{"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_count": 38, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00151495.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "NEW YORK STATE \nDEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES \nONE STATE STREET \nNEW YORK, NEW YORK 10004 \nx \nIn the Matter of \nDEUTSCHE BANK AG, \nDEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, and \nDEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY OF THE AMERICAS : \n--------------------------------------------- \n----------- \n-x \nCONSENT ORDER UNDER \nNEW YORK BANKING LAW 44 39 and 44 \nThe New York State Department of Financial Services (the \"Department\"), Deutsche \nBank AG, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the \nAmericas (collectively \"Respondents,\" \"Deutsche Bank,\" or the \"Bank\") are willing to resolve \nthe matters described herein without further proceedings. \nWHEREAS, Deutsche Bank AG is a global financial institution headquartered in \nFrankfurt, Germany; \nWHEREAS, Deutsche Bank AG is licensed by the Department to operate a foreign bank \nbranch in the State of New York, the Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch (the \"New York \nBranch\"), and also operates a trust company, Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the Americas \n(\"DBTCA\"), which is likewise licensed and supervised by the Department; \nEFTA00151495\n", "char_count": 1102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "WHEREAS, the Department has been investigating various aspects of Deutsche Bank's \noperations, specifically, the Bank's relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and related entities and \ncorrespondent and dollar-clearing relationships with the Federal Bank of the Middle East Ltd. \n(\"FBME\") and Danske Bank A/S (\"Danske\"); \nNOW THEREFORE, to resolve this matter without further proceedings pursuant to the \nSuperintendent's authority under Sections 39 and 44 of the Banking Law, the Department finds \nas follows: \nTHE DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION \nA. \nIntroduction \nI. \nGlobal financial institutions act as a critical line of defense against illegal \nfinancial transactions in an ever changing and interconnected financial network. \n2. \nThe Federal Bank Secrecy Act (\"BSA\") requires financial institutions to have \nadequate anti-money laundering (\"AML\") policies and systems in place. New York State law \nrequires financial institutions to devise and implement systems reasonably designed to identify \nand report suspicious activity and block transactions prohibited by law. All regulated institutions \nare expected to configure systems based on their unique risk factors, incorporating parameters \nsuch as institution size, presence in high-risk jurisdictions, and the specific lines of business \ninvolved, and the institutions have an affirmative duty to ensure that their systems run \neffectively. \n3. \nIn addition to having effective AML controls in place, it is also necessary for \nfinancial institutions to monitor their customers for the purpose of preventing their customers \nfrom facilitating criminal activity using the institutions' facilities. Further, Federal and \n2 \nEFTA00151496\n", "char_count": 1704}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Departmental regulations require correspondent banks to conduct due diligence on, and monitor, \nnon-U.S. respondent bank clients. \n4. \nAs such, KYC and customer due diligence are critically important, and financial \ninstitutions must collect customer information at the time of establishing new relationships with \nclients, including as necessary to assess the risks associated with the client. To properly consider \nthese risks, financial institutions should consider relevant factors such as the nature of the \nclient's business, the purpose of the client's accounts, and the nature and duration of the \nrelationship. For correspondent banking customers that are also foreign financial institutions, the \ndue diligence should consider reasonably available information as to the customer's own AML \nrecord, the types of customers and markets served, and the AML regime in the client's home \njurisdiction. \n5. \nFinancial institutions must also conduct KYC reviews for each client relationship \nat intervals commensurate to the AML risks posed by the client, including reviewing account \nactivity to determine whether such activity fits with what would have been expected given the \nnature of the account. Each client's AML risk should also be re-assessed if material new \ninformation or unexpected account activity is identified. \n6. \nFinancial institutions must also establish criteria for determining when a client \nrelationship poses too high of a risk and therefore must be terminated. A financial institution may \nbe liable under applicable laws if it maintains such a relationship despite repeated indications of \nfacilitation of improper transactions. \n7. \nThe Department has determined that Deutsche Bank failed in various respects to \nmeet these obligations fully with respect to three different customer relationships: one direct \ncustomer relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and entities related to Mr. Epstein; and two dollar-\n3 \nEFTA00151497\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "clearing/correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks, FBME and Danske. Each will \nbe addressed in turn. \nB. \nThe Bank's Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and Related Entities \n8. \nJeffrey Epstein was a wealthy financier with hundreds of millions of dollars in \nassets and an extensive network of friends and connections that included prominent financial \ninstitutions, politicians, royalty, and billionaires. Deutsche Bank maintained a relationship with \nMr. Epstein and related individuals and entities from August 2013 until December 2018. At that \npoint the Bank decided to terminate this relationship following additional negative press related \nto Mr. Epstein's past criminal conduct. \n9. \nMr. Epstein also had a well-publicized reputation related to the trafficking and \nabuse of young women. Allegations against him began appearing in the press as early as March \n2005 with the accusation that he paid a 14-year old girl for a \"massage.\" \n10. \nThat year, the Palm Beach (Florida) Police Department commenced an \ninvestigation into allegations against Mr. Epstein related to his activities in Palm Beach. The \ninvestigation quickly uncovered dozens of other alleged victims. In particular, the investigation \nidentified a number of individuals who were responsible for recruiting young women to come to \nMr. Epstein's house to give \"massages\" or otherwise furthering his abuse. Press reports state \nsome of these women told victims they should inform Mr. Epstein that they were 18 years old \nand represented to victims that they would be paid for performing such \"massages.\" \nII. \nAccording to press reports, in 2006 the State Attorney handling the case, after \nmeeting privately with an attorney representing Mr. Epstein, referred the case to a state grand \njury instead of charging Epstein and co-conspirators for crimes for which local police believed \nthere was abundant evidence. As a result, the Palm Beach Police Chief publicly denounced the \n4 \nEFTA00151498\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "State Attorney and referred the case to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which subsequently \nopened its own investigation and interviewed potential witnesses and victims. \n12. \nIn September 2007, Mr. Epstein agreed to plead guilty to two prostitution charges \nin state court, including the solicitation of a minor to engage in prostitution, in exchange for a \ndeferred prosecution agreement providing him with immunity from extensive federal sex-\ntrafficking charges. The deal included an 18-month sentence and Mr. Epstein was also required \nto register as a sex offender upon his release. Mr. Epstein ultimately served only 13 months of \nhis 18-month sentence in the Palm Beach County jail, and was allowed work release privileges \nthat enabled him to leave jail six days a week for twelve hours a day. \n13. \nIn 2009, Mr. Epstein's non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of \nJustice was made public when it was unsealed in connection with one of several civil suits by his \nalleged victims. The agreement, among other things, outlines details from the investigation, \nincluding that Mr. Epstein may have conspired to use a facility or means of interstate commerce \nto induce minors to engage in prostitution, to engage in illicit sexual conduct with minors, \nconspiring with others to do the same, and trafficking minors. That agreement also notes that the \nUnited States had compiled \"a list of individuals whom it [had] identified as victims,\" and that \nMr. Epstein would pay for legal representation for these alleged victims. \n14. \nIndeed, between 2005 and 2013, press reports outlined the allegations underlying \nthe plea agreement and to varying degrees detailed the involvement of Mr. Epstein's alleged co-\nconspirators, including three individuals hereinafter identified as CO-CONSPIRATOR-1, CO-\nCONSPIRATOR-2 and CO-CONSPIRATOR-3. Some articles reported that CO-\nCONSPIRATORS 1 and 2 had invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, \nand others reported t\n... [truncated, 2085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00151495/4 or ?id=EFTA00151495&page=4]", "char_count": 2085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Mr. Epstein \"massages.