{"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_count": 46, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00076068", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00076068.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 1 of 16 \nReid Weingarten \n1114 Avenue of the Americas \nNew York. NY 10036 \n212 506 3900 main \n212 506 3955 direct \nwww.steoloccorn \nnreeinoartenOsteotoe.com \nJuly 11, 2019 \nVIA ECF \nThe Honorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Court \nSouthern District of New York \nUnited States Courthouse \n(212) 805-6715 \n500 Pearl Street \nNew York, NY 10007 \nRE: \nUnited States v. Jeffrey Epstein, Criminal No. 19-490 \nDear Judge Berman: \nSteptoe \nSttPtOt • JOHNSON ttP \nWe write to outline the grounds entitling Jeffrey Epstein to pretrial release, proposing a \nstringent set of conditions that will effectively guarantee his appearance and abate any \nconceivable danger he's claimed to present. \nIn essence, the government seeks to remand a self-made New York native and lifelong \nAmerican resident based on dated allegations for which he was already convicted and punished —\nconduct the relitigation of which is barred by a prior federal nonprosecution agreement (the \n\"NPA\"). The government makes this drastic demand even though Mr. Epstein has never once \nattempted to flee the United States — despite a Florida federal judge's stated belief that he could \nvoid the NPA in appropriate circumstances, possibly threatening new charges there, and \nnotwithstanding legally erroneous government assertions in ancillary litigation that Mr. Epstein \nwas subject to potential prosecution in other federal judicial districts, including this one \nspecifically. Indeed, Mr. Epstein feared the toxic political climate might tempt the government to \ntry and end-run the NPA — yet continually returned home from travel abroad, fully prepared to \nvindicate his rights under the agreement and otherwise mount a full-throated defense. Finally, \nthe government takes its extreme position in the teeth of Mr. Epstein's perfect compliance with \nonerous sex offender registration requirements — pinpointing his exact nightly whereabouts —\nacross multiple jurisdicti\n... [truncated, 2044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/0 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=0]", "char_count": 2044}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 2 of 16 \nNonetheless, it is fundamental that pretrial detention is reserved for \"a small but \nidentifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom neither the imposition of \nstri[ct] release conditions nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the \nsafety of the community or other persons.\" S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6-7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 \nU.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189. And that's true no matter how much rhetoric and hyperbole the \ngovernment and media pile on a presumptively innocent citizen. Popular condemnation aside, \ncompelling legal issues stand between Mr. Epstein and any possible conviction on the allegations \nof conduct from 14 to 17 years ago pressed in the indictment. Importantly, the Bail Reform Act, \n18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., authorizes release for even wealthy defendants facing serious charges \nwho travel and own property abroad. \nThe government's indictment labels this a \"Sex Trafficking\" case. Yes, the government \nmay have witnesses who will testify to participating in sexual massages — most over 18; some \nunder; some who told the police they lied about their age to gain admission to Mr. Epstein's \nresidence; some who will testify that Mr. Epstein knew they were not yet 18.E But their \nanticipated testimony only punctuates the alleged offenses' purely local nature. (All occurred \nwithin a single New York residence or, if the Florida conduct is ultimately ruled admissible \ndespite the NPA, then within two residences.) There are no allegations in the indictment that Mr. \nEpstein trafficked anybody for commercial profit; that he forced, coerced, defrauded, or enslaved \nanybody; or that he engaged in any of the other paradigmatic sex trafficking activity that 18 \nU.S.C. § 1591 aims to eradicate. No one seeks to minimize the gravity of the alleged conduct, \nbut it is clear that the conduct falls within the heartland of classic state or local sex offenses —\nand at or ou\n... [truncated, 3400 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/1 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=1]", "char_count": 3400}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 3 of 16 \nin the U.S. Virgin Islands, his principal residence, Florida, and New York. Mr. Epstein has \nscrupulously fulfilled his obligations in every jurisdiction in which he was required to register \nthroughout the 10-year hiatus between his release and present arrest. All of his travel has been \nmeticulously reported to the registration authorities so that they have been aware of his precise \nlocation every single day for the past 10 years. Better still, the pending charges date back 14-17 \nyears, from 2002 to 2005. Yet, tellingly, they allege no recurrence of the conduct underlying the \nNPA and Florida state conviction at any time in the ensuing decade and a half (2005-2019). \nTogether, these unique factors are powerful indicia that Mr. Epstein is no longer a danger to \nanyone and will faithfully obey all conditions of release if ordered. \nIn sum, Mr. Epstein has substantial grounds to challenge the allegations charged by the \ngovernment in its indictment, and he has every intention of doing so in a lawful, professional, \nand principled manner. He intends to fight the current charges on their merits and, more, to \ncontest their legality given the inextricable intertwining of the current investigation and his NPA \nwhich promised him immunity and a global settlement for offenses including those brought \nunder 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Any perception that Mr. Epstein poses any conceivable danger or flight \nrisk may be readily dispelled by a slate of highly restrictive conditions, which amply suffice to \nsecure his release: \nI. Home detention in Mr. Epstein's Manhattan residence, with permission to leave only for \nmedical appointments as approved by Pretrial Services, including (at the Court's \ndiscretion) the installation of surveillance cameras at the front and rear entrances to \nensure compliance. \n2. Electronic monitoring with a Global Positioning System? \n3. An agreement not to seek or obtain any new passport during \n... [truncated, 2839 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/2 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=2]", "char_count": 2839}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 4 of 16 \n4. Consent to U.S. extradition from any country and waiver of all rights against such \nextradition! \n5. A substantial personal recognizance bond in an amount set by the Court after reviewing \nadditional information regarding Mr. Epstein's finances, which Mr. Epstein will seek the \nCourt's permission to provide via sealed supplemental disclosure. \n6. The bond shall be secured by a mortgage on the Manhattan residence, valued at roughly \n$77 million. Mr. Epstein's private jet can be pledged as further collateral. \n7. Mr. Epstein's brother Mark will serve as a co-surety of the bond, which shall be further \nsecured by a mortgage on Mark's home in West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Epstein's \nfriend David Mitchell will also serve as a co-surety and pledge his investment interests in \ntwo properties to secure the bond. \n8. Mr. Epstein shall deregister or otherwise ground his private jet? \n9. He shall demobilize, ground, and/or deregister all vehicles or any other means of \ntransportation in the New York area, providing particularized information as to each \nvehicle's location. \n10. Mr. Epstein will provide Pretrial Services and/or the government random access to his \nresidence. \nII. No person shall enter the residence, other than Mr. Epstein and his attorneys, without \nprior approval from Pretrial Services and/or the Court. \n12. Mr. Epstein will report daily by telephone to Pretrial Services (or on any other schedule \nthe Court deems appropriate). \n13. A Trustee or Trustees will be appointed to live in Mr. Epstein's residence and report any \nviolation to Pretrial Services and/or the Court. \n14. Any other condition the Court deems necessary to reasonably assure Mr. Epstein's \nappearance. \nI. \nApplicable law \nEchoing and reinforcing the presumption of innocence, our justice system's bedrock, \nthere is a \"strong presumption against [pretrial] detention.