{"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_count": 84, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00088802", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00088802.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nS2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION \nTO THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE \nDAMIAN WILLIAMS \nUnited States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of New York \nOne St. Andrew's Plaza \nNew York, New York 10007 \nAssistant United States Attorneys \nOf Counsel \nEFTA00088802\n", "char_count": 419}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Table of Contents \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nARGUMENT \n4 \nI. The Court Should Admit the Testimony of Dr. \n \n4 \nA. \nApplicable Law \n5 \nB. \nDiscussion \n9 \n1. Dr. )pinions \non Coercion and Attachment are Admissible \n10 \n2. Dr. \nOpinion on the Relationship Between Trust and Victim Awareness of Their \nAbuse is Admissible \n22 \n3. Dr. MINtDpinion on the Long-Term Consequences of Abuse is Admissible \n23 \n4. Dr. \nOpinion About the Significance of the Presence of Third Parties is Admissible \n \n25 \n5. Dr. \nOpinion on Delayed Disclosure is Admissible \n27 \nII. The Evidence Contained in the Government's October 11, 2021 Letter is Admissible \n32 \nA. \nApplicable Law \n33 \nB. \nDiscussion \n35 \n1. The Evidence is Admissible As Direct Evidence, or in the Alternative, Under Rule 404(b) 35 \n2. The Government Has Met and Exceeded Its Notice Obligations \n39 \nIII. The Testimony of Minor Victim-3 is Admissible \n41 \nA. \nBackground \n41 \nB. \nApplicable Law \n44 \nC. \nDiscussion \n45 \nIV. There is No Basis to Preclude Co-Conspirator Statements at Trial \n54 \nA. \nBackground \n55 \nB. \nDiscussion \n58 \nEFTA00088803\n", "char_count": 1093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "V. There is No Basis to Suppress Minor Victim-4's Identification of the Defendant \n63 \nA. \nBackground \n63 \nB. \nApplicable Law \n65 \nC. \nDiscussion \n67 \nVI. The Court Should Deny the Defense Motions to Preclude the Government's Exhibits \n71 \nA. \nApplicable Law \n71 \nB. \nDiscussion \n72 \nVII. There is No Basis to Preclude Discussion of \"Victims\" or Rape \n76 \nA. \nReferences to Victims \n76 \nB. \nEvidence of Rape \n79 \nVIII. \nThe Remaining Defense Motions are Aimed at Evidence the Government Does Not Plan to Elicit \n \n81 \nCONCLUSION \n83 \nEFTA00088804\n", "char_count": 547}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "PRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nThe Government respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the defendant's \nthirteen motions in limine, dated October 18, 2021. For the reasons that follow, the defendant's \nmotions should be denied. \nFirst, the Government has given notice of a qualified expert who will provide reliable and \nrelevant opinions, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow \nPharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (See Def. Mot. 3). Second, evidence relating to \nMinor Victim-3 is admissible both as direct evidence of the charged crimes, and admissible in the \nalternative under Rule 404(b). (See Def. Mot. 4). Third, the Government has provided adequate \nnotice pursuant to Rule 404(b), and in any event, all evidence for which it has provided such notice \nis also admissible as direct evidence of the charged crimes. (See Def. Mot. 2). Fourth, there is no \nbasis to preclude the introduction of co-conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). \n(See Def. Mot. 1). Fifth, Minor Victim-4's confirmatory identification of the defendant was not \nunduly suggestive, and it should not be suppressed. (See Def. Mot. 9). Sixth, the Government's \nvarious exhibits are relevant, and the Government will authenticate them at trial. (See Def. Moth. \n7, 8, 13). Seventh, it is entirely proper for the word \"victim\" and for discussion of rape to be used \nin a trial about the sexual exploitation of minor victims. (See Def. Mots. 11, 12). Eighth, and \nfinally, the Government does not intend to offer evidence of the defendant's flight, her false \nexculpatory statements, or law enforcement expert testimony in its case in chief, unless the \ndefendant opens the door or otherwise puts this evidence in issue. (See Def. Mots. 5, 6, 10). \n3 \nEFTA00088805\n", "char_count": 1800}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "ARGUMENT \nI. \nThe Court Should Admit the Testimony of Dr. \nThe Government intends to call Dr. •as \nan expert witness. Dr. Ms\n the \nPresident-Elect of the Division of Trauma Psychology at the American Psychological Association. \nShe is currently a clinical instructor at the Alpert Medical School of Brown University, and she \nhas practiced psychology for approximately 25 years, specializing in treating patients with trauma, \nincluding sexual trauma in childhood and adolescence. Dr. \nhas treated hundreds of \nvictims of trauma, including many victims of child sexual abuse, and she has written, presented, \nand taught about the assessment and treatment of trauma. She has also received continuing \neducation on trauma and the treatment of trauma in a clinical setting. (See generally Curriculum \nVitae, Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 2). \nOn April 23, 2021, the Government timely notified the defendant of its intent to call Dr. \nn its case-in-chief. As the notice explains, Dr. \nis expected to testify, based on \nher relevant education, training, experience, and research, and offer the following opinions: \nIndividuals with particular vulnerabilities are often targeted by \nperpetrators of sexual abuse. Sexual abuse of minors frequently \noccurs through the use of manipulation or coercion in the context of \nan established relationship that is developed over time, rather than \nthrough the use of forcible rape. Minor victims are often subject to \na strategic pattern of behaviors, often called grooming, that can take \na variety of forms and function to render the victims vulnerable to \nabuse, to obscure the nature of the abuse, and to build trust and \nattachment with their abuser. The relationship of trust and \nattachment can prevent victims from being aware that what they are \nexperiencing is abuse and can prevent disclosure. Minor victims \ntherefore may not identify themselves as victims of abuse while it is \nongoing, and may not recognize the consequences of that abuse until \nadulthood. Repeated \n... [truncated, 2128 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/4 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=4]", "char_count": 2128}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "traumatic and psychological consequences, especially when it \noccurs in the context of complex trauma. The presence of other \nindividuals can facilitate the sexual abuse of minors. Dr. \nis \nalso expected to testify that nondisclosure, incremental isc osure, \nand secrecy are common among victims of sexual abuse for a variety \nof reasons, and that memory and disclosure of traumatic or abusive \nevents is impacted by a number of factors, including the \ncircumstances surrounding the trauma. \n(Expert Notice, Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2). As the notice also explained, Dr. \nhas not evaluated \nany of the victims in this case, and the Government does not currently intend to offer Dr. \ntestimony regarding any specific victim. (See id.). \nThere is nothing controversial about this testimony. It is well supported by established \nscientific principles, and it is the kind of testimony frequently admitted in cases involving sexual \nabuse. This Court should do the same. \nA. Applicable Law \nDistrict courts have a \"gatekeeper function\" in analyzing the admissibility of expert \ntestimony. Phelps v. CBS Corp., No. 17 Civ. 8361 (AJN), 2020 WL 7028954, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. \nNov. 30, 2020) (quoting Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 575 (2d Cir. 2017)). Although \nthe proponent of the evidence carries a burden of proof to establish its admissibility by a \npreponderance of the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 965 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. \n2020), courts apply a \"presumption of admissibility of evidence.\" Felix v. City of New York, \nNo. 16 Civ. 5845 (AJN), 2020 WL 6048153, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2020) (quoting Borawick \nv. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the relevant rule of evidence, Rule 702, \nreflects \"the `liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their `general approach of relaxing the \ntraditional barriers to `opinion' testimony.\" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. \n5 \nEFTA00088807\n", "char_count": 1927}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "579, 588 (1993) (quoting Beech Aircraft Cap. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). \nUnder Daubert, a district court must first determine whether an expert is qualified. See \nFed. R. Evid. 702 (\"A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, \ntraining, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise . \n.\"); United States v. \nKidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"At the first step of the Daubert inquiry, courts \nare instructed to consider the expert's qualifications.\"). Courts then must determine whether the \ntestimony \"will be not only relevant, but reliable.\" United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 330 \n(2d Cir. 2015); see Dauber!, 509 U.S. at 597 (explaining that courts must ensure \"that an expert's \ntestimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand\"). On reliability, \nRule 702 identifies three \"indicia of reliability\": (1) \"that the testimony is grounded on sufficient \nfacts or data; (2) that the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) that \nthe witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\" United \nStates v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. \nPassenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002)). \"[T]hese criteria,\" however, \"are not \nexhaustive.\" Id. Daubert itself, which \"dealt with a scientific theory,\" offered additional factors, \nsuch as whether the theory \"'has been subjected to peer review and publication,\" and the \n\"'known or potential rate of error.\"' Romano, 794 F.3d at 330 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at \n593-94). And \"there are many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise.\" \nKumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). \"[W]hether the specific expert \ntestimony focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized translation of those \nobservations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a \n\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/6 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=6]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "particular case, the expert's testimony will often rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in \nkind to the jury's own.\" Id. at 149 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United \nStates v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"Such specialized knowledge can be \ngrounded in scientific or other particularized training, but it can also derive from personal \nobservations or experience, see id., so long as those observations or experience are outside the \nken of the average person.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702, \nAdvisory Committee's Note (2000) (explaining that expert testimony may be based on \n\"experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or \neducation\"). \nThe key question is whether \"an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional \nstudies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that \ncharacterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.\" Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see \nWilliams, 506 F.3d at 160 (explaining that the Daubers test is \"flexible\"). In particular, if an \nexpert's testimony is within \"the range where the experts might reasonably differ,\" the jury, not \nthe trial court, should be the one to decide among the conflicting views of different experts. \nKumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153. So long as the testimony is not \"speculative or conjectural or \nbased on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in \nessence an apples and oranges comparison . . . any other contentions that the assumptions are \nunfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.\" Phelps, 2020 WL 7028954, \nat *3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 'the rejection of expert testimony \nis the exception rather than the rule.'\" Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287 \n7 \nEFTA00088809\n", "char_count": 1933}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee's Notes (2000 Amendments)). \n\"[T]he law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine \nreliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.\" Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. \nat 142 (emphasis in original); see United States v. Requena, 980 F.3d 30, 47 (2d Cir. 2020). Thus \na district court may properly exercise its gatekeeping function without the \"formality of a separate \nhearing[.]\" Williams, 506 F.3d at 161; see also United States v. Barnes, 411 F. App'x 365, 370 \n(2d Cir. 2011) (summary order). \"This is particularly true if, at the time that the expert testimony \nis presented to the jury, a sufficient basis for allowing the testimony is on the record.\" Williams, \n506 F.3d at 161 (citing 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02 [2] (2d ed. 2006)). \nFinally, even if the expert testimony is reliable, it must also be relevant. See, e.g., United \nStates v. Torres, No. 20 Cr. 608 (DLC), 2021 WL 1947503, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2021). In \nthis context, the testimony must \"concern matters that the average juror is not capable of \nunderstanding on his or her own.\" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2008); see \nFaulkner v. Arista Records LLC, 46 F. Sup. 3d 365, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"Weighing whether the \nexpert testimony assists the trier of fact goes primarily to relevance.\"). \nCourts have frequently admitted expert testimony on the psychological relationship \nbetween perpetrators and victims of sex crimes. For instance, in United States v. Kidd, 385 F. \nSupp. 3d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), the Government gave notice of expert testimony on \"the \npsychology of the pimp-prostitute relationship,\" including concepts such as \"trauma bonding.\" Id. \nat 263. The defendant interposed a Daubert challenge, arguing that the expert's testimony was not \nbased on \"studies or empirical data\" and so could not \"be assessed for reliability.\" Id. (internal \n8 \nEFTA00088810\n", "char_count": 1999}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "quotation marks omitted). The district court rejected that argument, explaining that \"case law quite \ncommonly upholds this type of testimony against Daubert challenges,\" and that the expert's \nexperience writing about, treating, and speaking to prostitutes was sufficiently reliable. Id. at 263-\n64; see also, e.g., Letter, United States v. Kelly, No. 19 Cr. 286 (AMD) (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2021) \n(Dkt. No. 134); United States v. Torres, No. 20 Cr. 608 (DLC), 2021 WL 1947503, at •6 (S.D.N.Y. \nMay 13, 2021) (permitting expert testimony on \"domestic abuse and coercive control\"); Feb. 25, \n2020 Tr. at 24:1-40:15, United States v. Randall, 19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 335 \n(permitting expert testimony on \"[t]rauma and coercive control in the context of sex trafficking, \nincluding the psychological relationship between pimps and the women prostituted by them\"); \nNotice and Oct. 17, 2019 Tr. at 27:1-12, United States v. Dupigny, No. 18 Cr. 528 (JMF) \n(S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. Nos. 180-1, 198 (permitting expert testimony on \"the psychological relationship \nbetween a pimp and the woman prostituted by him\" and \"why prostituted women do not leave \ntheir pimp\"). \nB. Discussion \nThe defendant does not contest that Dr. IM \nis a qualified expert. Nor could she: Dr. \n=is \na leader in her field, teaching others as a professor at Brown University, and she has \napproximately twenty-five years of clinical experience. She is testifying in general about core \nconcepts in her field, based on her \"extensive study of the relevant data and literature and her \nclinical experience treating hundreds of trauma and abuse patients over the past twenty years.\" \n9 \nEFTA00088811\n", "char_count": 1669}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "United States v. Raniere, No. 18 Cr. 204 (NGG), 2019 WL 2212639, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, \n2019). \nInstead, the defendant suggests that Dr. \nopinions are unreliable, irrelevant, or \nprejudicial. To the contrary, and as explained in greater detail below, each of the Dr. \nfive challenged opinions is well supported and would aid the jury in understanding the evidence \nat trial. The Court should permit Dr. a \ntestify. \nini \n1. Dr. \nOpinions on Coercion and Attachment are Admissible \na. e a \nAs described in the expert notice, Dr. \nwill testify about the role that trust and \nattachment play in relationships between a victim and an abuser: \nSexual abuse of minors frequently occurs through the use of \nmanipulation or coercion in the context of an established \nrelationship that is developed over time, rather than through the use \nof forcible rape. Minor victims are often subject to a strategic pattern \nof behaviors, often called grooming, that can take a variety of forms \nand function to render the victims vulnerable to abuse, to obscure \nthe nature of the abuse, and to build trust and attachment with their \nabuser. The relationship of trust and attachment can prevent victims \nfrom being aware that what they are experiencing is abuse and can \nprevent disclosure. \n(Expert Notice, Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2). Dr. \nwill opine that victims are often abused in \nthe context of a coercive and manipulative relationship which develops over time through the \nbuilding of victims' trust and attachment. One aspect of this relationship is \"often called \ngrooming.\" (Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2). However, the concepts of attachment and coercion go beyond \ngrooming, and encompass both the trust-building aspect of the relationship and the ways in which \n10 \nEFTA00088812\n", "char_count": 1764}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "that bonds victims to their abusers and prevents victims from disclosing that they have been \nabused.'\nThese opinions stem in part from Dr. \npersonal familiarity and experience \ntreating victims of sexual abuse for decades. She is trained in trauma psychology, she has expertise \nin treating victims of sexual abuse who have been subject to this pattern of behavior, and she \nteaches residents about trauma psychology. Cl Bosco v. United States, No. 14 Civ. 3525 (JFK), \n2016 WL 5376205, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016) (expert testimony about \"common knowledge \namong urologists\" require the expert to \"draw upon the defining characteristics that make him a \nmember of that community: his training as a urological surgeon, his practical experience \nperforming several hundred ureteroscopies, and his knowledge as a clinical instructor of surgery\"). \nThese opinions also stem from the relevant literature. This pattern of coercive attachment \nis not a novel or outlier concept in the literature of trauma psychology. For instance, attached as \nExhibit A are some of the articles that have been provided by Dr. \nand inform her \ntestimony. See Dietz, \"Grooming and Seduction,\" 33 J. of Interpersonal Violence 28, 34 (2018) \nThe concepts of attachment and grooming encompass a variety of established techniques, \nincluding: (1) the use of attention, love, and affection; (2) using bribery and gift giving; (3) sexual \ndesensitization—that is, talking to children about sex and engaging in touching; (4) isolating the \nvictim; and (5) engaging in emotional manipulation. Grooming efforts can also extend to \n\"grooming the environment.