\" The names of these women and several other alleged co-conspirators \nwere publicly known by 2013. \n15. \nAdditionally, press reports during this time noted allegations that Mr. Epstein was \ninvolved with Eastern European women in particular and that a modeling agency he helped fund \nbrought \"young girls . . . often from Eastern Europe\" to the U.S. on Mr. Epstein's private jets. \nDeutsche Bank Onboarded Epstein in 2013 \n16. \nIn early 2013, Mr. Epstein, who had been banking with one of Deutsche Bank's \ncompetitors (herein, \"US BANK-11, began the process of moving his assets to Deutsche Bank. \n17. \nThe relationship between Deutsche Bank and Mr. Epstein came about through a \nDeutsche Bank relationship manager (herein, \"RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1\") who had left \nUS BANK-1 to join the Bank's private wealth department. At US BANK-1, RELATIONSHIP \nMANAGER-1 had been a member of the team servicing Mr. Epstein's accounts. \n18. \nRELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 joined Deutsche Bank in November 2012, and, \nsoon after joining Deutsche Bank, suggested to senior management in Deutsche Bank that Mr. \nEpstein was a potential client who could generate millions of dollars of revenue as well as leads \nfor other lucrative clients to the Bank. Although it is unclear who made the initial contact, \nRELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 and Mr. Epstein began discussions in the spring of 2013 about \na potential relationship between Deutsche Bank and Mr. Epstein. \n19. \nIn April of 2013, in preparation for Mr. Epstein's onboarding, a junior \nrelationship coordinator on the Epstein account (herein, \"RELATIONSHIP COORDINATOR-\n1\") prepared a memorandum for RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 to send to the Bank's then Co-\nHead of the Wealth Management Americas group (herein, \"EXECUTIVE-1\") and the Chief \nOperating Officer of Wealth Management Americas (herein, \"EXECUTIVE-2\"). \n6 \nEFTA00151500\n", "char_count": 1875}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "20. \nAmong other things, the memorandum contained information concerning Mr. \nEpstein's previous plea deal and prison sentence. In particular, the memorandum stated that \n\"Epstein was charged with soliciting an underage prostitution [SIC] in 2007,\" that \"[h]e served \n13 months out of his 18 month sentence,\" and that \"[h]e was accused of paying young woman \n[SIC] for massages in his Florida home.\" It also highlights that Mr. Epstein was involved in 17 \nout-of-court civil settlements related to his conduct in the 2007 conviction. \n21. \nIn the email to EXECUTIVE-1 and EXECUTIVE-2 attaching the memorandum, \nRELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 noted how lucrative the relationship could be, stating \n\"[e]stimated flows of $100-300 [million] overtime [SIC] (possibly more) w/ revenue of $2-4 \nmillion annually over time ....\" In the same email, RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 proposed \nthat all Epstein-related accounts be for \"entities\" affiliated with Mr. Epstein, \"not personal \naccounts.\" \n22. \nOn May 5, 2013, EXECUTIVE-1 sent an email (hereinafter, the \"Approval \nEmail\") to RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 which read \"spoke with [the Head of AML \nCompliance for Deutsche Bank Americas and the then-General Counsel for Deutsche Bank \nAmericas, who at that time served as chair of the Bank's Americas Reputational Risk Committee \n(\"ARRC\")]. Neither suggest [that the Epstein relationship] requires rep risk and we can move \nahead so long as nothing further is identified through KYC and AML client adoptions.\" The \nBank has represented to the Department that it has no other record of this communication \nbetween EXECUTIVE-1 and the other officers, and the ARRC did not meet in connection with \nthe initial onboarding of Mr. Epstein. \n23. \n\"Rep risk\" as referenced in the Approval Email referred to a review by the \nrelevant regional reputational risk committee. Deutsche Bank's policies and procedures provide \n7 \nEFTA00151501\n", "char_count": 1905}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "that, should a Deutsche Bank business or compliance unit identify a client that they believe could \npose a reputational risk to the Bank, they must escalate that client for review by the attendant \nreputational risk committee. In the case of the onboarding of the Epstein relationship, this was \nthe ARRC. \n24. \nThe relationship between Deutsche Bank and Mr. Epstein officially began on \nAugust 19, 2013, when the Bank opened brokerage accounts for Southern Trust Company Inc., a \nself-described \"database company and services\" founded in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2011, and \nSouthern Financial LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Southern Trust Company Inc. According \nto the KYC record, the purposes of the brokerage accounts were to \"hold marketable securities \nand cash\" and \"to invest long term [SIC] with the bank,\" respectively. Over the course of the \nrelationship, Mr. Epstein, his related entities, and associates would eventually open and fund \nmore than 40 accounts at the Bank. \n25. \nA Bank AML compliance officer cleared the relationship based on EXECUTIVE-\nl's Approval Email. The Bank represented that there is no indication that the AML compliance \nofficer spoke directly with EXECUTIVE-1 or with the other Compliance or Legal officers \nmentioned in the Approval Email. \nEpstein Used Deutsche Bank Accounts to Engage in Suspicious Transactions \n26. \nFrom the time of Mr. Epstein's onboarding, the relationship was classified by \nDeutsche Bank as \"high-risk\" and therefore subject to enhanced due diligence. Although the \nBank did not initially classify Mr. Epstein as a politically exposed person (\"PEP\"), the Bank did \ndesignate him an \"Honorary PEP\" because of his connections to prominent political figures. The \nhigh-risk classification and informal designation as an Honorary PEP resulted in enhanced \n8 \nEFTA00151502\n", "char_count": 1839}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "transaction monitoring of activity within Epstein's accounts. However, and as discussed below, \nthis scrutiny was not tailored to the specific risks that he posed. \n27. \nAs early as November 1, 2013, however, Mr. Epstein and his representatives \nbegan using Deutsche Bank accounts to send wires to people who had been alleged to be co-\nconspirators in his past criminal offenses. Over the course of the relationship, Mr. Epstein and \nhis representatives used Deutsche Bank accounts to send dozens of wires, directly and indirectly, \nincluding at least 18 wires in the amount of $10,000 or more to alleged co-conspirators who had \nbeen the subject of past press reports, including CO-CONSPIRATORS-1, -2, and -3. The Bank \nwas not always aware that the recipients of wire transfers were alleged co-conspirators. For \nexample, the wire transfers in November 2013 were made to an entity that was only later \npublicly associated with a co-conspirator (in 2015). As described further below, however, the \nconnection was made by Bank personnel for certain transactions. \n28. \nOn January 24, 2014, Deutsche Bank opened checking and money market \naccounts for an Epstein-related trust named \"The Butterfly Trust.\" The Butterfly Trust included a \nnumber of beneficiaries, including, among others, CO-CONSPIRATORS 1-3, and a number of \nwomen with Eastern European surnames. When Bank personnel asked Epstein and Epstein's \nrepresentatives about his relationship with the beneficiaries, Epstein represented that they were \nemployees or friends. The Bank's KYC records state that the purpose of the money market \naccount was \"to pay all expenses/disbursements related to the trust [such as] taxes, trust fee \n[SIC], etc.