{"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_count": 25, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00103709", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00103709.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \n \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nv. \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n x \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nMEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL \nIN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS ONE THROUGH FOUR \nOF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT AS TIME-BARRED \nMark S. Cohen \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue \nNew York, NY 10022 \nPhone: 212-957-7600 \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver, Colorado 80203 \nPhone: 303-831-7364 \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor \nNew York, NY 10011 \nPhone: 212-243-1100 \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00103709\n", "char_count": 716}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nPage \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nSUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS \n2 \nARGUMENT \n3 \nI. \nThe 2003 Amendment Does Not Apply Retroactively \n3 \nA. \nStep One: Congress did not expressly prescribe retroactivity and rejected a \nproposal to do so. \n6 \nB. \nStep Two: Application of the 2003 Amendment to Ms. Maxwell's alleged \noffenses would have impermissible effects.  \n9 \nII. \nSection 3283 Does Not Apply at All. \n 12 \nA. \nSection 3283 applies only to offenses that necessarily entail the sexual or \nphysical abuse, or kidnapping, of a child \n 12 \nB. \nThe offenses charged in Counts One through Four do not necessarily entail \nthe sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child. \n 15 \nCONCLUSION \n18 \nEFTA00103710\n", "char_count": 718}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nPage(s) \nCases \nBowen v .Georgetown Univ. Hosp., \n488 U.S. 204 (1988) \n5 \nBridges v. United States, \n346 U.S. 209 (1953) \n 12, 13, 15, 17 \nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., \n464 U.S. 89 (1983) \n8 \nBurrage v. United States, \n571 U.S. 204 (2014) \n 15 \nCommit. v. Clark, \n489 U.S. 726 (1989) \n 15 \nFood and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., \n529 U.S. 120 (2000) \n8 \nHudson Valley Black Press v. I.R.S., \n409 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2005) \n8 \nKaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, \n494 U.S. 827 (1990) \n6 \nKawashima v. Holder, \n565 U.S. 478 (2012) \n 13 \nLandgraf v. USI Film Prod., \n511 U.S. 244 (1994) \npassim \nLattab v. Ashcroft, \n384 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004) \n7 \nLeocal v. Ashcroft, \n543 U.S. 1 (2004) \n13 \nMartin v. Hadix, \n527 U.S. 343 (1999) \n7 \nShular v. United States, \n140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) \n 12, 13 \nEFTA00103711\n", "char_count": 888}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Stogner v. California, \n539 U.S. 607 (2003) \n10 \nThom v. Ashcroft, \n369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) \n10 \nToussie v. United States, \n397 U.S. 112 (1970) \npassim \nUnited States v. Bronneyer, \n616 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010) \n 17 \nUnited States v. Coutentos, \n651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011) \n 14 \nUnited States v. Davis, \n139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) \n 13 \nUnited States v. Gentile, \n235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) \n9 \nUnited States v. Lawson, \n683 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1982) \n8 \nUnited States v. Leo Sure Chief \n438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006) \n11 \nUnited States v. McElvain, \n272 U.S. 633 (1926) \n 15 \nUnited States v. Miller, \n911 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2018) \n10 \nUnited States v. Mogan, \n393 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) \n 13, 14 \nUnited States v. Napolitano, \n761 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1985) \n8 \nUnited States v. Pierre-Louis, \n2018 WL 4043140 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) \n9 \nUnited States v. Rashkovski, \n301 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) \n16 \nUnited States v. Rivera-Ventura, \n72 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 1995) \n 11 \niii \nEFTA00103712\n", "char_count": 995}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "United States v. Scharton, \n285 U.S. 518 (1932) \n5, 9 \nUnited States v. Valle, \n807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015) \n 15 \nWeingarten v. United States, \n865 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017) \npassim \nStatutes \n18 U.S.C. § 2422 \n2, 16, 17 \n18 U.S.C. § 2423 \n2, 17 \n18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) \n13 \n18 U.S.C. § 3282 \n1, 3, 15 \n18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994) \n3 \n18 U.S.C. § 3283 \npassim \n18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1994) \n3 \n18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003) \n4 \n18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1950) \n12 \nNew York Penal Law, Section 130.55 \n2, 3 \nPL 103-322 \n17 \nPL 104-104 \n2 \nPL 108-21 \n3 \nRules \nFed. R. Evid. 410 \n8 \nOther Authorities \nChild Abduction Prevention Act, H.R. 1104,108th Cong. § 202 (2003) \n6 \nPROTECT Act, S. 151, 108th Cong. (as engrossed in the Senate, Feb. 24. 