\" Craven et al., \"Sexual grooming of children: Review of literature \nand theoretical considerations,\" 3 J. of Sexual Aggression 287, 292-93 (2006) (\"Some offenders \ngroom the environment by targeting single-parent families to gain [a position of trust].] Offenders \nmay do this because they believe that these children are more vulnerable and because they believe \nit w\n... [truncated, 2226 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/11 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=11]", "char_count": 2226}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "(\"Since its introduction to the peer-reviewed professional literature in 1984, the term `grooming' \nhas become so widely adopted that it will remain in widespread use for decades to come.\"); \nBennett & O'Donohue, \"The Construct of Grooming in Child Sexual Abuse: Conceptual and \nMeasurement Issues,\" 23 J. Child Sexual Abuse 957, 964-68 (2014) (reviewing the literature on \nthe prevalence of various grooming techniques); Craven et al., \"Sexual grooming of children: \nReview of literature and theoretical considerations,\" 3 J. of Sexual Aggression 287, 292-93 (2006) \n(\"[R]etrospective identification of sexual grooming, i.e. after a sexual offence has been committed, \nis much easier than prospective identification, i.e. before a sexual offence\"). To be clear, however, \nher review of the literature—and therefore the basis of her testimony—extends beyond these \narticles. \nAccordingly, Dr. \ncame to her opinions through her clinical experience on this \nspecific issue, as informed by her education and study of the relevant literature. That is a sufficient \ndemonstration of \"how the expert came to [her] conclusion and what methodologies or evidence \nsubstantiate that conclusion.\" Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2006); see Feb. \n25, 2020 Tr. at 24:1-40:15, United States v. Randall, 19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 335 \n(rejecting the notion that \"the many studies that have validated trauma bonding and coercive \ncontrols as established phenomena are unreliable for want of laboratory-like statistical vetting\"); \nOct. 17, 2019 Tr. at 27:1-12, United States v. Dupigny, No. 18 Cr. 528 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. \nNos. 180-1, 198 (explaining that \"the basis for the testimony—namely, the witness's training and \nexperience—is not such that it would be subject to exclusion on the grounds that it's not based on \n12 \nEFTA00088814\n", "char_count": 1858}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "some sort of empirical scientific testing,\" and that \"those arguments go to the weight, not the \nadmissibility, of her proposed testimony\"). \nAs noted above, courts have frequently admitted testimony about the psychological \nrelationship between victims of sexual abuse and their perpetrators. See supra pp. 7-8. Courts \nhave also specifically authorized expert testimony on the subject of grooming. See, e.g., United \nStates v. Telles, 6 F.4th 1086, 1097-1098 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that admission of expert \ntestimony on grooming did not violate Federal Rules of Evidence 702 or 403 nor violate due \nprocess and finding that the expert \"'merely gave a straightforward account of relevant background \ninformation based on [the expert's] own knowledge and experience\" (quoting United States v. \nJohnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1141 (8th Cir. 2017)); United States v. Halamek, 5 F.4th 1081, 1087-89 \n(9th Cir. 2021) (holding that expert testimony on grooming was \"relevant, reliable, and properly \nadmitted\"); United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 833 n.15 (10th Cir. 2019) (\"Grooming can be \nestablished by use of an expert witness who testifies about psychological tactics that are common \nin cases of child sex abuse.\"); United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 158 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming \nexpert testimony on the \"grooming process\"); Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 656-69 (Tx. Ct. \nCrim. App. 2011) (collecting cases showing that \"grooming evidence has been received by courts \nfrom numerous types of experts\"); see also United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. \n2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Cabrera, 13 F.4th 140 (2d Cir. 2021) \n(noting that evidence of grooming supported the jury's verdict). \nAgainst this weight of authority, the defendant relies principally on one case from the \nDistrict of Maine. United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). The proposed \n13 \nEFTA00088815\n", "char_count": 1933}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "testimony in this case is readily distinguishable from that in Raymond. There, the government \ngave notice of expert testimony about the \"behavior of child molesters\" from a veteran FBI agent \nwho had reviewed case studies of child abuse and had written one book and one article. Id. at 143, \n145, 147. The purported expert's book, in turn, merely made assertions about the \"profile\" of child \nmolesters, with no information about how his experiences reliably led to his conclusions. Id. at \n147-48. In the same breath, however, the book \"disavow[ed] [its] reliability ... for legal use,\" and \nhis article similarly offered generalized views on what \"many\" offenders were \"more likely or less \nlikely to do.\" Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, at bottom, the purported expert's \ntestimony was based only on his subjective conclusions after reviewing case studies. See id. at \n147 n.5 (explaining that the expert \"troubling[ly]\" wrote that \"data is not the plural of anecdote,\" \nbut \"the information and opinions are based primarily on the totality of my acquired knowledge \nand expertise\"). \nThe situation here is quite different. Dr. \nconclusions are not anecdotal; they are \ngrounded in the academic literature and her formal and informal education. Moreover, she will be \ntestifying about concepts she regularly employs as a practicing clinician. Again, the defense does \nnot contest that Dr. \nis qualified to be an expert on this subject. And Dr. \nopinions are not an attempt to offer a \"profile\" of perpetrators of child sexual abuse or their \nactivities. \nInstead, Dr. \nwill testify about the psychological underpinnings of an \n14 \nEFTA00088816\n", "char_count": 1660}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "established pattern of victimization—attachment and coercion—experienced by victims of sexual \nabuse. \nThe defense would read Raymond to stand for the proposition that expert testimony is \nunreliable if it does not explain \"what testing was involved, what data she considered, or how her \nconclusions can be verified.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 8). For instance, the defense criticizes Dr. \nfor opining that sexual abuse of minors occurs \"frequently,\" without specifying whether it occurs \n\"half the time\" or \"two-thirds of the time.\" (Id. at 7; see id. at 8 (quoting Raymond, 700 F. Supp. \n2d at 148-49)). That is not what is required by Daubert in the context of qualitative social science, \nand it is not what many courts have held in the context of precisely this form of testimony, as \nexplained above. To the extent Raymond stands for such a broad proposition, it is contrary to the \nlaw of this Circuit. See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on \nother grounds as recognized by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 276 n.14 (2d Cir. 2011) \n(recognizing that social science research \"cannot have the exactness of hard science \nmethodologies, and expert testimony need not be based on statistical analysis in order to be \nprobative\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).2\nThe defendant's remaining critiques of Dr. \nopinion miss the mark. First, the \ndefendant asserts that Dr. \npatients are uncorroborated, and she \"simply assumes her \n2 Even in Raymond, the Court left open the possibility that the Government could call the expert \nin rebuttal to \"counter a defense case that victim testimony in this case should not be believed \nbecause the victim delayed in reporting the abuse or did not report it consistently.\" 700 F. Supp. \n2d at 156. Even were the Court inclined to follow Raymond rather than the cases in this District, \nit should similarly revisit permitting Dr. \nto testify about the opinion at issue if the defense \nattacks victim credibili\n... [truncated, 2022 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/15 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=15]", "char_count": 2022}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "patients are telling the truth.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 6). The defendant claims that this \"fatally \nundermines the reliability of her opinion\" because her conclusion has \"no known or identified rate \nof error . . . nor is there a reliable method or a series of factors guiding \nconclusion as to \nwhether an individual victim is fabricating her abuse.\" (Id. (alterations and quotation marks \nomitted)). Clinical psychologists are not so credulous. As part of Dr. \nwork as a \npracticing clinician, she examines consistencies and inconsistencies in the information provided \nby patients and assesses patient self-reporting in the context of literature and knowledge that she \nhas developed in her years of practice. As the Government's expert notice makes clear, Dr. \nhas treated hundreds and hundreds of patients in her decades of experience, and her \nopinions are based in part on the significant patterns she has observed among the patients she has \ntreated. The Court should reject the defendant's speculative claim that Dr. \nhas been \nmisled by hundreds of patients who sought professional treatment for traumatic events that did not \noccur. \nIn any event, the defendant's argument about error rates misunderstands the nature of a \nDaubers inquiry. An error rate is but one of the Daubers factors that may or may not be applicable \nin every case. See Romano, 794 F.3d at 330. And in cases such as this, where a social science \nexpert is testifying based on qualitative methodology, that factor is inapplicable. See Torres, 2021 \nWL 1947503, at *6 n.8. As the Second Circuit has explained, \"Peer review, publication, potential \nerror rate, etc. . . are not applicable to this kind of testimony, whose reliability depends heavily \non the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it. In \nsuch cases, the place to quibble with [an expert's] academic training is on cross-examination . . . \n16 \nEFTA00088818\n", "char_count": 1943}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 17, "text_content": ".\" Joseph, 542 F.3d at 21-22 (first and second alterations in original) (citations and internal \nquotation marks omitted). \nThat point is particularly true in sex trafficking cases. As Judge Engelmayer explained \nwhen evaluating the testimony of a similar expert in a sex trafficking case, analyzing error rates is \nan \"unusually poor fit\" in this area: \n[S]tudying the circumstances and psychological drivers of trafficked \nwomen is not like studying diseases or potential cures in laboratory \nanimals. . . . Given the necessarily retrospective nature of such a \nstudy, given the small size of the populations under review, and \ngiven the inherently individualized circumstances presented by \ndifferent perpetrators, victims, and contexts in this tumultuous and \nemotionally fraught area of criminal conduct, the vocabulary of \nerror rates ... is an unusually poor fit.... The testing that has been \ndone as to trauma bonding and coercive control, instead, necessarily \nuses more qualitative research methodologies. \nThese involve \ninterviews and case studies and clinical examinations conducted \nover time.\" \nFeb. 25, 2020 Tr. at 29:4-30:20, United States v. Randall, 19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. \n335. Because statistical rigor is not a useful method for evaluating the reliability of qualitative \nresearch like Dr. \nstatistical tools like error rates are irrelevant to the Daubers analysis. \nContrary to the defendant's next claim, these opinions are not \"impregnable for purposes \nof cross examination.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The \ndefendant is free to cross Dr. \non how frequently she sees grooming in her patients and \nhow she evaluates whether they are telling the truth. The defendant is also free to explore, in cross \nexamination, the difficulties in assessing whether a patient has been groomed. The defense can \nalso make arguments—in cross examination and in jury addresses—about the lack of quantitative \nrigor in this qualitative \n... [truncated, 2092 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/17 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=17]", "char_count": 2092}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "evidence, to evaluate what weight to give it. But that does not change whether Dr. \nopinions are squarely within the mainstream of psychological practice. \nThe defendant next argues that Dr. \npatients are \"self-selected,\" and she has not \nestablished the \"representativeness of her patients as typical victims of so-called grooming \nbehavior.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 7). But the defendant makes no argument that the minor victims in this \ncase are distinctive in some way such that general principles of psychology may diverge as to \nthem. And in any event, that argument is for the jury to evaluate, and not a basis to preclude Dr. \n...testimony. \nSee Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. at 36:13-37:5, United States v. Randall, 19 Cr. 131 \n(PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 335 (rejecting a defense attempt to distinguish between native-born \nand domestic-born women because, \"while a court is to be a gatekeeper as to reliability so as to \nkeep `junk science' away from juries, the Court must not overstep that role. Whether or not the \nCourt would be persuaded that adult native-born women can be subject to trauma bonding, the \nCourt is not to arrogate to itself that judgment.\") \nFinally, the defendant argues that Dr. \nhas no experience treating perpetrators of \nsexual assault, so she cannot testify as to the psychology of perpetrators and their \"so-called \n`grooming' techniques.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 7-8). Many of the opinions the defendant challenges \nconcern the experiences of victims, not perpetrators. Dr. \nwill testify about the pattern to \nwhich \"minor victims are often subject,\" which makes \"victims vulnerable to abuse,\" and builds \ntheir \"trust and attachment with their abuser.\" (Expert Notice, Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2 (emphasis \nadded)). Grooming creates in the victims \"a relationship of trust and attachment\" that \"can prevent \nvictims from being aware that what they are experiencing is abuse and can prevent disclosure. (Id. \n18 \nEFTA00088820\n", "char_count": 1934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "(emphasis added)). Dr. \ntestimony will also include discussion of techniques used by \nperpetrators. Dr. Rocchio's testimony regarding such techniques is supported by Dr. \nreview of the relevant literature, see Exhibit A, and through her clinical work. By virtue of her \nexperience treating victims, Dr. \nis necessarily informed about perpetrators' actions. See \nHalamek, 5 F.4th at 1088 (\"Extensive experience interviewing victims can qualify a person to \ntestify about the relationships those victims tend to have with their abusers.\"). Dr. \nwill \ntestify squarely within her expertise and experience.;\nb. Relevance and Rule 403 \nDr. \nopinions will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence at trial. \nThis case concerns an \"unusual area of human interaction.\" See Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. at 39:8-9, United \nStates v. Randall, 19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 335. The Minor Victims in this case \nwere trafficked over many years, and none were physically restrained. An average juror, with no \nexperience with sexual abuse victims, may not understand why the Minor Victims continued to \n3 In United States v. Raniere, No. 18 Cr. 204 (NGG), 2019 WL 2212639 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2019), \nJudge Garaufis questioned whether an expert on grooming with experience focused on victims \nmay have been able to testify reliably about how \"perpetrators often use `grooming' techniques on \nadult and child victims . . .\" Id. at *7. Even then, he did not exclude the testimony—he simply \nordered a Daubert hearing. Id. at *8. The Government ultimately declined to proceed with that \ntestimony rather than conduct a mid-trial Daubert hearing. Here, and as noted above, Dr. \nproposed testimony concerns the experience of manipulated and coerced victims, rather \nthan the intentions of perpetrators. \n19 \nEFTA00088821\n", "char_count": 1810}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "return to Epstein's home for sexual abuse, or why some occasionally expressed affection for the \ndefendant and Epstein. \nAlthough Dr. \nwill not testify about these specific Minor Victims, her testimony \nwill help the jurors understand the \"psychological dynamic often seen in abusive relationships that \nleads an abuse victim to behave in counterintuitive ways, such as by declining to take opportunities \nto leave an abusive situation or by expressing gratitude to an abuser.\" Torres, 2021 WL 1947503, \nat *7. This psychological dynamic between a victim of child sexual abuse and her abusers is \n\"beyond the knowledge of the average juror and would or could plainly be helpful in understanding \nthe psychological dynamics at play.\" Oct. 17, 2019 Tr. at 27:3-7, United States v. Dupigny, No. \n18 Cr. 528 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 198; cf. See Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. at 38:13-20, United States \nv. Randall, 19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 335 (\"[B]y and large the relationship between \nprostitutes and pimps is not the subject of common knowledge. Jurors are not apt to intuitively \nunderstand the mechanisms that may lead a woman who is not physically restrained or confined \nto heed the demands of a pimp to traffic herself.\"). Accordingly, Dr. testimony \nwill \nhelp the jury understand and contextualize the other testimony it will hear.' \nThe defendant expresses concern that a lay jury will be unable to apply Dr. \nanalyses to the facts of this case, stating \"[t]hat is not how Rule 702 works.\" (Def. Mot. at 10). \nRelying again on Raymond, the District of Maine case, the defendant argues that expert testimony \nabout \"general principles is helpful only when it `describes widely recognized and highly \npredictable and verifiable phenomena.' (Def. Mot. 10 (quoting Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 150 \nn.12 (alterations omitted)). That proposition comes from footnote 12 of Raymond, which \nattempted to distinguish that expert's \"profile\" testimony from the Federal Rules Advisory \nCommittee's obs\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/20 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=20]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "That is precisely how Rule 702 works in cases where experts testify about general principles, which \nthe Rule contemplates. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee note (\"[I]t might also be \nimportant in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without \never attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case.