{"efta_number": "EFTA00128968", "page_count": 5, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00128968", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00128968.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00128968", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "FD-302 (Res•. 5-8-10) \n-1 of 5 -\nFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION \nOFFICIAL RECORD \nDate of entry \n \n10/22/2019\nOn October 10, 2019 CHERIE QUIGLEY (QUIGLEY), date of birth (DOB) April \n29, 1967, was interviewed at her residence located at 736 1st Street, \nMiddletown, NJ 07748. Also present for portions of the interview was \nQUIGLEY'S husband. After being advised of the identities of the \ninterviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, QUIGLEY provided the \nfollowing information: \nAs of the date of the interview, QUIGLEY worked in the anti-financial \ncrime unit of DWS, which had its initial public offering in 2017 and was a \nsubsidiary of DEUTSCHE BANK (DEUTSCHE). Since 2014 until her transition to \nDWS, QUIGLEY was employed directly by DEUTSCHE in their asset and wealth \nmanagement business working on transaction management. Prior to her \nDEUTSCHE experience, QUIGLEY worked at BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON doing the \nsame type of work. \nDuring QUIGLEY'S time at DEUTSCHE, QUIGLEY reported to WAYNE SALIT \n(SALIT) and eventually MAURA LICONTE (LICONTE). LICONTE reported to TIM \nMCNEIL. SALIT, who now works at DWS, reported to KEITH FALCONER in Germany. \nQUIGLEY managed a team of seven individuals, three of which were in New \nYork, NY and four in Jacksonville, FL. The individuals in New York were \nYING WANG (WANG), KRIPA ARYAL (ARYAL) and ROBERT WANG (R. WANG). Currently, \nWANG worked for DWS and ARYAL was a yoga instructor. The Jacksonville, FL \nteam consisted of MICHELLE GABRIEL (GABRIEL), TAMMY MCFADDEN (MCFADDEN), \nDANYA FRIEDMAN (FRIEDMAN) and KEVIN WILSON (WILSON). Eventually two \nadditional people were added, HORACE SWAFFORD (SWAFFORD) and PATRICIA MELO \n(MELD). The Florida and New York teams worked together. QUIGLEY felt she \nwas provided appropriate resources within her department to perform her \nwork. \nThe wealth management department used a system called PRIME for \nInvestigation on \n10/10/2019 \nat Middletown, New Jersey, United States (In Person) \nFile# 272B—NY-3125676 \nDate drafted \n10/16/2019 \nby CACIOPPO CARMEN ANTHONY, WINTONICK STEVEN G \nThis document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the ',topiary of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents arc not \nto be distributed outside your agency. \nEFTA00128968\n", "char_count": 2302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00128968", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \n272B-NY-3125676 \nContinuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview - Cherie Quigley \n10/10/2019 \nm s, \n2 of 5 \ntransaction monitoring. The broker-dealer department used ACTIMIZE. The \nsystem parameters were already set when QUIGLEY began her employment with \nDEUTSCHE. Perhaps QUIGLEY'S predecessor, CLARISSA DELAFUENTE, set them. As \nof the date of the interview, QUIGLEY explained that an analytics team set \nthe parameters. Prior to the analytics team, DEUTSCHE Global ultimately \ndecided the parameters and the risk levels. There was an annual review of \nrisk and parameters. One year, QUIGLEY performed the review and sent \nQUIGLEY'S findings to SALIT which ultimately did not result in any parameter \nchanges. There were a lot of changes since the analytics team took over. \nPRIME created alerts and cases. Alerts were usually based on a \ntransaction, such as a currency transaction report (CTR). Some alerts were \ngenerated monthly, weekly or even daily. Once the PRIME system created the \nalert, QUIGLEY would assign it to a team member for review. The team member \nwould look at the customer account, the know your client (KYC) documentation \nand perform negative news searches. All steps of the review were documented \nin PRIME. If it was determined that the alert was not an issue, it would be \nexplained and waved within the system. If the alert review generated \nsuspicious activity, it was escalated to the next level in a suspicious \nactivity information form (SAIF) through a SAIF mailbox. Once the alert was \nescalated to the SAIF mailbox, the alert was closed in PRIME and a notation \nstating it was escalated would be attached. \nAs the manager, QUIGLEY was very active in the PRIME system and was aware \nof all alerts that were escalated to the SAIF mailbox. SAIFs were unusual \nand only five or six a year were filed to the SAIF mailbox. The filings \nwere usually related to cash activity. No one in QUIGLEY'S department had \naccess to the SAIF mailbox, including QUIGLEY. \nQUIGLEY recalled being unsure about issues such as BITCOIN and marijuana \ntransactions. She expressed her concerns to SALIT. The thresholds and \nparameters in the wealth management department were not necessarily set low, \nhowever, the overall risk in that line of business was lower risk. The KYC \ndepartment established the risk and that criteria was then used by QUIGLEY \nand her transaction monitoring team. \nPRIME also generated cases on a monthly basis. Each wealth management \ncustomer had an account profile average and a risk rating assigned to it. \nEFTA00128969\n", "char_count": 2579}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00128968", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \n2728-NY-3125676 \nCoMinuationofFD-302of (U) Interview - Cherie Quigley \n004, 10/10/2019 \"\ncc \n3 of 5 \nThe higher the risk, the lower the threshold. If that average or threshold \nwas exceeded, the system generated a case. \nAn example of a high risk wealth management client would be a politically \nexposed person (PEP). QUIGLEY performed a manual PEP review each month. \nThis review began with QUIGLEY downloading