{"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_count": 52, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00090721", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00090721.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nv. \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nx \nS2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF \nHER MOTIONS IN LIMINE \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \nDenver \nPhone: \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \nNew York NY \nPhone: \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \nAttorneys for Chislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00090721\n", "char_count": 466}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nI. \nA. \nB. \nC. \nD. \nTHIS COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION OF ALLEGED CO-\nCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS AS A SANCTION FOR GOVERNMENTS \nFAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S SEPTEMBER 3, 2021 ORDER \n1 \nThe Court's Order was Neither Ambiguous Nor Misread by the Defense \n1 \nThe Court Has the Authority to Require Disclosure \n2 \nThere Should Be a Sanction \n4 \nThere are Substantial Issues with the Government's Anticipated Position \n5 \nII. \nGOVERNMENT CONCEDEDLY FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE BASIS OR \nREASONING TO ADMIT ANY 404(B) EVIDENCE \n6 \nA. \nThe Emails Bear No Relationship to the Charged Conspiracy, Reflect Pure Propensity \nEvidence, and Otherwise are Unduly Prejudicial to Uninvolved Third-Party Adults .7 \nB. \n \n 11 \n1. \n \n 12 \n2. The government has apparently abandoned efforts to introduce her testimony as Rule \n404(b) evidence \n 13 \n3. \nconstitutes an impermissible constructive \namendment and variance to the Indictment. \n 13 \nC. \nbriefing and ruling on the admissibility \nfor two weeks. \n15 \nMs. Maxwell reiterates her re, uest to defer \nIII. \nTHIS COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE i \nTESTIMONY UNDER \nFEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 AND DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW \nPHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) AND GRANT A DAUBERT \nHEARING \n15 \nA. This Court should reject the government's arguments to the extent that they are based on \nnewly disclosed material, which this Court ordered the government to produce six months \nago  \n15 \nB. \nproposed testimony is inadmissible \n17 \nC. \nAt a minimum, this Court should hold a Dauber: hearing. \n23 \nIV. \nTHE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATED \n24 \nV. \nTHE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT IT WILL NOT OFFER EVIDENCE OF MS. \nMAXWELL'S ALLEGED \"FLIGHT\" \n32 \nEFTA00090722\n", "char_count": 1715}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "VI. \nTHE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT IT WILL NOT OFFER EVIDENCE OF MS. \nMAXWELL'S ALLEGED FALSE STATEMENTS AND AGREES TO MS. \nMAXWELL'S PROPOSED REDACTIONS32 \nVII. \nTHE COURT SHOULD HOLD A PRE-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MS. \nMAXWELL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION. \n32 \nVIII. GOVERNMENT AGREES NOT TO ELICIT LAW ENFORCEMENT OPINION \nTESTIMONY 35 \nIX. \nTHE COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE TESTIMONY ABOUT ANY ALLEGED \"RAPE\" \nBY JEFFREY EPSTEIN \n36 \nXII. \nREFERENCE TO ACCUSERS AS \"VICTIMS\" IS IMPROPER VOUCHING \n38 \nXIII. THE COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT \nEXHIBITS 52, 251, 288, 294, 313, 606 AND THE SEARCH OF EL BRILLO WAY \n41 \nA. \nThe Court Should Exclude the Challenged Government Exhibits \n41 \nB. \nGovernment Exhibit 52 \n42 \nC. \nThe Palm Beach Search of El Brillo Way \n42 \nD. \n \n43 \nE. \nThe Twin Torpedoes \n43 \nF. \nGovernment Exhibit 313 \n44 \nG. \nGovernment Exhibit 606 \n44 \nii \nEFTA00090723\n", "char_count": 910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nCases \nBosco v. United States, No. 14 CIV. 3525 (JFK), 2016 WL 5376205 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016)19 \nCf. State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233 (Vt. 2005) \n40 \nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) \npassim \nDougherty v. County of Sttffolk,No. CV 13-6493 (AKT), 2018 WL 1902336 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, \n2018) \n41 \nEsquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) \n30 \nHighland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 379 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) \n41 \nLou v. United States, 218 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1955) \n5 \nOld Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) \n38 \nPeople v. Davis, 423 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) \n39 \nRaheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001) \n34 \nRicketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397 (2d Cir.1996) \n41 \nSolomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1981) \n34 \nState v. Cortes, 851 A.2d 1230 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) \n39 \nState v. Sperou, 365 Or. 121, 131, 442 P.3d 581 (2019) \n40 \nTalkington v. State, 682 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App. 1984) \n39 \nUnited States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1981) \n8 \nUnited States v. Arroyo, 600 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2015) \n7 \nUnited States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) \n26 \nUnited States v. Bocio, 103 F. Supp. 2d 531 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) \n2 \nUnited States v. Bozeman, No. 3:11-CR-129, 2012 WL 1071207 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2012) \n3 \nUnited States v. Brewington, No. 15-CR-00073-PAB, 2018 WL 1411274 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, \n2018) \n3 \nUnited States v. Bums, No. 07 CR 556, 2009 WL 3617448 (N.D. III. Oct. 27, 2009) \n20, 21 \nUnited States v. Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) \n26 \nUnited States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) \n26 \nUnited States v. Curley, No. SI 08 Cr. 404 (SCR), 2009 WL 10688209 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2009) \n \n26 \nUnited States v. D 'Amelio, 683 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2012) \n14 \nUnited States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2006) \n14 \nUnited States v. Ehrens, No. CR-15-200-C, 2015 WL 7758544 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2015) \n39 \niii \nEFTA00090724\n", "char_count": 1954}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "United States v. English, No. 18 Cr. 492 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. 2020) \n37 \nUnited States v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002) \n4 \nUnited States v. Gonyer, No. 1:12-CR-00021-JAW, 2012 WL 3043020 (D. Me. July 24, 2012)20 \nUnited States v. Graham, No. 14 Cr. 500 (NSR), 2015 WL 6161292 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) 38 \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v \n2019) \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \n41 \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nUnited States v. \nGross, 15-cr-769 (MN), 2017 WL 4685111 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2017) \n14 \nJacobs, 650 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. Conn. 2009) \n2 \nLaFlan:, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) \n7 \nLee, 834 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2016) \n4 \nLewis, 818 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2020) \n15 \nLincoln, No. 19-CR-6047 (CJS), 2019 WL 719822 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019)28 \nMoccia, 681 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1982) \n38 \nMollica, 849 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1988) \n14 \nNektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) \n29, 37 \nPineros, 532 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976) \n4 \nRaniere, No. 18-CR-2041-NGG-VMS, 2019 WL 2212639 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, \n20, 23 \nRaymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010) \n20, 21, 22 \nRigas, 490 F.3d 208 (2d. Cir. 2007) \n14 \nSalmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) \n14 \nSchneider, No. CRIM.A. 10-29, 2010 WL 3734055 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010) 20, \nSena, No. 19-CR-01432, 2021 WL 4129247 (D.N.M. Sept. 9, 2021) \n39, 40 \nSliker, 751 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.1984) \n41 \nSmalls, No. CR 06-2403 RB, 2008 WL 11361098 (D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2008) \n3 \nStein, 521 F. Supp. 2d 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) \n38 \nTownsend, No. Si 06 CR. 34 (JFK), 2007 WL 1288597 (S.D.N.Y. May I, 2007) \n \n29, 36 \nTracy, 12 F.3d 1186 (2d Cir.1993) \n5 \nVelez, No. 3:10CR147 JBA, 2010 WL 4929266 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2010) \n3 \nV\n... [truncated, 2229 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/4 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=4]", "char_count": 2229}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Statutes \n18 U.S.C. § 1591 \n37 \n18 U.S.C. § 2422 \n28 \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) \n28 \nN.Y. Penal Law § 130.55 \n28 \nOther Authorities \n6 Handbook of Fed. Evid. § 801:25 (9th ed.) \n5 \nRules \nFed. R. Crim. 16 \n17 \nFed. R. Evid. 104 \n41 \nFed. R. Evid. 401  \n22, 43 \nFed. R. Evid. 402 \n10, 16, 43, 44 \nFed. R. Evid. 403 \npassim \nFed. R. Evid. 404(b) \npassim \nFed. R. Evid. 412 \n14, 18, 22 \nFed. R. Evid. 702 \n17, 21, 22 \nFed. R. Evid. 801  \n2, 3, 5 \nEFTA00090726\n", "char_count": 451}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell hereby submits her Reply In Support of Her Motions in Limine. \nI. THIS COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION OF ALLEGED CO-\nCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS AS A SANCTION FOR GOVERNMENT'S \nFAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S SEPTEMBER 3, 2021 ORDER \nThe government offers several excuses for its failure to comply with this Court's \nSeptember 3, 2021 Order. These excuses are insufficient and should be rejected. \nA. The Court's Order was Neither Ambiguous Nor Misread by the Defense \nFirst, the government suggests that Ms. Maxwell has misread the Order. We disagree. \nThe Court unambiguously rejected the government's position and ruled that the government's \nexpressed concern about disclosure \"does not outweigh the risk of surprise to the Defendant in \nthis case or the need for the parties to litigate co-conspirator issues in advance of trial to ensure \nthe absence of delay.\" Dkt. 335 at 3. To both \"avoid the risk of surprise\" and \"litigate co-\nconspirator issues in advance of trial to ensure the absence of delay, \" the Court identified two \nthings that were necessary from the government: First, no later than October 11, 2021, the \ngovernment was required to \"disclose to the defense the identities of any unnamed co-\nconspirators who allegedly participated in the conspiracies charged in the S2 indictment to whom \nthe government will refer at trial.\" Id. Second, the Court, unambiguously and emphatically, \ndirected: \"The Government is FURTHER ORDERED to disclose all co-conspirator hearsay \nstatements it intends to offer at trial no later than October 11, as consistent with this Court's \nscheduling order. Dkt. No. 297 at I.