{"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_count": 111, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00172546", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00172546.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "LIMITED \nOFFICIAL \nUSE \nThe attached information \nmust be protected and not \nreleased to unauthorized \nindividuals. Use of this \ncover sheet is in accordance \nwith the Department of \nJustice regulation on the \ncontrol of Limited Official \nUse information. \nEFTA00172546\n", "char_count": 270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY-NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE \nIN SPEC \nDRAFT \nInvestigation and Review of the Federal Bureau \nof Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of \nJeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional \nCenter in New York, New York \n* * \nMarch 202-:; \nNotice: This Draft Is Restricted to Limited Official Use. \nThis document is a WORKING DRAFT prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the \nInspector General. It has not been fully reviewed within the Department and is, therefore, subject \nto revision. This report may contain sensitive law-enforcement or privacy-protected information \nand is for authorized recipients only. Recipients of this draft must not, under any circumstances, \nshow or release its contents for purposes other than official review and comment. It must be \nsafeguarded in accordance with Department of Justice Order 2620.7 to prevent publication or \nother improper disclosure of the information it contains. \nIf you have received this draft report in error, please contact (202) 768-2643 to arrange its return. \nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY—NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE \nEFTA00172547\n", "char_count": 1119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY \nInvestigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of \nPrisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey \nEpstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in \nNew York, New York \nIntroduction and Background \nThe Department of Justice (OOJ) Office of the Inspector \nGeneral (OIG) initiated this investigation upon receipt of \ninformation from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) \nthat on August 10, 2019, in the Metropolitan \nCorrectional Center in New York, New York (MCC New \nYork), inmate Jeffery Epstein was found hanged in his \nassigned cell within the Special Housing Unit (SHU). \nThe Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New \nYork, determined that Epstein had died by suicide. \nThe OIG conducted this investigation jointly with the \nFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with the OIG's \ninvestigative focus being the conduct of BOP personnel. \nAmong other things, the FBI investigated the cause of \nEpstein's death and determined there was no \ncriminality pertaining to how Epstein had died. \nThis report concerns the OIG's findings regarding MCC \nNew York personnel's custody, care, and supervision of \nEpstein while detained at the facility from his arrest on \nfederal sex trafficking charges on July 6, 2019, until his \ndeath on August 10. Epstein was assigned to the SHU \non July 7 due to media coverage of his case and inmate \nawareness of his notoriety. SHU inmates are securely \nseparated from general population inmates and kept \nlocked in their cells for approximately 23 hours a day. \nWhile in MCC New York, Epstein was screened on \nnumerous occasions by psychological staff and in all of \nthe evaluations he denied having thoughts or a history \nof suicide. Psychological staff determined Epstein did \nnot meet the criteria for a psychological diagnosis. \nRelevant BOP Policies \nBOP policy requires SHU staff to observe all inmates at \nleast twice an hour and that lieutenants conduct at \nleast one round in t\n... [truncated, 4180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/2 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=2]", "char_count": 4180}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nDepartment determined Epstein needed to be housed \nwith an appropriate cellmate, and on July 30 it sent an \nemail to over 70 MCC New York employees informing \nthem of this requirement. The Warden at the time told \nthe OIG that he selected a new cellmate for Epstein in \nconsultation with BOP executive leadership. That \ninmate remained Epstein's cellmate until August 9. \nEvents of August 8-10, 2019, and Epstein's Death \nOn August 8, the U.S. Marshals Service sent two emails \nnotifying numerous MCC New York staff that Epstein's \ncellmate was being transferred to another facility on \nAugust 9. However, no action was taken to ensure \nEpstein was assigned another cellmate. \nAlso on August 8, Epstein met with his attorneys at the \nprison, as he had on prior occasions, and signed a new \nLast Will and Testament. MCC New York officials did \nnot learn about the new Will until after Epstein's death. \nThe following day, August 9, Epstein's cellmate was \ntransferred to another facility and he was not assigned - \na new cellmate. Also on August 9, after meeting at the \nprison with his lawyers, staff allowed Epstein to make \nan unrecorded, unmonitored telephone call before he \nwas returned to his SHU cell. Although Epstein said he \nwas calling his mother, he actually called an individual \nwith whom he allegedly had a personal relationship. \nAt approximately 8:00 p.m. on August 9, SHU inmates \nwere locked in their cells for the night, including Epstein \nwho was without a cellmate. A search of Epstein's cell \nfollowing his death revealed Epstein had excess prison \nblankets, linens, and clothing in his cell, and that some \nhad been ripped to create nooses. Only one SHU cell \nsearch was documented on August 9, and it was not of \nEpstein's cell. BOP records did not indicate when \nEpstein's cell was last searched. The OIG also found \nthat SHU staff did not conduct any 30-minute rounds \nafter about 10:40 p.m. on August 9 and that none of th\n... [truncated, 4904 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/3 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=3]", "char_count": 4904}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nThe available video from the one SHU camera captured \na large part of the common area of the SHU and \nportions of the stairways leading to the different SHU \ntiers, including Epstein's cell tier. Thus, anyone entering \nor attempting to enter Epstein's SHU tier from the SHU \ncommon area would have been picked up by that video \ncamera. Epstein's cell door, however, was not in the \ncamera's field of view. The OIG reviewed the video and \nfound that, between approximately 10:40 p.m. on \nAugust 9 and about 6:30 a.m. on August 10, no one was \nseen entering Epstein's cell tier from the SHU common \narea. The OIG determined that movements captured \non video before and after those times were generally \nconsistent with employee actions as described by \nwitnesses and documented in BOP records. \nResults of the OIG's Investigation and Review \nThe OIG's investigation and review identified numerous \nand serious failures by MCC New York staff, including \nmultiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies \nand procedures. The 016 found that MCC New York \nstaff failed on August 9 to carry out the Psychology \nDepartments directive that Epstein be assigned a \ncellmate, and that an MCC New York supervisor allowed \nEpstein to make an unmonitored telephone call the \nevening before his death. Additionally, we found that \nstaff failed to undertake required measures designed \nto make sure that Epstein and other SHU inmates were \naccounted for and safe, such as conducting inmate \ncounts and 30-minute rounds, searching inmate cells, \nand ensuring adequate supervision of the SHU and the \nfunctionality of the video camera surveillance system. \nThe OIG also found that several staff falsified BOP \nrecords relating to inmate counts and rounds and \nlacked candor during their OIG interviews. Two MCC \nNew York employees, Noel and Thomas, were charged \ncriminally with falsifying BOP records. The charges \nwere later dismissed after they successfully fulf\n... [truncated, 5207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/4 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=4]", "char_count": 5207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nTable of Contents \nChapter 1: Introduction \n1 \nChapter 2: Background \n5 \nI. \nSignificant Entities and Individuals \n5 \nII. \nMethodology \n6 \nIII. \nApplicable Law, Regulations, and BOP Policies  \n7 \nA. \nStandards of Conduct \n7 \nB. \nFalse Statements and Lack of Candor \n8 \nC. \nRelevant BOP Policies Regarding the Operation of Correctional Facilities  \n8 \n1. \nSpecial Housing Units \n8 \n2. \nInmate Accountability \n9 \n3. \nPsychological Screening \n 10 \n4. \nSuicide Response \n 11 \n5. \nInmate Discipline  \n 12 \n6. \nConditions of Confinement \n12 \nChapter 3: Timeline of Key Events \n14 \nChapter 4: Custody and Care of Epstein Prior to His Death \n21 \nI. \nEpstein's Arrest and Detention on July 6 \n 21 \nII. \nMCC New York's Special Housing Unit (SHU) \n22 \nIII. \nEpstein's Initial Cell and Cellmate Assignment from July 7 to July 23 \n26 \nIV. \nEvents of July 23 and the Placement of Epstein on Suicide Watch and Psychological Observation \nfrom July 23 to July 30 \n26 \nV. \nThe Psychology Department's Post-July 23 Determination that Epstein Needed to Have an \nAppropriate Cellmate \n30 \nVI. \nSelection of Epstein's Cellmate After Psychological Observation \n31 \nVII. \nEpstein's Cell Assignment from July 30 to August 10 \n31 \nVIII. \nPsychological Evaluations of Epstein from July 6 to August 9 \n37 \nChapter 5: The Events of August 8-10, 2019, and Epstein's Death \n45 \nI. \nEpstein Signs a New Last Will and Testament on August 8 \n45 \nII. \nCourt Order on August 9 Releasing Epstein-Related Documents in Pending Civil Litigation \n45 \nIII. \nTransfer of Epstein's Cellmate on August 9 to Another Institution and Failure to Replace Him with \nAnother Inmate \n45 \nA. \nNotice on August 8 of the Impending Transfer of Epstein's Cellmate on August 9 \n45 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172551\n", "char_count": 1836}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Reject Epstein Attorney's Request that Epstein be Housed Without a \nCellmate \n46 \nC. \nRemoval on August 9 of Epstein's Cellmate from MCC New York \n46 \nD. \nFailure to Assign Epstein a New Cellmate on August 9 \n47 \n1. \nDay Watch Staff Actions on August 9 \n47 \n2. \nEvening Watch Staff Actions on August 9 \n50 \nIV. \nEpstein is Allowed to Make an Unmonitored Telephone Call on August 9 \n52 \nV. \nFailure to Conduct SHU Inmate Counts and Staff Rounds on August 9-10 \n55 \nA. \nSHU Inmate Counts \n55 \n1. \nThe 4:00 p.m. SHU Count on August 9 \n56 \n2. \nThe 10:00 p.m. SHU Count on August 9 \n58 \n3. \nThe 12:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., and 5:00 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 \n60 \nB. \nStaff Rounds in the SHU \n61 \n1. \nCorrectional Officer Rounds \n61 \n2. \nLieutenant Rounds \n63 \nVI. \nEpstein's Death on August 10 \n64 \nA. \nDiscovery of Epstein Hanged in Cell and Emergency Response \n64 \nB. \nItems Found in Epstein's Cell on August 10 Following His Death \n70 \nC. \nAutopsy Results \n72 \nChapter 6: The Availability of Limited Recorded Video Evidence Due to the Security Camera Recording \nSystem Failure \n74 \nI. \nBackground on the Security Camera System at MCC New York \n74 \nII. \nDiscovery of Security Camera System Recording Issues in August 2019 \n75 \nA. \nDiscovery on August 8 of the DVR 2 Failure that Occurred on July 29 \n75 \nB. \nResponse on August 8 and 9 to Discovery of the Recording Failure \n76 \nC. \nSHU Camera Locations and Operational Status on August 10 \n77 \nD. \nFBI Forensic Analysis of the DVR System \n82 \nChapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations \n84 \nI. \nConclusions \n84 \nA. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that Epstein Had a Cellmate on August 9 as Instructed by \nthe Psychology Department on July 30 \n88 \n1. \nFailure to Make Required Notifications Regarding the Need to Assign Epstein a New \nCellmate \n88 \n2. \nFailure to Adequately Supervise SHU Staff \n90 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172552\n", "char_count": 1985}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \n3. \nFailure to Have a Contingency Plan for Assigning Epstein a Cellmate  \n91 \n4. \nLack of Candor \n91 \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct Mandatory Rounds and Inmate Counts Resulting in \nEpstein Being Unobserved for Hours Before His Death \n92 \n1. \nFailure to Conduct Rounds and Inmate Counts in the SHU \n92 \n2. \nFalse Statements and Lack of Candor \n93 \n3. \nPoor Judgment Regarding the Use of Overtime \n94 \n4. \nClearing the 10:00 p.m. Institutional Count Knowing that It Was Inaccurate \n95 \n5. \nFailure to Adequately Supervise SHU Staff and Conduct Lieutenant Rounds \n96 \nC. \nMCC New York Staff Allowed Epstein to Place an Unmonitored Telephone Call on August 9 97 \nD. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct and Document Cell Searches and Eliminate Safety \nHazards in Epstein's Cell on August 9 Leaving Epstein with Excessive Linens in His Cell \n98 \nE. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that the Institution's Security Camera System was Fully \nFunctional Resulting in Limited Recorded Video Evidence \n99 \nII. \nRecommendations \n100 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172553\n", "char_count": 1151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 1: Introduction \nThe Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation upon the \nreceipt of information from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (SOP) that on the morning of August 10, 2019, in \nthe Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), inmate Jeffery Epstein \nwas found hanged in his assigned cell within the Special Housing Unit (SHU). The SHU is a housing unit \nwhere inmates are securely separated from the general inmate population and kept locked in their cells for \napproximately 23 hours a day, to ensure their own safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. \nEpstein had been placed in the SHU on July 7, 2019, the day after his arrest, due to the significant media \ncoverage of his case and awareness of his notoriety among MCC New York inmates. \nAccording to information obtained by the OIG during the investigation, at approximately 8:00 p.m. on \nAugust 9, all SHU inmates, including Epstein, were locked in their cells for the evening. Additionally, the six \nseparate tiers or groups of cells within the SHU were also securely locked. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on \nAugust 10, 2019, SHU staff unlocked the door to the SHU tier in which Epstein's cell was located in order to \ndeliver breakfast to inmates through the food slots in the locked cell doors. When SHU staff entered the tier \nto deliver breakfast to Epstein, SHU staff knocked on the locked door to Epstein's cell. Epstein, who was \nhoused alone in the cell, did not respond to SHU staff. SHU staff unlocked the cell door and found Epstein \nhanged in his cell, with one end of a piece of orange cloth around his neck and the other end tied to the top \nportion of a bunkbed in Epstein's cell. Epstein was suspended from the top bunk in a near-seated position \nwith his buttocks approximately 1 inch to 1 inch and a half off the floor and his legs extended straight out on \nthe\n... [truncated, 4334 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/8 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=8]", "char_count": 4334}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ncause of death was hanging and the manner of death was suicide. \nThe OIG conducted this investigation jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with the OIG's \ninvestigative focus being the conduct of BOP personnel. Among other things, the FBI investigated the cause \nof Epstein's death. The FBI determined that there was no criminality pertaining to how Epstein had died. \nThis report concerns the OIG's findings regarding MCC New York personnel's custody, care, and supervision \nof Epstein during his detention at the facility from his arrest on July 6, 2019, until his death on August 10, \n2019. \nThe OIG investigation and review identified numerous and serious failures by MCC New York staff, as well as \nmultiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies and procedures. Among the most significant was the \nfailure to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August 9, 2019, after Epstein's cellmate was transferred out of \nMCC New York that day. Epstein was required to have a cellmate at all times pursuant to a written direction \nthat the MCC New York Psychology Department issued on July 30 after Epstein was removed from suicide \nwatch and psychological observation following a possible attempted suicide by him on July 23. As a result of \nthe failure to assign him a new cellmate, Epstein was housed alone in his cell from the night of August 9 \nuntil he was found hanged in his cell by SHU staff at approximately 6:30 a.m. the following morning. In \naddition, we determined that SHU staff failed to conduct required inmate counts and rounds, including \novernight on August 9-10, and allowed Epstein to have an excess of blankets, linens, and clothing in his cell. \nThese failures compromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates, and the security of the institution, \nand provided Epstein an opportunity to commit suicide while locked alone in his cell on the morning of \nAugust 10 without having been subject to overnigh\n... [truncated, 3992 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/9 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=9]", "char_count": 3992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nDuring the OIG's investigation, the OIG obtained information that the staff assigned to the MCC New York \nSHU did not conduct any counts of inmates within the SHU from August 9, 2019, at approximately 4:00 p.m., \nuntil Epstein was found hanged in his cell on the morning of August 10, 2019. However, in documentation \ncompleted by the SHU staff on duty during that period, staff members falsely certified in the count slips that \nthey had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned \nto the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately \n10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during that period had falsely certified in \nthe round sheet that the required rounds were conducted. The combination of these and other failures led \nto Epstein being unmonitored and locked alone in his cell, which the OIG found contained an excessive \namount of bed linens, from approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 until he was discovered hanged in his cell \nat approximately 6:30 a.m. the following day. \nWhile the OIG determined that MCC New York staff committed significant violatio \nYork policies and falsified records related to their conducting inmate counts and rou \nuncover evidence that contradicted the FBI's determination regarding the absence of cr \nconnection with how Epstein died. All MCC New York staff members who were interviewe \nthey did not know of any information suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other than \nsuicide. Additionally, none of the 15 inmates who agreed to be interviewed in connection with this \ninvestigation, 10 of whom were housed in the SHU on August 9 and 10, had any credible information \nsuggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other than suicide. Further, the SHU staff and the \nthree interviewed inmates with a direct line of sight to the door of Epstein's cell\n... [truncated, 4320 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/10 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=10]", "char_count": 4320}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwith the BOP's staffing levels, the custody and care of inmates at risk for suicide, and security camera \nsystems at BOP institutions. The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance \nfailures documented in this report all contributed to an environment in which arguably one of the most \nnotorious inmates in SON custody was provided with the opportunity to take his own life. The BOP's \nfailures are troubling not only because the BOP did not adequately safeguard an individual in its custody, \nbut also because they led to questions about the circumstances surrounding Epstein's death and effectively \ndeprived Epstein's numerous victims of the opportunity to seek justice through the criminal justice process. \nThe fact that these failures have been recurring ones at the SOP does not excuse them, and gives additional \nurgency to the need for DOJ and BOP leadership to address the chronic problerlaguing the SOP. \nUnless otherwise noted, the OIG applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining \nwhether DOJ personnel have committed misconduct. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board applies this \nsame standard when reviewing a federal agency's decision to take adverse action against an employee \nbased on such misconduct. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(8) and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii). \n11\nIn Chapter 2 of this report, we provide background information, including identification an \ndescription of \nsignificant entities and individuals; a summary of our methodology; and the applicable laws, federal \nregulations, and BOP policies. In Chapter 3, we outline a timeline of key events. In Chapter 4, we set forth \nour findings of fact relating to the SON custody and care of Epstein before his death. In Chapter 5, we set \nforth our findings of fact related to the events of August 8-10, 2019, including Epstein's death. In Chapter 6, \nwe set forth our findings of fact related to the BOP's failure to ens\n... [truncated, 2285 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/11 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=11]", "char_count": 2285}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 2: Background \nI. \nSignificant Entities and Individuals \nJeffrey Epsteinwas born in 1953 and, prior to his arrest, worked at various jobs in the financial industry and \nultimately developed considerable wealth. On July 2, 2019, a federal grand jury of the U.S. District Court for \nthe Southern District of New York returned an indictment that charged Epstein with engaging in sex \ntrafficking and a sex trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2. These \ncharges were based on allegations that between 2002 and 2005, Epstein paid girls as young as 14 years old \nhundreds of dollars in cash each for engaging in sex acts with him at his Florida and New York residences. \nThe indictment further alleged that Epstein also paid each of these minor victims hundreds of dollars in \ncash to recruit other girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein. \nOn July 6, 2019, Epstein was arrested at Teterboro Airport in New jersey upon his return to the United States \nfrom France and was transported to the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Metropolitan Correctional Center, \nlocated at 150 Park Row in New York, New York (MCC New York). Following a detention hearing on July 15, \n2019, the court ordered that Epstein be detained pending trial based on the court's finding that he was a \ndanger to the community and a flight risk. \nMCC New York is a federal administrative detention facility operated by the BOP that primarily provides \npretrial detention services for the U.S. District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. \nThe BOP temporarily closed MCC New York in October 2021 due to substandard conditions that are \nunrelated to this investigation. When it was operational, MCC New York housed approximately 750 inmates \nat any given time. Prior to its closure, the majority of MCC New York's inmate residents were individuals \nwith pending criminal charges (as opposed to individuals who had be\n... [truncated, 3846 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/12 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=12]", "char_count": 3846}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nfact, they had not.6\nOn November 19, 2019, a federal grand jury of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York \nreturned an indictment that charged Noel and Thomas with one count each of conspiracy and multiple \ncounts each of falsification of records, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001(a)(3), and 2. The indictment \nalleged that on August 9, 2019, Noel failed to conduct the mandatory 4:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. counts of \ninmates in the MCC New York SHU, and that on August 10, 2019, both she and Thomas failed to conduct the \nmandatory 12:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., and 5:00 a.m. counts and mandatory 30-minute rounds within the MCC \nNew York SHU. The indictment further alleged that Noel and Thomas created, certified, and submitted false \ndocumentation indicating that the counts and rounds had been done as required to conceal their failure to \nperform their assigned duties. As a result, it appeared from documentation that prisoners in the SHU, \nincluding Epstein, were being regularly monitored when, in fact, no correctional officer had checked on \nEpstein from approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019, until approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10, 2019, \nwhen Epstein was found hanged in his cell. \nOn May 25, 2021, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York entered into deferred \nprosecution agreements with Noel and Thomas. Their respective agreements, which are part of the court \nrecord in their cases, included admissions by Noel and Thomas that they falsely certified that they had \nconducted counts and rounds. The agreements also required each of them to truthfully and completely \ndisclose all information related to their activities and employment with the BOP; be interviewed by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office of the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and the OIG; complete 100 hours of \ncommunity service; refrain from violating the law; and fulfill other conditions related to pretrial \n... [truncated, 3994 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/13 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=13]", "char_count": 3994}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nMCC New York in the days leading up to the response and following the response, as well as other \nindividuals with information pertinent to our investigation. Additionally, the OIG participated in interviews \nof 15 inmates who had been housed at MCC New York during time periods relevant to our investigation, \nincluding three who were housed in the L Tier of the SHU on the day Epstein died.' Those three L-Tier \ninmates were housed in cells opposite Epstein's cell and therefore had a direct line of sight to Epstein's cell \non the night of August 9-10. The OIG also reached out to one of Epstein's attorneys to discuss the possibility \nof providing information, but ultimately the attorney declined to be interviewed, citing attorney-client \nprivilege and issues related to ongoing litigation involving Epstein's estate. \nThe OIG also collected over 127,000 documents, as well as MCC New York video and photographs. Among \nthese were BOP documents, including staff rosters; daily logs and reports; investigative and incident \nreports; documentation regarding inmate counts and 30-minute rounds; inmate housing assignment \ndocumentation; inmate transfer documents; Psychology Department reports and medical records relating \nto Epstein; Epstein's institutional phone call records; MCC New York records of Epstein's visits with his \nattorneys; electronic communications, including text messages and emails of BOP employees and \ncontractors; MCC New York security camera surveillance video; records from contractors regarding the MCC \nNew York security camera system; service records for MCC New York's security camera system; MCC New \nYork photographs, including photographs taken of efforts to revive Epstein on the morning of August 10, \n2019; BOP policies and program statements; MCC New York Post Orders; and financial records. The OIG \nalso conducted forensic analysis of the computers located in the SHU and BOP cellular telephones. In \nadditi\n... [truncated, 3968 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/14 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=14]", "char_count": 3968}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nprovides that employees can use government property for authorized purposes only, and further specifies \nthat personal use of government office equipment, such as computers, \"will not take place during official \nworking hours.