{"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_count": 34, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00089154", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00089154.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nx \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION \nTO THE DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nActing United States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nAttorney for the United States of America \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n- Of Counsel - \nEFTA00089154\n", "char_count": 418}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nx \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION \nTO THE DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE \nThe Government respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the defendant's \nrenewed motion for release on bail, dated December 8, 2020 (the \"Renewed Bail Motion\"). Five \nmonths ago, after thorough briefing and a nearly two-hour hearing, this Court concluded that the \ndefendant posed a serious flight risk and that no condition or combination of conditions could \nensure her appearance in court. The defense now asks this Court to reverse that finding by \nessentially repackaging its prior arguments and presenting a more specific bail package. However, \nat the July 14, 2020 bail hearing in this case, this Court rejected the defendant's request to keep \nthe record open to allow the defendant to do precisely what she has done here—namely, present \nmore detailed information about her finances and a more concrete package—determining that \nfurther information about her financial picture would be irrelevant because no combination of \nconditions could ensure this defendant's appearance. The Court's conclusion was plainly correct, \nand the Renewed Bail Motion does nothing to undermine it. The offense conduct outlined in the \nIndictment remains incredibly serious, the evidence against the defendant remains strong, and the \ndefendant continues to have extensive financial resources and foreign ties, as well as the \ndemonstrated ability to live in hiding for the long term. In short, the defendant poses an extreme \n1 \nEFTA00089155\n", "char_count": 1680}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "flight risk, no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably ensure her appearance in this \nDistrict, and the Court should not alter its prior finding to that effect. \nBACKGROUND \nAs detailed in the Indictment, the defendant is charged with facilitating the sexual abuse of \nmultiple minor victims by Jeffrey Epstein between approximately 1994 and 1997. The defendant \nplayed a critical role in the scheme by helping to identify, entice, and groom minor girls to engage \nin sex acts with Epstein. The defendant's presence as an adult woman normalized Epstein's \nabusive behavior, and she even took part in at least some acts of sexual abuse. Together, the \ndefendant and Epstein conspired to entice and cause minor victims to travel to Epstein's residences \nin different states, which the defendant knew and intended would result in their grooming for and \nsubjection to sexual abuse. Then, in an effort to cover up her crimes, the defendant lied under oath \nduring a civil deposition, including when asked about her interactions with minor girls. \nBased on that conduct, the Indictment charges the defendant in six counts. Count One \ncharges the defendant with conspiring with Epstein and others to entice minors to travel to engage \nin illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charges the defendant with enticing \na minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2. Count \nThree charges the defendant with conspiring with Epstein and others to transport minors to \nparticipate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charges the defendant \nwith transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2. \nCounts Five and Six charge the defendant with perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. \nOn July 2, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") arrested the defendant. \nFollowing extensive briefing, on July 14, 2020, the Court held a lengthy bail hearing. \n... [truncated, 2117 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/2 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=2]", "char_count": 2117}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Among other things, the defense emphasized the defendant's family ties and residence in \nthe United States (Dkt. 18 at 2, 3, 12), offered to hire a private security company to monitor the \ndefendant (Id. at 20), noted that the defendant remained in the country and was in touch with the \nGovernment through counsel following Epstein's arrest (Dkt. 18 at 12-13; Tr. 49, 52-55), argued \nthat the defendant went into hiding to avoid a media frenzy (Dkt. 18 at 14-16; Tr. 55-56), and \nargued that detention would hamper the ability to prepare a defense (Tr. 42, 67-69). Responding \nto the Government's concerns about the lack of transparency about the defendant's finances and \nsix proposed co-signers, the defense specifically asked the Court to keep the proceedings open if \nthe Court believed additional information or a more fulsome bond would be useful to the bail \ndetermination. (Tr. 52 (\"And if the court determines that the conditions that we have proffered are \ninsufficient or need further verification, as long as we can have some assurance of safety and \nconfidentiality, we would recommend that the court keep the proceeding open, and we should be \nable to get whatever the court needs to satisfy it.\"); Tr. 59 (\"Even if the court were to assume for \npurposes of today's proceeding that she has the means that the government claims she does, it does \nnot affect the analysis. That is to be addressed in conditions, to be addressed if the court requires \nit, through verifications and further proceedings before the court.\"); Tr. 66 (\"If the court desires to \nleave the proceeding open for a week and allow us to come back, if the court has concerns about \nthe number of suretors, for example, verification information, information about financial issues, \nwe think that, now that we have some ability to breathe a little bit, that we should be able to pull \nthis together for the court's consideration.\"); Tr. 70 (\"And if the court needs more information \nfrom us, we would respectfully req\n... [truncated, 2139 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/3 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=3]", "char_count": 2139}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "The Court declined the defense's request and instead concluded that the defendant posed a \nserious flight risk and that no combination of conditions could ensure her appearance. First, the \nCourt found that \"the nature and circumstances of the offense here weigh in favor of detention,\" \ngiven the statutory presumption of detention triggered by charges involving minor victims and the \npotential penalties those charges carry. (Tr. 82). Second, the Court determined that \"[t]he \ngovernment's evidence at this early juncture of the case appears strong\" based on the \"multiple \nvictims who provided detailed accounts of Ms. Maxwell's involvement in serious crimes,\" as well \nas corroboration in the form of \"significant contemporaneous documentary evidence.\" (Id.). \nThird, the Court found that the defendant's history and characteristics demonstrate that the \ndefendant poses a risk of flight. (Tr. 83). \nIn addressing that third factor, the Court emphasized the defendant's \"substantial \ninternational ties,\" which \"could facilitate living abroad,\" including \"multiple foreign \ncitizenships,\" \"familial and personal connections abroad,\" and \"at least one foreign property of \nsignificant value.\" (Tr. 83). The Court also noted that the defendant \"is a citizen of France, a \nnation that does not appear to extradite its citizens.\" (Id.). The Court further found that the \ndefendant \"possesses extraordinary financial resources\" and that \"the representations made to \nPretrial Services regarding the defendant's finances likely do not provide a complete and candid \npicture of the resources available.\" (Tr. 83-84). \nAlthough the Court recognized that the defendant \"does have some family and personal \nconnections to the United States,\" the Court highlighted \"the absence of any dependents, \nsignificant family ties or employment in the United States\" in support of the conclusion that \"flight \nwould not pose an insurmountable burden for her.