{"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_count": 29, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00156337", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00156337.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nv. \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nx \nS2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \n11ENIORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL IN SUPPORT OF \nII E:R OB JECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00156337\n", "char_count": 474}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nPage \nI. \nThe 2003 Guidelines Apply to the Offense Conduct \n 1 \nA. \nA Jury Must Determine the End Date of Criminal Conduct that Dictates \nWhich Guidelines Book Applies Consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. \n3 \nB. \nThe Trial Record Is Insufficient to Support a Finding that the Offense \nConduct Continued Past November I, 2004 \n4 \nC. \nThe Goals of Sentencing Are Not Served by Applying the More Onerous \n2004 Guidelines Based Solely on Epstein's Conduct \n8 \nII. \nThe Five-Point Adjustment Under USSG § 4B1.5 Does Not Apply \n10 \nA. \nMs. Maxwell Does Not Present a Continuing Danger to the Public.  \n 11 \nB. \nApplying § 4BI.5 Would Lead to Absurd Results. \n 14 \nIII. \nMs. Maxwell Does Not Qualify for an Aggravating Role Adjustment Under USSG \n§ 3B1.1 \n 16 \nA. \nMs. Maxwell Did Not Supervise Another Criminal Participant \n 16 \nB. \nThe Criminal Activity Was Not \"Otherwise Extensive\" \n 19 \nIV. \nThe Two-Point \"Undue Influence\" Enhancement Under USSG § 2G I.3(b)(2)(B) \nDoes Not Apply. \n20 \nV. \nThe Correct Sentencing Range is 51-63 Months Under the 2003 Guidelines \n22 \nCONCLUSION \n23 \nEFTA00156338\n", "char_count": 1118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nPage(s) \nCases \nApprendi v. New Jersey, \n530 U.S. 466 (2000) \n4 \nBlakely v. Washington, \n542 U.S. 296 (2004) \n4 \nKimbrough v. United States, \n552 U.S. 85 (2007) \n15 \nPeugh v. United States, \n569 U.S. 530 (2013) \n1, 4 \nStinson v. United States, \n508 U.S. 36 (1993) \n14 \nUnited States v. Bennett, \n37 F.3d 687 (1st Cir. 1994) \n8 \nUnited States v. Booker, \n543 U.S. 220 (2005) \n4 \nUnited States v. Bronneyer, \n699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012) \n12, 13 \nUnited States v. Cavern, \n550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) \n15 \nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, \n233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000) \n7 \nUnited States v. Dorvee, \n616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) \n15 \nUnited States v. Gigante, \n94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) \n7 \nUnited States v. Harris, \n79 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996) \n3 \nUnited States v. Julian, \n427 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005) \n3, 4 \nEFTA00156339\n", "char_count": 839}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "United States v. McGrain, \nNo. 6:20-cr-06113 (EAW), 2022 WL 287350 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2022) \n13 \nUnited States v. Patterson, \n576 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2009) \n21 \nUnited States v. Pope, \n554 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2009) \n14 \nUnited States v. Reuter, \n463 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2006) \n9, 10 \nUnited States v. Sanchez, \n30 F.4th 1063 (11th Cir. 2022) \n13 \nUnited States v. Santos, \nNo. 21-10381, 2022 WL 1196761 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) \n13 \nUnited States v. Skys, \n637 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2011) \n16 \nUnited States v. Suarez, \nNo. 21-1721, 2022 WL 1449174 (3d Cir. May 9, 2022) \n13 \nUnited States v. Torres, \n901 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1990) \n3 \nUnited States v. Tykarsky, \n446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2006) \n3 \nUnited States v. Watkins, \n667 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2012) \n20 \nStatutes \nChild Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998 \n12 \nProtection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998 \n11, 12, 14 \nOther Authorities \nMeriam-Webstercom Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-\n20 \nwebster.com/dictionary/coerce (accessed June 15, 2022) \nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines (2003) \nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines (2004) \npassim \npassim \niii \nEFTA00156340\n", "char_count": 1159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this memorandum in support of her objections to \nthe Presentence Investigation Report (\"PSR\") and her claim that the correct sentencing range \nunder the United States Sentencing Guidelines (\"USSG\" or the \"Guidelines\") is 51-63 months, \nnot the 292-365 month range calculated by the U.S. Probation Office (\"Probation\") in the PSR. \nAs set forth more fully below, the lower range is correctly calculated because (1) the 2003 \nGuidelines apply to Ms. Maxwell's offense conduct, not the 2004 Guidelines; and (2) the \nenhancements under § 4B1.5 (repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors), § 3B1.1 \n(aggravating role), and § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) (use of undue influence) do not apply.' \nARGUMENT \nI. \nThe 2003 Guidelines Apply to the Offense Conduct \nBefore determining the applicable sentencing range, the Court must first resolve the \nthreshold issue of whether the 2003 Guidelines or the 2004 Guidelines applies to the criminal \nconduct in this case. It is well-settled that it is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause for a \nsentencing court to apply a version of the Guidelines that did not come into effect until after the \ncriminal conduct was complete if it provides for a higher sentencing range. See Peugh v. United \nStates, 569 U.S. 530, 532-33 (2013) (\"Mhere is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is \nsentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new \nversion provides a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the \ntime of the offense.