\" BOP policy requires that employees \"obey the orders of their superiors at all times.\" \nB. \nFalse Statements and Lack of Candor \nUnder federal law, \"whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive...branch of the \nGovernment of the United States, knowingly and willfully...makes or uses any false writing or document \nknowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry\" has violated \n18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). The terms \"knowingly and willfully' mean that the subject acted with knowledge that \nthe conduct was, in a general sense, prohibited by law. It is not required that the subject was aware of the \nexistence of Section 1001. \nUnder BOP standards of conduct discussed above, employees are required to cooperate fully with official \ninvestigations, which includes providing \"all pertinent information they may have\" and \"truthfully responding \nto questions.\" \nC. \nRelevant BOP Policies Regarding the Operation of Correctional Facilities \n1. \nSpecial Housing Units \nSpecial Housing Units within BOP facilities are governed by federal regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.21-541.33. \nThese regulations provide that the BOP may establish Special Housing Units (SHU) \"where inmates are \nsecurely separated from the general inmate population.\" These regulations and BOP policy (Program \nStatement 5270.11, Special Housing Units) explain that inmates in the SHU are either on administrative \ndetention or disciplinary segregation status. Administrative segregation status is a non-punitive designation \nthat removes an inmate \"from the general population when necessary to ensure the safety, security, and \norderly operation of correctional facilities, or protect the publi\n... [truncated, 3882 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/15 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=15]", "char_count": 3882}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nBOP policy provides that inmates housed in the SHU for 30 continuous calendar days are to be examined \nand interviewed by a mental health staff member to assess the inmate's adjustment and the threat \npresented to self or others. \nBOP policy also requires that all staff assigned to the SHU participate in quarterly training on, among other \nthings, orderly supervision, suicide prevention, and security procedures relating to the unit. When a staff \nmember is assigned to the SHU at the last-minute and has not completed the quarterly training, the staff \nmember must be advised of the general requirements of a SHU post and be permitted to ask questions \nabout the duties. \n2. \nInmate Accountabilityll \na. \nCounts \nInmate counts serve an important security function, as they enable correctional officials to ensure that all \ninmates are accounted for and present at the appropriate location within the facility. BOP policy requires \nthat each institution \"conduct, at a minimum, five official inmate counts during every 24-hour period,\" and \nthat on \"weekends and holidays an additional count will be conducted at 10:00 a.m.\" At least one count a \nday during the week and two counts a day on weekends and holidays must be \"stand-up counts,\" which \nmeans that inmates are required to stand when they are counted. MCC New York SHU Post Orders \ndesignate that counts must occur at 12:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 5:00 a.m., 4:00 p.m., and that stand-up counts are \nto be conducted at 10:00 p.m. daily and also at 10:00 a.m. on weekends and federal holidays. \nThe BOP requires that each count be conducted by at least two officers, one of whom will count the inmates \nwhile the other observes the unit for any unauthorized movement from the end of the tier. This \nrequirement is also set out in the MCC New York SHU Post Orders. The two officers will then switch roles \nand compare the count numbers. If the totals do not match, then the officers must conduct a\n... [truncated, 3667 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/16 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=16]", "char_count": 3667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ndisciplinary segregation, i.e., for those detained in a SHU. In such cases, a correctional staff member must \nobserve all inmates at least twice an hour, once during the first 30 minutes (e.g., 12:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m.) \nand again during the second 30 minutes (e.g., 12:30 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.). BOP policy provides that these \n\"rounds are to be conducted on an irregular schedule and no more than 40 minutes apart.\" These same \nrequirements for rounds are also described in the Post Orders for the MCC New York's SHU. \nc. \nDocumentation Regarding Inmate Status and Confinement \nBOP policy also provides that each institution must prepare a daily change/transfer sheet, which indicates \nchanges to an inmate's status, including housing and job assignments and medical convalescence. The MCC \nNew York SHU Post Orders require that correctional staff assigned to the SHU create a SHU file for each \ninmate housed in that unit and that morning watch officers audit the inmate files every night. The MCC New \nYork SHU Post Orders further specify that all pertinent information about an inmate's confinement should \nbe noted on a Special Housing Unit Record Form (BP-292), and that SHU officers must maintain a log of \npertinent information regarding inmate activity and enter such information into the BOP computer system \nTRUSCOPE, which provides institution staff with detailed inmate and institution security-related information \nand provides unit officers an electronic event log. \nd. \nCell Searches \nBOP policy requires that BOP staff routinely and irregularly search housing units to, among other things, \nmaintain sanitary standards and eliminate safety hazards.12 The MCC New York SHU Post Orders require \nthat officers assigned to the SHU conduct searches of the SHU common areas and cells. During the \nmorning watch (12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.), SHU staff are required to search the common areas; during the day \nwatch (8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.), SHU s\n... [truncated, 3698 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/17 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=17]", "char_count": 3698}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nBOP staff must place the inmate on suicide watch until the inmate is no longer an imminent risk. \nBOP policy (Program Statement 5324.08, Suicide Prevention Program) requires that medical staff screen all \nnew inmates, ordinarily within 24 hours, for signs of suicidality. However, at MCCs, among other facilities \nwith high rates of admissions and short lengths of stays, \"comprehensive psychological intake conducted by \nPsychology Services ordinarily will be performed only on inmates who are suspected of being suicidal or \nappear psychologically unstable.\" Inmates in the SHU are monitored more closely, and inmates exhibiting \nsigns of potential suicide risk are referred to the shift lieutenant. BOP policy recognizes that inmates who \nare placed in the SHU due to a request for protective custody are at greater risk of committing suicide and \nshould therefore be screened for suicidal ideation within 72 hours of arriving in the SHU. SOP policy \nexplicitly states that \"staff must never take lightly any inmate suicide threats.\" Any staff member who has \nreason to believe that an inmate may be suicidal should \"ordinarily maintain the inmate under direct, \ncontinuous observation.\" \nEvery SOP institution must have one or more rooms, ordinarily in the health services area, dedicated to \ninmates placed on suicide watch. Suicide watch may be conducted by specially trained staff or inmates. For \ninmates placed on suicide watch, the specially trained staff or inmate maintains continuous observation of \nthe inmate believed to be at risk of committing suicide. Following suicide watch and based on clinical \nfindings following a face-to-face evaluation, the inmate will be removed from suicide watch or transferred to \na medical referral or health care facility. Psychological observation is a less restrictive form of individual \nmonitoring that is used for inmates who are stabilizing and not yet prepared for placement in general \npopulat\n... [truncated, 4193 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/18 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=18]", "char_count": 4193}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nover efforts to preserve a crime scene.13\n5. \nInmate Discipline \nFederal regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.8, and BOP policy (Program Statement 5270.09, Inmate Discipline \nProgram) establish an inmate discipline program, which is designed to ensure the safety, security, and \norderly operation of correctional facilities, as well as the protection of the public. The inmate discipline \nprogram applies to all inmates in BOP custody, including inmates with pending criminal charges. One of the \nguiding principles of this program is that BOP staff are to take disciplinary action when and to such a degree \nas necessary to regulate the behavior of inmates to promote a safe and orderly institution. \"Tattooing or \nself-mutilation\" is among the prohibited acts sanctioned through the inmate discipline program. This \nprohibited act falls within the second most severe category of offenses on a 4-tier scale. The SOP defines \n\"tattooing or self-mutilation\" as \"No put indelible patterns on the skin; to injure, disfigure or make imperfect \nby removing or irreparably damaging parts of the body (wrist cutting falls within this offense).\"16 The \ndefinition does not make an explicit reference to suicide attempts other than inclusion of \"wrist cutting.\" \nAmong other things, BOP policy addressing the inmate discipline program identifies the prohibited acts, \ndescribes the process for adjudicating violations, and lists applicable penalties for each category of offense. \nAs relevant to this matter, the discipline process begins when a staff member observes an inmate commit a \nprohibited act and issues a report documenting the incident. A BOP supervisor then investigates the alleged \ninmate misconduct, which includes taking a statement from the inmate regarding the incident. If an inmate \nappears to be mentally ill at any stage of the disciplinary process, a mental health staff member will \nexamine the inmate and assess the inmate's competenc\n... [truncated, 4030 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/19 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=19]", "char_count": 4030}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ncalled, and the reason for the call. The Special Investigative Services must enter this information into the \ntelephone recording system within 7 days. \nb. \nPersonal Effects, Medication, and Linens \nFederal regulations governing BOP Special Housing Units provide that inmates in administrative detention \nstatus ordinarily may have a reasonable amount of personal property.15 Under SOP policy regarding \nSpecial Housing Units, the personal property of SHU inmates \"may be limited or withheld for reasons of \nsecurity, fire safety, or housekeeping.\"16 The SOP Chief Pharmacist issues medication each workday for \ninmates in the SHU. Restricted medications are administered to inmates during daily SHU rounds. Each \ninstitution determines \"the medication(s) and amount (number of days) an inmate in SHU may maintain in \ntheir cell.\" Inmates may also purchase pre-approved over-the-counter medications at the commissary. MCC \nNew York General Housing Units Post Orders provide that when an inmate is released or transferred out of \na housing unit, the inmate will remove all limited and government-issued clothing from the cell in which the \ninmate was previously housed. These Post Orders further specify that all cells are to be cleaned daily by \ninmates occupying the cell, and that blankets, towels, and other linens will not be used as rugs or hung over \ninmate bunk beds at any time. Pursuant to these Post Orders, MCC New York housing unit officers on all \nthree shifts are responsible for maintaining \"a high level of sanitation\" and a \"safe and clean environment\" \nO \nis 28 C.F.R. § S41.31(hX1). \n76 BOP Program Statement 5270.11, Special Housing Units. \n13 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172566\n", "char_count": 1778}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 3: Timeline of Key Events \nExcept as otherwise noted, the following information is derived from the Federal Bureau of \nPrisons (SOP) records and OIG interviews. \nSeptember 21-24, \nThe BOP awards contracts to two companies (Company 1 and 2) to \n2018 \nupgrade the security camera system at Metropolitan Correctional Center \nin New York, New York (MCC New York). At the time, images from the \nMCC New York's analog video cameras are recorded to a Digital Video \nRecorder (DVR) system, which is divided into two DVR systems. Cameras \nassigned to the DVR 1 system record only to the DVR 1 hard drives, and \ncameras assigned to DVR 2 system record onIC the DVR 2 hard drives. \nMarch 17, 2019 \nIn connection with MCC New York's upgrade of its security ca \nsystem, the BOP's Northeast Regional Office begins arranging fo \ntechnicians from other BOP institutions to perform temporary duty (TDY) \nassignments to MCC New York to perform necessary mechanical, \nelectrical, plumbing, and wiring work. However, during the course of the \nTDY rotations, work is not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade \nbecause sometimes TDY staff are used to cover shortages at MCC New \nYork's custody posts. S\nJuly 2, 2019 \nAccording to court records, a federal grand jury of the U.S. District Court \nfor the Southern District of New York returns an indictment charging \nEpstein with sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. \nJuly 6, 2019\nEpstein is arrested at an airport in New Jersey and is transported for \ndetention pending his initial court appearance to the MCC New York as a \npretrial detainee. Epstein is placed in the general inmate population and \nmedically screened. \nJuly 7, 2019 \nAn MCC New York Facilities Assistant asks the Psychology Department to \nevaluate Epstein because he appears \"distraught, sad, and a little \nconfused.\" Epstein is assigned to the MCC New York's Special Housing \nUnit (SHU) because of significant media att\n... [truncated, 2395 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/21 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=21]", "char_count": 2395}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nJuly 8, 2019 \nAccording to court records, Epstein is arraigned in federal court and \nenters a plea of not guilty to all charges. The court sets a detention \nhearing for July 15, 2019. \nMCC New York staff conducts a routine intake screening of Epstein, the \nrecords of which indicate that Epstein denies a history of any mental \nhealth problems. After the Chief Psychologist consults with the National \nSuicide Prevention Coordinator from BOP's Central Office, the Psychology \nDepartment conducts a further evaluation of Epstein after his return from \ncourt. Records show that Epstein denies any suicidal thoughts but was \nplaced on psychological observation due to the presence of risk factors \n(high-profile case, nature of the charges, pre-trial status, and ongoing \nproceedings). \nJuly 9, 2019 \nThe Psychology Department administers a formal, in-person suicide risk \nassessment for Epstein. The Psychology Department continues \npsychological observation for another day pending a suitable housing \nplacement. \nJuly 10, 2019 \nJuly 11, 2019 \nJuly 15, 2019 \nJuly 16, 2019 \nJuly 18, 2019 \nThe Psychology Department removes Epstein from psychological \nobservation and returns him to the SHU with a recommendation that he \nhave a cellmate. Epstein is housed with another inmate (Inmate 1). \nAn MCC New York psychologist meets with Epstein briefly and \nrecommends an additional follow-up visit the following week. \nAccording to court records, Epstein appears in court for his detention \nhearing. \nAt Epstein's request, an MCC New York psychologist meets with him \nduring a legal visit. \nAccording to court records, Epstein appears in court for a ruling on the \nissue of detention. The court orders that Epstein be detained pending \ntrial because he presents a danger to the community and he is a flight \nrisk. \nThe Psychology Department conducts 30-day psychology reviews for the \nentire SHU population. Epstein is not in the SHU at the time and \ntherefo\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/22 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=22]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nJuly 22, 2019 \nAccording to court records, Epstein files an appeal of the courts order \ndenying Epstein pretrial release. \nJuly 23, 2019 \nJuly 24, 2019 \nJuly 25-29, 2019 \nAt approximately 1:27 a.m., SHU staff hears noises coming from Epstein's \ncell. Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 1) says that Epstein has attempted to \nhang himself. SHU staff observes Epstein lying on the floor with a piece \nof orange cloth around his neck. Epstein initially tells MCC New York staff \nthat his cellmate tried to kill him. Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 1) tells MCC \nNew York staff that while he was asleep, he felt something hit his legs and \nwhen he turned on the light, he saw Epstein with a string around his neck \nand called the guards.16\nEpstein is transferred out of the SHU and placed on suicide watch. \nLater that morning, Health Services Unit personnel conduct a medical \nassessment and observes that Epstein has a red mark two-thirds of the \nway around the front and sides of his neck. The BOP assesses Epstein for \nrisk of suicide and determines that he should remain on suicide watch. \nAt approximately 8:45 a.m., Epstein is removed from suicide watch but \nremains in the same cell and is under psychological observation. Medical \nstaff examines Epstein at 1:08 p.m. and Psychological Services staff \ncompletes a Post Suicide Watch Report. In contrast to his statement the \nprevious day, Epstein says he does not remember how he sustained the \ninjuries to his neck. \nEpstein is seen by the Psychology Department daily and on each date \nadamantly denies suicidality or having any memory of what occurred on \nJuly 23, 2019. \nJuly 29, 2019 \nPsychology Department staff determined that Epstein may be released \nfrom psychological observation and return to the SHU.19\nDisk failures occur in DVR 2 of MCC New York's security camera system, \nla When interviewed by the OIG, another inmate housed in the same SHU tier (Inmate 2) at the time of the July 23 \nincident \n... [truncated, 2730 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/23 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=23]", "char_count": 2730}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwhich results in the system being unable to record, although the cameras \ncontinue to work and broadcast live video feed. MCC New York personnel \ndo not learn of the DVR 2 recording failure until August 8, 2 days before \nEpstein's death. Roughly half of MCC New York's security cameras, \nincluding those located in the SHU, are assigned to record to the DVR 2 \nsystem. \nJuly 30, 2019 \nEpstein is transferred back to the SHU.20\nAn MCC New York Staff Psychologist from the Psychology Department \nsends an email to over 70 BOP staff members stating that Epstein \"needs \nto be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" Epstein and his new cellmate \n(Inmate 3) are placed in a cell within the SHU that can accommodate the \nelectrical needs of Epstein's medical device. \nMCC New York conducts disciplinary proceedings against Epstein for \nalleged self-mutilation and ultimately concludes that there is insufficient \nevidence to find that Epstein engaged in a prohibited act.21 When Epstein \nis psychologically evaluated in connection with the disciplinary \nproceedings, he says he does not remember how he sustained the marks \naround his neck. \nMCC New York personnel attempt to obtain an estimate from Company 1 \nto run the wiring and conduit for the new camera system, which would \neliminate the need for BOP technicians to perform the work. \nJuly 31, 2019 \nAccording to court records, Epstein appears in court for a status \nconference, at which time the court sets deadlines for motions and \nresponses. Upon his return to MCC New York, the U.S. Marshals Service \nprovide paperwork to BOP that indicates Epstein had \"suicidal \ntendencies.\" \nThe Psychology Department conducts a clinical visit with Epstein, who \ndenies any suicidal ideation. \nAugust 1, 2019 \nMCC New York Receiving and Discharge staff notify the Psychology \nDepartment of the notation of \"suicidal tendencies\" on U.S. Marshals \n20 The OIG's investigation revealed that at some point after he\n... [truncated, 2404 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/24 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=24]", "char_count": 2404}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nService paperwork relating to Epstein. The Psychology Department \nconducts a suicide risk assessment of Epstein, who denies that he is \nsuicidal, and determines that suicide watch is not warranted. Follow-up is \nrecommended in 1 week. \nAugust 2, 2019 \nMCC New York Special Investigative Services complete its investigation \ninto the incident on July 23, 2019, and finds that there is insufficient \nevidence to determine that Epstein harmed himself or that he was \nharmed by his cellmate. \nAugust 8, 2019 \nEpstein is seen by the Psychology Department and denies suicidal \nideation, intention, or plan. \nAugust 9, 2019 \nEpstein meets with his attorneys and, unbeknownst to MCC New York \npersonnel, changes his Last Will and Testament during the meeting. \nMCC New York staff receive notice that Epstein's cellmate will be \ntransferred out of the institution the following day, August 9. \nMCC New York staff discover the disk failures that occurred in the DVR 2 \nsystem on July 29 and that resulted in approximately one half of the \ninstitution's security cameras not recording, although the cameras \ncontinued to broadcast a live video feed. MCC New York staff do not \nperform the work necessary to restore recording functionality of the DVR \n2 system or address long-standing performance failures with the \ninstitution's camera system. \nAt approximately 8:30 a.m., Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 3) is transferred \nout of MCC New York. Two MCC New York SHU staff members said they \nnotified supervisory staff of Epstein's cellmate's transfer and Epstein's \nneed for a new cellmate. Other witnesses did not corroborate these \nstatements. Epstein is not assigned a new cellmate as required by the \nPsychology Department. \nSometime between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Epstein meets with his \nattorneys in the attorney conference room. Epstein's attorneys ask MCC \nNew York staff members if Epstein could be moved to a different housing \nunit or housed without a \n... [truncated, 2289 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/25 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=25]", "char_count": 2289}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nperformance failures with the institution's DVR 2 system. \nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unseals approximately \n2,000 pages of documents in civil litigation involving Ghislaine Maxwell, \nwho is later convicted in December 2021 of conspiring with Epstein to \nsexually abuse minors over the course of a decade. Some of these \ndocuments contain information that may relate to the criminal charges \npending against Epstein. There is extensive media coverage of \ninformation in the unsealed documents. \nAt approximately 6:45 p.m., Epstein leaves the attorney conference room. \nAt approximately 7:00 p.m., contrary to BOP policy but with the \npermission of a Unit Manager, Epstein is permitted to place an \nunmonitored telephone call to a number in the New York City area, \npurportedly to speak with his mother. In actuality, Epstein speaks with \nsomeone with whom he allegedly has a personal relationship. After the \ncall, Epstein is returned to his cell, where he remains without a cellmate. \nMCC New York SHU staff members do not conduct the 4:00 p.m. or 10:00 \np.m. inmate counts. After approximately 10:40 p.m., SHU staff members \ndo not conduct the required 30-minute rounds. \nAugust 10, 2019 \nMCC New York SHU staff members do not conduct the 12:00 a.m., 3:00 \na.m., or 5:00 a.m. inmate counts or any of the 30-minute rounds from \n12:00 a.m. until approximately 6:30 a.m. \nAt approximately 6:30 a.m., SHU staff begin to deliver breakfast to \ninmates in the SHU through the food slots in the locked cell doors. When \nSHU staff attempt to deliver breakfast to Epstein, SHU staff unlock the \ndoor to the tier in which Epstein's cell was located and then knock on the \ndoor to Epstein's cell. Epstein, who is housed alone in the cell, does not \nrespond to SHU staff. SHU