\" (Tr. 84). The Court recognized the defense \narguments t\n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/4 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=4]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "contact with the Government through counsel, but emphasized that the defendant may have \nexpected that she would not be prosecuted. (Tr. 84-85). The Court also noted that the defendant \n\"did not provide the government with her whereabouts,\" and that the \"[c]ircumstances of her arrest \n. . . may cast some doubt on the claim that she was not hiding from the government, a claim that \nshe makes throughout the papers and here today, but even if true, the reality that Ms. Maxwell may \nface such serious charges herself may not have set in until she was actually indicted.\" (Tr. 85). \nBased on all of those factors, the Court found that the Government had carried its burden of \ndemonstrating that the defendant \"poses a substantial actual risk of flight.\" (Tr. 86). \nThe Court then concluded that \"even the most restrictive conditions of release would be \ninsufficient\" to ensure the defendant's appearance. (Id.). Acknowledging that the defense's initial \nbail package represented only a fraction of the defendant's assets, the Court found that \"even a \nsubstantially larger package would be insufficient.\" (Id.). Although the defendant \"apparently \nfailed to submit a full accounting or even close to full accounting of her financial situation,\" the \nCourt implicitly rejected the defense's offer to provide additional information by determining that \n\"[elven if the picture of her financial resources were not opaque, as it is, detention would still be \nappropriate.\" (Tr. 86-87 (emphasis added)). That conclusion was informed not only by the \ndefendant's \"significant financial resources,\" but also her \"demonstrated sophistication in hiding \nthose resources and herself.\" (Tr. 87). \"Even assuming that Ms. Maxwell only wanted to hide \nfrom the press and the public,\" the Court emphasized that the defendant's \"recent conduct \nunderscores her extraordinary capacity to evade detection, even in the face of what the defense has \nacknowledged to be extreme and unusual efforts to locate her.\" (Id.).\n... [truncated, 2239 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/5 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=5]", "char_count": 2239}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "the Court rejected the defense's arguments about the risks of COVID-19 and the difficulty of \npreparing a defense with an incarcerated client. In so doing, the Court noted that the defendant \nhas no underlying conditions that place her at heightened risk of complications from COVID-19 \nand emphasized that the defendant had many months to prepare for trial. (Tr. 89-90). \nViewing all of these factors together, the Court ordered the defendant detained pending \ntrial. (Tr. 91). \nAPPLICABLE LAW \nUnder the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., federal courts are empowered to \norder a defendant detained pending trial upon a determination that the defendant poses a risk of \nflight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). When seeking detention on this ground, \"[t]he Government bears the \nburden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both that the defendant `presents an actual \nrisk of flight' and that 'no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the \ndefendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court.\" United States v. Boustani, 932 \nF.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Sabhani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007)). The \nBail Reform Act lists three factors to be considered in the detention analysis when the Government \nseeks detention based on flight risk: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) \nthe weight of the evidence against the person; and (3) the history and characteristics of the \ndefendant, including the person's \"character . . [and] financial resources.\" See 18 U.S.C. § \n3I42(g). If a judicial officer concludes that \"no condition or combination of conditions will \nreasonably assure the appearance of the person as required ... such judicial officer shall order the \ndetention of the person before trial.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). \nAdditionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving \na minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that \n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/6 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=6]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as \nrequired and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, \"the \ndefendant `bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut \nthat presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose . . . a risk of flight.' \nUnited States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, \n254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). The act of producing such evidence, however, \"does not \neliminate the presumption favoring detention.\" Id. Rather, the presumption \"remains a factor to \nbe considered among those weighed by the district court,\" while the Government retains the \nultimate burden of demonstrating that the defendant presents a risk of flight. Mercedes, 254 F.3d \nat 436. \nWhen the Court has already issued a detention order, the Bail Reform Act provides that the \ndetention hearing \"may be reopened . . . if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was \nnot known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of \nwhether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance\" of the \ndefendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0. Accordingly, \"[a] court may properly reject an attempt to reopen \na detention hearing where the new information presented is immaterial to the issue of flight risk.\" \nUnited States v. Petrov, 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, \n2015). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that \"a release order may be reconsidered \neven where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the \noriginal hearing,\" United States v. Rowe, 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. \nMay 21, 2003), generally the moving party must establish that its arguments \"warrant \nreconsideration\" by, for example, demonstrating \"that the court overlooked information or \n7 \nEF\n... [truncated, 2011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/7 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=7]", "char_count": 2011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "incorrectly applied the law,\" or that failure to reconsider \"would constitute manifest injustice.\" \nPetrov, 2015 WL 1102286 at *3. \nDISCUSSION \nHaving already raised numerous arguments in its briefing and oral argument at the initial \nbail hearing in this case, the defense now asks this Court to reverse itself based on virtually the \nsame arguments it already rejected. The Renewed Bail Application largely reiterates the same \nclaims regarding the defendant's ties to the United States and her behavior after Epstein's arrest \nthat the Court already found unpersuasive. To the extent the Renewed Bail Application presents \nnew information, it consists primarily of financial data that was certainly known to the defendant \nat the time of her initial bail application and that the Court already assumed could be made \navailable (and thus rejected as immaterial) when ordering detention. Ultimately, nothing in the \nRenewed Bail Application alters the analysis that led this Court to conclude that the defendant \n\"poses a substantial actual risk of flight,\" and that no combination of conditions could assure her \nappearance. (Tr. 86). All three of the relevant Bail Reform Act factors still weigh heavily in favor \nof detention, and the defense claims to the contrary do not warrant a revisiting of this Court's well-\nreasoned and thorough prior decision. \nA. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense \nThe first Bail Reform Act factor indisputably weighs in favor of detention in this case. The \negregious conduct charged in the Indictment gives rise to a statutory presumption of detention, and \nthe Renewed Bail Motion makes no effort to challenge this Court's prior conclusion that the nature \nand circumstances of the offense support detention. The charges in the Indictment describe \nhorrendous conduct involving the sexual abuse of multiple minor victims. If convicted, the \ndefendant faces up to 35 years of incarceration, and may very well spend the remainder of her \n8 \nEFTA00089162\n", "char_count": 1997}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "natural life in prison. The seriousness of the offenses make such a steep penalty a real possibility \nupon conviction, thereby giving the defendant an overwhelming incentive to flee if given the \nchance. \nIn light of that strong incentive to flee, all three of the victims listed in the Indictment have \nasked the Government to convey to the Court that they continue to seek the defendant's detention. \nAdditionally, pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act, one of the victims has provided a written \nstatement urging the Court to deny bail, which is attached as Exhibit A hereto. That unanimous \nview of the victims reflects three related reasons that this factor weighs so heavily in favor of \ndetention. First, the victims sincerely fear that if the defendant is released, she will be able to \nevade justice. Second, the pain that the victims still feel to this day as a result of the defendant's \nconduct supports the conclusion that this offense is especially serious and may result in a lengthy \nsentence. Third, as discussed further below, the victims' attention to this case and willingness to \nconvey their views reflects their commitment to take the stand and testify at the defendant's trial, \ndemonstrating the strength of the Government's case. \nIn short, this factor offers no reason to reverse the prior detention order. \nB. The Strength of the Evidence \nFurther incentivizing the defendant to flee, the Government's evidence remains strong. As \nthe Court recognized when analyzing this factor at the July 14, 2020 hearing, the central evidence \nin the Government's case will come from the detailed testimony of three different victims, who \nwill each independently describe how the defendant groomed and enticed them to engage in sexual \nactivity with Jeffrey Epstein. (Tr. 82). The Indictment itself contains a description of the accounts \nthese victims have provided law enforcement, which corroborate each other in meaningful part. \n9 \nEFTA00089163\n", "char_count": 1970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Further, and as set forth below, those victims' accounts are corroborated by other evidence, \nincluding contemporary documents and other witnesses. \nIn challenging this factor, the defense essentially restates its prior arguments on this score. \nAt the original hearing, the defense argued that the Government's case was weak because it rested \nheavily on witness testimony regarding events from 25 years ago. (See Dkt. 18 at 19; Tr. 64-65). \nHaving received and reviewed the discovery, the defense now contends the Government's \ncorroborating evidence—some of which the Motion itself identifies-is insufficient and reiterates \ndefense complaints that the discovery does not include other types of evidence.' (See Mot. at 30-\n33). \nNone of the defense arguments on this score changes the calculus for this factor. Three \ndifferent victims are prepared to provide detailed testimony describing the defendant's role in \nEpstein's criminal scheme to sexually abuse them as minors. As demonstrated by the information \noutlined in the Indictment, these accounts corroborate each other by independently describing the \nsame techniques used by the defendant and Epstein to groom and entice minor girls to engage in \nsex acts. Each victim will describe how the defendant befriended her, asked detailed questions \nabout her life, and then normalized sexual activity around Epstein. Each victim will describe the \nuse of massage as a technique to transition into sexual activity. Each victim will describe how the \npresence of an adult woman manipulated her into entering an abusive situation. In other words, \nthis is a case that involves multiple witnesses describing the same course of conduct, substantially \ncorroborating each other. \nAt the initial bail hearing, the defendant also raised a series of legal challenges she intended to \nmake on the face of the Indictment, all of which she contended weighed in favor of granting bail. \nAfter receiving discovery, the defense now appears to have abandoned t\n... [truncated, 2090 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/10 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=10]", "char_count": 2090}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "In addition to corroborating each other, these victims' accounts are further corroborated by \nother witnesses and by documentary evidence, which has been produced in discovery. That \nevidence will make it virtually indisputable that these victims in fact met and interacted with both \nthe defendant and Jeffrey Epstein at the times and locations they describe. Travel records, for \nexample, confirm that both the defendant and Epstein traveled to particular locations where victims \ndescribe interacting with them. These include records demonstrating that the defendant traveled \nwith Epstein and one of the minor victims on Epstein's private jet when the victim was a minor, \nconsistent with the victim's anticipated testimony. Contemporaneous journal entries corroborate \ndetails of another victim's account, including the details of when, where, and how that victim came \nto meet Epstein.2 Other records confirm that Epstein paid high school tuition for one of the victims \nand that Epstein knew and communicated with another victim. Beyond this documentary \nevidence, additional witnesses will confirm that both the defendant and Epstein knew and \ninteracted with certain minor victims when those victims were minors. In other words, the \nGovernment's evidence strongly corroborates the victims' testimony that they met and interacted \nwith the defendant and Epstein at particular times and in particular places. \nIn the instant motion, the defendant complains that the documentary evidence relevant to \nthe three victims identified in the Indictment and produced to date is not sufficiently voluminous \n2 In its Renewed Bail Motion, the defense complains that the Government has produced only seven \npages from this diary in discovery. To be clear, the Government produced all pages in its \npossession. Those pages are the only pages that relate to the charges in the Indictment, which \npages describe that victim's first trip to meet Epstein. Because this victim stopped writing in her \njournal\n... [truncated, 2656 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/11 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=11]", "char_count": 2656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "and that certain of the corroborating documentary evidence does not specifically name Maxwell. \nLeaving aside the fact that volume is not a reliable proxy for quality, by its very nature, abusive \nsexual contact is not the type of crime that leaves extensive documentary evidence. But, as \ndescribed above, there are indeed travel records confirming the defendant herself traveled to \nlocations described by certain of the victims at or around the relevant times. To the extent other \ncorroborative documents refer only to Epstein, they still support these victims' testimony, which \nwill detail their interactions with both the defendant and her co-conspirator, Epstein. In other \nwords, documentary evidence does exist, and as the Court has already found, the combination of \nmultiple victims describing the same scheme, together with documents and other witnesses \nconfirming that those victims did indeed interact with the defendant and Epstein at the times and \nplaces they say they did, makes this a strong case. (Tr. 82). \nTaken together, this evidence confirms that the Government's case remains as strong as it \nwas at the time of the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, this factor continues to weigh heavily in \nfavor of detention. \nC. The Characteristics of the Defendant \nThe defendant's history and characteristics include significant foreign ties, millions of \ndollars in cash that she largely transferred to her spouse in the last five years, among other assets, \nand a demonstrated willingness and sophisticated ability to live in hiding. The bulk of the \narguments in the Renewed Bail Motion focus on this factor in a manner that largely rehashes claims \nthat this Court already considered at the July 14, 2020 hearing. Any new information provided \nwas either known by the defense at the time of the initial hearing, assumed to be the case when the \nCourt analyzed this factor at the initial hearing, or, in the case of the defense report regarding \n12 \nEFTA00089166\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "French law, is simply incorrect. Accordingly, the defendant's foreign ties, wealth, and skill at \navoiding detection continue to weigh in favor of detention. \nFirst, there can be no serious dispute that the defendant has foreign ties. She is a citizen \nof three countries and holds three passports. As was already noted at the original hearing and is \nagain evidenced in the Renewed Bail Application, the defendant has close relatives and friends \nwho live abroad, as well as a multi-million dollar foreign property and at least one foreign bank \naccount. (Tr. 83). In an attempt to minimize the defendant's foreign ties, the defense emphasizes \nthe defendant's relatives and friends in the United States, history of residence in the United States, \nand United States citizenship. But the Court was already aware of those factors when making its \noriginal detention decision. (See Tr. 84; Dkt. 18 at 2, 12). The letters and documentation included \nin the Renewed Bail Motion simply prove points that were not in dispute. \nWhat that \ndocumentation does not do, however, is suggest that the defendant has the kind of ties to this \ncountry that come with any employment in the United States or any dependents living here. \nIndeed, as noted in the Pretrial Services Report, the defendant stated in July that she has no children \nand has no current employment. (Pretrial Services Report at 3). \nThe Renewed Bail Motion fails to establish sufficiently strong ties to the United States that \nwould prevent her from fleeing. Although the defendant now claims her marriage would keep her \nin the United States, her motion does not address the plainly inconsistent statements she made to \nPretrial Services at the time of her arrest, when, as documented in the Pretrial Services Report, the \ndefendant said she was \"in the process of divorcing her husband.