\"). Dr. \nwill \nprovide reliable opinions about principles of coercion and attachment in abusive relationships that \nwill help the jury understand the psychological factors underlying the relationships that the jury \nwill learn about at trial. \nFinally, the defendant argues that the Court should preclude Dr. aestimony \nunder \nRule 403. In so arguing, she expresses concern that Dr. \ntestimony will \"'radically \nsimplify' an otherwise complex case\" by \"Toist[ing] a damning teleology on a series of actions \neach of which might have been motivated by a variety of ends or no ends at all.\"' (Def. Mot. at \n11 (quoting United States v. Burns, No. 07 Cr. 556, 2009 WL 3617448, at *5 (N.D. III. Oct. 27, \n2009)).5 There is nothing prejudicial or simple about Dr. \ntestimony. The jury will not \nconclude that the defendant is guilty because Dr. \nexplains that acts which \"might have \nbeen motivated by a variety of ends\" are sometimes part of the process of sexual abuse. Whether \nexpert testimony to educate the factfinder on general principles.\" Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at \n150 n.12 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee note). The defendant cites no place \ncontaining this limitation in the text of the Rule, its advisory committee notes, Daubers, or the law \nof this Circuit or District. Nor does it make sense on its own terms: \"how financial markets respond \nto corporate reports\" or the \"principles of thermodynamics\" are sometimes highly predictable, but \nnot always, depending on the context. \n5 Burns, a case about a district court's application at sentencing of a Guidelines enhancement, says \nnothing about whether th\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/21 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=21]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "they were in this case will depend on the other evidence. That is not a prejudicial simplification—\nthat is the trial. \nThere is nothing unreliable, irrelevant, or unusual about Dr. \nopinion on coercion \nand attachment. Drawing on her decades of clinical experience and her familiarity with the \nrelevant literature, Dr. \nwill give opinion testimony that will help the jury understand \nwitness testimony. That is all Rule 702's gatekeeping requirements demand. \n2. Dr. \nOpinion on the Relationship Between Trust and Victim Awareness \nof Their Abuse is Admissible \nAt trial, the Government intends to offer Dr. \ntestimony about how victims \nprocess their abuse and how that can prevent or delay disclosure. As the Government set forth in \nits expert notice, Dr. \nwill testify that: \nThe relationship of trust and attachment can prevent victims from \nbeing aware that what they are experiencing is abuse and can prevent \ndisclosure. Minor victims therefore may not identify themselves as \nvictims of abuse while it is ongoing, and may not recognize the \nconsequences of that abuse until adulthood. \n(Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2). This opinion is part and parcel of Dr. \nother opinions about the \nrelationship between attachment and coercion. Specifically, and as noted above, victims develop \nrelationships of trust and attachment with their abusers that leave victims vulnerable to coercion. \nThis opinion adds that, as part of this relationship, victims may not recognize that they are \nexperiencing abuse and may not see themselves as victims while they are in this relationship, and \ntherefore may not disclose their abuse or recognize the consequences of their abuse until later in \nlife. As the defense correctly observes, this opinion is intertwined with Dr. \nopinions \nabout coercion and attachment. (Def. Mo. 3 at 12). Just as those are reliable, so is this one. \n22 \nEFTA00088824\n", "char_count": 1883}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "The defense argues that this opinion is outside Dr. \nexpertise because she has \"no \nexperience treating alleged perpetrators,\" so \"her view ... is entirely one-sided.\" (Id.). As is clear \nfrom the above excerpt, her testimony is about largely about trust and attachment built in victims, \nand the resultant ways in which victims process abuse. But she is also an expert in the actions and \ntechniques of perpetrators through her review of the literature and the lens of what she has learned \nthrough victims. This opinion is therefore squarely within Dr. \nexpertise. \nFinally, the defendant argues that this testimony violates Rule 704, because it is an \"opinion \nthat the alleged victims in this case are testifying truthfully,\" and 403, because it \"risks jurors \naccepting her `expert' opinion as gospel at the expense of their duty to evaluate the evidence.\" \n(Def. Mot. 3 at 13). Dr. as \nnot evaluated the victims in this case and will not express an \nopinion as to whether they are testifying truthfully. And the defense motion is entirely unclear on \nthe features of this expert opinion that create risk that the jurors would abdicate their \nresponsibilities. To the contrary, the defense concerns underscore how relevant this opinion will \nbe in aiding the jurors in understanding the testimony at trial. \n3. Dr. \nOpinion on the Long-Term Consequences of Abuse is Admissible \nDr. \nwill also testify that \"[r]epeated exploitation and abuse can increase the \nlikelihood of victimization later in life and can result in long-term traumatic and psychological \nconsequences, especially when it occurs in the context of complex trauma.\" (Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at \n2). As Dr. Sill \nexplain, and as is detailed in her Jencks Act material6, experiencing child \n6 The Government produced Dr. Jencks \nAct material to the defense at the time of the \nexpert notice. (See Def. Mot.\n2 (\"The Government is producing notes from the \nGovernment's interviews with Dr. \noday as well.\")). \n23 \nEFTA00088825\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "sexual abuse can lead to a variety of psychological difficulties, including substance use and \nparticipation in risky sexual behavior. Complex trauma—trauma involving repetitive or prolonged \nexposure to or experiences of multiple traumatic stressors, involving harm or abandonment by \ntrusted adults, and occurring at developmentally vulnerable times—can lead to various \npsychological consequences, including dysregulation in emotional control, difficulties in \nrelationships or with behavioral control, and distorted perceptions of the self and others. \nThis opinion is highly relevant. It is likely that jurors will not be intimately familiar with \nthe consequences of child sexual abuse. Accordingly, the causal connection between these \npsychological problems and child sexual abuse is outside the experience of the average juror. Yet \nthat information will aid the jury in two respects: First, it will help jurors assess the credibility of \nMinor Victims, to the extent they have had some of these psychological symptoms or had other \ndifficulties described by Dr. \nin the years since their abuse. For instance, the Government \nexpects the defense to attack the credibility of a Minor Victim by cross0-examining her about her \nsubstance abuse. Dr. \ntestimony will provide the jury with a fuller picture by showing \nthat substance abuse can be a consequence of sexual trauma. Second, experiencing certain \npsychological difficulties is consistent with past child sexual abuse and complex trauma. It is \nevidence that Minor Victims in fact experienced child sexual abuse that they suffered known \nconsequences of such abuse. See Raniere, 2019 WL 2212639, at *3, *7 (admitting expert \n24 \nEFTA00088826\n", "char_count": 1706}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "testimony that \"sexual assault can result in severe, long-lasting and wide-ranging psychological \nconsequences and related difficulties\"). \nThe defendant argues that this evidence is nonetheless prejudicial because it will inflame \nthe passions and emotions of the jury. (Def. Mot. 3 at 14). The Minor Victims, however, will be \nthe ones testifying about the abuse they experienced and observed, and—whether on direct or \ncross—about the psychological consequences of their experiences. The question is only whether \nthe jury will hear from an expert about the causal connection between those two concepts—\ntestimony about concepts not specifically applied to any victim, and testimony about a causal \nconnection whose reliability the defense does not challenge. There is nothing inflammatory about \nthis expert testimony, much less something sufficiently prejudicial to substantially outweigh the \nprobative value of the testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. \n4. Dr. \nOpinion About the Significance of the Presence of Third Parties is \nAdmissi e \nAs noted above, Dr. \nwill opine that \"[t]he presence of other individuals can \nfacilitate the sexual abuse of minors.\" (Def. Mot. 3 Ex. I at 2). For instance, and as Dr. \nwill explain, the presence of a third party can disarm an intended victim and make perpetrators \nappear safe and trustworthy, or can create a false sense of security on the part of a minor victim \nthat sexualized situations are normal and acceptable. Based on her experience as a clinician, Dr. \nwill testify that young children in particular often feel more comfortable in the presence \nof a woman. \nThe defendant objects to this testimony on the grounds that it concerns a lay matter \"which \na jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 14 \n25 \nEFTA00088827\n", "char_count": 1822}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Dr. \nhowever, is not testifying about \ncommon experience or from common experience. Her testimony stems from her clinical \nexperience, and it concerns the psychological experiences of victims when a third person is present \nduring parts of their sexual abuse, as part of her broader opinion on attachment and coercion. The \naverage juror will not have knowledge of or experience in the psychology of abuse victims, and \nDr. =testimony \nwill aid their understanding. \nThe defendant relatedly seeks to preclude Dr. \nfrom testifying about \"grooming-\nby-proxy,\" a term which appears nowhere in the Government's expert notice. (Def. Mot. 3 at 9). \nBy that term, the defendant appears to argue that Dr. \nwill opine that an individual can \ngroom a victim for abuse by another perpetrator, and that such an opinion is unreliable and \n\"prejudicial speculation.\" (Id.). This argument misses the mark in three respects. First, Dr. \nestimony primarily concerns the experience of victims, not perpetrators, as explained \nabove. If the victim experienced attachment and grooming, it makes no analytical difference \nwhether the perpetrator intends to engage in sexual contact with the victim or, instead, is preparing \nthe victim for abuse by a third party. See Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. at 31:1-34:12, United States v. Randall, \n19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 335 (explaining that, where there is a \"reliable basis for \ntesti[mony] about trauma bonding and coercive control as phenomena that exist more broadly,\" \nthe expert may testify, and defendants \"are at liberty to vigorously cross-examine [the expert] to \nattempt to cabin or limit trauma bonding and coercive control to populations predominately outside \nof the alleged victims in this case\"). Indeed, expert testimony is commonly offered in sex \ntrafficking cases on the pimp-prostitute relationship, which is specifically designed to permit the \n26 \nEFTA00088828\n", "char_count": 1959}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "pimp to arrange sex acts for third parties. See, e.g., Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 263; Oct. 17, 2019 \nTr. at 27:1-12, United States v. Dupigny, No. 18 Cr. 528 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 198. Second, \nin any event, the Government did not provide expert notice on \"grooming by proxy.\" Dr. \nwill give an opinion on grooming, and she will discuss how \"[t]he presence of other individuals \ncan facilitate the sexual abuse of minors.\" (Expert Notice, Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2). The former is \na reliable opinion, as explained above, and the defendant does not challenge the reliability of the \nlatter opinion. (See Def. Mot. 3 at 14). Third, trial testimony will show that the defendant (1) in \nfact participated in sexual abuse of minors, (2) facilitated that abuse through her presence, and (3) \nconspired with a predator who groomed and sexually abused minors. None of that involves \n\"grooming by proxy.\" \n5. Dr. \n)pinion on Delayed Disclosure is Admissible \nFinally, Dr. \nwill offer the opinion that \"nondisclosure, incremental disclosure, and \nsecrecy are common among victims of sexual abuse for a variety of reasons, and that memory and \ndisclosure of traumatic or abusive events is impacted by a number of factors, including the \ncircumstances surrounding the trauma.\" (Def. Mot. 3 Ex. 1 at 2). \nMuch of the basis for this opinion is set forth in Dr. \nJencks Act material. For \ninstance, extensive psychological literature supports the idea that individuals who are harmed as \nchildren may come to disclose their experiences incrementally or not until much later, as they may \nonly realize that their experiences were abusive later in life, among other reasons. Selected articles \nfrom that literature are attached as Exhibit B. See Alaggia et al., \"Facilitators and Barriers to Child \nSexual Abuse (CSA) Disclosures: A Research Update (2000-2016),\" 20 Trauma, Violence & \nAbuse 260, 276 (2016) (\"Disclosure is now generally accepted as a complex and lifelong process, \n27 \nEFTA00088829\n", "char_count": 1985}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "with current trends showing that CSA disclosures are too often delayed until adulthood\"); \nMcElvaney, \"Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: Delays, Non-disclosure, and Partial Disclosure,\" \n24 Child Abuse Rev. 159, 160 (2015) (There is consensus in the research literature that most people \nwho experience sexual abuse in childhood do not disclose this abuse until adulthood, and when \ndisclosure does occur in childhood, significant delays are common.\"); Bicanic et al., \"Predictors \nof delayed disclosure of rape in female adolescents and young adults,\" 6 Euro. J. of \nPsychotraumatology 25883 (2015) (listing among the predictors of delayed disclosure \"age \ncategory 12-17 years\"). Children who do disclose may choose to share information with a peer, \nbut are less likely to go to an adult. Especially where a child has been groomed, the perpetrator \nhas become a trusted adult for a child, reducing the likelihood of the child's disclosure. \nIncremental disclosure depends on a variety of factors, including how safe the victim feels with \nthe recipient of the disclosure, how voluntary the disclosure is, and psychological factors that may \nprevent the victim from accessing their full memories. Victims may also experience significant \nshame or self-blame that prevents them from sharing certain information, and they may still be \nattached to the perpetrators, such that they try to protect the perpetrators. \nSexual abuse also impacts the way memory is encoded. In traumatic circumstances, often \nonly the most salient details are encoded, and over time, specific details may be lost. With \ntraumatic memory in particular, adrenaline and cortisol responses in the context of fear and trauma \ncause people to narrow their focus to the most salient and relevant details. If someone is abused \nmultiple times or by multiple people, it is very common for memories of similar occurrences to \n28 \nEFTA00088830\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "jumble together, although the victim can remember the perpetrator and maybe some of the \nlocations where the abuse occurred. \nTaken together, Dr. \nexpert testimony explains why victims of child sexual \nabuse—and especially repeated sexual abuse—may disclose their abuse in a delayed and \nincremental fashion, and why their memories may lack some level of detail when the disclosure \nfinally occurs. \nThe defendant argues that testimony about delayed disclosure is unreliable, repeating some \nof the defendant's earlier arguments about whether the testimony is \"based entirely on her \ntreatment of a self-selected group of individuals she assumes are telling the truth\" and how the \nopinion lacks an error rate. (Def. Mot. 3 at 15). Here, as with her opinions on attachment and \ncoercion, Dr. \nis testifying based on her training, clinical experience, thid the academic \nliterature. See Exhibit B. That victims of childhood sexual abuse delay disclosure is a well-\nestablished phenomenon the fact of which—though not the underlying psychological \nexplanation—is readily visible in the news. See also 2 Mod. Sci. Evid. § 19:15 (explaining that \n\"a large literature over the years has demonstrated that individuals frequently fail to disclose \nautobiographical information in numerous different settings,\" including disclosure of \"episodes of \nsexual abuse\"). \nCourts have specifically authorized experts to provide testimony on delayed disclosure. \nSee, e.g., United States v. Gaudet, 933 F.3d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2019) (\"Moreover, the government \nprovided expert testimony from Dr. Ann Burgess .. . in which she testified that delayed disclosures \nare `[v]ery common' in abuse victims and stem from the way the brain processes, stores, and recalls \n29 \nEFTA00088831\n", "char_count": 1765}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "traumatic experiences\" (second alteration in original)); Raniere, 2019 WL 2212639, at *3, *7 \n(admitting expert testimony that \"disclosure by sexual assault victims often unfolds over time, and \nthe process of disclosure is influenced by multiple and changing factors including, but not limited \nto, the specific characteristics of the experience, the victim's psychological vulnerabilities, the \nvictim's relationship to her perpetrator and her pattern of recovery and coping\"); United States v. \nYoung, 623 F. App'x 863, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2015) (\"[The expert] testified that . . . delayed \ndisclosures, piecemeal disclosures and/or even recanted disclosures are coping mechanisms. . . . \n[The expert]'s testimony was helpful and probative because [the defendant] had attacked the \nvictims' credibility based on their delayed and incomplete reports of abuse.\" (citations and internal \nquotation marks omitted)); United States v. Belcher, 534 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2008) (\"In this \ncase, Dr. Levitt's testimony as to delayed disclosure helped the jury understand why the girls did \nnot reveal they had been photographed until they were confronted with the images.\"). \nThe defendant suggests that Dr.= \nopinions on delayed disclosure are not helpful \nto the jury because they are too generic. As set forth here and more fully in Dr. \ntencks \nAct material, Dr. \nhas elaborated on her opinions about the relationship between child \nsexual abuse and traumatic memory.' The defendant adds that, because Dr.M \nopinion is \nthat delayed disclosure is consistent with sexual abuse but not a necessary consequence of sexual \nabuse, jurors have no means to determine whether a Minor Victim is lying or telling the truth \nGM\n7 The defendant also argues that Dr. \nis not an expert in \"the human brain or memory \ngenerally.