\"). \nThere is no dispute that the 2004 Guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 2004, \ncall for a much harsher sentence than the 2003 Guidelines. If the Court applied all of the same \nThis memorandum sets forth arguments concerning the proper Guidelines calculation. Ms. Maxwell's arguments \nfor why the Court should grant a substantial downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range are addressed in \na separate submission\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/4 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=4]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "enhancements that were applied in the PSR, the recommended sentencing range under the 2003 \nGuidelines would be roughly 75% less than the recommended sentencing range under the 2004 \nGuidelines: 168-210 months based on a Combined Adjusted Offense Level of 35 under the 2003 \nGuidelines versus 292-365 months based on a Combined Adjusted Offense Level of 40 under \nthe 2004 Guidelines.2 The parties dispute, however, whether the offense conduct ended before \nor after November 1, 2004, and whether a court or a jury must make that finding. See USSG § \n1B1.11, cmt. n.2 (the \"last date of the offense of conviction\" is the \"controlling date for ex post \nfacto purposes\"). \nProbation and the government assert that the 2004 Guidelines apply because the second \nsuperseding indictment (the \"S2 Indictment\") generally alleges that the criminal conduct ended \n\"in or about 2004\" and the Court should find based on the trial testimony and other evidence that \nthe offense conduct continued \"through the end of 2004.\" See PSR at 58. That is legally and \nfactually incorrect. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court must apply the 2003 \nGuidelines in this case because (1) the jury, not the Court, must determine the end date of the \ncriminal conduct when that fact dictates which Guidelines book applies consistent with the Er \nPost Facto Clause; (2) even if the Court may make that determination, the trial record is \ninsufficient to find that the offense conduct continued past November 1, 2004, the effective date \nof the 2004 Guidelines; and (3) it would not serve the goals of sentencing to apply the harsher \n2004 Guidelines in this case when the record is clear that Ms. Maxwell was no longer actively \nparticipating in the offense conduct by 2002 or 2003 at the latest. \n2 The five-point difference in the total offense level is driven by the base offense level. Under the 2003 Guidelines, \nthe applicable base offense level is 19. See UM § 2O1.1(a)( I) (2003). Under the 2004 Guideline\n... [truncated, 2195 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/5 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=5]", "char_count": 2195}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "A. \nA Jury Must Determine the End Date of Criminal Conduct that Dictates \nWhich Guidelines Book Applies Consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. \nAs set forth above, it would be a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause for the Court to \nsentence Ms. Maxwell under the 2004 Guidelines absent a finding that the offense conduct \ncontinued past November 1, 2004. That finding must be made by a jury, not the sentencing \ncourt. Because the jury never made such a finding here, the Court cannot apply the 2004 \nGuidelines and must instead apply the 2003 Guidelines. \nSeveral appellate courts, including the Second Circuit, have held that if the end date of \nthe offense conduct dictates whether, consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause, a harsher penalty \nmay apply to the defendant, then that fact must be resolved by a jury. See United States v. \nJulian, 427 F.3d 471, 480-482 (7th Cir. 2005) (\"As it is the lifespan of the conspiracy that \ndetermines whether, consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause, the defendant may be subject to \nthe enhanced penalty [of 18 U.S.C. § 2423], the question whether the alleged conspiracy \ncontinued beyond the effective date of the new penalty is one that must be submitted to the \njury.\"); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 478-480 (3d Cir. 2006) (\"[B]ecause the \ncommunications spanned two different versions of the statute [18 U.S.C. § 2422] with different \nminimum penalties, the question of whether the violation extended beyond the effective date of \nthe amended version was one that had to be resolved by the jury.\"); United States v. Harris, 79 \nF.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that when the offense conduct for a continuing criminal offense \nis alleged to straddle the date when the applicable penalty increased, the jury must determine \nwhether the criminal conduct continued past the date of the change for purposes of the Ex Post \nFacto Clause); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), overruled \non other grounds as r\n... [truncated, 2083 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/6 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=6]", "char_count": 2083}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "In each of these cases, the ex post facto violation resulted from an increase in the \napplicable statutory penalty, as opposed to the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines. \nHowever, the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is also a violation of the Ex Post Facto \nClause to apply a later version of the Guidelines that increases the recommended sentencing \nrange if the criminal conduct was complete before the later version took effect. See Peugh, 569 \nU.S. at 532-33 (\"[T]here is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under \nGuidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a \nhigher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the \noffense.\"). An ex post facto violation is an ex post facto violation regardless of whether the \nincreased penalty resulted from a change in the statute or a change in the Guidelines. Hence, if \nthe end date of the offense conduct dictates whether it is permissible to apply a later Guidelines \nbook consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause, the jury must find that fact. \nHere, the S2 Indictment alleges only that the criminal conduct ended \"in or about 2004\" \nand does not specify whether the conduct continued into November and December 2004. Nor \nwas the jury asked to make a specific finding as to the end date of the offense conduct. Because \nthe jury did not make the necessary factual finding, the Court cannot apply the 2004 Guidelines \nand must instead apply the 2003 Guidelines.' \nB. \nThe Trial Record Is Insufficient to Support a Finding that the Offense \nConduct Continued Past November 1, 2004. \nEven if the Court can determine the end date of the offense conduct for Guidelines \npurposes, the record does not support a finding that the conduct extended past November 1, \n3 Although the issue is properly framed as an ex post facto issue, it would also violate Ms. Maxwell's Sixth \nAmendment rights for the Court, and not the jury, to determi\n... [truncated, 2379 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/7 