we can do to get something like this going? \nThanks so much! \nAaron\" \nMAPA Joseph responded on 06/30/2023 with the following: \n\"Good Morning Aaron, \nHope all is well. \nApology for the delayed response. We are conducting in-\nperson training this week for evidence tech's. For your \nawareness, we are working on wrapping up several projects \nfor this fiscal year. I am adding the DE idea to our \nwhiteboard to discuss this amongst the team to include all \nkey stakeholders that would be involved. If you don't mind, \nI'll send you a calendar invite so that it's on my calendar \nto circle back with you to discuss what the team decided. \nKind regards, \nAddy\" \nSince receiving this email, I have not heard back again \nfrom MAPA Joseph or anyone in her chain of command regard' \nthis issue. \n5\n) .7'\n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 42 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173414\n", "char_count": 1298}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nhave provided a recent example to the interviewing \nAgents. In this example, which took place in November 2023, \nafter the intrusion and the initiation of this inquiry, C-20 \nrequested funds for derivative evidence hard drives and were \ndenied. After requesting $2,155.62 for derivative evidence hard \ndrives, CACHTU responded to \"Please utilize cart for a resource \nfor this. We are under a CR and are very restrictive on what we \ncan approve\". C-20 then went to CART, as directed, who in turn \nstated they did not have any hard drives to spare and \nrecommended C-20 request funds from CACHTU. \nThis example further illustrates that even despite the \nintrusion and the negative attention we received regarding \nderivative evidence hard drives, the squad was again put in the \nposition of being unable to comply with policy because the FBI \nwould not provide the requisite hard drives or funding needed to \nbe compliant. \nSometime later C-20 would eventually receive some hard \ndrives but were then advised by the NYFO ISSO their hard drives \nwere out of policy and that they could not use them since the \nhard drives were not manufactured in the United States. This, \nagain, put the squad in an impossible situation with no \nalternatives being offered. It was also quite ridiculous as it \nis likely that none of our computer equipment is manufactured in \nthe United States. \nWhen interviewed by INSD, I originally stated I was not \nsure when the standard practice for C-20 members changed to not \nPage 43 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173415\n", "char_count": 1593}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(i!,) adding derivative copies to the ECU. This statement is \ninaccurate without context. The \"change\" that occurred was \nsomewhat two-fold and started when the FBI moved VCAC from the \nCyber Division to the Criminal Division and the funding we \nreceived was dramatically reduced. The other contributing factor \nwas, as discussed earlier, the increase in the size of the \nelectronic media seized during search warrants and the \nsubsequent need for significantly larger and more expensive \nmedia to house the derivative evidence. This affected many \nthings, including our ability to purchase hard drives. So, the \n\"change\" that led to our inability to regularly comply with the \nderivative evidence practice was out of our control. Despite \nthat, I personally voiced this concern numerous times over the \nyears, but it was not an issue many were willing to care about. \nEarly on, when VCAC fell under the Cyber Division, we had \nregular access to these drives, but when the program was moved \ninto the Criminal Division that changed. Despite repeated \nrequests, as well as having alerted everyone within the chain of \ncommand, we were told to figure it out. \nWe had been advised that if derivative hard drives were not \navailable, to store the derivative evidence on our local \nstorage, which is what we did. It may have been in 2016 or 2017 \nand possibly happened because we did not have hard drives. I \nbelieve we were initially getting some hard drives from DExT \nafter completing the certification course. DExT slowly went to \n(2) \nno longer providing hard drives to new DExT certified Agents at \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 44 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173416\n", "char_count": 1695}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "C\nt all. I do not know what they are teaching about digital evidence \nstorage in DExT or how to get drives, but I know from other \nAgents who have attended the DExT training more recently that \nguidance has still been to seek funding from CACHTU, who again \nhas been stating they do not have the funds. \nAs a more recent example of the FBI's funding issues, on \n11/06/2024, I had correspondences with the NYFO finance person \nEarle Long regarding a $25 bill from T-Mobile to pay for \nsubpoena return. This was a subpoena sent a while ago as part of \na child exploitation investigation and normally these are paid \nfor automatically by the FBI. In this case, as you can see in \nthe attached, it was not. According to the finance folks, the \nfunds are not available to pay this $25 for a standard \ninvestigative subpoena. I as a case Agent now have to request \nfunds be transferred from HQ on a case-by-case basis for this, \nthe most basic of investigative activities, to happen. This is \nridiculous, and underscores the fact that receiving funds for \nbasic things, even those required by policy, does not always \nhappen. I think this example is important to illustrate the \nissues with funding and paying for things that are required. In \nthis case, it was a subpoena issued pursuant to the \nidentification of a child predator. Until approximately February \n2023, the NYFO did not have a designated ISSO. This is a \nrequired position, and I think it being left unfilled \nexacerbated many of the problems that are discussed herein. I \nhave provided INSD with documentation from retired Special Agent \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 45 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173417\n", "char_count": 1694}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "ONCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nCi;il in Charge (SAC) Nicholas Bouchears who created a timeline and \nreport of his years-long request for an ISSO, which was a \nrequirement that the FBI left unfilled in the NYFO until January \nor February 2023. \nThe situation was in essence entrapment. We were required \nby policy to create derivative evidence, but we were not \nprovided with the ability to comply. Despite repeated \nacknowledgements from FBI HQ about the conundrum, solutions were \nnever provided. We were told to adapt and to figure things out, \nand we did. The result is that we got punished for it, which is \nquite insane. We should not be held accountable for a problem we \ncould not fix and were not responsible for fixing, especially \nwhen we have brought this problem to the attention of all levels \nof our leadership time and time again to no avail. \nWhen derivative hard drives were not available, we did as \nwe had been instructed by imaging the original evidence onto the \nRAID Storage or Network Attached Storage (NAS), and as \npreviously discussed, I even went above and beyond given our \nlimitations by creating derivative evidence copies of multiple \ncases onto larger internal hard drives so I could ensure I was \ndoing everything within my power to comply with the policy. At \ntimes I would create a second copy. If I made a second copy, I \nwould use one as the main copy and the other was the working \ncopy. If I did one copy, that one would be used as the working \ncopy. At times I would make multiple working copies. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 46 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nEFTA00173418\n", "char_count": 1602}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n$5 According to INSD, I advised I had not been making \nderivative copies of digital evidence and that I now believe I \npersonally made derivative copies and did whenever I was \nafforded with the requisite hard drives. \nThis is incorrect. From the beginning I have never wavered \nand have always been adamant that I had been making derivative \nevidence copies whenever possible. As I have also stated, this \nwas an FBI-wide issue that affected many Agents, including many \nin supervisory positions. The issue is not that derivative \nevidence copies were not always created, the issue is why the \nfield was not always provided with the ability to create \nderivative evidence copies. \nThe issue regarding derivative evidence that I and others \nfaced was well known to our supervisors and specifically to our \nsubstantive desk at HQ. The question for us in the field was \nwhat do we do? Do we stop investigating our cases because we do \nnot have a sufficient process for creating and storing \nderivative evidence? Of course not. Just because I, and others, \ndid not always receive the drives did not mean our VCAC \ninvestigations ceased. Of course, we had to adapt and overcome \nand felt that while we may not have been able to create \nderivative copies for all the evidence, the reasons for that \nwere well documented and out of our control. Had we, or I, \ndecided not to work cases due to the lack of derivative evidence \nhard drives or funding for them, we would have been punished for \nthat as well. Aside from neglecting work being itself an \n1\n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 47 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIND//FOU0 \nEFTA00173419\n", "char_count": 1641}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n—.) \noffense, there are other policies governing the child \nexploitation program that explicitly require child exploitation \nAgents to expeditiously conduct their investigations. It is like \nbeing stuck between a rock and a hard place, and I, and others, \nwere told by FBI leadership over the years to make do, as long \nas the cases were being properly investigated, and that is what \nwe did. \nAt no point in time have I ever improperly stored digital \nevidence at my residence. After the intrusion when the FBI's \nINSD conducted their interviews, I had been asked about \n\"evidence\" and reviewing materials from home. I acknowledged \nthat I, like everyone else, had done some work from home. \nHowever, the \"evidence\" being referred to has always been \n\"working copies\" and items that are absolutely covered under \npolicy. At no time had I taken original or derivative evidence \nhome. \nI believed that I had cleared up any misunderstanding or \nsemantics over the word \"evidence\", because that word used \nwithout a descriptor is just a generic term for evidence. The \nword has types, like a classification to distinguish what the \nevidence is such as \"original\", \"derivative\", and \"working \ncopy\". Then, there are caveats to the category of evidence such \nas \"digital\", \"general\", \"drug\", \"valuable\", etc. For example, \nwhen I review subpoena returns, I am reviewing \"evidence\", but \nCliP \nthat does not mean the evidence is \"original\" or \"derivative\", \nand unless those subpoena returns are in paper form, they are \nPage 48 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173420\n", "char_count": 1611}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ncategorized as \"digital evidence\". Nevertheless, I am authorized \nto review those from home. The same applies to chat messages \nderived from a device or having been included in a lead or \nGuardian. \nWhen discussing this with the Inspectors, I was clear that \nanything I reviewed outside appropriate facilities was working \ncopies. At no point had I ever discussed with anyone that I have \ntaken original and/or derivative evidence home or in any way in \nviolation of policy. Any assertion to the contrary is \ncategorically false. \nI have recently found a folder that I created on my FBINET \ncomputer called \"to Take home for baby leave\". This folder \ncontained items I planned to take home to work on while still \nunder the work-from-home guidance we received during the \npandemic, which is also during the time my wife gave birth to \nour twin boys. The items in this folder are generally indicative \nof other files I had reviewed from home, none of which are \noriginal evidence, derivative evidence, or CSAM. \nOther examples that have also been provided to INSD include \nan email from CACHTU SSA Jordan Hadfield which was sent to all \nVCAC OCEs. The email was sent during the pandemic when OCEs were \nworking from home and is requesting to know if OCEs were aware \nof a website contained in the email. SSA Hadfield instructed the \nQ.) \nOCEs to not use their \"HOME COMPUTER\" to access the link because \nit contained CSAM, however SSA Hadfield knew OCEs had their own \nPage 49 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173421\n", "char_count": 1564}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \n6\n \nNew York, NY \nFBI-issued misattributed laptops and phones that they could \naccess the link on from home. \nAnother example is from my supervisor at the time, SSA Sean \nWatson, who stated in an email dated 03/25/2020: \n\"I will be assigning Guardian lead(s) which can be worked \nfrom home or an alternate location. Reminder for 305 leads, \ndo NOT use personal networks to vet out 305 leads. Use \ncovert equipment with an aircard or covert cell phones.