\" \n29. \nThe Butterfly Trust accounts were, like the overall Epstein relationship itself, \napproved for onboarding based on the earlier Approval Email from EXECUTIVE-1, despite \napparent reputational and possible financial crime risks. Specifically, the beneficiaries of the \n9 \nEFTA00151503\n", "char_count": 1998}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Butterfly Trust included, among others, CO-CONSPIRATORS 1-3. The existence of co-\nconspirators as beneficiaries of the trust created the very real risk that payments through the \nTrust could be used to further or coverup criminal activity and perhaps even to endanger more \nyoung women. \n30. \nAt the time of onboarding of the Butterfly Trust accounts, Bank personnel were \naware that one of the Trust's beneficiaries was an alleged co-conspirator of Epstein's prior \noffenses. In October 2013, a compliance officer performed background checks on the \nbeneficiaries of the trust and flagged for RELATIONSHIP COORDINATOR-1 that one of the \nbeneficiaries, CO-CONSPIRATOR-2, had been alleged to be one of Epstein's co-conspirators. \nIn reply RELATIONSHIP COORDINATOR-1 confirmed that \"[CO-CONSPIRATOR-2] was \naccused as a co-conspirator in a case but was never brought to trial nor ever convicted.... The \naccount for which she will be associated is a trust account which names her as a beneficiary.\" \nThe alert was cleared citing the Approval Email from Executive-1. \n31. \nWhile Epstein held accounts at Deutsche Bank, he used the Butterfly Trust \naccount and various other accounts to send over 120 wires totaling $2.65 million to beneficiaries \nof the Butterfly Trust, including some transfers to alleged co-conspirators or women with Eastern \nEuropean surnames, for the stated purpose of covering hotel expenses, tuition, and rent. \n32. \nAlthough payments related to legal expenses are not inherently suspicious, Mr. \nEpstein also used his various accounts for what appear to have been multiple settlement \npayments totaling over $7 million to law firms, as well as dozens of payments to law firms \ntotaling over $6 million for what appear to have been the legal expenses of Mr. Epstein and co-\nconspirators. \n10 \nEFTA00151504\n", "char_count": 1827}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "ARRC's Consideration of the Epstein Relationship \n33. \nAt the end of 2014 and into 2015, the Bank's Anti-Financial Crime department \nescalated issues concerning Mr. Epstein. The first issue arose in connection with the Bank's \nopening of a Global Markets account for Mr. Epstein. In January 2015, during the onboarding \nprocess for that account, an AML Compliance Officer (\"AML OFFICER-1\") identified recent \ndevelopments in the press concerning Mr. Epstein, including (a) a June 2014 federal appeals \ncourt ruling that some of Mr. Epstein's alleged victims would be granted access to the details of \nthe 2008 plea bargain, potentially reopening their cases, and (b) additional allegations in the \npress regarding Mr. Epstein's relationships with a prominent former U.S. politician and a \nmember of a European royal family. \n34. \nAML OFFICER-1 escalated these issues to a more senior AML officer (\"AML \nOFFICER-2\"). In response, AML OFFICER-2 initially noted that the same negative allegations \nagainst Epstein had been approved by EXECUTIVE-1, the former Head of AML and the former \nGeneral Counsel for the Americas and attached a copy of the Approval Email. AML OFFICER-1 \nresponded that they should still run the issue by the then Head of AFC Americas because: the \nApproval Email was \"not a direct approval by [the Head of AML Compliance for Deutsche Bank \nAmericas and the [then] General Counsel for Deutsche Bank Americas]; it's a statement by a \nfront office MD about his conversation with them and their alleged opinion not to escalate to Rep \nRisk;\" the Head of AML Compliance was no longer at the Bank; and there were new \ndevelopments in Epstein's case that could lead to the reopening of his 2008 conviction. \n35. \nAs a result of these discussions and additional media reports regarding Epstein's \nassociation with prominent political figures, AML OFFICER-2 put the question of whether to \nescalate before EXECUTIVE-2, who agreed to escalate to the ARRC. In the email to \nEXECUTIVE-2, AML\n... [truncated, 2084 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00151495/10 or ?id=EFTA00151495&page=10]", "char_count": 2084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Letter occurred before these new developments and for further background also noted, among \nother things, that \"[b]y 2011, 40 underage girls had come forward with testimony of Epstein \nsexually assaulting them\" and that \"Epstein [had] managed to settle at least 17 lawsuits out of \ncourt.\" \n36. \nLater that month, on January 22, 2015, in preparation for the ARRC meeting, \nEXECUTIVE-1 and RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 met in person with Mr. Epstein at his New \nYork home. During the meeting, EXECUTIVE-1 asked Mr. Epstein about the veracity of the \nrecent allegations and appeared to be satisfied by Mr. Epstein's response. The Bank has \nrepresented to the Department that it is not in possession of contemporaneous records reflecting \nthe substance of EXECUTIVE-1's meeting with Epstein and is not aware of any other steps \ntaken at the time to investigate the veracity of the allegations beyond speaking with Mr. Epstein. \n37. \nOn January 30, 2015, members of the ARRC met to discuss the Epstein \nrelationship. Despite the fact that Deutsche Bank's policies and procedures mandate that detailed \nminutes of such meetings be kept, the Bank has represented to the Department that there are no \nrecorded minutes from that particular meeting. Later that day, however, a member of the ARRC \nemailed EXECUTIVE-1 to say, without explanation, that the committee was \"comfortable with \nthings continuing\" with Mr. Epstein, and that another member of the committee had \"noted a \nnumber of sizable deals recently.\" \nConditions on the Epstein Relationship Were Communicated to Neither the Relationship \nManagers nor the Relevant Transaction Monitoring Team \n38. \nThe following week, another member of the ARRC (the Bank's Head of \nCompliance, Americas) reiterated the ARRC's decision in an email to other executives, stating \nthat ARRC had agreed to \"continue business as usual with Jeff Epstein based upon \n[EXECUTIVE-1]'s due diligence visit with him.\" \n12 \nEFTA00151506\n", "char_count": 1957}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "39. \nThat same email outlined three conditions, however, that the ARRC placed on the \nrelationship: \na. Mr. Epstein would be allowed to continue to \"conduct trades and transactions in \nexisting accounts without Compliance pre-approval, provided that the business \nhad determined these transactions do not involve any unusual and/or suspicious \nactivity or are in a size that is unusually significant or novel in structure.\" \nb. The Bank's Corporate Banking and Securities unit would be allowed to \"also \n'open' accounts to facilitate activity as a booking matter where the activity has \nalready been approved by [the Bank's America's Wealth Management division].\" \nc. The business would \"need to monitor for any further developments in connection \nwith the reputational risk of the client relationship and to review \ntransactions/activity conducted in the accounts for any activity, size or structure as \ndescribed in [the first condition].\" \n40. \nThese mandatory conditions were communicated to several senior Bank \npersonnel, up to and including the Bank's CEO of the Americas. Inexplicably, however, they \nwere apparently never communicated to all members of the Epstein relationship team. Epstein's \nrelationship managers continued conducting business with Epstein in the same manner as they \nhad prior to the ARRC meeting. \n41. \nThis failure was then substantially compounded when AML OFFICER-2 \npurportedly misinterpreted the conditions; as a result they were also not communicated to the \ntransaction monitoring team responsible for monitoring the Epstein relationship. Specifically, \nAML OFFICER-2 interpreted the clause \"transactions [with] unusual and/or suspicious activity \nor are in a size that is unusually significant or novel in structure\" to mean transactions that were \n13 \nEFTA00151507\n", "char_count": 1805}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "unusual, suspicious, or novel as compared to the prior history of transactions related to the \nEpstein relationship. He communicated this interpretation to the rest of the transaction \nmonitoring team responsible for the Epstein relationship. The interpretation was exemplified by \na later email exchange in March of 2017, when a member of the transaction monitoring team \nresponded to an alert about payments to a Russian model and Russian publicity agent, stating, \n\"[Once this type of activity is normal for this client it is not deemed suspicious.