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=7]", "char_count": 2379}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "2004, as the government asserts. The government's claim is based solely on (I) \nvague \nrecollection that she stopped performing sexualized massages for Epstein in 2005 when she was \n18 years old (Tr. 1525, 1549), and (2) two message pad slips that were never admitted in \nevidence. (GX 4-B, GX 4-F). Such meager and unreliable evidence is insufficient to support a \nfinding that the offense conduct continued into the last two months of 2004, especially when that \ndetermination has such a significant effect on the recommended sentencing range. Instead, the \ncredible evidence in the trial record established, at most, that Epstein was receiving sexualized \nmassages in his Palm Beach residence through the summer of 2004, before the 2004 Guidelines \ntook effect. \nrecollection that she was 18 when she stopped seeing Epstein cannot be \ncredited. (Tr. 1525, 1549). \nmemory of the timeline of events—in particular, her age \nat the time of the relevant events—was demonstrably inconsistent and unreliable. For example, \ninitially testified that she was 14 years old when \nfirst took her to \nEpstein's Palm Beach residence, which would have been in 2001. (Tr. 1518-19, 1525; GX-11). \nHowever, when \nwas confronted on cross-examination with her prior deposition \ntestimony in 2009, she agreed that \nfirst took her to Epstein's house in May or June 2002 \nwhen she was 15 years old, as she stated in her deposition. (Tr. 1570-73). Then on redirect \nchanged her testimony yet again and testified that she first went to Epstein's house when \nshe was 13 years old, which would have been in 2000. (Tr. 1693). \nalso testified that \nshe was \"15, going to be 16\" when she recruited her friend \nto give Epstein massages, \nwhich would have been towards the end of 2002 or early 2003. (Tr. 1544). However, according \nto the message pad slips that were admitted in evidence, the earliest of which dates to January \n2003, \ndid not begin calling the Palm Beach residence until April 2004 when \nwas \n5 \nEFTA00156345\n", "char_count": 1997}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "17. (GX-3-B). \nfurther testified that she had trouble remembering details of the events \nin question and affirmed that she \"[doesn't] remember the times and dates\" of her visits to \nEpstein's Palm Beach residence. (Tr. 1525, 1559). \nThe government asserts that \nrecollection can be credited because even if she \ncannot recall the year that an event took place, she has been consistent about how old she was \nwhen the event took place. (PSR at 53). As set forth above, this claim is flatly contradicted by \nthe record. If \ncould not accurately remember how old she was when she first met \nEpstein, the Court should not credit her recollection of how old she was when she last saw him. \nmemory of when she stopped seeing Epstein was not only unreliable, but also \ncontradicted by the other evidence in the record. \nherself testified that her last \ninteractions with Epstein were when she returned from Georgia after giving birth to her son on \nMarch 14, 2004. (Tr. 1548-49). \nstated that she went back to Epstein \"four or five \ntimes\" because she needed money to buy things for her son, but eventually gave up when it \nbecame clear that she was too old for Epstein. (Tr. 1549).4 The message pads that were \nadmitted in evidence corroborate that these interactions occurred from approximately late spring \nthrough summer 2004, when \nwas 17 years old. (See GX-3-E (undated message from \n\"=M \n\"; surrounded by messages dated April 29 and May 2 and included in a book \nof messages from 2004); GX-3-I (July 6 message from a \n'; included in a book \nof messages from 2004); GX-1-B (July 30 message from a \na\"; \nnext to a message \ndated August 12, 2004 and included in a book of messages from 2004). Accordingly, the trial \nmemory of her interactions with Epstein around the time of the Georgia interlude was also inconsistent \nand contradictory. On the one hand, \ntestified that she left Florida in 2003 \"to escape the traumatic events\" \nthat had happened in Palm Beach and traveled to Georgia where she becam\n... [truncated, 2189 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/9 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=9]", "char_count": 2189}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "evidence indicates that \nstopped performing sexualized massages for Epstein at the latest \nin the summer of 2004, not in 2005.5\nThe two message pad slips cited by the government (GX 4-B, GX 4-F) do not support a \nfinding that the offense conduct lasted beyond November 1, 2004. Although these two messages \nwere labeled as government exhibits along with the rest of the message slips in the same book \n(GX 4-A-K), these messages were never admitted in evidence. The Court admitted the message \nslips from three other message books (GX 1-3) because \nand \nrecognized \ntheir signatures and/or handwriting in those books and could establish a business records \nfoundation for their admission. (Tr. 877-889, 1772-1790). The government presumably did not \nhave anyone who could do the same for GX 4 or it would certainly have admitted the message \nslips from that book as well. The Court should not rely on two isolated, unauthenticated \ndocuments in determining when the offense conduct ended, especially when they would almost \nsingle-handedly increase the recommended sentencing range by over 10 years. Cl United States \nv. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that enhancements based \non relevant conduct may result in sentences that are \"excessive, inappropriate, and unintended \nunder Sentencing Guidelines\" when imposed \"without regard to the weight of the evidence \nproving the relevant conduct\"); United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding \nthat, for sentencing purposes, \"the preponderance standard is no more than a threshold basis for \nadjustments and departures, and the weight of the evidence, at some point along a continuum of \nsentence severity, should be considered\") (emphasis in original). \n5 In her 2007 interview with the FBI, which the government cites in its own objections to the PSR, \nstated \nthat she went to Epstein's residence \"over 100 times for \nproximately three years beginning when she was 14 years \nold.\" See PSR at 54. Ac\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/10 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=10]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Furthermore, it would be improper for the Court to rely on \nrecollection and the \nmessage slips to find that the offense conduct lasted until 2005 because the government alleged \nin the S2 Indictment that the offense conduct ended \"in or about 2004,\" not \"in or about 2005.