\" \nThroughout most of its existence the C-20 lab was Internet \nconnected. However, and for clarification, the C-20 lab existed \nlong before the DExT program and the misattributed Internet was \nconnected to our squad's misattributed computers. At the time, \nOnline Covert Employee (OCE) work was primarily conducted on \ncomputer-based Internet platforms whereas today, the majority of \nOCE work is on mobile-based platforms. \nBack then, we used misattributed FBI-issued desktop \ncomputers to conduct OCE sessions from the lab and adjusted our \nwork hours accordingly. As offenders began using mobile-based \napplications, OCEs were required to do the same. With the use of \nmobile applications offenders were now online and chatting \nthroughout the day, versus just when they were on their home \ncomputers. Thus, the expectation of OCEs changed to emulate that \na\nl)\nof the offenders. I do not know exactly when we received FBI-\nissued misattributed cellular telephones, but when we did, we \nPage 50 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nEFTA00173422\n", "char_count": 1523}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nalso received the authority to take them with us wherever we \nwent if we were engaging with CSAM offenders. In fact, OCEs have \nlong been encouraged to communicate with offenders at random \nhours of the days and on weekends, to send offenders benign \nphotographs while on vacation, at events, etc.; all to better \nlegitimize the OCEs and help to dispel any fear offenders may \nhave that the OCEs are law enforcement. \nWhen we became DExT certified, our computers were not \nconnected to the Internet except when we needed to update \nsoftware, or some other Internet required task. As the years \nwent on, the need for our DExT computers to be connected to the \nInternet grew. As discussed, HQ was aware of this and at times \neven promoted programs that required this. Additionally, two \nagents from C-20 and our SSA had all gone down to CACHTU to \nbecome SSAs and the UC respectively, and they were aware of this \npractice and need both from having worked on C-20 as well as \nfrom their positions at CACHTU. Lastly, as previously discussed, \nat the time of the intrusion our squad had been participating in \na CACHTU pilot program, which included several other VCAC squads \nfrom across the FBI and required the computers to be connected \nto the Internet. \nRegardless, our lab has always been \"stand-alone\", meaning \nnone of our computers were connected to any FBI systems. \nAdditionally, our lab was \"misattributed\" and able to be used in \ncovert capacities and to access websites that could contain \nChild Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM). \nPage 51 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173423\n", "char_count": 1631}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nInitially, in approximately 2012, the C-20 lab was not \nconnected to the Internet, but at the time we had little reason \noutside of software updates to be connected to the Internet. \nSeveral years later that changed as the advancement in our \nsoftware and capabilities grew, requiring our computers to be \nInternet-connected. The only guidance or direction we received \nat the time was that our Internet-connected DExT computers not \nbe connected to a FBI network, but that has changed and we have \nreceived mix-messages with some guidance telling us not to \nconnect our machines to the Internet and other guidance telling \nus we can if we use misattributed Internet. Confusing the matter \nmore has been the implementation of software and programs that \nrequire us to be connected to the Internet. When OTD was brought \nin to bring the C-20 lab back online after the intrusion, they \npromised FBI EM and the NYFO it had a sensible solution, however \nnine months later and thousands of dollars spent by OTD in \nequipment, their solution was abandoned. I have learned that \nthere were differing opinions in OTD about what to do and how to \ndo it, with the OTD executives promising outcomes that the OTD \nengineers knew to be unattainable. One OTD engineer in \nparticular vented to me personally his frustrations that OTD \nmanagement is promising things they knew they could not deliver \non. \nEven FBI HQ implemented investigative steps that required \nDExT labs to be Internet-connected, such as the method that was\nused to transmit CSAM to the National Center for Missing and \nPage 52 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nEFTA00173424\n", "char_count": 1670}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FO17O \ne\n)  Exploited Children (NCMEC), whereas previously it had been to do \nso via a storage media. Later, the FBI created the \"SIFTS\" \nprogram which was an online portal for CSAM transmission. As an \nexample, the FBI's guidance on using SIFTS has been provided to \nINSD which includes a section that DExT machines must be \nconnected to the Internet to use SIFTS. \nIn approximately 2022, CACHTU advised the field that the \nlicensing method for one of our most used programs, \"Axiom\", was \nmoving from dongle-based to cloud-based. CACHTU wanted to pilot \nthe cloud-based method and elicited the assistance of five or \nsix VCAC squads from across the FBI to do so, one of which was \nour squad. This pilot program, which began prior to our \nintrusion and continued well after, required the DExT computers \nto be connected to the Internet. It allowed us to check out a \nlicense when we needed to, but to do so, we needed to stay on \nthe Internet to use it. There was some level of security \nprovided by the switch box and some on the NAS itself. \nThe computers, NAS and RAID tower storage that contained \nCSAM were then all connected to the Internet. We received \nguidance from CACHTU, specifically from the DExT PMs, to disable \nthe antivirus to use the Axiom since the antivirus would flag \nthe program. I believe this came from Tommy, Heath, and CART, \nand others. Squad C-20 did not know how to set up the Internet \nand the switch box. We reached out to Computer Scientists (CSs) \nand CART and received some help, and I have numerous emails that \nI can provide to support this if requested. I do not know \nPage 53 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEFTA00173425\n", "char_count": 1697}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n@ \nanything about networking and how to set up networks, nor did \nanyone on my squad. The CSs also did not know. I believe someone \nfrom the Operational Technology Division (OTD) told me to Google \nit and stated that since we were not using OTD's OPWAN, they \nwould not help us. Ironically, we were also told we could not \nuse OPWAN since the building our squad was in did not have an \nOPWAN connection, plus the size of our dataset would have been \ntoo much for OPWAN to handle. \nNetworking is not a DExT function and is not in my skill \nset, so I did not even know what questions to ask. As I have \nstated numerous times, I am not, nor was anyone on my squad, a \nSystems Administrator. Despite the INSD having labeled us this \nin their post-intrusion report, we are not. We have never \nreceived any training or instruction on systems administration, \nand labeling us as such implies knowledge we did not possess. \nThe off-the-shelf security that was in place was what we \nwere using. I and the squad asked everyone we could think of for \n- CART, the CSs, OTD, the Office of the OCIO, Management \nhelp \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nInformation Systems (MIS), etc. - however, all were of no help. \nCS Jim Walsh helped us set up some of the equipment. \nChristian Idsola from CART also helped, as did another CART \nemployee whose name I cannot recall. I also asked SSA Francisco \nAtrusa, the supervisor of the NYFO CART squad, for assistance. \nSSA Artusa responded back, asking Anthony Broderick, the CART \nnetworking and actual systems administrator, for help. Broderick \nresponded that I should read the user manuals and that he did \nPage 54 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173426\n", "char_count": 1701}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nCgnot have the \"bandwidth\" to support us. These communications, \nalong with many others, occurred in writing via email and I have \nprovided them to investigators. \nIn our desperation to find someone with a networking/system \nadministrator background to help us, we put out a Confidential \nHuman Source (CHS) canvass for assistance with our network \nthrough our CHS Coordinator. This fact alone should highlight \nthe lengths we went to in order to get our lab networked \nsecurely and correctly. The desperate act of issuing a CHS \ncanvas for assistance should also convey the utter lack of \nassistance we received from within the FBI. We also reached out \nto OTD, Counterterrorism Division (CTD), and Cyber Division \n(CyD) for help, but none were able to. An Agent on a CT squad \nsuggested that they had a Counterterrorism (CT) CHS who could \ncome over and look at the network, however the CHS advised \nnetworking was not his/her specialty. The CHS was a former \ncontractor for the FBI and had a Top Secret (TS) clearance and \nwas not able to assist. \nOur request was simple - to network the few standalone \ncomputers in our lab. However, no responsible entity within the \nFBI would assist, so we had to reach out to friends and \ncolleagues to help on their own. While their help was valuable, \nnone of our volunteered help came from anyone who was a network \nor systems administrator, and the FBI's network or system \nadministrators would not assist. The various networking and \nsystem administrative units in the FBI handle FBI networks, and \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 55 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173427\n", "char_count": 1639}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n®the few that handle covert/misattributed networks do not handle \nCSAM networks. Despite the irrelevance of the latter from a \ntechnical perspective, CSAM is off putting and no one wanted to \nassist and CACHTU did not know what to do. In fact, CACHTU was \naware that networking CAC computers was an issue affecting so \nmany other FBI Offices that PMs Stacie Kane, Brenden Roth and \nJames Harrison encouraged us to find the solution so that it \ncould be emulated across the other VCAC DExT labs. In fact, our \nlab, and the improvements we had been making on behalf of the \nVCAC program, contributed to several end-of-year \"gold\" ratings \nby CACHTU. \nAs an example, in September 2022, SSA Brendan Roth, who was \nthe PM for the Northeast region for CACHTU, requested that I \nassist the Albany Field Office VCAC squad who needed to enhance \ntheir program. FBI Albany was trying to figure out how to \nreceive funds for their upgrades, and SSA Roth knew that I in \nthe NYFO had been through this process and asked that I assist. \nAfter SSA Roth and I spoke over the phone, he sent an email to \nmyself and SA Brian Seymore from the Albany Field Office stating \nin part the following: \n\"Aaron \nPer our convo about Group I UCO funds for CSAM review \nstations - CC'ing Brian from Albany. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nMaybe you guys can talk and answer questions he had about \nthe process and questions you were asked about it from <44II> \nlegal/procurement. \nPage 56 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173428\n", "char_count": 1516}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nN \nSSA Brendan Roth Criminal Investigative Division I Violent Crime \nSection Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking Unit \n(CACHTU)\" \nIn 2017, our lab flooded after the temperatures in the lab \ngot so hot they triggered the sprinkler system. This devastated \nour lab and ruined thousands of dollars' worth of DExT \nequipment. After this flood, some of the equipment was replaced \nby CACHTU and CART was able to salvage some of the equipment. We \nmoved the C-20 lab to the 10th floor in December 2020. I \nreceived approval on 12/22/2020 to purchase switches, NASs, \ncables and hard drives. This equipment was purchased with \n$34,000 in CACHTU funding, which also supplied the Long Island \nResident Agency (RA) with similar equipment. This was less of an \nupgrade and more of a replacement for the lost equipment, but it \nset into motion our upgrades. \nCACHTU PM Leslie Adamczyk was a former NYFO Agent and \nmember of C-20 and knew about these issues. SSA Adamczyk \nsimilarly had her DExT computer connected to the Internet and \nsimilarly did not always create derivative evidence. \nDuring the COVID pandemic there were three of us from my \nsquad who came to the office on a regular basis; myself, SA Matt \nDeragon, and SA Brian Gander. The guidance, however, was to work \nfrom home. The C-20 SSA at the time was Sean Watson. SSA Watson \nprovided guidance to work from home, in addition to the guidance \npushed by the FBI Director, our AD, and others in FBI \nmanagement. This guidance included conducting limited forensics \nPage 57 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//POUO \nEFTA00173429\n", "char_count": 1623}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nQ. om home, and CACHTU pushed out to the field temporary AXIOM \nlicenses for the sole purpose of conducting limited forensic \nreviews from home. This meant that literally the FBI was \nencouraging Agents to conduct forensic reviews, of evidence, \nfrom home. Ironically, however, I did not take advantage of this \nsince the bulk of my forensic reviews meant reviewing CSAM. Due \nto this reason I came into the office almost daily to do CSAM \nreviews. This is a fact and can be corroborated by SAs Deragon \nand Gander, as well as by checking the building access logs \nwhich will show I used my access badge to enter the building and \nthe frequency I accessed the