\" \n42. \nInstead of monitoring the accounts for all potential crimes and suspicious activity \nthat could be implicated by Mr. Epstein's alleged past conduct, including payments to co-\nconspirators and those that could be related to sex trafficking involving adults, AML OFFICER-\n2 only instructed the relevant transaction monitoring team to verify, using intemet searches, that \nany woman involved with transactions related to the Epstein relationship was at least 18 years \nold and to only flag transactions if they could not discern a rational reason for the transaction, a \nstandard which had little if any effect on the Bank's relationship with Mr. Epstein. \nThe Bank Continued to Maintain the Relationship for Years Despite Additional Red Flags \n43. \nOn July 21, 2015, Mr. Epstein requested an increase in his trading limits. Several \ndays later, a member of Epstein's coverage team (\"COVERAGE TEAM MEMBER-1\"), who \nwas aware of the ARRC's conditions on the relationship, escalated this request to AML \nOFFICER-2, who in turn escalated the issue to the Chairman of the ARRC. On July 29, 2015, \nafter conferring with other members of the ARRC but without formally meeting, the Chairman \nreplied to AML OFFICER-2 stating they had no objections. The Chairman added, \"I also \nchecked in with [EXECUTIVE-1] last night to make sure he supports this and has heard nothing \nnegative on the client. [EXECUTIVE-1] confirmed both.\" \n14 \nEFTA00151508\n", "char_count": 1994}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "44. \nOn January 4, 2016, an accountant representing Mr. Epstein (herein, \n\"ACCOUNTANT-1\") requested that the Bank open a brokerage account for Gratitude America, \nMr. Epstein's private charity. COVERAGE TEAM MEMBER-1 escalated the request to AML \nOFFICER-2, who directed the inquiry to the Secretary for the ARRC. The Secretary of the \nARRC conferred with a member of the ARRC and ordered that an external due diligence report \nbe prepared on Mr. Epstein. In response to the request for additional information, \nACCOUNTANT-1 informed the Bank of Mr. Epstein's resignation from Gratitude America and \nwithdrew the request to open the account. As a result, no due diligence report was run on Mr. \nEpstein. \n45. \nBy April 2016, RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-1 was replaced by another \nrelationship manager (herein, \"RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-2\") to handle accounts associated \nwith Mr. Epstein. Although RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-2 had Mr. Epstein's KYC file and \nhad been made aware of the prior escalation of the relationship to the ARRC, he was not made \naware by anyone at the Bank of the three conditions the ARRC placed on the relationship after \nits February 2015 review. \n46. \nIn a May 2018 email, a compliance officer submitted an inquiry to \nRELATIONSHIP MANAGER-2 about payments to the accounts of women with Eastern \nEuropean surnames at a Russian bank, and asking for an explanation of the purpose of the wire \ntransactions and Epstein's relationship with the counterparties. After submitting the questions to \nACCOUNTANT-1, RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-2 forwarded ACCOUNTANT-1's response \nto the compliance officer, which read \"SENT TO A FRIEND FOR TUITION FOR SCHOOL.\" \nWhen the compliance officer followed up, asking \"[w]tty is this client using this account to . . . \npay school tuition?,\" RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-2 replied \"[g]enerally, Jeffrey has separate \n15 \nEFTA00151509\n", "char_count": 1862}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "accounts to manage each of his properties. This is one of them. However, when making one-off \ntransfers to people, he and his finance staff have the flexibility to use any account they like that \nis funded.\" The Bank has represented to the Department that it has no records of the compliance \nofficer asking further follow-up questions, and the transaction was cleared. \n47. \nIn addition, payments from the Butterfly Trust accounts and other Epstein \naccounts were used for lawsuit settlement payments to alleged victims, and rent, legal, and \nimmigration expenses made to or on behalf of young (albeit adult) women, including additional \nwomen with Eastern European surnames. \nDeutsche Bank Was Aware of Suspicious Cash Activity Throughout the Relationship \n48. \nSeveral of Mr. Epstein's employees or agents had authority to conduct \ntransactions in the accounts on Mr. Epstein's behalf. One of them, Mr. Epstein's personal \nattorney (herein, \"ATTORNEY-1\"), was active in withdrawing cash for Mr. Epstein. \nATTORNEY-1, on behalf of Mr. Epstein, made a total of 97 withdrawals from the Bank's Park \nAvenue (New York City) Branch from 2013 to 2017 from personal accounts belonging to Mr. \nEpstein. The transactions in question occurred roughly two to three times per month, all in the \namount of $7,500 per withdrawal, the Bank's limit for third-party withdrawals (Le., withdrawals \nmade by an authorized user who is not a primary account holder). When Bank personnel asked \nATTORNEY-1 why Epstein needed cash, ATTORNEY-1 replied Epstein used it for travel, \ntipping and expenses. \n49. \nUnder federal regulations, banks and other financial institutions must file \nCurrency Transaction Reports (\"CTRs\") with the U.S. Treasury Department when there are cash \ntransactions with an individual in excess of $10,000 in one day. Breaking up transactions to \navoid the CTR reporting is a criminal offense commonly referred to as \"structuring.\" When \nATTORNEY-1's cash activity triggered reporting requirements\n... [truncated, 2052 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00151495/15 or ?id=EFTA00151495&page=15]", "char_count": 2052}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "requisite CTRs. The Bank also monitored ATTORNEY-1 's activity for suspicious activity \nreporting. \n50. \nIn May 2014, ATTORNEY-1 inquired into how often he could withdraw cash on \nbehalf of Mr. Epstein without triggering an alert. The record is unclear as to whether anyone \nfrom the Bank ever responded to ATTORNEY-1's inquiry. RELATIONSHIP COORDINATOR-\nI sent an email to the branch manager stating that ATTORNEY-1 \"asked how often they could \ncome in to withdraw cash without creating some sort of alert,\" and asking \"Is it once a week? \nTwice a week? Once every other week?\" The Bank has represented that it has no record of any \nresponse. RELATIONSHIP COORDINATOR-1 has since represented that she understood \nATTORNEY-1's inquiry related to ATTORNEY-1's desire to withdraw more than the $7,500 \nlimit for third-party withdrawals, and not to CTR filing requirements. \n51. \nIn 2017, ATTORNEY-1 again inquired about triggering an alert. Specifically, in \nJuly 2017, ATTORNEY-1 had, among other things, asked a teller whether a withdrawal \ntransaction in excess of $10,000 would require reporting and, upon being advised that it would, \nbroke up the withdrawal transaction over two days. In July of that year, members of the Bank's \nWealth Management AML transaction monitoring team, including AML OFFICER-2, met to \ndiscuss suspicions of cash structuring to avoid currency transaction reports (\"CTRs\") by \nATTORNEY-1. AML OFFICER-2, among others, spoke with ATTORNEY-1 and advised that \n(a) his patterns gave the appearance of structuring, (b) this pattern was unacceptable, and (c) he \nwould be provided with additional information about CTR reporting requirements. \nATTORNEY-1 represented that he had not intended to structure cash withdrawals. Bank \npersonnel found ATTORNEY-I credible and permitted him to continue to withdraw cash from \nhis own and Epstein's accounts. In 2018, just prior to the Bank's closing of the Park Avenue \n17 \nEFTA00151511\n", "char_count": 1955}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Branch, which was located nearby Mr. Epstein's house, ATTORNEY-1 withdrew $100,000.00 \nin cash on behalf of Mr. Epstein. When later questioned why ATTORNEY-1 withdrew these \nsums from the Bank, ATTORNEY-1 reported that Mr. Epstein needed the funds for tipping and \nhousehold expenses. \n52. \nIn total, in a roughly four-year period, ATTORNEY-1 withdrew on Mr. Epstein's \nbehalf more than $800,000 in cash from Mr. Epstein's personal accounts. Throughout the \nEpstein relationship the Bank filed CTRs appropriately, but there is no indication that the Bank \never sought or received any explanation for Epstein's cash activity beyond the travel, tipping, \nand expenses explanation provided by ATTORNEY-1. \nTermination of the Epstein Relationship \n53. \nIn November 2018, the Miami Herald released an article on Mr. Epstein detailing \nhis 2008 plea deal. The article prompted senior members of Wealth Management to reassess the \nrelationship's reputational risk and ultimately terminate the Epstein Relationship. On December \n21, 2018, the Bank informed Mr. Epstein by letter that they would no longer be servicing his \naccounts. \n54. \nDespite the Bank's decision to offboard all Epstein accounts due to reputational \nrisks, RELATIONSHIP MANAGER-2 drafted reference letters to two other financial \ninstitutions, on Deutsche Bank letterhead, indicating in one such letter that he was \"unaware of \nany problems relating to the operation or use of [the] accounts.