\" United States v. Hanson, 613 F. \nSupp. 2d 85, 87 (D.D.C. 2009). A\n... [truncated, 2724 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/3 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=3]", "char_count": 2724}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 5 of 16 \nThough the Bail Reform Act contains a rebuttable presumption in favor of detention \nbased on the crimes charged, the presumption shifts only the burden of production, not \npersuasion. See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the \nstatutory demand on defendants \"is fairly easily met.\" United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756, \n2011 WL 3421321, at *2 (ND. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011). To rebut the presumption, a defendant need \nonly \"show that the specific nature of the crimes charged, or that something about their \nindividual circumstances, suggests that `what is true in general is not true in the particular \ncase ... '\" United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States \nv. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir.1985)). \"The quantum of evidence required to rebut the \npresumption is not high.\" United States v. Thompson, No. 16-CR-00019, 2018 WL 447331, at *2 \n(M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2018) (citation omitted). \"Any evidence favorable to a defendant that comes \nwithin a category listed in § 3142(g) can affect the operation of [the presumption], including \nevidence of their marital, family and employment status, ties to and role in the community, clean \ncriminal record and other types of evidence encompassed in § 3142(g)(3).\" Dominguez, 783 F.2d \nat 707 (clean record plus socioeconomic stability sufficed to rebut presumption). \nIn short, evidence that the defendant is unlikely to flee or commit crimes rebuts the \npresumption, forcing the government to persuade the court that detention is warranted. See \nConway, 2011 WL 3421321, at *5 (§ 1591 defendant released pending trial). While not \ndisappearing entirely, the presumption thus recedes to one factor among many in determining \nwhether there are sufficient conditions to \"reasonably assure\" both presence and safety. See \nMartir, 782 F.2d at 1144; see also United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 1985\n... [truncated, 3479 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/4 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=4]", "char_count": 3479}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 6 of 16 \nfuture danger when viewed in the context of the unparalleled global media attention the case has \ngarnered, including the creation of a website by the government requesting witnesses claiming \nabuse to come forward. Accordingly, any danger that Mr. Epstein may have once posed to the \ncommunity has long since abated. At the very least, this enormous gap in time precludes a \nfinding by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the \ncommunity's safety.' \nThe rebuttable presumption of a risk of flight is negated by the evidence that the \ngovernment had stated it believed it could prosecute Mr. Epstein for the very same conduct for \nwhich he was immunized, albeit in a second jurisdiction, despite the protections conferred upon \nhim under the NPA. Mr. Epstein's continuous presence in the United States even while he had a \nresidence out of the country reinforces the point. As detailed below, Mr. Epstein understood the \nNPA as a global resolution of any charges arising from the alleged conduct at issue here, \nincluding conduct in New York. Indeed, the government, in a Southern District of Florida filing \nThe government vastly overreaches in painting Mr. Epstein as dangerous based on musty plea \ndiscussions. The government's argument that Mr. Epstein's release would risk obstructive \nbehavior, at pages 8-9 of its submission, rests primarily upon statements made between Mr. \nEpstein's prior counsel and an Assistant U.S. Attorney while they searched for a federal offense, \nat the government's behest, with a one-year statutory maximum or guideline during the give-and-\ntake of those of plea negotiations. The communication from prior counsel about a potential \nproffer for a federal charge was met with the response that there was no sufficient evidence to \ncharge such an offense. These purported facts were mere allegations that did not ultimately \nmanifest themselves in any agree\n... [truncated, 3643 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/5 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=5]", "char_count": 3643}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 7 of 16 \nthat was unsealed and became public in July 2013, specifically noted that \"a number of districts \noutside the Southern District of Florida (e.g., the Southern District of New York and the District \nof New Jersey) share jurisdiction and venue with the Southern District of Florida over potential \nfederal criminal charges based on the alleged sexual acts committed by Epstein against the \nPetitioners. Epstein is thus subject to potential prosecution for such acts in those districts.\" \nExhibit 2, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 v. United States, 08-CV-80736 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2013), \nDkt. 205-2, at 9. The government went so far as to invite the alleged victims \"to contact the \nUnited States Attorney's Office in those districts and seek to confer with government attorneys \nin those offices about investigating and potentially prosecuting Epstein based on the alleged \nfederal crimes committed against them.\" Id. at 10. The Florida U.S. Attorney's Office even \noffered to share the evidence gathered in its investigation with prosecutors and grand juries in the \nother relevant jurisdictions. See id. at 10 n.9. \nThe defense strongly disagrees with the premise that the government can offer and \nexecute an immunity or nonprosecution agreement with a citizen in the location of one of two \nvenues where an interstate telephone call (or flight or any form of wire or mail communication) \noccurs and then circumvent the consequences of that immunity grant by having the very same \nprosecution office promote and motivate a prosecution by another office at the second venue of \nwhat in fact was a single criminal transaction. What is significant for bail purposes is that \nnotwithstanding this notice of the government's illegal position, and his knowledge of the \nsubstantial penalties that he would face if charged and convicted, Mr. Epstein made no attempt to \nflee in the approximately six years preceding his arrest. During that time, \n... [truncated, 3650 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/6 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=6]", "char_count": 3650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 8 of 16 \nThe NPA required Mr. Epstein to plead guilty to a state felony charge (Fla. Stat. \n§ 796.07), then pending in the State of Florida and to an additional state felony charge (not \npreviously charged or required by the State) of violating Fla. Stat. § 796.03 (Case No. 2008-CF-\n9381AXX), a charge requiring registration as a sex offender. Mr. Epstein complied with all of \nhis obligations under the NPA. \nContrary to the government's argument, the NPA was not limited to a \"list of several \ndozen victims identified in the prior investigation ....\" Gov't Bail Letter at 6-7. Indeed, the \nNPA contains no \"list of several dozen victims\" and regardless, the NPA immunized Mr. Epstein \nfrom prosecution \"for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement,\" allegedly \ncommitted between 2001-07, as well as \"any offenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury \ninvestigation.