\" \nThe initial indictment charged Ms. Maxwell with offenses that lasted \"up to and including in or \nabout 1997.\" (Ind. ¶¶ 9, 13, 15, 19). The S2 Indictment, which the government filed after it had \nlocated and interviewed =0, \ncharged offense conduct that lasted \"up to and including in or \nabout 2004.\" (S2 Ind. ¶¶ 11, 17, 23, 27). The expanded end date of the S2 Indictment was based \nsolely on \nanticipated testimony and corroborating evidence. Yet the government \nalleged that the offense conduct ended in 2004, even though the government knew \nrecollection of when she last visited Epstein and was aware of the two message slips when it \nfiled the S2 Indictment. The Court should hold the government to its allegations and not allow it \nto expand the end date of the offense conduct for purposes of sentencing. See United States v. \nBennett, 37 F.3d 687, 700 (1' Cir. 1994) (\"In determining 'the last date of the offense of \nconviction' for ex post facto purposes and ... Application Note [2 of § 1B1.11], it is only \nreasonable to hold the Government to its own alleged dates.\"). \nFor these reasons, the record is insufficient for the Court to find that the offense conduct \ncontinued past November 1, 2004, the effective date of the 2004 Guidelines. The Court must \ntherefore apply the 2003 Guidelines to avoid an ex post facto violation. \nC. \nThe Goals of Sentencing Are Not Served by Applying the More Onerous \n2004 Guidelines Based Solely on Epstein's Conduct. \nIf the Court finds that the offense conduct continued past November 1, 2004, it should \nnevertheless vary downwardly and sentence Ms. Maxwell as if the 2003 Guidelines apply. The \nvariance would account for the fact that Ms. Maxwell had stopped actively p\n... [truncated, 2128 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/11 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=11]", "char_count": 2128}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "variance would provide just punishment for the offense and promote respect for the law because \nit would punish Ms. Maxwell only for the conduct for which she was directly responsible, rather \nthan artificially inflating her sentence based on two months' worth of Epstein's criminal conduct \nin which she was not involved. \nThere is no evidence in the record that Ms. Maxwell did anything in furtherance of the \nconspiracy in November or December 2004. In fact, the evidence clearly showed that by that \ntime, Ms. Maxwell was in a committed relationship with another man and \nhad \ntaken over responsibility for scheduling the massage appointments at the Palm Beach residence. \nMs. Maxwell's assistant \ntestified that by 2002 Ms. Maxwell had \"moved \non\" from Epstein, had stopped coming to the office, and had begun a long-term relationship with \nTed Waitt. (Tr. 2370-71, 2374, 2378-80). \ntestified that \nwhom he \nrecalled seeing for the first time towards the end of his employment in 2002, \"immediately took \nover\" responsibility for answering the phones and scheduling the massage appointments at the \nPalm Beach residence as soon as she was hired. (Tr. 832-33). \ntestified that Ms. \nMaxwell called her to schedule massage appointments only in \"the first year or two\" and that \ncalled her thereafter. (Tr. 1527). In sum, the record is clear that by 2002 or 2003 at \nthe latest Ms. Maxwell had stopped actively participating in the offense conduct and had been \nreplaced by \nApplying the 2004 Guidelines would significantly increase Ms. Maxwell's sentencing \nrange based on a finding by a mere preponderance that her co-conspirator Epstein engaged in \noffense conduct in the final two months of 2004 that Ms. Maxwell had nothing to do with and \nwas not personally responsible for. That result would be fundamentally unjust and contrary to \nthe purposes of sentencing. See United States v. Reuter, 463 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) \n9 \nEFTA00156349\n", "char_count": 1949}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "(Posner, J.) (\"A judge might reasonably conclude that a sentence based almost entirely on \nevidence that satisfied only the normal civil standard of proof would be unlikely to promote \nrespect for the law or provide just punishment for the offense of conviction.\"). Accordingly, the \nCourt should exercise its discretion to vary from the 2004 Guidelines and sentence Ms. Maxwell \nunder the 2003 Guidelines. See id. (the § 3553(a) sentencing factors \"are broad enough and \nloose enough to allow the judge to dip below the guidelines range if he is justifiably reluctant to \nimpose a sentence most of which rests entirely on a finding of fact supported by a mere \npreponderance of the evidence\"). \nII. \nThe Five-Point Adjustment Under USSG & 4B1.5 Does Not Apply. \nProbation and the government seek to substantially increase Ms. Maxwell's Guidelines \nrange by adding a five-point adjustment under USSG § 4B1.5 applicable to a \"Repeat and \nDangerous Sex Offender Against Minors.\" That one adjustment increases Ms. Maxwell's \nadvisory sentencing range from 168-210 months to 292-365 months — a roughly 75% increase. \nBut § 4B1.5 was intended to apply only to habitual sexual offenders who present a high risk of \nrecidivism and pose \"a continuing danger to the public.\" USSG § 4B1.5, cmt. background. The \nfacts of this case fall far outside the scenarios that Congress and the Sentencing Commission \nwere trying to address with § 4B 1.5. Here, the government concedes that the defendant is not a \ndanger to the public, there is no evidence that the defendant herself is sexually attracted to \nminors, the conduct that gives rise to the adjustment ended almost 20 years ago, and there is no \nevidence that the defendant has re-offended and no concern that she will ever re-offend. \nMoreover, the application of § 4B1.5 to Ms. Maxwell would lead to absurd results that the \nSentencing Commission did not contemplate. Section 4B1.5 therefore does not apply. \n10 \nEFTA00156350\n", "char_count": 1970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "A. \nMs. Maxwell Does Not Present a Continuing Danger to the Public. \nIt is clear from the Guidelines commentary and the Congressional intent underlying the \ncreation of § 4B1.5 that the adjustment does not apply to Ms. Maxwell. The Sentencing \nCommission created § 4B1.5 after the passage of the Protection of Children from Sexual \nPredators Act of 1998 (the \"Act\"). See Pub. Law 105-314 (Oct. 30, 1998). As part of the Act, \nCongress directed the Sentencing Commission to review and amend the Sentencing Guidelines \napplicable to several offenses involving child sexual abuse and exploitation, including the \nenticement and transportation offenses charged in the S2 Indictment, to ensure they were \n\"appropriately severe.