staff unlock the cell door and find Epstein \nhanged in his cell, with one end of a piece of orange cloth around his neck \nand the other end tied to the top portion\n... [truncated, 2674 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/26 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=26]", "char_count": 2674}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ninitiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). At approximately 6:33 a.m., \nBOP medical staff respond to the SHU, continue CPR, apply the \nautomated external defibrillator, and move Epstein to MCC New York's \nHealth Services Unit. Minutes after arriving in the Health Services Unit, an \nambulance arrives and paramedics continue CPR, incubate Epstein, and \nadminister medications and fluids. At approximately 7:10 a.m., the \nambulance takes Epstein to New York Presbyterian Lower Manhattan \nHospital, where he is pronounced dead at 7:36 a.m. by the emergency \nroom physician. \nMCC New York staff unsuccessfully attempts to recover video from the \nDVR 2 system of the SHU and the FBI seizes all hard drives contained in \nthe DVR 2 system as evidence. The BOP begins repairing the DVR 2 \nsystem. \nAugust 11, 2019 \nThe Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New York, performs an \nautopsy on Epstein. \nAugust 14-15, 2019 \nAugust 16, 2019 \nThe FBI returns to MCC New York and seizes additional components of \nthe DVR 2 system and the entire DVR 1 system. The FBI's Digital Forensics \nAnalysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, subsequently begins to conduct a \nforensic analysis of MCC New York's DVR systems and determines that \nthere was catastrophic disk failures in the DVR 2 system disk array, and \nno recordings were available on the DVR 2 system after July 29, 2019. \nThe Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New York, releases its \nfindings publicly that the cause of death was hanging and that the \nmanner of death was suicide. \n20 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172573\n", "char_count": 1660}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 4: Custody and Care of Epstein Prior to His Death \nI. \nEpstein's Arrest and Detention on July 6 \nOn July 2, 2019, a grand jury of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York returned a two-\ncount indictment that charged Epstein with committing sex trafficking and a sex trafficking conspiracy, in \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2, based on allegations that he sexually exploited and \nabused dozens of minor girls, some as young as 14 years old, at his homes in New York and Florida. The \nindictment alleged that from at least 2002 through 2005, Epstein enticed and recruited girls, many of whom \nhe knew were underage, to visit his homes and perform sex acts in exchange for paying each girl hundreds \nof dollars in cash. The indictment further alleged that Epstein, working with employees and associates, \ncreated a vast network of underage victims to sexually exploit in New York and Florida by paying some \nvictims hundreds of dollars in cash each to recruit other minor girls to be similarly abused by Epstein. In \naddition to the two criminal charges, the indictment also contained forfeiture allegations, which sought to \nforfeit to the United States any property that was either used to commit or was a proceed of the charged \nsex trafficking offense, including Epstein's New York residence. \nOn Saturday, July 6, 2019, Epstein was arrested at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey upon his return to the \nUnited States from France. He was transported to the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New \nYork, New York (MCC New York), where he was initially placed in the general inmate population. MCC New \nYork is a federal administrative detention facility operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The BOP \ntemporarily closed MCC New York in October 2021 due to substandard conditions that are unrelated to this \ninvestigation. When it was operational, MCC New York housed primarily pre\n... [truncated, 4354 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/28 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=28]", "char_count": 4354}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nobligations as a registered sex offender. The court found that the United States had also shown by a \npreponderance of the evidence that Epstein was a flight risk based on the severity of the criminal charges \nand severity of the potential punishment the strength of the evidence against Epstein; and Epstein's \ncriminal history, sex offender registration, vast wealth and substantial liquid assets, multiple residences, a \nforeign residence, limited family ties in the United States, private plane(s), extensive overseas travel, and \npossession of a foreign passport bearing Epstein's photograph but not his name. Finally, the court found \nthat Epstein's pretrial release proposal was inadequate because, among other things, it did not contain \nsworn, accurate, or comprehensive financial statements; it required excessive court involvement in routine \naspects of the proposed home confinement the proposed consent to extradition was unenforceable; and \nthe proposed appointment of a trustee to monitor Epstein's compliance with release conditions was \nunacceptably vague and problematic due to the potential conflict of interest presented by monitoring the \nconduct of a person who paid the trustee's salary, and allegations that Epstein engaged in unlawful acts with \nhis employees during the sex trafficking conspiracy. Epstein appealed the court's order on July 22, 2019. \nThis appeal remained pending at the time of Epstein's death. \nII. \nMCC New York's Special Housing Unit (SHU) \n‘Nk \nEpstein was initially assigned to MCC New York's general inmate population, but on July 7, 2019, at \napproximately 7:20 p.m., he was moved to the SHU pending reclassification due to the significant increase in \nmedia coverage and awareness of his notoriety among other MCC New York inmate residents. The SHU is a \nhousing unit within MCC New York where inmates are securely separated from the general inmate \npopulation, and kept locked in their cells for a\n... [truncated, 4458 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/29 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=29]", "char_count": 4458}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nconference room, even at times when Epstein had to leave the conference room for a medical visit \nAt MCC New York, the SHU was located on the south side of the institution's ninth floor and was often \nreferred to as \"9 South.\" Primary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door adjacent to the elevator \nbay on the north side of the floor (Main Exterior Entry Door). That door was opened remotely by a staff \nmember in MCC New York's centralized Control Center, which is located on the first floor of the institution. \nAccess into the SHU from the primary elevator bay was further controlled by a second locked door (Main \nInterior Entry Door), to which only one of the correctional officers assigned to the SHU had keys, while on \nduty. \nAx.\nSecondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door adjacent to the elevator bay on the south side \nof the floor. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centralized Control Center. Access \ninto the SHU from the secondary elevator bay was further controlled by three additional locked doors, to \nwhich only one of the correctional officers assigned to the SHU had keys, while on duty. The secondary \nelevators and access doors were used only by staff when facilitating visits between the SHU inmates and \ntheir outside visitors. \n4IL. \nWithin the SHU, inmates were assigned to six separate tiers or groups of cells, three of which were \naccessible via stairs leading up from the common area on the ninth floor (Upper Tiers—G, J, and L Tiers) and \nthree of which were accessible via stairs leading down from the common area on the ninth floor (Lower \nTiers—H, K, and M Tiers). The entrance to each tier could be accessed only via a single locked door at the \ntop or bottom of the staircase leading to the individual tier. Keys to open the locked tier doors were \navailable only to one of the correctional officers assigned to the SHU, while on duty. Each tier had eight \ncells, \n... [truncated, 3927 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/30 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=30]", "char_count": 3927}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 4.1: Primary SHU Entrance (Ninth Floor) \nMain Interior \nEntry Door \nFigure 4.2: Secondary SHU Entrance (Ninth Floor) \nSouth \nElevato,\nI i \ni \n \nej\n-1 \n_ I \n/ \nIe \ne \nMain Entry Door \n(not pictured) \n24 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172577\n", "char_count": 323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 4.3: Tiered Structure of SHU (2-Dimensional) \nUpper Tiers \nFigure 4.4: Tiered Structure of SHU (3-Dimensional) \n25 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172578\n", "char_count": 236}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 4.5: Stairways Leading to SHU Upper and Lower Tiers \nIll. \nEpstein's Initial Cell and Cellmate Assignment from July 7 to July 23 \nAccording to the Warden, MCC New York typically housed inmates in the SHU with a cellmate. Upon \nEpstein's initial transfer to the SHU on July 7, 2019, he was assigned a cell in the M Tier of the SHU with \nInmate 1. The Warden explained that Epstein was a high-profile inmate and that he initially selected Inmate \n1 to be Epstein's cellmate because Inmate 1 was another high-profile inmate, and the Warden believed \nInmate 1 to be the least likely SHU inmate to harm Epstein.23 Epstein and Inmate 1 were housed together in \ncell Z05-124. \nIV. \nEvents of July 23 and the Placement of Epstein on Suicide Watch and Psychological \nObservation from July 23 to July 30 \nAccording to BOP documents, at approximately 1:27 a.m. on July 23, 2019, Senior Officer Specialists 1 and 2 \nheard noise coming from the M Tier in the SHU, the tier where Epstein was housed. Senior Officer Specialist \n2 documented in a BOP report that upon checking cell Z05-124, he saw Epstein laying down near his bunk \nwith 'a piece of handmade orange cloth\" around his neck, and Senior Officer Specialist 1 wrote in a BOP \nreport that Epstein's cellmate (Inmate 1) said Epstein had attempted to hang himself. In his interview with \nthe OIG, Senior Officer Specialist 1 said that Inmate 1, who appeared shaken up, told him that he had been \n23 In 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty in a Florida state court to a felony charge of procurement of minors to engage in \nprostitution in violation of Florida Statute § 796.03. As a result of this conviction, Epstein was required to register as a \nsex offender. \n26 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172579\n", "char_count": 1822}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nasleep on the floor of the cell and was awoken when he felt Epstein land on him. Senior Officer Specialist 2 \nreported that after he had been alerted by the noise, he grabbed the door keys, called the Control Center \nfor assistance, and then he and Senior Officer Specialist 1 entered the cell, where they secured and removed \nEpstein's cellmate. Senior Officer Specialist 1 reported that he then reentered the cell, placed Epstein on his \nside, and removed an orange homemade rope\" from his neck. In his interview with the OIG, Senior Officer \nSpecialist 1 said Epstein had a sheet around his neck, which was attached to the bunkbed ladder in the cell. \nSenior Officer Specialist 1 said that Epstein was sifting on the floor of the cell with his back against the \nbunkbed ladder. Senior Officer Specialist l's report said that Epstein was breathing, but unresponsive, so he \nbegan chest compressions, at which time the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant and other staff arrived. \nSenior Officer Specialist 1 confirmed in his OIG interview that they started cardiopulmonary resuscitation \nbut stopped when they realized that Epstein was already breathing. The Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant documented in a BOP report that when she arrived at the SHU, she saw Epstein lying in the fetal \nposition in his cell, breathing heavily and snoring, wearing only a t-shirt and boxers. The Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant observed that Epstein's neck was red, but she saw no further injuries. She called out \nto Epstein, who flickered his eyes and continued snoring. The correctional officers unsuccessfully tried to \nget Epstein to stand on his own, and then placed him on a stretcher and took him to the Health Services \nUnit.\nAccording to BOP records, at approximately 1:40 a.m., Epstein was transferred out of the SHU and placed on \nsuicide watch. As previously noted in Chapter 2, inmates on suicide watch are housed in a dedicated room, \ntypi\n... [truncated, 4087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/34 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=34]", "char_count": 4087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant's report notes that she also spoke with Epstein, who told her that \nhe had returned to his cell after an attorney visit at approximately 8:00 p.m. the previous day, at which time \nhis cellmate was reading the Daily News newspaper. Epstein's said his cellmate turned to a page of the \nnewspaper that had Epstein's picture and reported that Epstein was worth $77 million. Epstein told the \nMorning Watch Operations Lieutenant that he looked at his picture, balled it up, and threw it in the garbage. \nEpstein further stated that he woke up at approximately 1:00 a.m. to get a drink of water, returned to his \nbunk, and the next thing he remembered was that he was snoring and MCC New York staff were inside his \ncell. When asked about the allegations against his cellmate, Epstein said he had been told that if his \ncellmate hurt him, MCC New York staff would not care. \nInmate 2, who was housed in the same SHU tier as Epstein on July 23, told the FBI about an incident that \noccurred in the SHU around 1:20 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. on an unspecified date. Inmate 2 said he was reading a \nbook when he heard an inmate scream and bang on the cell door to get the SHU officers' attention. Inmate \n2 said he could only see the cell door and not inside. According to Inmate 2, Senior Officer Specialist 2 \nresponded to the cell and then left and returned with additional officers. The FBI was further told by Inmate \n2 that the officers opened the cell door, removed an inmate, placed the inmate in handcuffs, and put the \ninmate in the shower area. Inmate 2 stated that the officers reentered the cell and Inmate 2 heard a thump \nas if something had hit the floor. The officers then pulled the other inmate out of the cell, placed him on a \nstretcher, and took him away. Inmate 2 also told the FBI that, later in the evening, around 2:10 a.m. to 2:15 \na.m., the correctional officers returned to the cell where the incide\n... [truncated, 4102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/35 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=35]", "char_count": 4102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nuntil July 30, 2019.24\nThe MCC New York Chief Psychologist told the OIG that an inmate is placed on suicide watch when the \ninmate is believed to be imminently suicidal. During suicide watch, the inmate is under constant \nobservation by staff; the cell lights are on 24 hours a day; and the inmate is given a special mattress, \nblanket, and smock to wear. The Chief Psychologist explained that although psychological observation is a \nlower classification, at MCC New York the psychological observations was the same as suicide watch except \nthat inmates were allowed to have their clothing and some materials, such as books, as determined by \nPsychology Department. At MCC New York, psychological observation was used to see how an inmate was \ndoing before releasing the inmate to a housing unit. \nThe Chief Psychologist told the OIG that the Psychology Department independently makes the decision who \ngoes on and off suicide watch. The Chief Psychologist also stated that the Psychology Department makes \nrecommendations to the institution's management about where inmates are housed when they come off of \nsuicide watch. According to her, the Psychology Department always recommends that inmates coming off \nof suicide watch be housed with other inmates; however, she said the recommendations cannot always be \ncarried out due to other security factors. When that occurs, the Psychology Department recommends \nconducting increased rounds and keeping an eye on those inmates. \nThe Chief Psychologist further told the OIG that, based on a conversation with the Psychiatrist with the \nBOP's Central Office who was the BOP's National Suicide Prevention Coordinator, she passed along to the \nMCC New York executive staff the recommendation that Epstein be housed with an alleged sex offender in \nthe SHU.25 The Chief Psychologist stated that the MCC New York Warden and Associate Wardens decided \nwho Epstein would be housed with and the Psychology De\n... [truncated, 3563 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/36 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=36]", "char_count": 3563}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nV. \nThe Psychology Departments Post-July 23 Determination that Epstein Needed to \nHave an Appropriate Cellmate \nFollowing the events of July 23, the MCC New York Psychology Department determined that Epstein needed \nto be housed with an appropriate cellmate. To ensure Epstein's cellmate requirement was disseminated to \nMCC New York staff, on July 30, 2019, at 12:30 p.m., the Staff Psychologist sent an email to over 70 MCC New \nYork staff members which read, \"Inmate Epstein #76318-054 is being taken off Psych Observation and \nneeds to be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" A review of the email recipients showed that the email \nwas sent to, among others, the Warden, Associate Warden 2, the Captain, the SHU Lieutenant, the SIS \nLieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, and Correctional Officer 1. The Staff \nPsychologist also completed a \"Post-Watch Report,\" which stated that the \"SHU L[ieutenant] informed \ninmate Epstein needs to be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" \nThe Warden told the OIG that the Chief Psychologist had advised him that Epstein was not suicidal and was \nready to return to the SHU. According to the Warden, when he spoke with the Chief Psychologist regarding \nEpstein, she told him to assign Epstein a cellmate. He added that MCC New York would typically house an \ninmate who was previously on suicide watch with a cellmate. The Warden stated there was no BOP policy \nmandating that an inmate coming off of suicide watch have a cellmate, but they usually housed such an \ninmate with a cellmate. \nDuring their interviews with the OIG, Associate Warden 1, the Captain, and the SHU Lieutenant each said \nthey had verbally informed the SHU staff of Epstein's cellmate requirement and were confident that all SHU \nstaff members knew of Epstein's cellmate requirement. Additionally, the Cap\n... [truncated, 3811 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/37 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=37]", "char_count": 3811}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nthat MCC New York staff members knew of Epstein's cellmate requirement because it was discussed during \nstaff meetings, department head meetings, SHU meetings, morning meetings, and during required staff \ntraining. \nForensic Psychologist 1 told the O16 that on August 9, 2019, she was present during a meeting in which one \nof Epstein's attorneys opposed Epstein having a cellmate. Forensic Psychologist 1 said she explained to the \nattorney that Epstein needed to have a cellmate because he was housed in the SHU and he was a sex \noffender. \nVI. \nSelection of Epstein's Cellmate After Psychological Observation \nThe Captain told the OIG that he compiled a list of possible cellmates for Epstein, vetted those inmates, and \nprovided the list of names to the MCC New York Warden. The Warden told the OIG that he identified two \npotential cellmates and tentatively decided on Inmate 3. The Warden said he passed this information on to \nthe BOP Director's Chief of Staff and later received word that Mould assign Inmate 3 to be Epstein's \ncellmate. \nThe Warden told the O16 that no inmates were pre-vetted to replace Inmate 3 if he left MCC New York. The \nWarden and the Captain told the OIG that if Inmate 3 had been removed as Epstein's cellmate, they would \nhave had to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to ensure that Epstein was housed with an \nappropriate inmate. According to the Warden and the Captain, if Inmate 3 were no longer detained at MCC \nNew York, SHU staff should have informed a lieutenant on duty, who should have informed the Captain, \nwho would have ensured that the process of selecting a new cellmate for Epstein would begin. \nVII. \nEpstein's Cell Assignment from July 30 to August 10 \nAs a result of Epstein's cellmate requirement, on July 30, 2019, following his release from psychological \nobservation, Epstein was initially assigned to cell Z04-206 with Inmate 3 in the J Tier of the SHU.36 A BOP \nmedical re\n... [truncated, 3962 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/38 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=38]", "char_count": 3962}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nmedical device. SOP witnesses told the OIG that on that same date, Epstein and Inmate 3 were moved to \ncell 206-220 in the L Tier of the SHU to accommodate the electrical needs of Epstein's medical device. Of all \nthe cells in the SHU, cell Z06-220 was the closest cell with a direct line of sight to the SHU Officers' Station in \nthe common area of the SHU, which was approximately 15 feet away. \nInmate 3 told the OIG that when he and Epstein were first assigned as cellmates in cell Z06-220 in the L Tier, \nthe Day Watch Operations Lieutenant told Inmate 3 that he had a \"cool bunkie\" for him, an \"old guy\" who \nwould not bother Inmate 3. Inmate 3 said he told the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant that he slept on the \nbottom bunk, and the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant said that would not be a problem because his new \ncellmate slept on the floor. Inmate 3 said he was surprised by this response because he understood that \nsleeping on the floor was not allowed and he had previously been disciplined for doing so. \nWhen Epstein arrived in the cell, Inmate 3 recognized him and said he (Inmate 3) told the Day Watch \nOperations Lieutenant that the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant had \"jammed up\" Inmate 3. Inmate 3 said \nhe knew Epstein had tried to hang himself and had just come from suicide watch. According to Inmate 3, \nthe Day Watch Operations Lieutenant told Inmate 3 not to worry, that Epstein was okay, and that Inmate 3 \nshould keep an eye on him. Inmate 3 asked the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant if he was supposed to \nserve as a suicide prevention advocate, that is, an inmate who is assigned to the suicide watch area. Inmate \n3 said the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant laughed and brushed off Inmate 3's comment. \nAccording to Inmate 3, correctional officers brought two mattresses to the cell for Epstein and placed them \non the floor. Epstein put the mattresses on the right side of the cell, which is only partially visible t\n... [truncated, 2518 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/39 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=39]", "char_count": 2518}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 4.6: SHU L Tier \nFigure 4.7: Exterior Views of Epstein's Cell \n33 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172586\n", "char_count": 187}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 4.8: The Door to the Cell Occupied by Epstein and Inmate 3 from July 30 to August 9 \n34 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172587\n", "char_count": 209}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 4.9: View of Epstein's Empty Cell from Cell Door Window \nfir \nFigure 4.10: Interior View of Epstein's Empty Cell from Just Inside the Cell Door \n35 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172588\n", "char_count": 269}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "EFTA00172589\n", "char_count": 13}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nVIII. \nPsychological Evaluations of Epstein from July 6 to August 9 \nDuring Epstein's detention at MCC New York, a variety of medical professionals, including a Medical Doctor, \na Clinical Nurse, and Physician Assistant 1, who is a Mid-Level Practitioner, conducted multiple medical \nappointments with Epstein, and Epstein was prescribed a variety of medications for various ailments and \nhealth needs. Epstein was also given an eye and dental exam, as well as a blood panel screening. This \nsection details Epstein's psychological evaluations while he was in MCC New York custody prior to his death. \nOn Saturday, July 6, 2019, at 9:38 p.m., upon Epstein's intake into MCC New York, he was medically screened \nby Physician Assistant 2. The screening included taking vital signs and asking various medical history \nquestions, including questions related to Epstein's mental health. Among other things, Physician Assistant 2 \nannotated that Epstein did not have current suicidal ideation and had denied having a history of suicide \nattempts. Physician Assistant 2 instructed Epstein how he could obtain medical, dental, and mental health \ncare. \nAt 2:58 a.m. on Sunday, July 7, 2019, a Facilities Assistant emailed the Psychology Department asking that \nsomeone evaluate Epstein because he appeared 'distraught, sad, and a little confused.