2003) \n7 \nRobert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014), at 3 \n7 \niv \nEFTA00103713\n", "char_count": 794}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Senator Leahy, Amber Legislation, Cong. Rec. 149:50, 55147 (2003) \n7 \nv \nEFTA00103714\n", "char_count": 86}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "PRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nGhislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of her Motion to \nDismiss Counts One Through Four of the Superseding Indictment as Time-Barred (\"Motion\"). \nThe government's late-discovered zeal to attempt to prosecute Ms. Maxwell has forced it \nto reach back more than 25 years and bring charges that have long been time-barred. Counts \nOne through Four charge Ms. Maxwell with offenses allegedly committed between 1994 and \n1997. But the applicable statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, expired five years after the \nalleged conduct. \nIn an attempt to get around its statute of limitations problem, the government has invoked \n18 U.S.C. § 3283, as that statute was amended in 2003—many years after the alleged conduct \noccurred. But the government's reliance on that provision is improper for two separate and \nindependent reasons, either of which, by itself, mandates dismissal of Counts One through Four. \nFirst, the charges are time-barred even under § 3283 unless the Court retroactively \napplies the 2003 amendment to the statute to cover Ms. Maxwell's conduct from the 1990s, \nrather than the version of § 3283 that was in effect at the time of the alleged offenses. But \nCongress made surpassingly clear that it did not intend the 2003 amendment to apply \nretroactively. To the contrary, the conference committee considered and rejected an express \nretroactivity provision in the House version of the bill, and one of the bill's original Senate co-\nsponsors acknowledged on the Senate floor that the omission was intentional. Moreover, any \nsuch retroactive application would have a presumptively impermissible retroactive effect. \nSecond, even if the 2003 amendment could be applied retroactively, § 3283 does not \napply to any of the offenses alleged in the indictment at all. Section 3283 is an exception to the \ngeneral five-year statute of limitations, and it applies only to an \"offense involving\" the sexual or \nphysical abuse or kidnapping\n... [truncated, 2080 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/6 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=6]", "char_count": 2080}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "phrase \"offense involving\" particular conduct refers to an offense whose elements necessarily \nentail that conduct. Because none of the offenses with which Ms. Maxwell has been charged \nnecessarily entails or requires the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child, § 3283 does \nnot apply here. \nSUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS \nCounts One through Four of the indictment allege that Ms. Maxwell violated and \nconspired to violate two separate provisions of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424. These \ncounts are based on conduct that occurred at unspecified times between 1994 and 1997. \nCount One of the indictment alleges that Ms. Maxwell violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (now \n§ 2422(a))1 by conspiring to entice \"one or more individuals\" to travel in interstate and foreign \ncommerce to engage in \"sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal \noffense.\" Indictment ¶¶ 9-10. Count Two charges Ms. Maxwell with a substantive § 2422(a) \nviolation, claiming she \"persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced\" an individual identified as \nMinor Victim-1 to travel from Florida to New York \"with the intention that Minor Victim-1 \nwould engage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of New York Penal Law, \nSection 130.55.\" Id. ¶ 13. \nCount Three alleges that Ms. Maxwell conspired to transport \"an individual\" in interstate \nand foreign commerce to engage in \"sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a \ncriminal offense\" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Indictment ¶¶ 15-16. Count Four charges \nMs. Maxwell with a substantive § 2423(a) violation, claiming she \"arranged for Minor Victim-1 \nto be transported from Florida to New York, New York on multiple occasions with the intention \nPrior to February 8, 1996, the provision at issue constituted the entirety of § 2422; it became § 2422(a) as a result \nof the enactment of additional subsections as of that date. Telecommunications Act of 1996, PL 104-104, Feb. 8, \n1996, Title V, § 508, 110 Stat. 56. \n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/7 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=7]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "that Minor Victim-1 would engage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of \nNew York Penal Law, Section 130.55.\" Id. ¶ 19. \nARGUMENT \n\"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,\" a non-capital criminal offense must be \ncharged \"within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.\" 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3282(a); see 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994) (same). Because Counts One through Four charge Ms. \nMaxwell with offenses that were completed no later than 1997, and because the indictment was \nnot returned until July 2020, these counts are time-barred unless \"otherwise expressly provided \nby law.