\" (emphasis in original.) \nThe Court used the word \"disclose\" both as to the identity of the co-conspirators \"to \nwhom the government will refer to at trial\" and \"all co-conspirator hearsay statements it intends \nto offer at trial....\" The government, in an attempt to blunt the Order, decided to interpret the \nsame word, \"disclose\" in materially disti\n... [truncated, 2171 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/6 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=6]", "char_count": 2171}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "the Order, however, the government defined the word \"disclose\" differently. Disclose, as to the \nactual statements, according to the government, means \"produced\" at some time in the past or to \nbe produced in the future, perhaps as an oral statement during trial. \nOf course, the Court will tell the parties whether it meant two completely different things \nwhen it used the same word, as argued by the government, or whether it intended for the \ngovernment to disclose the statements it intends to offer as co-conspirator statements. To avoid \ndelay over this issue during trial, Ms. Maxwell suggests that she cannot litigate this issue in \nadvance of trial without knowing what statements are being offered under Federal Rule of \nEvidence 801(d)(2)(e). \nWhat is clear from the government's response is not that it misunderstood the Order, but \nrather, it continues to disagree with the Order. \nB. The Court Has the Authority to Require Disclosure \nSecond, doubling down on its disagreement with the Court, the government claims \"it is \naware of no such case\" in which a court ordered the identification of anticipated co-conspirator \nstatements prior to trial. While the government may not be \"aware\" of such cases, they certainly, \nand abundantly, exist. \nIn United States v. Bocio, 103 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), the court ordered \npretrial disclosure of statements of co-conspirators (Government \"must disclose to the defendant \nand make available for inspection, copying, or photographing: any relevant written or recorded \nstatements ..., or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the government.\"). \nIn United States v. Jacobs, 650 F. Supp. 2d 160, 171 (D. Conn. 2009), the court ordered \nco-conspirator statements be produced in advance of trial (\"In the case of a co-conspirator who \nthe government plans to call as a witness at trial, that time is now, and the government is directed \nto produce any relevant statement to defense counsel forthwith.\") \n2 \n\n... [truncated, 2013 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/7 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=7]", "char_count": 2013}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "In United States v. Velez, No. 3: 10CRI47 JBA, 2010 WL 4929266, at *7 (D. Conn. Nov. \n30, 2010), the defendant moved for disclosure of any co-conspirator statements in advance of \ntrial. In response, the government agreed to disclose \"well in advance of trial, exactly which of \nthe intercepted telephone calls will be offered as full exhibits at trial and transcripts of those calls \nwill be provided in advance of trial.\" Based on that representation the court denied the motion to \nproduce as moot, \"without prejudice to renew if the Government fails to comply with its ongoing \ndisclosure obligations.\" Id. \nIn United States v. Smalls, No. CR 06-2403 RB, 2008 WL 11361098, at *8-9 (D.N.M. \nJan. 24, 2008), the court's order was very detailed: \nThe United States is hereby instructed to: \nfile a supplemental brief identifying the summary witness; specifically identifying \neach and every coconspirator statement it intends to offer at trial as evidence against \nDefendants pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); and stating how each proffered \nstatement satisfies the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Specifically, with respect \nto each alleged coconspirator statement, the United States must indicate: a) the \nidentity of the coconspirator who made the alleged statement; b) the identity of the \nperson or persons to whom the coconspirator statement was made; c) the identity \nof the witness who will testify at trial about the coconspirator statement; d) the \ncontent of the coconspirator statement; e) when the statement was made; 0 how the \nstatement is in the course of the alleged conspiracy; and g) how the statement is in \nfurtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Additionally, the United States must identify \nthe independent evidence it intends to offer in support of admission of the alleged \ncoconspirator statements. \nSee also United States v. Brewington, No. 15-CR-00073-PAB, 2018 WL 1411274, at *3 (D. \nCob. Mar. 21, 2018) (court required the government to identify and produce al\n... [truncated, 2399 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/8 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=8]", "char_count": 2399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "129-1, 2012 WL 1565099 (E.D. Tenn. May I, 2012) (government must disclose any statements \nof co-conspirators that it intends to use at trial three weeks prior to the trial). \nThere is ample legal authority for the Court to enter the Order to avoid delays and \narguments during trial about what statements are or are not within the 10-year conspiracy alleged \nhere and to prevent surprise and prejudice to the Defendant. \nC. There Should Be a Sanction \nHedging its bets, the government acknowledges that it \"may have misread the court's \norder\" but offers no solution other than the defense is \"free to litigate the admissibility of any \nsuch statement during trial.\" This was the government's losing argument before the Order. \nDistrict courts have broad discretion to sanction a party who violates discovery orders. \nUnited States v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002). In considering a particular \nremedy for a violation, the factors considered are \"the reasons why disclosure was not made, the \nextent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by \na continuance, and any other relevant circumstances.\" United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 159 \n(2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Pineros, 532 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1976)). The \nappropriate remedy is exclusion. Ms. Maxwell has been in jail for approximately 18 months. She \nis trying not to request a continuance of the trial and her lawyers are making every effort to \nreview massive amounts of discovery, interview potential witness, prepare for trial, and juggle a \nmyriad of other responsibilities. The government offers no legitimate excuse for non-\ncompliance. It clearly knows what statements it will try to introduce, it just does not want to tell \nanyone to avoid challenges to the statements. This is willful, not negligent or inadvertent conduct \nwhich should not be sanctioned by the Court. \n4 \nEFTA00090730\n", "char_count": 1943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "D. There are Substantial Issues with the Government's Anticipated Position \nFor a statement to fall within the definition of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), \"a court must \nfind (1) that there was a conspiracy, (2) that its members included the declarant and the party \nagainst whom the statement is offered, and (3) that the statement was made both (a) during the \ncourse of and (b) in furtherance of the conspiracy.\" United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1196 \n(2d Cir. 1993). A cursory review of the discovery produced related to one purported co-\nconspirator demonstrates the folly of proceeding as the government persists. \nThe government failed to follow the Court's Order and fails to explain why it did not \ndisclose the statements as ordered. Accordingly, the Court should prohibit introduction of any \nalleged co-conspirator statements at trial. \n5 \nEFTA00090731\n", "char_count": 868}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "II. GOVERNMENT CONCEDEDLY FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE \nBASIS OR REASONING TO ADMIT ANY 404(B) EVIDENCE \nThe government concedes that (i) it was aware of the December 2020 Amendments to \nRule 404(b) (Resp. at 34), (ii) those Amendments required it to give notice of the \"permitted \npurpose for which the prosecutor intends to offer the [404(b)] evidence and the reasoning that \nsupports the purpose\" (id.) (\"Notice\"), and (iii) the October 11'h \"Maxwell Rule 404 Letter\" \n(\"Letter\") did not identify the \"permitted purpose\" under Rule 404(b) for which the government \nseeks (alternative) admission of the two categories of evidence, nor the \"reasoning that supports \nthat evidence.\"' The government wholly fails to explain why it could not comply with these \n\"relatively modest\" new Notice requirements on the timeline ordered by this Court. Nowhere in \nresponse does the government seek leave for an extension to provide the appropriate Notice out \nof time nor justify its \"good cause\" for failure to timely comply with both the Court's Order and \nthe Rule. Instead, they assert that \"any alleged gap in the Government's notice is remediated by \nthis brief.\" Resp. at 39-40. To quote the government's response to Ms. Maxwell's motion in \nlimine, \"to the extent the [government] takes issue with the rule\" requiring specific pre-trial \nNotice under Rule 404(b), \"that complaint is properly directed to the drafters of the Federal \nRules of Evidence.\" Resp. at 61 n.15. \nHaving failed to comply with the Notice requirements of the Rule by the (extended) \nCourt ordered deadline of October 11, the government belatedly argues that the tendered \nevidence is either direct evidence or admissible under Rule 404(b). They are wrong on both \nfronts. \nI Under the misleading and disingenuous sub-heading (2) (\"The Government has Met and \nExceeded its Notice Obligations\"), the government points only to its (i) October 11 disclosure of certain \nof the evidence (which gives neither a a proper \"purpose\" or \"r\n... [truncated, 2105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/11 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=11]", "char_count": 2105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "\"In assessing whether a district court properly admitted other act evidence, we consider \nwhether (I) it was offered for a proper purpose; (2) it was relevant to a material issue in dispute; \n(3) its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect; and (4) the trial court \ngave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury if so requested by the defendant.\" United \nStates v. Arroyo, 600 F. App'x II, 13 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting United States v. \nLanam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). \nare offered for improper purposes, i.e., \npropensity, are not relevant to any material issue in dispute and their probative value is \nsubstantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. \nA. near \nNo Relationship to the Charged Conspirac Reflect Pure \nPropensity Evidence, and Otherwise are Unduly Prejudici \nThe government's argument for admissibility of \nis breathtaking in its claims \nand unsupported by admissible evidence. Without expert testimony or even bothering to \ninterview \nthe government contends \nrepresent \"direct evidence\" \nof a conspiracy (to recruit, groom, and sexually abuse minor females or to entice, transport or \ntraffic them for Jeffrey Epstein's sexual pleasure) that \nResp. at 36. \n2 The proffered evidence is found at GX 401-404, 409-410 and 413 \n7 \nEFTA00090733\n", "char_count": 1322}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "The government contends that \nreveal \"defendant's intent and motive,\" but \ntheir argument is defies logic. \nThis is exactly the \ntype of evidence forbidden by Rule 404(b). See United States v. AngellIli, 660 F.2d 23, 40-41 \n(2d Cir. 1981) (\"While we conclude that the custom and practice evidence was admissible for the \npurposes we have discussed, we agree with the defendants that Rule 404(b) barred its use to \nprove that the individual defendants acted in conformity with the custom and practice. ...