building. Other work was done from \nhome. I looked at subpoena returns and reviewed working copy \nmaterial that did not include CSAM. Anything I took home was \ncovered under policy and was covered under the guidance being \ndisseminated. I have a Bureau-issued laptop computer that I \nutilized for these purposes. It is categorically false that I \nviolated policy by taking home CSAM, original, or derivative \nevidence. I have numerous examples of guidance put out by the \nFBI, including from the Director, CACHTU, the NYFO ADIC, and my \nSSA about working from home. I have supplied some of these \nexamples to INSD and can provide additional examples if \nrequested. \nAt the time, I was working on three cases primarily: Robert \nHadden, Darnel Feagins, and Jacob Daskal. Only one of these \ncases, Feagins, was a CSAM investigation. The Feagins \ninvestigation was the reason for my having to come to the office \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 58 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//7000 \nEFTA00173430\n", "char_count": 1664}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nduring the pandemic, which eventually changed when, after \nindicting him, Feagins fled, turning the investigation into a \nfugitive matter. The Daskal and Hadden investigations were \ncontact offense, or \"hands-on\" offense, cases that did not \ninvolve CSAM. \nTo conduct the investigation for Hadden I was doing web-\nbased interviews from home and writing FD-302s and subpoena \nreturns which were all non-CSAM-related. For the Daskal case I \ncompleted a 68-page DExT review FD-302. I took metadata-related \ninformation. Some of it was exported from Daskal's computer, but \nnone of it was CSAM; rather it was data to prove he and the \nvictim of the investigation were together in various locations \nand certain dates and times. For the Darnel Feagins case I was \nsplitting the work. I did not do CSAM-related work from home. I \ndid not take any storage devices home that were original or \nderivative evidence. Any copies or data I took home would have \nbeen working copies. It would have been impossible for me to \ntake derivative copies home in general. \nI was coming into the office every day to do my CSAM \nreviews. I do not believe I was doing any OCE work at the time \nsince we were instructed not to. We were trying NOT to create a \nneed for Agents to have to run out on warrants or to conduct \nKnock and Talks (KTs) due to COVID unless it was an emergency -\nBUT I and other OCEs would do OCE work from everywhere, \nincluding home, but all of that was covered under our Group I \nauthority. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 59 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173431\n", "char_count": 1588}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nAccording to INSD, during my original interview I advised \nthat Agents believed they were authorized to conduct OCE work \noutside FBI space and that we now have Electronic Communication \n(EC) authority to conduct OCE work outside FBI space. This is a \nslight mischaracterization of my statement as to this day it is \nour belief that we always had authorization to conduct OCE work \noutside FBI space. The reference to now having an EC was in \nresponse to additional questioning by INSD and did not change \nthe fact we had appropriate authorization prior to the EC. For \none, how we functioned as OCEs, to include when and where we \nconducted OCE sessions, had been directed to us through FBI \ntrainings, FBI HQ, and our supervisors. Second, the authority \nwas written in our bi-annual Group I/Group II renewals, which \nare reviewed and approved by the entire chain of command and \ninclude the NYFO Chief Division Counsel (CDC) and the Office of \nGeneral Counsel (OGC). \nRegarding anything I took home to work on, I have always \nbeen certain about what I knew I was authorized to take home and \nwhat I was not. As was authorized, I would take home removable \nstorage devices like a hard drive or thumb drive that contained \nworking-copy data and/or other material that would allow me to \nwork from home. Some of my devices, including my FBI-issued OCE \ntelephone and my FBI-issued and encrypted laptop, may have had \nCSAM on them, but as an OCE who was authorized to conduct OCE \nsessions from outside FBI space, which included my home and \nelsewhere, taking these devices home was covered by policy as \nPage 60 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//POUO \nEFTA00173432\n", "char_count": 1698}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nthese devices were used in authorized and capacities. The OCE \n(Q3 \nand UCE polices allow for these things since communicating as an \nOCE with VCAC offenders can require around-the-clock \ncommunication. There is absolutely zero truth to any notion that \nI violated any of these policies. I was quite literally doing my \njob, which as a VCAC OCE, meant taking my OCE laptop and \ntelephone with me outside FBI space to communicate with CSAM \noffenders. The communications with these offenders and any CSAM \nI collected as a result, were maintained in accordance with \npolicy and that is just a fact. \nAs for any evidence review I did from home, all was done in \naccordance with policy and guidance. Any evidence I did take \nhome was all authorized under policy - it was not original or \nderivative and was only working copies. As a matter of \nlogistics, I would not have been able to take home original or \nderivative evidence as I do not have the technical equipment at \nhome to review them on my laptop. Rather, in what I believe was \nin accordance with policy and guidance, I had copied select \ndatasets from evidence sources onto a thumb drive or external \nhard drive as working copies, which I would review at home. The \noriginal device would have been checked into the NYFO ECU and a \ncopy would have been on the C-20 lab server. \nThe lab server had to be connected to the Internet to send \nCSAM to NCMEC. As mentioned previously, the official way to send \nCSAM to NCMEC is to use the SIFTS online portal. They will \nPage 61 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEFTA00173433\n", "char_count": 1616}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \ni:),,X ccept hard drives, but it is not what they want, and NCMEC has \nbeen moving to eliminate the use of hard drives altogether. \nThere are conflicting policies, and I brought this up while \nassisting in revising the policy. I am one of, if not the only, \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nCourt-certified expert witness for the entire FBI for child \nexploitation.During COVID, the concept of remote working was \nbecoming a thing. The idea came up during COVID to be able to do \nremote work since that is what the FBI \nThe idea was continued by hearing from \nenforcement, including some within the \nversions of remote computing to access \nwas beginning to promote. \nother members of law \nFBI, that they were \ntheir forensic labs \naway, such as on TDY or at a conference. The intention was \nusing \nwhile \nnot \nto work from home, per se, but rather to increase the efficiency \nof the forensic review process, as well as to assist the RAs and \nother FBI offices with their reviews, rather than having to use \n\"Bu-mail\" to send working-copy evidence back and forth or to \nrequire travel to another office to provide assistance. The \nsteps of imaging and processing evidence before it is ready for \nreview can sometimes take days. During this time there is little \nfor the DExT Agent to do while the computer is doing its \nprocessing work. What little there is for the DExT Agent to do \nis often what separates one stage of this process from the next. \nSo, if a stage is completed on a Saturday, it will not move to \nthe next stage until the DExT Agent does the very \nneeded to proceed, which may not happen until the \nMonday. This may then kick the process off to the \nfew things \nfollowing \nnext stage, \nPage 62 of 106 \nUNCLASSIBIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173434\n", "char_count": 1764}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \ntbut now the Agent may have to wait several hours or longer for \nthe next step. In order to be more efficient and to allow this \nprocess to begin on a Friday, for example, and be ready for \nreview on a Monday, I believed the idea of remote computing was \na reasonable solution. Remote computing would have allowed for a \nthe DExT Agent to remote in over a weekend to initiate the next \nstage of a process so that the process took advantage of the \nweekend to conduct the lengthy steps so that by Monday it was \nready for review. The downloading process could take a while, \nbut the steps between the process were three or four clicks. If \nI knew a hard drive was going to take a day or so to process, \nand the next process would also take a day or so, and it would \nnot have been practical to go into the office just to click a \nbutton. Especially in a densely populated area like New York \nCity during COVID. The idea was to be able to remote in to the \nserver and tell the computer to move on to the next step of the \nprocess. \nThe idea of using remote computing was reinforced a few \nyears ago when I attended training provided by the International \nAssociation of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) during \nwhich we went through basic computer forensics. I heard about \nlaw enforcement use of Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) \nthere. I believe RDP was being used in the Bureau, but I am not \nsure for what purpose or on what devices. I spoke with several \nothers in the FBI about RDP, including the DExT PM at the time, \nSSA Heath Graves, who mentioned he had either been using it or \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 63 of 106 \nUNCLASSIPIED//POU0 \nEFTA00173435\n", "char_count": 1699}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \noyed around with the idea. SSA Graves mentioned to me that \nsetting it up and using it was fairly easy, and that all I \nneeded to do was follow Microsoft's directions as they were \npretty easy to follow. SSA Graves knew what my intentions were \nand thought it was a great idea to be able to remote in to cut \nthe lag time of our processing. \nThe first use of remote accessing software by the FBI that \nI recall was over ten years ago. Before then, OCEs using desktop \ncomputers to conduct their sessions had to be in the office; \noften having to work night shifts to chat with their offenders. \nI know that many OCEs used an application called Team Viewer \nthat predates RDP to access their OCE desktop computers remotely \nfrom home. I recall Team Viewer was something that was pushed by \nHQ, however I never used it as an OCE. I also recall that when \nwe were toying with using RDP I asked SSA Graves about Team \nViewer and I remember him saying RDP was better and more secure. \nI do not remember if he said he had used it or not, but I do \nrecall specifically that he suggested RDP over Team Viewer. I \nthink this is important because remote access applications such \nas Team Viewer and RDP have been used by the FBI for years, have \nbeen known by, and even recommended by HQ. \ni thought the C-20 system was secure. I attempted to access \nthe C-20 computer lab through RDP. I believed the lab's security \nprevented me from remoting in. I had no idea that in so doing I \nhad opened the lab's RDP port and that it had worked. I could \naccess the port from in the lab, but once outside the lab, I was \nPage 64 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173436\n", "char_count": 1696}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n8\n.)1 \nnable to gain access to the network. I thought the security was \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ndoing what it was supposed to. I was later advised that the RDP \nconfiguration was mostly correct and that I was a step or two \naway from having set it up successfully and securely. I was not \ntrying to be lazy or silly, I wanted to be more efficient in the \ndownload process. Sometimes I would start a process on a Friday \nonly to come in on Monday and see it crashed and needed to be \nrestarted. RDP access would have allowed me to see the crash and \nrestart the process remotely. \nI believe enabling remote access to the C-20 computer lab \nwas a good initiative, but it was not executed properly. It was \nall about improving our abilities to protect children. I had \nasked for help, but I did not get it, but I did get \nencouragement. I was going off the guidance I received from the \nDExT PM and CACHTU supervisor, SSA Heath Graves, who advised me \nto follow the instructions off the Microsoft website. While I \ncannot recall verbatim what he said, I am positive it was in the \nrealm of the Microsoft instructions regarding RDP to be \"very \ngood\" and \"easy to follow\" or something to that affect. My heart \nand mind were in the right place, but I lacked the knowledge for \nnetworking and was not a system administrator. Yet I was tasked \nwith setting up a network I did not know how to set up, and \ndespite repeated requests for help, I was denied. I should not \nbe held accountable for the FBI's systemic failure, especially \nwhen the FBI encouraged me and approved me to enhance our lab. I \nthought my attempt to remote into the C-20 lab did not work \nPage 65 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173437\n", "char_count": 1725}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(\n1 because the security settings were effective. I asked for help, \neven help with RDP, from nearly every unit in the FBI that had \nanything to do with networking, DExT, etc., including