\" \nOn July 8, 2019, Forensic Psychologist 1 of the Psychology Department conducted an Intake Screening of \nEpstein that included a self-report, staff observation, and a review of information in SENTRY. Forensic \nPsychologist 1 noted that during Physician Assistant l's initial intake evaluation, on the intake questionnaire, \nEpstein denied having a history of mental health treatment and any history of mental health symptoms. \nAdditionally, Forensic Psychologist 1 noted no suicidal ideations, attempts, or self-harm; no history of \nsubstance abuse or treatment; and no sexual offense convictions. \nDuring the \n... [truncated, 3839 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/44 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=44]", "char_count": 3839}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nSuicide watch is for inmates who are showing immediate and exigent signs of being suicidal. \nSubsequent to the intake screening, on July 8, 2019, the Chief Psychologist consulted with the Psychiatrist \nwho was the National Suicide Prevention Coordinator from the BOP's Central Office, regarding the various \nrisk factors associated with Epstein for suicidality. These risk factors were that Epstein was involved in a \nhigh-profile case with media attention, had been charged with sex offenses, was on pretrial status, and \nthere was the potential for bad news from a court proceeding that day. A determination was made that \nupon Epstein's return from court, staff were to notify the psychologist and place Epstein on a \"watch status\" \nuntil a thorough suicide risk assessment could be conducted. \nWhen Epstein returned from court on July 8, 2019, it was after duty hours and MCC New York staff contacted \nthe Psychology Department and informed them that Epstein denied suicidality. However, for precautionary \nreasons, Epstein was placed on psychological observation status until Psychology Department staff could \nconduct a suicide risk assessment the following day. During Epstein's period of psychological observation, \ninmate companions continuously observed him and kept a log that detailed Epstein's activities in 15-minute \nincrements. Under BOP policy, on a case-by-case basis, the Warden may authorize such an inmate \ncompanion program at an institution to utilize inmate observers, who are selected, trained, and supervised \nby the institution's Suicide Prevention Program Coordinator. \nOn July 9, 2019, the Chief Psychologist conducted a suicide assessment of Epstein. She reviewed Epstein's \nmedical record and interviewed him, which revealed that he possessed some risk factors for suicidality. \nEpstein denied having any past or present suicidal ideation, intention, or plan, and also denied having any \nhistory of mental health treatm\n... [truncated, 4203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/45 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=45]", "char_count": 4203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nThe following day, July 11, 2019, the Staff Psychologist attempted to see Epstein in the morning and \nafternoon, but he was meeting with his attorneys. Since the Staff Psychologist was unable to meet with \nEpstein, the Chief Psychologist met with Epstein in the attorney conference area for a psychological \nobservation follow-up. During this meeting, Epstein expressed concerns about a number of issues, \nincluding not yet receiving his property, not having enough water during his attorney conference, and a \ndesire to attend recreation. Epstein was upset about having to wear an orange uniform and the Chief \nPsychologist explained the orange uniform was because he was being housed in the SHU. During this \nclinical contact, the Chief Psychologist provided Epstein with additional coping strategies, to which he was \nreceptive. Additionally, Epstein was educated about routine and emergency procedures for contacting the \nPsychology Department staff and reminded of self-help books/audiotapes available through the Psychology \nDepartment Epstein continued to deny any suicidal ideation, intention, or plan and was scheduled to be \nseen again the following week. The Chief Psychologist told the OIG that Epstein and his attorney mocked \nher for thinking Epstein was suicidal.\nS \nOn July 16, 2019, at Epstein's request, the Chief Psychologist met with Epstein during his\ntorney \nconference. The Chief Psychologist noted that Epstein did not have any psychological concerns and denied \nsuicidality. The Chief Psychologist noted that she provided Epstein with psychoeducation regarding \nadditional coping strategies. Epstein was educated about routine and emergency procedures to contact \nPsychology Department staff and reminded of self-help books and audiotapes that are available to him. \nThe Chief Psychologist noted in her clinical contact report that there was no need for follow-up and that \nEpstein would be seen in the SHU for rounds and mon\n... [truncated, 4324 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/46 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=46]", "char_count": 4324}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nno inflammation, deformities, hematomas, lacerations, or tenderness. The BOP report stated that Epstein \nwas able to move his neck without any restriction and denied having any pain, discomfort, or respiratory \nproblems. Physician Assistant 1 further noted there was another small erythema (or redness) on Epstein's \nleft knee about 2 centimeters in diameter, which was noted as mild. Physician Assistant l's assessment was \nthat the injury was unspecified and was self-inflicted. \nAlso on July 23, 2019, the Staff Psychologist conducted a suicide risk assessment that included a clinical \ninterview of Epstein and a review of Epstein's medical record, the psychology data system, and a review of \nthe SENTRY database. According to the Staff Psychologist's report, Epstein denied knowing why he was \nplaced on suicide watch. SOP records state that Epstein recalled getting a drink of water the night prior and \nthen went back to bed. Epstein's next recollection was hearing himself snoring. The BOP assessment \nrecords reflect that Epstein wanted to know why he was on suicide watch and he was informed that he had \nbeen found with a string on his neck. The Staff Psychologist noted that it was unclear whether Epstein had \nplaced the string around his neck or if someone else did. Epstein denied current suicidal or self-harm \nthoughts or ever having these thoughts; denied a history of self-harm and suicide attempts; and denied \nfeeling hopeless and fearing for his safety. Epstein told the Staff Psychologist that he lived to enjoy life and \nthat his future plans included fighting his criminal case and getting back to his normal life. The Staff \nPsychologist noted that Epstein was to remain on suicide watch for further observation. The Staff \nPsychologist told the OIG she had advised BOP staff that Epstein would need a cellmate. \nThe Chief Psychologist said she considered three possibilities to explain the July 23 incident (1) Epstein \nan\n... [truncated, 4407 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/47 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=47]", "char_count": 4407}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \n2 that he did not recall himself or his cellmate tying a string or rope around his neck. \nFollowing Forensic Psychologist 2's examination of Epstein, she determined that he should be removed from \nsuicide watch. Forensic Psychologist 2 told the FBI that she discussed the decision to step Epstein down to \npsychological observation from suicide watch with the Chief Psychologist and Associate Warden 2, who both \nconcurred with her determination. Epstein was therefore taken off suicide watch and placed on \npsychological observation, during which time BOP records reflect that he was continuously observed by \ninmate companions and seen daily by Psychology Department staff. Forensic Psychologist 2 annotated in \nthe Post Suicide Watch Report that the reason for removing Epstein from suicide watch was due to Epstein \nstating he had no interest in killing himself; he had described having a wonderful life; and Epstein had said it \nwould be crazy to take his own life and he would not do that to himself. Forensic Psychologist 2 told the FBI \nthat following her clinical visit with Epstein on July 24, 2019, she was cautious with Epstein's case and his \nself-reporting of what had occurred the previous day. Forensic Psychologist 2 stated that she observed \nsigns of positivity and that Epstein \"adamantly denied suicide.\" Nevertheless, she was not comfortable \ntaking Epstein off suicide watch and instead opted to place Epstein on psychological observation, which was \na step down from suicide watch. Forensic Psychologist 2 told the FBI that \"I made the decision with the \nconsent\" of the Chief Psychologist and Associate Warden 2, with whom she had consulted. Forensic \nPsychologist 2 told the FBI that placing Epstein on psychological observation allowed him to possess hygiene \nproducts, two novels, attend legal visits, and take showers. It also allowed him to have standard inmate \nclothing, a flex pen, a toothbrush and toothpaste, soap, a\n... [truncated, 4605 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/48 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=48]", "char_count": 4605}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwas similar to when he was housed in the SHU. The Staff Psychologist informed Epstein that he would be \nmoving to a different cell. \nOn July 29, 2019, according to BOP records, Epstein reported to the Chief Psychologist that his memory of \nthe July 23, 2019 incident may be impaired because of his sleep apnea. On this date, Epstein was to receive \nhis personally owned medical device. SOP records state that Epstein was aware he would be returning to \nthe SHU but reported that he did not feel well due to lack of sleep and other medical concerns. Epstein \nasked to stay on psychological observation, where he felt safe, for one more night to get some sleep and \nthen return to the SHU with a cellmate the following day. According to BOP records, the Chief Psychologist \ninformed Epstein that he could stay 1 more night and explained that there were no mental health issues \nprecluding him from returning to the SHU the following day. The Chief Psychologist explained to Epstein \nthat he would be placed in a safe situation in the SHU. Epstein again was provided supportive interventions \nand psychoeducation regarding additional coping strategies. BOP records state that Epstein was somewhat \nreceptive but more concerned with getting phone calls, recreation, and housing placement concerns. \nOn July 30, 2019, according to BOP records, Epstein reported to the Staff Psychologist that he had not slept \nwell, and Epstein discussed how he did not think he would be able to sleep well in the SHU because of the \nnoise. The Staff Psychologist annotated in the clinical contact summary that documentation revealed \nEpstein had eaten and taken a shower the day prior (July 29) and also had eaten breakfast on July 30. The \nStaff Psychologist annotated, Epstein did not display indications of disturbed thought process or content \nand denied current suicidal or self-harm ideation. BOP records further stated that Epstein agreed to \nimmediately report to\n... [truncated, 4343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/49 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=49]", "char_count": 4343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nOn July 31, 2019, according to BOP records, Forensic Psychologist 3 conducted a clinical visit with Epstein \nand noted that he was in a pleasant mood, generally slept well, and was getting readjusted to being in the \nSHU. Epstein told Forensic Psychologist 3 that he was getting along with his cellmate. According to her \nreport, Epstein explicitly denied recent and current suicidal ideation or intent and denied having thoughts of \nharming others. Epstein also agreed to contact staff immediately if he experienced any suicidal thoughts or \npsychological distress. Forensic Psychologist 3's report further stated that Epstein was receptive to her \nutilization of cognitive behavioral therapeutic techniques. She wrote that there did not appear to be a need \nfor follow-up at the time and Epstein expressed a willingness to self-refer to Psychology Department staff if \nneeded. According to the report, Epstein would continue to be seen during routi \nHU rounds and SHU \nreviews. \nOn August 1, 2019, according to BOP records, SOP Receiving and Discharge staff, who are responsible for \nprocessing inmates who enter or leave the facility, notified the Staff Psychologist that the previous day when \nthe U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) had brought Epstein back to MCC New York from court, they had provided \na form on which it was noted that Epstein had \"suicidal tendencies: The OIG reviewed the USMS Prisoner \nSchedule Report for July 31, 2019, as well as the USMS Prisoner Custody Alert Notice that had annotated in \nthe remarks that Epstein had \"Mental Concerns: Suicidal Tendencies\". The Chief Psychologist told the OIG \nthat the USMS annotates suicidal tendencies for many inmates if the USMS was aware the inmate was \npreviously on suicide watch. Therefore, the Chief Psychologist said the annotation was not abnormal since \nEpstein had just come off suicide watch and Epstein may have told the USMS that he had been on suicide \nwatch. \nFollowing r\n... [truncated, 4456 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/50 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=50]", "char_count": 4456}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nto be in any distress. The Chief Psychologist wrote that SHU staff had not reported any unusual behaviors \nrelated to Epstein. She provided Epstein with supportive interventions and psychoeducation regarding \nadditional coping strategies, to which Epstein was receptive. Epstein was educated on routine and \nemergency procedures for contacting Psychology Department staff and also reminded of self-help books \nand audiotapes that are available to him. The Chief Psychologist wrote that Epstein would be seen in weekly \nSHU rounds and monthly for SHU reviews. The Chief Psychologist told the OIG that the fact that Epstein \nunderwent three suicide risk assessments was unusual. \n44 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172597\n", "char_count": 795}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 5: The Events of August 8-10, 2019, and Epstein's Death \nI. \nEpstein Signs a New Last Will and Testament on August 8 \nIn the weeks following Epstein's death, multiple media outlets reported that Epstein signed a new Last Will \nand Testament on August 8, 2019. At least one media organization published a copy of the notarized \ndocument showing that it was signed by Epstein and two of his attorneys and notarized on August 8, 2019. \nAttorney visitor logs from the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York (MCC New York) \nconfirmed that those attorneys and the notary public visited Epstein on that date. The OIG confirmed via \ncourt records that the August 8, 2019 will and other probate-related documents were filed in the Superior \nCourt of the Virgin Islands on August 15, 2019. Among the court filings was an affidavit from another \nattorney who stated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney \nvisitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG's \ninvestigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed \nhis will 2 days before he died. \nThe Chief Psychologist said she had heard that Epstein had changed his will from media reporting following \nhis death. The Chief Psychologist did not know if the media reporting was accurate, but she thought that if \nit were true, it would have been useful information to know because it would have been a red flag. The Staff \nPsychologist and the Chief Psychologist told the OIG that if Epstein's attorneys had notified them or the \nPsychology Department that Epstein had changed his will, such information would have been a factor \nwarranting a review of Epstein's mental state and Epstein probably would have been placed back on suicide \nwatch or some type of observation. \nII. \nCourt Order on August 9 Releasing Epstein-Related Documents in Pendi\n... [truncated, 3407 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/52 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=52]", "char_count": 3407}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nAugust 8, 2019, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) sent an email to MCC New York personnel assigned to \nReceiving and Discharge, the area within the Correctional Services Department that is responsible for \nprocessing inmates who enter or leave the facility, with the subject 'Transfer of Prisoners from NYM [MCC \nNew York] to GEO.\"29 The body of the email identified Inmate 3 as one of the prisoners to be transferred \nand further stated, \"Please schedule the transfer for Friday 8/9/19.\" \nAt 3:36 p.m. on the same day, the USMS sent a second email to a number of MCC New York personnel, \nincluding Associate Warden 2, the Captain, the SHU Lieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the \nDay Watch Activities Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, another Lieutenant, and the SIS \nLieutenant, with the subject \"Prisoner Production 08-09-2019.\" This email contained two attachments, one \nof which was the Prisoner Schedule Report for MCC New York for August 9, 2019. The first page of this \nattachment reflects that Inmate 3 was scheduled to be transferred from MCC New York to GEO (Queens \nDetention Facility) on August 9, 2019. This attachment also includes the acronym 'WAB\" within the \nDestination/Description portion of the document, which MCC New York personnel told the OIG means \"with \nall belongings.\" During their OIG interviews, MCC New York staff members further explained that the 'WAB\" \nnotation meant that Inmate 3 was being permanently removed from MCC New York on August 9, 2019. \nNotwithstanding this email, as detailed below, several of the email recipients identified above, including the \nCaptain, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that \nthey believed Inmate 3 had gone to court on August 9, and they did not know he had been transferred to \nanother facility. \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Reject Epstein Attorney's Request that Epstein be Housed \nWithout a Cel\n... [truncated, 3816 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/53 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=53]", "char_count": 3816}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nthat took place within the institution during their respective shifts. \nThe Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist was the supervisor of Receiving and Discharge on August 9, \n2019, and was responsible for overseeing all inmate movements in and out of the institution that day. The \nSupervisory Correctional Systems Specialist verified that Receiving and Discharge would have used the \nUSMS emails sent on August 8, 2019, to coordinate Inmate 3's transfer out MCC New York, and since Inmate \n3 was listed as 'WAB\" on the USMS emails, that meant he was being transferred from the facility and not \ncoming back. She explained to the OIG that if Inmate 3 had been going to court, as many pretrial inmates \nheld at MCC New York often did, the Daily Log would have reflected \"court\" rather than \"pre-remove.\" Since \nthe Daily Log listed Inmate 3 as \"pre-remove,\" the Receiving and Discharge personnel who entered the \ninformation into the report were made aware that Inmate 3 was being transferred from MCC New York on \nor before the morning of August 9, 2019. The Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist told the OIG that \nthe language in the USMS emails (\"WAIL\" i.e., \"with all belongings\") and MCC New York reports (\"pre-\nremoved\") made it clear that Inmate 3 would not be returning to the SHU or MCC New York. \nThe OIG also interviewed the Correctional Systems Officer, who was the Receiving and Discharge officer who \nhandled inmate movement in and out of MCC New York on August 9, 2019. The Correctional Systems \nOfficer confirmed that the Daily Log reflected that Inmate 3 was \"pre-removed\" on August 9, 2019, at 8:38 \na.m., because he was being officially moved from the institution to another prison. She explained to the \nOIG that the ordinary process was that Receiving and Discharge personnel would enter the information \nregarding Inmate 3 into SENTRY, along with information pertaining to other inmates who would be leaving \ntheir MC\n... [truncated, 4203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/54 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=54]", "char_count": 4203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nLieutenant on duty. The Day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the \nOIG that on August 9, 2019, they had oversight of the SHU from approximately 6:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. due \nto their position descriptions and because of the SHU Lieutenants absence. \nAccording to the MCC New York Staff Roster, on August 9, 2019, SHU Officer #1 was listed as Senior Officer \nSpecialist 5. Although SHU Officer #1 is typically the Officer in Charge, another Senior Officer Specialist told \nthe OIG that, in actuality, he was the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge on August 9 from approximately 6:00 \na.m. until 2:00 p.m. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said that since he had the most experience and \nseniority, he was considered by everyone to be the SHU Officer in Charge, which the SHU Lieutenant \nconfirmed. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to have a \ncellmate. He said that, as a general practice, every inmate who is transferred from suicide watch and/or \npsychological observation to the SHU is placed with a cellmate. He also confirmed that the SHU Lieutenant \nhad instructed him that Epstein was to be housed with a cellmate at all times. According to the Day Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge, between July 30 and August 9, 2019, he told all other MCC New York staff members \nwho worked in the SHU of Epstein's cellmate requirement and further stated that everyone who worked in \nthe SHU should have known that Epstein was required to have a cellmate due to their knowledge, training, \nand experience. \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge confirmed that on the morning of August 9, 2019, the SHU staff \nreceived an inmate call out list that listed Inmate 3 as \"WAB,\" which he explained meant that Inmate 3 was \nbeing removed from MCC New York. He told the OIG that sometime between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., he \nescorted Epstein from the SHU to the attorney conference room fo\n... [truncated, 4509 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/55 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=55]", "char_count": 4509}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nsome point that day, it was likely that he also informed the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, but he could \nnot specifically recall if he had done so. \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that a replacement cellmate should have been identified \nas soon as it was confirmed that Inmate 3 had left the institution. He said a new cellmate could have been \nreassigned before the 4:00 p.m. SHU count if it was known that Inmate 3 was not coming back, but the SHU \nstaff members had until Epstein returned from his attorney visit to assign Epstein a new cellmate. \nAccording to the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, SHU staff definitely should have realized that Inmate 3 \nwas not returning both during the 4:00 p.m. count and when Epstein returned from his attorney visit later \nthat evening. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that Epstein's daily routine was that he \nwould be with his attorneys in the attorney conference room until approximately 8:00 p.m., so SHU \npersonnel had time to make a new cellmate assignment. He said all SHU staff members shared the \nresponsibility to find a replacement cellmate and that anyone assigned to the SHU could have found \nanother inmate to replace Inmate 3. However, he also said that due to Epstein's high profile, the SHU \npersonnel should have asked a lieutenant to contact the Psychology Department to see which inmate \nshould be placed with Epstein. \nOn August 12, 2019, following Epstein's death, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge wrote a memorandum \nto the Warden stating, \"On Friday August 9, 2019 at approximately 1:50 p.m., I 5/O/S [the Day Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge] passed on to oncoming staff member [the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge] and \npresent shift staff [Senior Officer Specialist 5] and [Correctional Officer 2] that Inmate [3] was going WAS \n[i.e., with all of his belongings] and possibly may not return. Also that Inmate Epstein #76318-054 will be \nne\n... [truncated, 4248 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/56 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=56]", "char_count": 4248}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nThe Day Watch Activities Lieutenant did not recall Inmate 3 departing the institution with all of his \nbelongings or having any conversations with the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge or anyone else regarding \nInmate 3's departure from MCC New York. According to the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not \nknow that Epstein was without a cellmate. Other senior officials, including the Warden, Associate Warden 1, \nand the Captain, were also unaware of Inmate 3's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate. \nThese officials concurred that while all SHU staff and supervisors were responsible for notifying a supervisor \nin the chain-of-command of the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge \nbore primary responsibility for the notification because he was the SHU Officer in Charge and one of two \npeople who saw Inmate 3 leave the facility with all of his belongings. The Captain told the OIG that since \nEpstein was in the attorney conference room all day, no one may have even thought about it, and may have \nonly become aware when they put Epstein back in his cell after his attorney visit that evening. The Captain \nsaid as soon as the SHU staff became aware that Epstein was without a cellmate, they should have notified \nthe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant. The Captain said that if he had been informed, he would have \ntaken immediate action to ensure that Epstein was either assigned a new cellmate or monitored until that \nassignment occurred. The Captain, however, was one of the recipients of the USMS August 8 email that \nnotified members of MCC New York supervisory staff of Inmate 3's transfer to another facility. The Warden \nand Associate Warden 1 did not receive this email. \nThe Warden told the OIG that he was off duty on August 9, 2019. The Warden said that in the event Epstein \nwas without a cellmate, the plan was to review the situation and decide who should replace I\n... [truncated, 4493 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/57 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=57]", "char_count": 4493}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwho witnessed the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge making it. \nSenior Officer Specialist 5 told the OIG that on August 9, he worked in the SHU from approximately 8:45 a.m. \nuntil 4:00 p.m. Senior Officer Specialist 5 said when he reported for duty, Epstein was already with his \nattorneys, Inmate 3 had already left the SHU, and neither inmate returned to the SHU prior to his departure. \nSenior Officer Specialist 5 told the OIG that he did not know Inmate 3 had been released from MCC New \nYork and that no one told him Epstein would need a new cellmate, including the Day Watch SHU Officer in \nCharge, the Captain, the SHU Lieutenant, or anyone from the Psychology Department. \nCorrectional Officer 2 told the OIG that on August 9, he worked in the SHU from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. \nCorrectional Officer 2 said he did not recall Inmate 3 departing the SHU that day, and that he was unaware \nthat Epstein needed a new cellmate. \nThe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that he was the Operations Lieutenant at the MCC \non August 9 from approximately 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said \nhe was aware that Epstein was required to have a cellmate due to a mass email that was sent to all of the \nMCC New York Lieutenants. According to the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, everyone who regularly \nworked in the SHU should have known that Epstein was required to have a cellmate. The Evening Watch \nOperations Lieutenant told the OIG that he did not know Inmate 3 had left MCC New York earlier that day \nand was unaware that Epstein did not have a cellmate. He said that if Inmate 3 had been transported to \nReceiving and Discharge as 'WAB\" and the SHU Lieutenant was off, then another supervisor should have \nbeen notified. The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that SHU personnel assigned to his \nshift should have notified him that Epstein was without a cellmate, but he had n\n... [truncated, 4399 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/58 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=58]", "char_count": 4399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nthat Epstein needed to have an appropriate cellmate. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant also \nreceived the August 8 USMS email notifying MCC New York supervisory staff of Inmate 3's scheduled \ntransfer out of MCC New York. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that if SHU staff \nknew that Epstein required a cellmate and did not have one, they should have informed her when she \nvisited the SHU at approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 10, as part of her lieutenant rounds. \nThe Material Handler said the SHU was not his regular post and he had not attended SHU training, but he \nhad worked in the SHU approximately 10 to 20 times. According to the Material Handler, on August 9 he \nreported for a voluntary overtime shift from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and then worked his regular 8:00 a.m. \nto 4:00 p.m. shift in the warehouse. At some point during the day shift, the Day Watch Operations \nLieutenant called and asked the Material Handler if he could work overtime in the SHU, and he agreed. The \nMaterial Handler said he worked the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift in the SHU with the Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge and Noel. The Material Handler told the OIG that he felt pressured to work the third shift, \nwhich resulted in him working 24 hours straight, from 12:00 a.m. on August 9 through 12:00 a.m. on August \n10. After the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge left at 10:00 p.m., the Material Handler and Noel were \nthe only employees working in the SHU from 10:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. The Material Handler recalled that \nEpstein came back to the SHU from meeting with his attorneys at approximately 8:00 p.m., which was later \nthan the rest of the inmates, and was returned to his cell on L Tier. After the Material Handler and Noel \ngave Epstein his food, the Material Handler said they left the L Tier area. The Material Handler said Epstein \nwas alone in his cell, but he was unaware that Epstein needed a cellmate. \nNoel\n... [truncated, 4231 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/59 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=59]", "char_count": 4231}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \n9, 2019, from 6:58 p.m. to 7:19 p.m. No other BOP records exist regarding the unmonitored call, including \nidentity of the person called or a summary of the conversation. The OIG found no evidence that Epstein \nsigned an Acknowledgement of Inmate form, as required by SOP policy and necessary for him to use a non-\nInmate Telephone System line. The Acknowledgement of Inmate form provides, among other things, that \nthe BOP reserves the authority to monitor and record non-attorney conversations on any telephone located \nwithin the institution to preserve the security and orderly management of the institution and to protect the \npublic. The OIG did not find that any notification was made to the MCC New York's Special Investigative \nServices (SIS) staff advising the telephone call had been made, the date and time of the telephone call, the \nname of the person being called, Epstein's name and register number, or a brief7 ment explaining the \npurpose of Epstein's telephone call, as SOP policy requires. \nThe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that when he was preparing to escort Epstein back \nto the SHU from the attorney conference room on August 9, 2019, a Unit Manager said to the Evening Watch \nOperations Lieutenant that he was going to escort Epstein so he could provide Epstein with the opportunity \nto place a telephone call using an unrecorded legal telephone line that is utilized by inmates to call their \nattorneys. The Unit Manager was the Institutional Duty Officer the week of Epstein's death. The Northeast \nRegional Director told the OIG that an Institutional Duty Officer is a supervisor who monitors the facility on \nnon-duty hours on behalf of the Warden when the Warden is not present. \nThe Captain told the OIG that he had authorized the Unit Manager to provide Epstein with a telephone call \nfrom the SHU on August 9, 2019, because he wanted to accommodate Epstein's request for a telephone call \nsince Ep\n... [truncated, 4334 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/60 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=60]", "char_count": 4334}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nand dialed the telephone number that Epstein provided. As noted above, the number that was dialed was \nin the local 646 area code. The Unit Manager said he allowed Epstein to place the telephone call on the \nunrecorded legal line because he believed that Epstein had not set up his Inmate Telephone System account \nthat would have allowed him to call on the institutions recorded lines. According to the Unit Manager, a \nmale answered, and the Unit Manager handed the receiver to Epstein. Bullock heard Epstein say, \"Hey, how \nare you doing? How's everything?\" The Unit Manager admitted that he should have verified who was on the \nline, as Epstein had requested to make a telephone call to speak with his mother, and it was a male who \nanswered the phone. The Unit Manager said he could not verify the phone number because he believed \nthat Epstein did not have his Inmate Telephone System account set up, and he did not have any phone \nnumbers associated with his account. The Unit Manager told the OIG that after he handed the telephone to \nEpstein, his shift ended so he left the SHU and left MCC New York for the day. \nThe Unit Manager said that when he left the SHU, Epstein was still on the call and the Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge and Noel were at the officers' desk, and that Senior Officer Specialist 1 was also present. \nAccording to the Unit Manager, when he was leaving, he told the officers, 'Hey, make sure he gets his 15-\nminutes, and after that, he's done.\" The Unit Manager said he did not provide the SHU staff with \ninstructions to monitor the call. He said that after he left, he contacted Noel on the SHU telephone and \nasked her to make sure that Epstein's call had ended because his time was up. \nThe Unit Manager acknowledged that he did not stay and monitor the call as he should have done. The Unit \nManager said the proper way to have an inmate place a telephone call on an unmonitored line would be to \nbring the\n... [truncated, 4094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/61 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=61]", "char_count": 4094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nthat Epstein was issued the necessary documentation to make telephone calls when Inmate 1 was his \ncellmate. Senior Officer Specialist 1 also advised the OIG about an interaction that he had with one of \nEpstein's attorneys prior to August 9 when he was on an elevator with Epstein and the attorney. According \nto Senior Officer Specialist 1, Epstein's attorney asked him about getting Epstein the necessary \ndocumentation to make calls. Senior Officer Specialist 1 said he then verified that Epstein was able to make \ncalls through the Inmate Telephone System. When Senior Officer Specialist 1 asked Epstein why he had said \nhe was unable to make calls, Epstein responded, \"[T]hey said they monitor those phone calls.\" Senior \nOfficer Specialist 1 said that in a subsequent conversation with Epstein's attorney, the attorney asked how \nEpstein could get an unmonitored call. Senior Officer Specialist 1 told Epstein's attorney that decision had to \nbe made by a lieutenant or unit Manager. \nNoel told the OIG that after Epstein's attorney conference on August 9, the Unit Manager plugged a \ntelephone line in the legal line, and placed Epstein in a shower area within the SHU where he was afforded a \ntelephone call. The OIG investigation determined that the legal line is an unrecorded telephone line outside \nof the Inmate Telephone System, which is designed for inmates to use when speaking with their counsel \nand therefore is not recorded. Noel said that after the Unit Manager set Epstein up with the call, he left the \nSHU and did not instruct Noel, or anyone else to Noel's knowledge, to monitor Epstein's call. According to \nNoel, the call was not monitored or logged. Noel said that approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, while \nEpstein was still using the telephone, the Unit Manager called the SHU staff via telephone, told Noel that \nEpstein's time was up, and asked that Noel retrieve the telephone from Epstein. Noel estimated that \nEp\n... [truncated, 4004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/62 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=62]", "char_count": 4004}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ninstitutional count is one of the basic and essential aspects of a correctional officers job, and the count was \none of the basic and essential components of the daily operation of MCC New York. The Captain told the \nOIG that counts are a core responsibility of correctional officers and ensure accountability of the inmates. \nThe Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said that it is very important that the institutional count is \naccurate because that is how staff members know if all inmates are present and if anyone has escaped. \nOn weekdays, MCC New York conducted institutional counts at 12:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 5:00 a.m., 4:00 p.m., \nand 10:00 p.m. The 10:00 p.m. count was a stand-up count, which meant that inmates were required to \nstand when they were counted. Pursuant to BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders, two \ncorrectional officers were required to perform the institutional count for each housing unit, including the \nSHU. To perform the institutional count in the SHU, BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders \nrequired two officers to walk from tier to tier to observe and count each individual inmate. During each \ncount, one correctional officer would count the inmates while the other officer observed the inmates. The \ntwo officers would then switch roles and compare the count numbers. If the totals did not match, then the \nofficers had to conduct another count in the same manner. Correctional officers had to document their \nperformance of inmate counts on an official MCC New York form often referred to as a count slip.32\nOn the count slip, correctional officers were required to fill in the date and time the count had been \nperformed, write the total number of inmates physically present in the unit counted, and then both \ncorrectional officers printed their name and signed the count slip. Once the correctional officers had \ncompleted and signed the count slip, the count slips were then collected and deli\n... [truncated, 4095 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/63 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=63]", "char_count": 4095}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nSHU attorney visitation room, was correctly accounted for during the 4:00 p.m. and subsequent SHU counts. \nThe OIG determined that the error in the 4:00 p.m. SHU count was carried over into the next inmate count \nat 10:00 p.m. that counted an inmate who had been transferred out of the SHU. The SHU inmate count was \nnot corrected until 12:00 a.m. when the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant reviewed the master \ninstitutional count and housing unit count slips and informed SHU staff of the correct number of inmates in \nthe SHU at that time. \nSenior Officer Specialist 5 told the OIG that prior to his departure from the SHU at approximately 4:00 p.m., \nhe told the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge what the SHU count should be. In addition, the Day Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that SHU staff maintain a \"cheat sheet\" which lists the number of \ninmates believed to be in the SHU at any given time. \nWhen interviewed by the OIG, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge reviewed the 4:00 p.m. SHU count slip \nfrom August 9, 2019, which was signed by the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and Correctional Officer \nNoel. Based on his review, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that the Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge and Noel probably did not count the inmates in the SHU. He said they likely wrote down \nthe numbers they thought should have been entered for the count because the count slip inaccurately \nincluded an inmate (Inmate 4) among the number of inmates in the SHU after that inmate had been \ntransferred to another housing unit. According to what he told the OIG and wrote in an email on August 9, \nearlier that afternoon the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge observed Inmate 4 attempt to retrieve an \nunknown item from his visitor in the MCC New York SHU visiting room. The Lieutenants Log from August 9, \n2019, reflected that following this incident Inmate 4 was removed from the SHU at 3:15 p.m. and \ntr\n... [truncated, 4168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/64 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=64]", "char_count": 4168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nthe 4:00 pm SHU count slip, Noel said she did not recall if she conducted the count. According to Noel, she \nand other SHU staff filled out the count slip before conducting the counts because they knew the number of \ninmates they were supposed to report. \n2. \nThe 10:00 p.m. SHU Count on August 9 \nAt the time of the 10:00 p.m. count, all inmates in the MCC New York SHU, including Epstein, were locked in \ntheir cells for the night. At or around that time, the two officers assigned to the SHU were responsible for \nconducting the 10:00 p.m. stand up count. At 10:00 p.m. on August 9, the two assigned SHU officers were \nNoel and the Material Handler. Through review and analysis of the SHU security camera video, witness \nstatements, and BOP records, the OIG determined that MCC New York staff did not perform the 10:00 p.m. \ncount in the SHU.34 Nonetheless, Noel and the Material Handler completed and signed the 10:00 p.m. SHU \ncount slip. The 10:00 p.m. SHU count slip listed the total number of inmates as \"73 + 1.\" According to the \nMCC New York master count sheet for the 10:00 p.m. count on August 9, 2019, all units had verbally \nreported their inmate counts to the Control Center by 10:30 p.m.35 At approximately 10:36 p.m., the Control \nCenter completed all paperwork and officially cleared the 10:00 p.m. institutional count. \nThe Material Handler said he was present at the time of the 10:00 p.m. count, but that the count was not \nconducted because everyone was tired. The Material Handler noted that on August 9, he had worked an \novertime shift from 12:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m., his regular shift from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., followed by his \nSHU overtime shift from 4:00 p.m. to midnight. Thus, at the time of the 10:00 p.m. count, he had worked 22 \nconsecutive hours at MCC New York. The Material Handler verified that he and Noel signed the 10:00 p.m. \ncount slip, and believed that Noel called the Control Center with their count \n... [truncated, 3984 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/65 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=65]", "char_count": 3984}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ncounts slips accurately listed 72 inmates in the SHU. \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 told the OIG that on August 9, 2019, he worked in the Control Center from \napproximately 4:00 p.m. until 12:00 a.m., and then he worked as an Internal Officer from 12:00 a.m. until \n8:00 a.m. on August 10. According to Senior Officer Specialist 6, he took the August 9 10:00 p.m. \ninstitutional count by himself in the Control Center, and assisted with the 12:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., and 5:00 \na.m. counts on August 10 as an internal officer. Senior Officer Specialist 6 confirmed to the OIG, as MCC \nNew York records reflect, that he had received verbal counts from all units by 10:30 p.m., and further stated \nthat he had cleared the institutional count at 10:36 p.m., which was when paperwork was complete and the \ncount was officially complete. \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed the MCC New York 10:00 p.m. institutional count, which showed that the \nSHU had 73 inmates assigned, whereas the Receiving and Discharge Department had zero inmates assigned \nto the unit. When questioned by the OIG about the 10:00 p.m. SHU count slip that listed \"73 + 1\" inmates \nand was signed by the Material Handler and Noel, Senior Officer Specialist 6 told the OIG that he believed \nthat the \"+ 1\" on the count slip was in his handwriting. Senior Officer Specialist 6 also reviewed the 10:00 \np.m. Receiving and Discharge count slip, which listed \"9S + 1\" on the count slip, and told the OIG that it was \nhis handwriting.TM Senior Officer Specialist 6 explained that the \"9S + 1\" on the SHU count slip meant that he \nwas \"ghost counting\" the inmate (Inmate 4) who had been moved from the SHU, located in the 9 South area, \nto the Receiving and Discharge area earlier that day. Senior Officer Specialist 6 said that because there \nwere, in actuality, only 72 inmates in the SHU during the 10:00 p.m. count, he should have written /3 - 1\" on \nthe SHU count slip rather than \"73 + \n... [truncated, 3283 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/66 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=66]", "char_count": 3283}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nneeded to authorize him to do the \"ghost count\" and write on the count slips, although he could not recall \nprecisely who gave him the authorization or when he had done so. The OIG investigation and review \ndetermined that the only Operations Lieutenant on duty at the time was the Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant, who started her shift at 10:00 p.m. on August 9. When questioned by the OIG, the Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant adamantly denied having authorized a \"ghost count\" and the OIG identified no \nrecord or witness (other than Senior Officer Specialist 6) to indicate that she had done so. The OIG \ninterviewed other MCC New York personnel, who said 'ghost counting\" was not permitted, and stressed the \nimportance of an accurate physical count of inmates. \n3. \nThe 12:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., and 5:00 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12:00 a.m. \ninstitutional count from the Control Center. During the count, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant \nsaid she identified the issue with the inaccuracy of the SHU count slip because it counted Inmate 4 as \npresent in the SHU, when in actuality he had been removed from the SHU and placed in the Receiving and \nDischarge dry cell the previous day (August 9, 2019). The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said that \nafter learning of the discrepancy, she made the appropriate update reflecting the inmate transfer in \nSENTRY. This update is reflected in Inmate 4's Inmate History Quarters, which states that Inmate 4 was \ntransferred out of the SHU into a different housing unit on August 10, 2019, at 12:35 a.m. The Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she believed she told the SHU staff to conduct a new count \nand create a new count slip, but she did not know if they had actually done so. \nDuring his interview with the OIG, Senior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed BOP records relati\n... [truncated, 4180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/67 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=67]", "char_count": 4180}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nshe left the SHU to assist Correctional Officer 3, she took the SHU keys with her and that no one could have \naccessed the SHU while she was gone because she had to physically open the door for anyone who came \ninto the SHU. Noel also told the OIG that when the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant arrived to \nconduct a round at approximately 4:00 a.m., Noel let her into the SHU. The OIG's review and analysis of the \nSHU video shows that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant arrived in the SHU at approximately 4:00 \na.m., visited the 10 South Unit at 4:04 a.m., returned to SHU at 4:11 a.m., and left the SHU at 4:14 a.m. \nAccording to Noel, no one other than the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant and Correctional Officer 3, \nas detailed later below, entered the SHU during her shift. \nThomas told the OIG that since he had begun working with the BOP in 2007, he had worked in the SHU fairly \nregularly and he was familiar with how to work in the SHU and how the SHU operated. Thomas described \nhis responsibilities while working in the SHU as to maintain the count of inmates, make sure the inmates are \nfed, and, depending on the shift, make sure they get their showers. Thomas's Overtime Schedule showed \nthat he worked 21 shifts in the SHU during morning watch from May through August 2019. The overtime \nschedule also showed that Thomas worked 12 overtime shifts in the SHU when Epstein was assigned to the \nSHU in July and August 2019. \nThomas acknowledged that neither he nor Noel conducted any rounds or counts in the SHU during their \nshift between approximately 12:00 a.m. and approximately 6:30 a.m. Thomas said the August 10, 2019 \nround sheets were signed, but the rounds were not conducted because he was tired that day. Thomas \nrecalled \"dozing off from here and there\" during his shift, but he did not know if Noel slept. \nThomas did not recall having a conversation with anyone concerning the discrepancy between the 12:00 \n\n... [truncated, 3681 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/68 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=68]", "char_count": 3681}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nevery day. He said that the Warden, lieutenants, and other MCC New York staff members frequently told \nthe SHU staff to conduct rounds and to keep an eye on Epstein. To reinforce this message, the Day Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge created a sign on orange paper that he hung on a computer in the SHU officers area \nthat said, \"MANADATORY [sic] ROUNDS MUST BE CONDUCTED EVERY 30 MINUTES ON EPSTEIN # 76318-054 \nAS PER GOD!!!!\" The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said the sign was hanging on the computer on August \n9 and 10, 2019, and it was clearly visible to everyone who worked in the SHU. The Acting Evening Watch \nActivities Lieutenant confirmed that written instructions to conduct rounds on Epstein were posted on the \nSHU computer. \nFigure 5.2: Sign Created by the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge \nMANADATORY)ROUN DS MUST '■ \nBE CONDUCTED EVERY 30 \nMINUTES ON \nEPSTEIN #76318-054 AS PER \nGOD!!!! \nThe Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that \nNoel filled out the round sheet on behalf of everyone who was \nworking in the SHU during his shift. The Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge was not certain if all of the rounds were \nactually conducted. The Material Handler said he believed the \nrounds listed on the round sheet as having occurred between \n4:01 p.m. to 7:36 p.m. probably had been done, but he was \nuncertain about the remaining rounds. The Material Handler \nsaid he had seen officers \"blow off\" 30-minute rounds in the \npast. Noel told the OIG that, as a general practice, when the \ncorrectional officers went to the various SHU tiers to distribute \nfood or supplies, they counted that as a round. Noel said she was aware that she was supposed to conduct \ntwo rounds every hour during their shift, but that she had never actually completed rounds every 30 \nminutes while working in the SHU. When asked which rounds she conducted on August 9, 2019, Noel \nresponded, \"That's hard for me to tell because I didn't conduct \n... [truncated, 3871 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/69 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=69]", "char_count": 3871}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nbriefly around 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. to search for motorcycle sales and sports news. \nNoel told the OIG that she went through each tier in the SHU at approximately 10:00 p.m., and at the time \nshe went to Epstein's cell and saw him laying on a mattress on the floor, which she said was typical for him. \nEpstein asked Noel for his medical device, so she plugged it in for him. Noel saw that Epstein was in the cell \nby himself and without a cellmate, but she maintained that she did not know that Epstein was required to \nhave a cellmate. Noel told the OIG that Epstein's cell was approximately 15 feet away from the SHU Officers' \nStation. Noel said that during her shift on August 10, 2019, no one went to Epstein's cell and no one other \nthan the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant and Correctional Officer 3 came into the SHU. \nThrough review and analysis of the SHU video footage, witness statements, and BOP records, the OIG \ndetermined that at approximately 10:40 p.m. a correctional officer, believed to be Noel, carried linen or \ninmate clothing up to the L Tier, which was the last time any correctional officer approached the only \nentrance to the SHU tier in which Epstein was housed. \n2. \nLieutenant Rounds \nAt\nBOP policy requires that a lieutenant visit the SHU during each shift to ensure that all procedures are being \nfollowed. BOP training for new lieutenants instructs that the Operations Lieutenant must visit the SHU at \nleast once per shift and \"[t]his visit will be substantially more than just entering the unit, signing the log \nbook, and talking with staff.