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 17). The overnment agrees. But Dr. \ns an expert in trauma \npsychology, which includes related issues of memory. \n30 \nEFTA00088832\n", "char_count": 1958}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "(Def. Mot. 3 at 16). This argument misunderstands the role of the jury. Jurors are not tasked \nmerely with applying Dr. \nexpertise to facts. The jury will hear testimony that some \nMinor Victims did not immediately disclose their sexual abuse. When evaluating the credibility \nof those delayed disclosures, they will have the benefit of observing the Minor Victims' testimony, \nincluding their cross-examination which is sure to address their delayed disclosure, and the Minor \nVictims' explanation for those delays. The jury will also hear general testimony from Dr. \nabout various circumstances that may lead victims of sexual abuse to delay disclosure. In the \ntotality of the circumstances, the jury can then decide who it finds credible. \nThe defendant also argues it is prejudicial to her that Dr. \nsuggests \"that delayed \nreporting is more consistent with truthfulness than fabrication, a determination which the jury must \nmake for itself.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 17). It is unclear how the defendant can simultaneously argue \nthat (1) Dr. \nestimony improperly assumes the role of the jury by suggesting that delayed \nreporting is \"more consistent\" with child sexual abuse (id.); and (2) Dr. \ntestimony would \nonly help the jury if she resolved any ambiguity by saying that delayed reporting is a necessary \nconsequence of child sexual abuse (id. at 15-16). \nFinally, according to the defendant, Dr. \narguments will only prejudice the \ndefendant, because it will serve to bolster the witnesses' credibility. As the defense acknowledges, \nhowever, Dr. \nwill not offer an opinion regarding any specific victim, and she has not \nevaluated any victims in this case. (Cf. Def. Mot. 3 at 16 (citing United States v. Charley, 189 \nF.3d 1251, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1999), in which the expert opined that the victims were in fact \nabused based \"largely on crediting the girls' account,\" thereby \"vouching for their truthfulness\"). \n31 \nEFTA00088833\n", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Instead, the Government will seek to offer Dr. \ntestimony as background in this case. \n\"Dauber! instructs that vigorous cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence are \nthe central tools available to an adversary who wishes to debunk an expert's testimony.\" Randall, \n19 Cr. 131 (PAE), Dkt. No. 335 at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dauber!, 509 U.S. \nat 594-595). Thus, to the extent the defendant wishes to cast doubt on the applicability of Dr. \nbackground testimony, she is free to do so through cross-examination or by offering \ncontrary evidence. As discussed above, Dr. \ntestimony is relevant to helping the jury \nunderstand key issues in the case, like why the Minor Victims may have returned to the defendant \nand Epstein without being physically forced to do so, and why they delayed disclosure. \n* * * \nThe parties agree that Dr. \nis a qualified expert. Her opinions are well within the \nrange of reasonable expert opinions, and so are sufficiently reliable to go to the jury. And they \nwill aid the jury in evaluating other testimony in this case. That is enough for the Court to admit \nDr. Rocchio's testimony. \nH. \nThe Evidence Contained in the Government's October 11, 2021 Letter is \nAdmissible \nOn October 11, 2021, the Government notified the defense of certain evidence it may offer \nat trial. In particular, the letter addressed \nand the expected testimony of one potential \nwitness. (See October 11, 2021 Letter, Def. Mot. 2 Ex. A). As the Government explained in its \nletter to the defense, the evidence constitutes direct evidence of the charged offenses, but the \nGovernment provided notice under Rule 404(b) in the alternative. That same day, the Government \nprovided the defense with \nalong with copies of all other marked Government \n32 \nEFTA00088834\n", "char_count": 1809}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "exhibits, all of which were in the Government's discovery productions. The Government also \nprovided the defense with Jencks Act materials for all trial witnesses that same day, including \ndetailed notes and reports of the Government's interviews of the witness referenced in the letter. \nThe defendant now moves to exclude this evidence, arguing, among other things, that the \nGovernment has not provided sufficient notice of the evidence it intends to offer at trial under Rule \n404(b). For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion lacks merit, and should be denied. \nThe Government has provided detailed notice, well in advance of trial. This evidence is admissible \non multiple grounds, and the jury should be permitted to consider it. \nA. Applicable Law \nRelevant evidence is \"not confined to that which directly establishes an element of the \ncrime.\" United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1997). As the Second Circuit has \nexplained, \"(t]o be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the government's case, and evidence \nthat adds context and dimension to the government's proof of the charges can have that tendency.\" \nId.; accord United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit has \nrepeatedly held that actions and statements are admissible as direct evidence of the crimes charged, \nand are \"not considered other crimes evidence under\" Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), if (a) they \n\"arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,\" (b) they are \n\"inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense,\" or (c) they are \n\"necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.\" Carboni, 204 F.3d at 44; see also United \nStates v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90, 93-94 \n(2d Cir. 2003). In those circumstances, the uncharged crimes evidence is \"appropriately treated \n33 \nEFTA00088835\n", "char_count": 1956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "as part of the very act charged, or, at least, proof of that act.\" Quinones, 511 F.3d at 309 (internal \ncitations and quotations marks omitted). \nFederal Rule of Evidence 404(b) allows for the admission of uncharged crimes, wrongs, or \nother acts for purposes other than proving criminal propensity, \"such as proving motive, \nopportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of \naccident.\" Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The Second Circuit \"has long adopted an inclusionary' approach \nto the admission of uncharged crime evidence, under which evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or \nacts is admissible for any purpose other than to show a defendant's criminal propensity.\" United \nStates v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the \ndefendant claims her conduct has an innocent explanation, the admission of such evidence of other \nacts is particularly appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. \n1993) (\"Where a defendant claims that his conduct has an innocent explanation, prior act evidence \nis generally admissible to prove that the defendant acted with the state of mind necessary to commit \nthe offense charged.\"). Where evidence is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), it may \nonly be excluded if the probative value of the evidence is \"substantially outweighed\" by the danger \nof unfair prejudice. Id. at 1182; see Fed. R. Evid. 403. \nUntil December I, 2020, the Government was required to provide \"reasonable notice of \nthe general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial.\" Fed. R. Evid. \n404(b)(2)(A) (2011). On December 1, 2020, the rule was amended (the \"2020 Amendments\") to \nrequire the Government to also \"articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the \nprosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that supports the purpose.\" Fed. R. \n34 \nEFTA00088836\n", "char_count": 1952}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Evid. 404(b)(3)(B) (2020). The 2020 Amendments also removed language permitting notice of \nthe \"general nature\" of the evidence. \nThese amendments are \"relatively modest.\" Wright & Miller, \"2020 Amendments to Rule \n404(b),\" 22B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5242.1 (2d ed.). They simply require the prosecutor to \n\"articulate a non-propensity purpose for which the evidence is offered and the basis for concluding \nthat the evidence is relevant in light of this purpose.\" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) Advisory \nCommittee note). The other act evidence should also be \"described with helpful specificity.\" Id. \nB. Discussion \nTo be clear, in the Government's view, the exhibits and testimony discussed in the \nGovernment's October 11, 2021 letter are direct evidence of the offenses charged, such that they \ndo not need to be admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b). And although notice was not required under \nRule 404(b), the Government has provided the defense with notice substantially in advance of trial. \nThe Court should admit this evidence, regardless of whether Rule 404(b) applies. \n1. The Evidence is Admissible As Direct Evidence, or in the Alternative, Under Rule \n404(b) \nThe Government's October 11 letter identified seven exhibits and one witness whose \nstatements are admissible as direct evidence, or in the alternative under Rule 404(b). (See October \nII, 2021 Letter, Def. Mot. 2 Ex. A at 1). More specifically, the letter explained that the \nGovernment may offer at tria \nmarked as Government Exhibits 401 through 404, \n409 through 410, and 413. In addition, the Government notified the defense that it may call as a \nwitness an individual (\"Employee-1\") who worked for Jeffrey Epstein \nimmediately \n35 \nEFTA00088837\n", "char_count": 1732}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "following the charged conduct. Both categories of evidence are admissible as direct evidence of \nthe charged conduct, or in the alternative under Rule 404(b). \na. Government Exhibits 401 through 404, 409 through 410, and 413 \nTurning first to the exhibits, the Government has notified the defense that it intends to offer \n(October 11, 2021 Letter, Def. Mot. 2 Ex. A at 1). \n36 \nEFTA00088838\n", "char_count": 392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "But the jury could easily draw different inferences from these exhibits. The \nexhibits go directly to the defendant's intent and motive, because they show \nAccordingly, these exhibits are probative of the issues the jury will be asked to resolve at \ntrial and should be admitted as direct evidence of the charged crimes.9 In the alternative, this \nevidence is probative of the defendant's motive, intent, plan, and knowledge, and should be \nadmitted pursuant to Rule 404(b)(2). \n8 The remaining exhibits identified in the Government's October 11, 2021 letter are necessary to \nidentify the parties to the emails. \n9 This evidence would also be admissible to rebut defense arguments concerning similar topics, \nand in cross-examination of the defendant. \n37 \nEFTA00088839\n", "char_count": 771}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "only highlights that this evidence does \"not involve conduct any more \nsensational or disturbing than the crimes with which [the defendant] was charged,\" which weighs \nin favor of admitting these exhibits under Rule 404(b)(2). United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 \nF.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). \nb. Testimony of Employee-1 \nEmployee-1 worked as a personal assistant for Epstein for approximately \n(October 11, 2021 Letter, Def. Mot. 2 Ex. A at 1). During that time, Employee-1 \nreported directly to another employee (\"Employee-2\"), who worked for Epstein during the \ntimeframe of the charged conspiracy, and who is referenced in the Second Superseding Indictment \n(the Indictment\"). (ECF No. 187, ¶r 6, 7(b)). The Government expects that Employee-1 will \ntestify about Employee-1's observations of the close relationship between the defendant and \nEpstein. \nIndeed, Employee-1 will testify that Employee-1 worked out of the defendant's \ntownhouse in Manhattan during the weeks that Employee-1 worked in New York City. The \nGovernment also expects Employee-1 to testify about her observations at Epstein's properties, \nincluding observations of minor girls at the properties, as well as her knowledge of Epstein's \npractice to arrange multiple sexualized massages per day. In addition, although Employee-1's \nemployment post-dates the defendant's conduct with the victims in this case, Employee-1 became \nfamiliar with certain items in Epstein's residences during her tenure there, and thus Employee-1 \nwill authenticate certain exhibits relating to the Minor Victims. Finally, the Government expects \n38 \nEFTA00088840\n", "char_count": 1617}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Employee-1 to testify that in or about October 2005, Epstein and her supervisor directed her to \ngather the computers and contact books in the house and hand them over to a specified individual. \nEmployee-I's testimony is admissible for multiple permissible purposes. Her testimony \nshows the relationship between Epstein and the defendant \nshortly after the end of the \nconspiracy period, including the defendant's role in Epstein's affairs. Similarly, it provides \nbackground information about the operation of Epstein's homes and lifestyle. Employee-1's \ntestimony will also show the defendant and Epstein's plan and preparation, because it will describe \nthe process and frequency of obtaining masseuses, including the fact that the masseuses were often \nunderage girls, and that some of the massages developed into sexual abuse. And Employee-1 's \ntestimony tends to show the defendant's knowledge, because it describes the visibility of Epstein's \nabuse to individuals at his properties. Finally, Employee-1's testimony will authenticate exhibits \nthat are direct evidence of the charged crimes. Accordingly, Employee-I's testimony is direct \nevidence of the crimes charged. Moreover, this evidence is admissible in the alternative under \nRule 404(b), for substantially the same reasons. \n2. The Government Has Met and Exceeded Its Notice Obligations \nEven if Rule 404(b) applies here, the Government's October 11, 2021 letter—and the \ncorresponding Jencks Act disclosures—have satisfied any notice obligations that apply here. \nThe defense claims that the Government's October 11, 2021 notice was inadequate in light \nof the 2020 amendments to Rule 404(b). The Government provided the defense with a letter, and \ncorresponding disclosures, seven weeks before trial. In fact, the defense has had the seven exhibits \nfor much longer, since they were part of the Government's Rule 16 discovery productions. The \ndefense now also has this briefing, five weeks before trial. Thus, any alleged gap i\n... [truncated, 2024 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/39 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=39]", "char_count": 2024}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Government's notice is remediated by this brief. This is ample notice of the possible Rule 404(b) \nevidence in this case. Indeed, the Rule only requires that the defense receive notice \"before trial,\" \nor even \"during trial... for good cause.\" Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3)(C). \nThe defense claims, without supporting authority, that Rule 404(b) requires heightened \nnotice that cannot be satisfied here without, essentially, a script of all of the proposed testimony at \ntrial accompanied by detailed expositions of the Government's case-in-chief. (Def. Mot. 2 at 4-\n5). But the Government has provided the defense with marked exhibits and comprehensive Jencks \nAct materials of the single witness subject to this motion (approximately 400 pages) \"unusually \nearly\" (Endorsed Letter at 3, Dkt. No. 353), along with a letter specifically highlighting the \nproffered evidence at trial. That is all that is required, and the defendant cannot leverage the notice \nrequirements of Rule 404(b) to preclude this evidence at trial. Indeed, the \"Second Circuit \ngenerally disfavors the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence on technical grounds.\" Hart v. \nBHH, LLC, No. 15 Civ. 4804 (WHP), 2019 WL 1494027, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2019) (citing \nRodriguez v. Vill. Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 47 (2d Cir. 2015)). Accordingly, the only judge \nin this District to consider a similar situation concluded that the Government's Rule 404(b) notice \nwas sufficient in combination with the Government's motion papers. See United States v. \nChandler, No. 19 Cr. 867 (PKC), 2021 WL 1851996, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2021). \nThe defense vaguely asserts that it cannot perform an independent investigation into the \nRule 404(b) evidence due to the inadequacy of the Government's notice. (Def. Mot. 2 at 5-6). \nThat conclusory assertion cannot support a motion to preclude the jury from hearing evidence of \nthe defendant's guilt. The defense has not identified any specific way that they have been hampered \n40 \nEFT\n... [truncated, 2010 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/40 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=40]", "char_count": 2010}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "in their ability to investigate or move in limine. The Government's Rule 404(b) notice—and this \nbrief—have been provided far in advance of trial. In many cases, the Government gives Rule \n404(b) notice two weeks before trial, and here the Government's notice concerns a small number \nof exhibits and only one witness. See, e.g., United States v. Tranquillo, 606 F. Supp. 2d 370, 383 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"The Government has indicated that it will make the required disclosure two \nweeks prior to trial, a practice that typically comports with Rule 404(b).\"); United States v. Fennell, \n496 F. Supp. 2d 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (\"The government has in good faith noted its obligations \nunder Rule 404(b), and indicated that it intends to provide notice of the 404(b) evidence it intends \nto introduce two weeks before the beginning of trial. There is therefore no need to issue the order \nDefendant seeks.\"). The Government has identified the specific evidence it will seek to admit—\nnot just the types of evidence—and has explained the connection between that evidence and non-\npropensity purposes for which it will be offered. That is all Rule 404(b) requires. \nIII. \nThe Testimony of Minor Victim-3 is Admissible \nThe defendant has moved to exclude evidence related to Minor Victim-3. This is nothing \nmore than an attempt to seek reconsideration of the Court's pretrial order denying the defense's \nmotion to strike Minor Victim-3 from the Indictment. Evidence of the defendant and Jeffrey \nEpstein's abuse of Minor Victim-3 is direct evidence of the offense charged in the Indictment, \nincluding the overt acts in the Indictment that pertain to Minor Victim-3. And in any event, her \ntestimony would easily satisfy the requirements of Rule 404(b). \nA. Background \nBoth the first and second superseding indictments described the defendant and Epstein's \nsexual abuse of Minor Victim-3. As set forth in the Indictment, the defendant \"groomed and \n41 \nEFTA00088843\n", "char_count": 1964}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "befriended Minor Victim-3 in London, England between approximately 1994 and 1995, including \nduring a period of time in which [the defendant] knew that Minor Victim-3 was under the age of \n18.\" (Indictment ¶ 9(c)). The defendant \"introduced Minor Victim-3 to Epstein and arranged for \nmultiple interactions between Minor Victim-3 and Epstein,\" during which the defendant \n\"encouraged Minor Victim-3 to massage Epstein, knowing that Epstein would engage in sex acts \nwith Minor Victim-3 during those massages.