\"). \nEven if the Court overlooks the government's failure to provide notice, \nabsence of relevance to the charged conspiracy, and the government's failure to set forth a non-\npropensity ground for admissibility, \nshould also be excluded under Rules 401 and \n403, as they do not tend to make any fact of consequence more or less probable, and their \nprobative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusing the \nissues. \n8 \nEFTA00090734\n", "char_count": 975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "9 \nEFTA00090735\n", "char_count": 16}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Ms. \nMaxwell strongly disputes that suggestion. Notably, as the Court can tell, the government did \nnot offer any evidence (or any offer of proof in their Response) that this document was in fact \nI0 \nEFTA00090736\n", "char_count": 214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "drafted by Ms. Maxwell. Compare GX 417-B, 418-B, 420-B, 420-B (all purporting to represent \nmetadata of other emails with the author identified). \nSuch arguments are based on outdated \nstereotypes and reveal a reliance on character evidence that the Rules of Evidence specifically \ndisallow. \nThis Court should reject the belated, insufficient, improper argument that \nare \ndirect evidence of the charged conspiracy, should find they are propensity evidence barred by \nRule 404(b) and should also exclude them under Rule 403 as more prejudicial than probative. \nB. \n11 \nEFTA00090737\n", "char_count": 583}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "1. \nMot. at 7. Defense counsel had insufficient time to \nreview, investigate or rebut the admissibility of the materials as direct evidence less than one \nweek later on October le. For that reason, the Motion did not move to exclude the evidence as \ndirect evidence but rather sought additional time in which to do so. Given the drafting of \nhundreds of pages of pleadings in the last week, counsel is still unprepared to make the required \nshowing on the direct evidence point and seeks additional time in which to do so. \n5 Bear in mind that the government also moved to exclude evidence that these same \"abused\" \nindividuals reported to the police that they had no interactions or dealings with Ms. Maxwell. Gov't \nMotion in Limine at 42 (\"The defendant is not charged with committing crimes against [the] victims [who \nreported that they had no interactions or dealings with Ms. Maxwell].\") The fact that the government \nclearly intends to rely on how open the alleged abuse was, the relevance of evidence that even the people \nwho claim they were abused by Epstein during the same time frame but without any knowledge or \nparticipation by Ms. Maxwell becomes highly relevant to rebut such testimony. \n12 \nEFTA00090738\n", "char_count": 1223}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "2. The government has apparently abandoned efforts to introduce her \ntestimony as Rule 404(b) evidence. \nIn their response, the government still fails to comply with the new Rule 404(b) notice \nrequirements. First, they do not actually identify the evidence with any specificity, especially \nwith respect to the \"exhibits\" that they hope to introduce through her. Second, while they use the \nwords \"plan and preparation\" or \"knowledge,\" they fail to explain how those uses of the \ntestimony are independent of the character / propensity inference banned by Rule 404(b). How \nare the process and frequency of massages or the sexual nature of massages after the period of \nthe conspiracy proof of a plan or preparation, apart from the propensity inference? A plan or \npreparation usually comes before an event. Planning or preparing for something after it has \noccurred can only be based on an assumption that because you are the kind of person who \nsolicits underage massages later, you must have been the kind of person to do so earlier. \nSimilarly, knowledge after the end of the conspiracy is not the same as knowledge at the time of \nor before the purported charged acts occurred, except by way of propensity. Finally, unspecified \nexhibits, many of which appear to have been written after the conspiracy (e.g., GX 505 — dated \nFeb. 14, 2005) cannot likewise be proof of the charged crimes which were allegedly completed \nbefore \nuses of \nshowed up. \nBecause the government makes no effort to argue the non-propensity purpose for these \nvia Rule 404(b), and failed to give notice of the purposes or reason in \nadvance in any event, this Court should exclude the evidence on this ground. \n3. \nconstitutes an impermissible \nconstructive amendment and variance to the Indictment. \nFinally, what is clear from the government's proffer in their Response, the anticipated \ntestimony o \nwill serve as an improper constructive \n13 \nEFTA00090739\n", "char_count": 1940}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "amendment to, and an impermissible variance of, the Indictment. As this Court previously has \nruled: \n\"To prevail on a constructive amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate that \n'the terms of [an] indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence \nand jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that \nthere is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an \noffense other than that charged in the indictment.\" United States v. D'Amelio. 683 \nF.3d 412. 416 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Mollica. 849 F.2d 723. 729 \n(2d Cir. 1988)). Because the doctrine of constructive amendment protects a \ndefendant's Grand Jury Clause rights, a constructive amendment constitutes a \"per \nse violation\" of the defendant's constitutional rights—i.e. there is no requirement \nthat a defendant make a specific showing of prejudice. Id. at 417. In contrast to a \nconstructive amendment, \"[a] variance occurs when the charging terms of the \nindictment are left unaltered, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially \ndifferent from those alleged in the indictment.\" Id. (quoting United States v. \nSalmonese, 352 F.3d 608. 621 (2d Cir. 2003)). \nUnited States v. Gross, 15-cr-769 (MN), 2017 WL 4685111, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2017). \nAs this Court then recognized, the Second Circuit has consistently relied on the same \nstart and end dates of a conspiracy to find that differing trial proof did not affect a constructive \namendment or variance. See id. (\"The indictment and the evidence at trial contained the same \nstarting and ending dates of the conspiracy...\") (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, \n229 (2d. Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"The \nstarting and ending dates of the conspiracy noted in the indictment correspond to the conspiracy \nproven at trial...\"). Conversely, the substantial quantity of testimony — for the post-conspiracy \ntime period of \n\n... [truncated, 2347 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/19 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=19]", "char_count": 2347}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "C. Ms. Maxwell reiterates her re uest to defer briefin and rulin on the \nadmissibility \nfor two \nweeks. \nFor the reasons already detailed, the complexity of the issues and the fact that ■ \nrecently disclosed testimony appears to be of utmost centrality to the government's \ncase, Ms. Maxwell repeats and reiterates her request that she be afforded additional time to \nsubmit a comprehensive motion in limine concerning the introduction of this testimony and \nexhibits as supposed direct evidence of the charged conspiracy. In that there remains a full \nmonth before opening statements, Ms. Maxwell's fundamental rights to present a defense, to \nhave the effective assistance of counsel, and to a right to confront witnesses and subpoena \nwitnesses to testify in her defense all will be preserved by a small delay on this issue. \nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE \nTESTIMONY UNDER \nFEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 AND DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW \nPHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) AND GRANT A DAUBERT \nHEARING \nA. This Court should reject the government's arguments to the extent that they are \nbased on newly disclosed material, which this Court ordered the government to \nproduce six months ago. \nRecognizing that \nproposed testimony is on shaky ground (to say the least), the \ngovernment belatedly tries to shore up its case and hoist up its expert witness. Two days ago, and \nsix months after the court-imposed deadline for expert disclosures, the government first \ndisclosed to defense counsel about 300 pages of material on which \napparently relied in \nreaching her conclusions. This Court should reject the government's untimely effort to save \ntestimony from exclusion. See United States v. Lewis, 818 F. App'x 74, 79 (2d Cir. \n2020) (unpublished) (affirming exclusion of defendant's proffered expert evidence \"that did not \nadhere to the discovery schedule\"). \n15 \nEFTA00090741\n", "char_count": 1884}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "In any case, the newly discovered material doesn't help the government's cause. Exhibit \nA (literally) to the government's response is a journal article describing \"grooming\" as a \n\"construct.\" Resp, Ex. A, Natalie Bennett & William O'Donohue, The Construct of Grooming in \nChild Sexual Abuse, 23 J. Child Sexual Abuse 957, 974 (2014). (In fact, Ms. Maxwell cited this \narticle in her motion.) Far from supporting \nconclusions, the article proves their \nunreliability: \nThere have been claims that some child molesters engage in a \"seduction stage\" \nprior to committing abuse. These behaviors, commonly known as \"grooming,\" are \nunderstood as methods child molesters use to gain access to and prepare future \nvictims to be compliant with abuse. However, there is a lack of consensus regarding \nexactly what this process entails and how it is clearly distinguished from normal \nadult-child interactions. . . . Furthermore, there are no methods of known \npsychometrics to validly assess grooming. \nGov't Resp., Ex. A, p 2 (emphasis added). The article concludes: \nCurrently there is no consensus regarding how to define grooming. In addition, \nthere is no valid method to assess whether grooming has occurred or is occurring. \nThe field possesses an insufficient amount of knowledge about key issues such as \nthe interrater reliability of these judgments or the error rates of these judgments \nincluding the frequency of false negatives or false positives. Thus currently it \nappears that grooming is not a construct that ought to be used in forensic settings \nas it does not meet some of the criteria in the Daubert standard. . . . Right now it \ndoes not appear to be the case that there are \"reliable principles and methods\" to \ndefine and detect grooming. \nId. at 19 (emphasis added). \nBecause the government cannot justify admission of \ntestimony based on its \nprejudicially late disclosures, and because those disclosures don't support \nviews, and \nunderscore that \"grooming\" is not a scientific p\n... [truncated, 2243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/21 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=21]", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "B. \nproposed testimony is inadmissible. \nAccording to the government, Ms. Maxwell \"does not contest that Dr. \nis a \nqualified expert.