\" (Id.). On this point, it bears \nnoting that the defendant's motion asks that she be permitted to live with her sister if granted bail, \nnot her spouse. \n... [truncated, 2195 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/13 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=13]", "char_count": 2195}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "time of her arrest. While a friend's desire to avoid publicity may be understandable, a spouse's \ndesire to distance himself in that manner—particularly when coupled with the defendant's \ninconsistent statements about the state of their relationship—undermine her assertion that her \nmarriage is a tie that would keep her in the United States. Adding to this confusion, bank records \nreflect that when the defendant and her spouse established a trust account in or about 2018, they \nfilled out forms in which they were required to provide personal information, including marital \nstatus. On those forms, which the Government has attached hereto as Exhibit B, both the defendant \nand her spouse listed their marital status as \"single.\" (See Ex. B at 6, 7). It is unclear why the \ndefendant lied to the bank about her marital status, but that lack of candor on a bank form mirrors \nher lack of candor with Pretrial Services in this case, discussed further below. \nAs for the defendant's asserted relationships with her stepchildren and other relatives in \nthe United States, the defendant did not appear to have an issue living alone without these relatives \nwhile she was in hiding in New Hampshire, which undercuts any suggestion that these ties would \nkeep her in the United States. In any event, the defendant could easily receive visits from her \nfamily members while living abroad, and, as noted, the defendant has multiple family members \nand friends who live abroad. \nIn addition to those foreign connections and ample means to flee discussed further below, \nthe defendant will have the ability, once gone, to frustrate any potential extradition. Attempting \nto downplay that concern, the defense relies on two legal opinions to claim that the defendant can \nirrevocably waive her extradition rights with respect to both the United Kingdom and France. \n(Mot. at 25; Def. Ex. U; Def. Ex. V). But the defendant's offer to sign a so-called \"irrevocable \nwaiver of her extradition rights\" is ultima\n... [truncated, 2074 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/14 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=14]", "char_count": 2074}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "whatsoever and, with respect to France, is based on an erroneous assessment of France's position \non the extradition of its nationals. (Mot. at 25). \nAs an initial matter, the Government would need to seek the arrest of the defendant before \nsuch a waiver would even come into play. Even assuming the defendant could be located and \napprehended—which is quite an assumption given the defendant's access to substantial wealth and \ndemonstrated ability to live in hiding—numerous courts have recognized that purported waivers \nof extradition are unenforceable and effectively meaningless. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, \n425 F. Supp. 3d 306, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"The Defense proposal to give advance consent to \nextradition and waiver of extradition rights is, in the Court's view, an empty gesture. And, it comes \ninto [play] only after [the defendant] has fled the Court's jurisdiction.\"); United States v. Morrison, \nNo. 16-MR-118, 2016 WL 7421924, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016); United States v. Kazeem, \nNo. 15 Cr. 172, 2015 WL 4645357, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2015); United States v. Young, Nos. 12 \nCr. 502, 12 Cr. 645, 2013 WL 12131300, at *7 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2013); United States v. Cohen, \nNo. C 10-00547, 2010 WL 5387757, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Bohn, \n330 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL \n1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D. \nFla. 1985).3 For very good reason: Any defendant who signs such a purported waiver and then \n3 The defense argues that several courts \"have addressed concerns about a defendant's ties to a \nforeign state that enforces extradition waiver by requiring the defendant to execute such a waiver \nas a condition of release.\" (Mot. at 26). In the cases cited by the defendant, the courts approved \nthe release of the defendants based on the particular facts, but did not address at all the question of \nwhether a waive\n... [truncated, 2771 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/15 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=15]", "char_count": 2771}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "flees will assuredly contest the validity and/or voluntariness of the waiver, and will get to do so in \nthe jurisdiction of her choosing (Le., the one to which she chose to flee). The Department of \nJustice's Office of International Affairs (\"OIA\") is unaware of any country anywhere in the world \nthat would consider an anticipatory extradition waiver binding. Indeed, the defendant's own \nexperts' conclusion—that \"because of these waivers and other factors, it is highly unlikely that she \nwould be able to resist extradition successfully,\" (Mot. at 27)—leaves open the possibility that she \ncould avoid extradition. \nSuch an outcome is virtually a certainty as to France, a country of which the defendant is \na citizen and which does not extradite its citizens to the United States. To confirm this fact, after \nreceiving the Renewed Bail Motion, the Government, through OIA, contacted the French Ministry \nof Justice (\"MOJ\") to clarify whether there is any circumstance under which France would \nextradite a French citizen to the United States. In response, the MOJ provided the Government \nwith a letter setting forth the relevant law and conclusively stating that France does not extradite \nits citizens to the United States. That letter in its original French, as well as an English translation \nof the letter, are attached hereto as Exhibit C. In that letter, the MOJ makes clear that France does \nnot extradite its nationals outside the European Union (regardless of the existence of dual \ncitizenship), including to the United States, and has never derogated from that principle outside \nthe European Union. See Ex. C; see also United States v. Cilins, No. 13 Cr. 315 (WHP), 2013 WL \n\"taken a number of surprising turns,\" including the \"suppression of video evidence, the \nindeterminate stay of proceedings, the overall uncertainty of the government's evidence\"); United \nStates v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D.D.C. 2004); United States v. Cirillo, No. 99-1514, \n1999 WL 1456536, at \n... [truncated, 2353 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/16 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=16]", "char_count": 2353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "3802012, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013) (\"Because France refuses to extradite its citizens, Cilins \ncan avoid prosecution on this Indictment if he can reach French soil.\"). \nIn other words, even assuming the Government could locate the defendant, if she flees to \nFrance, her citizenship in that country will completely bar her extradition. Any purported waiver \nof extradition executed in the United States would not be enforceable against the defendant in \nFrance because French law embodies an inflexible principle that its citizens will not be extradited \nto other countries outside of the European Union, including the United States. As set forth in \nExhibit C, according to the MOJ, the French Code of Criminal Procedure \"absolutely prohibits the \nextradition of a person who had French nationality at the time of the commission of the acts for \nwhich extradition is requested.