\" \nConclusions Reeardine the Epstein Accounts \n55. \nIf a financial institution decides to do business with a high-risk client, that \ninstitution is required to conduct due diligence commensurate with that risk and to tailor its \n18 \nEFTA00151512\n", "char_count": 1701}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "transaction monitoring to detect suspicious or unlawful activity based on what the risk is. In this \ncase, Deutsche Bank failed to do so. \n56. \nThe Bank's fundamental failure was that, although the Bank properly classified \nMr. Epstein as high-risk, the Bank failed to scrutinize the activity in the accounts for the kinds of \nactivity that were obviously implicated by Mr. Epstein's past. The Bank was well aware not only \nthat Mr. Epstein had pled guilty and served prison time for engaging in sex with a minor but also \nthat there were public allegations that his conduct was facilitated by several named co-\nconspirators. Despite this knowledge, the Bank did little or nothing to inquire into or block \nnumerous payments to named co-conspirators, and to or on behalf of numerous young women, or \nto inquire how Mr. Epstein was using, on average, more than $200,000 per year in cash. \n57. \nWhether or to what extent those payments or that cash was used by Mr. Epstein to \ncover up old crimes, to facilitate new ones, or for some other purpose are questions that must be \nleft to the criminal authorities, but the fact that they were suspicious should have been obvious to \nBank personnel at various levels. The Bank's failure to recognize this risk constitutes a major \ncompliance failure. \n58. \nThis substantive failure was compounded by a series of procedural failures, \nmistakes, and sloppiness in how the Bank managed and oversaw the Epstein accounts. Despite \nthe nature of Mr. Epstein's prior criminal history, the initial onboarding of the first account was \nnot reviewed by the Bank's regional reputational risk committee but was instead approved in \nwhat appears to have been an off-hand conversation reflected only in the Approval Email. That \nApproval Email was then relied upon, substantially without additional scrutiny, to open \nnumerous other Epstein-related accounts. When the relationship was finally elevated to the full \nARRC in early 2015, no minutes were taken of that meeting\n... [truncated, 2053 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00151495/18 or ?id=EFTA00151495&page=18]", "char_count": 2053}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "committee was satisfied enough to continue the relationship based primarily on a brief due \ndiligence meeting between two front-office personnel and Mr. Epstein himself, the substance of \nwhich was also not reflected in writing. Moreover, the conditions imposed by the ARRC — \nconditions that, if followed, might have detected and prevented many subsequent suspicious \ntransactions — (a) were not transmitted to the majority of the relationship team; and (b) were \nmisinterpreted by a compliance officer in a way that resulted in very little change in how the \nmonitoring of the accounts occurred going forward. Throughout the relationship, very few \nproblematic transactions were ever questioned, and when they were, they were usually cleared \nwithout satisfactory explanation. \n59. \nThese errors are unacceptable in the context of a major international bank and \ninexcusable in the context of the heightened scrutiny that should have occurred in the monitoring \nof a high-risk customer. \nC. \nThe Bank's Correspondent Banking Relationships with FBME and Danske Bank \n60. \nDeutsche Bank has had correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks, \nincluding several that were in high-risk jurisdictions or themselves had customers operating in \nhigh-risk industries. The Department has concluded that Deutsche Bank failed to adequately \nmonitor and manage those relationships, including, in particular, with FBME and Danske. \nFBME \n61. \nIn 1982, FBME was established in Cyprus as a subsidiary of the Federal Bank of \nLebanon, which was founded in 1952. \n62. \nIn January 1984, FBME opened a correspondent banking account with Bankers \nTrust, which Deutsche Bank acquired in 1999 and later renamed to Deutsche Bank Trust \nCompany Americas, though this account was mostly unused for years as FBME did limited \n20 \nEFTA00151514\n", "char_count": 1828}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "business with Western financial institutions until Cyprus' 2004 acceptance into the European \nUnion. \n63. \nDue to Cypriot laws that placed restrictions on domestic financial institutions that \nprimarily provided offshore banking services, FBME was incorporated in the Cayman Islands in \n1986, though it would remain headquartered and staffed in Cyprus. In 1987, FBME's Cyprus \nbranch was granted a license by the Central Bank of Cyprus to assume banking activities within \nits jurisdiction. \n64. \nIn April 2001, FBME's Cyprus branch opened a second account with DBTCA. \n65. \nAfter the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and in \naccordance with the USA PATRIOT Act, the Cayman Islands implemented legislation requiring \nall banks registered within the country to establish a physical local presence. In response, rather \nthan complying with the new directive, FBME management elected to begin the process of \nrelocating to Tanzania. In 2003 FBME was reincorporated in Tanzania, and also received a \nbanking license from the Bank of Tanzania. \n66. \nCyprus' acceptance to the European Union in May of 2004 precipitated the active \ncorrespondent banking relationship between FBME and Deutsche Bank. On August 23, 2004, \nFBME's Cyprus branch opened a third account with DBTCA. \n67. \nDeutsche Bank was aware of potential issues with FBME's compliance regime \nfrom very early in the active phase of the correspondent banking relationship. A May 2005, \n\"Annual Anti-Money Laundering Discussion\" memo for FBME, for example, shows that the \nBank was aware that: \na. FBME's Compliance Officer headed a department comprised of two staff \nmembers; \n21 \nEFTA00151515\n", "char_count": 1676}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "b. the Compliance Officer was at the time \"trying to develop a back office \ncompliance [SIC]\"; \nc. FBME was at the time still using a transaction monitoring system that was \npartially manual; and \nd. FBME at the time considered the cost of compliance with AML and KYC \nregulations to be the most significant issue challenging the Cyprus banking sector. \n68. \nLater-in-time \"Anti-Money Laundering Discussions\" for FBME showed that \ncertain aspects of FBME's compliance program did not change over subsequent years, although \nthose memos did reflect that the number of AML Compliance staff at FBME generally increased \neach year between 2005 and 2013 and FBME implemented automated transaction monitoring \nand sanction screening tools in 2009 and 2010, respectively. \n69. \nOn November 17, 2005, Deutsche Bank's North American Client Screening \nCommittee (\"CSC\") assigned FBME a Risk Assessment Customer (\"RAC\") score of eight, \nthereby designating it as a high-risk client. At Deutsche Bank, RAC scores are graded on a scale \nof one to ten, with one being the lowest level of risk and ten the highest. Clients who receive a \nscore of eight and above are considered high-risk. \n70. \nDuring the relevant period, FBME Cyprus was always rated high-risk, with \nDeutsche Bank's records indicating that it was assigned a RAC score, over the years, of eight or \nnine. The Bank's records show that FBME Tanzania over this time period had a RAC score of \nseven in 2007, and eight thereafter. \n71. \nAt the time of the initial risk rating, information provided to the CSC included \nthat other banks had alleged in the past that FBME had been associated with money laundering \nlinked to Russian organized crime. A 2005 memo provided to the CSC stated that the USA \n22 \nEFTA00151516\n", "char_count": 1767}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "PATRIOT Act and the EU Money Laundering Directive limited FBME's ability to commit \nmoney laundering in the hypothetical event that it chose to engage in such conduct. The same \nmemo noted that the Central Bank of Cyprus (\"CBC\") had represented to Deutsche Bank that the \nCBC regarded FBME as excellent from a KYC and AML perspective, and that FBME's \nCompliance Officer was the most experienced in the Cypriot market. This, in part, served as the \njustification of Deutsche Bank's continued relationship with FBME. \n72. \nIn January 2007, a former Bank Director of U.S. Anti-Financial Crimes (herein, \n\"AML COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1\"), along with executives from Deutsche Bank's Greece \noffice, met with FBME executives in Cyprus. Over the course of this meeting and subsequent in-\nperson meetings, Deutsche Bank executives became well aware of the