\" Resp. at 9. To the degree that Dr. \nhas the credentials of a potential \nexpert, the government is right. \nBut saying that \nis a \"qualified expert\" is not enough. The government must \nidentify what \nis an expert in. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Fed. R. Crim. 16. As Ms. Maxwell \npointed out in her motion, the government hasn't done that. Mot. at 2. \nWhat's more, even if \nis a \"qualified expert\" in something, she is not a \"qualified \nexpert\" in everything. (For example, the government agrees that she is not an expert in the \nhuman brain or memory generally. Resp. at 30 n.7.) And as even the government admits, \nhas no experience or expertise in diagnosing, evaluating, or treating alleged perpetrators \nof sexual abuse. Resp. at 19, 23, 26. She cannot therefore speak to the psychology of alleged \nperpetrators and their so-called \"grooming techniques.\" \nThe government attempts a two-step to get around this problem. \"By virtue of experience \ntreating victims,\" says the government, \"Dr. \nis necessarily informed about perpetrators' \nactions.\" Resp. at 19. \nBut how does \nknow her patients were victims of sexual abuse? Because her \npatients told her so, and \nassumes they are telling the truth. Again, \nopinions \nare based on her treatment of a self-selected, unrepresentative group of individuals she assumes \nare telling the truth and are therapeutic consumers in a financial relationship with her. \nThe government has no response to this, other than to say that \nand other \n\"[c]linical psychologists are not so credulous.\" Resp. at 16. If this were right, though, one would \nexpect the government to explain how clinical psychologists ensure their patients are telling the \ntruth — in other words, how clinical psychologists like \ntest and verify their opinions. \n17 \nEFTA00090743\n", "char_count": 1915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "But that's not what the government does. Instead, right after claiming that \"[c]linical \npsychologists are not so credulous,\" the government essentially says to Ms. Maxwell, \"How dare \nyou?\" In the government's words, \"The Court should reject the defendant's speculative claim \nthat Dr. \nhas been misled by hundreds of patients who sought professional treatment for \ntraumatic events that did not occur.\" Resp. at 16. \nIn this way, and in one breath, the government attests that \nis \"not so credulous.\" \nBut in the next breath, the government asks this Court to assume that \n\"has [not] been \nmisled by hundreds of patients who sought professional treatment for traumatic events that did \nnot occur.\" In other words, the government asks this Court to assume \npatients are \ntelling the truth, just as \ndoes. Apparently \nis \"so credulous.\" But there is no \nreason this Court should be. \nThe government next notes that the term \"grooming-by-proxy\" \"appears nowhere in the \nGovernment's expert notice.\" Resp. at 26. That's hardly surprising, though, because there is no \nreliable way to assess or analyze if one individual \"grooming\" a minor to facilitate abuse by \nsomeone else, even though that is exactly what the government says Ms. Maxwell did. \nAs detailed today is Ms. Maxwell's Rule 412 motion, the Indictment alleges \"grooming\" \nor \"normalization\" of sexual behavior by Ms. Maxwell over a dozen times. The government does \nnot, however, contend that Ms. Maxwell \"groomed\" anyone for her own benefit; instead, the \ngovernment contends that she \"groomed\" them for Epstein's benefit. But as the government does \nnot dispute, there is nothing—not a journal article, and not a study, nothing—to validate \nopinions on grooming-by-proxy (even if she doesn't use that phrase).6\n6 The articles and cases the government cites involve alleged grooming behavior by the preparator \nof the abuse, not alleged grooming behavior by a third patty. \n18 \nEFTA00090744\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Recognizing that \nopinions are thus unreliable, the government says: \"If the \nvictim experienced attachment and grooming, it makes no analytical difference whether the \nperpetrator intends to engage in sexual contact with the victim or, instead, is preparing the victim \nfor abuse by a third party.\" Resp. at 26. \nHardly. It makes all the difference in the world because Ms. Maxwell is on trial, not Mr. \nEpstein. The logic (such as it is) of grooming evidence is that the perpetrator normalizes sexual \nbehavior to facilitate his later abuse of the victim. But because Ms. Maxwell did not abuse \nanyone, there is no basis to conclude that anything she did was \"grooming.\" The government \nthus intends to have \ncharacterize innocent conduct by Ms. Maxwell as something more \nnefarious, thereby further blurring the line that experts are already unable to draw reliably. Resp. \nEx. A, p 2 (\"There is a lack of consensus regarding exactly what [the grooming] process entails \nand how it is clearly distinguished from normal adult—child interactions.\"). \nThe government's additional arguments fail. \n• \nA psychologist who treats alleged victims of abuse but does not treat alleged \nperpetrators is nothing like a urologist who treats urology patients. Resp. at 11 \n(citing Bosco v. United States, No. 14 CIV. 3525 (JFK), 2016 WL 5376205 \n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016)). \nassumes her patients are telling the truth, and \nshe never hears or credits the other side of the story. The urologist, by contrast, \nhas scientific means to verify what her patients tell her, and there isn't another \nperson whose side of the story she needs to hear. \n• \nThe government repeatedly says that \"courts have frequently admitted testimony \nabout the psychological relationship between victims of sexual abuse and their \nperpetrators.\" Resp. at 13. See also id. at 7-8. But those cases do not address the \n19 \nEFTA00090745\n", "char_count": 1898}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "situation here, in which the alleged \"groomer\" was not the person who perpetrated \nthe alleged abuse. \n• \nEven where the \"groomer\" and \"perpetrator\" are the same person, courts have \nrecognized the unreliability of grooming testimony. United States v. Gonyer, No. \n1:12-CR-00021-JAW, 2012 WL 3043020, at *2-3 (D. Me. July 24, 2012); United \nStates v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146-47 (D. Me. 2010); United States v. \nSchneider, No. CRIM.A. 10-29, 2010 WL 3734055, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, \n2010); see also United States v. Raniere, No. 18-CR-204I-NGG-VMS, 2019 WL \n2212639, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2019); United States v. Burns, No. 07 CR 556, \n2009 WL 3617448, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (criticizing the \"grooming \ntheory\" in the context of a sentencing guidelines calculation). \n• \nThe government tries to distinguish United States v. Raymond by saying that the \nexpert's own book in that case \"disavow[ed] [its] reliability . . . for legal use.\" \nResp. at 14. But that is exactly the situation here, because the primary article on \nwhich the government relies—Exhibit A to its response-flatly says \"that \ngrooming is not a construct that ought to be used in forensic settings as it does not \nmeet some of the criteria in the Daubert standard.\" Resp., Ex. A, p 19. \n• \nThe government says \nopinions are not \"anecdotal.\" But that's not right \neither, as her endorsement makes clear: \nopinions are based \"on her \neducation and training on psychological trauma, traumatic stress, interpersonal \nviolence, and sexual abuse (and her] extensive clinical experience treating \nindividuals who suffered sexual abuse and trauma in childhood and adolescence, \n20 \nEFTA00090746\n", "char_count": 1679}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "as well as (herJ experience conducting forensic psychological evaluations of \npeople who have experienced sexual abuse and trauma.\" Mot. Ex. 1, p 2. \n• \nThe government tries to disclaim the importance of error rates. Resp. at 15-17. \nBut it's not just that \ncannot identify an error rate, it's that her implicit \nconclusion is that she doesn't have an error rate. That is, all her patients are \ntelling the truth when they say they were groomed, so any evidence that matches \nwhat her patients have told her is therefore evidence of grooming. \n• \nBut even if the error-rate discussion were misplaced, that doesn't mean \nopinions are reliable. As a \"qualitative\" matter, and as the government's own \nExhibit A concedes, there are no \"'reliable principles and methods' to define and \ndetect grooming.\" Govt. Resp., Ex. A, p 19 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). \n• \nThe government apparently expects that, \"somehow, a lay jury without guidance \n[will] apply I \nI analyses reliably to the facts of a case in determining \nguilt.\" See Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (rejecting argument that a jury could \ndo just that). This Court should not, as the government request, simply punt the \nmatter to the jury. Resp. at 17-18. The Court is the gatekeeper. It must ensure the \nevidence is reliable and relevant. If it's not both, it has no place in a criminal jury \ntrial, because it will \"radically simplify\" an otherwise complex case, Burns, 2009 \nWL 3617448, at *5, and it will, as the United States Supreme Court has \ncautioned, prejudicially mislead the jury, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharnts., Inc., \n509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (\"Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite \nmisleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.\"). \n21 \nEFTA00090747\n", "char_count": 1741}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "• \nThe government denies Ms. Maxwell's argument that \"a lay jury will be unable to \napply Dr. \nanalyses to the facts of this case\" because \"[t]hat is not how \nRule 702 works.\" Resp. at 20. Responds the government: \"That is precisely how \nRule 702 works in cases where experts testify about general principles, which the \nRule contemplates.\" Id. at 21. Surely that is not right when, as here, the \"general \nprinciples\" are unreliable. Fed. it Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note (if expert \ntestifies to general principles but not apply them, \"the testimony [must] be \nreliable\"). See also Mot. at 10; Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 150 n.12 (expert \ntestimony about general principles is helpful only when it \"describe[es] widely \nrecognized and highly predictable and verifiable phenomena\"). \n• \nThe government attempts to fault Ms. Maxwell for making \"no argument that the \nminor victims in this case are distinctive in some way such that general principles \nof psychology may diverge as to them.