all PEP account activity for the \nrelevant time period. Thresholds were set for domestic and international \ncustomers. The PRIME system did not automatically generate PEP cases. This \nwas not a feature. QUIGLEY created 30 or 40 PEP cases each month when the \nthresholds were exceeded. The PEP case review involved the same types of \nactivities as an alert review. In the beginning of her time at DEUTSCHE, \nQUIGLEY assigned all PEP cases to WANG. However, as the department got \nbusier, all team members were assigned PEP cases. Most of the review work \nwas documented in PRIME. However, email was used throughout and a case \nsummary was put into PRIME. Those emails were then attached in PRIME. \nQUIGLEY was able to comment in PRIME but not edit. QUIGLEY did not review \nthe case analysis before it went into PRIME. If someone asked QUIGLEY \nquestions during the process QUIGLEY would respond. At the end of each \nmonth, QUIGLEY sampled 50% of PEP cases, 10% of alerts and 20% of high risk \ncountry transactions. If issues were discovered QUIGLEY would look into \nthem. \nQUIGLEY had not experienced a culture of sweeping issues under the rug at \nDEUTSCHE. QUIGLEY was never told not to report something or not file a \nSAIF. QUIGLEY felt no pressure and received no instruction to avoid filing \nSAIFs. QUIGLEY was free to do her job. In fact, QUIGLEY usually took a more \nconservative approach and filed SAIFs when in doubt. However, as previously \nmentioned, wealth management clients were not high risk clients and \ntherefore, not many SAIFs were filed. \nMCFADDEN and QUIGLEY did not get along. MCFADDEN was narcissistic, \ndidn't like criticism and difficult to manage. MCFADDEN was OK at MCFADDEN'S \njob but was not good at it. MCFADDEN liked to manipulate things and wait \nuntil deadline dates to submit work in order to avoid being assigned \nadditional tasks. MCFADDEN did nothing more than what MCFADDEN was told. \nMCFADDEN was able to do monotonous things but did not like to ask questions \nand interact with people. MCFADDEN just used what MCFADDEN found on the \ninternet. Out of all the members of QUIGLEY'S team, QUIGLEY trusted \nMCFADDEN the least. For example, QUIGLEY recalled an instance when MCFADDEN \nEFTA00128970\n", "char_count": 2665}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00128968", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \n2728-NY-3125676 \nCoMinuationofFD-302of (U) Interview - Cherie Quigley \nO04, 10/10/2019 m g, 4 of 5 \ndetermined no structuring was taking place when it actually was. \nQUIGLEY also recalled a PEP review performed by MCFADDEN related to JARED \nKUSHNER (KUSHNER). The transaction involved four thousand dollars ($4,000) \nsent to Russia out of a KUSHNER corporate account. MCFADDEN looked at a \nGODADDY website and found someone in New Hampshire and found part of the \nKUSHNER business name. The information was sent to the relationship manager \nand it was determined the recipient was a software developer. QUIGLEY even \ndiscussed the situation with SALIT. When the NEW YORK TIMES article came \nout about MCFADDEN, QUIGLEY was surprised by the allegations because this \nwas the only instance in which MCFADDEN raised an issue about KUSHNER to \nher. MCFADDEN did the right thing by raising the issue to QUIGLEY. \nQUIGLEY also recalled an issue, raised by MCFADDEN, in which 102 PEPs \nwere put into a deferred status by WANG. During this time, the PRIME system \nrequired a bank statement to be attached to the file in order to complete \nthe review. WANG would perform the review, document accordingly and then \nwait to attach the statement. In the meantime, WANG placed the PEPs in a \ndeferred status. MCFADDEN made a big stink about this when MCFADDEN saw \nit. MCFADDEN tried to make a big deal out of nothing. MCFADDEN did not \nlike WANG. At this time, WANG was overwhelmed with work. QUIGLEY \nacknowledged QUIGLEY cut WANG slack and perhaps should have made WANG finish \nthe reviews quicker. Statements being required to complete the review was \neventually eliminated from the process. In order to corroborate this \ninformation, QUIGLEY suggested the time stamps within PRIME be looked at. \nMCFADDEN's performance reviews remained steady, however, QUIGLEY would \nnot promote MCFADDEN. \nQUIGLEY thought JEFFREY EPSTEIN (EPSTEIN) was a pig and could not stand \nhim. Had there been something to file on EPSTEIN, QUIGLEY would have. \nHowever, there wasn't. QUIGLEY recalled a conversation she had with SALIT \nin which QUIGLEY wondered why DEUTSCHE was doing business with EPSTEIN. \nSALIT agreed with QUIGLEY. However, it was not their call to make. The \nrisk was on the reputational side. QUIGLEY's filing to the SAIF mailbox was \nrelated to transactions, not reputation. QUIGLEY did see the EPSTEIN \naccounts paying women, who appeared to be models of legal age. She also \nrecalled EPSTEIN'S attorney, DARREN INDYKE (INDYKE), withdrawing seven \nthousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) in cash each week. A SAIF was filed \nEFTA00128971\n", "char_count": 2651}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00128968", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \n272B-NY-3125676 \nContinuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview - Cherie Quigley \n10/10/2019 \nm s, \n5 of 5 \non INDYKE. \nQUIGLEY was unable to recall the types of accounts EPSTEIN had \nat DEUTSCHE. DEUTSCHE recently tried to terminate the EPSTEIN relationship \nbefore details hit the papers. Looking back, maybe a SAIF should have been \nfiled on EPSTEIN. However, QUIGLEY was transaction activity based, not \nreputation based risk. \nQUIGLEY also noted DONALD TRUMP (TRUMP) became a covered client, which \nmeant special access was required to view the profile. QUIGLEY had to \nreview all relationships to TRUMP. \nQUIGLEY also noted that DEUTSCHE advised all employees not to speak with \nthe press. \nEFTA00128972\n", "char_count": 726}]}