state of FBME's \ncompliance operations and provided annual seminars or \"AML workshops\" for Cypriot clients, \nincluding FBME, starting in June 2010. \n73. \nIn March 2007, FBME's Cyprus branch, opened a fourth account with Deutsche \nBank's New York Branch. \n74. \nSince 2008, the Bank identified a total of 826 suspicious transactions that \nreferenced FBME, with 96 alone in 2008. That year, Deutsche Bank performed an analysis of the \nvolume of suspicious transactions related to FBME and concluded that FBME presented an \naverage to greater-than-average risk compared to other banks in an already high-risk market. \n75. \nThis number increased to 125 suspicious transactions in 2009 and eventually \npeaked at 132 the following year. While the number of suspicious transactions decreased to 77 in \n2012, there was a significant increase in 2014, with the Bank identifying a total of 131 suspicious \ntransactions concerning FBME. \n23 \nEFTA00151517\n", "char_count": 1788}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "76. \nDespite the high number of suspicious transactions in relation to FBME, the Bank \nfacilitated 478,379 dollar-denominated transactions totaling more than $618 billion over the \ncourse of the relationship. \n77. \nIn communications with Deutsche Bank, FBME sometimes refused to disclose in \nwriting the ultimate beneficial owners of its own corporate clients, explaining that such \ninformation could not be shared without violating local law. For example, in March of 2007, a \nDeutsche Bank official in Greece contacted FBME concerning additional information regarding \nOFFSHORE COMPANY-1. In response, FBME stated that the company was a privately-owned \ncompany whose business activities included trading in securities and that FBME had conducted \ntheir own due diligence checks which identified the beneficial owner. However, FBME stated \nthat it could not share the underlying information with the Bank without violating Cypriot law \ngoverning client confidentiality unless ordered by a court to do so. Three years later, Deutsche \nBank flagged an additional transaction concerning OFFSHORE COMPANY-1, noting that they \nhad inquired about the same FBME customer before. Despite this lack of transparency with \nrespect to this FBME customer, Deutsche Bank continued its banking relationship with FBME. \nAfter Deutsche Bank decided to close the FBME relationship in July 2014, the U.S. Government \ndetermined that OFFSHORE COMPANY-1's ultimate beneficial owner was a Russian \nbusinessman who was affiliated with a Syrian research facility responsible for developing and \nproducing non-conventional weapons. \n78. \nThis was apparently not an isolated incident. Although the Department has not \nfound that the Bank was aware at the time, many ultimate beneficial owners of clients of FBME \nhave subsequently been associated in the press with \"weapons proliferators, terrorists, and \ntransnational organized criminals.\" \n24 \nEFTA00151518\n", "char_count": 1936}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "79. \nOn July 15, 2014, the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network \n(\"FinCEN\") named FBME a foreign financial institution of primary money laundering concern \npursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (the \"311 Designation\"), and proposed \nprohibiting U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts or \npayable through accounts for or on behalf of FBME. \n80. \nAt this time, Deutsche Bank was the largest of the few remaining Western banks \nthat had continued to maintain correspondent banking relationships with FBME. \n81. \nIn response to the 311 Designation, Deutsche Bank decided by July 18, 2014 to \nend its relationship with FBME. \n82. \nThe Department concludes that the high-risk nature of the FBME relationship, the \nred flags, numerous suspicious transactions, and overt lack of transparency exhibited by FBME \nshould have prompted Deutsche Bank to exit the relationship before the 311 Designation, yet it \nfailed to do so. \nDanske Estonia \n83. \nIn 2007, Danske Bank A/S, the largest financial institution in Denmark, acquired \nthe Baltic business of a Finnish financial institution, Sampo Bank. The segment of the business \nlocated in the nation of Estonia became known as Danske Estonia. \n84. \nThe relationship between Deutsche Bank and Danske Estonia began on October 1, \n2007, with the latter institution's opening of a correspondent banking account with Deutsche \nBank. Deutsche Bank assigned Danske Estonia a RAC Score of eight in 2007, i.e., high-risk, due \nto Danske Estonia's high-risk jurisdiction, the volume of AML alerts and cases involving Danske \nEstonia's customers, and the high-risk market segments serviced by Danske Estonia. \n25 \nEFTA00151519\n", "char_count": 1720}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "85. \nBecause it was a high-risk client, Danske Estonia was required to undergo annual \ndue diligence reviews as part of the Bank's KYC process for correspondent banking clients. This \nprocess included a discussion between the client relationship manager and Danske Estonia \npersonnel focused on AML and KYC issues, including any changes in the relevant laws and \nregulations, changes to the client's internal policies and procedures, major banking issues in the \nclient's country, and the client's risk analysis of its own customers. \n86. \nBy June 2008, Deutsche Bank was aware of issues at Danske Estonia concerning \nits non-resident customer accounts. Specifically, Deutsche Bank observed an increase in AML-\nrelated alerts generated by the Bank's monitoring systems involving non-resident customers of \nDanske Estonia \"with a Russian or Latvian (indirectly Russia[n]) connection.\" These AML alerts \nprompted Bank officials from the U.S. and Germany to meet with Danske Estonia in New York, \nat which point they were assured that Danske Estonia was moving away from its non-resident \nclient portfolio. \n87. \nAdditionally, a plan to place the Estonian Branch on the same IT platform as \nDanske's home office fell through in 2008. Failure to implement the IT protocols resulted in the \nEstonian Branch not having the same AML checks as Danske Bank's home office, despite its \nlocation in a higher-risk jurisdiction. \n88. \nIn July 2009, Deutsche Bank was sufficiently concerned about AML risks posed \nby Danske Estonia that AML COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-I provided on-site training to Danske \nEstonia staff to address AML and KYC topics, which consisted of an overview of U.S. \nregulatory requirements. \n26 \nEFTA00151520\n", "char_count": 1714}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "89. \nJust a few months later, in November 2009, Deutsche Bank increased Danske \nEstonia's RAC score to a nine due to the lack of improvement in compliance seen at the client \nbank, despite its assurances a year earlier. \n90. \nIn September 2010, Deutsche Bank elected to increase Danske Estonia's RAC \nscore again, to a ten, the maximum on the Bank's risk scale, after it continued to see insufficient \nimprovements from Danske Estonia regarding its non-resident customer portfolio. The score was \nexpressly based on \"the volume and nature\" of suspicious activity involving Danske Estonia and \nits customers, as well as \"law enforcement inquiries related to Danske Estonia and its \ncustomers.\" Despite this lack of improvement, the Bank elected to continue its relationship with \nDanske Estonia. \n91. \nDeutsche Bank's perception that Danske Bank was not improving was accurate. \nDanske Estonia saw a notable increase in non-residential business from Russia and other former \nSoviet states in 2010. This business was disproportionately large and lucrative for Danske Bank \n— in 2011 alone, Danske Estonia generated 11% of Danske Bank's total profits despite only \naccounting for 0.5% of the bank's assets. \n92. \nIn April 2011, AML COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1 and other Bank employees \nmet with Danske Estonia personnel once again to discuss Deutsche Bank's concerns regarding \nthe volume of AML investigations involving Danske Estonia customers. During the April 2011 \nmeeting, Deutsche Bank personnel expressed concerns to Danske Estonia involving its non-\nresident portfolio. In particular, the Bank noted that it would need to consider reassessing its \nrelationship, including possible termination of Danske Estonia's accounts, unless Danske Estonia \nwas able to mitigate the AML-related issues involving its non-resident customers. The number of \n27 \nEFTA00151521\n", "char_count": 1860}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "suspicious transactions involving Danske Estonia's customers slightly decreased between 2010 \n(21 transactions) and 2011 (17 transactions). \n93. \nThese concerns persisted, however, and the question of whether to retain Danske \nEstonia as a client was raised again in late 2013. In a November I, 2013 email, AML \nCOMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1 stated that Deutsche Bank was \"[o]nce again, not happy with \nwhat [they had] experience[d] with some of Danske Bank Estonia's clients in addition to some \nAML and sanctions controls.