\" Id. \nFor two independent reasons, § 3283, on which the government relies (see Government's \nMemorandum in Support of Detention (\"Gov. Mem.\"), Dkt. No. 4, (filed Jul. 2, 2020), at 5), \ndoes not save Counts One through Four. First, under the version of § 3283 that was in effect at \nthe time of the alleged offenses, the limitations period expired when the accuser reached the age \nof 25, which indisputably occurred many years ago here. 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1994). While \nCongress amended the statute in 2003 to extend the limitations period to \"during the life of the \nchild,\" see Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of \n2003 (PROTECT Act) (the \"2003 Amendment\"), PL 108-21, April 30, 2003, § 202, 117 Stat. \n650, 660, that amendment cannot apply to conduct that occurred during the 1990s. Second, by \nits plain terms, § 3283 applies only to offenses \"involving the sexual or physical abuse, or \nkidnaping, of a child.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3283. But the sexual or physical abuse or kidnaping of a \nchild is not an element of any of the offenses charged here. Accordingly, § 3283—regardless of \nwhich version is considered—simply does not apply. \nI. \nThe 2003 Amendment Does Not Apply Retroactively. \nAt the time of the alleged offenses, § 3283 provided as follows: \n3 \nEFTA00103717\n", "char_count": 1939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense \ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse of a child under the age of 18 years shall \npreclude such prosecution before the child reaches the age of 25 years. \n18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1994). Thus, if an individual committed an offense involving the sexual or \nphysical abuse of a 16-year-old person on June 1, 1994, and the victim reached age 17 on July 1, \n1994, then the statute of limitations as to that offense would have expired on July 1, 2002, when \nthe victim reached age 25—such that an indictment in 2020 would be time-barred. There is no \ndispute that all three of the accusers here turned 25 long ago, and thus the statute of limitations in \neffect at the time of the offenses has expired. \nIn 2003, however, Congress amended the statute and extended the time in which a \nprosecution could be brought to within the life of the victim. See 2003 Amendment at 660.2 18 \nU.S.C. § 3283, as amended in 2003, provided as follows: \nNo statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense \ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of \n18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child. \n18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). While the government would apply the 2003 Amendment retroactively \nto offenses Ms. Maxwell is alleged to have committed years earlier, nothing in the text suggests \nthat the statute may be applied retroactively. \nTo the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed a strong \"presumption against \nretroactive legislation\" that is \"deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.\" Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., \n511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (emphasis added). \"Tillie principle that the legal effect of conduct \nshould ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has \ntimeless and universal appeal.\" Id. (internal quotation omitted). \"Retroactivity is not favored in \n2 The statute was amended again in 200\n... [truncated, 2405 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/9 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=9]", "char_count": 2405}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "the law.\" Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). This presumption \nagainst retroactivity carries particular force with respect to statutes of limitations in the criminal \ncontext. \"[C]riminal limitations statutes are 'to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.'\" \nToussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. \n518, 522 (1932)). This principle transcends any particular statute or any particular defendant: \n\"The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain \nfixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish \nby criminal sanctions.\" Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114. \"Such a limitation is designed to protect \nindividuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have \nbecome obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment \nbecause of acts in the far-distant past.\" Id. at 114-15. \nIn Landgraf, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step framework to evaluate the \nproposed retroactive application of a statute to a particular case: \n[T]he court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed \nthe statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to \nresort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such \nexpress command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have \nretroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he \nacted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with \nrespect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate \nretroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent \nclear congressional intent favoring such a result. \nLandgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. Thus, if Congress has \"expressly prescribed\" that a statute will or \nwill not apply retroactively, the inquir\n... [truncated, 2352 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/10 