\" Resp. at 18. This argument flips the \nproper analysis on its head. It's the government's burden to prove reliability. E.g., \nUnited States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007). It's not Ms. \nMaxwell's burden to prove unreliability (though if it were her burden, she would \nhave met it). \n• \nThe government says that \"the causal connection between ... psychological \nproblems and child sexual abuse is outside the experience of the average juror\" \nand is relevant to the alleged victims' credibility. Resp. at 24. It's not, and any \nminor probative value the evidence has is substantially outweighed by the danger \nof unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. And as explained in the Rule 412 \nmotion today, if \noffers testimony and the government presents argument \n22 \nEFTA00090748\n", "char_count": 1788}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "along these lines, that will open the door to other sexual behavior evidence. That \ndoor can remain at least partially closed if \nis not permitted to offer her \nirrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony. \n• \nThe government still hasn't explained how it helps the jury to be told that a victim \nof sexual abuse might make an immediate disclosure, or she might make an \nincremental disclosure, or she might make a delayed disclosure. Resp. at 27-30. \nAnd when the government says, \"[s]exual abuse also impacts the way memory is \nencoded,\" that opinion is far outside \nexpertise because the parties agree \nthat she is not an expert in \"the human brain or memory generally.\" Resp. at 30 \nn.7. \nC. At a minimum, this Court should hold a Dauber! hearing. \nThere is ample reason for this Court to exclude \ntestimony outright. At the very \nleast, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a Daubert hearing. The government implicitly concedes as \nmuch. In a footnote, the government acknowledges the decision in United States v. Raniere, in \nwhich Judge Garaufis ordered a Daubert hearing on the government's proposed expert testimony \non grooming. 2019 WL 2212639, at *7-8. In that case, however, the government withdrew its \nendorsement rather than submit to an Dauber! hearing. Resp. at 19 n.3. \nJudge Garaufis reasoned that even if other courts in other cases had admitted testimony \nabout grooming, \"that [did] not make Dr. Hughes's opinion about grooming techniques reliable \nunder the Daubert standard,\" if only because \"her extensive academic and clinical experience \nappears focused on victims of sexual abuse, not perpetrators.\" See id. at *7. The same is true \nhere, particularly because \nhas no experience in, and there is no authority supporting her \nopinions on, grooming-by-proxy. Quite the contrary. The government's late-breaking disclosure \nstates: \n23 \nEFTA00090749\n", "char_count": 1866}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Thus currently it appears that grooming is not a construct that ought to be used in \nforensic settings as it does not meet some of the criteria in the Daubert standard. . \n. . Right now it does not appear to be the case that there are \"reliable principles \nand methods\" to define and detect grooming. \nId. at 19 (emphasis added). \nAt a minimum, therefore, this Court should hold a Daubert hearing. \nIV. THE \nRT SHOULD EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATED \nThe government's arguments in favor of admitting evidence related \nas direct evidence of the charged conspiracies all but concede that the \nevidence is more appropriately considered under Rule 404(b). In an effort to bolster their \nposition, the government makes the sweeping assertion that as long as \nwas \nunder the age of 18, her evidence is admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy. That is a \nfundamentally incorrect statement of the law and should be rejected. The government's \narguments for admitting \nevidence under Rule 404(b) and for denying the \ndefense's requested limiting instruction are similarly baseless. The Court should therefore \nexclude evidence related to \nor, if it is admitted, give the jury the requested \nlimiting instruction.' \nThe government advances four principal arguments for why evidence related to \nshould be admitted as direct evidence of the charged conspiracies: (1) her testimony \nallegedly shows a \"pattern\" of how Epstein and Ms. Maxwell sexually abused young women and \nestablishes Ms. Maxwell's \"intent\" to participate in the charged conspiracies (Resp. at 45-46), \n(2) her allegations are included in the S2 Indictment and are therefore not covered by Rule \n7 As it pertains to \nand the other accusers, the defense will be submitting \nproposed jury instructions and special verdict findings. \n24 \nEFTA00090750\n", "char_count": 1805}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "4O4(b) (id. at 46-47), (3) her evidence is \"intrinsic\" proof of the charged conspiracies and \nnecessary to \"complete the story\" of the charged offenses (id. at 47-49), and (4) \nwas under the age of 18, the age of consent under federal law, when the alleged sexual \nabuse took place, and that is \"all that is required for evidence relating to the defendant's \nexploitation of Minor Victim-3 to be direct evidence of the charged offenses\" (id. at 50). The \nfirst is an argument for admission of this evidence under Rule 404(b), not as direct evidence of \nthe conspiracy. The second simply begs the question and assumes that the government can \ncircumvent Rule 404(b) by alleging \"other act\" evidence in the indictment. The third overlooks \nthe numerous precedents in this Circuit finding that evidence of criminal offenses that are \nseparate and distinct from the charged offenses are not admissible as direct evidence of a \nconspiracy. And the fourth completely misstates the law. These arguments should be rejected. \nFirst, the government argues that \nevidence is admissible as direct \nevidence of the charged conspiracies because it is relevant to show the \"pattern\" of abuse—\nincluding \"grooming\" the accusers, encouraging them to give massages to Epstein, and asking \nthem to recruit others—and her \"intent\" to participate in the charged conspiracies. (Id. at 45-46). \nBut \"pattern\" is just another word for \"modus operandi,\" which along with \"intent\" are bases for \nadmission under Rule 404(b), not as direct evidence of the conspiracies. See Fed. R. Evid. \n404(b) (\"other act\" evidence may be admissible to prove \"motive, opportunity, intent, \npreparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident) (emphasis \nadded); United States v. Walia, No. 14—CR-213 (MKB), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. \nJul. 25, 2014) (Rule 404(6) permits \"other act\" evidence to be admitted to prove \"modus \noperandi\"). \n25 \nEFTA00090751\n", "char_count": 1948}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "The very case the government cites in support of their position, United States v. Curley, \n639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011), affirmed the district court's decision to admit \"other act\" evidence of \nprior spousal abuse to prove \"intent\" and \"pattern\" under Rule 404(b) \"with an appropriate \ninstruction on this evidence's limited purpose,\" not as direct evidence of the conspiracy. See \nCurley, 639 F.3d at 59 (citing United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1998) \n(per curiam) (affirming district court's decision to admit evidence of prior domestic violence to \nprove defendant's intent under Rule 404(b)). Indeed, the evidence could not have been admitted \nas direct evidence of a conspiracy because Curley was not charged with a conspiracy. See \nUnited States v. Curley, No. SI 08 Cr. 404 (SCR), 2009 WL 10688209, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, \n2009) (defendant was convicted of two counts of stalking and one count of interstate violation of \na protection order). Curley therefore supports the defense's position that the admissibility of. \nevidence must be evaluated under Rule 404(6). \nSecond, the government does not confront the defense's point that simply including \n\"other act\" evidence in the indictment does not necessarily mean it is direct evidence of the \nconspiracy. See Mot. at 9-10. Instead, the government engages in circular reasoning by \neffectively arguing that (i) allegations in an indictment are not 404(b) evidence, (ii) \nallegations are in the indictment, (iii) therefore they are not 404(b) evidence. See \nResp. at 46-47. But as the defense pointed out in its Motion, \"other acts\" are only admissible as \nevidence of a conspiracy \"as long as they are within the scope of the conspiracy. \" United States \nv. Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), vacated on other grounds 858 F.3d 763 \n(2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 1983)). The \ngovernment has not explained why \nevidence provides any proof that Ms. \nMaxwel\n... [truncated, 2108 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/31 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=31]", "char_count": 2108}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "for the purpose of engaging in unlawful sexual activity (it was not). Moreover, allowing the \ngovernment to circumvent Rule 404(b) by charging \"other act\" evidence in the Indictment would \nswallow the rule and allow the jury to broadly consider evidence that should only be considered \nfor a limited purpose and with an appropriate limiting instruction regarding propensity. The \nCourt should not allow this. \nThird the government claims that \nevidence can be admitted as \nintrinsic proof of the charged conspiracies to show Ms. Maxwell's (1) \"relationship with Epstein, \nincluding her willingness to procure teenagers to give Epstein massages,\" (2) \"knowledge of \nboth the sexual nature of those massages and the need to procure additional victims,\" and \n(3) \"willingness to transport minors to further their abuse.\" Resp. at 47. The government further \nargues that \nevidence is necessary to \"complete the story\" of the charged \noffenses. Id. at 48-49. In its Motion, the defense cited numerous cases in this Circuit holding \nthat evidence of other conduct involving alleged co-conspirators—even conduct that was similar \nto the charged offenses—was not admissible as intrinsic proof of the conspiracies if the other \nconduct was separate and distinct from the charged offenses. See Mot. at 9 (citing cases). The \ngovernment concedes that these cases so hold and points out that these cases admitted some of \nthe proffered evidence under Rule 404(b). Resp. at 48 n.11. This just proves the point; the \nadmissibility of \nevidence should be evaluated under Rule 404(b). \nFourth, the government asserts that the defense \"misunderstands\" the law and that the \ngovernment simply needs to prove that Ms. Maxwell \"took steps to provide Jeffrey Epstein with \naccess to girls under the age of 18, knowing that Epstein intended to have sexual contact with \nthose girls.\" Id. at 50 (emphasis added). In the government's view, it is totally irrelevant that \n27 \nEFTA00090753\n", "char_count": 1964}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "See id. at 49-50. According to \nthe government, \"all that is required\" for \nevidence to be admissible as direct \nevidence of the charged conspiracies is that she was under the age of 18, the age of consent \nunder U.S. federal law, and that Ms. Maxwell knew that Epstein intended to engage in sexual \ncontact with her. See id. \nIt is the government. not the defense, that apparently does not understand the law. The \nMann Act conspiracies charged in the S2 Indictment each require proof that Ms. Maxwell acted \nwith the intent that the alleged victim would \"engage in sexual activity for which a person can be \ncharged with a criminal offense.