CACHTU and \nthe DExT PMs. All I got in response was encouragement in what I \nwas doing, but no form of technical assistance. The FBI cannot \nsay it did not know what I was trying to do, because the FBI did \nknow, and the FBI was suppurative of my efforts. \nI attempted to set the RDP up in either the Fall/Winter of \n2022 or early 2023. The intrusion happened on Super Bowl Sunday \nof 2023, and I discovered it the very next day, on Monday. \nI provided the interviewing SSAs with an outline I drafted \non 02/13/2024 of the intrusion situation which I read out loud. \nI signed the copy of the outline and provided it to the \ninterviewing SSAs to add to my statement. The following is from \nmy outline. This portion of my statement is written as it \nappears in the physical outline: \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nSeamus, below is a timeline of what transpired today, \nnoting that we had no idea this was a potential hack until late \nthis afternoon. Given the potential that someone accessed our \nlab to do this, and that the issue may have been with the way we \nsetup our network, below is also a little insight to the many \nattempts we've made to get the FBIto assist in both physical \nsecurity to the lab and to help with networking: \nToday's events (approx times) \nPage 66 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \nEFTA00173438\n", "char_count": 1519}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F0170 \n(;) \n-7:30am - I arrived at the office and noticed my Talino computer \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nhad restarted. \n-7:40am - I logged in to my Talino and a txt file popped up that \nsaid in part my network has been compromised and provided an \nemail address to contact. This file was in the \"startup\" folder \nso when logging in it opened automatically. I ran my computer's \nanti-virus software, which was up to date and active, and it \nidentified one potential threat which I attempted to remove. \nWhile this is not common, it is also not unusual given the data \nwe recover from 305 subject devices. \n-I attempted to remove the potential threat, but my \nadministrative privileges had been removed, and despite many \nattempts to gain access, I could not \n-8:30am - I reached out to Christian Idsola at CART for help, \nbut he was going to be tied up for a couple of hours \n-9:00am, I reached out to Talino for help and they walked me \nthrough some steps, but nothing worked. They then advised me of \na process to take to run antivirus software against my Talinos \nOperating System hard drive, which took some time but identified \nthe likely source of the threat, which was attributed to a \nforensic program we use called Axiom. The threat was \ndeterminedq )\nto possibly be a \"booby-trap\" left by a subject (who is a \nPage 67 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173439\n", "char_count": 1383}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \ntiShacker) that was tripped when the Axiom forensic program ran \nacross it. After this discussion it was believed that was the \nreason for the issues and we then began working on a solution, \nwhich seemed likely to fix my issue. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n-Around this time I also noticed our main server was down, but I \ndidn't think too much of it since we just added a new switch and \ntried to configure some ports to run at different settings to \nincrease our bandwidth. I assumed at the time the lack of access \nwas a result of incorrectly applying the settings to \nthe \"LAG\" and \"BOND\" configurations of the switch. I was able to \nsee that according to the switch, the server seemed to be \nconnected just fine, so I spent some time troubleshooting it. \n-Around 11:00am or so I was finally on instant message chat with \nthe makers of the server, Synology, who had us conduct some \ntests and they ultimately concluded that a possible issue was a \ndefective hard drive in the server. This was a problem sine the \nserver is \"raided\" and finding the defective hard drive was a \ntime-consuming and difficult task, but several of us began our \nattempts. \n-3:00pm - Is when Christian Idsola and Lewis LNU from CART came \nover to help. After a bunch of triage and testing we could not \nfigure out why we could not \naccounts it was working. \nconnect to the server, since by all \nPage 68 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173440\n", "char_count": 1445}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n0\n \n-We then noticed that our other servers (NAS1 and NAS2) were \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nalso not working properly, although we were able to access their \ncontrol windows, unlike with the Synology server. After some \ndigging around we noticed the folders that contain our data was \nmissing. Initially we thought this was due to a firmware \nissue since Christian and I had dealt with that in the past and \nresembled the same issue. \n-Around 3:30pm or so we located the log files and began combing \nthrough, which is when we noticed strange IP activity that took \nplace yesterday from two IP addresses. The activity included \ncombing through certain files pertaining to the Epstein \ninvestigation. I reached out to one of the case agents to see if \nthey were in the office yesterday, thinking that maybe they \ninadvertently changed a setting on the NAS or if they noticed \nanything strange about them. \n-Around 4/4:30pm we dove into the IPs and checked all of our \ncomputers to see which had the IPs in question. One computer, \nour discovery computer, matched one of them and is located in a \nroom next to the lab, The other IP is one we don't recognize, \nbut is the same address as the IPson our network, leading us to \nbelieve it was a computer that accessed our network somehow. We \nwere not able to identify the computer, but it had to have \naccessed our network either by being plugged into the network, \nor possibly by telnetting in virtually. \nPage 69 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173441\n", "char_count": 1523}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n-5:00pm - we realized we were hacked and discussed what we \nneeded to do to ensure its contained. \n-5:15pm, we immediately saved our logs and shut everything down. \nWe disconnected the Internet and ensured anything containing a \nlog file was preserved. \n-5:30pm - I began calling my SSA, Bob Whelp in Security, Jessica \nCardenas at CART, Amit Patel in Cyber. Physical Security \n-Dec, 2021 - Moved into the 10th floor lab \n-Dec, 2021 - made numerous requests for an electronic keypad \nlock on the door only to be told by the locksmith there is no \nfunding for a lock. These requests have been made numerous times \nfrom Dec, 2021 until a couple months ago, when the response was \nto make numerous copies of the key we have to the lab \nNetworking/Network Security \n-Since approx 2017 we have elicited help from CART and Cyber in \nnetworking our lab, all to no avail. Some CART and Cyber folks \nhave come over on their good graces, but they were not network \nsavvy and just tried to do what they could. Some months ago (I \ncan look up the exact date) we again requested help from CART, \nbut were told their networking person was too busy to help. This \nPage 70 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173442\n", "char_count": 1245}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nIR`leant no one with networking experience or ability was willing \nto help, so we had to figure it out on our own. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEnd of the Outline - \nOnce I realized there had been an intrusion, I called SSA \nSeamus Clarke, and Bob Welp with Security. I also called CART \nand Cyber. This all occurred the same day I found out about the \nintrusion. \nThe switch box was for the internal network. We had a \nserver rack and a server. We had a switch box, and we just added \na second switch box. We also had a misattributed Internet that \nwas connected to the OCE computers. The switch boxes were never \nconnected together. The Internet entered through a router that \nwas connected to the DExT computer and connected to the switch \nbox. I believed all were secure. \nI believed, since we had a revolving door of CSs and CART \nmembers, and since CACHTU was aware and having other offices \nemulate the C-20 computer lab, I thought we were good. \nWhen the intrusion happened, we were in the middle of \npiloting Axiom. I thought of a lot of different things to allow \nremote access. We were trying to be on the cutting edge and \nthink outside the box. We have a large set of hash files that we \nsent to NCMEC. A hash is a random string of text used to verify \nthe integrity of a file. Hashes are also like a fingerprint, in \nthat they are unique and can be cataloged. Regarding CSAM, all \nPage 71 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \nEFTA00173443\n", "char_count": 1462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI\n/files are \"hashed\" and those hash values are distributed \nthroughout law enforcement and public sector entities. Using \nthese hashes, CSAM can be detected since if a files hash matches \nthat of a CSAM hash, the file can be identified as CSAM without \neven having to see it. We wanted to share what we had with the \nRAs. 500 terabytes of data was gone as a result of the \nintrusion. I was able to recover about 400 terabytes of that \ndata, however, I was told to Google how to recover the data. No \none else tried to help us. \nThe OCIO Section Chief (SC), Matt Smith, was pissed because \nhe found an email I had sent prior to the intrusion requesting \nassistance that no one had responded to. I spoke with SC Smith \nwho believed this was part of systemic failures. We asked for \nhelp, and our requests fell on deaf ears. We were always \nreferred to someone else. I understand I opened the C-20 lab's \nRDP ports, but the FBI knew I was going to do this, and the FBI \nhad told me to follow the instructions on Microsoft's website on \nhow to open the ports. I was trying to make things better, and \nmoreover CACHTU and other HQ and management entities knew what I \nwas doing and supported me. The policies are not easy to find, \nare simply not available on the FBI's site, and often contradict \none another. In fact, I have examples I can share of attempts to \naccess policy just to find it isn't there. \nFBI HQ Criminal Investigative Division (CID) DAD Jose Perez \nhas since acknowledged the policy for the lab was vague or non-\nexistent, which is something he advised EM of in an email that I \nPage 72 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173444\n", "char_count": 1690}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(R)\nprovided to the interviewing Agents. This email was sent on \n2/28/2023, approximately two weeks after the intrusion. DAD \nPerez was emailing my, now retired SAC Michael Brodack, IIII \n, and Richard Ruggieri, who I believe then was the Section \nChief of Cyber. As this email is worth noting, DAD Perez stated, \nin sum, the following: \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \n\"Following the incident in NY we identified a few other \noffices who were operating a similar set-up and were told \nto immediately disconnect from any open internet lines. \nBefore you guys stand things back up I want to know that \nOGC, OTD, OCIO opine and establish firm guidelines. \nGiven that this is affecting a few other offices as well we \nneed to provide an alternative solution to the field. \nGenerally speaking we are not opposed to a stand-alone \nnetwork to review CSAM evidence if it is not connected to \nthe internet while evidence is being stored or connected. \nI've asked OCIO to provide us with field guidance to \nspecify: 1) a list approved FBI/OTD built tools to \nfacilitate what we need (OpWan, DCAP, etc..) and/or 2) \nguidelines for an office to build their own tools or \nnetwork. \nPolicy is vague or nonexistent on this issue which we are \nworking to address with formal updates and immediate \ninterim guidance from the AD.