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=10]", "char_count": 2352}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "retroactivity provision in the 2003 Amendment; it actually considered and rejected such a \nprovision, signaling its clear intent that the amendment not be retroactive. Accordingly, the \nLandgraf analysis should end at step one, with a determination that the 2003 Amendment is not \nretroactive and that Counts One through Four are therefore time-barred. However, even if the \nanalysis advances to step two, application of the 2003 Amendment to Ms. Maxwell's alleged \nconduct would create impermissible retroactive effects in violation of Landgraf by expanding a \ncriminal statute of limitations. \nA. \nStep One: Congress did not expressly prescribe retroactivity and rejected a \nproposal to do so. \nThe first step of Landgraf asks whether Congress \"expressly prescribed\" the temporal \nreach of the 2003 Amendment. Here, Congress \"expressly prescribed\" that the 2003 \nAmendment was to apply prospectively only. Not only does the text of the 2003 Amendment \nomit any mention of retroactivity, but the legislative history makes it absolutely clear that \nCongress considered and rejected a retroactivity provision. Because such unambiguous \ncongressional intent is sufficient to constitute an \"express prescription\" under the first step of \nLandgraf that the amendment not be retroactive, there is no need to proceed to the second \nLandgraf step. \n\"[W]here the congressional intent is clear, it governs.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 \n(quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Coq). v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990)). Here, the \nlegislative history leaves no doubt as to congressional intent. The House version of the bill, \nwhich would have eliminated the statute of limitations entirely, included an express retroactivity \nprovision. Child Abduction Prevention Act, H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. § 202 (2003) (\"The \namendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed \nbefore, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section.\"). The Senate version contained no \n6 \nEFTA001037\n... [truncated, 2003 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/11 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=11]", "char_count": 2003}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "retroactivity provision. PROTECT Act, S. 151, 108th Cong. (as engrossed in the Senate, Feb. \n24. 2003). When the House and Senate conferenced to resolve differences between the bills, the \nretroactivity provision was omitted. As Senator Leahy, one of the bill's original co-sponsors and \na former chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated on the Senate floor, the omission was \nintentional: \"I am pleased that the conference agreed to drop language from the original House-\npassed bill that would have extended the limitations period retroactively.\" Senator Leahy, \nAmber Legislation, Cong. Rec. 149:50, S5147 (2003). \nSuch a clear expression of congressional intent should end the Landgraf analysis at the \nfirst step. In applying Landgraf, the Supreme Court has made clear that the \"expressly \nprescribed\" analysis is not limited to the text of the statute, but may look to legislative history. \nSee Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining \"structure and legislative history\" \nas part of first Landgraf step); see also Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F. 3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (\"our \ninquiry is not limited to the statutory text but may include an examination of standard ensigns of \nstatutory construction, such as the statute's structure and legislative history\"). Indeed, Landgraf \nitself included a legislative history analysis. 511 U.S. at 264. In Landgraf, however, the Court \nconcluded that the legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding \nretroactivity. Id. That is not the case here. \nAs Judge Katzman of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative \nhistory should not be disregarded: \nWhen courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators consider their \nwork product, the judiciary not only is more likely to reach the correct result, but \nalso promotes comity with the first branch of government. It is a bipartisan \ninstitutional perspective within Congress that courts should consider reliable \nlegisla\n... [truncated, 2276 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/12 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=12]", "char_count": 2276}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "typically give it great weight in interpreting federal statutes. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. \nBrown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000) (noting that \"Congress \nconsidered and rejected\" federal bills that would have granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate \ntobacco products); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 464 \nU.S. 89, 104 (1983) (noting that Congress had \"expressly considered and ultimately rejected\" \nproposed interpretation of Civil Service Reform Act); Hudson Valley Black Press v. I.R.S., 409 \nF.