\" (Ex. C at 3). That the defendant is a citizen of multiple countries \nis of no moment. (See id.). In applying the Bilateral Extradition Treaty between the United States \nand France and the \"general principle of non-extradition of nationals under French law, France \nsystematically refuses to grant the extradition of French nationals to the American judicial \nauthorities.\" (Id. at 4). Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the defense submission, any \nanticipatory waiver of extradition would not be effective under French law, and would not be \nrecognizable by French courts in any extradition process, or otherwise enforceable. \nThe defendant's expert writes that \"[i]n the recent past,\" he is \"not aware that the French \nauthorities would have had to address the situation in which the United States sought extradition \nof a French citizen who was also a United States citizen. Thus, there is no precedent to draw from \nin that regard.\" (Def. Ex. V. at 2). That is not so. France has previously rejected such a request. \nFor example, in 2006, Hans Peterson, an American citizen and French national, turned himself \n... [truncated, 2215 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/17 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=17]", "char_count": 2215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "enforcement despite the repeated requests of O1A and U.S. officials. See Durbin, Schakowsky, \nEmanuel Urge French Justice Minister To Ensure Justice Is Done During Hans Peterson Retrial \n(Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.durbin.senate.govinewsroorn/press-releases/durbin-schakowsky-\nemanuel-urge-french-justice-minister-to-ensure-justice-is-done-during-hans-peterson-retrial; see \nalso \nSenators' \nletter \nto \nFrench \ngovernment \n(Mar. \n14, \n2008), \nhttps://www.nbcnews.corn/id/wbna23601583 (citing a letter from the MOJ to the Department of \nJustice on August 22, 2007 which provides that the \"Ministry of Justice considers the American-\nborn, U.S. citizen Peterson to also be a French national and that the extradition request has been \ndenied\"). Indeed, the Government is unaware of any instance in which France has ever extradited \na French citizen to the United States. (See Ex. C at 4 (\"[T]he principle of non-extradition of \nnationals is a principle of extradition law from which France has never deviated outside the \nframework of the European Union.\")). Simply put, the Court was correct when it determined at \nthe initial bail hearing that France does not appear to extradite its own citizens. (Tr. 83). \nThe defendant's supposed waiver of her extradition rights with respect to the United \nKingdom should similarly be afforded no weight. Although an anticipatory waiver of extradition \nmay be admissible in extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom, such a waiver is by no means \nbinding, authoritative, or enforceable. See United States v. Stanton, No. 91 Cr. 889 (CHS), 1992 \nWL 27130, at *2 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992) (denying modification of defendant's bail where \ndefendant indicated willingness to waive extradition proceeding by providing extradition waivers, \nas British authorities advised that extradition waivers were possible only in cases where the \nfugitive actually appeared before a British magistrate after the filing of an extradition request, and \nconcluding that suc\n... [truncated, 2188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/18 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=18]", "char_count": 2188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "has the assistance of counsel or a solicitor to represent him in the proceedings before the \nappropriate judge.\" \nExtradition Act 2003, § 127(9), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ \n2003/41. As such, a judge in the United Kingdom must independently evaluate any waiver of \nextradition in real time, thereby necessarily rendering any anticipatory waiver executed before the \ndefendant is found in the United Kingdom meaningless. Id. at §127. In other words, consent given \nto authorities in the United States would not be binding in the United Kingdom, and the defendant \ncould easily decide not to consent to extradition once found abroad. \nFurther, a judge in the United Kingdom must make an independent decision on extradition \nbased on the circumstances at the time the defendant is before the court, including the passage of \ntime, forum, and considerations of the individual's mental or physical condition. See, e.g., id. at \n§§ 82, 83A, & 91. Even if a final order of extradition has been entered by a court, the Secretary \nof State still has the discretion to deny extradition. See id. at § 93. The Government understands \nfrom OIA that extradition from the United Kingdom is frequently extensively litigated, uncertain, \nand subject to multiple levels of appeal. Moreover, even where the process is ultimately \nsuccessful, it is lengthy and time-consuming. \nUltimately, although the defendant purports to be willing to waive her right to challenge \nbeing extradited to the United States, she simply cannot do so under the laws of France and the \nUnited Kingdom, and she would be free to fight extradition once in those countries. And, of \ncourse, the defendant could choose to flee to another jurisdiction altogether, including one with \nwhich the United States does not have an extradition treaty. The defendant's written waivers of \nextradition from France and the United Kingdom certainly provide no guarantee that the defendant \nwill not flee to a third country from which, even if she\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/19 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=19]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "defendant's flight risk, and have cited such facts as a relevant consideration in detaining defendants \npending trial. See, e.g., United States v. Namer, 238 F.3d 425, 2000 WL 1872012, at •2 (6th Cir. \nDec. 12, 2000); Chins, 2013 WL 3802012 at *2; United States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. Supp. 2d 433, \n443 (D.N.J. 2007) (\"The inability to extradite defendant should he flee weighs in favor of \ndetention.\"). \nBeyond being impossible to guarantee, extradition is typically a lengthy, \ncomplicated, and expensive process, which would provide no measure of justice to the victims \nwho would be forced to wait years for the defendant's return. The strong possibility that the \ndefendant could successfully resist extradition only heightens the defendant's incentive to flee. \nSecond, the defendant's behavior in the year leading up to her arrest demonstrates her \nsophistication in hiding and her ability to avoid detection. The Court noted as much in denying \nbail, and the Renewed Bail Application also does nothing to change that conclusion. (Tr. 87). \nIndeed, the defendant's time in isolation in the year leading up to her arrest makes clear that, even \nto the extent she has loved ones and property in this country, she has proven her willingness to cut \nherself off entirely from them and her ability to live in hiding. She did so by purchasing a home \nusing a trust in another name and introducing herself to the real estate under an alias, placing her \nassets into accounts held under other names, registering cellphones and at least one credit card \nunder other names, and living in near total isolation away from her loved ones. \nThe Renewed Bail Application again tries to cast those steps as efforts to avoid the media \nfrenzy that followed Epstein's death. (Tr. 44, 56-57). However, as the Court already recognized, \nregardless of the defendant's reasons for taking these steps, that course of conduct clearly \nestablishes her expertise at remaining hidden and her willingness to cut herself of\n... [truncated, 2232 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/20 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=20]", "char_count": 2232}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "purchasing property, registering cellphones, and managing finances. Here, the defendant has \nindisputably taken all of those steps. She was able to do so because of both her finances and her \nwillingness to take extreme measures and to experience social isolation away from her loved ones. \nAnd she was so good at assuming another identity that she was able to avoid notice by locals and \nthe media even when a bounty was offered for her location and when numerous media outlets were \nsearching for her. \nThe charts, graphs, and affidavits proffered by the defense do not undercut the defendant's \nskill at evading detection, and do nothing more than restate the justification for those actions that \nthe defense already made at the prior hearing. (See Dkt. 18 at 14-16). That said, there is still \nreason to believe that the defendant was hiding not just from the press, but also from law \nenforcement. It is undisputed that defense counsel, even while