\" Id., Section 502. Congress also specifically directed the Sentencing \nCommission to review the guidelines applicable to these and other sexual abuse offenses and \npromulgate amendments \"to increase penalties applicable to the[se] offenses ... in any case in \nwhich the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of \na minor.\" Id., Section 505. In response, the Sentencing Commission created § 4B1.5, which was \nadded to the Sentencing Guidelines on November 1, 2001. See USSG, App's C, amend. 615. \nThe legislative history of the Act makes clear that the purpose of the law, and § 4B1.5 \nspecifically, was to protect children from habitual sexual predators and to inflict severe \npunishments on repeat (and often violent) offenders who present a significant risk of recidivism. \nCongress was particularly concerned about the danger these defendants pose to the community \nbecause they are typically far more likely to re-offend than other criminal defendants — a fact \nwhich numerous members of Congress cited as a primary justification for the passage of the Act. \n• \n\"Constituents deserve to be protected from society's worst offender-- the repeat \nsexual predator.... [T]he recidivism rates of sex offenders are astonishingly \nhig\n... [truncated, 2403 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/14 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=14]", "char_count": 2403}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Cong. (Apr. 30, 1998) (testimony of Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY)), available \nat 1998 WL 210930. \n• \"These strong sentencing provisions are important because the recidivism rates \nfor sex offenders and pedophiles are 10 times higher than that of other \ncriminals. Frankly, chances are that these predators will strike again.\" Child \nProtection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998, Proceedings and \nDebates Before the House of Representatives, 1056 Cong., 2 nd Session (Jun. II, \n1998) (comments of Rep. Deborah Pryce of (R-OH)), available at 144 Cong. \nRec. H4491-03, 1998 WL 306835. \n• \n\"Sentences for child abuse and exploitation offenses will be made tougher. In \naddition to increasing the maximum penalties available for many crimes against \nchildren and mandating tough sentences for repeat offenders, the bill will also \nrecommend that the Sentencing Commission reevaluate the guidelines \napplicable to these offenses and increase them where appropriate to address the \negregiousness of these crimes.\" Protection of Children from Sexual Predators \nAct of 1998, Proceedings and Debates Before the Senate, 1056 Cong., 2nd\nSession (Sept. 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch of (R-UT)), available \nat 144 Cong. Rec. SI0518-02, 1998 WL 636904. \nThe Congressional intent underlying the Act was clear: the criminal statutes and the Sentencing \nGuidelines needed to be amended to impose harsher sentences on these sorts of dangerous, \nrepeat sexual offenders to make sure that they do not \"strike again.\" \nThe Sentencing Commission adopted this rationale in promulgating § 4B1.5. The \ncommentary to the guideline explains that the adjustment should only apply to defendants who \npresent a continuing danger to the community because there is a significant risk that they will re-\noffend if they are released from prison. See USSG § 4B 1.5, cmt. background (\"This guideline is \nintended to provide lengthy incarceration for offenders who commit sex offenses against minors \nand who present a\n... [truncated, 2457 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/15 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=15]", "char_count": 2457}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "The case law bears this out. The adjustment is typically applied to defendants (virtually \nall of whom are male) who repeatedly and often violently sexually abuse or exploit children for \ntheir own sexual gratification and who are caught soon after or while still engaging in that \nbehavior. See, e.g., Broxnzeyer, 699 F.3d at 284-88; United States v. Suarez, No. 21-1721, 2022 \nWL 1449174, at *1-*2 (3d Cir. May 9, 2022); United States v. Santos, No. 21-10381, 2022 WL \n1196761, at *1-*3 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2022); United States v. Sanchez, 30 F.4th 1063, 1067-76 \n(11th Cir. 2022); United States v. McGrain, No. 6:20-cr-06113 (EAW), 2022 WL 287350, at *1-\n*6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. I, 2022). \nIn sharp contrast, Ms. Maxwell has never been accused of any sex offenses—or any \ncrimes, for that matter—in the almost 20-year period since the conduct at issue in this case \nended. There is absolutely no evidence that Ms. Maxwell is attracted to minors or has the sort of \nuncontrollable impulses that would compel her to re-offend. According to the trial record, it was \nEpstein who had such proclivities, whereas Ms. Maxwell's role was to facilitate Epstein's sexual \nabuse. Indeed, after she moved on from Epstein in the early 2000s, Ms. Maxwell was involved \nin two long-term relationships with men who had young children and was actively involved in \ntheir lives without even the slightest hint of impropriety. Most importantly, the government \nconcedes that Ms. Maxwell is not a danger to the community. The government never made that \nassertion in connection with Ms. Maxwell's numerous bail applications and there is no evidence \nwhatsoever to support such a claim. Put simply, Ms. Maxwell is not \"dangerous\" and there is no \nrisk that Ms. Maxwell will ever \"repeat\" the offense. Accordingly, there is no basis to apply \n§ 4B1.5, which is meant to apply only to \"Repeat and Dangerous\" sex offenders. \nThe government asserts that § 4B1.5 should apply as long as the offense conduct fits \nwithin the text o\n... [truncated, 2102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/16 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=16]", "char_count": 2102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "not. The government ignores the background commentary to § 4B1.5, which explicitly states \nthat the adjustment only applies to sex offenders \"who present a continuing danger to the \npublic.\" USSG § 4B1.5, cmt. background (emphasis added). In doing so, the government \nrejects an authoritative statement from the Sentencing Commission about the proper \ninterpretation and application of § 4B1.5. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) \n(\"[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative \nunless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly \nerroneous reading of, that guideline.\"). The government is not at liberty to reject the Sentencing \nCommission's instructions, and neither is the Court. \nApplying § 4B1.5 to Ms. Maxwell would directly contradict the intent of Congress and \nthe explicit instructions of the Sentencing Commission and would improperly add over 10 years \nto her sentencing range. It was not meant to be applied in cases where the defendant is not a \ndanger to the community and poses no risk of recidivism. It should not be applied here. \nB. \nApplying § 4B1.5 Would Lead to Absurd Results. \nApplying § 4B1.5 would also yield a sentencing range for Ms. Maxwell that is \nsignificantly higher than the range for a proven recidivist sex offender — i.e., the type of \ndefendant that Congress and the Sentencing Commission were so clearly targeting with § 4B 1.5. \nThe Court should not interpret a guideline in such a way that it would lead to such obviously \nabsurd results. See United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 2009). \nSection 4B1.5 contains two prongs — one that applies to defendants who have been \nconvicted of at least one prior sex offense (USSG § 4B 1.5(a)) and one that applies to defendants \nwho have not been convicted of a prior sex offense (USSG § 4B1.5(b)). As discussed above, the \npurpose of the Act and § 4B1.5 was to increase the sentences given t\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/17 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=17]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "receive more serious punishment than those defendants who have never been convicted of a sex \noffense. In this case, the reverse would happen. If we assume for the sake of argument that Ms. \nMaxwell had been convicted of a prior sex offense and that § 4B1.5(a) therefore applied, Ms. \nMaxwell's recommended sentencing range under the 2004 Guidelines would be 262-327 months \nbased on a Combined Adjusted Offense Level of 35 and a criminal history category of V. See \nUSSG §§ 4B1.5(a)(1)(A) & (a)(2)(B) (2004). By contrast, if we assume the facts—La, that Ms. \nMaxwell has never been convicted of a prior sex offense and § 4B 1.5(b) therefore applies—her \nrecommended sentencing range under the 2004 Guidelines is 292-365 months based on a \nCombined Adjusted Offense Level of 40 and a criminal history category of I. See USSG §§ \n4B 1.5(b)(1) & (b)(2) (2004). Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell is subject to a substantially higher \nGuidelines range than a defendant who had been previously convicted of a sex offense. Such a \nresult would be unjust and contrary to the express purpose of § 4B1.5.6\nFurthermore, by applying § 4B1.5 Ms. Maxwell would face the same sentencing range \nthat Jeffrey Epstein would face for the same offenses, even though he was indisputably the more \nculpable offender. It would be fundamentally unjust and contrary to the goals of sentencing for \nthe Court to apply the Guidelines in a way that would create no meaningful distinction between \nthe most serious offenders and those with lesser culpability. See United States v. Dorvee, 616 \nF.3d 174, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2010) (\"[A]dherence to the Guidelines results in virtually no \ndistinction between the sentences for [less culpable] defendants ... and the sentences for the most \ndangerous offenders.... This result is fundamentally incompatible with § 3553(a).\"); see also \nUnited States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Kimbrough v. United States, \n6 A similar disparity would occur under the 2003 Guidelines, wh\n... [truncated, 2084 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/18 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=18]", "char_count": 2084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "552 U.S. 85, 108-09 (2007) (\"[A] district court may vary from the Guidelines range based solely \non a policy disagreement with the Guidelines, even where that disagreement applies to a wide \nclass of offenders or offenses.\"). Section 4B1.5 should therefore not apply. \nIII. \nMs. Maxwell Does Not Qualify for an Aggravating Role Adjustment Under USSG § \n3B1.1. \nA. \nMs. Maxwell Did Not Supervise Another Criminal Participant. \nUnder the plain language of USSG § 3B1.1 and its commentary, Ms. Maxwell does not \nqualify for an aggravating role enhancement. The Guidelines are clear that for any of the three \naggravating role enhancements to apply, the Court must first find that Ms. Maxwell supervised at \nleast one other criminal participant in the offense. USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2 (\"To qualify for an \nadjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or \nsupervisor of one or more other participants.\" (emphasis added)); United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d \n146, 156 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2). A \"participant\" is defined as \"a person \nwho is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been \nconvicted.\" USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1; Skys, 637 F.3d at 156. \nThere is no evidence in the trial record that Ms. Maxwell supervised another criminal \nparticipant in the offenses against '=\" \n, or \nwhich form the basis for the \nthree offense groups in the PSR. See PSR ¶¶ 89-90.7 According to the trial testimony, the only \ncriminal participants in the offenses involving ``M'' and \nwere Epstein and Ms. \nMaxwell. There is certainly no support in the record that Ms. Maxwell supervised Epstein. In \nfact, the record is clear that the opposite is true: Epstein directed and managed Ms. Maxwell, \n7 Because the Court ruled that \nis not a victim of the offenses of conviction, Probation and the government \nagree that the conduct related to ' \n' cannot be treated as a separate offense group and is not subject to a \nGuidelin\n... [truncated, 2292 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/19 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=19]", "char_count": 2292}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "who was his employee. According to the record, there were several people employed by Epstein \nwho interacted with \"M\" and \nand whom Ms. Maxwell supervised in her role as \nmanager of Epstein's properties in the mid-late 1990s — e.g., \nin Palm Beach and \nvarious unnamed employees at Zorro Ranch. The record also reflects that Ms. Maxwell had \nsome role in coordinating payroll and expenses for Epstein