{"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_count": 7, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00091006", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00091006.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice\nUnited States Attorney\nSouthern District of New York\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\nJuly 28, 2020\nVIA ECF\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, New York 10007\nRe:\nUnited States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan:\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter with respect to the protective order to be\nentered in the above-captioned case, and to respond to the defendant's letter and submission of\nJuly 27, 2020 (the \"Defendant Letter\" or \"Def. Ltr.\") (Dkt. 29). The Government and defense\ncounsel have conferred regarding a protective order several times via telephone and email between\nJuly 9, 2020, and today, including as recently as this morning. The Government and defense\ncounsel have come to an agreement on much of the proposed protective order. However, the\nparties disagree as to two inclusions sought by the defendant which the Government objects to and\nfor which, as detailed herein, the Government submits there is no legal basis. Accordingly, the\nGovernment respectfully requests that the Court enter its proposed protective order (the\n\"Government Proposed Order\"), which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and which differs from the\ndefendant's proposed order in those two respects, as further described below.\nA. The Defendant's Request to be Permitted to Publicly Name and Identify Victims\nAs detailed herein, the Government seeks to protect the identities of victims, consistent\nwith their significant privacy interests and the well-established law in this Circuit, and proposes a\nprotective order consistent with those very significant interests. In contrast, the defendant insists\nthat the protective order be modified such that she and her counsel would be permitted to \"publicly\nreferenc[e]\" individuals, by name, who have \"spoken on the public record to the media or in public\n... [truncated, 2602 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00091006/0 or ?id=EFTA00091006&page=0]", "char_count": 2602}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 2\nThe defendant's demand that she and her counsel be permitted to name any individuals who have\never publicly identified themselves as a victim of either Epstein or the defendant in any \"public\nfora,\" and at any time, without limitation, is extraordinarily broad, unnecessary, and inappropriate,\nand should be denied.\nAs an initial matter, there can be no serious question that there are significant privacy and\nvictim interests at issue here, which the Government Proposed Order seeks to protect. Particularly\nin the context of victim witnesses, there are compelling reasons to limit public disclosure of victim\nidentities and other sensitive information. Indeed, the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §\n3771, requires district courts to implement procedures to ensure that crime victims are accorded,\namong other rights, \"[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused,\" in addition to \"[t]he\nright to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.\" Id. §§\n(a)(1), (a)(8) (emphasis added). Moreover, \"the public generally has a strong interest in protecting\nthe identities of... victims so that other victims will not be deterred from reporting such crimes.\"\nUnited States v. Paris, 2007 WL 1484974, at *2 (D. Conn. May 18, 2007).\nMoreover, and consistent with those interests, courts in this Circuit have routinely\nacknowledged the need to protect victim-witness identities. See, e.g., United States v. Corley,\n13 Cr. 48 (AJN), 2016 WL 9022508, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (\"Because Corley's minor\nvictims have significant privacy and safety interests at stake, while Corley's interests are minimal,\nthe Court finds good cause to modify the protective order in this case to prevent Corley from\nlearning the surnames of the minor victims.\"); United States v. Kelly, 07 Cr. 374 (SJ), 2008 WL\n5068820, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008) (\"Given the potentially explicit nature of the government\nwitnesses' \n... [truncated, 3903 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00091006/1 or ?id=EFTA00091006&page=1]", "char_count": 3903}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 3\nspeak by name on the public record in this case, as one victim has already chosen to do, because\nthose victims, and only those victims, have affirmatively chosen to be publicly identified in\nconnection with this case. These proposals are reasonable, narrowly tailored, and not broader than\nnecessary to protect victims' privacy interests, safety, and well-being, to avoid potential\nharassment of witnesses by the press and others, and to prevent undue embarrassment and other\nadverse consequences. At this stage in the case, permitting defense counsel to refer to witnesses\nby name in sealed filings, to refer to witnesses by name in the course of private conversations\nduring their investigation, and to refer by name to individuals who have made the affirmative\nchoice to be identified by name in connection with this criminal case is more than enough to enable\nthe defendant ability to vigorously pursue her defense.\nThe defendant has rejected this proposal because, as noted above, she believes that she and\nher counsel should be permitted to \"publicly referenc[e]\" individuals, by name, who have \"spoken\non the public record to the media or in public fora, or in litigation - criminal or otherwise - relating\nto Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell.\" In support of the defendant's application for such\nsweeping ability to publicly name any such individuals, defense counsel provides only the\nconclusory assertion that an inability to publicly reference the names of victims, in court\nproceedings and beyond, will hinder their ability to investigate, prepare witnesses for trial, and\nadvocate on the defendant's behalf. The Government has repeatedly asked defense counsel to\nexplain how or why it would need to publicly name victims of sexual abuse to prepare for trial,\nand the defense repeatedly has declined to do so, presumably because the argument borders on the\nabsurd.²\nThe Government's proposed protective order would do no such thing. \n... [truncated, 3761 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00091006/2 or ?id=EFTA00091006&page=2]", "char_count": 3761}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 4\nMoreover, the defendant is able, at any time, to apply to the Court for a modification of the\nprotective order should she be able to identify a particularized need to publicly name victims who\nhave not yet identified themselves on the record in this case-as opposed to redacting their names\nfrom court filings, or referring to them in an anonymized fashion. As noted, to date, defense\ncounsel has declined to identify to the Court or to the Government any example of why doing so\nwould be necessary or helpful to the defense, or even under what circumstances the defense might\nwant to do so.