in contact with the Government, \nnever disclosed the defendant's location or offered her surrender if she were to be charged. (Tr. \n53-54). The Court already inquired about defense counsel's interactions with the Government in \nthe year leading up to the defendant's arrest, and the Renewed Bail Application offers nothing new \non that score. (Id.). Defense counsel contacted the Government when the FBI attempted to serve \nthe defendant with a subpoena, but were unable to locate her, on July 7, 2019. Prior to her arrest, \nthe Government and defense counsel communicated on multiple occasions between July and \nOctober of 2019, and communicated briefly on two additional occasions, most recently in March \nof 2020. At no point did defense counsel disclose the defendant's location, offer to surrender the \ndefendant, or offer to bring the defendant in to be interviewed. \nMoreover it is undisputed that when the FBI located the defendant, she ignored their \ndirectives and ran away from the arresting agents. Although the defense has submitted \n... [truncated, 2127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/21 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=21]", "char_count": 2127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "determination that detention is appropriate here. The defense already informed the Court at the \nJuly 14, 2020 bail hearing that the defendant's security protocol was to move to an inner room if \nher security was breached. (Tr. 55). Even still, the new affidavit makes clear that the agents who \nentered the defendant's property were wearing clothing that clearly identified them as FBI agents. \n(Def. Ex. S ¶ 12). Moreover, the FBI announced themselves as federal agents to the defendant \nwhen they first approached her. Thus, even if the defendant was following her private security's \nprotocol when she fled, she did so knowing that she was disobeying the directives of FBI agents, \nnot members of the media or general public. Those actions raise the very real concern, particularly \nin light of the terms of her proposed package, that the defendant would prioritize the directives of \nher private security guards over the directives of federal law enforcement. Further, the act of \nwrapping a cellphone in tin foil has no conceivable relevance to concerns about the press. The \ndefense argues that the defendant only took those measures because that particular phone number \nhad been released to the public, but that just suggests the defendant believed that was the only \nnumber of which law enforcement was aware. In other words, there is still reason to believe, as \nthe Court previously found, that in the year leading up to her arrest, the defendant sought to evade \nnot only the press, but also law enforcement. (Tr. 87). \nThird, the defendant has access to significant wealth. At the initial bail hearing, the \nGovernment expressed doubt that the defendant's assets were limited to the approximately $3.8 \nmillion she reported to Pretrial Services, and noted that it appeared the defendant was less than \ncandid with Pretrial Services regarding the assets in her control. (Tr. 28-30, 72-73). The finances \noutlined in the defense submission confirm the Government's suspicion that the defe\n... [truncated, 2228 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/22 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=22]", "char_count": 2228}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "person of substantial means with vast resources.4 The defendant's apparent willingness to deceive \nthis Court already weighed in favor of detention, and confirmation of that deception only \nreemphasizes that this defendant cannot be trusted to comply with bail conditions. \nNow, the defense has submitted a financial report that reflects the defendant has \napproximately $22 million in assets-far more than the figure she initially reported to Pretrial \nServices. (Def. Ex. 0). Accepting the financial report at face value, it is clear that the defense's \nproposed bail package would leave the defendant with substantial resources to flee the country. \nNot only would she have millions of dollars in unrestrained assets at her disposal,5 but she would \nalso have a $2 million townhouse in London, which she could live in or sell to support herself. In \nother words, even with the proposed bond—which is only partially secured—the defendant would \nstill have millions of dollars at her disposal. She could absolutely afford to leave her friends and \nfamily to lose whatever they may pledge to support her bond, and then repay them much of their \nlosses. In fact, the defendant could transfer money to her proposed co-signers immediately \nfollowing her release,6 given the large sums of money that would be left unrestrained by her \nproposed bail package. \n4 As noted above, the Court effectively assumed the defendant had considerably more assets than \nthose disclosed to Pretrial Services in rejecting defense counsel's repeated offer to provide a more \nfulsome picture of the defendant's finances and concluding that even assuming the defense could \nprovide a clearer description of the defendant's assets, detention was still warranted. (See Tr. 87). \n5 In particular, according to the report, the defendant would have more than $4 million in \nunrestrained funds in accounts, in addition to hundreds of thousands of dollars of jewelry and other \nitems. Moreover, the Government presumes the defenda\n... [truncated, 2521 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/23 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=23]", "char_count": 2521}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Moreover, the schedule provided by the defense is notably silent regarding any future \nrevenue streams to which the defendant may have access. The financial report only addresses the \ndefendant's assets without detailing her income at all. The defendant has similarly provided the \nCourt with no information about what resources her spouse might have access to on a prospective \nbasis, in addition to their substantial assets. The financial report submitted by the defense is also \ncareful to note that it does not account for any possible income from inheritances. (Def. Ex. O at \n5). This is significant, given that the Government has produced to the defendant in discovery a \ncopy of Jeffrey Epstein's will, which includes a $10 million cash grant to the defendant. \nThe financial report further shows that the defendant apparently spent the last five years \nmoving the majority of her assets out of her name by funneling them through trusts to her spouse. \nThat pattern suggests the defendant has used the process of transferring assets as a means to hide \nher true wealth. As the Renewed Bail Application points out, the defendant currently has \napproximately $3.4 million worth of assets held in her own name, which is close to the amount of \nwealth she told Pretrial Services she possessed in July 2020. Importantly, though, that number \nomits the millions of dollars of assets that she has transferred from her name through trust accounts \nto her spouse, including funds that were used to purchase the New Hampshire property where the \ndefendant was residing when she was arrested.' This confirms that the Government was right to \nbe concerned that the defendant had refused to identify her spouse or his assets to Pretrial Services. \nThat practice further demonstrates the defendant's sophistication in hiding her assets and \nmaintaining assets that are under her control in other names. \nOn this score, it bears noting that that defendant told Pretrial Services that the property was \nowned\n... [truncated, 2231 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/24 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=24]", "char_count": 2231}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "In this vein, the financial report suggests that the defendant originally brought more than \n$20 million to her marriage, but that her husband brought only $200,000.8 (See Def. Ex. O at 10). \nSetting aside whether the defendant's spouse has additional assets beyond those included in the \nfinancial report, the vast majority of the assets contained in the report itself apparently originated \nwith the defendant. (See Def. Ex. O at 10). Based on the report, it seems clear that the defendant \nslowly funneled the majority of her wealth to trusts and into her husband's name over the last five \nyears. As a result, if the Court were to grant the defendant's proposed bail package and the \ndefendant were to flee, her spouse would primarily lose the money that the defendant gave him \nrather than his own independent assets. In other words, were the defendant to flee, she would \nlargely be sacrificing her own money and assets, thereby limiting the moral suasion of her spouse \nco-signing the bond. In sum, the defendant's submission does not change the Government's \nposition at the