\" AML COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1 further stated that the Bank \n\"value[s] the relationship [with Danske Estonia], but must see improvements.\" \n94. \nThe following week, on November 6, 2013, AML COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1 \ndrafted an internal memorandum after conducting an on-site visit at Danske Estonia. The draft \nmemorandum concluded that there was a \"basis for closure\" of the Danske Estonia accounts \nlargely due to a lack of improvements in AML controls. The memorandum also advocated that \nthe Bank limit Danske Estonia's transactions to processing payments which originated from \nDanske Estonia's customers who were residents of Estonia. This draft memorandum does not \nappear to have been sent to any other Deutsche Bank personnel (or third party) prior to the \ntermination of the Danske Estonia correspondent banking relationship in October 2015. \n95. \nTwo days later, on November 8, 2013, U.S. AFC officers from the Bank had a \nphone conversation with their colleagues in Germany. On that call, concerns were raised \nregarding recent law enforcement inquiries into Danske Estonia's customers, as well as an \nincrease in suspicious transactions. It was also mentioned during the call that Danske Estonia \nwas \"not cooperative enough\" and had \"not improved,\" despite the Bank's suggestions. This was \nsubsequently discussed in an in-person meeting on November 20, 2013, in which AML \n28 \nEFTA00151522\n", "char_count": 1915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1 advocated to maintain the relationship while mitigating the risks \ninvolving Danske Estonia's non-resident customer portfolio. \n96. \nNotwithstanding these concerns, Deutsche Bank decided to maintain the \nrelationship for two reasons: 1) Danske Estonia was viewed an important component of the \nBank's global relationship with Danske Bank A/S; and 2) Deutsche Bank believed that it could \neffectively mitigate and control the risks. \n97. \nBy early 2014, other major Western financial institutions began de-risking efforts \nin the Baltic region related to money laundering risks. Deutsche Bank elected to continue to do \nbusiness in the region, however. \n98. \nThe Bank was aware that the risks mostly centered on high-risk non-resident \n(\"HRNR\") accounts held in the region with beneficial owners located largely in Russia and other \nformer Soviet states. When later questioned about whether Deutsche Bank was concerned with \nthe volume of HRNR accounts maintained at Danske Estonia and other financial institutions \nbased in the Baltics, the Bank's relationship manager stated that \"there were legitimate reasons \nfor former Soviet businesses and individuals to use non-resident banks,\" and that \"such \ncustomers often operated and lived under governments that were corrupt and rapacious, and thus \nthere were valid reasons for them to hold their money overseas.\" \n99. \nIn response to the Bank's efforts to mitigate and control the AML risk posed by \nDanske Estonia, Danske Estonia did in fact undergo some reforms over the course of 2014, but \nthese underscored the failings up to that point. For example: \na. Danske Estonia introduced a \"customer risk level determination\" procedure, the \nfirst change in five years to Danske Estonia's policies and procedures for \nevaluating a client's risk. \n29 \nEFTA00151523\n", "char_count": 1834}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "b. While Danske Estonia had previously screened outgoing payments against the \nU.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control and European Union \nsanctions lists, it began screening incoming payments against those lists. \n100. \nDeutsche Bank was aware of the lack of such reforms prior to 2014. For example, \nDeutsche Bank's annual AML Discussions, which were required by internal Bank policy for \nhigh-risk clients, reflect that certain aspects of Danske Estonia's AML/KYC program were \nlargely holdovers from the Sampo Bank era, with the AML Discussions simply listing \"[n]o \nchanges to previous discussion,\" year after year, with only minor changes. \n101. \nOn September 29, 2014, AML COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR-1 stated in a \ntransition memo that \"the Baltics suffer from an inherently high client AML risk .... \n[C]ontinued monitoring should be placed on . . . Danske Bank Estonia. If the situation for \nDanske Bank Estonia worsens, I recommend that the account be closed.\" \n102. \nDespite this recommendation from a high-ranking and seasoned compliance \nprofessional, Deutsche Bank continued its relationship with Danske Estonia yet again. \n103. \nDuring the eight-year period between 2007 and 2015, Deutsche Bank cleared \nmore than $267 billion in 1,638,844 transactions for Danske Estonia. Out of this total, Danske \ntransferred at least $150 billion in payments from Russia and other former Soviet states through \nDeutsche Bank. \n104. \nBetween 2007 and 2015, Deutsche Bank identified a total of 340 suspicious \ntransactions that referenced Danske Estonia's U.S. dollar correspondent accounts. The high \nnumber of suspicious transactions, the history of high RAC scores, and various dialogues that the \nBank had with its client concerning AML policies and controls, put Deutsche Bank on notice that \nthere were issues that required timely further action. \n30 \nEFTA00151524\n", "char_count": 1883}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "105. \nDespite this, the Bank maintained its relationship with Danske Estonia until \nOctober 7, 2015, a year in which Deutsche Bank identified 87 additional suspicious transactions \nconcerning Danske Estonia. \nThe Bank's Compliance Failures in its Correspondent Banking Relationships \n106. \nIn connection with the Bank's relationships with these high-risk correspondent \nbanking customers, the Bank failed to maintain policies that set out sufficiently specific criteria, \nsuch as patterns of high RAC scores or high suspicious activity volumes, under which the Bank \nwould determine whether to terminate a correspondent banking relationship or whether lesser \nrisk-mitigation measures would be appropriate. \n107. \nDuring part of these relationships, the Bank failed to maintain policies that clearly \nprovided for the closure of accounts based on the failure to obtain or update a USA PATRIOT \nAct certification from its correspondent banking clients. \n108. \nFinally, the Bank failed to consistently maintain policies that provided practical \nguidance to facilitate their implementation, such as procedures for determining whether other \nforeign banks use the respondent's correspondent account, or explanations of how employees \ncould verify the identities of respondents' beneficial owners. \nD. \nDeutsche Bank's Substantial Cooperation and Remediation \n109. \nThe Department recognizes and credits the Bank's exemplary cooperation during \nthe course of the Department's investigations of the Bank's former relationships with Danske \nBank, FBME, and Jeffrey Epstein. This cooperation, which occurred over several years, included \nconducting comprehensive and thorough internal investigations of each of those former \nrelationships and sharing the results of those investigations with the Department in a detailed and \ntransparent manner; collecting, analyzing and producing numerous documents and other \n31 \nEFTA00151525\n", "char_count": 1921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "information to the Department; and providing timely and detailed responses to the Department's \ninquiries. \n110. \nThe Department also recognizes and credits the Bank's ongoing efforts to \nremediate the shortcomings identified in this Consent Order, including the fact that these efforts \ncommenced before the inception of the Department's investigations of the former relationships \ndescribed herein. Among other things, the Bank has demonstrated its commitment to remediation \nby devoting significant financial and other resources to enhance the Bank's AML program, \nincluding through changes to its policies, procedures, systems, governance structures, and \npersonnel, as well as its ongoing cooperation with the independent monitor selected by the \nDepartment (as referenced in paragraph 117 below), and by reducing the Bank's portfolio of \nhigh-risk clients in its correspondent banking and Wealth Management businesses. \nIII. \nConsistent with the requirements of New York Banking Law § 44(5), the \nDepartment has given substantial weight to the commendable conduct described in paragraphs \n109 and 110 above. \nViolations of Laws and Regulations \n112. \nThe Department finds that Deutsche Bank conducted business in an