\" (Id.) Minor Victim-3 provided those massages, \nduring which Epstein sexually abused Minor Victim-3. (Id.) Two overt acts in those Indictments \nconcerned the defendant and Epstein's sexual abuse of Minor Victim-3 in London. (Id. ¶¶ 13(d), \n19(d)). \nThe defendant moved to strike the portions of the S I Indictment involving Minor Victim-\n3, arguing that the events involving Minor Victim-3 were unrelated to the conspiracies charged in \nCount One and Count Three. (See generally Mem. of Law, Dkt. No. 146). In response, the \nGovernment explained that the defendant and Epstein's \"interactions with Minor Victim-3 were \npart of a broader scheme and agreement to entice and transport minor victims with the intent to \ncommit illegal sex acts,\" and in any event, admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of the \ndefendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi. (Gov't Opp. at 157-169, Dkt. No. 204). The \nGovernment expects Minor Victim-3 to testify, in substance and in part, that she met the defendant \nwhen she was \nThe defendant befriended Minor Victim-3 by, among other things, \ndiscussing Minor Victim-3's life and family with Minor Victim-3. \n42 \nEFTA00088844\n", "char_count": 1675}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "The Court denied the defendant's prior motion to strike portions of the Indictment related \nto Minor Victim-3 (Op. & Order at 33, Dkt. No. 207), explaining that it was premature to strike \nany language from the Indictment, because Minor Victim-3's allegations \"may reflect conduct \n43 \nEFTA00088845\n", "char_count": 299}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "undertaken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy or be relevant to prove facts such as \nMaxwell's state of mind.\" (id. at 26-27). \nB. Applicable Law \nIt is axiomatic that the Government may offer proof of acts included within the indictment. \nThose are the very acts the Government seeks to prove at trial. See United States v. Dugue, 763 \nF. App'x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (\"[A]n act that is alleged to have been done in \nfurtherance of the alleged conspiracy is not an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); \nrather, it is part of the very act charged.\" (alterations and citation omitted)); Quinones, 511 F.3d at \n308 (\"While Rule 404(b) identifies various rationales ... for which evidence of bad acts other than \nthose charged in the indictment may be admitted at trial, the rule has no bearing on the admissibility \nof acts that are part of the charged crime.\" (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)). \nAs discussed above, see supra Section II, direct evidence is \"not confined to that which \ndirectly establishes an element of the crime.\" Gonzalez, 110 F.3d at 942, see id. at 942 (rejecting \na claim that the evidence fell under Rule 404(b)). It also includes actions or statements that (a) \n\"arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,\" (b) are \n\"inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense,\" or (c) are \"necessary \nto complete the story of the crime on trial.\" Carboni, 204 F.3d at 44. \nIn addition, in a conspiracy case, \"the Government need not set out with precision each and \nevery act in furtherance of the conspiracy.\" United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 182 (2d Cir. \n2002) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). \nInstead, \"where the \nGovernment must prove a conspiracy existed, evidence of acts committed in furtherance of the \nconspiracy is ... direct evidence of the acts charged in the Indictment.\" United States v. Townsend, \n44 \nEFTA00088846\n", "char_count": 1988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "No. Si 06 Cr. 34 (JFK), 2007 WL 1288597, at ■1 (S.D.N.Y. May I, 2007) (citing United States v. \nConcepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Van Putten, No. 04 Cr. 803 (PKL), \n2005 WL 612723, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2005) (similar). \nAs also discussed in Section II, supra, evidence of \"other acts\" is admissible under Rule \n404(b) if it is (1) advanced for a proper purpose, such as to prove \"motive, opportunity, intent, \npreparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident\"; (2) relevant to the \ncrimes for which the defendant is on trial; and (3) has probative value which is not substantially \noutweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect. See Zackson, 12 F.3d at 1182. If requested, such \nevidence must be admitted with limiting instructions to the jury. See United States v. Edwards, \n342 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit \"ha[s] adopted an inclusionary approach to \nevaluating Rule 404(b) evidence, which allows evidence to be received at trial for any purpose \nother than to attempt to demonstrate the defendant's criminal propensity.\" Id. (internal quotation \nmarks and citations omitted). \nC. Discussion \nMinor Victim-3's testimony is direct evidence of the charged criminal conduct—\nspecifically, the conspiracies in Counts One and Three of the Indictment. \nThe Government expects that Minor Victim-3's testimony, which concerns a \nperiod of time overlapping with or in close proximity to other Minor Victims' experiences with \nthe defendant and Epstein and concerns teenagers of similar ages, will significantly overlap with \nthe testimony of those other Minor Victims. \nPut simply, Minor Victim-3's account is \n45 \nEFTA00088847\n", "char_count": 1704}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "corroborative of the accounts of the other Minor Victims. It is also direct evidence of the operation \nof the conspiracy that is probative of the defendant's intent at the time of the offense. See Op. & \nOrder at 10, Dkt. No. 106 (\"[I]t is anticipated that the three witnesses will provide detailed and \ncorroborating accounts of the Defendant's alleged role in enticing minors to engage in sex acts.\"); \nsee also United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining in an interstate stalking \ncase that evidence of earlier abuse that was \"similar in nature and severity\" demonstrated a \"pattern \nof activity that was probative of [the defendant's] intent\"). \nMinor Victim-3's testimony is also direct evidence of the offense because it concerns acts \ntaken by the defendant in furtherance of the conspiracies. In particular \nIndeed, at a minimum, the defense motion should be denied because the Government's \nproffered evidence relating to Minor Victim-3 is admissible to prove the overt acts involving \nMinor Victim-3 contained in the Indictment. (Indictment ¶'f 13(d), 19(d)). Evidence proving overt \nacts in the Indictment is direct evidence of the offense, and not other-acts evidence. See United \nStates v. James, 520 F. App'x 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (\"James's possession of five \npounds of marijuana on December 22, 2005, and December 2, 2010, were charged as overt acts in \nthe indictment. Accordingly, evidence of James's possession of marijuana on these occasions was \nnot subject to the structures of Rule 404(b).\"). The Court previously denied the defense's motion \nto strike the overt acts involving Minor Victim-3 as surplusage, explaining that it \"may reflect \nconduct undertaken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy or be relevant to prove facts such as \n46 \nEFTA00088848\n", "char_count": 1821}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Maxwell's state of mind.\" (Op. & Order at 26-27, Dkt. No. 207 (\"Courts in this district generally \ndelay ruling on any motion to strike until after the presentation of the Government's evidence at \ntrial, because that evidence may affect how specific allegations relate to the overall charges.\")). \nHaving concluded that it should delay striking these overt acts until after presentation of the \nGovernment's evidence, the Court should not now effectively reverse its decision by precluding \nthat very evidence. If the Government's proof at trial does not establish the relevance of Minor \nVictim-3's testimony, if anything, the proper course is for the defense to move to strike the relevant \novert acts and Minor Victim-3's testimony at that time. \nEven if evidence of Minor Victim-3 were uncharged criminal activity, it would still be \nnecessary to understand the other aspects of the charged conspiracies. \nMinor Victim-3 \nexperienced the pattern of abuse in close temporal proximity to the other Minor Victims: the \nconduct involving Minor Victim-1 spans 1994 to 1997, the conduct involving Minor Victim-3 \nspans 1994 to 1995, and the conduct involving Minor Victim-2 occurred in 1996. The defendant's \nacts toward Minor Victim-3 show (1) the defendant's relationship with Epstein, including her \nwillingness to procure teenagers to give Epstein massages, (2) the defendant's knowledge of both \nthe sexual nature of those massages and the need to procure additional victims, and (3) her \nwillingness to transport minors to further their abuse. This evidence is therefore direct proof of \nthe defendant's state of mind and agreement to participate in a conspiracy with Epstein. Moreover, \nher relationship with Minor Victim-3 was \"part of [her] continued effort\" to commit the offenses \ncharged in Counts One and Three. Carboni, 204 F.3d at 44; see United States v. Romero-Padilla, \n583 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (\"We reject Romero-Padilla's contention that evidence of his \n47 \nEFTA00088849\n", "char_count": 1999}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "previous plans with Ferro to import narcotics . .. was evidence of 'other crimes' . . . . [I]t \ncorroborated the charge that Ferro and Romero-Padilla were partners during the charged \nconspiracy and established that Romero-Padilla's participation in the charged conspiracy was at \nleast in part motivated by his desire to acquire [certain] funds ...\").\" \nMinor Victim-3's testimony is also necessary to complete the story of the offense conduct \nin light of expected defenses at trial. To the extent that the defense argues, for instance, that the \ndefendant played no role in obtaining girls to massage Epstein or was unaware that Epstein's \nThe cases the defendant cites (Def. Mot. 4 at 8-9) conclude that the admission of evidence about \ndistinct criminal incidents are not direct evidence of the conspiracy. See United States v. \nCummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 858 F.3d 763 (2d \nCir. 2017) (evidence of prior narcotics arrest and firearms conviction in narcotics and firearms \ncase \"could be . . . connected to the charged conspiracy, but the Government has not provided \nenough detail\"); Townsend, 2007 WL 1288597, at *2 (stating that the Government did not show \nthat uncharged firearm and drug transactions involving the same confidential informant outside \nthe time period of the charged conspiracy, described \"rather generically\" as a sale of firearms and \n\"narcotics transactions,\" are \"part and parcel of the charged conduct or sufficiently similar to \nthem); United States v. Mahe, 477 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that, although \nthe facts between two fraud schemes were \"quite similar,\" the other acts were \"a separate, discrete \noffense that may be conceptually segregated from the charged offenses without impairing the \njury's ability to understand the facts underlying the schemes alleged in the indictment\"), vacated \nin part on other grounds 285 F. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. \n2\n... [truncated, 3005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/48 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=48]", "char_count": 3005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "massages were sexualized, evidence that she did so in the case of Minor Victim-3—at roughly the \nsame time as Epstein was abusing Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2—is \"necessary to complete \nthe story of the crime on trial.\" United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 37 (2d Cir. 2012) \n(\"Robinson argued at trial that Jane Doe was his `girlfriend' and that he had no control over her \nprostitution activities. Evidence that Robinson was in the prostitution business and controlled \nprostitutes other than Jane Doe was therefore 'necessary to complete the story of the crime on \ntrial.\"). \nThe defense focuses on allegations involving Minor Victim-3 in isolation. In its attempt \nto confuse the issues, the defense argues that the defendant's conduct with Minor Victim-3 was \nlawful in the United Kingdom, and that Minor Victim-3 was an adult when she ultimately traveled \nto the United States and was abused by Epstein. The defense states that \"[a]s to [Minor Victim-\n3], the completed endeavor—i.e., her alleged sex acts with Epstein—was not a substantive criminal \noffense.\" (Def. Mot. 4 at 8 (emphasis in original)). The defense then claims—without any basis—\nthat the allegations relating to Minor Victim-3 in the Indictment are \"of no consequence,\" because \n\"the government evidently charged the conduct under the mistaken belief that [Minor Victim-3] \nwas a minor when she engaged in sex acts with Epstein.\" (Id. at 9-10). According to the defense, \nthe government \"did not know that [Minor Victim-3] was above the [age] of consent in the U.K. \nThe government presented [Minor Victim-3]'s allegations to the grand July incorrectly assuming \nthat she was a minor and that the alleged sex acts between Epstein and [Minor Victim-3] were \nillegal.\" (Id. at 1-2). \n49 \nEFTA00088851\n", "char_count": 1781}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Not so. The defendant's argument entirely misunderstands the charges in the Indictment \nand the jury's task at trial. The defendant is charged with conspiring to transport and entice minors \nfor the purpose of sexual abuse. The question at trial will be whether the defendant took steps to \nprovide Jeffrey Epstein with access to girls under the age of 18, knowing that Epstein intended to \nhave sexual contact with those girls. The defendant's acts involving Minor Victim-3 were part of \nthat scheme and are highly relevant to demonstrating the existence of the conspiracy and the \ndefendant's role in the scheme. That is all that is required for evidence relating to the defendant's \nexploitation of Minor Victim-3 to be direct evidence of the charged offenses. The defendant is not \ncharged with an offense under United Kingdom law, and the age of consent in the United Kingdom \nis irrelevant. The defendant is also not charged with any substantive offenses with respect to Minor \nVictim-3, and thus it makes no difference whether the defendant could have, attempted to, or did \nsuccessfully transport Minor Victim-3 in violation of those statutes.'?\nIn any event, this evidence is all admissible under Rule 404(b).13 Testimony regarding the \ndefendant's efforts to recruit and encourage Minor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts with Epstein in \nthe context of massages establishes that the defendant knew of Epstein's attraction to minor girls \n12 Indeed, there is no risk at trial that the jury will convict the defendant based on the testimony of \nMinor Victim-3 alone. As the Government has made clear, the jury may not convict the defendant \nof the conspiracy offense solely based on Minor Victim-3 due to the statute of limitations. (Gov't \nOpp. at 157-58, 163, Dkt. No. 204). The jury should be appropriately instructed at the conclusion \nof the trial. \n13 To the extent this evidence is properly admissible under Rule 404(b) rather than as direct \nevidence, the Government's detailed memorandu\n... [truncated, 2256 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/50 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=50]", "char_count": 2256}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "and knew that Epstein used massage to initiate sexual contact with minor girls. Minor Victim-3's \ntestimony shows the defendant's intent, through her acts befriending Minor Victim-3, encouraging \nMinor Victim-3 to provide Epstein massages, and asking Minor Victim-3 to find other girls. And \nit shows the defendant's specific modus operandi of the conspiracies in the Indictment. For these \nand the other reasons described above, Minor Victim-3's testimony easily satisfies Rule 404(b)'s \nrequirements. Evidence of other acts involving the grooming or abuse of minor victims is regularly \nadmitted for similar purposes in cases where charges allege sexual activity with minors. See, e.g., \nUnited States v. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732, 737 (2d Cir. 2017) (\"As to the testimony concerning \nVickers' grooming' of his victims, we conclude that such evidence was admissible even under \nRule 404(b), because it was probative of Vickers' knowledge of how to secure adolescent boys' \ntrust so that he could sexually abuse them. We identify no abuse of discretion in the district court's \ndecision to admit all of the challenged testimony [regarding uncharged acts of sexual abuse] under \nRule 403.\"); United States v. McDarrah, 351 F. App'x 558, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming \nadmission pursuant to Rule 404(b) of defendant's \"e-mail responses to the Craigslist \nadvertisements\" for erotic services because the e-mails \"were relevant to his knowledge and intent, \nbecause he wrote those emails to girls he knew could be minors (he enthusiastically indicated that \ngirls younger than 18 are acceptable) and his e-mails showed his interest in actual sexual \nconduct\"); United States v. Brand, No. 04 Cr. 194 (PICL), 2005 WL 77055, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. \n12, 2005) (admitting \"evidence that Brand exhibited an interest in child erotica and child \npornography on the intemet in the period leading up to the charged conduct\" under Rule 404(b) \n51 \nEFTA00088853\n", "char_count": 1946}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "because evidence was \"pertinent to whether he used the intemet in an attempt to engage in sexual \nconduct with\" putative victim). \nThe defense argues that this testimony will be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. See \nFed. R. Evid. 403. According to the defense, if Minor Victim-3 testifies that she had sex with a \n\"much older man when she was 17 years old\" or that she was sexually abused, the jury will assume \nthat Epstein engaged in illegal conduct, which will somehow prejudice the defendant. (Def. Mot. \n4 at 13). The Court should not assume that the jury will speculate about principles of United \nKingdom law and apply them to this case. The Court will properly instruct the jury on the elements \nof the offenses charged in the Indictment and the evidence that the jury can—and cannot—\nconsider. Those instructions will not ask the jury to consider or pass upon any aspect of United \nKingdom law, which will not be in evidence at trial. And in any event, as discussed in the \nGovernment's opposition to the defendant's pretrial motion to strike references to Minor Victim-\n3 in the Indictment, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant and \nEpstein are no more inflammatory or upsetting than those of Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-\n2. The risk of unfair prejudice is therefore minimal. \nIn the alternative, the defense seeks three rulings: (1) precluding the Government from \nreferring to Minor Victim-3 as a \"minor,\" (2) precluding the Government and Minor Victim-3 \nfrom representing that she was \"sexually abused\" by Epstein, and (3) giving a limiting instruction \nabout United Kingdom law. The defense's requested rulings are not grounded in law or reason. \nFirst, the defense claims that Minor Victim-3 should not be referred to as a \"minor\" because \nshe was above the age of consent in the relevant jurisdictions at the times she had sexual contact \n52 \nEFTA00088854\n", "char_count": 1913}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "with Epstein. When Minor Victim-3 began having sexual contact with Epstein, she was\n The \nissue at trial will be the defendant's knowledge of Epstein's preference for girls under the age of \n18. Under federal law, there is a term for individuals under the age of 18: minors. There is nothing \ninappropriate about using that term at trial. \nSimilarly, the phrase \"sexual abuse\" is accurate, and the Government should be permitted \nto use it. Minor Victim-3 is expected to testify about her experiences with the defendant and \nEpstein, including that she was sexually abused by Epstein numerous times. Regardless of whether \nshe uses the term \"sexual abuse,\" her testimony will capture her experience—that she was \nexploited sexually. And it is fair for the Government to argue that those acts were sexual abuse. \nThe defense argues that the phrase \"sexual abuse\" is misleading because it suggests to the jury that \nEpstein engaged in \"criminal sexual activity\" with Minor Victim-3. (Def. Mot. 4 at 14-15). To \njustify that proposition, the defense cites a single Supreme Court case in which (I) the parties were \nengaged in the task of statutory interpretation, not argument in a jury address or description of a \nvictim's lived experience, and (2) the Court rejected that proposed definition of \"sexual abuse of \na minor\" as \"flatly inconsistent with the definition of sexual abuse contained in th[at] very \ndictionary.\" Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2017). Again, the Government \nis confident that the Court will properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of the crimes in \nthe Indictment. \nFinally, there is no basis for an instruction about United Kingdom law. The defense has \ndemonstrated no unfair prejudice that might warrant a limiting instruction, and the defense's \nproposed instructions would only confuse the jury. The jury will be instructed to consider only \n53 \nEFTA00088855\n", "char_count": 1921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "the elements of the crimes the Court provides them, so any assumptions the jury might make about \nUnited Kingdom law are irrelevant.14 See United States v. Vasquez, 82 F.3d 574, 577 (2d Cir. \n1996) (appropriate to reject defense request for an instruction if it does not \"represent[] a theory \nof the defense with a basis in the record that would lead to acquittal\"). And the proposed jury \ninstruction that the sexual activity involving Minor Victim-3 \"cannot be considered `illegal' or \n'criminal' or `unlawful' for purposes of the crimes charged in the indictment\" (Def. Mot. 4 at 15), \nis wrong on the law. The sexual activity involving Minor Victim-3 can be considered criminal for \npurposes of the crimes charged in the Indictment, because it is probative proof of the defendant's \nguilt of those crimes. The instruction the defense proposes, in contrast, creates serious risk that \nthe jury will think the Court is telling them that the conduct is lawful and therefore irrelevant to \nthe case. It is not irrelevant: it is direct evidence of the crimes charged, and it should be put before \nthe jury. \nIV. \nThere is No Basis to Preclude Co-Conspirator Statements at Trial \nOn October 11, the Government provided the defense with comprehensive Jencks Act \nmaterial for trial witnesses and its exhibits, along with a letter telling the defense, consistent with \nthe Court's order, the identities of the individuals the Government intends to argue are co-\nconspirators at trial. The defense nonetheless asks the Court to enter an order precluding the \nGovernment from introducing any co-conspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence \n14 In the event the Court instructs the jury on the age of consent in the United Kingdom, the \nGovernment requests that the Court also instruct the jury that the United Kingdom's age of consent \nis irrelevant and they should not consider it. \n54 \nEFTA00088856\n", "char_count": 1905}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "802(d)(2)(E) because it claims the Government failed to comply with the Court's September 3, \n2021 Order. (Def. Mot. 1 at 1). The defense misreads this Court's September 3, 2021 Order to \nrequire the Government to do something unprecedented: identify and itemize for the defense each \nand every co-conspirator statement it plans to use at trial, seven weeks in advance of trial. Then, \ncomplaining that the Government has not complied with the defense's peculiar reading, the \ndefense seeks an extraordinary remedy: precluding the Government from offering any co-\nconspirator statements at trial. Each step of this analysis is erroneous, and the Court should deny \nthe motion. \nA. Background \nThe defendant first sought to compel the Government to identify the co-conspirator \nstatements it plans to use at trial in its initial round of pretrial motions. There, the defendant argued \nthat the Second Circuit's practice of conditional admission of co-conspirator statements at trial \nwould prejudice her because \"any cautionary instruction would be of doubtful utility.\" (Mem. of \nLaw at 13, Dkt. No. 148). She therefore asked the Court to order a \"proffer from the government \nor conduct a pretrial hearing to determine if the statements are admissible.\" (Id. at 13-14). \nIn response, the Government observed that the practice of conditional admission of co-\nconspirator statements is the law of the Circuit, notwithstanding the defense's preference to the \ncontrary. (Gov't Opp. at 192, Dkt. No. 204). The Government also explained that \"the Second \nCircuit has rejected the suggestion that non-exculpatory co-conspirator statements are discoverable \nunder Rule 16 or by any means other than the Jencks Act.\" (Id.). See In re U.S., 834 F.2d 283, \n284-87 (2d Cir. 1987) (issuing a writ of mandamus reversing District Court's order directing the \nGovernment to \"produce all oral statements made by the defendants and coconspirators that the \n55 \nEFTA00088857\n", "char_count": 1958}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Government planned to offer at trial as admissions of a defendant\" under Fed. R. Evid. 801). \nAccordingly, the Government argued that \"the defense will receive notice of any co-conspirator \nstatements that the Government may seek to introduce through witness statements\" in its Jencks \nAct production. (Gov't Opp. at 192, Dkt. No. 204). \nThe Court denied the motion, explaining that the Court lacked the power to order pretrial \ndisclosure of non-exculpatory co-conspirator statements. (Op. & Order at 30, Dkt. No. 207). The \nCourt also explained that the \"[go-conspirator statements may often be admitted at trial on a \nconditional basis,\" and to the extent that \"can pose a problem, a pretrial hearing is unnecessary \nhere because the Government has committed to producing co-conspirator statements at least six \nweeks in advance of trial to allow Maxwell to raise any objections.\" (Id. at 30-31). \nThe defendant's second bite at the apple came in the parties' joint scheduling letter. (Letter, \nDkt. No. 291). There, the defense requested that the Government \"identify any co-conspirator's \nnames and statements (whether via witness testimony or documentary evidence) at the same time \nas it discloses []3500 material,\" so it could \"litigate their admissibility before trial.\" (Id. at 11-12). \nThe Government responded that it is \"entirely appropriate for defense counsel to receive notice of \nany co-conspirator statements through Jencks Act materials and marked exhibits,\" because any co-\nconspirator statements will be contained therein. (Id. at 5). The Government also noted that the \ndefendant cited no cases \"directing separate notice of coconspirator statements that the \nGovernment may introduce at trial.\" (Id.) \nOn June 2, 2021, the Court adopted the \"Government's proposal\" and set a deadline of \nOctober 11, 2021, for the \"disclosure of Jencks Act and Giglio material, Rule 404(b) evidence and \n56 \nEFTA00088858\n", "char_count": 1927}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "notice, co-conspirator statements, and Government witness list,\" as well as the \"Defendant's \nproposal\" that the Government disclose its proposed exhibit list that same day. (Order at 1, Dkt. \nNo. 297). This order did not expressly require the Government to specifically identify co-\nconspirator statements within its other productions. \nIn the defendant's second round of pretrial motions, she asked the Court to order the \nGovernment to disclose a series of information about the Indictment. That list contained a renewed \nrequest for the Government to identify uncharged co-conspirators, but it did not contain a new \nrequest for the Government to separately identify co-conspirator statements within its discovery \nproduction. (Mem. of Law at 23-24, Dkt. No. 293). On August 13, 2021, the Court denied the \ndefense's motion, but in a footnote, explained that it \"presume[d] the Government intends to \ndisclose\" the \"identi[ties of] the unnamed co-conspirators who allegedly participated in the \nconspiracies charged in the S2 Indictment,\" since the Government had not previously opposed that \nrequest. (Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 317 at 12 n.1). The order said nothing about identifying co-\nconspirator's statements. (Id.). \nThe Government filed a letter opposing the request for the Government to \"identify [the \ndefendant]'s unnamed co-conspirators.\" (Letter at 1, Dkt. No. 320). The defendant filed a new \nletter in response, raising \"two issues.\" (Letter at 1, Dkt. No. 331). First, the defendant sought the \nidentities of co-conspirators. (Id. at 1-2). Second, the defendant took a third bite at the apple, once \nagain seeking \"disclosure of the purported co-conspirator statements [the Government] intends to \noffer at trial.\" (Id. at 3). The defendant also argued that the Court's scheduling order had already \nrequired the Government to specifically identify co-conspirator statements. (Id. at 3-4). \n57 \nEFTA00088859\n", "char_count": 1925}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "On September 3, 2021, the Court ordered the Government to \"disclose to the Defendant \nthe identities of all unnamed co-conspirators alleged in the S2 indictment to whom it will refer at \ntrial.\" (Order at 1, Dkt. No. 335). The Court further ordered the Government to \"disclose all co-\nconspirator statements it intends to offer at trial no later than October I I, as consistent with this \nCourt's scheduling order.\" (Id. at 2). \nAccordingly, on October 11, 2021, the Government produced its exhibit list and Jencks \nAct material to the defendant. The Jencks Act materials and exhibits contained the only co-\nconspirator statements in the Government's possession that will be offered at trial. It also disclosed \nthe identities of the individuals to whom it may refer at trial as co-conspirators and informed the \ndefendant that it \"has produced all co-conspirator statements which it intends to offer at trial . . . \nin the Government's production [that day] or in its previous productions.\" (Def. Mot. 1 Ex. 1 at \nI). The Government further noted that \"[t]o the extent the Government learns of additional co-\nconspirator statements as it continues to prepare for trial. it will produce those statements in \nconnection with its ongoing obligation to produce Jencks Act material.\" (Id.). \nB. Discussion \nThe Government has complied with its pre-trial disclosure obligations, consistent with the \nCourt's orders and on a schedule with deadlines well in advance of trial. As of October 11, the \nGovernment produced all co-conspirator statements in its possession that it intends to offer at trial. \nTo the extent that the Government learns of additional co-conspirator statements as it prepares for \ntrial—such as in a session preparing a witness for trial—it will produce those statements as part of \nits ongoing Jencks Act obligations. \n58 \nEFTA00088860\n", "char_count": 1853}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "The defense errs when it suggests that the Court ordered the Government to specifically \nitemize any co-conspirator statements contained in its disclosures. When the Court first set a \ndisclosure schedule for Jencks Act material, it adopted the \"Government's proposal,\" which \nopposed any requirement that the Government isolate co-conspirator statements from other witness \nstatements. (Order at 1, Dkt. No. 297). When the Court ordered the Government to produce the \nidentities of co-conspirators, it again ordered the Government to \"disclose\" all co-conspirator \nstatements, citing the Court's earlier order. (Order at 2, Dkt. No. 335). Neither order expressly \ndirected the Government to produce a set of co-conspirator statements it would offer at trial \nseparately from the other evidence it would offer at trial. \nA requirement to \"disclose statements\" is not a requirement to isolate statements. For one, \nthe Court denied the defense request for effectively that relief in the first round of pretrial motions. \n(Op. & Order at 30-31, Dkt. No. 207). For another, in the defense's many rounds of briefing on \nthis issue, it has cited no case—not from this District, nor any other—in which a Court ordered the \nGovernment to segregate and itemize co-conspirator statements from other statements for the \nconvenience of the defense. The Government is aware of no such case—likely because such an \norder would be in considerable tension with Circuit precedent, see In re U.S., 834 F.2d at 286. For \na third, the guiding principle of the defense's justification for its request is to facilitate litigation \nof those statements' admissibility pre-trial. But the law of the Second Circuit is that such \nstatements can be conditionally admitted during the trial, and their admissibility litigated \nthereafter. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 273 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing United \nStates v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969)); Op. & Order at 30, Dkt. No. 207. As much \n59\n... [truncated, 2015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/59 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=59]", "char_count": 2015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "as the defense might like the Government to create such an index, that is simply not how the \nlitigation of co-conspirator statements is handled. And it is not what the Court's order, requiring \n\"disclos[ur]e\" of co-conspirator statements, required. \nThe Government's obligation is to make disclosures. The Government is not obligated to \nserve as members of the defense team, reviewing Jencks Act materials for the defense and \nitemizing and indexing disclosures for them. The Government is no more obligated to itemize \nJencks Act materials containing co-conspirator statements than it is obligated to exhaustively detail \nfor the defense the basis for offering any other type of witness statement contained in the Jencks \nAct material it has produced. Such an obligation would extremely burdensome and is both without \nprecedent and entirely unnecessary. The defense team has ample resources to review the \nGovernment's disclosures and file any motions they wish to make regarding the admission of \ncertain testimony. And there is ample time before trial for the defense to do so, and no basis in the \nrecord to believe the defense will be unable to raise these issues and seek a ruling before trial. \nThe defense argues that the Court did order the Government to itemize co-conspirator \nstatements contained in its Jencks Act production. In support, however, the defense cites to orders \nrelating to the disclosure of the identities of co-conspirators. (Compare Def. Mot. 1 at 2 (citing \nDkt. No. 317 at 12 n.1) and Def. Mot. 1 at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 335 at 3) (stating that the Court \nrejected the defendant's arguments \"because of 'the need for the parties to litigate co-conspirator \nissues in advance of friar (emphasis in Def. Mot. I)), with Op. & Order at 12 n.1, Dkt. No. 317 \n(\"Additionally, Maxwell includes in her motion for a bill of particulars a request to require the \ngovernment to identify the unnamed co-conspirators who allegedly participated in the conspiracies \n60 \nEFTA0008886\n... [truncated, 2002 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/60 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=60]", "char_count": 2002}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "charged in the S2 indictment.\"), and Order at 3, Dkt. No. 335 (following the above sentence with \n\"In light of the interests discussed above . . . the Court will require the Government to disclose the \nidentities of any unnamed co-conspirators . . . .\"). \nThe defense also argues that failure to provide an index of co-conspirator statements \npermits \"the presentation of false testimony\" and is \"an invitation to manufacture evidence,\" \nbecause a witness will offer a co-conspirator statement for the first time. (Def. Mot. 1 at 4). This \nargument is nonsensical and offensive. It is deeply unfortunate that defense counsel would so \ncasually resort to baseless allegations that the Government would manufacture evidence and \npresent false testimony at trial. And in any event, the Government produced to the defense Jencks \nAct material containing co-conspirator statements in its possession on October 11 and will \ncontinue to make Jencks Act productions as it prepares for trial. To the extent the defense is \nconcerned that a witness will say something on the stand for the first time, the Government cannot \ndisclose that in advance because no lawyer can know a witness's verbatim answer in advance. But \nwere that to occur, the defense would be well positioned to cross-examine the witness.15\n15 The defendant's motion also makes the puzzling argument that co-conspirator statements are \nproblematic in this case because the defense is limited in its ability to call co-conspirators to testify \nas defense witnesses. (Def. Mot. 1 at 4). That is true in essentially every criminal case, as the \nCourt has previously noted. (See Op. & Order at 17-18, Dkt. No. 207 (\"There are also serious \ndoubts under all of the relevant circumstances that a jury would have found testimony from Epstein \ncredible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf.\")). \nIn any event, to the extent the defense takes issue with the rule that co-conspirator statements can \nb\n... [truncated, 2160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/61 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=61]", "char_count": 2160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Even if the Government has misread the Court's order, the defense's claims of prejudice \nare exaggerated. Although the defense complains that the Government seized \"multiple electronic \ndevices\" containing \"hundreds of thousands of statements spanning decades\" (Def. Mot. 1 at 3), \nany statements contained in emails or other documents that the Government plans to use at trial \nhave been marked as Government exhibits and produced to the defense. The defense need look \nno further than the Government's exhibit list to discover what documents will be offered at trial. \nSimilarly, although the defense complains of \"document dumps\" (id. at 2) and the need to review \n\"thousands of pages of newly provided discovery material\" (id. at 7), any witness testimony \ncontaining co-conspirator statements is contained in the Government's Jencks Act production—\nand specifically, the Government's production of material for testifying witnesses. Although the \nGovernment produced as a courtesy prior statements of non-testifying witnesses, by definition the \nGovernment does not plan to call those individuals at trial. And the Government has informed the \ndefense of the limited number of co-conspirators to whom it may refer at trial, so the defense \nknows exactly which declarants' statements are possibly subject to the co-conspirator exception. \nSee Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).16\nFinally, and in any event, suppression is not a proper remedy. The defense relies \nprincipally on Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), in which the Supreme Court upheld an order \n16 To be clear, the defendant's motion concerns the admission of statements under Rule \n801(d)(2)(E). The majority of the statements made by co-conspirators that will be offered at trial \nhave other bases for admissibility. For example, witnesses will testify regarding promises, offers, \ninstructions, and directions they received from Epstein. Those statements are not factual assertions \nsubject to hearsay rules. Rather, they are offere\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/62 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=62]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "excluding the testimony of a defense witness as a sanction for counsel's (i) noncompliance with a \ndiscovery rule that required notice of intention to call the witness, and (ii) misleading the court \nconcerning his knowledge of the witness's whereabouts. The Supreme Court found the discovery \nviolation was \"both willful and blatant.