original bail hearing that the defendant has considerable financial resources, and \ncould live a comfortable life as a fugitive. \nThe combination of all these factors, including the defendant's foreign ties, demonstrated \nability to live in hiding, and financial resources, confirm that the defendant's characteristics \ncontinue to weigh in favor of detention. Given the multiplicity of factors supporting detention, \n8 The Government has not been able to verify this financial information—in part because the \ndefense has declined to provide the Government with the spouse's current banking information—\nbut according to public news articles, both prior to and during his marriage to the defendant, he \nwas the CEO of a company that was valued at $100 million in 2016. \n(See, e.g., \nhttps://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-scott-borgerson-ceo-ghislaine-maxwell-jeffrey-epstein-\ncargometrics-2019-8; https://www. freig\n... [truncated, 2674 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/25 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=25]", "char_count": 2674}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "this is not one of the rare cases in which a private security company could conceivably be \nconsidered as a bail condition. See United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). The \nSecond Circuit has squarely held that \"the Bail Reform Act does not permit a two-tiered bail \nsystem in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants \nare released to self-funded private jails,\" and that \"a defendant may be released on such a condition \nonly where, but for his wealth, he would not have been detained.\" Id. Here, detention is warranted \nnot only because of the defendant's financial means, but also her foreign ties, her skill at and \nwillingness to live in hiding, the nature of the offense resulting in a presumption of detention, and \nthe strength of the evidence, among other factors. The defense suggestion that the defendant's \nprivate security guards should post cash in support of a bond does not change this calculus. There \nis no reason to believe that the defendant would be at all troubled by a security company in which \nshe has no personal stake losing $1 million, especially if that sacrifice meant she could escape \nconviction and sentencing. Accordingly, release to the equivalent of a \"privately funded jail\" is \nnot warranted here. Id. at 83. \nBelatedly, as the Court previously recognized (Tr. 87-88), a GPS monitoring bracelet offers \nlittle value for a defendant who poses such a significant flight risk because it is does nothing to \nprevent the defendant's flight once it has been removed. At best, home confinement and electronic \nmonitoring would reduce a defendant's head start after cutting the bracelet. See United States v. \nBanki, 10 Cr. 008 (JFK), Dkt. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010) (denying bail to a naturalized citizen \nwho was native to Iran, who was single and childless and who faced a statutory maximum of 20 \nyears' imprisonment, and noting that electronic monitoring is \"hardly foolproof.\"), aff'd, 369 F. \nApp'x 1\n... [truncated, 2206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/26 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=26]", "char_count": 2206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "with electronic monitoring \"at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant's head start\"); United States v. \nBenatar, No. 02 Cr. 099 (JG), 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same). Simply \nput, no bail conditions, including those proposed in the Renewed Bail Motion, would be sufficient \nto ensure that this defendant appears in court. \nIn urging a different conclusion, the defense again cites the same cases discussed in its \ninitial briefing and at the July 14, 2020 hearing to argue that the proposed bail conditions are \nconsistent with or exceed those approved by courts in this Circuit for \"high-profile defendants with \nfinancial means and foreign citizenship.\" (Mot. at 34; see Dkt. 18 at 16, 21; Tr. 48-51). The Court \nshould reject the defense's efforts to raise the same precedent that the Court already took into \nconsideration when denying bail. \"A motion for reconsideration may not be used ... as a vehicle \nfor relitigating issues already decided by the Court.\" Jackson v. Goord, 664 F. Supp. 2d 307, 313 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court already considered and rejected \nthe defendant's efforts to liken her case to other \"serious and high-profile prosecutions where the \ncourts, over the government's objection, granted bail to defendants with significant financial \nresources.\" (Tr. 88). Noting \"crucial factual differences,\" the Court described those cases, \nincluding United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), United States v. Dreier, \n596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. \n2009), as \"not on point and not persuasive,\" and distinguished the defendant for a number of \nreasons, including the defendant's \"significant foreign connections.\" \n(Tr. 88; see id. \n(distinguishing Esposito where the risk of flight appeared to \"have been based on the resources \navailable to defendant, not foreign connections or experience and a record of hiding from being \nfound\"); \n... [truncated, 2102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/27 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=27]", "char_count": 2102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "package agreed to by the parties for a considerable period of time before the government sought \ndetention\")). \nThe Court already engaged in a fact-specific analysis in ordering the defendant detained. \nAmong the reasons provided, the Court found that the \"the defendant not only has significant \nfinancial resources, but has demonstrated sophistication in hiding those resources and herself.\" \n(Tr. 87). Following the analysis the Court has already conducted, several of the cases cited by the \ndefendant are readily distinguishable. See, e.g., United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, \n1050-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in ordering defendant released pending trial, noting, among other \nthings, that the defendant not only waived his right to appeal extradition in Switzerland, but that \nhe traveled immediately to the United States for arraignment, and that his country's Government \ncommitted to ensuring his appearance at trial); United States v. Bodmer, No. 03 Cr. 947 (SAS), \n2004 WL 169790, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004) (setting conditions of bail where defendant \narrested abroad had already consented to extradition to the United States and finding that the \nGovernment—whose argument was \"based, in large part, on speculation\" as to the defendant's \nfinancial resources—had \"failed to meet its burden\"). And there is support in the case law for \ndetaining individuals in comparable situations to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. \nBoustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252-55 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 19-344, 2019 WL 2070656 (2d Cir. \nMar. 7, 2019) (ordering defendant detained pending trial and finding that defendant posed a risk \nof flight based on several factors, including seriousness of the charged offenses, lengthy possible \nsentence, strength of Government's evidence, access to substantial financial resources, frequent \ninternational travel, \"minimal\" ties to the United States, and \"extensive ties to foreign countries \nwithout extradition\"); United States v. Patrick Ho, 1\n... [truncated, 2160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/28 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=28]", "char_count": 2160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "the Government's evidence, lack of meaningful community ties, and \"potential ties in foreign \njurisdictions\"); United States v. Epstein, 155 F. Supp. 2d 323, 324-326 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding \nthat defendant's dual citizenship in Germany and Brazil, lucrative employment and property \ninterests, and lack of an extradition treaty with Brazil weighed in favor of detention despite the \nfact that defendant and his wife owned \"substantial\" property and other significant assets in the \nUnited States). Further, unlike those cases and the cases cited by the defendant, the crimes charged \nhere involving minor victims trigger a statutory presumption in favor of detention, weighing \nfurther in favor of detention. See Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436. \n\"Each bail package in each case is considered and evaluated on its individual merits by the \nCourt.\" Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 326. Unlike the cases cited by the defense, the Government \nseeks detention not solely on the basis that the defendant is of financial means and has foreign \ncitizenship. Rather, detention is warranted because the defendant is a citizen of multiple foreign \ncountries, including one that does not extradite its nationals, with \"substantial international ties,\" \n\"familial and personal connections abroad,\" and \"substantial financial resources,\" (Tr. 83-84), with \na demonstrated sophistication in hiding herself and her assets, who, for the myriad reasons \ndiscussed herein and identified at the original hearing—including the seriousness of the offense, \nthe strength of the Government's evidence, and the potential length of sentence—presents a \nsubstantial flight risk. (Tr. 82-91). The defendant continues to pose an extreme risk of flight, and \nthe defense has not offered any new information sufficient to justify reversal of the Court's prior \nfinding that no combination of conditions could ensure her appearance. \n29 \nEFTA00089183\n", "char_count": 1911}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "D. Conditions of Confinement \nFinally, the Renewed Bail Application reiterates the same argument about the potential \nharms of detention on the defendant that this Court rejected at the initial bail hearing. (Tr. 42, 68-\n69). As was the case in July, these complaints do not warrant the defendant's release. \nThe defendant continues to have more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review \nher discovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys. Specifically, the \ndefendant currently has thirteen hours per day, seven days per week to review electronic discovery. \nAlso during that time, the defendant has access to email with defense counsel, calls with defense \ncounsel, and when visiting is available depending on pandemic-related conditions, the defendant \nhas access to legal visits. Due to the recently implemented lockdown at the MDC, visitation is not \ncurrently available, but MDC legal counsel is arranging for the defendant to receive a VTC call \nwith legal counsel three hours per day every weekday, starting this Friday. Defense counsel will \nalso be able to schedule legal calls on weekends as needed. Given those facts, the defense \nargument essentially suggests that no defendant could prepare for trial while housed at the MDC—\na patently incorrect claim. \nThe defendant is able to review her discovery using hard drives provided by the \nGovernment, discs that defense counsel can send containing any copies of discovery material \ndefense counsel chooses within the confines of the protective order, or hard copy documents \nprovided by defense counsel. The Government has taken multiple steps to address technical \ndifficulties the defendant has encountered when reviewing her hard drives. These steps included \nmodifying and reproducing productions in new formats, asking MDC IT staff to assist the \ndefendant in viewing her hard drives on the MDC computer, and then purchasing and providing a \n30 \nEFTA00089184\n", "char_count": 1960}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "laptop for the defendant's exclusive use.9 Even when the defendant was temporarily unable to \nreview some files from some hard drives, she was always able to review other portions of her \ndiscovery. \nAs to the defense's most recent complaints, the malfunctioning of the sixth production that \nthe defense complains of resulted from the defendant herself dropping the hard drive onto the \nground, and that drive has been replaced. When the defense informed the Government that the \ndrive containing the seventh production may be malfunctioning, the Government offered to have \nIT staff review the drive. In response, the defense indicated the drive was in fact still viewable \nand declined to have IT staff review it. Accordingly, it is the Government's understanding that \nthe defendant currently has a full, readable set of discovery at the MDC. At the defense's request, \nthe Government is preparing yet another copy containing all productions to date on a single drive \nso that the defendant will have a backup copy of discovery materials at the MDC.1° Throughout \nthe defendant's pretrial detention, the Government has been responsive to the defense's concerns \nregarding access to discovery and counsel. The Government will continue to work with MDC \n9 The Government understands from MDC legal counsel that the defendant has access to the \nlaptop thirteen hours per day during weekdays and has access to the MDC desktop computer \nthirteen hours per day seven days per week. The use of the laptop is limited to weekdays \nbecause the MDC restricts the number of employees who carry the key to the secure location \nwhere the laptop is kept, and the employees with that key do not work regularly on weekends. \nThe MDC previously accommodated an exception to this rule while the defendant was in \nquarantine and arranged for her to use the laptop in her isolation cell on weekends because \notherwise she would not have had access to a computer during weekends while in quarantine. \nNow that she is o\n... [truncated, 2600 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/31 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=31]", "char_count": 2600}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "legal counsel to ensure that the defendant is able to review her discovery and to communicate with \ndefense counsel over the seven months still remaining before trial. \nAs to the defense complaints regarding the defendant's conditions of confinement, the \ndefense notably does not suggest that the defendant should be housed in general population. \nIndeed, the defense appears to agree that the best way to ensure the defendant's safety while \ndetained is to be away from general population. Unlike other inmates in protective custody, \nhowever, the defendant is released from her isolation cell for thirteen hours per day, has her own \nshower, has exclusive use of two different computers, has her own phone to use, and has her own \ntelevision. Those conditions set her far apart from general population inmates, not to mention \nother inmates in protective custody. Additionally, psychology and medical staff check on the \ndefendant daily, MDC legal staff are highly attuned to any complaints the defendant has raised, \nand following initial complaints about the defendant's diet early in her incarceration, the MDC has \nensured that the defendant receives three full meals per day and has access to commissary from \nwhich she can supplement her diet. \nThe MDC has taken numerous steps to strike the balance between the security of the \ninstitution and providing the defendant with adequate time and resources to prepare her defense. \nIn that vein, many of the searches the defendant complains of-such as searches after every visit, \nsearches of her cell, pat downs when she is moved, and directing her to open her mouth for visual \ninspection (while the searching staff member is wearing a mask)—are the same searches to which \nevery other inmate is subjected for the security of the institution. MDC legal counsel has assured \nthe Government that MDC staff does not record or listen to the substance of the defendant's calls \nand visits with legal counsel. To the extent MDC staff conducts additio\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00089154/32 or ?id=EFTA00089154&page=32]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00089154", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "of the defendant, MDC legal counsel has indicated that those steps are necessary to maintain the \nsecurity of the institution and the defendant. \nWith respect to the defense concerns regarding COVID-19, the Government recognizes, as \nit did in its initial bail briefing, that the virus presents a challenge at any jail facility. At least for \nthis defendant, the MDC's precautionary measures appear to have worked. When the defendant \nwas potentially exposed to the virus, she was placed in quarantine, remained asymptomatic, tested \nnegative, and then was released from quarantine. As the Court found at the initial bail hearing, the \ndefendant has no underlying health conditions that would place her at greater risk of complications \nfrom COVID-19. (Tr. 89). For that same reason, the Court should again reject the suggestion that \nthe pandemic warrants the defendant's release. \nCONCLUSION \nAs this Court previously found, the defendant \"poses a substantial actual risk of flight.\" \n(Tr. 86). Nothing in the defense submission justifies altering the Court's prior conclusion that \nthere are no conditions of bail that would assure the defendant's presence in court proceedings in \nthis case. Accordingly, the Renewed Bail Motion should be denied. \nDated: New York, New York \nDecember 16, 2020 \nRespectfully submitted, \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nActing United States Attorney \nBy: \n33 \nEFTA00089187\n", "char_count": 1392}]}