pilots, \nand \nME, \nwho transported \"M\" on Epstein's private planes. But these people had no \nknowledge of the criminal conduct and do not qualify as criminally responsible participants for \nthe purposes of the aggravating role enhancement. \nSimilarly, there is no evidence in the trial record that Ms. Maxwell supervised another \ncriminal participant in the offenses against \nApart from Epstein, \nwas the \nonly other person identified in the trial record as a criminal participant in the offenses against \n. Among other things, \ntestified that \nscheduled massage \nappointments for her and took nude pictures of her at the Palm Beach residence on one occasion. \n(Tr. 1527-28; 1538-39). The record is clear, however, that Ms. Maxwell did not supervise \n. Rather, \nwas hired by Epstein as his assistant to replace Ms. Maxwell and take \nover responsibility for scheduling massage appointments and other property management tasks at \na time when Ms. Maxwell was moving on from Epstein and was no longer actively managing the \nday-to-day affairs of his residences. \nFor example \ntestified that \nwas hired sometime between 2000-\n2002 to be Epstein's assistant and that she, and not \n=, \nwas Ms. Maxwell's assistant \nfrom when she was hired in 1996 up through the end of her employment in 2002. (Tr. 2332-33, \n2376-77).8 Espinosa further testified that in the last two years of her employment (2000-2002), \ns-\nlater clarified on cross-examination that he \"didn't know what her exact job\" was and did not know whether \ninitially testified that he thought \nwas Ms. Maxwell's assistant. (Tr. 139-40). But he \n1\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/20 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=20]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Epstein and Ms. Maxwell ended their romantic relationship and \"went their separate ways\": Ms. \nMaxwell \"moved on\" from Epstein, stopped coming into the office, started dating other men, and \neventually entered a long-term, committed relationship with Ted Waitt. (Tr. 2370-71, 2374, \n2378-80). \ntestified that \n\"immediately took over\" responsibility for answering \nthe phones and scheduling the massage appointments at the Palm Beach residence as soon as she \nwas hired. (Tr. 833). \nherself testified that there was a clear break in time between when \nMs. Maxwell called her to schedule massage appointments and when \ncalled her. \n(Tr. 1527) (Ms. Maxwell called her in roughly \"the first year or two\" of her visits to the Palm \nBeach residence-2001-2002, according to \nand \ncalled her thereafter). \nrecalled seeing Ms. Maxwell in the kitchen office of the Palm Beach residence during the period \nwhen \nscheduled her massage appointments. (Tr. 1527). But nothing in her testimony \nindicates that Ms. Maxwell supervised or directed \nor that Ms. Maxwell had anything to \ndo with the massage appointments at that time. (Id.). Accordingly, there is no basis in the trial \nrecord to conclude that Ms. Maxwell supervised \nin connection with the offense \nconduct and therefore no basis to apply the aggravating role enhancement. \nBoth Probation and the government contend that the aggravating role enhancement \napplies because Ms. Maxwell was the organizer or leader of criminal activity relevant to each \nvictim that was \"otherwise extensive.\" (PSR at 58-59). But this position ignores the first step in \nthe analysis. Regardless of whether the criminal activity was \"otherwise extensive,\" no \naggravating role enhancement applies unless Ms. Maxwell supervised another criminal \nparticipant in the offense. USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2. The record does not contain any evidence \nwas iin's assistant or Ms. Maxwell's assistant. (Tr. 204). He further conceded that his best recollection was \nthat \nwas \"an employee w\n... [truncated, 2050 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/21 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=21]", "char_count": 2050}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "that she did so in connection with the offense conduct related to \"M,\",\ngroups. \nM, \nor \n. The aggravating role enhancement therefore does not apply to any of the three offense \nB. \nThe Criminal Activity Was Not \"Otherwise Extensive\" \nEven if the Court finds that Ms. Maxwell supervised another \"participant,\" the record \ndoes not support a finding that the criminal activity related to \"M,',\nM, \nor \nwas \"otherwise extensive,\" as the government contends.' Under the Guidelines, the Court must \ntreat each minor victim separately and consider whether the enhancement applies based solely on \nthe criminal activity related to that minor victim. See USSG § 2G1.3, cmt. n.6 (\"[S]ubsection \n(d)(1) directs that if the relevant conduct of an offense of conviction includes travel or \ntransportation to engage in a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct in respect to more \nthan one minor ... each such minor shall be treated as if contained in a separate count of \nconviction.\"). For example, the government cannot use conduct from the 2001-2004 time period \nrelated to \nto justify applying the aggravating role enhancement to the criminal activity in \n1994-1997 related to \"M\" or in 1996 related to \nThe government nevertheless attempts to justify the enhancement as to each of the three \nminor victims by making a broad assertion about the nature and scope of the conspiracy as a \nwhole, rather than making an individualized determination that the criminal activity was \n\"otherwise extensive\" as to each. (See PSR at 59). Because that is insufficient to establish that \nthe criminal activity was \"otherwise extensive,\" Ms. Maxwell should, at most, be subject to a \ntwo-point enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c). \n9 The government does not argue that the aggravating role enhancement applies because the criminal activity \ninvolved \"five or more participants,\" conceding that the trial record does not support the conclusion that five or \nmore people criminally participated in the offense conduct\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/22 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=22]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "IV. \nThe Two-Point \"Undue Influence\" Enhancement Under USSG S 2G1.3O31(2)(B) \nDoes Not Apply. \nFinally, it would be improper for the Court to apply a two-level enhancement on the \ngrounds that a participant in the criminal activity \"unduly influenced a minor to engage in \nprohibited sexual conduct.