\" Id. at 416. Taylor does not support the defense's position. \nThe defense, citing Taylor, accuses the Government of willfully violating the Court's September \n3, 2021 Order. (See Def. Mot. 1 at 6-7; see id. at 3 (accusing the Government of \"attempting to \noverstuff an already full sandbag\")). The Government did no such thing. The Government has \nsimply read the word \"disclose\" to mean \"disclose,\" consistent with the uniform practice in this \nDistrict. The defense's accusations are baseless and offensive. \nThe defense has all of the co-conspirator statements the Government plans to use at trial. \nThey have these records \"unusually early\"—seven weeks before trial. (Endorsed Letter at 3, Dkt. \nNo. 353). The defense also knows the identities of the limited number of co-conspirators to whom \nthe Government may refer at trial, a highly unusual circumstance that makes the defense's task \neven easier. And they are free to litigate the admissibility of any such statement during trial. The \nGovernment has complied with its obligations, and the defense is fully equipped to prepare for \ntrial. The Court should deny the motion. \nV. \nThere is No Basis to Suppress Minor Vicdro-4's Identification of the Defendant \nThe defendant claims that Minor Victim-4's identification of her was unduly suggestive \nand should be suppressed. (Def. Mot. 9). That argument finds support in neither fact nor law. \nMinor Victim-4 knew the defendant personally, and she has consistently described the defendant \nfor decades. The identification was not suggestive, and the motion should be denied. \nA. Background \n63 \nEFTA00088865\n", "char_count": 1950}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "As set forth in Counts Five and Six of the Indictment, Minor Victim-4 was trafficked by \nthe defendant and Jeffrey Epstein from approximately 2001 to 2004. (Indictment ¶¶ 22-27). \nDuring that time, Minor Victim-4 personally interacted with the defendant—for instance, the \ndefendant paid Minor Victim-4 following Minor Victim-4's sexual encounters with Epstein. (Id. \n25(a)). \nIn 2007, Minor Victim-4 was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In that \ninterview, she described meeting \"an older lady with short black hair and an unknown accent\"—a \ndescription that is consistent with the defendant's appearance—at her first meeting with Epstein. \nJr= \nMinor Victim-4 was deposed, during which she explained that she sometimes called the \nhouse to get work, and she would talk to an employee or \"Maxwell.\" Later in the deposition, she \nadded that the same employee or \"Maxwell\" would contact her when Epstein wanted her to come. \nThis Office first interviewed Minor Victim-4 in July 2020. During that meeting, Minor \nVictim-4 spoke about her many interactions with the defendant. She did so again at the \nGovernment's meetings with her in August 2020, and at multiple meetings in January 2021. \nThe Government met Minor Victim-4 again in June 2021 for several meetings. During one \nof those meetings, the Government showed Minor Victim-4 a photo book containing 20 photos. \nThe Government asked Minor Victim-4 to review each photograph in the book and to indicate \nwhether she recognized anyone in the book. The Government explained that just because someone \nis in the book, it does not mean that Minor Victim-4 knowns that person or that the person is in \ntrouble. The Government instructed Minor Victim-4 just to let the Government know if she \nrecognized anyone. \n64 \nEFTA00088866\n", "char_count": 1798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Minor Victim-4 identified phot4as possibly depicting the defendant, but indicated that \nshe was not sure. When she reached photo'. Minor Victim-4 said it depicted the defendant. \nAfter completing her review of the book, Minor Victim-4 returned to compare photosi\nl \nand she confirmed that she believed photo \nvas a photo of the defendant, and she was not sure \nwhether she knew the person in photo \nB. Applicable Law \nAs a general matter, the Constitution \"protects a defendant against a conviction based on \nevidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by \naffording the defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted as \nunworthy of credit.\" Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012). \nEyewitness \nidentifications should therefore be excluded only where \"improper police conduct\" occurred that \nwas \"so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable \nmisidentification.\" Id. at 238-39; see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,112-14 (1977); Simmons \nv. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). \nFederal courts follow a two-step analysis in ruling on the admissibility of identification \nevidence. Perry, 565 U.S. at 238-40; Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2009). First, the \ndefendant must show that the identification was \"so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to \nirreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of law.\" United \nStates v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks \nomitted); see Raheem v. Keloi, 257 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2001). This is a high threshold to meet, \nas the defendant must show that, under the totality of the circumstances, there is \"a very substantial \n65 \nEFTA00088867\n", "char_count": 1817}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "likelihood of irreparable misidentification.\" United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, \n973 (2d Cir. 1990). If the defendant cannot make such a showing, \"the trial identification \ntestimony is generally admissible without further inquiry into the reliability of the pretrial \nidentification. \nIn that circumstance, any question as to the reliability of the witness's \nidentifications goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.\" Id. \nSecond, an unduly suggestive identification procedure does not alone require suppression \nof the identification evidence. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110-14. Instead, the court must then \ndetermine whether the identification evidence is nevertheless \"independently reliable\" based on \nthe totality of the circumstances. Brisco, 565 F.3d at 89; United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, \n950 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"[E]ven a suggestive out-of-court identification will be admissible if, when \nviewed in the totality of the circumstances, it possesses sufficient indicia of reliability.\"). Among \nthe factors to be considered are: \"the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of \nthe crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the \ncriminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of \ntime between the crime and the confrontation.\" Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). \nNo single factor is dispositive. See Kelly, 257 F.3d at 135. \n66 \nEFTA00088868\n", "char_count": 1522}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "C. Discussion \nThere was nothing unduly suggestive about the identification procedure used here. \nAccordingly, there is no basis to suppress Minor Victim-4's identification of the defendant, and \nMinor Victim-4 should be permitted to identify the defendant at trial.\" \nFirst, the identification procedure was not suggestive because it was merely a \n\"confirmatory identification\" of a person Minor Victim-4 had known and identified by name over \nthe years. \nThere is no \"improper police conduct\" creating a \"substantial likelihood of \nidentification\" by showing a person in that position even a single photograph, much less a photo \narray or photo book. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, No. 10 Cr. 1123 (JSR), 2011 WL 7782582 \n(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2011) (\"Displaying a confirmatory photograph of a person the witness has \nindicated that he already knows is perfectly acceptable.\"); Gilbert v. Sup't of Collins Corr. Fac., \nNo. 03 Civ. 3866 (LBS), 2004 WL 287683, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004) (upholding \nconfirmatory identification following street canvass on the grounds that 'police suggestiveness \ndoes not require suppression of an identification if the witness was not thereby influenced, as, for \nexample, when the witness's identification was already positive.'\" (quoting Jarrett v. Headley, \n802 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1986))); see also, e.g., Franco v. Lee, No. 12 Civ. 1210 (SJF), 2013 \nWL 704655, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013) (\"In cases in which the defendant's identity is not in \nissue, or those in which the protagonists are known to one another, suggestiveness is not a concern \n17 Even if the Minor Victim-4's identification of the defendant were suppressed, that would not \npreclude Minor Victim-4 from testifying about her abuse and the name and physical description \nof the person involved. \n67 \nEFTA00088869\n", "char_count": 1833}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "and the identification is merely confirmatory.\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); \nStallings v. Wood, No. 04 Civ. 4714 (RLM), 2006 WL 842380, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2006) \n(collecting cases). \nMinor Victim-4's personal knowledge of the defendant is well established. The defendant \nand Minor Victim-4 met in person and interacted multiple times between 2001 and 2004. Minor \nVictim-4 then mentioned the defendant by description or by name in 2007, 2009, 2020, and 2021, \nall prior to being shown the photo book. And the circumstances of the identification were not \nsuggestive. Minor Victim-4 was shown 20 photos \nShe was not asked to locate the defendant, or asked whether a particular photo \ndepicted the defendant, but just whether she recognized anyone, although she was told that she \nwas not expected to recognize someone just because their photo was in the book. And, indeed, \nMinor Victim-4 said she did not recognize some photos in the book. Regarding the defendant \nspecifically, Minor Victim-4 carefully considered whether a different photo depicted the person \nshe believed to be the defendant before seeing and selecting a photo of the defendant. This \nprocedure was cautious and not suggestive—much less unduly suggestive. \nThe reality is straightforward: Minor Victim-4 knows exactly who the defendant is and \nconfirmed that the person in the photograph was the defendant. In response, the defense argues \nthat the photo \"looks like a mug shot\" and \"is different than the others.\" (Def. Mot. 9 at 3). Of \ncourse, as is often the case with photo arrays or photo books, all of the photos generally resemble \nmug shots, so there is nothing suggestive about the fact that the defendant's photo does. And it is \nnot in fact different from the others: While the defendant's photo is lower resolution than some, \n68 \nEFTA00088870\n", "char_count": 1857}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "there are several similar quality photos in the book. (See Ex. A, photosi\n). In any event, \nthese highly conclusory statements fall well short of transforming the careful confirmatory \nidentification used in this case into an unduly suggestive procedure. The motion to suppress should \nbe denied on this basis, and the identification should be admitted at trial, where the defendant will \nhave a full opportunity to contest the persuasiveness of that evidence through cross-examination \nand attorney argument. See Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 973 (where there has been no showing \nof suggestiveness, \"any question as to the reliability of the [identification] goes to the weight of \nthe evidence, not its admissibility\"). \nEven if the \"confirmatory identification\" procedure was impermissibly suggestive as the \ndefendant claims, which it was not, Minor Victim-4's identification had clear independent \nreliability because Minor Victim-4 stated that she knew the defendant by name from previous \ninteractions. For example, in Wiggins v. Greiner, the Second Circuit declined to address a disputed \nquestion about a confirmatory identification's suggestiveness because the independent basis for \nthe in-court identification was so clear. See Wiggins, 132 F. App'x 861, 864-66 (2d Cir. 2005) \n(witness saw defendant at distance of 50 feet under \"streetlight illumination\" but was familiar with \ndefendant from seeing him previously in neighborhood); accord United States v. Lumpkin, 192 \nF.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 1999) (officers' in-court identifications reliable where officers had \nunobstructed views of the defendant selling narcotics on two occasions, one of which was during \ndaylight at close range); United States v. Crumble, No. 18 Cr. 32 (ARR), 2018 WL 1737642, at *2 \n(E.D.N.Y. Apr. II, 2018) (collecting cases finding that \"in-court identification is [] admissible, \ndespite an improper pre-trial identification procedure, if the witness is familiar with the defendant \n69 \nEFTA00088871\n", "char_count": 1994}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "prior to the incident,\" or alternatively, if \"if a witness gets a good look at the defendant during the \ncourse of a crime\"); United States v. Reed, No. 11 Cr. 487 (RJS), 2012 WL 2053758, at *5 \n(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012) (noting that a \"witness's familiarity with a suspect may establish that the \nidentification . . . is independently reliable\"). \nThis is not a crime in which a victim captures a fleeting glance of the perpetrator. Minor \nVictim-4 interacted with the defendant personally on multiple occasions between 2001 and 2004. \nShe knew the defendant by name and gave a description. In the totality of the circumstances, it is \nplain that Minor Victim-4's identification of the defendant is sufficiently independently reliable to \npermit the jury to decide its persuasiveness. \nThe defense merely replies, again in conclusory fashion, that Minor Victim-4 (1) never \nidentified the defendant as an abuser, (2) did not have an opportunity to view her during the crime \nbecause the defendant was not involved in a crime, (3) never described the defendant, and (4) the \ntime between the abuse and the identification was extraordinarily long. (Def. Mot. 9 at 4). The \nfirst three of these points are inaccurate, as set forth above. And the delay in time is untroubling \ngiven Minor Victim-4's contacts with the defendant and consistent references in the intervening \ntime. The defense is free to attempt to argue these points to the jury, but none of these arguments \nsupports a motion to suppress Minor Victim-4's identification of the defendant. \nMinor Victim-4 knows who participated in the sexual abuse she experienced, as she has \nfor the decades since it happened. This Court should deny the motion. \n70 \nEFTA00088872\n", "char_count": 1726}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "VI. \nThe Court Should Deny the Defense Motions to Preclude the Government's \nExhibits \nThe defense has filed several motions to preclude certain Government exhibits. (Def. \nMots. 7, 8, and 13). The Court should deny the defense authentication arguments without prejudice \nbecause the Government expects its witnesses will be able to authenticate the exhibits at trial \nbefore it offers them. The defendant's arguments regarding relevance and Rule 403, however, are \nmeritless, and the Court should deny them. \nA. Applicable Law \nIn general, \"[tjo satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of \nevidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what \nthe proponent claims it is.\" Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The Second Circuit has made clear that \"the bar \nfor authentication of evidence is not particularly high.\" United States v. El Gamma!, 831 F. App'x \n539, 542 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 \n(2d Cir. 2007)). Rule 901 is \"satisfied if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable \njuror could find in favor of authenticity or identification,\" El Gamma!, 831 F. App'x at 542 \n(quoting United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)), and such \"proof of \nauthentication may be direct or circumstantial,\" United States v. A!-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 172 \n(2d Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). \nFor instance, in United States v. Al Farekh, 810 F. App'x 21 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary \norder), the defendant challenged the authenticity of \"handwritten letters that were found in a USB \ndrive that was handed to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Afghanistan.\" Id. at \n24. The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. \"Although the Government did not present \n71 \nEFTA00088873\n", "char_count": 1854}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the seizure of the USB drive, Federal Rule of \nEvidence 901(b)(4) permits authentication based on Mlle appearance, contents, substance, \ninternal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the \ncircumstances.'\" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid 901(b)(4)). Witness testimony \nabout the content of the letters was \"sufficient to pass the relatively low bar for authentication of \nevidence,\" and \"any remaining questions as to the reliability of the letters go to their evidentiary \nweight, not their admissibility.\" Id. at 24-25. \nSimilarly, although physical evidence may be authenticated through a chain of custody, \n\"any flaws in the chain of custody bear only on the weight of the evidence, and not on its \nadmissibility.\" United States v. Stuckey, No. 06 Cr. 339 (RPP), 2007 WL 2962594, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. \n2007) (citing United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 57 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. \nHemmings, 482 F. App'x 640, 643 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (similar). \"Evidence should \nbe excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential \ngrounds.\" United States v. Cilins, No. 13 CR. 315 (WHP), 2014 WL 173414, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. \n15, 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \nB. Discussion \nThe defense's challenges to the Government's exhibits largely turn on the Government's \nability to authenticate them. Those arguments are premature. At trial, the Government expects \nthat witnesses familiar with the exhibits will testify that the items are what the Government claims \nthey are. The defendant is not entitled to a preview of the Government's case-in-chief at this \njuncture. \n72 \nEFTA00088874\n", "char_count": 1786}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "First, the defendant moves to exclude Government Exhibit 52, which it says was obtained \nby the Government \"as part of discovery in \nv. Maxwell civil litigation . . . with no \nexplanation about its origin.\" (Def. Mot. 7 at 1). The defendant misidentifies the exhibit. \nGovernment Exhibit 52 is a physical contact book belonging to the defendant. The records \nattached by the defense as Exhibit 1 appear to be a scan of Government Exhibit 52 that was \nproduced in discovery in \nv. Maxwell. But the Government will not offer that scan at trial. \nIt will offer the physical book itself, along with scans taken by the Government of the physical \nbook. A witness with personal knowledge of the physical book is expected to testify to its \nauthenticity. \nThe defendant takes issue with the history of the Government's acquisition of Government \nExhibit 52. The defendant is correct that the Government came into custody of this exhibit after a \nformer employee of Jeffrey Epstein attempted to sell it to a civil lawyer suing Epstein. (Id.). The \ndefense calls this \"particularly troubling\" (Def. Mot. 7 at 2), but that argument is misplaced. How \nthe Government acquired the exhibit goes, if anything, to its weight and not its admissibility. If a \nwitness can identify the exhibit based on its contents, that is sufficient to pass the relatively low \nbar for authentication of evidence.