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that legislative history, including conference report, \n\"plainly establishes that Congress expressly considered broader remedies\" against IRS for \nretaliatory audits \"before rejecting them\"); United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 137 (2d \nCir. 1985) (\"legislative history of the [Speedy Trial] Act clearly indicates that Congress \nconsidered and rejected defendant's suggestion\" that dismissal sanction be applied to certain \nsubsequent charges); United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1982) (characterizing \nconference committee's rejection of Senate proposal to permit use of plea bargaining statements \nfor impeachment purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 410 as \"demonstrating Congress' explicit \nintention to preclude use\" of such statements). It cannot reasonably be disputed that Congress \nintended that the 2003 Amendment would not apply retroactively. \nNothing in Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017), the only Second \nCircuit case that analyzes the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment, is inconsistent with this \nanalysis. In Weingarten, the court's analysis was in the context of an ineffective assistance of \ncounsel claim. Thus, Weingarten offers little more than a distraction from the analysis required \nhere: The court was not required to and did not decide the merits of the issue, noting that \"[t]he \nunderlying merits question remains for another day, a\n... [truncated, 2155 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/13 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=13]", "char_count": 2155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "had expressly prescribed that the 2003 Amendment would not be retroactive; Weingarten \nconsidered only whether there was an express prescription that the 2003 Amendment would be \nretroactive, concluding that the defendant's counsel could have made \"colorable\" arguments that \nthere was no such prescription. Id. at 58.3\nCongressional intent here could not be clearer. The House bill would have made the \n2003 Amendment retroactive, the Senate bill did not, and the conference consciously rejected the \nretroactivity provision. It is unnecessary to proceed to the second Landgraf step, and Counts \nOne through Four are time-barred. \nB. \nStep Two: Application of the 2003 Amendment to Ms. Mavn ell's alleged \noffenses would have impermissible effects. \nIf the Court were to proceed to the second Landgraf step—whether application of the \n2003 Amendment here would have an impermissible retroactive effect—that step also counsels \nagainst retroactivity. \nAny analysis of the retroactivity of a criminal statute of limitations under the second step \nof Landgraf must be undertaken in conjunction with the principle that unlike civil statutes of \nlimitation, \"criminal limitations statutes are `to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.\"' \nToussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (quoting Scharton, 285 U.S. at 522). As one court recognized in \ndeclining to extend a criminal statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, if Landgraf and \nToussie \"are read in conjunction,\" courts \"must interpret the statute of limitations in a manner \nfavoring repose for Defendant.\" United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649, 655 (D.N.J. \n2017). \n3 Nor was this clear evidence of congressional intent raised or considered in United States v. Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL \n4043140 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018), which the government cites in support of its contention that the 2003 \nAmendment may be applied retroactively. Gov. Mem. at 6. \n9 \nEFTA00103723\n", "char_count": 1921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "In the civil context, the Second Circuit has acknowledged a distinction between \nretroactively applying an extended limitations period to revive a stale claim, which has been held \nimpermissible under Landgraf, and retroactively extending the limitations period for a live claim, \nwhich has been held permissible. See, e.g., Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57-58 (2d Cir. 2017) \n(collecting and comparing civil cases). The criminal context, however, is fundamentally \ndifferent. \nAt a minimum, Toussie \"potentially alters the second step in the Landgraf approach\" in \ncriminal cases. United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2018) (evaluating 2003 \nAmendment in adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claim). \"In other words, when \nCongress has sounded an uncertain trumpet, a court ought to refrain from applying an enlarged \ncriminal statute of limitations retrospectively.\" Id. As shown in the first step of Landgraf, the \ntrumpet sounded by Congress in enacting the 2003 Amendment was anything but uncertain: \ncongressional intent is clear. \nIn the criminal context, the retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations to \nrevive a time-barred claim is not merely an impermissible effect under Landgraf; it violates the \nEx Post Facto Clause. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 618 (2003).4 As Landgraf itself \nrecognized, however, the principle against retroactivity is not simply an application of the Ex \nPost Facto Clause; rather, it is a \"deeply rooted\" presumption based on \"[e]lementary \nconsiderations\" of fundamental \"fairness.