{"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_count": 6, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00105576", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00105576.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building \nNew York, New York 10007 \nNovember 21, 2021 \nBY E-MAIL \nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan \nUnited States District Court \nSouthern District of New York \nUnited States Courthouse \nNew York, New York 10007 \nRe: \nUnited States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, S2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nDear Judge Nathan: \nThe Government respectfully submits this letter in reply to the defendant's motion to \nexclude Government Exhibit 52. (See Dkt. No. 476). The Court ordered the Government to \nrespond in particular to the defendant's argument that \"Employee-1 cannot authenticate \nGovernment Exhibit 52 because -\na former employee, purportedly removed the \ndocument from the property before Employee-1 began working for Mr. Epstein.\" (Id.) \nThe Second Circuit has \"often commented that the bar for authentication of evidence is not \nparticularly high.\" United States v. Al-Moyad, 545 F.3d 139, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration and \ninternal quotation marks omitted). The \"proponent of the evidence is not required to rule out all \npossibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence \nis what it purports to be.\" United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 658 (2d Cir. 2001). All that is \nrequired is \"sufficient proof . . . so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or \n1 \nEFTA00105576\n", "char_count": 1429}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "identification.\" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The \"standard \nfor authentication is one of 'reasonable likelihood' and is 'minimal.' The testimony of a witness \nwith knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be is sufficient to satisfy this standard.\" \nUnited States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation \nmarks omitted). After this low bar is satisfied, \"the other party then remains free to challenge the \nreliability of the evidence, to minimize its importance, or to argue alternative interpretations of its \nmeaning, but these and similar other challenges to go the weight of the evidence—not to its \nadmissibility.\" United States v. Tan Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphases in \noriginal). \nThe defendant's argument suggests that Government Exhibit 52 is unique in a way \nunsupported by the evidence. Government Exhibit 52 is a bound, sewn, typed address book with \na particular cover. Employee-1 will testify that, based on its appearance, contents, and distinctive \ncharacteristics, it appears to be a copy of the defendant's address book. She will also testify that \nother bound, sewn, typed copies of the same address book with the same cover were located in \nspecific places in Epstein's Palm Beach house, as was the operating practice of Epstein's house. \nThat testimony is corroborated by Government Exhibit 606, the household manual, which states \nthat \"A copy of Mr Epstein and Ms Maxwell's telephone directories must be placed to the right of \neach telephone (except for the Guestrooms).\" (GX 606 at 7). And it is corroborated by■ \nhimself, whose counsel said at sentencing in his case that the book he possessed was \"a \ncopy of the book, of which there were many copies, anc\nhad one as Mr. Epstein's \nhouse man.\" Sent. Tr. at 10, United States v.\n10 Cr. 80015 (KAM) (S.D.F.L. June 18, \nEFTA00105577\n", "char_count": 1915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "2010), Dkt. No. 32.1\nFurther, Employee-1 observed the defendant's contact book in close temporal proximity to \ndeparture. \nworked for Epstein in \"2004 and 2005.\" Plea \nAgreement/Factual Proffer Statement ¶ 10(a),\n10 Cr. 80015 (KAM), Dkt. No. 25.2\nEmployee-1 worked for Epstein in 2005 and 2006. There was therefore no significant time gap \nbetween the day \nleft Epstein's employment with a copy of the address book and when \nEmployee-1 worked for Epstein and saw a copy of the address book. Consider if an employer \ngives a \"history of the firm\" book to each new employee. An employee who was aware of that \npractice and who starts in 2021 can authenticate a copy of that book, even if the particular copy \nwas given to an employee who started in 2020. Or consider if the Yankees have distinctive team-\nbranded water bottles spread across their locker room. A player who has seen the water bottles \ncan authenticate one, even if the particular water bottle was taken from the locker room before that \nplayer joined the Yankees. The same is the case here. See United States v. Al Farekh, 810 F. \nApp'x 21, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2020) (authenticating \"handwritten letters\" based on their contents and \n\"considerable similarities between the handwriting\" and known exemplars). Indeed, the fact that \nboth Employee-1 aa \nhave seen multiple copies of the same address book further \nconfirms its authenticity. \nFinally, the authenticity of the address book does not rely exclusively on Employee-1's \ntestimony: it is also reinforced by its internal markings. Other evidence at trial will show that the \naddress book in fact contains the information of persons listed therein who in fact knew the \nThe Government is not currently planning to offer trial evidence regarding \nalthough it may if the Court concludes that evidence is critical to the authentication question. \n2 The defendant erroneously suggests that \nstopped working for Epstein in 2004. \n(11/15/21 Def. Letter at I). \nEFTA00105578\n", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "defendant at the time. See United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 319 F.R.D. 459, 463 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (describing \"distinctive characteristics\" for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4) \nto include \"pages of `nonpublic information\"') \nThe Court can readily reject the defendant's suggestion that Government Exhibit 52 is a \nforgery. The book is sewn, bound, and contains an extensive set of private information. The \ndefense offers no theory for how-could \nhave generated that information and bound \nit together seamlessly in an address book that could fool Employee-1. Further, if the address book \nwere a forgery, it would have provided \nwith a complete defense in his criminal \ncase: the defendant could not have impaired a grand jury investigation by \"concealing\" a forged \ndocument. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). Instead, \nwas sentenced to eighteen months in \nprison. \nNor is there reason to believe that the book was altered in any significant way by. \nAs the Court can see from the pages the Government has marked separately (see GX \n52-A through G2-H), any handwriting is minimal and non-substantive, at least on the pages the \nGovernment intends to emphasize at trial. The \"added tabs\" the defendant mentions are literally \nsticky notes attached to certain pages, likely added by law enforcement after they seized the book \nfrom-And \nthe \"additional handwritten pages\" to which the defendant refers are \nseparate notes that are not part of Government Exhibit 52. \nSee Plea \nAgreement/Factual Proffer Statement ¶ 10(0, \n10 Cr. 80015 (ICAM), Dkt. No. 25 \nEFTA00105579\n", "char_count": 1572}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "(\"During the meeting, the defendant produced a small bound book and several sheets of legal pad \npaper containing hand-written notes.\"). Again, the book is sewn and bound, like the other copies \nseen by Employee-1, and is not amenable to easy insertion of pages. These \"alterations\" do not \nundermine the authenticity of the book in the slightest, but at most, they go to weight and not \nadmissibility. See Tan Yat Chin, 371 F.3d at 38; cf. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (\"Based on the[] \ntestimony [that electronic communications were accurate], a reasonable juror could have found \nthat the exhibits did represent those conversations, notwithstanding that the e-mails and online \nchats were editable.\"). \nThe defense is correct that Employee-1 cannot say that she saw the specific address book \nthat is Government Exhibit 52 while she worked for Epstein. But she can recognize Government \nExhibit 52 as one of the many copies of the defendant's address book that she did see, and she can \ntestify to the practice that, close in time to when Government Exhibit 52 left Epstein's house, the \naddress book was regularly kept in specific places around Epstein's house. That testimony is \nenough to satisfy the low bar for authentication, and it is supported by Government Exhibit 606 \nand by testimony that corroborates private information inside the address book. \nEFTA00105580\n", "char_count": 1376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00105576", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Respectfully submitted, \nDAMIAN WILLIAMS \nUnited States Attorney \nBy:  \ns/ \nAssistant United States Attorneys \nSouthern District of New York \nCc: Defense Counsel (by e-mail) \nEFTA00105581\n", "char_count": 188}]}