\" See AI Farekh, 810 F. App'x at 24-25. \nFinally, the defendant argues that the contents of Government Exhibit 52 are hearsay \nbecause they are not a business record. (Def. Mot. 7 at 4-6). The exhibit is separately admissible \nnot for the truth of the matters asserted therein (such as the accuracy of the contact information for \nvictims), but to establish that the defendant kept contact information for relevant individuals at \ntrial, including victims. \nThe exhibit has evidentiary value in showing that the defendant \n73 \nEFTA00088875\n", "char_count": 1921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "maintained a contact book containing what purports to be this list of names and associated contact \ninformation. \nSecond, the defendant moves to preclude any items seized during the 2005 search of \nEpstein's home in Palm Beach, Florida. The defense claims, in a conclusory fashion, that \"no \nwitness has sufficient personal knowledge about the proposed exhibits\" to demonstrate \nauthenticity, because \"the evidence collection and retention in this matter is an unreliable mess.\" \n(Def. Mot. 8 at 3-5). The defense further speculates that the Government intends to offer these \nexhibits without any testimony about their authenticity, in part because the original custodian—\nDetective eis \ndead. (Id. at 4-5). The defense is mistaken. The Government intends to \ncall live witnesses to establish the authenticity of the evidence at trial.' \nThird, the defendant argues that the photographs in Government Exhibit 251 and 288 are \nirrelevant. (Def. Mot. 13 at 2). \n18 As to Government Exhibit 295 specifically, that exhibit was written by both Detective \nand another witness who is expected to testify at trial. The exhibit is primarily mare \nor \nidentification, although portions of that document may be offered as a past recollection recorded \nby that other witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(5). The Government will not offer statements from \nDetective \n74 \nEFTA00088876\n", "char_count": 1366}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Fourth, the defendant argues that Government Exhibit 294 is irrelevant. (Def. Mot. 13 at \n2-3). Government Exhibit 294 displays a box containing \"Twin Torpedos\"-sex toys-seized \nduring the search of Epstein's Palm Beach house. This photograph is corroborative of witness \ntestimony, which is expected to describe the presence of sex toys and that the defendant and \nEpstein used sex toys during their abuse. \nFifth, the defendant argues that Government Exhibit 313 is irrelevant. (Def. Mot. 13 at 2-\n3). Government Exhibit 313 is a photograph of the defendant and Epstein swimming together \nwhile nude. This evidence corroborates witness testimony expected at trial, which will describe \ntopless swimming in the pool at Epstein's Palm Beach House. It is also relevant to the relationship \nbetween the defendant and Epstein. For instance, to the extent the defense at trial argues that the \ndefendant was merely an employee of Epstein's, this photograph is evidence to the contrary. \nSixth, the defense argues that Government Exhibit 606 lacks evidentiary foundation, is \nhearsay, and is irrelevant because it was created after the events alleged in the Indictment. (Def. \nMot. 13 at 2-3). Government Exhibit 606 is a manual governing the operations of the Palm Beach \nhouse. A witness at trial is expected to authenticate this document and explain that it was the \nversion in effect at the house in 2005. Another witness is expected to testify about the rules in \neffect in the Palm Beach household during the time period of the charged conduct; those rules are \n75 \nEFTA00088877\n", "char_count": 1580}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "consistent with the rules in this exhibit.19 The relevance of the document is self-evident: among \nother things, it directs employees to \"see nothing, hear nothing, say nothing.\" (GX 606 at 4). It is \nnot prejudicial as to her \"lifestyle\" (Def. Mot. 13 at 3), because the jury will already hear testimony \nabout her and Epstein's various properties, private jet, and employees. And the document is not \nhearsay, because the statements are being offered as instructions to staff, not for the truth of the \nmatter asserted. \nAs described above, each of these exhibits is highly relevant, not hearsay or subject to a \nhearsay exception, and can be authenticated at trial. The Court should deny the defense's motion \nregarding relevance and Rule 403, and deny the motion regarding authentication with leave to \nrenew it at trial. \nVII. \nThere is No Basis to Preclude Discussion of \"Victims\" or Rape \nCiting no case in the federal system, the defendant moves to preclude any trial participants \nfrom referring to the Minor Victims as Victims. The defendant also moves to preclude testimony \nconcerning a rape committed by Jeffrey Epstein against one of the Minor Victims. Both of these \nmotions lack merit, and they should be denied. \nA. References to Victims \n19 Here and elsewhere (see, e.g. Def. Mot. 2 at 3-4), the defense argues that evidence that post-\ndates the time period of the conspiracy is irrelevant. That is incorrect. What matters is whether \nthe evidence tends to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. If, for instance, there is \nevidence showing that Epstein and the defendant were extremely close partners in 2005, that tends \nto make it more probable that they had such a relationship in 2004, during the time period of the \nconspiracy. It is therefore highly relevant. \n76 \nEFTA00088878\n", "char_count": 1814}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "The defendant moves to preclude any trial participants from using the word \"victim\" to \nrefer to any of the Minor Victims. The Government expects that it will use the word \"victim,\" \nparticularly in jury addresses, but such use is not improper vouching or prejudicial to the defense. \nThe Government also expects its expert to use the word \"victim,\" but she will testify about victims \ngenerally and not any victims in this case specifically. The Government does not otherwise expect \nits witnesses to use the word \"victim.\" To the extent they do, however, it is not prejudicial to the \ndefense.2°\nThe defendant cites no federal case that has accepted its argument. Nor does this argument \nmake sense. The erroneous premise in the defense argument is that referring to someone as a \n\"victim\" \"necessarily conveys the speaker's opinion that a crime in fact occurred and that the \naccusers are credible.\" (Def. Mot. 12 at 1). That is incorrect. The Government's references to \n\"victims\" are part of its theory of the case. Use of that term in a jury address is not an expression \nof counsel's opinion; it is the Government's litigating position, just like referencing someone as \nthe \"shooter\" in a shooting case or the \"dealer\" in a narcotics case. See United States v. Arias-\nJavier, 392 F. App'x 896, 898 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (\"The prosecutor is permitted \nvigorously to argue for the jury to find its witnesses credible as long as it does not link its own \ncredibility to that of the witness or imply the existence of extraneous proof supporting the witness's \n2° Notably, the defense motion is entirely premised on the notion that the parties disagree about \nwhether the Minor Victims are in fact victims of any crime. If the defense concedes at any point \nthat the Minor Victims are victims of any crime—for example, if the defendant concedes the \nvictims were abused by Epstein but disclaims knowledge or involvement—their argument in \nsupport of this motion collapses entirely. (Def. \n... [truncated, 2142 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/77 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=77]", "char_count": 2142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "credibility.\"). Prosecutors are simply using a term that is consistent with the Government's theory \nof the case. See United States v. Edwards, No. CR 16-103-BLG-SPW-1, 2017 WL 4159365, at \n*I (D. Mont. Sept. 19, 2017) (explaining that \"use of the term `victim' is not prejudicial to the \ndefendant's rights when the presentation of evidence taken as a whole clarifies the government's \nburden of proving all of the elements of the crime\" and finding that the \"jury will not be unduly \nprejudiced against [the defendant] if the government refers to certain witnesses as victims\"); (citing \nUnited States v. Washburn, 444 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006) (\"[A] number of courts have \ndetermined that the use of the term \"victim\" in jury instructions is not prejudicial to a defendant's \nrights when, as is the case here, the instructions taken as a whole clarify the government's burden \nof proving all elements of the crime\")); Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1990) (\"No \nlogical argument can be made that the mere use of the term `victim' [injury instructions] somehow \nshifted the burden of proof.\"). In addition, \"[t]he term 'victim' is not inherently prejudicial. It is \na term commonly used in the English language that does not by its nature connote guilt.\" United \nStates v. Lussier, No. 18-CR-281 (NEB), 2019 WL 2489906, at *5 (D. Minn. June 15, 2019).2' \nAnd just as the defense may make arguments attacking the credibility of victims, the Government \nis free to argue that these witnesses are, in fact, victims of a crime. Cl United States v. Thai, 29 \nF.3d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that prosecutors may also \"respond to an argument that \nimpugns its integrity or the integrity of its case\"). \n21 The same is true with references by the Government to \"minor victims.\" (Cf. Def. Mot. 12 at 4-\n5). The Government does not expect any other trial participant to use the phrase \"minor victims.\" \n78 \nEFTA00088880\n", "char_count": 1942}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Witnesses may also reference \"victims.\" But the only witness the Government expects to \nuse the term \"victim\" is its expert, Dr. \nAnd Dr. Mill \nnot be testifying about the \ndefendant or the Minor Victims in this case, but about victims of sexual abuse generally. \nAccordingly, she is not vouching for the credibility of anyone in this case, or presuming anything \nabout the truth or falsity of any accusations. \nTo the extent other Government witnesses use the term \"victim,\" however, it would not be \nprejudicial to the defense. The limitation on improper vouching applies to the prosecutor, not to \nGovernment witnesses, as even one of the defendant's cases acknowledges. See Jackson v. State, \n600 A.2d 21, 25 (De. 1991) (\"The opinion does not state, nor does it imply, that the use of the term \n`victim' by witnesses, as a term of art or in common parlance, is a basis for objection.\"). In \nparticular, some of the witnesses who may use the word \"victim\" are the Minor Victims \nthemselves, who are testifying about their subjective experiences. It is not prejudicial to the \ndefense for someone who considers herself a victim to testify as much? \nHere, as with other motions, the defendant requests an extraordinary order not seen in other \ncases in this District. That request lacks merit, and the Court should deny it. \nB. Evidence of Rape \nThe Government expects that at least one minor victim may describe being raped by Jeffrey \nEpstein. If that testimony is offered, it is directly relevant to issues before the jury. The defendant \nand Epstein are charged with transporting minors, enticing minors, or trafficking minors with the \n22 The Government defers to the Court on how it would like to refer to the Minor Victims. It notes, \nhowever, that \"Accuser\" is an alternative that is prejudicial to the Government. \n79 \nEFTA00088881\n", "char_count": 1842}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "intention that they would engage in illegal or commercial sex acts, and conspiring to do, and aiding \nand abetting, the same. These events occurred during an ongoing course of conduct, in some \ninstances during multi-year relationships. The ongoing relationships between the defendant, \nEpstein, and the victims is directly relevant, and the victims' accounts of these events are necessary \nto complete the story of the crime on trial. Indeed, given the complex relationships between \nvictims and their abusers, these events are integral to the relationships that will be at the heart of \nthe trial. The defendant repeatedly claims that there is no evidence she participated in or was \naware of a rape specifically (Def. Mot. 11 at 1-2), but defense arguments about her knowledge and \ninvolvement are for the jury. \nThe defense argues that the Indictment does not allege that Epstein raped anyone, and so \nthe rape is irrelevant. (Def. Mot. 11 at 2). That is a non sequitur. Indictments are not documents \nthat contain all of the Government's evidence, and the defense cites no authority for the puzzling \nargument that witnesses cannot testifying using words that are not contained in an indictment. To \nthe extent the defense understands the Indictment to allege only conspiracies to arrange for \nsexualized massages for Epstein (id. at 3), the defense is mistaken. The Indictment charges the \ndefendant with conspiracies to arrange for \"sexual activity\" (Indictment?! 12, 18) and \"a \ncommercial sex act\" (Id. ¶ 24). \nThe defense also argues that evidence of a rape does not satisfy Rule 403 balancing, \nbecause evidence of a rape is \"highly emotional and inflammatory.\" (Def. Mot. 11 at 3). This \nconclusory claim is insufficient to show prejudice to the defense. Testimony from victims in sex \ncrimes trials can be very emotional when describing their abuse and the perpetrator. But that \n80 \nEFTA00088882\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "evidence—including evidence of rape, where it occurs-is the core conduct in the case. See, e.g., \nUnited States v. English, No. 18 Cr. 492 (PGG), 2020 WL 7773606, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, \n2020) (describing evidence of rape in a trial for sex trafficking of minors); United States v. \nGraham, No. 14 Cr. 500 (NSR), 2015 WL 6161292, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) (concluding, \nin response to the argument that \"rape\" is a legal term, \"there is a \"critical distinction between a \npatient telling a physician that she `had intercourse with three men' and a patient telling the \nphysician that she was 'raped' by three men.\"). Its probative value is certainly not outweighed by \nany unfair prejudice. Nor is it the case that evidence of a rape—especially at the level of \nabstraction described by the defense-is significantly more inflammatory than the charged crime: \nthe sexual abuse of minors. \nIn the event that a Minor Victim testifies that Epstein raped them, it is part of the charged \nconspiracy in this case, and it should be admitted. \nVIII. The Remaining Defense Motions are Aimed at Evidence the Government Does \nNot Plan to Elicit \nThree of the defense motions are aimed at precluding the Gm ernment from offering \nevidence it does not intend to offer at trial. \nFirst, the defense seeks to preclude the Government from arguing that the defendant was \nhiding from, evading, or fleeing from law enforcement between Epstein's arrest and her own. \n(Def. Mot. 5 at 1). The Government's view remains that such conduct reflects the defendant's \nconsciousness of her guilt (see id. at 2 (citing multiple Government filings)), and the Government \ndoes not agree that such evidence lacks an adequate factual basis or is inadmissible under Rule \n403. (See id. at 6-9). However, the Government does not intend—and so will agree not to offer—\n81 \nEFTA00088883\n", "char_count": 1859}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "such evidence in its case-in-chief, unless the defendant opens the door to this evidence or otherwise \nputs it at issue at trial. Furthermore, if the defendant testifies, the Government may cross-examine \nthe defendant about this conduct, depending on the scope of her direct examination. But the \nGovernment will not affirmatively offer this evidence in its case-in-chief. \nThe same is true for the defense motion to exclude evidence of the defendant's false \nstatements in her 2016 depositions. (Def. Mot. 6 at I). Although false exculpatory statements are \nadmissible as proof of a defendant's consciousness of guilt (see Gov't Opp. at 142-43, Dkt. No. \n204 (citing, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2014)), the Government does \nnot intend—and so will agree—not to offer this information as part of its case-in-chief, unless the \ndefense opens the door or otherwise puts these statements at issue. However, the Government may \noffer these statements in rebuttal to defense arguments. Moreover, the defendant's prior statements \nare of course appropriate material for cross-examination of the defendant. The Government also \nconsents to the defense request to redact the perjury counts from the Indictment. (Def. Mot. 6 at \n6). \nFinally, the defense seeks to preclude the Government's law enforcement witnesses from \noffering expert testimony. (Def. Mot. 10 at 5). The defense appears to take an improperly broad \nview of the scope of expert testimony.23 However, the Government has not noticed the three law \n23 For instance, the defense, citing United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005), makes \nthe sweeping claim that \"any opinion testimony\" based on those three law enforcement witnesses' \n\"specialized 'training and experience' is expert opinion testimony subject to Rule 702 and Rule \n16(1)(G) and is inadmissible at trial.\" (Def. Mot. 10 at 4 (emphasis in original)). But in Garcia, \nthe Second Circuit simply held that an undercover law enforcement agent\n... [truncated, 2138 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00088802/82 or ?id=EFTA00088802&page=82]", "char_count": 2138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00088802", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "enforcement officers identified by the defense as experts and will not elicit expert testimony from \nthem. Those witnesses are being called as fact witnesses to describe, for instance, the execution \nof a search and evidence seized during that search.24\nCONCLUSION \nFor the reasons set forth above, the Government respectfully requests that the Court deny the \ndefendant's motions in limine. \nDated: October 25, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nRespectfully submitted, \nDAMIAN WILLIAMS \nUnited States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of New York \nBy:  \nIsl \nAssistant United States Attorneys \npartner in the narcotics distribution conspiracy. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 216. That is distinguishable \nfrom cases where, as expected here, witnesses testify based on their personal involvement in \ncertain investigative steps. \n24 It bears noting that the defense's motion is expressly concerned about testimony from case \nagents (Def. Mot. 10 at 5 n.2), and testimony about \"the case, its origins, and the investigation\" \n(id. at 3), which it considers to be improper expert testimony. The Government has moved to \npreclude the defense from offering such evidence, including by calling the case agents identified \nin its Touhy notice. (See Gov't Motions in Limine Section III). Accordingly, if the defense plans \nto call case agents for such testimony—which the Court should preclude—the defense must \nprovide expert notice of such testimony. \n83 \nEFTA00088885\n", "char_count": 1447}]}