\" Additionally, when the SHU Lieutenant is unavailable, the Operations \nLieutenant should make rounds in the SHU on each shift. The training instructs that while in the SHU the \nOperations Lieutenant must walk each range (tier), inspect logs and records, observe activities, and \nperiodically observe SHU inmate counts. The training further outlines that the SHU L\n... [truncated, 4068 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/70 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=70]", "char_count": 4068}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nlieutenant round in the SHU on August 9 sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. The Acting Evening \nWatch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that she did not know that that Epstein's cellmate had departed \nfrom MCC New York or that Epstein required a cellmate because she was only the Acting Activities \nLieutenant and had not attended SHU or department head meetings. The Evening Watch Operations \nLieutenant reviewed the August 9 round sheets and said that although his signature is on one of the forms \nas if he conducted a round in the SHU, it was actually the Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant who \nhad conducted the round. The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said he did not know why his signature \nwas on the form because he did not conduct any rounds within the SHU on August 9 and he did not recall \nsigning the form. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant confirmed that she conducted her round in \nthe SHU at approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 10. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said she went \nup to the 10 South Unit and then back down to the SHU because she needed to sign the round sheets. \nContrary to BOP training for new lieutenants, which she attended in 2011, the Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant told the OIG, 'We are not required to go to each individual cell and look at the inmates. When \nwe make rounds, we get with the officers.\" The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said she did not \nconduct a round to observe the inmates when she visited the SHU. Noel confirmed that the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant visited the SHU but did not walk down the tiers. \na \nThrough review and analysis of the SHU security camera video, witness statements, and BOP records, the \nOIG determined that at approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 10, 2019, the Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant briefly visited the SHU as part of her supervisory duties and conferred with Noel and Thomas, \nwho were seated at and a\n... [truncated, 4206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/71 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=71]", "char_count": 4206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 5.3: Photograph of a Piece of Orange Cloth Hanging from the Bunkbed in Epstein's Cell \nFollowing His Death \nThomas explained that when he first entered Epstein's cell, \nEpstein had an orange string, presumably from a sheet or a \nshirt, around his neck. The end of the string was tied to the \ntop portion of the bunkbed. Epstein was suspended from the \ntop bunk in a near-seated position, with his buttocks \napproximately 1 inch to 1 inch and a half off the floor and his \nlegs extended out straight on the floor. Thomas said Epstein \ndid not look discolored or very different from when he last \nsaw Epstein alive. Thomas said he immediately ripped the \norange sheet or shirt away from the bunkbed, and Epstein's \nbuttocks dropped approximately 1 inch to 1 inch and a half to \nthe ground. Thomas then lowered Epstein's entire body to \nthe floor and, because he did not believe Epstein was \nbreathing, Thomas immediately began providing chest \ncompressions until responding MCC New York staff members \narrived approximately 1 minute later. Thomas said he did not \nprovide rescue breaths and was unaware if Epstein was dead \nor alive because he never checked for a pulse before initiating \nchest compressions. Thomas said medical personnel took \nover the emergency response, including chest compressions \nand use of an automated external defibrillator (AED), when they arrived. Thomas said he assisted with \nbringing Epstein down to the Health Services Unit on the second floor, and that he left MCC New York at \napproximately 8:00 a.m. Thomas said he had received cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training during \nMCC New York annual refresher training and had responded to medical emergencies in the past, but this \nwas the first time he was the first responder. \nThomas said he was present in the SHU for his entire shift on August 10, 2019, from 12:00 a.m. until the \ntime he attempted to deliver breakfast to Epstein at approximately 6:30\n... [truncated, 3524 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/72 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=72]", "char_count": 3524}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \narms and dragging him back out of the corner of the cell and laid him down on the ground to perform CPR. \nAccording to Noel, within seconds of Thomas calling out for the cutter she hit the body alarm, which is a \nbutton on an MCC staff members radio that is used to signal distress or an emergency. Noel recalled \nhearing Thomas say, \"Breathe, Epstein, breathe,\" and 'We're going to be in so much trouble.\" Noel said she \nstood at the door about a foot away from Epstein's cell and never went in. Noel said Thomas only \nperformed chest compressions and said she did not see Thomas checking for breath or pulse. Noel said \nthat when she saw Epstein, he looked blue and did not have a shirt on or anything around his neck. Noel \nsaid she did not get the cutter because Thomas did not need it based upon the ripping sound she heard. \nNoel said an MCC New York Lieutenant who responded to the alarm asked her what happened, and before \nshe got the chance to answer, Thomas stated, \"Oh, its not her fault, we fucked up.\" Noel did not recall \nmaking any comments or statements to the Lieutenant. Other than the Lieutenant, Noel did not recall \nwhich correctional officers responded to the alarm and she did not know what happened in the cell after \nMCC New York staff arrived because she was waiting at the bottom of the steps outside the L Tier. Noel said \nshe was alone in the SHU for 20 minutes after they left with Epstein and she kept calling the Control Center \nto get status updates. \nNoel told the OIG that Epstein's cell was approximately 15 feet from the SHU Officers' Station. Noel said she \nwould have known if someone went in or out of Epstein's cell overnight and no one did. She also said that \nthere was no indication that any of the inmates could have gotten out of their cells. Noel said she never \nslept during her shift on August 9-10, 2019. Noel said that when she is seen on the camera at the desk not \nmoving, she was on the computer\n... [truncated, 4302 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/73 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=73]", "char_count": 4302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nOperations Lieutenant and Noel. The Electronics Technician believed he was in the SHU prior to 7:00 a.m. \nand until approximately 8:00 a.m., but was not positive with regard to the times. The Electronics Technician \nsaid he delivered food to the inmates on one tier while the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant did the \nsame on another tier while Noel unlocked the doors outside of the tiers for the Electronics Technician and \nthe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant. The Electronics Technician said that when they were delivering \nfood to the inmates, he heard the inmates saying, \"You killed him. You weren't making rounds. You killed \nhim.\" The Electronics Technician told the OIG that the inmates also said Thomas and Noel just sat at the \nSHU Officers' Station and never checked on the inmates. The Electronics Technician told the OIG he \nunderstood the inmates to be saying that Thomas and Noel were responsible for Epstein's death because \nthey had not conducted rounds during their shift. The Electronics Technician \nhe believed that Epstein \ntook his own life and said he had no reason to believe otherwise. \nSenior Officer Specialist 6 said he responded to the emergency call at 6:33 a.m. and when he arrived, staff \nmembers were already performing CPR on Epstein. Senior Officer Specialist 6 said he assisted with \ntransporting Epstein to the Health Services Unit, taking Epstein to the ambulance, and then followed the \nambulance to the hospital in another vehicle, and stayed at the hospital until he was relieved from duty. \n4'\nThe OIG also reviewed photographs that were taken in the MCC New York Health Services Unit of EMTs \nattempting to resuscitate Epstein. The photographs show, among other things, Epstein on his back with an \nintravenous line in his arm, his orange BOP-issued shirt ripped open and laying around his arms, and him \nwearing orange BOP-issued boxer shorts. None of the photographs taken at MCC New York show Eps\n... [truncated, 4493 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/74 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=74]", "char_count": 4493}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nand they both fell. Inmate S said officers had trouble getting Epstein onto the stretcher because Epstein \nwas basically dead weight. When the officers did get Epstein on the stretcher, Epstein still had on \nheadphones.d1 Inmate S did not see any marks around Epstein's neck, and he did not see a rope around \nEpstein's neck. However, Inmate 5 saw a male correctional officer come out of Epstein's cell with a sheet \nthat had a loop and knot. \nFigure 5.4: Location of the Cells Assigned to Inmates 5-7 in Relation to Epstein's Cell in the L Tier \nInmate 6 told the OIG that on August 9 and 10, 2019, he was housed within the SHU on L Tier in a cell \ndirectly across from Epstein's cell. Inmate 6 last saw Epstein's cellmate, Inmate 3, on August 9 when Inmate \n3 said, \"See you later. I'm going to court.\" Inmate 6 said Inmate 3 did not return that night, and said the \nSHU officers never conducted their required 30-minute rounds. Inmate 6 believed the correctional officers \nlast checked on the inmates in the SHU on August 10 between 12:30 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. Inmate 6 did not \nobserve anyone entering Epstein's cell after Epstein returned from his legal visit on August 9, 2019, did not \nhear noise that night, and said Epstein's door was not opened during the night. Inmate 6 said a male officer \ndiscovered Epstein dead during breakfast delivery on August 10. Inmate 6 said he observed the male \ncorrectional officer entered Epstein's cell and began performing CPR, while the female correctional officer, \nwho appeared panicked, stayed outside of the cell. Inmate 6 said he observed Epstein on the floor, but did \nnot see a rope over Epstein's head. However, when Epstein was removed from his cell, Inmate 6 observed \nthe correctional officers holding a rope and a defibrillator. Inmate 6 did not see marks on Epstein's neck but \ndid see bruising on his face and observed earphones that were still in place on Epstein's ears. \nInmate 7, who was t\n... [truncated, 2340 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/75 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=75]", "char_count": 2340}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nto Epstein's cell on the evening of August 9, 2019, Inmate 7 did not recall seeing anyone going in or out of \nEpstein's cell until the following morning at around 6:00 a.m. He further stated that he did not hear any \ndoor \"pop open\" that evening. Inmate 7 said he remembered waking up around 6:00 a.m. on August 10, \n2019, and hearing a voice, possibly male, saying \"Breathe.\" Inmate 7 said he saw Epstein removed from his \ncell on a stretcher. \nIn addition, the OIG and the FBI interviewed seven inmates assigned to other tiers in the SHU, none of \nwhom had any direct knowledge of how Epstein died. These inmates consistently reported that the SHU \nofficers did not systematically conduct the counts and rounds as required on the evening Epstein died and \nthat the last round was either between 9:30-10:00 p.m. or 12:30-1:00 a.m. Several inmates told the OIG that \nbefore Epstein died the SHU staff never conducted rounds at night. \nAccording to the BOP Form 583 Report of Incident, on August 10, 2019, at approximately 6:33 a.m., while \ndelivering the breakfast meal, Epstein was found unresponsive in his cell. Consistent with the required \nresponse to a suspected suicide outlined in the MCC New York General Housing Unit Post Orders that are \ndescribed in Chapter 2, staff called for assistance and began life-saving measures.d2 At 6:39 a.m., Epstein \nwas taken to the MCC New York Health Services Unit, and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) arrived to MCC \nNew York at 6:43 a.m. Epstein was transported to the local hospital, New York Presbyterian Lower \nManhattan Hospital, at 7:10 a.m., and was pronounced deceased at 7:36 a.m. \nAccording to a memorandum attached to the Form 583 from the Clinical Nurse dated August 10, 2019, when \nthe medical emergency involving Epstein was called over the radio, the Clinical Nurse immediately \nresponded to the call and upon arrival, saw Epstein on the floor within his cell unresponsive with CPR in \npro\n... [truncated, 4141 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/76 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=76]", "char_count": 4141}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwere escorted to the second-floor medical area. EMS departed MCC New York with Epstein and a BOP \nescort via ambulance and chase car to the local hospital at 7:10 a.m. \nThe Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she was relieved as the Operations Lieutenant \nprior to 6:00 a.m. on August 10, 2019, but was still working on things like the Daily Activity Reports and \nLieutenant Logs that she did not get to finish during her shift. At some point, the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant heard that there was a medical emergency in SHU, so she went to assist because she \nknew that inmates would need to be given food and other things would need to be done. The Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant estimated that she went to the SHU around 7:00 a.m. to help with the inmate \nmeals, and believed the Electronics Technician was also helping out. Noel was there, but she was not \nhelping with delivering food to the inmates. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant said that after the \nmeals were delivered, she finished up and went home. \nAll MCC New York staff members who were interviewed by the OIG said they did not know of any \ninformation suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other than suicide. Additionally, no \ninmate provided the OIG with information suggesting that anyone assisted Epstein with taking his own life, \nor had any credible information suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other than suicide. \nSome MCC New York staff told the OIG that Epstein's death could have been prevented if, among other \nthings, Epstein had been assigned a new cellmate after Inmate 3's departure and rounds and counts had \nbeen conducted in the SHU as required. Some witnesses also faulted MCC New York staffing shortages, \nwhich resulted in excessive overtime and meant that MCC New York staff members were often overtired \nduring their shifts. Other MCC New York staff members told the OIG that even\n... [truncated, 3857 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/77 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=77]", "char_count": 3857}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nlogged only one cell search in TRUSCOPE, and the search was not of Epstein's cell.40 BOP records did not \nindicate when Epstein's cell was last searched. \nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that at least five cell searches should be conducted on \nthe day and night watch shifts within the SHU, and that cell searches are conducted in cells every time the \ninmate departs the cell. He said the SHU Officer in Charge was responsible for making sure the searches \nwere conducted and logged into the SOP TRUSCOPE database. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said \nthat only one cell search was entered into TRUSCOPE on August 9, 2019, because cell searches were tedious \nto enter, and he was busy. He did not believe that it was a problem that only one cell search was logged on \nAugust 9, because he said the SHU staff would have gone into every cell when the inmates took their \nshowers. He said that during the period of Epstein's custody, SHU inmates showered on Mondays, \nWednesdays, and Fridays. The Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge said that during showers, SHU staff \nsearched every cell. He explained that all of the SHU cells should have been searched on Friday, August 9 \nbecause it was a shower day. He said SHU staff should also conduct cell searches when inmates go to the \nrecreation area or for attorney visits. According to the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, Epstein's cell \nshould have been searched because both Epstein and Inmate 3 left the cell on the morning of August 9. He \nfurther stated that he believed that the majority of cells in the SHU were searched although, as noted above, \nthe SHU staff logged only one cell search in TRUSCOPE on August 9 and the search was not of Epstein's cell. \nFigure 5.5: Photograph of Epstein's Cell After His Death\nThe Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that in \nAugust 2019, each inmate would have been authorized to \nhave two sheets and one blanket. He said that in \n... [truncated, 3399 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/78 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=78]", "char_count": 3399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nmatter. \nFigure 5.6: Photograph of a Piece of Orange Cloth Tied into a Noose Recovered from Epstein's Cell \nAfter His Death' \nThe Captain also reviewed the picture of Epstein's cell \nfrom August 10, 2019, when interviewed by the OIG. \nHe said Epstein had too many linens, t-shirts, and \nblankets in his cell. The Captain said the SHU staff \nwere responsible for removing those items because \nthey did not want to hear the other inmates complain \nthat they were not issued the same number of items. \nThe Captain stated that it is also a security issue \nbecause it \"gives the inmates the materials to be able \nto make homemade fashioned and improvised \nnooses\" or \"use it as escape paraphernalia7 such as a \nrope that inmates had used to escape from another \nfacility in Chicago. \nInmate 3 told the OIG that Epstein was allowed to sleep on the floor, which he said was unusual for the SHU \nwhere that was not normally allowed. Inmate 3 said Epstein also had two extra blankets, which no other \ninmate had, as well as two pens, which inmates were not allowed to have. Epstein would ask for things, and \nif the correctional officers said no, Epstein would tell them he was writing down their name and providing \nthe information to his lawyer. According to Inmate 3, the correctional officers were on \"eggshells\" around \nEpstein. Inmate 3 said that when he left the SHU on August 9, 2019, there was an orange cloth twisted \naround the ladder, strings on the side of the ladder, and a string tied across the bed. Inmate 3 explained \nthat the string tied across the bed served as a clothesline, and that the strings were part of a sheet they had \nripped. According to Inmate 3, one night he woke up, saw Epstein fidgeting with the clothesline, and asked \nEpstein what he was doing. Epstein said he was trying to fix the clothesline, but Inmate 3 told him no and \nflushed the clothesline down the toilet. As discussed in Chapter 4, when Inmate 3 and Epstein \n... [truncated, 3235 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/79 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=79]", "char_count": 3235}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \noffice's Medical Examiners performed the autopsy, and the autopsy report was reviewed by the First Deputy \nChief Medical Examiner. In connection with this investigation, the OIG interviewed the Medical Examiner \nwho performed the Epstein autopsy (hereinafter the \"Medical Examiner\"). The Medical Examiner told the \nOIG that the pattern of Epstein's neck bone fractures was consistent with a hanging. The Medical Examiner \nexplained that a different fracture pattern is present if there has been a manual compression of the neck \nversus a sustained pressure like in a hanging, and the pattern of Epstein's neck fractures was that of a \nhanging. The Medical Examiner also said Epstein had petechial hemorrhages, which are pinpoint bleeds in \nskin, on his face and mouth. These hemorrhages are caused when the blood flow is obstructed and the \nsmall skin capillaries burst. The Medical Examiner additionally identified plethora, which is purple \ndiscoloration of the skin, and stated that both petechial hemorrhages and plethora are consistent with \nsuicide by hanging. The Medical Examiner stated that Epstein's petechia and plethora were identified from \nhis neck up. In homicidal strangulations, according to the Medical Examiner, these conditions are normally \nfound only in the eyes and mouth, and in a different pattern. Epstein also had, the Medical Examiner \nexplained, a marked and obvious ligature furrow that peaked upward which is consistent with suicide as \nopposed to a ligature strangulation. \nThe Medical Examiner further stated that there was no evidence of defensive wounds consistent with what \nis seen in victims of strangulation. The Medical Examiner told the OIG that in strangulation cases there is \ninvariably some signs of a struggle, even if the victim is impaired. The Medical Examiner noted that the \nautopsy did not identify any signs of a struggle. Epstein did not have any marks on his hands, no broken \nfingernails, no de\n... [truncated, 3502 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/80 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=80]", "char_count": 3502}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 6: The Availability of Limited Recorded Video Evidence \nDue to the Security Camera Recording System Failure \nIn August 2019, the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York) had \napproximately 150 video security cameras (no audio) placed throughout the institution. The OIG found that \napproximately 11 cameras were located in and around the Special Housing Unit (SHU) where Epstein was \nconfined at the time of his death on August 10, 2019, including one at the end of the L Tier where Epstein \nwas housed that showed any movement in or out of inmate cells and in the Tier's hallway. In addition to \nbroadcasting live video, MCC New York had a system that recorded the live video feeds. Following Epstein's \ndeath, MCC New York officials and FBI investigators attempted to review video recordings related to the \nincident and discovered that, although the security cameras were working and transmitting live video, \nrecorded video from most of the cameras in the SHU area was not available due to a malfunction of the \nvideo recording system that had occurred on July 29, 2019, including video from the camera at the end of \nthe L Tier. As a result, while the L Tier video camera was transmitting a live video feed on the night of \nAugust 9, 2019, and morning of August 10, 2019, the video was not being recorded. One of the cameras \nthat had available recordings from August 9 and 10 was a camera located outside a housing unit adjacent to \nthe SHU. That camera captured video of a large part of the common area of the SHU, including the SHU \nOfficers' Station and portions of the stairways leading to the different SHU tiers, including the L Tier. Thus, \nanyone entering or attempting to enter the L Tier from the common area of the SHU, including on August 9 \nand 10, would have been picked up by the video recorded by that camera. In addition, the recordings \nshowed the SHU Officers' Station where the t\n... [truncated, 3700 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/81 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=81]", "char_count": 3700}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwas subject to frequently recurring failures, particularly with respect to the DVR hard drives.d6\nThe Warden, who assumed his responsibilities at MCC New York in May 2018, told the OIG he was generally \naware that there were problems with the security camera system throughout the institution. He further \nstated that efforts were undertaken to determine which cameras were working and which needed to be \nfixed, and that MCC New York officials intended to ultimately seek funding to replace the entire system. \nBOP records reflect that on September 6, 2018, the Warden submitted a memorandum to the Federal \nBureau of Prisons' (BOP) Northeast Regional Director to request $800,000 in funding to replace the entire \ncamera system. The memorandum identified an estimated project start date of December 1, 2018, and an \nestimated completion date of February 9, 2019. The BOP approved the funding request, and on September \n21, 2018, a contract in the amount of $698,108.99 was awarded to Company 1 to provide various equipment \nfor the project and associated labor. On September 24, 2018, a separate contract in the amount of \n$34,089.28 was awarded to Company 2 to provide assorted networking equipment and wiring needed to \ninstall the camera system. \nAs the camera upgrade project was beginning, BOP officials recognized that MCC New York's mechanical, \nelectrical, and plumbing systems were also in need of major repairs. MCC New York did not have enough \nqualified technicians on staff to complete both the camera installation and other repairs needed at the \nfacility, so beginning the week of March 17, 2019, the BOP's Northeast Regional Office arranged for \ntechnicians from other BOP institutions to conduct temporary duty (TDY) assignments at MCC New York to \nperform the work. During the course of the TDY rotations, work was not consistently conducted on the \ncamera upgrade because sometimes TDY staff assigned to the project were used to \n... [truncated, 3922 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/82 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=82]", "char_count": 3922}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nCommunications Office, and the Electronics Technician arrived to assess the problem sometime before his \nshift was scheduled to end. The Electronics Technician told the OIG that he found that roughly half of the \ninstitution's approximately 150 cameras, which were assigned to record to DVR 2, were displaying a live \nvideo feed but were not recording. \nThe Electronics Technician told the OIG that, before Epstein's death, no one was specifically tasked with \nensuring that video from the cameras was being recorded. The Electronics Technician said he therefore did \nnot perform any daily checks to ensure that video was being recorded. The Warden indicated that SIS staff \nare usually responsible for checking the system for recording functionality and reporting any problems to \nthe Communications Office. However, the SIS Lieutenant told the OIG that it was her belief that the \nElectronics Technician should have been checking the system daily to ensure it was recording. The OIG \nfound that there are no SOP policies that require institutional staff to perform periodic checks to ensure the \ncamera system is fully functional or that security camera systems have the capacity to record. The Facility \nManager told the OIG that since Epstein's death, he now checks to ensure that all cameras and the \nrecording system are working on a daily basis, and he subsequently provides a report about the status of \nthe system to the facility's executive staff, the SIS, and the electronics technicians. \nB. Response on August 8 and 9 to Discovery of the Recording Failure \nOn August 8, following discovery of the recording failure, Company 1 service request records reflect that the \nElectronics Technician contacted a Company 1 technical support representative, who ultimately determined \nthat two hard drives within DVR 2 had failed. According to the Electronics Technician and the Company 1 \nservice request record, the Company 1 representative infor\n... [truncated, 4356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/83 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=83]", "char_count": 4356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nthe GIG that, in hindsight, he should have stayed at the institution to begin work on the problem that same \nday. \nThe 515 Lieutenant told the GIG that she verbally informed the Captain on August 8 that the cameras were \ndown, but BOP records reflect that the Captain left the institution before the malfunction was discovered. \nThe Captain told the GIG that he did not learn about the DVR recording issue until after Epstein's death on \nAugust 10 when he asked to see video related to the Epstein incident Associate Warden 1 confirmed she \nwas with the SIS Lieutenant on August 8 when the camera problem was discovered, but she told the OIG she \nonly knew video could not be replayed. She did not know the recording system for certain cameras was \ndown. She could see live video from the cameras on that date, and therefore assumed they were recording. \nAccording to the Electronics Technician, after he reported to work on August 9, 2019, and attended to other \nmatters throughout the day, the Electronics Technician obtained the replacement hard drives and \nattempted to perform the repair sometime late in the day. However, the Electronics Technician told the GIG \nthat no SIS staff were present at that time to give him access to the room in which the DVR room was \nlocated, so he requested access from the only other individual who had a key to the space, Correctional \nOfficer 4.