\" NPA at 2 (emphasis added). Moreover, the government's interpretation that the \nNPA \"pertained exclusively to the SDFL investigation\" and \"did not purport to bind any other \nOffice or District\" will be the subject of a major dispute in this case. This is especially so \nbecause Mr. Epstein's alleged conduct at his Palm Beach residence features prominently in the \nconspiracy count (Count 1, ¶¶ 14-19, ¶ 22.a, d, f) and is incorporated by reference in the \nsubstantive charge (Count 2, ¶ 23). \nBeyond that, Mr. Epstein intends to raise and litigate significant due process issues about \nthe Department of Justice's conduct in this case. Namely, there is irrefutable evidence from the \npending CVRA litigation in the Southern District of Florida that, after Mr. Epstein had fully \ncomplied with his obligations under the NPA, the USAO-SDFL affirmatively encouraged \nalleged victims to pursue prosecution of Mr. Epstein in other districts, in violation of the DOJ's \ncommitment to a \"global\" resolution. See Exhibit 2, at 8-12. The United States Attorney for th\n... [truncated, 3461 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/7 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=7]", "char_count": 3461}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 9 of 16 \nFinally, the government fails to consider the doctrine of pre-indictment delay, inasmuch \nas the statute of limitations does not fully define a defendant's rights with respect to delays that \noccurred prior to the indictment. See generally United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). \nHere, the delays of 14 years from the last alleged act and 12 years since Mr. Epstein signed the \nNPA are extraordinary. If the government is correct that the NPA does not, and never did, \npreclude a prosecution in this district, then the government will have to explain why it \npurposefully delayed a prosecution of someone like Mr. Epstein, who registered as a sex \noffender 10 years ago and was certainly no stranger to law enforcement. There is no legitimate \nexplanation for the delay. \nIII. \nThe government fails to meet its burden of proving that no combination of \nconditions will assure Mr. Epstein's appearance and public safety \nAn analysis of the relevant statutory factors and case law supports pretrial release. Even \nshould the Court conclude, despite substantial evidence to the contrary, that the defendant \npresents a risk of flight, the foregoing combination of conditions virtually guarantees his \nappearance as required. Crucially, while it is always possible to hypothesize risks, the statutory \nstandard requires only a reasonable assurance that the defendant, if released, will appear. The \nconditions proposed above, including electronic GPS monitoring, surrender of Mr. Epstein's \npassport, deregistration and/or grounding of Mr. Epstein's private plane, and a substantial \npersonal bond (including posting of personal residence(s) and/or private jet as security to \nguarantee appearance) would extinguish any plausible risks. Mr. Epstein's current notoriety \nminimizes any conceivable risk of flight even further. The location where he could be detained —\nhis residence on East 71' Street in New York has entrances (one on \n... [truncated, 3369 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/8 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=8]", "char_count": 3369}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 10 of 16 \nTo reiterate, the Bail Reform Act requires pretrial release on the \"least restrictive\" \nconditions that will assure both appearance and public safety. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) \n(emphasis added). Home confinement monitored by 24-hour private security guards — a lesser \nrestriction than pretrial detention — has proven effective in meeting those goals in many \nprominent cases prosecuted in our Circuit, including cases against defendants as infamous as \nBernie Madoff, Marc Dreier and David Brooks. \nTo be clear, defense counsel are fully confident Mr. Epstein will appear as required \nwithout resort to this measure. And we understand and appreciate Your Honor's opposition to it. \nSee United States v. Zarrah, No. 15-CR-867, 2016 WL 3681423 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016). Still, \nMr. Epstein stands ready and willing to pay for 24-hour armed guards should the Court deem it \nnecessary or appropriate. \nMore precisely, we realize that Your Honor objects to the measure as more akin to \ncustody than release, finding it inequitable for wealthier defendants to \"buy their way out\" of jail \npending trial. Id. at *2, *9-10, *13 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, a band of other courts in our \narea have endorsed the procedure,' and the Second Circuit has affirmed its use.' \nFor reasons explained elsewhere, round-the-clock, privately funded security guards will \nvirtually guarantee — not just reasonably assure — Mr. Epstein's presence in the circumstances of \nthis case. Accordingly, and given the division of authority surrounding the practice, we \nrespectfully propose it here as a fallback, asking the Court to revisit its propriety despite the \nreservations expressed in Zarrah. Those reservations, though admirably motivated and sincerely \nheld, raise substantial equal protection concerns. They impair the statutory right to release on the \nleast restrictive conditions in the circumstances presented — an inherently individualized \nd\n... [truncated, 3004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/9 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=9]", "char_count": 3004}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 11 of 16 \nOther than his 2008 guilty plea predicated on conduct substantially overlapping the same \nconduct charged here, Mr. Epstein has no criminal history. Congress specifically listed these \nfactors as considerations for the Court, and their absence therefore should weigh in favor of Mr. \nEpstein's pretrial release. Mr. Epstein comes from a stable and humble family background. All \nof his remaining family members, his brother, niece, and nephew, reside in the United States. \nThrough his business and the five residences he maintains in the United States, Mr. Epstein \nemploys people, many of whom have been with him for more than a decade, and feels personally \nresponsible for their livelihoods. Mr. Epstein is admittedly wealthy with all of his financial \nresources (other than his Paris residence) in the United States (including the U.S. Virgin Islands) \nand will provide the Court with more specific information regarding his assets in a sealed \nsupplemental disclosure prior to the upcoming bail hearing if the Court grants leave to file such a \nsealed supplement. Mr. Epstein has, to this point, not provided a complete financial disclosure \non advice of counsel, motivated by a desire to ensure the accuracy of the information provided to \nthe Court. During the years since his release from incarceration in connection with his Florida \nguilty plea, Mr. Epstein has been a law-abiding citizen without a single allegation of criminal \nmisconduct during that period and has focused his efforts on business and philanthropy. At the \nCourt's request, Mr. Epstein will provide a sealed list of his philanthropic donations. \nCrucially, the government has failed to proffer any evidence that Mr. Epstein has ever \nindicated an intent to flee from this investigation or any other criminal matter, which several \ncourts have observed is a critical factor in evaluating whether pretrial release is appropriate. See \nHanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d\n... [truncated, 3773 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/10 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=10]", "char_count": 3773}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 12 of 16 \nsignificantly undercuts any suggestion of current dangerousness based on any regulatory \nclassification. Moreover, as discussed above, Mr. Epstein's strict compliance with the various \nmonitoring requirements associated with his sex-offender registration actually decrease any \ndanger that he might otherwise pose. It is also worth noting that Mr. Epstein is classified as a \ntier-one sex offender, the lowest classification available, in the U.S. Virgin Islands, where he \nmaintains his primary residence. The defense respectfully suggests that Mr. Epstein's Virgin \nIslands designation is more consistent with the circumstances of the actual offenses for which he \nwas convicted, and certainly more consistent with the predictive factor of whether there is a \ndanger of recidivism which the defense contends there is not. \nMr. Epstein's financial means and