\" S2 Ind. ¶¶ 12 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2422), 18 (citing 18 U.S.C. § \n2423(a)). That element incorporates offenses under state law. See United States v. Lincoln, No. \n19-CR-6047 (CJS), 2019 WL 719822, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019) (collecting § 2422 cases); \nUnited States v. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (criminal sexual \nactivity under § 2423 includes crimes \"under federal, state, or foreign law\"). Indeed, the Mann \nAct conspiracies in the S2 Indictment charge a violation of a New York State misdemeanor as \nthe \"sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense.\" S2 Ind. ¶¶ 13b, \n19b (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 130.55). Section 130.55 prohibits \"subject[ing] another person to \nsexual contact without the latter's consent.\" N.Y. Penal Law § 130.55. To be guilty of Section \n130.55 based on the victim's incapacity to consent due to age, the victim must be under the age \nof 17. Id. § 130.05(3)(a). The government itself acknowledged this in its draft proposed jury \ninstructions, as well as the fact that Ms. Maxwell cannot be convicted of the Mann Act \nconspiracies unless she knew that the alleged victim was under 17. See Gov't Proposed Jury \nInstructions (\"[I]n order to find that the intended acts were nonconsensual solely because of the \n28 \nEFTA00090754\n", "char_count": 1964}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "victim's age, you must find that the defendant knew that the victim was less than seventeen years \nold.\") (emphasis added). \nIt is unclear whether the government is now claiming that to admit \nevidence as proof of the Mann Act conspiracies, it only needs to prove that \nwas under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged abuse and that Ms. Maxwell did not need to \nknow anything about \nage, or that Ms. Maxwell only needed to know that ■ \nwas under the age of 18. Either one is a misstatement of the law. For \"sexual \nactivity\" to be \"criminal,\" it must be illegal under the laws of the jurisdiction where the sex acts \nallegedly took place. If those crimes are based on lack of consent due to age, it is only illegal if \nthe alleged victim is under the age of consent in that jurisdiction. And according to the \ngovernment's own proposed jury instructions, Ms. Maxwell can only be found guilty of the \nMann Act conspiracies if she knew \n(and the other alleged victims) were under \nthe age of consent in the particular jurisdictions where the sex acts allegedly took place. Because \nwas, at all times, over the age of consent in the relevant jurisdictions, her \nevidence is not within the scope of the charged conspiracies and is therefore not admissible as \ndirect evidence. At the very least, because it is not \"manifestly clear\" that \nevidence is proof of the charged conspiracies, \"the proper course is to proceed under Rule \n4O4(b).\" United States v. Townsend, No. SI 06 CR. 34 (JFK), 2007 WL 1288597, at *1 \n(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007) (citing United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. \n2004)). \nevidence should also be excluded under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. \nAs argued in our initial Motion, evidence that Ms. Maxwell allegedly encouraged an adult to \nengage in legal sexual activity is not, in any way, evidence of her intent to facilitate Epstein's \n29 \nEFTA00090755\n", "char_count": 1893}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "alleged scheme to cause minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, or her knowledge of the \nsame. See Mot. at 11. Nor is the evidence of alleged \"grooming\" sufficiently unique to qualify \nas proof of \"modus operandi.\" See id. at 12. Furthermore, there is a strong likelihood that the \njury will assume that Epstein's alleged sex acts with \nwere illegal and will \nmisapply that evidence in evaluating Ms. Maxwell's guilt or innocence to the charged Mann Act \nconspiracies. Her evidence should therefore be excluded under Rule 403. See id. at 12-13. \nIf the Court decides to admit \nevidence, it should preclude the \ngovernment and \nfrom referring to her as a \"minor\" or asserting that she was a \n\"minor\" at the time of the alleged sex acts, (2) preclude the government and \nfrom representing that she was \"sexually abused\" by Jeffrey Epstein, and (3) give the July the \nappropriate limiting instruction the defense has requested. See Mot. at 14-15. \nThe government argues that the term \"minor\" is appropriate because \nwas, for a brief time, below the age of 18, which is the age of consent under federal law. Resp. \nat 52-53. Although the government would like to believe that U.S. federal law is the only law \nthat matters, even as to acts that allegedly took place in a foreign country, that is not the case. \nThe Court should not permit \nto be referred to as a \"minor\" because she was not \na \"minor\" under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction when any of the alleged sex acts took place. \nIt would not only be inaccurate to call her a \"minor,\" but it would also mislead the jury to believe \nthat the acts that allegedly took place in the U.K. were \"criminal sexual activity\" when they were \nnot. The same is true for the phrase \"sexual abuse,\" which connotes criminal activity. See Mot. \nat 14-15 (citing Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2017)). \nFinally, the government opposes the defense's requested jury instruction regarding the \nage of consent under U.K. law on the \n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/35 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=35]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "jury.\" Resp. at 53-54. Apparently, the government believes the jury would be \"confused\" if the \nCourt told the jurors what the law actually is so that they do not improperly assume that \ntestimony is being offered as proof of \"criminal sexual activity\" and apply it \nincorrectly to convict Ms. Maxwell of the Mann Act conspiracies. The jurors would not be \n\"confused\"; they would be educated on how to properly evaluate \nevidence. \nThe government's objection is non-sensical. But not as non-sensical as the government's final \nproclamation: \nThe sexual activity involving Minor Victim-3 can be considered criminal for \npurposes of the crimes charged in the Indictment, because it is probative proof of \nthe defendant's guilt of those crimes. The instruction the defense proposes, in \ncontrast, creates serious risk that the jury will think the Court is telling them that \nthe conduct is lawful and therefore irrelevant to the case. \nId. at 54. A better example of circular reasoning you could not find — \nsex \nacts with Epstein are \"criminal\" because they are \"proof of the defendant's guilt of those \ncrimes\"? No. And the \"risk that the jury will think that ... the conduct is lawful? It was lawful. \nWhatever misgivings \nmay now have about those alleged sex acts, and whether \nshe now views those incidents as \"sexual abuse,\" there was nothing illegal about them. \nAnd that is precisely the point. If she is permitted, \nwill testify about \nfeeling sexually abused by Epstein and the jury will assume that the sex acts were illegal. Unless \nthe Court instructs the jury that the sex acts were not illegal under U.K. law, and they cannot be \nconsidered as \"criminal sexual conduct\" in evaluating the elements of the Mann Act \nconspiracies, there is a substantial risk that the jury will misapply her evidence and improperly \nconvict Ms. Maxwell of those counts. The government has agreed to do this in similar cases and \nit is appropriate to do so here. See Vickers, 708 F. App'x at 735-36 (governmen\n... [truncated, 2228 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/36 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=36]", "char_count": 2228}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "activity for which the defendant could be charged with specific New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New \nYork, and Canadian criminal offenses\" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court should give \nthe jury the defense's requested limiting instruction.' \nV. THE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT IT WILL NOT OFFER EVIDENCE \nOF MS. MAXWELL'S ALLEGED \"FLIGHT\" \nThe government has conceded that it will not elicit any evidence or argue to the jury that \nMs. Maxwell \"was hiding from, evading, or fleeing from law enforcement between Epstein's \narrest and her own.\" Resp. at 81-82. \nVI. THE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT IT WILL NOT OFFER \nEVIDENCE OF MS. MAXWELL'S ALLEGED FALSE STATEMENTS \nAND AGREES TO MS. MAXWELL'S PROPOSED REDACTIONS \nThe government has also conceded that it will not elicit any evidence concerning Ms. \nMaxwell's alleged false statements in her 2016 depositions and agrees to the defense's request to \nredact the perjury counts and related allegations from the S2 Indictment. Resp. at 82. \nVII. THE COURT SHOULD HOLD A PRE-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING \nON MS. MAXWELL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION. \nFrom approximate \n8 The defense also agrees with the govemment that the Court should instruct the 'u that it \ncannot convict Ms. Maxwell of the charged conspiracies based solely on \nevidence. \nSee Resp. at 50 n.12. \n32 \nEFTA00090758\n", "char_count": 1332}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "It was not until 2020, after making a multi-million dollar claim to the Epstein Victim \nCompensation Lund. that the SDNY interviewed \nand then in 2021 showed her \nphotos -- the majority of which were men or women much younger than Ms. Maxwell. Only two \nof the photos look anything like Ms. Maxwell and \nthought one was Ms. Maxwell \nand the other might be Ms. Maxwell. Of course, no one thought to ask \nif her \nlawyers had shown her photos of Ms. Maxwell as part of her multi-million-dollar request or if \nshe had seen any of the many photographs displayed on the internet of Ms. Maxwell, including \nthose published in relation to the first indictment by Acting U.S. Attorney Strauss's Rule 23.1-\nviolative press conference, or any of the millions of photographs published in the wake of the \nIndictment. The photo array process was not recorded, and we do not know why certain photos \nin the array were selected or by whom. No one documented how long the photo array was \nviewed or any other relevant indicia of reliability. \nThe claim that the show-up was merely a \"confirmatory identification\" of someone that \nhad \"known and identified by name over the years\" is completely unsupported by \nthe evidence. Tellingly, the government appends no supporting exhibit or declaration in support \nof this conclusory statement because it cannot. The truth of the matter is that \nhad \nnever identified Ms. Maxwell as someone who abused her and never claimed to have seen Ms. \nMaxwell prior to 2020 when it became economically prudent for her to do so. \n33 \nEFTA00090759\n", "char_count": 1562}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "The facts about \ninteraction with Ms. Maxwell are hotly disputed. Ms. \nMaxwell rejects the government's unsupported conclusory statements about when and if she \ninteracted with Ms. Maxwell and her ability to do so absent suggestion. \nWhen the prosecution offers testimony from an eyewitness to identify the defendant as a \nperpetrator of the offense, fundamental fairness requires that that identification testimony be \nreliable. Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 2001). The court must first determine \nwhether the pretrial identification procedures unduly and unnecessarily suggested that the \ndefendant was the perpetrator. If the court finds, however, that the procedures were suggestive, it \nmust then determine whether the identification was nonetheless independently reliable. Id. \nThe critical question here, ignored by the government, is not whether \nknew \nthat she was accusing Ms. Maxwell in 2020 (she undoubtably was) but whether she could \nidentify Ms. Maxwell as the person she was now claiming abused her. Of the pictures selected \nhere, \nhad a high probability of picking Ms. Maxwell -- even then, she was \ntentative about one person who was not Ms. Maxwell. The show up was neither confirmatory nor \nfair. \nThe protection against unduly suggestive procedures encompass not only the right to \navoid improper police methods that suggest the initial identification, but as well the right to \navoid having suggestive methods transform a selection that was only tentative into one that is \npositively certain. Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1185 (2d Cir. 1981). \nMs. Maxwell has met her burden of demonstrating the show up was unduly suggestive. \nUnder these circumstances the Court should next consider the well know \"five factors\": (1) the \nwitness's opportunity to observe the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the degree of the \nwitness's attention at that time, (3) the accuracy of the witness's initial description of the \n34 \nEFTA00090760\n", "char_count": 1974}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "criminal, (4) the certainty with which the witness first identified the suspect, and (5) the time \nlapse between the crime and the identification. Id. at 1186. Each of these factors weighs heavily \nin Ms. Maxwell's favor: as to 1-3, until 2020, \nhad never claimed Ms. Maxwell \nparticipated in any abuse and never identified Ms. Maxwell -- indeed, she had never before been \nasked to identify Ms. Maxwell. Concerning number 4, \nwas less than certain, as \ndemonstrated by her selection of someone else who may have been \"Ms. Maxwell.\" Factor 5 \nalso weighs in Ms. Maxwell's favor, as the delay was 17 years. \nAccordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing on this \nmotion and find that the show up was unduly suggestive and suppress any identification of Ms. \nMaxwell, before or during trial. \nVIII. GOVERNMENT AGREES NOT TO ELICIT LAW ENFORCEMENT \nOPINION TESTIMONY \nThe government agrees that it has not noticed any law enforcement officers as experts \nand, as to their fact police officers, \"will not elicit expert testimony from them.\" Resp. at 82-83. \nOverlooking the long list of potential law enforcement opinion testimony that has been \ndisallowed by Courts in the past (see Mot. at 2-5), the government then goes on to make the \nconfusing claim that the defense should have to \"provide expert\" testimony from the \ngovernment's own case agents if it wants to call them as witnesses. Resp. at 83 n.24. \nThe defense has no intention of eliciting opinion testimony from the agents when they \ntestify. As the motion makes clear, the defense fully understands the contours of lay versus \nopinion testimony from law enforcement officers. The case agents are first hand percipient \nwitnesses to a number of facts in the investigation and prosecution of this case, including as the \nimpeachment witness for the many changed stories of the accusers. \n35 \nEFTA00090761\n", "char_count": 1895}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "As evidenced by their recently disclosed interviews, the government lawyers, despite its \nprotests about the defense's ability to call percipient fact witnesses, have been preparing the case \nagents for months to testify in the defense's case. The risk highlighted by the defense it its \nfootnote is that, even though they are not asked a question that calls for opinion testimony, the \nagents are likely to try to offer their opinions either during the defense's questioning or when the \ngovernment attempts to rehabilitate them. Because neither side has noticed any opinion \ntestimony from the case agents, they should be prohibited from offering any, especially because \nit will be non-responsive to any questions that should be asked of them. \nIX. THE COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE TESTIMONY ABOUT ANY ALLEGED \n\"RAPE\" BY JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nThe government argues that the expected testimony of \nthat she was raped \nby Jeffrey Epstein is admissible to show the \"ongoing relationships between the defendant, \nEpstein, and the victims\" and is necessary \"to complete the story of the crime on trial.\" Resp. at \n79-80. The government offers no explanation, however, for why testimony of an alleged rape \nwould prove the relationship \"between the defendant, Epstein, and the victims\" when \nhas never claimed in her prior statements to the FBI or anywhere else that Ms. Maxwell knew of, \nfacilitated, or participated in the alleged rape in any way. Nor does the government explain why \nthis testimony is somehow necessary \"to complete the story of the crime on trial\" when the rape \nallegation is an outlier and does not fit the \"story\" of alleged sexual abuse that the government \nhas described in the S2 Indictment—namely, \"grooming\" the alleged victims to gradually break \ndown their inhibitions so that forcible rape is not required to engage in sexual activity with them. \nBecause the rape allegation is the only one of its kind and has no connection to the other \nincidents of alleged sexual abuse, it should\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/41 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=41]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007) (defendant's prior narcotics and firearm transactions with the same \nconfidential informant not \"inextricably intertwined\" with the charged narcotics conspiracy, even \nthough the conduct was \"generally similar to the conduct underlying the offenses charged in the \nindictment\"); United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (prior \nsimilar money laundering transactions between defendant and cooperating witness not \n\"inextricably intertwined\" with the charged money laundering offense or \"necessary to complete \nthe story\" of the charged conspiracy (emphasis in original)). \nTestimony concerning the alleged rape should also be excluded because the S2 \nIndictment contains no allegations of rape and such testimony is therefore irrelevant to the \ncharged crimes. The government dismisses this point arguing that indictments do not need to \ninclude all of the government's evidence, and the terms \"sexual activity\" and \"commercial sex \nact\" are broad enough to cover rape. See Resp. at 80. But this misses the point. The rape \nallegations are irrelevant to the charges because the charges are based on sexual activity that was \nillegal because the alleged victims were under the age of consent. The indictment does not \ncharge any crimes that are premised on sex acts that involve the use of force, like rape. For \nexample, Counts Five and Six charge sex trafficking offenses. See S2 Ind. \n22-27. But they \ndo not charge the section of the statute that criminalizes sex trafficking that \"was effected by \nmeans of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). The government is \ntherefore off base when its states that \"evidence of rape, where it occurs ... is the core conduct in \nthe case.\" Resp. at 81. It is only the \"core conduct\" of the case when the indictment alleges \nforcible sex acts. Indeed, the cases cited by the government prove this point. See Ex. E, \nIndictment, United States v. English, No. 18 Cr. 492 (PGG) \n... [truncated, 2146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/42 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=42]", "char_count": 2146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "United States v. Graham, No. 14 Cr. 500 (NSR), 2015 WL 6161292, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, \n2015) (same). \nFinally, whatever minimal probative value the rape allegation might have would be \nsubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading \nthe jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403. As we previously argued in our initial Motion, rape is highly \nemotional and inflammatory, much more so than the \"sexualized massages\" alleged in the S2 \nIndictment. See Mot. at 2-3. Admitting testimony of an alleged rape would pose a serious risk \nthat the \"jury will convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will \nconvict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment.\" OM Chief v. United States, 519 \nU.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, \nJ.)) (discussing propensity evidence). Such evidence would also confuse the issues at trial and \nmislead the jury. It will cause the jurors to focus on conduct that is not relevant to the charged \noffense and suggests that they convict Ms. Maxwell on an improper and highly emotional basis. \nSee United States v. Stein, 521 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (excluding other-act \nevidence in a conspiracy case under Rule 403 because of the \"risk that this evidence would \nconfuse the issues, cause undue delay, and be used for an improper purpose\"). The Court should \ntherefore preclude any testimony or evidence about an alleged rape. \nXII. REFERENCE TO ACCUSERS AS \"VICTIMS\" IS IMPROPER VOUCHING \nWithout explaining its logic, and by way of cases concerning jury instructions, the \ngovernment disagrees that use of the term \"victim\" by witnesses and the prosecution during trial \namounts to improper vouching. Yet, the government offers that the only times it expects the \nword will be used at trial are (a) by the prosecutors during their jury addresses, and (b) in Dr. \ntestimony concerning her patients. Resp. at 77. The government's legal\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/43 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=43]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "argument are flawed, and the Court should enter the order proposed by Ms. Maxwell that all \nparties, witnesses, and the Court should refer to the individuals by their proper names. \nFirst, overlooking the frequency with which state courts must grapple with fair trials \ninherent in sex crimes, the government complains that the defendant cited no federal authority \nfor the proposition that the Court, witnesses, and parties should use the individuals' names rather \nthan the word \"victim.\" To remedy that perceived problem, counsel refers the Court to United \nStates v. Sena, No. 19-CR-01432, 2021 WL 4129247, at *1-2 (D.N.M. Sept. 9, 2021), and the \nother cases cited therein: \n\"(Defendant] is correct that the term (victim] is prejudicial when the core issue at \ntrial is whether a crime has been committed—and, therefore, whether there is a \nvictim. See State v. Cones, 851 A.2d 1230, 1239-40 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004), aff'd, \n885 A.2d 153 (Conn. 2005) (holding that jury charges using the term \"victim\" \ninstead of \"alleged victim\" violated a defendant's due process right to a fair trial); \nTalkington v. State, 682 S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. App. 1984) (use of the term \n\"victim\" in court's rape charge was reversible error when the issue at trial was \nwhether complainant consented to sexual intercourse); People v. Davis, 423 \nN.