\" \nPage 73 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173445\n", "char_count": 1378}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOTIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nFL) \nAdditionally, a few weeks after the intrusion, DAD Perez, \nwith others from FBI HQ, were visiting the NYFO on un-related \nmatters, however there was a meeting to discuss the status of \nthe intrusion which I was present for. Prior to the meeting, DAD \nPerez, whom I have known for years, approached me and informed \nme that he knew I was not responsible for the intrusion. DAD \nPerez further advised me that our lab was one of many across the \nFBI that had similar configurations. DAD Perez assured me that \nhe knew the FBI had systemic failures, that we in the NYFO were \nnot alone, that I should not worry, and that FBI HQ would help \nget our lab back up and running. DAD Perez also acknowledged me \nfor my work and stated he knew I was the kind of hard-working \nAgent that the FBI needs. \nEven as recently as November 2024 there is contradictory \ninformation being passed by CACHTU and OTD. As noted in the \nattached example \"2024-CACHTU-dext computers online for \ncellebrite\", an email was sent out from CACHTU to the field \nregarding the FBI's new method of using the cellphone forensic \nprogram \"Cellebrite\". Specifically, the guidance requires that \nDExT machines be connected to the Internet. This is along the \nsame lines as the piloting of Axiom discussed earlier. The field \nis being required to connect their DExT machines to the \nInternet, much to the opposition of other \"best practice\" \ndocuments. \nPage 74 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173446\n", "char_count": 1514}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "uNcLASS/FIE0//r0u0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI was not part of the conversations to conduct a Security \nIncident Reporting System (SIRS) report. \nI am certain, based on the statistics, that if I did not \nhave the initiative, we would not have had our successes, which \nhave resulted in hundreds of children being rescued and their \noffenders being brought to justice. I continued to receive \npraise for my work, and CACHTU has continued to ask me to review \npolicy before it is sent out to the field. I took over the Group \nI UCO and doubled its statistical accomplishments. I have \nrescued more exploited children than anyone in the NYFO and in \nmost of the Bureau. All I wanted to do was to better the Bureau. \nI did not know how to do everything right, but I always did the \nright thing and everything I did was with good intentions. I \nlove this job. I was not reckless. There was no self-interest \ninvolved. I was always trying to do the right thing. I also want \nto point out that I was twice awarded the Medal of Excellence \nfor my work, among other accolades. \nPrior to the intrusion the squad was seen as the gold \nstandard for child exploitation programs. Our end-of-year \nratings were consistently \"gold\", and we were often touted as \nbeing amongst the highest performing squads in the Bureau. Our \nsquad was responsible for hundreds of child victims being \nrescued and dozens of offenders being brought to justice. These \nimpacts are directly correlated to our DExT lab and the work we \ndid to enhance it. Even our 2023 end-of-year rating, post \nintrusion, was initially given as \"gold\" by CACHTU. CID AD Luis \nPage 75 o£ 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOII0 \nEFTA00173447\n", "char_count": 1674}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nQuesada later overturned that rating to \"yellow\", however, and \nlater still the DD, in an unprecedent move, overturned that \nrating to \"red\". \nAfter the intrusion we were directed to completely stand \nour lab down. We were directed to submit all our electronic \nevidence to CART for imaging and processing. A few months into \nthis process, I and others on my squad compiled statistics \ncomparing our effectiveness before and after the intrusion. At \nthe direction of \n, this was provided to OCIO and to \nothers in FBI EM. By comparison, after the intrusion our squad \nsuffered a 95.52% reduction in productivity. During this time \nframe, my squad had 281 electronic evidence items that needed to \nbe imaged and processed, and all but 12 of these devices had \nbeen taken to CART. Prior to the intrusion Agents on the squad \ncould begin imaging evidence they seized the same day and were \ngenerally done imaging all their evidence within a few days. \nHowever, the average completion time for CART to image devices \nwas approximately 30.5 days. This is a staggering number and is \na prime example of why the DExT program is so important and how \nmuch of an impact the DExT lab had on my squad's ability to \nswiftly and effectively conduct child exploitation \ninvestigations. \nAdditionally, this summary highlighted one very unfortunate \ninstance in which, because of the lag time at CART and the \namount of time it took CART to image and process devices, an \noffender who was a citizen of another country managed to flee \nPage 76 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173448\n", "char_count": 1615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n6\n the United States before the CART review could be completed. It \nis almost certain this would not have happened if the DExT \nreview could have taken place in the squad's lab. However, it \ndid happen, and again illustrates the significance of the lab \nand why the enhancements I made over the years, and the numerous \npleas I made for help, were so important. \nThis summary has been turned over to the interviewing \nAgents, and I can make it available again if requested. \nCompletely separate and apart from the intrusion, but \noccurring simultaneously, ApostleX is both the name of a \nsoftware company and their product. I had no previous \nrelationship with the company prior to a representative from \nApostleX visiting the FBI, NYFO to provide a presentation on \ntheir software. They were touring the United States, and \napproaching law enforcement and intelligence agencies promoting \ntheir product. They are a startup company. ApostleX reached out \nto several entities within the FBI: not just the NYFO. One of \nthe ApostleX employees is a retired agent from NYFO named Chris \nBraga. I knew Braga from NYFO as a polygrapher. In October 2021 \nBraga reached out to me and several other individuals in the \nNYFO about ApostleX. I initially did not care much about the \nproduct. They were pitching a preservation tool that was geared \ntowards CHSs. It initially did not sound relevant to what we in \nC-20 were working. Braga worked it out with others in the NYFO \nand set up a few information sessions for different NYFO \nDivisions. Our Gang squad, C-30 had an information session. On \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 77 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173449\n", "char_count": 1684}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(P.) \n10/20/2021, the C-30 SSA sent out an email to my SSA who sent \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nthe invite for the presentation to our squad. Another Agent from \nmy squad and I decided to attend. I attended what I believed was \na Bureau-sanctioned information session. \nI want to be very clear that I had no previous relationship \nwhatsoever with ApostleX. They approached the FBI, and I \ninitially declined to even attend an information session. It \nwasn't until my supervisor sent an email to our squad advising \nof the information session that I decided to attend. All of this \nis very provable from the many emails and correspondences that I \nhave provided as well as others I \nI showed up late to the NYFO \nand left early. The portion I did \nApostleX helped with CHSs' use of \ncan provide. \nApostleX information session \nsit in on talked about how \n3rd party apps. The lack of \ntechnology available to preserve encrypted apps, or self-\ndestruct communications, was a widely known issue. Self-destruct \napps cannot be recovered, which makes them very popular with \nVCAC offenders. There were no good methods to capture the \ninformation. We voiced concerns about this for years, most \nnotably during the CACHTU policy revisions in 2018, but there \nwas no fix. There is a VCAC email distribution list in which \nCACHTU supervisors are participants, and there have been \nhundreds of emails over the years of Agents voicing concerns, \nasking questions, identifying issues etc.; which include \nconcerns about this very issue. We did not have the ability to \ngo after VCAC offenders who used self-destruct apps like Wicker. \nPage 78 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED/it= \nEFTA00173450\n", "char_count": 1688}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n-.._) There were, and remain, no ways for us to preserve those types \nof communications. When conducting chat operations, depending on \nthe application being used, the OCEs are unable to preserve the \nchats with the offenders. Some applications allow for as short \nas a one second self-destruct period, meaning that after one \nsecond of viewing the chat, it is deleted and gone forever. \nThere is no forensic program in existence within the FBI to \npreserve that chat. Furthermore, these self-destruct apps are \ndesigned in such a way that if an OCE attempts to screen record \nor use a screen shot to preserve a chat they either alert the \nperson on the other end or do not allow the screenshot to be \ntaken. The Bureau's answer to this problem was not really an \nanswer. Some responses to this problem were to use another \ndevice to photograph the chats, which is problematic for a \nvariety of reasons, while other responses were for our issue to \nbe passed around. During the post-intrusion interview with INSD, \nI was advised that a solution would be to use my \"Bu-phone\" to \ntake photographs of these chats. I asked what to do with the \nCSAM that I would inevitably be taking photographs of, and the \nINSD interviewer had no answer. \nOnce ApostleX came along and I heard what their product did \nfor CHSs, I asked if it would work for encrypted chats and self-\ndestruct chats. They said it would. I left the meeting and met \nwith ApostleX after the presentation was over. When we met, we \ndiscussed if their technology would do what I described. They \nadvised they would check and get back with me. They got back to \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 79 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173451\n", "char_count": 1715}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nin early November 2021 and advised they believed they had the \nability to incorporate what I was asking for. I led the effort \nwith ApostleX, but my squad was involved. I spoke with SSA \nSeamus Clark and ASAC John Penza (retired). We saw the benefit \nof it for VCAC purposes. My bosses wanted me to explore it. It \nwas early on and we needed to do everything right. \nI believe there were a ton of Agents, throughout the \nBureau, simultaneously engaged in similar conversations with the \nApostleX company, discussing how to purchase the tool. The \nApostleX company has been to multiple FBI offices and may have \nhad conversations with Safe Streets, Cyber Division squads, etc. \nI know this because I spoke to many of these Agents who were \nalso trying to find a way to use ApostleX. I believe the \nApostleX company pitched OTD and other ADs. At one point I even \nhad an Executive Assistant Director (EAD) reach out to me \npersonally about ApostleX. \nOn 11/08/2021, ApostleX requested I sign a nondisclosure \nagreement. I reached out to NYFO CDC Tara Semos and we may have \nalso spoken with an Associate Division Counsel (ADC). The \ndecision was that we would not sign anything. We did not have \nthe position or authority. I told this to ApostleX, but I also \ntold them that we were not going to steal their intellectual \nproperty. \nPeople liked the ApostleX program. The consensus was that \nit was not a fully developed program, but that it could be \ndeveloped. \nPage 80 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173452\n", "char_count": 1557}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//POUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI know there are several programs that are used in the FBI \nthat were either made through Agent input or created entirely by \nthe Agents themselves. I use some of these programs myself, and \nsome of them have even been promoted via the VCAC email \ndistribution list mentioned above. \nAxiom is a CART-approved tool that the Bureau uses. I was \nasked to work with Axiom on how it was useful for us and what \nchanges could be made to make it better for the case Agent. With \nrespect to ApostleX, my understanding was that we were talking \nto a company that was brought in to us to fix a problem Agents \nthroughout the Bureau were routinely encountering when dealing \nwith a CHS or an OCE, namely the undetected real time \npreservation of their text chats. \nWe communicated with CACHTU who liked ApostleX, but said \nthey would not commit funding. \nIn November 2021 ApostleX was still conceptual. It was in \nthe right direction but needed to be refined. They knew from a \nbig picture standpoint what the problems were. From a technical \nstandpoint the product was a home run. \nJust as was the case with the lack of funding for hard \ndrives we discussed previously, nothing I or my squad did with \nrespect to ApostleX was done in a vacuum. We briefed all the way \nup to the ASAC (Penza) level. He did not want us to go to the \nSAC or ADIC with a problem. He wanted us to also have a solution \nbefore we briefed the ADIC. He wanted the product to be more \ndeveloped. He did not want an on-paper solution. \nPage 81 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//F40130 \nEFTA00173453\n", "char_count": 1596}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F0170 \ndi )  \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nAt no point did anyone on my squad or I sign a contract \nwith ApostleX, or with anyone else for that matter. We followed \nthe direction of the CDC, OGC, FFD, and others, including now \nretired AD Mark Gerber, with whom I had several related \ntelephone calls and who was very suppurative of ApostleX and my \ninvolvement with it. We spent months going through the Privacy \nThreshold Analysis (PTA) steps to get the Bureau to sign a \ncontract, as well as other steps and processes we were directed \nto undertake. We also never orally or verbally agreed to a \ncontract with ApostleX. It was our goal to have the FBI take on \npursuing a contract, not us. \nAt this point ApostleX was a concept and not a product. My \nchain of command had no issue with me working with ApostleX to \ndevelop the concept into a product. We were briefing our chain \nof command regularly and we even brought in our Intel \nsupervisors. We wanted to make the product useful, not only to \nus, but to other people throughout the Bureau as well. We \nbrought in CHS Coordinators, people from Intel, and people from \nthe UC program. We did not want to think singularly about our \nviolation. \nIt is required by FBI policy that we preserve OCE sessions, \nbut even to this day technology does not exist to