past international travel do not extinguish this Court's \ncongressional mandate to order pretrial release in every case where reasonable conditions can \nassure the appearance of the defendant as required.' Indeed, numerous courts have rejected \ngovernment requests for detention, and instead ordered pretrial release, in cases where the \ncharged defendant was either a non-citizen (unlike Mr. Epstein) or a naturalized citizen with \nsubstantial if not weightier contacts with foreign jurisdictions, including the following decisions: \n• \nUnited States v. Sablmani, 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007) (reversing district court order of \ndetention of defendants, who were natives of Indonesia, and ordering release despite \ndefendants' \"strong motive to flee\" because of serious charges and \"strong\" evidence of \nguilt, despite finding that defendants faced \"lengthy term of incarceration\" if convicted, \ndespite finding defendants possessed \"ample means to finance flight,\" despite finding that \ndefendants \"maintained strong family ties to their native countries as well as personal an\n... [truncated, 3335 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/11 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=11]", "char_count": 3335}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 13 of 16 \n\"bail statute does not . . . require that foreign defendants be detained simply because their \nreturn cannot be guaranteed through extradition\"); \n• \nUnited States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2004) (ordering release of \ndefendant, an Israeli national who had resided in South Africa for the 18 years preceding \nhis arrest when he landed in Colorado for a family ski trip based on allegations he \nviolated the Export Administration Act and the International Economic Emergency \nPowers Act by acquiring products capable of triggering nuclear weapons and exported \nthem to Pakistan, despite defendant's lack of any ties to the United States, despite finding \nthat defendant had \"no ties to the United States or the Washington, D.C. area,\" despite \nfinding that \"no evidence [was] presented establishing that Defendant has ever lived in \nthis country, owned property here, or that he has any family or community ties in the \nUnited States,\" despite finding that defendant \"was only in this country in order to \nparticipate in a ski vacation with his wife and daughter,\" and despite finding that \"the \nweight of the evidence against Defendant is substantial\"); \n• \nUnited States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (ordering release of \ndefendant, a naturalized citizen of the United States, despite finding defendant \"has \nstrong ties to [her home country of] China,\" finding that the defendant owned property in \nChina, that the defendant spent almost all of her ten years of marriage living abroad with \nher husband, that during 2008 the defendant spent only 22 days in the United States, that \nthe charges against the defendant (violations of International Emergency Economic \nPowers Act and the Export Administration Regulations) \"were serious and carried a \npotential for a significant period of incarceration\" and that the \"government has strong \nevidence against\" the defendant \"including her own statement to inves\n... [truncated, 3397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/12 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=12]", "char_count": 3397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 14 of 16 \nthe alleged conduct at issue here do not apply retroactively to Mr. Epstein's case (including a \nmaximum sentence of life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years). Mr. \nEpstein would, moreover, be subject to prosecution if he fled, which he now knows carries a \nmaximum penalty of up to 10 additional years of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(I)(A)(1), \nand/or the real risk of an enhanced sentence by the Court in this matter if not acquitted. \nIt must further be emphasized that the allegations outlined within the indictment are just \nthat — allegations — and the defendant anticipates substantial factual and legal challenges to the \ngovernment case. For one thing, Epstein has potent legal defenses to prosecution under 18 \nU.S.C. § 1591, the sex trafficking statute driving the pending indictment. We front and briefly \noutline one of those defenses for the limited purpose of seeking bail. We will amplify it later, \nalong with various other arguments, in full-blown dismissal motions. \nSection 1591 was passed as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 \n(\"TVPA\"), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (October 28, 2000). In enacting the TVPA, \nCongress recognized that human trafficking, particularly of women and children in the sex \nindustry, \"is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.\" 22 \nU.S.C. § 7101(b)(1); see also id. at § 7101(b)(2), (4). \"The TVPA criminalizes and attempts to \nprevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial gain.\" United \nStates v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007). Importantly, \"the entire language and \ndesign of the statute as a whole indicates that it is meant to punish those who are the providers or \npimps of children, not the purchasers or the johns.\" Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11-CV8573, 2012 WL \n13042630, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012) (quoting United States v. Bonestroo, No. 1\n... [truncated, 2991 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/13 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=13]", "char_count": 2991}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 15 of 16 \nIV. \nSixth Amendment \nFinally, in a case such as this one, which will likely involve voluminous discovery and is \npredicated on events allegedly occurring 14 or more years ago, it is critical to counsel's ability to \nprovide effective assistance, as well as the defendant's ability to meaningfully contribute to his \ndefense, that Mr. Epstein be permitted pretrial release. The Sixth Amendment \"does not provide \nmerely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right \nto make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be `informed of the nature and \ncause of the accusation,' and who must be `confronted with the witnesses against him,' and who \nmust be accorded `compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.'\" Faretta v. \nCalifornia, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Given the unique circumstances of this case, Mr. \nEpstein's exercise of these important Constitutional rights would be materially impaired by his \npretrial detention. \nV. \nConclusion \nWherefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Epstein respectfully submits that his conduct \nover the past 14 years proves that he poses no risk of flight or threat to the safety of the \ncommunity. Even if the Court should have concerns to the contrary, there clearly exist a \ncombination of conditions that would be sufficient to assure his presence as required and/or the \nsafety of the community, including but not limited to some or all of the conditions proposed \nsupra, or any other conditions the Court deems necessary and appropriate. \nYours truly, \nReid Weingarten \nSteptoe & Johnson, LLP (NYC) \n1114 Avenue of the Americas \nNew York, NY 10036 \n(202)-506-3900 \nFax: (212)-506-3950 \nrweingarten®steptoe.com \nMartin G. Weinberg (application for \nadmission pro lac vice forthcoming) \nMartin G. Weinberg, P.C. \n20 Park Plaza, Suite 1000 \nBoston, MA 02116 \n(617) 227-3700 \nFax: (617) 338-9538 \nowlmgw@att.net \n15 \nE\n... [truncated, 2012 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/14 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=14]", "char_count": 2012}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 16 of 16 \nMarc Allan Fernich \nLaw Office of Marc Fernich \n810 Seventh Ave \nSuite 620 \nNew York, NY 10019 \n(212) 446-2346 \nFax: (212)446 2330 \nmaf@femichlaw.com \n16 \nEFTA00076083\n", "char_count": 232}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-Cr-00400-RMS Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 1 of 15 \nEXHIBIT 1 \nEFTA00076084\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 2 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 2 of \n15 \nCV RE: \nINVESTIGATION OF \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nNON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nIT APPEARING that the City of Palm Beach Police Department and the State \nAttorney's Office for the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (hereinafter, \nthe \"State Attorney's Office\") have conducted an investigation into the conduct of Jeffrey \nEpstein (hereinafter \"Epstein\"); \nIT APPEARING that the State Attorney's Office has charged Epstein by indictment \nwith solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section 796.07; \nIT APPEARING that the United States Attorney's Office and the Federal Bureau of \nInvestigation have conducted their own investigation into Epstein's background and any \noffenses that may have been committed by Epstein against the United States from in or \naround 2001 through in or around Septanber 2007, including; \nknowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to \ncommit an offense against the United States, that is, to use a facility or means \nof interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice \nminor females to engage in prostitution, in violation of Title IS, United States \nCode, Section 2422(b); all in violation ofTitle 18, United States Code, Section \n371; \n(2) \nknowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to travel \nin interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as \ndefined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females, in violation of Title 18, \nUnited States Code, Section 2423(b); all in violation of Title 18, United States \nCode, Section 2423(e); \n(3) \nusing a facility or moans of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly \npersuade, induce, or entice minor females to engage in prostitution; in \nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2; \n(4) \ntraveling in interstate commerce \n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/17 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=17]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 3 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 3 of \n15 \nof Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b); and \n(5) \nknowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruiting, \nenticing, and obtaining by any means a person, knowing that the person had \nnot attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a \ncommercial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(eX I); in violation of Title \n18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1) and 2; and \nIT APPEARING that Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state and federal criminal \nliability and Epstein understands and acknowledges that, in exchange for the benefits \nprovided by this agreement, he agrees to comply with its terms, including undertaking certain \nactions with the State Attorney's Office; \nIT APPEARING, after an investigation of the offenses and Epstein's background by \nboth State and Federal law enforcement agencies, and after due consultation with the State \nAttorney's Office, that the interests of the United States, the State of Florida, and the \nDefendant will be served by the following procedure; \nTHEREFORE, on the authority of It Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for \nthe Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be \ndeferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the \nfollowing conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth below, \nIf the United States Attorney should determine, based on reliable evidence, that, \nduring the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions of this \nAgreement, then the United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days following the \nexpiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide Epstein with timely \nnotice specifying the condition(s) of the Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate its \nprosecut\n... [truncated, 2790 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/18 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=18]", "char_count": 2790}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 4 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 4 of \n15 \nTerms of the Agreement: \n1. \nEpstein shall plead guilty (not nob contendere) to the Indictment as \ncurrently pending against him in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for \nPalm Beach County (Case No. 2006-cf-009495A3OaMB) charging \none (I) count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Fl. Stat § \n796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty to an Information filed \nby the State Attorney's Office charging Epstein with an offense that \nrequires him to register as a sex offender, that is, the solicitation of \nminors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section \n796.03; \n2. \nEpstein shall make a bindirig recommendation that the Court impose a \nthirty (30) month sentence to be divided as follows: \n(a) \nEpstein shall be sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve (12) \nmonths and six (6) months in county jail for all charges, without \nany opportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing, and \nwithout \nprobation or community control \nin lieu of \nimprisonment; and \n(b) \nEpstein shall be sentenced to a term of twelve (12) months of \ncommunity control consecutive to his two terms in county jail \nas described in Term 2(a), supra. \n3. \nThis agreement is contingent upon a Judge of the 15th Judicial Circuit \naccepting and executing the sentence agreed upon between the State \nAttorney's Office and Epstein, the details of which are set forth in this \nagreement. \n4. \nThe terms contained in paragraphs 1 and 2, supra, do not foreclose \nEpstein and the State Attorney's Office from agreeing to recommend \nany additional charge(s) or any additional term(s) of probation and/or \nincarceration. \n5. \nEpstein shall waive all challenges to the Information filed by the State \nAttorney's Office and shall waive the right to appeal his conviction and \nsentence, except a sentence that exceeds what is set forth in \n... [truncated, 2121 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/19 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=19]", "char_count": 2121}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 5 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 5 of \n15 \nproposed agreements with the State Attorney's Office prior to entering \ninto those agreements. \n7. \nThe United States shall provide Epstein's attorneys with a list of \nindividuals whom it has identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement and been sentenced. \nUpon the execution of this agreement, the United States, in consultation \nwith and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel, shall \nselect an attorney representative for these persons, who shall be paid for \nby Epstein. Epstein's counsel may contact the identified individuals \nthrough that representative. \n8. \nIf any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7), supra, elects to \nfile suit pursuant to IS U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest the \njurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District \nof Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives \nhis right to contest liability and also waives his right to comes' damages \nup to an amount as agreed to between the Identified Individual and \nEpstein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed \nexclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other \nclaim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal, or common law. \nNotwithstanding this waiver, as to those individuals whose names \nappear on the list provided by the United States, Epstein's signature on \nthis agreement, his waivers and failures to contest liability and such \ndamages in any suit are not to be construed as an admission of any \ncriminal or civil liability. \n9. \nEpstein's signature on this agreement also is not to be construed as an \nadmission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional \nor other defense as to any person whose name does not appear on the \nlist provided by the United States. \n1\n... [truncated, 2570 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/20 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=20]", "char_count": 2570}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 6 