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (\"By referring in its charge to the \ncomplainant as the `victim' and to the defendant as the 'perpetrator', the court \nimpermissibly insinuated to the jury that the complainant was the victim of injuries \nresulting from acts committed by the defendant.\"). \nAt [the] upcoming trial, the jury has the responsibility of deciding whether a crime \noccurred and whether that crime resulted in harm to [the accuser]. Thus, to label \n[the accuser] as a victim at the outset of trial carries the risk of improperly \ninfluencing the jury's decision. Moreover, there is virtually no probative value in \nallowing the government to use the term \n... [truncated, 2823 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/44 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=44]", "char_count": 2823}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "speculating that the accusers have already been found credible by someone, or that their decision \nis a foregone conclusion. On the other side of the probative-prejudicial scale, the government \nsimultaneously fails to articulate any probative value in use of the term \"victim,\" either in its jury \naddress or otherwise. Cf. State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 2005) (\"the use of the term \n'victim' had no inherent probative value\"). \nSecond, the government improperly suggests in response that the stricture on vouching \nshould not apply to the witnesses themselves. Resp. at 79. As explained by numerous cases, \nhaving any witness refer to themselves or another witness as a \"victim\" is the very height of \nimproper vouching. Semi, supra; State v. Sperou, 365 Or. 121, 131, 442 P.3d 581, 590 (2019) \n(\"another witness's description of the complaining witness as a 'victim' conveys an opinion that \nthe complaining witness is telling the truth. That is what the vouching rule is intended to \nprevent.\"); Wigg, supra. \nFinally, the government contends that Dr. \ncan use the word \"victim\" in reference \nto \"victims of sexual abuse generally,\" but her use of the term is even more problematic. For the \nreasons articulated in our Daubert motion and reply, Dr. \nbases her expertise on her \ntherapeutic number of individuals who have self-identified as sexual abuse victims, without any \nresearch or investigation as to whether the individuals' self-reports are true. She then intends to \ndraw from her anecdotal and experiential treatment to generalize about all \"victims\" without their \never having been a finding that any of the persons she has provided treatment to were, in fact, \n\"victims.\" If she is permitted to testify, there is no reason for her to vouch for the credibility of \nher patients, unless she clarifies each time that she is taking the individual at their word that they \nwere in fact a victim. The danger of confusion to a jury is that anyone treated by Dr. \nmust have been a vict\n... [truncated, 2086 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/45 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=45]", "char_count": 2086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "prejudice because the [witness's] choice of language implied that he and the prosecution believed \nthe complainant's testimony.\" Id. \nFor these and the previously stated reasons, Ms. Maxwell asks the Court to order that the \nparties, the witnesses, and the Court use individuals' names in the presence of the jury. \nXIII. THE COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT \nEXHIBITS 52, 251, 288, 294, 313, 606 AND THE SEARCH OF EL BRILLO WAY \nA. The Court Should Exclude the Challenged Government Exhibits \nRule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that \"[t]he requirement \nof authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by \nevidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent \nclaims.\" See also Ricketts v. City of Hanford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1409 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. \nSliker, 751 F.2d 477, 496-500 (2d Cir.1984) (discussing the interaction between \nFed.R.Evid. 104 and 901). \"In order for a piece of evidence to be of probative value, there must \nbe proof that it is what its proponent says it is. The requirement of authentication is thus a \ncondition precedent to admitting evidence.\" United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 497 (2d Cir. \n1984). A motion in limine to preclude evidence calls on the \"[C]ourt to make a preliminary \ndetermination on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of \nEvidence.\" Highland Capital Mgrnt., L.P. v. Schneider, 379 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) \n(internal quotation marks omitted). \"The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court \nto rule in advance of trial on the admissibility and relevance of certain forecasted \nevidence.\" Dougherty v. County of Suffolk, No. CV 13-6493 (AKT), 2018 WL 1902336, at *1 \n(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \nMs. Maxwell has filed in limine motions challenging the admissibility of discrete items of \nevidence that the government intends to offer at tria\n... [truncated, 2063 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00090721/46 or ?id=EFTA00090721&page=46]", "char_count": 2063}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "a pre-trial hearing at which the government must demonstrate that the proposed evidence is both \nauthentic, admissible, relevant and not unduly prejudicial. \nB. Government Exhibit 52 \nGovernment Exhibit (GX) 52 was acquired by the government as part of a sting operation \nfrom \nworked for Jeffrey Epstein for approximately six \nmonths, from late 2004 to early 2005. In 2009, he was deposed and then ultimately arrested in an \nundercover sting operation in which the government claims exhibit 52 was seized from ■ \napparently on or about November 3, 2009, by one \nwho is not listed \nas a testifying witness. No one knows where or when the exhibit was acquired by ■ \nwhat he did with it for as long as he had it, who may have created the exhibit, and \nwhere it came from. In its Response, the government does not identify what it claims this exhibit \nto be, who might authenticate the exhibit, only that a \"witness with personal knowledge of the \nphysical book is expected to testify to its authenticity.\" Resp. at 73. Given that \nis \ndead, and \nbe. \nis not a witness, we are left to wonder who this foundational witness may \nThe government further claims that even if the exhibit is hearsay, it is admissible, not for \nthe truth of the matter asserted, but to show \"the defendant kept contact information for relevant \nindividuals at trial, including victims.\" Id. These are bold, unexplained claims that Ms. Maxwell \ndisputes. The proffers here are inadequate to meet any burden of admissibility. The government \nshould not be allowed to refer to the exhibit prior to the establishment of an adequate foundation; \nand Ms. Maxwell requests a pretrial evidentiary hearing on this issue. \nC. The Palm Beach Search of El Brillo Way \nAgain, the government claims that it will have live witnesses \"to establish the \nauthenticity of the evidence at trial.\" It does not identify the witness or the basis of that person's \n42 \nEFTA00090768\n", "char_count": 1931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "knowledge. The government does not provide any clues about who may have touched the \nevidence after it was seized in October 2005, ten months after the end of the conspiracy alleged \nand it does not address how these items seized are relevant to acts allegedly seized 10 years after \nthe start of the alleged conspiracy or even 10 months after it ended. \nGX 295 is not a \"past recollection recorded\" by some other witness. It is a testimonial \nhearsay statement by a dead witness and admission of any part of GX 295 would violate Ms. \nMaxwell's rights to confront the declarant and the rules of evidence. The government offers no \nexplanation about how the affidavit of \ncould possibly be the recorded \nrecollection of someone else; and a pretrial evidentiary hearing is warranted. \nD. \nThe supposed relevance for \nagain seized almost one year after the \nalleged conspiracy ended, is that they \"help to establish that it was apparent from ■ \nd. at 74-75. ■ \nThe \nthen, establish no material fact in this case and their \nadmission should be prohibited under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404(b). \nE. The Twin Torpedoes \nSeized in 2005, and still in the box, unopened, no witness will testify that Ms. Maxwell \nused these devices. The items were not and could not have been used in connection with any \nalleged act in this case, assuming a foundation can be established. Accordingly, the exhibit, \nwhether it be the photograph or the actual boxed items, should not be admitted under FRE 401, \n402, 403, and 404(b). \n43 \nEFTA00090769\n", "char_count": 1546}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "F. Government Exhibit 313 \nGX 313 was seized in 2019. It was not seized from Ms. Maxwell. No one will testify \nabout where it was taken, who took it, or where it was kept. Because the government cannot \nestablish the location of the photograph, it is not corroborative, as the government claims, of \n\"topless swimming\" at the Palm Beach pool, which is also not relevant to the allegations here. \nMs. Maxwell has not challenged other photographs showing a close relationship between Ms. \nMarcell and Epstein, and we expect there to be evidence of their relationship at trial. Accordingly, \nany probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact of the \npicture. Again, this exhibit should be excluded under FRE 401, 402, 403, and 404(b). \nG. Government Exhibit 606 \nGX 606 comes from an unknown author, created at an unknown time, and for an \nunknown purpose. The government's proffer is speculative and does not supply any evidentiary \nfoundation, authenticity, or relevance. The exhibit should be excluded under FRE 901, 802, 401, \n402, 403, and 404(b). As with the other exhibits discussed herein, Ms. Maxwell requests a \npretrial evidentiary hearing. \nDated: October 27, 2021 \n44 \nEFTA00090770\n", "char_count": 1232}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Respectfully submitted, \ns/ Jeffrey S. Pagliuca \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \nDenver \nPhone: \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \nNew York NY \nPhone: \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \n45 \nEFTA00090771\n", "char_count": 305}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00090721", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Certificate of Service \nI hereby certify that on October 27, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Ghislaine \nMaxwell's Reply In Support of Her Motions In Limine with the Clerk of Court using the \nCM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: \nU.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY \nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza \nNew York NY 10007 \ns/ Nicole Simmons \n46 \nEFTA00090772\n", "char_count": 390}]}