\" According to the Electronics Technician, Correctional Officer 4 denied him access to the room \nbecause Correctional Officer 4's shift was ending at 4:00 p.m., and Correctional Officer 4 was unable to stay \nand accompany him in the space while the Electronics Technician performed the work. According to the \nElectronics Technician, Correctional Officer 4 said he would be at the institution the following day to provide \nthe Electronics Technician access to the room, so the Electronics Technician decided to postpone the repair \nuntil the following day. The Ele\n... [truncated, 4201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/84 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=84]", "char_count": 4201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nleading to the different SHU tiers, including the tier containing Epstein's cell. Thus, anyone entering or \nattempting to enter the L Tier from the common area of the SHU on August 9 and 10 would have been \npicked up by the video recorded by that camera. Epstein's cell door, however, was not in that camera's field \nof view. The other camera that was recording was located in one of the ninth floors two elevator bays and \nprovided video of the ninth-floor fire exit and two of the floors four elevators. \nThe available video showed that at approximately 7:49 p.m. on August 9, Epstein was escorted toward the L \nTier stairway by an individual believed to be the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge.50 At approximately \n10:39 p.m., an unidentified Correctional Officer appeared to walk up the L Tier stairway, and then \nreappeared within view of the camera at 10:41 p.m. This is believed to be the last time anyone entered L \nTier before approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10. Between approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 and just \nbefore 6:30 a.m. on August 10, the OIG did not observe on the recorded video any Correctional Officer or \nother individual enter any of the SHU tiers, which is consistent with Correctional Officer Tova Noel and \nMaterial Handler Michael Thomas' admissions to the OIG that the SHU rounds and counts were not \nconducted during that time frame. At approximately 6:28 a.m., an unidentified officer was observed on the \nL Tier stairway, presumably to deliver breakfast food trays. Between 6:28 a.m. and 6:32 a.m./an \nunidentified officer, believed to be Noel, moved back and forth several times between the L Tier stairway \nand the SHU Officers' Station. At approximately 6:33 a.m., additional officers entered the SHU and ascended \nthe L Tier stairway, presumably after Noel activated her body alarm when Epstein was discovered hanged in \nhis cell. \nAs noted above, the camera at the end of the L Tier was providing a live\n... [truncated, 3809 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/85 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=85]", "char_count": 3809}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 6.1: SHU Camera Locations and Recording Status on August 10, 2019 \nupper \nI on. r, Tie \nRecording Camera \n(i) Non-recording Camera \nFigure 6.2: Location of Recording SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South entrance \n79 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172632\n", "char_count": 331}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 6.3: Field of View of the SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South Entrance \nFigure 6.4: Partial View of L Tier Stairway, from the SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South Entrance \n80 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172633\n", "char_count": 286}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 6.5: View of SHU Officers' Station from the SHU Camera at 10th Floor-South Entrance \nFigure 6.6: Field of View of the Recording 9th Floor Elevator Bay Camera \n81 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172634\n", "char_count": 283}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nFigure 6.7: Location of Non-Recording Camera in the L Tier of the SHU \nThe Warden, who was not scheduled to work on August 10, 2019, arrived at the institution later that \nmorning after being notified of Epstein's death, and was informed that most of the cameras in the SHU were \nnot recording. He told the OIG that when the SIS Lieutenant arrived at the facility that morning, he informed \nher that the SHU cameras had not been recording, and the SIS Lieutenant explained that the hard drive \nissue had been detected on August 8. He told the OIG that prior to August 10, he was unaware that the DVR \n2 issue had been detected on August 8, and that approximately half of the facility's cameras, and in \nparticular the cameras in the SHU, were found to not be recording on that date. \nThe Electronics Technician told the OIG that the Warden had instructed Electronics Technician to try and \nrecover any potential SHU video that may have been recorded by the cameras assigned to the \nmalfunctioning DVR 2 system, but the Electronics Technician was unable to find anything. The Electronics \nTechnician further said that the Warden wanted to have all the facilitys cameras recording again as soon as \npossible, so he instructed the Electronics Technician to begin repairing DVR 2. \nD. \nFBI Forensic Analysis of the DVR System \nFBI evidence documents revealed that on August 10, 2019, the FBI seized all hard drives contained within \nthe DVR 2 system. On August 14, 2019, the FBI returned to MCC New York and seized additional DVR 2 \ncomponents. On August 15, 2019, the FBI seized the entire DVR 1 system. \nThe FBI's Digital Forensics Analysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, received MCC New York's DVR system on \nAugust 16, 2019, and began to conduct a forensic analysis of the system. According to FBI forensic reports, \nDVR 2 did not start successfully. The Digital Forensics Analysis Unit found that the system contained three \nfaulty hard drives. The FB\n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/89 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=89]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nData Recovery Specialist, but the DVR was never able to be assembled successfully. The forensic reports \nfurther state that an FBI computer scientist and the Company 1 Technician reviewed the DVR 2 controller \nlogs and found that there had previously been \"catastrophic disk failures,\" and no recordings would have \nbeen available after July 29, 2019. \nWhen the OIG asked the Electronics Technician about this finding by the FBI, he told the OIG he was \nunaware that cameras were not recording to DVR 2 between July 29 and August 8, 2019. Neither the \nWarden nor the SIS Lieutenant was aware the cameras assigned to DVR 2 had not been recording since July \n29, 2019. The Company 1 Technician could not recall working with the Electronics Technician on any DVR \nissues prior to August 8, 2019, but he said that if the entire DVR 2 server went down on July 29, 2019, no \nvideo would have been able to have been retrieved from that point forward from any of the cameras \nrecording to DVR 2. \nO \n83 \nLimited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nEFTA00172636\n", "char_count": 1109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nChapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations \nI. \nConclusions \nOur investigation and review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of \nJeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional \nCenter located in New York, New York (MCC New York), including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate \ncounts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies and procedures, which \ncompromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates, and the security of the institution. Specifically, \nwe found that MCC New York staff failed to undertake required measures designed to make sure that, \namong other things, Epstein and other inmates were accounted for and safe, such as conducting inmate \ncounts and 30-minute rounds, searching inmate cells, and ensuring adequate supervision of the Special \nHousing Unit (SHU) and the functionality of MCC New York's security camera system. \nWe further found that multiple BOP employees submitted false documents claiming that they had \nperformed the required counts and rounds and that several MCC New York staff members lacked candor \nwhen questioned by the OIG about their actions. Two MCC New York employees, Tova Noel and Michael \nThomas, were charged criminally with falsifying BOP records relating to their conducting inmate counts and \nrounds. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York subsequently entered into deferred \nprosecution agreements with Noel and Thomas and the court dismissed all charges against them after Noel \nand Thomas successfully fulfilled the terms of their agreements. Prosecution was declined by the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of New York for other MCC New York employees assigned to the \nSHU on August 9-10, 2019, who the OIG found also created, certified, and submitted false documentation \nregarding inmate counts and rounds on the day be\n... [truncated, 3753 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/91 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=91]", "char_count": 3753}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwere securely separated from the general inmate population and kept locked in their cells for \napproximately 23 hours a day, to ensure their own safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. \nAccess to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior \nEntry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. \nAdditionally, there was a second locked door at the main entrance (Main Interior Entry Door), which could \nbe opened only with a key held by one of the correctional officers assigned to the SHU, while on duty.\" \nWithin the SHU, the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via a single locked door at the top or \nbottom of the staircase leading to the individual tier. Keys to open the locked tier doors were available only \nto one of the correctional officers assigned to the SHU, while on duty. Each tier had eight cells, each of \nwhich could house either one or two inmates. Each individual cell, which was made of cement and metal, \ncould be accessed only through a single locked door, to which only one of the correctional officers assigned \nto the SHU had keys, while on duty. The SHU cell doors were made of solid metal with a small glass window \nand small locked slots that correctional staff used to handcuff inmates and provide food and toiletries to \ninmates. Asa further security measure, during each shift one officer carried the keys to the second SHU \nentrance doors and the SHU tier doors while another officer carries the keys to the SHU cell doors. \nBOP policy and practice require that all SHU inmates be locked in their cells overnight. The OIG found no \nevidence indicating that the door to Epstein's cell or any other cell in the SHU tier in which Epstein was \nhoused was unlocked on the evening of August 9-10, 2019, after SHU staff locked Epstein in his cell at \napproximately 8:00 p.m. SHU staff told the OIG that \n... [truncated, 4657 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/92 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=92]", "char_count": 4657}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ncells on that tier of the SHU. \nWe also noted that the surveillance camera in the L Tier, as shown in the photograph in Figure 6.7, was in \nplain view of the inmates and therefore inmates would have been aware that any hallway movements, \nincluding into or out of Epstein's cell, were being live streamed and could be monitored, even if, \nunbeknownst to them, the DVR system was not recording the live stream at that time. As the OIG has noted \nin numerous prior reports regarding the BOP's camera system, SOP staff and inmates are aware of where \nprison cameras are located and often engage in wrongdoing in locations where they know cameras are not \nlocated.52 Additionally, the OIG did not observe on the recorded video of the SHU common area that Noel \nand Thomas, who were seated at the desk at the SHU Officers' Station immediately outside the L tier during \nthat time period, at any time rose from their seats or approached the L Tier. We additionally found that \nThomas' and Noel's reaction on the morning of August 10 upon finding Epstein hanging in his cell, as \ndescribed to us by Thomas, Noel, the responding Lieutenant, and inmates, was consistent with their being \nunaware of any potential harm to Epstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein's cell at about 6:30 a.m. on \nAugust 10. \nWe further noted that Epstein had previously been placed on suicide watch and psychological observation \ndue to the events of July 23, 2019; that numerous nooses made from prison bed sheets were found in his \ncell on the morning of August 10; and that he had signed a new Last Will and Testament on August 8, 2 days \nbefore he died. No weapons were recovered from Epstein's cell after his death. Additionally, the inmates \nwho were interviewed consistently reported that on the evening Epstein died the SHU staff did not \nsystematically conduct the required rounds and counts, which was one of the primary mechanisms for the \nSHU staff to ensure the safet\n... [truncated, 3902 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/93 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=93]", "char_count": 3902}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nand management failures at multiple levels within the BOP.53 Similar to the Bulger report, the numerous \nand serious transgressions that occurred in this matter came to light largely because they involved a high-\nprofile inmate. The fact that serious deficiencies occurred in connection with high-profile inmates like \nEpstein and Bulger is especially concerning given that the SOP would presumably take particular care in \nhandling the custody and care of such inmates. \nRegrettably, the OIG has encountered similar issues on many other occasions. For example, the OIG has \ninvestigated numerous allegations related to the falsification of official SOP documentation concerning \ninmate counts and rounds, several of which have resulted in criminal prosecution. The OIG currently has \nfive open investigations into allegations of falsified inmate count and round documentation, each involving \nan inmate death (by suicide and homicide) or escape from a BOP facility. \nThis investigation and review also revealed the direct impact of insufficient staffing levels on inmate safety. \nWitnesses repeatedly told the OIG that counts, rounds, cell searches, and other methods of inmate \naccountability were not undertaken because correctional staff were working multiple shifts—including one \nstaff member who worked 24-hours straight—and were tired and overwhelmed with other duties. As \ndiscussed in greater detail in our recommendations, the OIG has repeatedly found the need for SOP to \naddress staffing shortages. Most recently, in March 2023, the OIG found that the coronavirus disease 2019 \n(COVID-19) pandemic exacerbated the effects of preexisting BOP medical and nonmedical staffing \nshortages, an issue the OIG has identified as a concern for the BOP since at least 2015.50\nFurther, the OIG has repeatedly found that BOP personnel have not consistently been attentive to the needs \nof inmates at risk for suicide. In this investigation, that inat\n... [truncated, 3775 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/94 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=94]", "char_count": 3775}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nreport all contributed to an environment in which arguably one of the most notorious inmates in BOP's \ncustody was provided with the opportunity to take his own life, resulting in significant questions being asked \nabout the circumstances of his death, how it could have been allowed to have happen, and most \nimportantly, depriving his numerous victims, many of whom were underage girls at the time of the alleged \ncrimes, of their ability to seek justice through the criminal justice process. The fact that these failures have \nbeen recurring ones at the BOP does not excuse them, and gives additional urgency to the need for DOJ and \nBOP leadership to address the chronic staffing, surveillance, security, and related problems plaguing the \nBOP. \nThe OIG has completed its investigation and is providing this report to the BOP for appropriate action. \nUnless otherwise noted, the OIG applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining \nwhether DOJ personnel have committed misconduct. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board applies this \nsame standard when reviewing a federal agencys decision to take adverse action against an employee \nbased on such misconduct. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B) and S C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii). \nA. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that Epstein Had a Cellmate on August 9 as \nInstructed by the Psychology Department on July 30 \nOn July 30, 2019, the MCC New York Psychology Department sent an email to over 70 BOP staff members \nstating that Epstein 'needs to be housed with an appropriate cellmate.\" The Psychology Department's \ndirective that Epstein have an appropriate cellmate arose out of the events that occurred on July 23, 2019, \nwhen Epstein was found lying on the floor of his cell with a piece of orange cloth around his neck. Epstein's \ncellmate at the time (Inmate 1) told MCC New York staff that Epstein had tried to hang himself, and another \ninmate housed on the same SHU tier a\n... [truncated, 3828 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/95 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=95]", "char_count": 3828}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nPsychology Department's directive issued just 10 days earlier. \nBOP standards of conduct require that employees \"obey the orders of their superiors at all times.\"57 MCC \nNew York Post Orders for the SHU require, among other things, that all SHU officers \"maintain a log of \npertinent information regarding inmate activity, detailing time, persons involved (if pertinent) and the event, \nwhich must be logged into TRUSCOPE.\"58 Importantly, the SHU Post Orders clarify that they \"are not \nintended to describe in detail all the officer's responsibilities. Good judgment and common sense are \nexpected in all situations not covered in these post orders.\" \nOn August 9, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, and \nCorrectional Officer Tova Noel were each assigned to the MCC New York SHU as their permanent quarterly \nassigned post and served as the SHU Officer in Charge during their respective shifts.59 The OIG \ninvestigation found that each of these employees knew that Epstein was required to have a cellmate at all \ntimes per the Psychology Department's directive. \nThe OIG further found that on August 9 the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge, and Noel each became aware at various times during their respective shifts that Epstein's \ncellmate, Inmate 3, had been transferred from the institution with all of his belongings, a status known to all \nMCC New York staff members as meaning the inmate was being permanently transferred out of the \ninstitution. Specifically, the OIG investigation found that on the morning of August 9, the Day Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge and Correctional Officer 1, who was also assigned to the SHU, reviewed the MCC New York \ndaily call out list, a document that identifies all inmates who were leaving their housing units each day, \nwhich listed Inmate 3 as being scheduled to depart MCC New York with all of his belongings. At \napproxim\n... [truncated, 3810 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/96 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=96]", "char_count": 3810}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nThe OIG investigation also found that during the next shift in the MCC New York SHU, both the Evening \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge and Noel became aware that Epstein was without a cellmate. The Evening \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that when he escorted Epstein back to his cell after Epstein's \ntelephone call, he saw that Inmate 3 was not there and then he, Noel, and the Material Handler discussed \nthe need for Epstein to have a new cellmate. The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge also told the OIG \nthat he notified an unspecified supervisor. However, other witnesses did not corroborate his account Noel \ntold the OIG that she was unaware both that Epstein needed to have a cellmate and that Inmate 3 had been \nremoved from the institution. Noel also told the OIG that she went to Epstein's cell at approximately 10:00 \np.m., a time of day when all inmates were secured in their cells, and may have plugged in Epstein's medical \ndevice for him. The OIG did not credit Noel's statements that she did not know that Epstein needed a \ncellmate or that Inmate 3 had been removed from the SHU based on contradictory witness statements \n(including her own) regarding SHU staffs knowledge of Epstein's cellmate requirement and Inmate 3's \ntransfer out of the SHU. \n4f,V \nThe OIG investigation concluded that on August 9, 2019, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Evening \nWatch SHU Officer in Charge, and Noel failed to notify a supervisor as required after Epstein's cellmate was \npermanently removed from the MCC New York SHU, which constituted a violation of BOP standards of \nconduct. Additionally, their inaction violated MCC New York SHU Post Orders because none of these \nindividuals documented the fact the Epstein needed a new cellmate as required. Finally, all of these officers \nfailed to exercise good judgment and common sense, as required by the SHU Post Orders, by not \nimmediately undertaking steps through their chai\n... [truncated, 4152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/97 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=97]", "char_count": 4152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nof these individuals to adequately supervise SHU staff and ensure that a high-profile inmate who had \nrecently been on suicide watch and psychological observation had an appropriate cellmate constituted a job \nperformance failure. \n3. \nFailure to Have a Contingency Plan for Assigning Epstein a Cellmate \nAdditionally, the OIG found that the Warden's failure to have a back-up cellmate assignment for Epstein \nconstituted poor judgment. The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that although he knew \nthat Epstein needed to be assigned another cellmate, SHU staff could not just put anyone in the cell with \nEpstein. The Warden confirmed this in his OIG interview, when he explained that he and BOP executive \nleadership selected Inmate 3 as Epstein's cellmate following the events of July 23, 2019. The Warden told \nthe OIG that no inmates were pre-vetted to serve as Epstein's cellmate if Inmate 3 left MCC New York. The \nNortheast Regional Director, the Warden, and the Captain all told the OIG that if Inmate 3 had been \nremoved as Epstein's cellmate, they would have had to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to \nensure that Epstein was housed with an appropriate inmate. This selection process, which involved multiple \nsteps undertaken by high-level BOP management, would be difficult to accomplish in a short period of time \nand ultimately may have impeded SHU officers' ability to house Epstein with a cellmate on August 9, 2019. \n4. \nLack of Candor \nBOP policy requires that h[d]uring the course of an official investigation, employees are to cooperate fully by \nproviding all pertinent information they may have. Full cooperation requires truthfully responding to \nquestions.