unsafe and \nunsound manner, in violation of New York Banking Law § 44. \n113. \nThe Department finds that Deutsche Bank failed to maintain an effective and \ncompliant anti-money laundering program, in violation of 3 NYCRR § 116.2. \nNOW THEREFORE, to resolve this matter without further proceedings, pursuant to the \nSuperintendent's authority under Sections 39 and 44 of the Banking Law, the Department and \nRespondents stipulate and agree to the following terms and conditions: \n32 \nEFTA00151526\n", "char_count": 1717}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS \nMonetary Penalty \n114. \nDeutsche Bank shall pay a penalty to the Department, pursuant to New York \nBanking Law §§ 39 and 44, in the amount of one hundred fifty million U.S. dollars \n($150,000,000.00). The entire amount shall be paid to the Department within ten (10) business \ndays of executing this Consent Order. \n115. \nDeutsche Bank agrees that it will not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or \ntax credit with regard to any U.S. federal, state, or local tax, directly or indirectly, for any portion \nof the civil monetary penalty paid pursuant to this Consent Order. \n116. \nDeutsche Bank further agrees that it shall neither seek nor accept, directly or \nindirectly, reimbursement or indemnification with respect to payment of the penalty amount, \nincluding but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy. \nRemediation \n117. \nAn independent monitor selected by the Department is already engaged to assist \nthe Bank pursuant to the Consent Order entered into between the Bank and the Department dated \nJanuary 30, 2017. The Department has directed the monitor to address the compliance failures \nimplicated by the instant Consent Order in the context and within the timetables of that \nengagement. The Bank reconfirms its commitment to cooperate fully with the monitor and \nacknowledges that, although no extension of the monitorship is currently contemplated, the \nDepartment may, in its sole regulatory discretion, extend the scope of duration of the \nmonitorship to address the Bank's failures described herein. \n33 \nEFTA00151527\n", "char_count": 1587}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Full and Complete Cooperation \n118. \nThe Bank commits and agrees that it will fully cooperate with the Department \nregarding all terms of this Consent Order, and as noted above, the Bank has already provided \nexemplary cooperation in these and related matters. \nWaiver of Rights \n119. \nThe parties understand and agree that no provision of this Consent Order is \nsubject to review in any court or tribunal outside the Department. \nParties Bound by the Consent Order \n120. \nThis Consent Order is binding on the Department, Deutsche Bank, including its \nNew York Branch, as well as any of their successors and assigns. This Consent Order does not \nbind any federal or other state agency or any law enforcement authority. \n121. \nNo further action will be taken by the Department against the Bank for the \nconduct set forth in this Consent Order provided that the Bank complies with the terms of this \nConsent Order. For the sake of clarity, such conduct includes (a) the Bank's AML control \ndeficiencies with respect to the onboarding and monitoring of foreign bank customers to whom \nthe Bank provided dollar-clearing services through the date of this Order, including but not \nlimited to the Bank's relationships with FBME and Danske Estonia discussed herein, but only to \nthe extent that such deficiencies do not constitute knowing and willful misconduct that would be \nsubject to penalty under New York Banking Law § 44(4); and (b) the Bank's relationship with \nJeffrey Epstein and related individuals and entities. \n122. \nNotwithstanding any other provision in this Consent Order, the Department may \nundertake action against Deutsche Bank for transactions or conduct in connection with FBME, \nDanske Bank, and Jeffrey Epstein and his related entities that Deutsche Bank did not disclose to \n34 \nEFTA00151528\n", "char_count": 1811}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "the Department in the presentations and written materials submitted to the Department in \nconnection with these matters. \nBreach of Consent Order \n123. \nIn the event that the Department believes any party to this Consent Order to be in \nmaterial breach of the Consent Order, the Department will provide written notice to the party, \nand the party must, within ten (10) business days of receiving such notice, or on a later date if so \ndetermined in the Department's sole discretion, appear before the Department to demonstrate \nthat no material breach has occurred or, to the extent pertinent, that the breach is not material or \nhas been cured. \n124. \nThe parties understand and agree that any party's failure to make the required \nshowing within the designated time period shall be presumptive evidence of that party's breach. \nUpon a finding that a breach of this Consent Order has occurred, the Department has all the \nremedies available to it under New York Banking and Financial Services Law and may use any \nevidence available to the Department in any ensuing hearings, notices, or orders. \nNotices \n125. \nAll notices or communications regarding this Consent Order shall be sent to: \nFor the Department: \nTerri-Anne Caplan \nSenior Assistant Deputy Superintendent for Enforcement \nNew York State Department of Financial Services \nOne State Street \nNew York, NY 10004 \n35 \nEFTA00151529\n", "char_count": 1391}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Randolph Hall \nAssistant Counsel for Enforcement \nNew York State Department of Financial Services \nOne State Street \nNew York, NY 10004 \nZachary Shapiro \nAttorney for Enforcement \nNew York State Department of Financial Services \nOne State Street \nNew York, NY 10004 \nFor Deutsche Bank: \nJoe Salama \nGlobal Head of Litigation and Regulatory Enforcement \n60 Wall Street \nNew York, NY, 10005-2836 \nAndrew Stemmer \nHead of Litigation & Regulatory Enforcement - Americas \n60 Wall Street \nNew York, NY, 10005-2836 \nMiscellaneous \n126. \nEach provision of this Consent Order shall remain effective and enforceable until \nstayed, modified, suspended, or terminated by the Department. \n127. \nNo promise, assurance, representation, or understanding other than those \ncontained in this Consent Order has been made to induce any party to agree to the provisions of \nthe Consent Order. \n(The remainder of this page is intentionally blank) \n36 \nEFTA00151530\n", "char_count": 943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Consent Order to be signed this filli day \nof July, 2020. \nNEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT \nDEUTSCHE BANK AG \nOF FINANCIAL SERVICES \nBy: \nR. BRUCE WELL \nAssociate Counsel \nConsumer Protection & Financial \nEnforcement Division \nBy \n• \nBy: \nKEVIN R. PUVALOWSKI \nSenior Deputy Superintendent \nConsumer Protection & Financial \nEnforcement Division \nICA \nERINE AEMIRE\nExecutive Deputy Superintendent \nConsumer Protection & Financial \nEnforcement Division \nBy: \nKaren Kuder \nGeneral Counsel \nBy: \nThorsten Seyfried \nGeneral Counsel — Germany and \nEMEA \nDEUTSCHE BANK AG, \nNEW YORK BRANCH \nBy: \nJoe Salama \nGlobal Head of Litigation and \nRegulatory Enforcement \nBy: \nBy:  \nkist \nAc-4^-141A \nAndrew Stemmer \nHead of Litigation & Regulatory \nLINDA A. LACEWELL \nEnforcement - Americas \nSuperintendent of Financial Services \nDEUTSCHE BANK TRUST \nCOMPANY OF THE AMERICAS \nBy: \nJoe Salama \nGlobal Head of Litigation and \nRegulatory Enforcement \nBy: \nAndrew Stemmer \nHead of Litigation & Regulatory \nEnforcement - Americas \n37 \nEFTA00151531\n", "char_count": 1070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00151495", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Consent Order to be signed this 6th day \nof July, 2020. \nNEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT \nOF FINANCIAL SERVICES \nBy: \nR. BRUCE WELLS \nAssociate Counsel \nConsumer Protection & Financial \nEnforcement Division \nBy: \nKEVIN R. PUVALOWSKI \nSenior Deputy Superintendent \nConsumer Protection & Financial \nEnforcement Division \nBy: \nKATHERINE A. LEMIRE \nExecutive Deputy Superintendent \nConsumer Protection & Financial \nEnforcement Division \nBy: \nLINDA A. LACEWELL \nSuperintendent of Financial Services \n37 \nDEUTSCHE BANK AG \nBy: \n/C14,10,  /C41.411. \nBy: \nKaren Kuder \nGeneral C \nThorsten Seyfrt \nGeneral Counsel \nEMEA \nGermany and \nDEUTSCHE BANK AG, \nNEW YORK BRANCH \nBy:  \ne. &lama-\nSalama \nGlobal Head of Litigation and \nRegulatory Enforcement \nBy:  Attiviafr• St unkta \nAndrew Stemmer \nHead of Litigation & Regulatory \nEnforcement — Americas \nDEUTSCHE BANK TRUST \nCOMPANY OF THE AMERICAS \nBy:  \nSakfrita• \nSalama \nGlobal H \nBy: \nf Litigation and \nement \nSteven F. Reich \nGeneral Counsel — Americas \nEFTA00151532\n", "char_count": 1051}]}