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 6 of \n15 \nsentenced not later than October 26, 2007. The United States has no \nobjection to Epstein self-reporting to begin serving his sentence not \nlater than January 4, 2008. \n12. \nEpstein agrees that he will not be afforded any benefits with respect to \ngain time, other than the rights, opportunities, and benefits as any other \ninmate, including but not limited to, eligibility for gain time credit \nbased on standard rules and regulations that apply in the State of' \nFlorida. At the United States' request, Epstein agrees to provide an \naccounting of the gain time he earned during his period of \nincarceration. \n13. \nThe parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any \npublic record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information \nAct request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of \nthe agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making that \ndisclosure. \nEpstein understands that the United States Attorney has no authority to require the \nState Attorney's Office to abide by any terms of this agreement. Epstein understands that \n11 is his obligation to undertake discussions with the State Attorney's Office and to use his \nbest efforts to ensure compliance with these procedures, which compliance will be necessary \nto satisfy the United States' interest. Epstein also understands that it is his obligation to use \nhis best efforts to convince the Judge of the 15th Judicial Circuit to accept Epstein's binding \nrecommendation regarding the sentence to be imposed, and understands that the failure to \ndo so will be a breach of the agreement. \nIn consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation \nin the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions \nof this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will n\n... [truncated, 3016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/21 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=21]", "char_count": 3016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 7 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 7 of \n15 \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is \nmaterial to this agreement and is supported by independent consideration and that a breach \nof any one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement \nand to investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other individual or entity for any and all \nfederal offenses. \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that he is aware of the fact that \nthe Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that in all criminal \nprosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Epstein further \nis aware that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court \nmay dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint for unnecessary delay in presenting \na charge to the Grand Jury, filing an information, or in bringing a defendant to trial. Epstein \nhereby requests thatthe United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such \nprosecution. Epstein agrees and consents that any delay from the date of this Agreement to \nthe date of initiation of prosecution, as provided for in the terms expressed herein, shall be \ndeemed to be a necessary delay at his own request, and he hereby waives any defense to such \nprosecution on the ground that such delay operated to deny him rights under Rule 48(b) of \nthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the \nUnited States to a speedy trial or to bar the prosecution by mason of the running of the statute \nof limitations for a period of months equal to the period between the signing of this \nagreement and the breach of this agreement as to those offenses that were the subject of the \ngrand jury's investigation. Epstein further asserts and certifies t\n... [truncated, 2557 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/22 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=22]", "char_count": 2557}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 8 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 8 of \n15 \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \nDated: \nDated: \nBy: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nGERALD LEFCOURT, BSQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCM3Z, BSQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nPage 7 of 7 \nEFTA00076091\n", "char_count": 638}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 9 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 9 of \n15 \nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non. \nProsecution Agreement and agreos to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDatod: \nBy: \nDated: \nDated:  711'4107 \nDated: \nA. MARIE VILLAFARA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ., ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nPage 7 of 7 \nEFTA00076092\n", "char_count": 607}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 10 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 10 of \n15 \nBy signing this apeman, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been rad \nand explained to him. Epstein hereby sates that he understands the conditions of this Non-\nProsecution Agreement and sgreat to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNTIED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \n \nBY: \nDated: \nDated: \nDaIod4e \nA. MARIE VILLAFA14A \nASSISTANT US. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nOBRALD LEPCOURT, ESQ• \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nFags 7 of 7 \nEFTA00076093\n", "char_count": 644}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 11 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 11 of \n15 \nRE: \nINVESTIGATION OF \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nADOENTIUM TO THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nrt APPEARING that the parties seek to clarify certain provisions of page 4. paragraph 7 \nof the Non-Prosecution Agreement (hereinafter \"paragraph 7\"), that agreement is modified as \nfollows: \n7A. \nThe United States has the right to assign to an independent third-perry the responsibility \nfor consulting with and, subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel, selecting \nthe attorney representative for the individuals identified under the Agreement If the \nUnited States elects to assign this responsibility to an independent third-party, both the \nUnited States and Epstein retain the right to make good faith objections to the attorney \nrepresentative suggested by the independent third-party prior to the final designation of \nthe attorney representative. \n7Th. \nThe parties will jointly prepare a short written submission to the independent third-party \nregarding the role of the attorney representative and regarding Epstein's Agreement to \npay such attorney representative his or her regular customary hourly rate for representing \nsuch victims subject to the provisions of paragraph C, infra. \n7C. \nPursuant to additional paragraph 7A, Epstein has agreed to pay the fees of the attorney \nrepresentative selected by the Independent third party. This provision, however, shall not \nobligate Epstein to pay the fees-and costs of contested litigation filed against him. Thus, \nif after consideration of potential settlements, an attorney representative elects to file a \ncontested lawsuit pursuant to IS U.S.C. s 2255 or elects to pursue any other contested \nremedy, the paragraph 7 obligation of the Agreement to pay the costs of the attorney \nrepresentative, as opposed to any statutory or other obligations to pay reasonable \nattorneys fees an\n... [truncated, 2119 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/26 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=26]", "char_count": 2119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 12 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 12 of \n15 \nBy signing this Addendum. Epstein assorts end catibes that the above has been read and \nexplained to Mm. Epstein hereby, states that he understands the elarifttations to the Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \nDated: /44 \nDated: \nDated: \nEY: \nA. MARIE VILLAPANA \nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY \nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nEFTA00076095\n", "char_count": 639}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 13 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 13 of \n15 \nBy signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and cettiflee that the above has been read and \nexplained to him. Epstein hereby stases that he understands the clarifications to the Noe. \nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDated: \nDated: \nDated: \nBy: \nA. MARIE VILIAFARA \nASSISTANT V.S. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nD LEPCO \nESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. \nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nEFTA00076096\n", "char_count": 639}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 14 of 15 \nCase 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 14 of \n15 \nBy signing this Addendum, Epstein tan and certifies that the *ow hes beta mad and \nexplained to him. SpateIn hereby sea that he understand. the delineations to the Non-\nProsecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. \nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDowd: \n \nBy: \nDated: \nDoted: \nDated: iragfiffr\n.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nA. MARIE VILIAFARA \nASSISTANT U.B. ATTORNEY \nJEFFREY EPSTEIN \nGERALD LEPCOURT, ESQ. \nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN \nEFTA00076097\n", "char_count": 629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6-1 Filed 07/11/19 Page 15 of 15 \nCase 9:98-cv-80736-KAM Document 361-62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/10/2016 Page 15 of \n15 \n• \n14:1150o \nFrar fouler-MO to Punt t \nArnnoatloo \n3015710201 \n1-ill \nP. M1/MI Fart \n1, haw E. Sprain do had* meant the Nophosecatian Await \nAdderehmi \nrase dyed October 30, 2007. \nEFTA00076098\n", "char_count": 349}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:19-Cr-00400-RMS Document 6-2 Filed 07/11/19 Page 1 of 15 \nEXHIBIT 2 \nEFTA00076099\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:08-c \\O2;613B194O1-0Otfitaltifiletil arte2urfeneleta off Ficarvaatkat Pag6/2Ct1131.5Page 2 of 20 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA \nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON \nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2, \nPetitioners, \nvs. \nUNITED STATES, \nRespondent. \nUNITED STATES' SEALED MOTION TO DISMISS \nFOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION \nThe United States hereby requests that this Court enter an order dismissing these \nproceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section \n3771 (DE I, the \"Petition\"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have \nadvanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), for lack of subject \nmatter jurisdiction.1 \nThis Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition because \nSee, e.g., Gnipo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004) \n(\"Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction can of course be raised at any time prior to final \njudgment.\"); United States v. Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing \nthat \"a party may raise jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the proceedings\"); Harrell \n& Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1977) \n(\"[U]nder Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be \nraised at any time by motion of a party or otherwise.\"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In the \npresent motion, the United States seeks dismissal of Petitioners' claims based on both a legal and \nfactual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. This Court may properly consider \nand weigh evidence beyond Petitioners' allegations when evaluating such a challenge to the \nCourt's subject matter jurisdiction: \nFactual attacks [on a Court's subject matter jurisdiction] ... \"challenge subject \nmatter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.\" In resolving a factual \nattack, the district court \"may cons\n... [truncated, 2144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/32 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=32]", "char_count": 2144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-c Noba3nacookootailltdidetil aliteetirEetteeed of ifildElEiThitket GP-46/30131.5Page 3 of 20 \nPetitioners lack Article III standing and because the claims raised by Petitioners in these \nproceedings are not constitutionally ripe. \nI. \nThe Claims Raised in the Petition Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject \nMatter Jurisdiction Because the Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring Those Claims. \nThese proceedings pursuant to the CVRA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter \njurisdiction because Petitioners lack standing to pursue the remedies that they are seeking for \nalleged CVRA violations. As the Supreme Court has explained, \nto satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has \nsuffered an \"injury in fact\" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or \nimminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the \nchallenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely \nspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. \nFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOG), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 \n(2000); see also, e.g., Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1038 (11th Cir. \n2008) (quoting Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994) (en bane)). Moreover, \"a \nplaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.\" Friends of the \nEarth, 528 U.S. at 185. \nHere, the record incontrovertibly demonstrates that Petitioners cannot satisfy the third \nprong of the standing test, and the Petition and these proceedings must accordingly be dismissed \nfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 E.g., Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. South Florida \ncourt's jurisdiction, a \"trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as \nto the existence of its power to hear the case\" without presuming the truthfulness \nof the plaintiff's allegations. \nMakro Capital of America, Inc. v. UBS AG, \n... [truncated, 2558 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/33 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=33]", "char_count": 2558}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv0303B-19401-00taildRetft 20:15302urErnefisd oFiRLDEVEhlt.kat ®ldgb/409f315Page 4 of 20 \nWater Management Dist, 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) (\"If at any point in the litigation \nthe plaintiff ceases to meet all three requirements for constitutional standing, the case no longer \npresents a live case or controversy, and the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject \nmatter jurisdiction.\"); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1161 (11th \nCir. 2007) (\"[T]he issue of constitutional standing is jurisdictional ....\"); National Parks \nConservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (\"[B]ecause the \nconstitutional standing doctrine stems directly from Article III's 'case or controversy' \nrequirement, this issue implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, and accordingly must be \naddressed as a threshold matter regardless of whether it is raised by the parties.\") (citation \nomitted). \nIn these proceedings, the only identified legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant \nto the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into \nbetween Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida \n(\"USAO-SDFL\"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners seek \"is to \ninvalidate the non-prosecution agreement\"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights \nunder the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non-\nProsecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non-\nProsecution Agreement — which by its terms induced Epstein to, inter alia, plead guilty to state \ncriminal charges and serve an 18-month sentence of state incarceration; — or the governmental \nthis Court need not reach or address those issues because an analysis of the third prong of the \nstanding test incontrovertibly establishes the Petitioners' lack of standing. Nonetheless, the \ncircumstances\n... [truncated, 2442 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/34 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=34]", "char_count": 2442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9 :08-c‘O3O3B.49664-0CtailltdReta 2fft3eurfetteSCt off ikkElEgaltket (0748/S01315Page 5 of 20 \nobligations undertaken therein to be set aside.4 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York 404 U.S. 257, \n262 (1971) (\"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the \nprosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise \nmust be fulfilled.