\"\nAs discussed above, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge and the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told \nthe OIG that they notified supervisory personnel regarding the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate. \nBased on a lack of corrob\n... [truncated, 3614 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/98 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=98]", "char_count": 3614}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nB. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct Mandatory Rounds and Inmate Counts \nResulting in Epstein Being Unobserved for Hours Before His Death \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed that on August 9 and 10, 2019, MCC New York SHU staff did not \nconduct the mandatory rounds and inmate counts during their shift in the SHU. The failure to undertake \nthese required measures to account for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing—and the supervisors' failure to \nproperly supervise the SHU staff, as discussed further below—resulted in Epstein being unobserved for \nhours before his death, which compounded the failure of MCC New York staff to ensure that Epstein had an \nappropriate cellmate. \n1. \nFailure to Conduct Rounds and Inmate Counts in the SHU \nFederal regulations require that employees \"use official time in an honest effort to perform official duties.\"65\nAdditionally, BOP standards of conduct required that employees \"[Conduct themselves in a manner that \nfosters respect for the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Government.\"66 Because \n\"[0nattention to duty in a correctional environment can result in escapes, assaults, and other incidents,\" BOP \nstandards of conduct also require employees 'to remain fully alert and attentive during duty hours.\" BOP \npolicy also requires \"[Continuous inmate accountability,\" which is accomplished through rounds and inmate \ncounts.67 Among other things, rounds and inmate counts enable staff to observe inmates and ensure that \nthey are safe and secure in their cells and are in good health. \nBOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders set out the requirements for these inmate accountability \nmeasures, specifying that correctional staff must conduct rounds on an irregular schedule at least twice \neach hour, no more than 40 minutes apart. BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders further specify \nthat at least two MCC New York SHU staff members must conduct inmate cou\n... [truncated, 3842 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/99 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=99]", "char_count": 3842}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nleading to some, but not all, of the tiers several minutes after the SHU inmate count had been called into the \nControl Center; (2) the 10:00 p.m. count slip, which erroneously included the SHU Inmate 4, who had been \ninternally transferred to Receiving and Delivery; (3) other BOP records; and (4) the Material Handlers \nstatement to the OIG that no one conducted the 10:00 p.m. count because everyone was tired. \nInstead of performing the required duties to account for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing, the OIG found \nthat officers assigned to the SHU on August 9 and 10, including the Material Handler, Noel, and Thomas, \nprimarily remained seated in the SHU Officers' Station—sometimes without moving for a period of time, \nsuggesting that they were asleep—and conducted a variety of internet searches on MCC New York \ncomputers. Thomas also admitted to the OIG that he \"dozed off' for periods of time during his shift. The \nOIG's analysis of the SHU security camera video revealed that after approximately 10:40 p.m., no \nCorrectional Officer entered Epstein's tier in the SHU until just before 6:30 a.m. when Noel and Thomas \nbegan to serve breakfast to the inmates. \nThe OIG investigation and review concluded that the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material \nHandler, Noel, and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory rounds and inmate counts during their \nrespective shifts in the MCC New York SHU on August 9 and 10, 2019, and that their actions constituted \nviolations of S C.F.R. §§ 2635.101(b)(5) and 2635.705(a), BOP Program Statements 3420.11 and 5500.14, and \nMCC New York SHU Post Orders. \n2. \nFalse \nFalse Statements and Lack of Candor \nThe OIG's investigation and review found that on August 9 and 10, 2019, the Evening Watch SHU Officer in \nCharge, the Material Handler, Noel, and Thomas made false statements when they falsified BOP records by \nattesting that they had completed the mandatory rounds and inmate counts w\n... [truncated, 3836 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/100 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=100]", "char_count": 3836}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ninstitution's overall inmate count sheet, could the institutional count be deemed 'cleared\" or completed. \nThe Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, Noel, and Thomas each prepared and/or \nsigned a false count slip to create the impression that they had fulfilled their inmate accountability \nresponsibilities when, in fact, they had not!' These individuals admitted to the OIG that instead of \nperforming their assigned duties, they pre-filled the count slips with the number of inmates they believed \nwere in the SHU based on what officers from the previous shift had told them and signed off on the \ndocuments knowing that they falsely attested to having completed the counts. Additionally, Noel admitted \nto the OIG that she had prefilled the official MCC New York forms documenting the times of the 30-minute \nrounds, often referred to as round sheets, and falsely attested to having completed the rounds.0 \nNoel and Thomas were indicted by a grand jury for their false certifications of having conducted counts and \nrounds. Subsequently, each entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office \nfor the Southern District of New York. The U.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District of New York \ndeclined prosecution for the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge and the Material Handler. \nThe OIG investigation has found that the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, Noel, \nand Thomas knowingly and willingly falsified BOP records in violation of federal law by attesting that they \nhad completed the mandatory rounds and inmate counts on the evening of August 9, 2019, and morning of \nAugust 10, 2019. \nAdditionally, as noted above, BOP policy requires employees to cooperate fully with an official investigation \nand truthfully respond to questions. The OIG found that Noel lacked candor when she told the OIG that she \nhad conducted the 10:00 p.m. count when the weight \n... [truncated, 3448 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/101 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=101]", "char_count": 3448}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nduring the day shift, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, a higher ranking official, called and asked the \nMaterial Handler if he could work overtime in the SHU and he agreed. The Material Handler told the OIG \nthat he felt pressured to work the third shift, which resulted in him working 24 hours straight, from 12:00 \na.m. on August 9 through 12:00 a.m. on August 10. As discussed previously, the Material Handler admitted \nto the OIG that on the evening of August 9, during his third shift which he worked in the SHU, he did not \nconduct the mandatory inmate counts and rounds because he was too tired. \nThe OIG investigation and review concluded that the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant exercised poor \njudgment when he requested that the Material Handler work a third consecutive shift. As the Day Watch \nOperations Lieutenant, he had access to the staff roster and schedule and therefore he should have known \nthat the Material Handler had already worked 16 straight hours. Additionally, the Day Watch Operations \nLieutenant's action was inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement and did not reflect sound \ncorrectional judgment, as it would have been extremely difficult for the Material Handler to have effectively \nperformed his duties during his third shift. \n4. \nClearing the 10:00 p.m. Institutional Count Knowing that It Was Inaccurate \nThe OIG's investigation and review determined that on August 9, 2019, MCC New York staff cleared the \n10:00 p.m. institutional count knowing that the inmate counts from two housing units were inaccurate. \nBOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders require that correctional officers conducting an institutional \ncount relay the count verbally to the Control Center, which maintains the master count of all inmates!' If a \ncount reported verbally does not match the master count, the Control Center must notify the Operations \nLieutenant and the staff members must recount the inmates. M\n... [truncated, 3759 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/102 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=102]", "char_count": 3759}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nThe OIG found that Senior Officer Specialist 6 modified the count slips received from the SHU and Receiving \nand Discharge, failed to request a recount of the SHU inmates, and cleared the 10:00 p.m. institutional \ncount knowing that it was inaccurate in violation of BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders. \n5. \nFailure to Adequately Supervise SHU Staff and Conduct Lieutenant Rounds \nThe OIG also found that MCC New York supervisory personnel failed to effectively perform their duties, \nwhich contributed to the fact that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death. As discussed \nabove, federal regulations require that MCC New York supervisory personnel \"put forth honest effort in the \nperformance of their duties,\" which includes appropriate supervision of SHU personnel.75 Additionally, BOP \npolicy requires that a lieutenant visit the SHU during each shift to ensure that all procedures are being \nfollowed.76\nThe OIG's investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant had oversight of the SHU during their respective shifts.\" The Evening Watch \nOperations Lieutenant told the OIG that on August 9, 2019, he did not supervise the 4:00 p.m. count or \nconduct any rounds in the SHU. He acknowledged that he Igned some of the pages of the 4:00 p.m. count, \nbut he did not sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning at 10:00 p.m. on August 9, the Morning \nWatch Operations Lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the SHU. The Morning Watch Operations \nLieutenant told the OIG that she noticed an error in the 12:00 a.m. count on August 10, which was due to \nSHU staff including Inmate 4, who had been internally transferred to Receiving and Discharge, among the \ninmates in the SHU. According to the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant, the SHU staff should have \nconducted another count and submitted a new count slip, but she did not know if they act\n... [truncated, 4186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/103 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=103]", "char_count": 4186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \ninmates in the SHU. As the Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant explained, unlike inmates in general \npopulation, SHU inmates cannot approach a supervisor because they are confined within a cell. Further, the \nBOP lieutenant training, which the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant attended in 2011, taught that \nOperations Lieutenants were required to visit the SHU at least once during each shift and that \"[t]his visit \nwill be substantially more than just entering the unit, signing the log book, and talking with staff.\" Instead, \nOperations Lieutenants were trained to, among other things, walk through each range (or tier), inspect logs \nand reports, observe activities, and periodically observe counts within the SHU. \nThe OIG found that the failure of the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Morning Watch \nOperations Lieutenant to adequately supervise SHU staff, and of the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant \nto adequately conduct a lieutenant round in the SHU, which contributed to the SHU staffs failure to conduct \nmandatory rounds and counts, constituted a job performance failure. \nC. \nMCC New York Staff Allowed Epstein to Place an Unmonitored Telephone Call on \nAugust 9 \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed that on the night before his death, Epstein placed an \nunrecorded, unmonitored telephone call using a non-Inmate Telephone System line from 6:58 p.m. to 7:19 \np.m. Other than an MCC New York call log, no other BOP records exist regarding this unmonitored call, \nincluding the identity of the person Epstein called or a summary of the conversation. \nFederal regulations require that the Warden of each BOP institution establish procedures to monitor inmate \ntelephone conversations, which is \"done to preserve the security and orderly management of the institution \nand to protect the public.\"78 For safety and security reasons, BOP policy requires that all inmate telephone \ncalls be made through the I\n... [truncated, 3907 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/104 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=104]", "char_count": 3907}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nand logged. \nThe Unit Manager told the OIG that he escorted Epstein from his attorney visit to the shower area of the \nSHU, where he connected a telephone into an unrecorded legal line, and dialed the phone number provided \nby Epstein. The Unit Manager said that when a male answered the call, he handed the telephone to Epstein, \nand then left MCC New York for the day because his shift had ended. Before leaving the SHU, the Unit \nManager said he told the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, and Noel, who were at \nthe SHU Officers' Station, to make sure Epstein got his 15 minutes on the telephone, but he did not instruct \nthem to monitor the telephone call. The Unit Manager admitted that he did not verify the recipient of the \ntelephone call, and that neither he nor anyone monitored or logged the telephone call as required. \nThe OIG found that the Unit Manager violated BOP policy by allowing Epstein to make an unrecorded and \nunmonitored telephone call, and by failing to verify the telephone call recipient, monitor, and log the call. \nWe further found that the Unit Manager exercised poor judgment when he left MCC New York while Epstein \nwas still on the telephone call that the Unit Manager had arranged and failed to instruct the Evening Watch \nSHU Officer in Charge, the Material Handler, or Noel to monitor the call. \nD. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Conduct and Document Cell Searches and Eliminate \nSafety Hazards in Epstein's Cell on August 9 Leaving Epstein with Excessive Linens \nin His Cell \nThe OIG's investigation and review determined that MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU on August 9, \n2019, failed to conduct and document searches of Epstein's cell in the SHU. BOP policy requires that BOP \nstaff routinely and irregularly search housing units.w MCC New York SHU Post Orders require that SHU \nstaff conduct at least five cell searches each shift during daytime and evening hours (7:45 a.m. to\n... [truncated, 3760 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/105 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=105]", "char_count": 3760}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nan improvised noose or use as escape paraphernalia. \nThe OIG found that on August 9, 2019, the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge either failed to conduct the \nrequired cell searches or failed to document the cell searches that he conducted in the SHU, and that the \nEvening Watch SHU Officer in Charge failed to ensure that MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU \nconducted cell searches and himself failed to log cell searches in violation of BOP policy and MCC New York \nSHU Post Orders. Additionally, the OIG found that it was a performance failure for the Day Watch SHU \nOfficer in Charge, the Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge, and Noel, who served as the SHU Officer in \nCharge during their respective shifts on August 9 and 10, 2019, to have permitted Epstein to have an \nexcessive amount of linens in his cell. \nE. \nMCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that the Institution's Security Camera \nSystem was Fully Functional Resulting in Limited Recorded Video Evidence \nThis investigation and review revealed longstanding deficiencies with MCC New York's security camera \nsystem. These deficiencies resulted in nearly all of the cameras in and around the SHU where Epstein was \nbeing housed to not record video starting in late July 2019 and continuing through the date of Epstein's \ndeath on August 10, 2019. According to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death, on July \n29, 2019, a disk failure in MCC New York's Digital Video Recorder (DVR) 2 system caused approximately half \nof the institution's cameras—including nearly all of the cameras in and around the SHU—to display only a \nlive video feed with no video recording. MCC New York personnel did not learn of this system failure until \n11 days later on August 8, 2019. MCC New York personnel determined that the DVR 2 system needed to be \nrebuilt to restore recording functionality. Despite the lack of recording functionality, this repair was not \ncompleted until a\n... [truncated, 3827 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/106 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=106]", "char_count": 3827}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nevaluate the system to determine needed upgrades. 82 In response to the 2016 recommendation, the BOP \nassessed the camera systems at each institution over the next several years and determined that 45 of its \n122 institutions, including MCC New York, required camera system upgrades. The SOP worked to upgrade \nthe systems at those 45 institutions between 2019 and 2021. In June 2021, the BOP reported that it had \nupdated all cameras at the 45 institutions with the latest software and equipment, and that it had installed \nadditional cameras to bolster surveillance. However, as reported in an October 2021 Management Advisory \nMemorandum issued to the BOP, the OIG analyzed the reported upgrades at the 45 institutions and found \nthat the SOP had addressed some but not all of the deficiencies described in the 2016 OIG report. In its \n2021 Management Advisory Memorandum, the OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive \nstrategic plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system. The BOP has provided the OIG with \na strategic plan that includes estimated cost projections and timelines for addressing the camera system \nconcerns and completing the system upgrades 83 As of 2023, the OIG's 2021 recommendation remains \nopen. \nJg'' \nThe BOP's failure to address the issue of functional security camera systems across t \nncy  and at \nindividual institutions presents an ongoing risk to the safety of BOP staff and inmates and hal the potential \nto impair the investigation of and accountability for staff and inmate misconduct. It is imperative that the \nBOP prioritize the expeditious expansion and modernization of its security camera system to mitigate \nsecurity risks. \nid\\ \nII. \nRecommendations \nThe OIG investigation identified multiple shortcomings in BOP policies that should be further assessed to \nensure the BOP can more effectively handle issues that arise in connection with the custody and care of \ninmates. \n... [truncated, 3703 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/107 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=107]", "char_count": 3703}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nwould be beneficial. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP implement a requirement that all \ninmates coming off of suicide watch or psychological observation to be assigned cellmates, provide \nguidance for determining when a cellmate is no longer required, and implement a process for approving, \ndocumenting, and communicating to institutional staff the assignment and removal of cellmates for these \ninmates. \n2. \nThe BOP should establish a contingency plan for cellmate assignment for high-risk inmates, \nensuring that another cellmate can be assigned efficiently. \nThe OIG's investigation and review found that there was no contingency plan in place to assign Epstein a \nnew cellmate when his then-cellmate was transferred out of MCC New York. Although the failure to assign a \nnew cellmate was due, in part, to SHU staff failing to make required notifications and supervisory staff \nfailing to adequate supervise SHU staff, the gap in cellmate assignment was also due to the lack of a \ncontingency plan. The Evening Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that although he knew that Epstein \nneeded a new cellmate, he said that SHU staff did not have the authority to assign a new cellmate, which \nwas consistent with what MCC New York supervisory personnel told the OIG. A contingency plan, such as a \nlist of alternate cellmates, would have increased the likelihood that Epstein would not have been housed \nalone at the time of his death. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP develop contingency plans for \ncellmate assignment for high-risk inmates. \nAa-\n\\a, \n3. \nThe BOP should implement a process that requires approval to be obtained and \ndocumented for social or legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or psychological \nobservation. \nAccording to the BOP's Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement 5324.08 and the MCC New York \nInstitution Supplement to the suicide prevention policy, inmates on suicide watch must b\n... [truncated, 3710 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/108 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=108]", "char_count": 3710}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \n4. \nThe BOP should improve its methods of accounting for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing \nby expanding institutional controls and documentation. \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed many inmate accountability deficiencies. Most fundamentally, \nMCC New York staff assigned to the SHU on August 9 and 10, 2019, did not conduct many of the required \nrounds and inmate counts. Additionally, there was lacking or delayed documentation regarding inmates, \nincluding cell assignments and internal inmate transfers. Internal reports, such as the daily call out list and \nthe lieutenant log, are either not retained or subject to continuous modification, which reduces their utility \nas accountability tools. Therefore, the OIG recommends that the BOP develop a plan to improve its \nmethods of accounting for inmate whereabouts and wellbeing, institutional controls, and documentation. \n5. \nBOP policy should clarify what is required of a lieutenant when conducting a round. \nThe OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff \nassigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York lieutenants to conduct at least one \nround in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a lieutenant during the round is not specified. \nDuring their interviews with the OIG, experienced MCC New York supervisory personnel described what \nshould be done during a round, which is also reflected in BOP lieutenant training, but this expectation was \nnot memorialized in any BOP or MCC New York policy or Post Order. The OIG recommends that the BOP \ndevelop a policy, either at an agency-wide or institution-specific level, to define what is expected of \nsupervisory personnel during a round in the SHU to better ensure that BOP staff are appropriately \nsupervised. \n6. \nThe BOP should develop and implement a plan to address staffing shortages at its prisons. \nSince at least 2015, the OIG has repeatedly \n... [truncated, 4225 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00172546/109 or ?id=EFTA00172546&page=109]", "char_count": 4225}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00172546", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release \nNew York to perform necessary mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and wiring work. Yet, during the course of \nthe TDY rotations, work was not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade because sometimes TDY \nstaff were used to cover shortages at MCC New York's custody posts. Without adequate staffing, the BOP \ncannot fulfill its mandate to ensure safe and secure correctional facilities. The OIG therefore recommends \nthat the SOP develop and implement a plan to address staffing shortages at its institutions. \n7. \nThe BOP should clarify and improve the cell search policy. \nThe OIG's investigation and review found that there were an excessive amount of linens in Epstein's cell at \nthe time of his death. BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders require that SHU cells be searched, \nbut they do not specifically address the issue of excessive bed linens, which the Captain told the OIG \npresent a safety hazard because an inmate can use them to harm him/herself or escape from the \ninstitution. Therefore, the OIG recommends that the SOP clarify, either at an agency-wide or institution-\nspecific level, what materials should be seized during a cell search. \n8. \nThe BOP should develop policies requiring that institutional security camera systems have \nthe capacity to record video and that BOP institutions conduct regular security camera \nsystem functionality checks. \nAs discussed in the Conclusions section of this chapter, the OIG found that, even though the highest levels \nof leadership knew of the MCC New York security camera system's recurring deficiencies, prior to Epstein's \ndeath, no one at MCC New York was tasked with the responsibility of checking the security camera system \non a routine basis to ensure that the system was functional. As a result, when on July 29, 2019, video from \napproximately half of the institution's security cameras was no longer being recorded, the problem went \nundetected for 11 days. The OIG al\n... 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