do that. I saw \nit, and still see it, almost as an entrapment for OCEs, in that \nwe are required by FBI policy to preserve chats, yet the FBI has \nnot provided us with a means to do so. I realized just how bad \nthe disconnect from FBI HQ and the field was when someone in EM \nPage 82 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nEFTA00173454\n", "char_count": 1647}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n(g) \ntold me he thought OCE chats were automatically preserved. This \nblew me away as this could not have been further from reality \nand shows how bad the disconnect is from what FBI HQ perceives \nand the reality in the field. \nWe saw ApostleX as an opportunity to address this and other \nconcerns, follow policy, and follow the law. Current methods \ninclude all or nothing solutions, which result in \"over-\ncollection\" and create potential First Amendment issues, in that \nthey may record the communications of people who are not \ninvolved in child exploitation crimes or violating the law. \nApostleX addressed this. The support we got from the onset of \nthat vision was incredible. \nFBI HQ knew what we were doing because I discussed with \nthem the problems we were having with apps like Wicker. ApostleX \nwas already successful with apps like Telegram and they were \nworking on Signal and a few others. ApostleX engineers figured \nout how to make their program work with Signal while we were \nworking with them. They were going in the right direction, we \njust needed to guide them towards a total solution to our actual \nneeds. They were already working on trying to fix the problem \nOCEs were having in 2021. We just needed to work on how to \npreserve apps that created secret and self-destructing chats. \nThe ApostleX company was never given access to FBI \ninformation. They did not come into FBI space. We would FaceTime \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nthem. We never gave them anything that belonged to the FBI. The \nApostleX program was installed on a completely standalone \nPage 83 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED/in= \nEFTA00173455\n", "char_count": 1647}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ncomputer that was connected to a misattributed Internet line. It \nwas never attached to any FBI networks, storage containers, or \ncovert networks, very specifically including the compromised \ncovert C-20 computer lab network that was previously discussed. \nThe computer with the ApostleX program was \nwas an old computer that was going to be thrown \ncovert computer. I cannot recall if we had a CS \nof the computer or if it was provided to us with no drives and \nwe installed wiped drives. Either way, we had to install \noperating systems. The CS was Jim Walsh. The computers were \ngiven to us to use at our discretion for misattributed purposes, \nsuch as for projects like ApostleX. I do not remember if I told \nhim what the computers were going to be used for. I am not sure \nif we got the computers before or after we heard the ApostleX \nsales pitch. One event did not trigger the other, and I believed \nit did not matter as the computers were for covert use anyway. \nApostleX ran on a main computer. In our case it was the one \nwe set up. The ApostleX database resides on the computer and the \ncomputer's sole function was to run the ApostleX server. \nApostleX allowed undercover phones to connect to it. ApostleX is \na server that sits on a computer and runs in the background. \nThere is a web-based computer interface. It only works from one \nparticular computer which sits behind a Virtual Private Network \n(VPN). If I am an OCE using the Telegram app I would connect my \nTelegram account to ApostleX. There is an authentication \nprocess. We had the company add an icon that let the OCE know \nPage 84 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nin FBI space. It \naway. It was a \nwipe the drive \nEFTA00173456\n", "char_count": 1745}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n1!)\nApostleX was working in the background preserving the chats. The \nApostleX company added a small icon that showed ApostleX was \nactive. ApostleX's integration was chat application specific, so \nwe were only preserving what needed to be preserved. It started \nwith Telegram. Around the time we were told to shut down, it \nworked with Signal. We were getting close with What's App. \nAny Telegram account we wanted to preserve would be added \nto the ApostleX account. We had the ability to select what was \nrelevant and what was not. With appropriate authorization, we \ncould do an account takeover of a Subject's account. With \nApostleX there is an ability to avoid overcollection. \nApostleX was initially grabbing everything, and we would \nneed to check what to preserve. We wanted to make a parameter \nfor how long to keep information that was not checked, which \nwould then be purged. The accounts would be taken over through \nconsent or with a warrant. We were testing the capability of \nApostleX to preserve self-destructing chats. Initially, in the \ntesting environment, the disappearing chats were preserved on \nboth the sender and the receiver's telephones, which obviously \nwould not work for us. We worked with the company to address \nthat. \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nThe ApostleX company did not have the ability to access the \ndata we collected from chat applications. The only data ApostleX \nhad access to was the telemetry. I believe OCIO looked at that \nand was happy with it. SC Matt Smith from OCIO was also involved \nand sent Requests for Information (RFIs) to our local ISSO, Jim \nPage 85 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173457\n", "char_count": 1672}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n& \nckel, who reviewed ApostleX, the code, and had at least one \ncall with them that I was a part of. I believe he also had \nadditional communications with them that I was not a part of. In \nthe end, I know that OCIO's questions were sufficiently \nanswered. \nWe never went live with the ApostleX program and only \noperated it in a testing environment. We did not use active \ncases. We used dummy phones and OCEs chatting on the Telegram \napplication. We added a bunch of older OCE Telegram accounts to \ntest it out. All the accounts we used were real covert accounts. \nSome of the accounts were historical. When we synced ApostleX to \nchat application accounts, the entire history of the chat \napplication account would be pulled. The information was \nexclusively stored on the local hard drive of the computer \nrunning ApostleX. One of the Telegram accounts I used for \ntesting was about 12 years old. The test accounts I used were \nnot involved in any chat groups that were pertinent. I am not \nsure about the other folks who were testing ApostleX. I do not \nbelieve anyone cared about the accounts we used. I believe the \nhistorical data attached to the accounts had already been \nadjudicated but it is possible some of the information may not \nhave been. I cannot say there was no evidentiary data put on the \nstandalone ApostleX computer, which is routine. Many undercover \nAgents use multiple devices to access their accounts, including \nboth computer and cellular devices. Since the account originates \non their FBI-issued undercover phones, any ancillary devices \n(i)) \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 86 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173458\n", "char_count": 1673}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \n(39 \nhave no impact. I do not believe having information on the \nApostleX computer was any different than having it on any other \ncomputer. I did use a historic case to demonstrate how we could \nexport from ApostleX for discovery purposes. The case was not \nfully adjudicated at that point. I am certain the accounts we \nwere using had no impact on any ongoing investigation. There was \nlikely CSAM from the historical accounts that was extracted and \nuploaded onto the ApostleX computer when the historic accounts \nwere synced with the ApostleX program. The ApostleX company or \nanyone else could not see it, however, and this, again, was all \nknown to the chain of command including CDC, OGC, etc. \nIt took a while to set the standalone ApostleX computer up. \nWe may have hooked the computer up in December 2021 or January \n2022. We tested it intermittently for a couple of months. It \nwould be a day's long process to reconfigure things. We would \ngive feedback to the ApostleX engineers who monitored the \ntelemetry data and could see the issues with the ApostleX \nprogram from their end as we tested it. Sometimes the fixes took \na few hours or a day or two. Once they had a fix, ApostleX \nengineers would send me a document with instructions on how to \nfix the issues. Any message that was sent from the company was \ndone through Bureau email. The instructions would be written in \nthe email itself or provided verbally. Though it is possible I \nmay have used my personal telephone to communicate with ApostleX \nengineers using the video teleconferencing application, Zoom, I \ndo not recall for sure. I do believe I may have used my FBI \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 87 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173459\n", "char_count": 1739}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F000 \nSC\nI \nlaptop and possibly my OCE telephone for the Zoom calls with \nApostleX engineers, however. \nSometimes the ApostleX engineer could see me during our \nZoom calls and sometimes not. When conducting Zoom calls in FBI \nspace, we sanitized the FBI space if the engineer would be able \nto see me. We would input the instructions sent by the ApostleX \ncompany into the computer with the ApostleX program on it. I \ndon't have a background in computer coding and could not read or \nunderstand the coding I input on the ApostleX computer. I also \ndid not have a process in place for an FBI employee who could \nread the coding to review what was being sent to me. When I was \ninitially interviewed I advised I did not have someone reviewing \neverything ApostleX sent me. However, there were a couple of \ntimes I had \"tech people\", SA Robert Depresco, SA Martin \nNachman, and others, look at the ApostleX computer and to review \nthe code. I also provided the code and entire system to the NYFO \nISSO, Jim Eckle, and others from OCIO to review the code and \nsystem. Additionally, I advised OTD and FBI HQ that they could \nreview it as well. It is possible I forwarded the codes to other \npeople to look at it. \nThere was no formalized process set up for updating the \nstandalone ApostleX computer. The updates consisted mostly of \nupdating a configuration file and if I needed to change code it \nwas due to the configuration file. I made the deliberate \ndecision not to let the ApostleX company remote access into the \nstandalone AposlteX computer. During this process, I felt like \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 88 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \nEFTA00173460\n", "char_count": 1670}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F00O \n(c%) \nthe ApostleX company was a verified entity and I was working \nwith someone the Bureau invited in, and more importantly, that I \nhad approval. \nWe ran the security process through OLIO and the NYFO ISSO, \nJim Eckle, and Certified Information Systems Security Officer \n(CISSO) Robert Cavallo who were all satisfied with the setup. \nThe NYFO did not have either the ISSO or the CISSO positions \nstaffi\n1 \nl\nd urA4. February 1023,I however. My Squad SSA, branch 4SAC,I \nCDC, and CACHTU were all aware of ApostleX and of what we were \ndoing with them from the very earliest stages. There were others \nin the office who knew as well. As we progressed with our \ntesting and development of the program, others were involved to \ninclude OGC, the General Counsel himself, the Procurement \nOffice, several SACs, the NYFO ADIC, and various other leaders \nin FBI management. At a minimum, my squad SSA, branch ASAC and \nNYFO CDC all knew what we were doing. OTD was involved but not \nat this initial stage. dACHTU was aware aid the Child \nExploitation Operational Unit (CEOU) was also aware. I had gone \nback and forth with them a bit. There was communication on \n11/08/2021. \ni was passionate about this product gas a force multiplier. \nI can t assure you there was nothing \ndone in a vacuum, and I can \nalso assure you that everything I did was \"above board\". Any \nnotion otherwise is patently false. When I started working with \nApostleX on this product, my chain of command knew. My chain \ngave me the thumbs up to proceed and my guidance was to get to a \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 89 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173461\n", "char_count": 1648}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \npoint where it was functional before we briefed the ADIC. From \nthe very beginning I had the approval of my SSA, ASAC and CDC. I \nadvised my supervisor on a regular basis on what we were doing, \nwhy, and how, but he did not micro-manage me and did not know \nevery little detail that was involved. \nI reached out to CACHTU to see who I needed to work with to \nget it approved. They said if I could develop the tech, it would \nbe great. We also discussed funding, and CACHTU was not sure who \nwould fund ApostleX. They said that perhaps they could fund the \nVCAC portion of it, but that for an enterprise-wide use funding \nwould have to come from OTD or elsewhere. At the request of INSD \nI have included some email correspondence to support this. I \nalso have hundreds of