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66. See also Thom v. \nAshcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., writing for the majority but noting \nhe was speaking for himself) (stating that anti-retroactivity presumption in Landgraf is \"triggered \nFor this reason, the government would be barred from prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for any offense against the third \naccuser (identified in the indictment as Minor Victim-3) even if the \n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/15 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=15]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "by statutes whose retroactive application, while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, \nnevertheless would run afoul of `familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and \nsettled expectations.\", Thus, in the criminal context, the second step of Landgraf should be read \nas providing protections broader than simply violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and as \nprohibiting retroactive application of a criminal statute of limitations—and the resulting \nexpansion of an individual's exposure to criminal liability for completed conduct—even where \nthe charge is not time-barred at the time of the amendment. \nStatutes of limitations \"applicable to criminal prosecutions are designed principally to \nprotect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges supported by facts that are \nremote in time.\" United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995). That \nconcern is heightened here, where the government seeks to rely on the retroactive extension of a \ncriminal statute of limitations to prosecute a case based on conduct more than two decades old, \nwith little, if any, evidence other than witness testimony. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 \n(observing that statute of limitations \"may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law \nenforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity\"). Since the time of the \nalleged conduct, memories have become faded or corrupted, documents have been lost or \ndestroyed, and witnesses have died, all to the extreme prejudice of Ms. Maxwell.° Retroactively \napplying the 2003 Amendment here not only would fly in the face of congressional intent; it \nwould violate all notions of fundamental fairness.°\n5 See Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Six of the Superseding Indictment for Pre-Indictment Delay. \n6 In Weingarten, the court stated that if the defendant's counsel had successfully persuaded the trial court that the \n2003 Amendment could not retroactively extend the statute \n... [truncated, 2472 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/16 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=16]", "char_count": 2472}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "H. \nSection 3283 Does Not Apah at All. \nEven if the 2003 Amendment could be retroactively applied to Ms. Maxwell's alleged \nconduct during the 1990s, Counts One through Four would still be time-barred for a separate and \nindependent reason: Section 3283 does not apply to the offenses with which Ms. Maxwell is \ncharged. Section 3283 extends the statute of limitations only for \"offense[s] involving the sexual \nor physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3283, but none \nof the offenses charged in Counts One through Four is such an offense.' \nA. \nSection 3283 applies only to offenses that necessarily entail the sexual or \nphysical abuse, or kidnapping, of a child. \nA long line of cases establishes that an \"offense\" or \"crime\" that \"involves\" certain \nconduct means an offense that \"necessarily requir[es]\" that conduct. Shular v. United States, 140 \nS. Ct. 779, 785 (2020) (internal quotations omitted). Those cases date back at least to Bridges v. \nUnited States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which construed the Wartime Suspension of Limitations \nAct's extension of statutes of limitations for \"any offense 17 involving fraud or attempted fraud \nagainst the United States.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1950) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held \nthat that extension was \"limited strictly to offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud \nthe United States is an essential ingredient of the offense charged.\" Bridges, 346 U.S. at 221. \nThus, the Court held that charges that the defendant knowingly made and conspired to make \nfalse statements in a naturalization proceeding, and that he aided and abetted a fraudulent \ncertificate of naturalization, were subject to the general statute of limitations and not the \nexception, because \"fraud is not an essential ingredient\" of such offenses, and \"[t]he offense is \ncomplete without proof of fraud, although fraud often accompanies it.\" Id. at 222. \n7 The words \"or kidnaping\" were added as part of the 2003 Ame\n... [truncated, 2049 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/17 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=17]", "char_count": 2049}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Since Bridges, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutory references to an \n\"offense involving\" or \"offenses involving\" certain elements call for such an approach. See \nShular, 140 S.Ct. at 785; Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (interpreting \"offenses \nthat involve fraud or deceit\" to mean \"offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or \ndeceitful conduct\") (internal punctuation omitted); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) \n(stating that \"offense that . . . involves\" language \"requires us to look to the elements and the \nnature of the offense .. .rather than to the particular facts\" at issue); see also United States v. \nDavis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019) (\"In all but the most unusual situations, a single use of a \nstatutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.