\nThe defendant's proposal is also extraordinarily broad, and without any temporal or subject\nmatter limitation as to the phrase \"public fora.\" Adopting the defendant's proposal would mean\nthat any individual who has ever self-identified as a victim of Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell\npublicly in any capacity would be subject to public identification by the defendant and her counsel\nin connection with this case. This would include, as hypothetical examples, someone who spoke\nto a journalist for a local story in 1997, or posted on a MySpace page followed by a handful of\nfriends in 2005, or made a statement on a small podcast in 2009, or posted on Twitter to a handful\nof followers in 2013. But none of these examples of ventures into the \"public fora\" can possibly\nbe construed as efforts by hypothetical victims to consent or choose \"to self-identify,\" Def. Ltr.\nat 3, in a future criminal case against Ghislaine Maxwell subject to extraordinary public attention\nand scrutiny.\nAdditionally, while some individuals have identified themselves as victims without\nproviding any details or additional information about their abuse, the defense contemplates no\nlimitation of publicly associating those individuals with the details of their abuse in public defense\nstatements or filings. In essence, the defendant's proposal seeks authorization to drag \n... [truncated, 3676 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00091006/3 or ?id=EFTA00091006&page=3]", "char_count": 3676}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 5\na provision stating that it did not prohibit defense counsel from publicly referencing individuals\nwho had spoken on the public record in litigation relating to Jeffrey Epstein. Id. 4. Here, defense\ncounsel seeks permission to publicly identify any individuals who have self-identified as victims\nof either the defendant or Epstein \"to the media or in public fora, or in litigation\"-a vastly broader\nallowance. Indeed, as a comparison, none of the hypothetical examples described above would\nhave been subject to public naming and identification under the Epstein protective order, but every\nsingle one would be under the defendant's proposed order in this case.\nAdditionally, beyond the differences in the language itself, there are two significant\ndifferences between the circumstances of the Epstein prosecution and this case. First, at the time\nthe Epstein protective order was entered, there were exceptionally few victims who had identified\nthemselves by name in litigation. Accordingly, the practical application of that provision was\nextremely limited. Second, and related, in the time between when the Epstein protective order was\nentered and the indictment in this case, many more victims have made public statements about\ntheir victimization at the hands of Epstein, and the defendant, on their own terms and in their own\nways, including by exercising their rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act in the context of\nthe dismissal of the indictment against Jeffrey Epstein following his suicide. Those victims could\nnot possibly have predicted, much less chosen, that their names would be publicly broadcast by\ndefense counsel in connection with a subsequent criminal case. Victims should be able to continue\nto come forward, in the ways and in the venues they themselves choose, without fear of reprisal,\nshaming, or other consequence arising from having their identities broadcast by defense counsel\nin this case.\nIn sum, the request\n... [truncated, 3514 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00091006/4 or ?id=EFTA00091006&page=4]", "char_count": 3514}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 6\nGovernment. The defendant cites not a single example in any district court in the country where\nsuch a restriction has been imposed in a protective order. Indeed, it is nonsensical for a protective\norder to require limitations of the Government in its use of material already in its possession so\nthat the Government may provide a defendant with discovery. The defendant's attempt to refuse\nto agree to receive discovery unless the Government agrees to additional restrictions upon the use\nof its own materials should be rejected.\nAs an initial matter, the Government's use of materials it has gathered through its\ninvestigation, including through the grand jury process, search warrants, interviews, and voluntary\ndisclosures, is already subject to a wide range of restrictions, including Rule 6(e) of the Federal\nRules of Criminal Procedure, the Privacy Act of 1974, and other policies of the Department of\nJustice and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. In this case,\nconsistent with the Government's customary practice, and as the Government has informed\ndefense counsel, the Government has no intention of providing witnesses, victims or their counsel\nwith the entirety of discovery produced to the defendant, nor anything even close to that. Indeed,\nconsistent with its standard practice, the Government rarely provides any third party, including a\nwitness, with any material they did not already possess. While the Government does more\ncommonly show a witness materials in connection with proffers or trial preparation, the\nGovernment rarely if ever shows a witness material she has not already seen, does not have\npersonal knowledge of, or would not have some specific reason to opine upon. Practically\nspeaking, therefore, the concerns defense counsel raises about future use in civil litigation are not\nlikely to occur.\nNevertheless, a criminal protective order is not the appropriate forum for the defendant\n... [truncated, 3788 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00091006/5 or ?id=EFTA00091006&page=5]", "char_count": 3788}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00091006", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 7\nof such materials provided by the defendant to the Government. But there is no basis to add\nadditional restrictions upon the Government's use of materials gathered by the Government itself.\nThe defendant's only counter-argument, as noted that this Court should put third parties\n\"on equal footing with the defense\" is both unlikely to be relevant given the Government's\nstandard practice, as described above, and, the Government submits, an irrelevant consideration in\nthe context of a criminal protective order. Indeed, the Government respectfully submits that\nneither it nor this Court is well-positioned to, or should, become the arbiter of what is appropriate\nor permissible in civil cases.\nIn sum, the defendant's attempt to restrict the Government and to restrict third parties in\nthis way appears to be unprecedented, and is without legal basis, and should be denied.\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court should enter the Government's\nproposed protective order, which is enclosed, and deny the defendant's motion.\nRespectfully submitted,\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\nCc:\nAll counsel of record (via ECF)\nBy\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nSouthern District of New York\nEFTA00091012\n", "char_count": 1277}]}