\" USSG § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). First, it would constitute impermissible \ndouble-counting to apply § 2G1.3(bX2)(B) to the offense conduct related to \"M,\" \nand \nbecause it would punish Ms. Maxwell for the same harm that was fully \naccounted for in the base offense level for Counts Three, Four, and Six. \"Impermissible double \ncounting occurs when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase the defendant's sentence \nto reflect the kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by another part of the \nGuidelines.\" United States v. Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2012). Ms. Maxwell was \nconvicted of conspiring to \"entice\" and \"coerce\" minors to travel to engage in prohibited sexual \nconduct and \"enticing\" minors to engage in commercial sex acts. (S2 Ind. ¶¶ 12, 24, 27).1°\nWebster's Dictionary defines the word \"entice\" to mean \"to attract artfully or adroitly or by \narousing hope or desire; tempt\" and the further explains that the word \"tempt\" \"implies the \npresenting of an attraction so strong that it overcomes the restraints of conscience or better \njudgment.\"11 Similarly, Webster's Dictionary defines the word \"coerce\" to mean \"to compel to \nan act or choice\" and further explains that the word \"compel\" \"typically suggests overcoming of \nresistance or unwillingness by an irresistible force.\" 12 Accordingly, the base offense level for \nI° Count Three charged a conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. S2 Ind. \n16-19. Although this offense does not contain an element of \"enticement\" or \"coercion,\" the offense conduct for \nCounts One, Three, and Five (the three conspiracy counts) was consolidated under Count Three for the purposes\n... [truncated, 2359 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00156337/23 or ?id=EFTA00156337&page=23]", "char_count": 2359}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Counts Three, Four, and Six already includes the concept of \"unduly influenc[ing] a minor to \nengage in prohibited sexual conduct.\" The enhancement therefore should not be applied to any \nof the three offense groups. \nSecond, under the 2003 Guidelines, which should apply in this case, the analogous two-\npoint enhancement only applies if \"a participant otherwise unduly influenced a minor to engage \nin a commercial sex act.\" USSG § 2G1.1(b)(4)(B) (2003) (emphasis added). There is no \nevidence that \"M\" or \nengaged in a commercial sex act. Accordingly, the \nenhancement should not apply to their two offense groups (Groups 1 and 2). \nThird, the evidence does not support that \nwas \"unduly influenced\" to provide \nsexualized massages to Epstein. The \"undue influence\" enhancement applies when \"a \nparticipant's influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor's behavior.\" \nUSSG § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), Appl. Note 3(B). \"[T]he defining characteristic of undue influence is \nthat it involves a situation where the influencer has succeeded in altering the behavior of the \ntarget. \" United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks \nomitted). Apart from \ninitially offering \nthe opportunity to massage \nEpstein, the record indicates that \nsought out additional massage appointments herself \nand recruited other minors to perform sexualized massages to make more money. (Tr. 1527-28, \n1543-46). \nfurther testified that after she became pregnant, she returned to Epstein \nwithout being contacted to earn additional money. (Tr. 1548-49). In addition, \nwas not \nso influenced by Epstein or Ms. Maxwell that she did whatever they asked of her. \ntestified that she refused their offers to have her travel with them to Epstein's island. (Tr. 1534-\n35). In sum, the record does not support the conclusion that Ms. Maxwell or anyone else \n21 \nEFTA00156361\n", "char_count": 1898}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "compromised the voluntariness of \nbehavior. Accordingly, the enhancement should not \napply to \noffense group (Group 3). \nV. \nThe Correct Sentencing Range is 51-63 Months Under the 2003 Guidelines. \nBy applying the 2003 Guidelines and eliminating the enhancements under §§ 4B1.5, \n3B1.1, and 2G1.3(bX2)(B), the correct sentencing range is 51-63 months, based on a total \noffense level of 24 and criminal history category I, calculated as follows: \nGroup 1: Offense Conduct Related to \"=\" \nBase Offense Level: Because the offense involved a minor, the base offense \nlevel is 19. USSG § 2G.1.1(a)(1). \n19 \nSpecific Offense Characteristics: Because the offense involved a victim who \nhad attained the age of 12 years but not attained the age of 16 years, a two-\nlevel enhancement is warranted, pursuant to USSG § 2G.1.1(b)(2). \n+2 \nAdjusted Offense Level (Subtotal): \n21 \nGroup 2: Offense Conduct Related to \nBase Offense Level: Because the offense involved a minor, the base offense \nlevel is 19. USSG § 2G.1.1(a)(1). \nAdjusted Offense Level (Subtotal): \nGroup  Offense Conduct Related to \nBase Offense Level: Because the offense involved a minor, the base offense \nlevel is 19. USSG § 2G.1.1(a)(1). \nSpecific Offense Characteristics: Because the offense involved a victim who \nhad attained the age of 12 years but not attained the age of 16 years, a two-\nlevel enhancement is warranted, pursuant to USSG § 2G.1.1(b)(2). \nAdjusted Offense Level (Subtotal): \n19 \n19 \n19 \n+2 \n21 \n22 \nEFTA00156362\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Multiple Count Adjustment \nGroup/Count \nAdjusted Offense Level \nUnits \nGroup 1 \n21 \n1.0 \nGroup 2 \n19 \n1.0 \nGroup 3 \n21 \n1.0 \nTotal Number of Units: \n3.0 \nGreater of the Adjusted Offense Levels Above: \n21 \nIncrease in Offense Level: \n+3 \nCombined Adjusted Offense Level: \n24 \nTotal Offense Level: \n24 \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should apply the 2003 Guidelines, which yield a \nproperly calculated sentencing range of 51-63 months. Should the Court apply the 2004 \nGuidelines, it should not apply the enhancements under §§ 4B1.5, 3B1.1, and 2G1.3(b)(2XB). \nDated: June 15, 2022 \nNew York, New York \nRespectfully submitted, \nIs/ Christian R. Everdell \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n23 \nEFTA00156363\n", "char_count": 786}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Jeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n \n0 \nI \nI \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \n24 \nEFTA00156364\n", "char_count": 133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00156337", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that on June 15, 2022, I served by ECF the within memorandum upon the \nfollowing: \nIs/ Christian R. Everdell \nChristian R. Everdell \nEFTA00156365\n", "char_count": 187}]}