\"). Thus, only if the offense \"necessarily entails\" the \nidentified conduct can it be said to be an \"offense involving\" that conduct. Kawashima, 565 U.S. \nat 484. \nIn United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit used this approach in interpreting 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3237(a), a venue statute that applies to \"[a]ny offense involving the use of the mails, \ntransportation in interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an object or person into \nthe United States.\" The court concluded that \"[t]he most natural reading\" of the statute is \"to \nconstrue `any offense involving' by reference to the elements of the offense at issue.\" 393 F.3d \n192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The court then gave an illustrative example of \na case in which a defendant travels in interstate commerce, commits a federal offense, and then \nreturns home via interstate commerce: \n[T]he circumstances surrounding the crime include [the defendant's] travel in \ninterstate commerce, but his crime is not an \"offense involving\" transportation in \ninterstate commerce. In other words, a faithful reading of the precise words of the \nstatute in the order in which they are written suggests that an \"offen\n... [truncated, 2133 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/18 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=18]", "char_count": 2133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Id. Similarly, an \"offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under \nthe age of 18 years\" is an offense in which such sexual abuse, physical abuse, or kidnapping is an \nelement of the offense. \nThe Eighth Circuit concluded as much in United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th \nCir. 2011). There, the court held that § 3283 did not apply to a charge of possession of child \npornography. Id. at 817-18. The court clearly looked to the elements of the statute, as the facts \nof the case did involve the sexual abuse of a child, including the production and possession of \nchild pornography. Id. at 813-14. Yet the court held that, on the same set of facts, the offense of \npossession of child pornography did not involve sexual abuse and thus was subject to the general \nstatute of limitations, but the offense of production of child pornography did involve sexual \nabuse and was subject to § 3283: \"That a producer of child pornography will possess it at the \ntime of the abuse is insufficient to change our view that the offense of possessing child \npornography itself does not involve an act against a child, i.e., the sexual abuse of a child.\" Id. at \n817. \nCoutentos demonstrates that the \"offense involving\" language of § 3283, as with other \nstatutes, requires the court to look to the elements of the offense, rather than the facts of a \nparticular case, to determine whether a particular offense \"involves\" the sexual or physical abuse \nor kidnapping of a child. Id. at 817. This approach makes practical sense: If the applicability of \n§ 3283 depended on the facts of a particular case, rather than the elements of the offense, the \ngovernment would effectively be required to prove conduct beyond the elements of the \noffense—Le., that sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping occurred—in order to prove that its \ncharges are not time-barred. \n14 \nEFTA00103728\n", "char_count": 1901}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Such a \"necessarily entails\" or \"elements of the offense\" approach is particularly \nappropriate for three additional reasons here. First, like the Wartime Suspension Act in Bridges, \n§ 3283 creates an \"exception\" to the general five-year limitations period of § 3282, and such \nexceptions should be \"narrowly construed.\" Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16 (citing United States v. \nMcElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 (1926)); see also Comm 'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (\"we \nusually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision,\" \nparticularly when the exception is \"somewhat ambiguous\"). Second, § 3282 itself requires that \nany exception to the five-year rule be \"expressly provided by law.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (emphasis \nadded). Nowhere does § 3283 \"expressly\" purport to cover offenses that could (but need not) be \nproved by facts involving sexual or physical abuse of a minor. And third, under the rule of \nlenity, ambiguity with respect to criminal statutes should be construed in favor of the defendant. \nBurrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014); see also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d \n508, 523 (2d Cir. 2015) (\"where, as here, the Government and the defense both posit plausible \ninterpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires us to adopt the defendant's \nconstruction\"). To do otherwise would violate the \"longstanding congressional `policy of \nrepose' that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law.