pages of documents that cover nearly \neverything that involved ApostleX, from the first instance I \never heard of them through the PTAs, the correspondences with \nCACHTU, CDC, OGC, FBI EM, etc. These documents show that \neverything I did with ApostleX was above board, and any notion \nto the contrary is unfounded. \nAs I mentioned previously, in April or May 2022, I went to \nan IACIS conference and the ApostleX program was working. Leslie \nAdamczyk, who was a former squad mate and a VCAC PM, was also in \nattendance. Leslie already knew about ApsotleX since we were \ngood friends, and I was her former training Agent when she was \nin the NYFO. We spoke regularly and she knew about ApsotleX, but \nat this conference I showed her some screenshots of it. Leslie \nwas amazed and thought the greater FBI needed to have this, and \nPage 90 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIEW/FOUO \nEFTA00173462\n", "char_count": 1694}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOD \nshe said it needed to be briefed at the Program Coordinators \nli. \n(PCOR) conference, and that when she got back to CACHTU after \nthe conference, she would talk to the other PMs to see about \nadding me to the list of presenters. That was the perfect venue \nsince it would be attended by VCAC PCORs from every Field \nOffice. I was added to the list of presenters. I had \nconversations with the PMs and UC who oversaw the conference, \nand I was added to the agenda. I worked on a presentation and \nshowed it to SSA Adamczyk. She loved it. SSA Adamczyk was a PM \nfor CACHTU at the time and was coordinating with the person who \nput the conference together. I submitted a summary of what \nApostleX was and what I was presenting on. I submitted a draft \nof my presentation prior to the conference. \nwas \npresent during my presentation. \nThe PCOR conference presentation went well. There were \nnumerous questions, and I had people who called me to talk more \nabout it later. I heard from an Agent in Las Vegas whose SSA, \nMatt Schaeffer, was on an 18-month TDY to CACHTU as an Assistant \nSection Chief (ASC). ASC Schaeffer did not like the ApostleX \nprogram. The feedback was all positive except what I heard \nsecond-hand from ASC Schaeffer. During my presentation I made it \nclear ApostleX was technology that we were developing but that \nwe did not have yet. If I made comments during the presentation \nabout not following policy in my work with the ApostleX company, \nit was done as a joke. I was briefing a room full of supervisors \nas well as CACHTU about a program designed to help all their \nPage 91 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEFTA00173463\n", "char_count": 1689}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOOO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ngents. In no way, shape, or form did I ever say, in any serious \nfashion, that I violated policy and/or that I paid anything for \nApostleX. There is a possibility that I may have made jokes \nabout paying the ApostleX company a dollar for the program, but \nI did not pay them a dollar, nor any amount for that matter. \nThat would have obviously been beyond my authority as a GS-13 \ncase Agent. At some point early on there may have been a \nconversation with ApostleX about if we should pay the company a \ndollar. We were concerned that we were using a product for free. \nI took the question to Legal or maybe even my bosses. The \ndecision was made not to pay them. I remember this conversation \noccurring, but I do not recall the details since no monetary \nexchange ever took place. I began hearing rumors in March or \nApril of 2023 about things I said during my ApostleX \npresentation at the VCAC PCOR conference being taken out of \ncontext. There was never a contract between the FBI and \nApostleX, either orally or in writing, and if there had been it \nwould have been through approved channels and not with me. \nDuring the PCOR conference, ApostleX was still soliciting \nthe FBI about their product. Around that time, ASAC Penza \nretired and at some point, Spencer Horn became ASAC. The \nApostleX program was not active; there was no contract, and my \nchain of command was aware of what I was doing. The guidance to \nget the concept to a place where it was a better solution befor \nit was briefed higher up the chain of command continued after 6;',) \nPage 92 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173464\n", "char_count": 1649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nSAC Penza retired and \ncame in. The SAC was eventually \nbriefed. \nA few days after the VCAC PCOR conference I heard from \nJoanna Pasquarelli who is an Assistant General Counsel (AGC) for \nOGC. AGC Pasquarelli attended the VCAC PCOR conference and saw \nmy presentation. AGC Pasquarelli informed me we needed to stop \ntesting ApostleX immediately. She did not say we needed to stop \nworking with the ApostleX company, but to shut down the computer \nwith the ApostleX program. We did so immediately. She also \ninformed me we needed a PTA given the direction we were trying \nto take ApostleX. She also had concerns about the Fair Act and \nthe procurement process in relation to how we worked with the \ncompany. We discussed the laws about companies bidding on the \nchance to work with the FBI on a product as opposed to a single \nsource product. This process eventually included a lot of people \nfrom OGC. After sending AGC Pasquarelli my first draft of the \nPTA, she responded with, among other things, \"I read through \nyour draft PTA and you did an excellent job\". \nI spoke with CDC Semos about my conversation with AGC \nPasquarelli. I was sent a \"pony\" of the PTA which I filled out \nand returned. AGC Pasquarelli was very pleased with what I \nturned in. Both she and CDC Semos mentioned orally and over \nemail how pleased they were with the work I had done, and both \nexpressed their eagerness to help. AGC Pasquarelli, CDC Semos, \nand later numerous others including people in FBI management all \nreviewed the entire process I had been engaged in and not a \ng\n)\nPage 93 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIEWFOU0 \nEFTA00173465\n", "char_count": 1656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nsingle person expressed concern. To the contrary, all were eager \nto be involved in the project and to help get the needed \napprovals to develop and use ApostleX. There were a lot of email \ncommunications and Microsoft Teams calls. We had to make some \ncomparisons to see if there were other companies that offered \nproducts like ApostleX. \nI had spoken with OTD about the issues OCEs were having \ncapturing chats on encrypted applications and capturing \ndisappearing chats in the past. We had tried, unsuccessfully, to \nget OTD involved prior to this process. After OGC was involved, \nthey required us to check with OTD on what they had to address \nthe issue, or if they could come up with a solution in house. We \nalso asked if OTD would work with the ApostleX company to \ndevelop the ApostleX product. We learned there was a product \ncalled Eagle Claw available which I believe is so bad that it \nshould be taken off the approved list of tools to use. There was \nonly one guy at the time working on Eagle Claw, and he said what \nI described of ApostleX was a homerun. Eagle Claw had a lot of \nlimitations. We spoke with a lot of people about existing \nprograms and external products as part of the procurement \nprocess. Nothing could do what ApostleX could do. I have and can \nprovide extensive documentation regarding Eagle Claw and other \nprograms, including testimonials, side-by-side comparisons, and \nmore. Some of these products were created by the HQ desk for \nSafe-Streets, where UC Matthew Cobo was overseeing their \nattempts to use ApostleX. \nPage 94 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173466\n", "char_count": 1651}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FO0O \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI also know that even as of October 2022, CACHTU \nsupervisors, including ASC Schaeffer and then SC Jose Perez, \nwere aware of ApostleX. I know this because I have email \ncommunications between them and PMs at CACHTU who were helping \nto try and arrange a meeting about ApostleX. Never had there \nbeen any issues or reservations expressed to me or to the PMs \nhelping to facilitate our meetings. \nI continued to work through my chain of command, CACHTU, \nOGC, Safe Streets, OCIO, NYFO ISSO, Finance and Facilities \nDivision (FFD), OTD and various units within OTD. We were moving \nalong up and through the holidays of 2022. There were a lot of \nrevisions to the PTA. We even worked through an emergency in \nwhich the Boston Field Office had a hands-on offender, and they \nneeded to preserve their chat information. Despite initially \nreceiving support, emergency use authority was never granted in \nthat case. I worked with OGC GA Christopher Dearing on PTA \nrevisions. I was delayed getting back to him due to a trial. \nOnce I got back to him, the cyber intrusion of the C-20 computer \nlab happened. \nThe standalone computer containing the ApostleX program had \nbeen turned off in our testing environment since July 2022, \nroughly six months before the C-20 computer lab intrusion took \nplace. We were not using it at all. I am not sure if it was even \nplugged in. I heard there was a rumor that some people believed \nApostleX had to do with the C-20 lab computer intrusion. I \nreceived an email from CDC Semos that the initiative to use \nPage 95 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//VOU0 \nEFTA00173467\n", "char_count": 1634}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nb\npostleX was going to be shut down due to the belief it was \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ninvolved in the intrusion. This was completely untrue, of \ncourse, as two completely separate networks were involved, and \nthe ApostleX network was not even running when the C-20 computer \nlab intrusion took place. ApostleX had nothing whatsoever to do \nwith the intrusion. I believe CDC Semos cleared this rumor up \nwith OGC. My chain of command wanted ApostleX to continue to \nmove forward because they saw value in it. Before and after the \nintrusion I had been tasked with providing briefings and \ninformation to upper management including SAC Michael Brodack, \nSAC Robert Kissane, and ADIC \n. None were \ndeterred by the intrusion and knew one had nothing to do with \nthe other. These executives, along with the NYFO CDC, Tara \nSemos, and ADC Dane Christensen, were supportive of the pursuit \nof ApostleX and had no issue with anything I or anyone else had \ndone. We saw that NYFO Criminal Division and CACHTU were being a \nroadblock. We had a meeting with \nprior to the C-20 \nlab intrusion to get the ADIC involved in the ApostleX project \nto push the needle forward. We wanted to be able to pilot the \nprogram. Some of the questions from OGC asked who was supporting \nthe ApostleX project. The intrusion happened before a formal \nbriefing could take place, however. \nThere was a meeting about ApostleX with NYFO CT Division \nSAC Robert Kissane in August 2023. CDC Semos, \n, the \nISSO, SSA of the Tech squad, Eddie Pennetta, SA Depresco, and SA \nNachman. The meeting was about trying to use a Domestic \nPage 96 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173468\n", "char_count": 1666}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \n0\n..;) Terrorism (DT) case as a pilot case for ApostleX. There were \nstill conversations about ApostleX taking place until I was \nnotified of this INSD internal investigation. \nI was working with CTD's International Terrorism Operations \nSection (ITOS) and some high-tech unit. They were asking for \ninformation to push up to EAD Larissa Knapp, who reached out to \nme personally. I had my ASAC respond to her on my behalf. \nAfter the C-20 lab intrusion, CACHTU wanted nothing to do \nwith ApostleX. NYFO wanted to see if they could do something \nwith ApostleX on their own. They also got CT involved to see if \nthey could push ApostleX through their networks. There were \nconference calls with the ApostleX company to field questions. \nRepresentatives from the ApostleX company may have also gone to \nHuntsville, Alabama and spoken with the AD of OTD. \nThere was confusion on getting the Authority to Operate \n(ATO). It was a chicken or egg situation. We did not know which \none we needed first, the ATO or the PTA. We were working on the \nATO process as well. \nCACHTU funded the equipment for the C-20 lab. I believe \nGroup I UCOs were exempt from needing an ATO. \nwas \ntrying to see if we could get approval to use ApostleX under the \nGroup I because he believed we would not need an ATO. I believe \nthis was discussed with CDC Semos, because I was present when \nthey argued about it. When I was putting together the \ninformation for the C-20 lab, I did not know about an ATO \nrequirement. I later found out we did not need an ATO for covert \n(I45 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nPage 97 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173469\n", "char_count": 1645}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n(.?) \npurchases. I think they may have tried to change that after-the-\n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nfact. \nThere was a financial threshold for the lab purchases. This \nwas approved by Jack Cordes in OGC. It outlined what was needed \nfor the C-20 lab and how we were going to use the equipment. I \nbelieve everything that needed an F number received one. \nNo one ever told me of the requirement for an ATO for the \nC-20 lab. It came up after \nand CDC Semos had their \ndiscussions. This was not my responsibility anyway, as it would \nhave been up to one of the dozen or so entities overseeing our \nGroup I renewals whose job it is to know what is and what is not \nrequired from an administrative perspective. \nSome of the ApostleX company sits in Ireland and some in \nthe United States (US). They are registered in the US to receive \ngovernment contracts. \nOur squad's end-of-year review for fiscal year 2022 \nmentioned ApostleX as one of the reasons to give us a \"gold\" \nrating. However, ApostleX was also referenced as the reason for \na lower program rating for fiscal year 2023. CACHTU initially \nrated our squad \"gold\", the highest rating, but DD Paul Abbate \nlater changed our rating to \"red\", the worst rating, and \nincluded the reference to ApostleX and its direct involvement in \nthe intrusion as the reason, which, as discussed previously in \ngreater detail, is categorically false and both physically and \ndigitally impossible. My ASAC attempted to fight this false \nnarrative but was told it could not be changed. \nct \nPage 98 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173470\n", "char_count": 1594}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI never understood that just working with ApostleX in \ngeneral could cause procurement issues, and even to this day as \nmuch as I have learned from all of this, I know that my \ninvolvement did not and would not cause procurement issues. I \nhave learned that nothing I did was improper and that many \nprograms used by the FBI originate in much the same manner. OGC \nwas trying to figure out how to make it work. \nAs mentioned previously, I think it is also important to \nnote that NYFO did not have an ISSO or a CISSO when the C-20 lab \nwas set up. \nUnder no circumstances whatsoever did I exceed my authority \nby contracting an outside company. There was no contract. My \nchain of command, including our CDC and later OGC, to include \nthe General Counsel himself, knew I was speaking with ApostleX \nand creating a solution to a problem. I engaged the PTA process \nas instructed, working for months with many FBI lawyers, \nprocurement officers, and management, all ensuring our pursuit \nof this much-needed program was done correctly. Any notion that \nI violated any policy, rule, or regulation is categorically \nfalse. \nFor perspective, ApostleX first came to the NYFO in October \n2021, and despite the vast amount of people, entities, and \noversight my work on ApostleX received, not once had I been \nadvised anything I did was inappropriate until I received notice \nof this inquiry in March 2024. Among the many documents and \ncorrespondences I have provided INSD include many with OGC, CDC, \nPage 99 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 \nEFTA00173471\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nand CACHTU. Specific to CACHTU, I know that ASC Schaeffer did \nCS) \nnot like ApostleX, and after the intrusion he used it as an \nexcuse to punish me. ASC Schaeffer banned me from being an \ninstructor at the VCAC OCE course, of which I am a founding \ninstructor. ASC Schaeffer accused me of lying when I presented \non ApostleX at the PCOR conference. ASC Schaeffer stated that he \nbelieved I was supposed to present at the PCOR conference on a \ncase update, but that at the last minute I switched my \npresentations to present on ApostleX and that no one in CACHTU \nwas aware. ASC Schaeffer says he believed this, but it was \nmonths after the PCOR conference before he would eventually make \nthis accusation. Additionally, after the PCOR conference, in \napproximately October 2022, I was an instructor at a VCAC OCE \ntraining and even discussed ApostleX. In advance of this \ntraining, I attempted to secure a meeting with then SC Jose \nPerez to discuss ApostleX since I was going to be at HQ for the \ntraining. I have correspondence between CACHTU supervisors/PMs, \nsome of which include ASC Schaeffer, about my proposed meeting \nwith SC Perez, and at no time was this \"lie\" ever mentioned. \nAfter ASC Schaeffer accused me of this lie, I immediately sent \nhim proof that the allegation was false. ASC Schaeffer responded \nwith acknowledgment that I was in fact telling the truth; \nhowever, he suspended me from the training anyway. My \ncommunications with ASC Schaeffer have been provided to INSD and \nadditional communications are available upon request. \nPage 100 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173472\n", "char_count": 1653}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nAs I repeatedly stated, I attempted to solicit help from \nevery appropriate entity, to include the NYFO \"Security \nOfficer\", Robert Welp. However, until just weeks before the \nintrusion this position was only temporarily staffed, and the \nISSO and CISSO positions were not staffed at all. I have \nprovided a document to the interviewing Agents that originated \nfrom former NYFO SAC Nicholas Bouchears in which he outlines the \nissue of not having these positions filled and the steps he took \nto fill them. If these positions had been filled there is little \ndoubt that I would have received the assistance I needed to \nensure our network was secure. However, these positions were not \nfilled, and I was nevertheless encouraged to enhance our lab by \nall levels of management and received the necessary approvals \nalong the way. I should not be punished for failures in \nhindsight that were out of my control. While I take \nresponsibility for all my actions, I am confident that nothing I \ndid was without approval, and everything was done in the \ninterest of improvement. \nThere is an abundance of evidence to support that \neverything I did was with full knowledge and support of FBI EM. \nI can provide much of this, but the proof consists of copious \namounts of emails, numerous iterations of the PTA, and more. As \na couple last anecdotes is an email between myself and (now \nretired) AD Mark Gerber. AD Gerber had reached out to me \nrequesting some information regarding ApostleX back in March of \n2023. In the email I mentioned to him that DAD Jose Perez had \nPage 101 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOLIO \nEFTA00173473\n", "char_count": 1662}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nbeen briefed on and supported ApsotleX, specifically this \nportion of the email states: \n\"We've briefed this up our chain any my ASAC and SAC \nare very much on board, as is our ADIC from what I hear. \nI've also spoken with DAD Jose Perez, who seems to \nalso support it, as have many others along the CID chain of \ncommand. We've coordinated with several units in OTD, all \nof whom stated the love the program and would provide \nsupport however possible, including housing the data, \nhelping with additional features like ELSUR, evidence, etc. \nI've also spoken with Ma Smith at OCIO who also seems to be \na supporter, and is looking to see \nwho all from HQ needs to approve this before we move \nforward.\" \nI know this because I personally spoke to DAD Perez about \nApostleX when he visited the NYFO, which is discussed above. I \nalso believe that AD Gerber spoke with DD Abbate and possibly \nDirector Wray about ApostleX as well. I later learned that the \nGeneral Counsel, who at the time was Jason Jones, was also aware \nof ApostleX and did not have any legal concerns, rather he \nwithheld his approval until OCIO provided theirs. \nAdditionally, in September 2023, NYFO ADC Dane Christensen \nadvised me that he heard that someone in the FBI EM circles had \nconflated ApostleX with having been a contributing factor in the \nintrusion, something that was far from the case and technically \nimpossible, as discussed above. Ironically, the following week \nPage 102 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173474\n", "char_count": 1549}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nso, the case Agent assigned to investigate the intrusion \nreached out to me to request information on ApsotleX. The Agent, \nTerrence Carthy, had independently learned about ApositeX and \nwas interested in using it for an un-related case. SA Carthy had \nheard that I had been the point-person for ApostleX and reached \nout in hopes that he could use it. I informed SA Carthy of the \nrecent assertion that ApostleX was somehow related to the \nintrusion and he could not believe it. SA Carthy investigated \nthe intrusion and knew exactly what was and what was not \nrelated, and until just before reaching out to me, SA Carthey \nhad not even heard of ApostleX. Shortly thereafter, I sent an \nemail for clarification to NY CDC Semos, cc'ing both ADC \nChristensen and SA Carthy. My email to CDC Semos stated in sum: \n\"Last week Terrence Carthy (CCd) from CY-2 hit me up asking \nabout ApostleX. He had only recently heard of it (from \nsomeone else, not me) and was interested in where it is in \nthe process. I mentioned to him that the DD needs to \napprove it and that there is the misconception that \nApostleX was related somehow in the intrusion. Ironically, \nTerrence was the case agent on Cyber for the intrusion, and \nwas a bit surprised since he had never heard of ApostleX \nuntil recently. Terrence is happy to clear the air \nregarding ApostleX and it's (non) involvement in the \nintrusion, but I wanted to put him in touch with you both.\" \nPage 103 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173475\n", "char_count": 1537}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \ng\nCDC Semos responded with the following: \n\"Hey Aaron, \nNo confusion on our end. Legal is clear on the fact \nthe intrusion and ApostleX are 2 unrelated matters. A/II \n, OCIO, discussed Apostle X (and maybe the \nintrusion, I'm not exactly clear) with the ADIC last week. \nThe ADIC advised 2 ADs and the GC were interested in coming \nto NY to discuss. I think the ADIC tasked Spencer Horn with \nsetting that up at the EM yesterday. Circle back with \nSpencer b/c the discussion got a little confusing at the \nmeeting. In any event, ADIC will not approve use of Apostle \nX until GC and the ADs approve of it at the HQ level.\" \n--Tara \nLastly, it should be noted that, since the intrusion, my \nsquad mates and I have been referenced as having been \"System \nAdministrators\", which we absolutely are not. The INSD report \nidentifies me, and others on my squad, as having been System \nAdministrators despite the fact we were not, have never been \ntrained in system administration, and were never qualified to be \nsystem administrators. Despite myself and my chain of command \nbringing this to the attention of INSD we continued to be \nreferred to in this manner. This is a critical fact since I \ncannot, nor can my squad mates, be held to the same standard of \nknowledge as an actual system administrator. The title implies a \nlevel of knowledge, and thus a level of responsibility, that I \n(l;!)\nPage 104 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nEFTA00173476\n", "char_count": 1485}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "UNCLASSIFIED//F000 \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \ndid not and do not possess. None of us on my squad do or ever \nhave. \nIn my defense I possess hundreds, if not thousands, of \npages of supporting documentation. I have provided a large \nnumber of these documents to the interviewing Agents and am \nhappy to provide more if requested. This includes, but is not \nlimited to, the NYFO's opposition to the post-intrusion INSD \nfindings, many of which are provable as categorically false and \nmisleading. \nI am including here many of the documents referenced in \nthis statement and will provide INSD with additional documents. \nThese are, however, not all the supporting material I have and \ncan provide more upon request. As I do not know what information \nhas been presented to INSD in support of these allegations, nor \ndo I know exactly who provided the information, I cannot \npossibly anticipate every document in my defense I possess. I am \nan open book and will provide anything requested of me in order \nto reveal the truth. \nI am willing to voluntarily take a polygraph examination \nconcerning the truthfulness of the information contained in this \nsigned, sworn statement. I have no other pertinent information \nregarding the aforementioned allegations. I have been advised \nthat I should submit any additional information of which I may \nbecome aware, regarding this inquiry, to \nSection (IAS)/Inspection Division (INSD) \nProfessional Responsibility (OPR). \nthe Internal Affairs \nor to the Office of \nPage 105 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173477\n", "char_count": 1552}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00173373", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "ONCLASSIFIED//FOUO \n01/26/2024 \nNew York, NY \nI have been given the opportunity to review this statement \nand make any changes prior to signing it. \nI was instructed on 01/26/2024 not to discuss this matter \nwith anyone other than the person(s) conducting this interview, \nrepresentatives from IAS/INSD, Security Division - Clearance \nReferral Evaluations Unit, OPR, the FBI Ombudsman, and/or an FBI \nEmployee Assistance Program (EAP) Counselor. I have been told \nthat should I decide to discuss this matter with anyone else, I \nmust first obtain authorization from the interviewer(s). \nI have read this statement, consist \nthis and 36 other \npages and it is true and correct. \nAaron E. Spivack \nSworn to and subscribed before me on the 12th day of \nDecember, 2024, in New York, NY. \nWitness: \nWitness \nIV (+Fe M. 4&.%ou\\ \nPage 106 of 106 \nUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO \nEFTA00173478\n", "char_count": 873}]}