\" See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-\n16; see also Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (\"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted \nin favor of repose\" (internal quotation omitted)).8\nB. \nThe offenses charged in Counts One through Four do not necessarily entail \nthe sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child. \nUnder the \"necessarily entails\" approach, § 3283 does not apply: None of the charged \ncounts \"necessarily\" entails \"the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child.\" See 18 \n8 Nor ha\n... [truncated, 2293 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/20 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=20]", "char_count": 2293}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "U.S.C. § 3283. Counts One and Two arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), which, at the time of the \nalleged conduct, provided that a person could be charged with a criminal offense if she \n\"knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or \nforeign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in \nprostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (1996) (emphasis added). That statute criminalizes enticing \n\"individual[s],\" not necessarily children, to cross state lines to engage in sexual activities. In \nother words, the act that violates § 2422(a) does not necessarily entail the enticement of a child \nto travel, because the enticement of an individual of any age satisfies the statute. \nFurther, § 2422(a) does not necessarily entail \"sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping.\" \n18 U.S.C. § 3283. A substantive § 2422(a) offense is complete when an individual is \n\"persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d], or coerce[d]\" to travel to engage in unlawful sexual activity, \nand a conspiracy to commit such an offense is complete when an agreement to \"persuade[], \ninduce[], entice[], or coerce[)\" an individual to engage in such travel is reached and a single \novert act is committed in furtherance of the agreement. It is immaterial to either offense whether \nany unlawful sexual activity subsequently occurs. Moreover, the intended unlawful sexual \nactivity required to establish a § 2422(a) offense need not involve \"sexual or physical abuse, or \nkidnaping\"; § 2422(a) is frequently, if not primarily, invoked in prosecutions involving the \nenticement of adults to travel to engage in prostitution, including on a voluntary basis. See, e.g., \nUnited States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2002). For all of these reasons, \nCounts One and Two do not charge offenses involving the sexual or physical abuse or \nkidnapping of a child and thus are no\n... [truncated, 2039 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00103709/21 or ?id=EFTA00103709&page=21]", "char_count": 2039}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Nor does § 3283 apply to extend the statutes of limitations under Counts Three and Four. \nThose counts arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which prohibits \"transporting\" minors across state \nlines \"with intent that the [minor] engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be \ncharged with a criminal offense\" (emphasis added).9 Neither that offense nor a conspiracy to \n\"transport\" a minor with such intent necessarily entails \"the sexual or physical abuse, or \nkidnaping, of a child.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Instead, as with § 2422(a), the offense is a \"crime of \nintent and a conviction is entirely sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever \noccurs.\" United States v. Bronneyer, 616 F.3d 120, 129 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010). For this reason, \nCounts Three and Four are not subject to § 3283's extended statute of limitations. \nIt does not matter that the particular facts alleged in the indictment fall within § 3283. \n\"The embellishment of the indictment does not lengthen the time for prosecution.\" Bridges, 346 \nU.S. at 222. Nor does it matter that sexual abuse of a minor may \"often accompan[y]\" the \noffenses charged. See id. \"[U]nder the statute[s] creating the offense[s],\" physical or sexual \nabuse of a minor, or kidnapping, is not \"an essential ingredient.\" Id. Thus, § 3283's extension \nfor \"offense[s] involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of \n18 years\" does not apply. \n9 18 U.S.C. § 2423 was amended effective September 13, 1994, to add a subsection (b) and make cosmetic \nadjustments, immaterial here, to what is now subsection (a). Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of \n1994, PL 103.322, Sept. 13, 1994, Title XVI, § 160001(g), 108 Stat. 1796. \n17 \nEFTA00103731\n", "char_count": 1750}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "CONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the \nindictment against her. \nDated: January 25, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ Mark S. Cohen \nMark S. Cohen \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue \nNew York, NY 10022 \nPhone: 212-957-7600 \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver, Colorado 80203 \nPhone: 303-831-7364 \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor \nNew York, NY 10011 \nPhone: 212-243-1100 \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \n18 \nEFTA00103732\n", "char_count": 649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00103709", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that on January 25, 2021, I served by email, pursuant Rule 2(B) of the \nCourt's individual practices in criminal cases, the within memorandum and any accompanying \nexhibits upon the following: \n/s/ Christian Everdell \nEFTA00103733\n", "char_count": 272}]}