\"); United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) (\"Due \nprocess requires the government to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity \nagreement it makes.\"). \nIndeed, even if this Court were somehow to set aside the Non-\nProsecution Agreement on the authority of the CVRA, and even if after consultation with \nPetitioners the United States determined that it would be proper and desirable to institute a \ncriminal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida against Epstein on the criminal charges \ncontemplated in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States would still be \nconstitutionally required to adhere to the negotiated terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. \nSee, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Harvey, 869 F.2d at 1443. \nDue process considerations further bar this Court from setting aside a non-prosecution \nagreement that grants contractual rights to a contracting party (Epstein) who has not been made a \nparty to the proceedings before the Court. See, e.g., School Dist of City of Pontiac v. Secretary \nof U.S. Dept of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 303 (6th Cir. 2009) (\"It is hornbook law that all parties to a \ncontract are necessary in an action challenging its validity . ...\"); Dawavendewa v. Salt River \nProject Agr. Imp. & Power Dist, 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (\"[A] party to a contract is \nnecessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that \nsubsequent 18-month state incarceration). \n4 To the extent that the Petitioners' requested invalidation of the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement wou\n... [truncated, 2484 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/35 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=35]", "char_count": 2484}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:08-c‘080a3fi-19401-00taG1HIRMB 20153eurfteThelifea oFiRicEllaThlt.kat GRAB/601315Page 6 of 20 \ncontract.\"); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) (\"No procedural \nprinciple is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease \nor a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are \nindispensable.\"); see also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940) (\"It is \nelementary that it is not within the power of any tribunal to make a binding adjudication of the \nrights in personam of parties not brought before it by due process of law.\").5\nAdditionally, a \"favorable ruling\" from this Court will not provide Petitioners with \nanything for the alleged CVRA violations that is not already available to them. For the due \nprocess reasons already discussed above, the United States must legally abide by the terms of the \nNon-Prosecution Agreement even if this Court should somehow set the agreement aside for \nPetitioners to consult further with the government attorney handling the case. Moreover, as will \nbe explained in greater detail below, see infra at 8-12, Petitioners already have the present ability \nto confer with an attorney for the government about a federal criminal case against Epstein — \nwhether or not the Non-Prosecution Agreement is set aside — because the investigation and \npotential federal prosecution of Epstein for crimes committed against the Petitioners and others \nremains a legally viable possibility.6\nThe present proceedings under the CVRA must accordingly be dismissed for lack of \nstanding because Petitioners simply have no injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable \nruling in these proceedings. See, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 470 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2006) \n(holding that there was no standing where it was speculative that remedy that Plaintiff sought \n5 \nSignificantly, it is Epstein's contractual rights under the non-prosecution agreement th\n... [truncated, 2384 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/36 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=36]", "char_count": 2384}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:08-c\n3E-194M-0Otailitletil affoeurEenieiffea off ired3317O.0ftet (/46/201315Page 7 of 20 \nwould redress claimed injury). \nII. \nThe Claims Raised in the Petition Are Not Constitutionally Ripe, and These \nProceedings Must Thus Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. \nThis Court must also dismiss these proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction \nbecause the Petitioners' claims are not constitutionally ripe. \nRipeness, like standing, \"originate[s] from the Constitution's Article III requirement that \nthe jurisdiction of the federal courts be limited to actual cases and controversies.\" Elend v. \nBasham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2006). \"'The ripeness doctrine keeps federal courts \nfrom deciding cases prematurely,' Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. \n2006), and `protects [them] from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the \nreview of potential or abstract disputes,' Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, \n589 (11th Cir.1997).\" United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 2010); see also \nPittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (\"The ripeness doctrine prevent[s] the \ncourts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract \ndisagreements . . . .'\") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of \nAtlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the \nripeness doctrine, a court must therefore determine \"'whether there is sufficient injury to meet \nArticle III's requirement of a case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently \nmature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by \nthe court.\"' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d \n1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). \nWhen evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: \"11) the fitness of the\n... [truncated, 2223 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/37 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=37]", "char_count": 2223}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 9:08-c\n3fi-19464-0CtailltdReta 2ffeeurEenteea o if iractsarmatket GRAB/80131.5Page 8 of 20 \nsee also, e.g., Association For Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc. v. Conger, 899 F.2d \n1164, 1165 (11th Cir. 1990). Under the doctrine, \"[a] claim is not ripe when it is based on \nspeculative possibilities,\" In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011), such as if the claim \n\"'rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur \nat all,\"' Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1392, 1404 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Texas v. \nUnited States, 523U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). Indeed, \"[t]he ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent \nfederal courts from engaging in such speculation and prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily \nreaching constitutional issues.\" Pittman, 267 F.3d at 1280. \nIn these proceedings, the Petitioners have sought to set aside the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement between Epstein and the USAO-SDFL so that Petitioners can \"confer with the \nattorney for the Government\" about the possible filing of federal criminal charges against \nEpstein and the potential disposition of any such charges. See, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 6-7 \n(seeking an \"[o]rder that the [non-prosecution] agreement that was negotiated is invalid\" so that \nPetitioners can exercise the right to confer with the government); id. at 19-20, 24; 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(a)(5); see also DE 1 at 2 ¶ 5 (claiming that Petitioner was \"denied her rights\" under the \nCVRA because she \"received no consultation with the attorney for the government regarding the \npossible disposition of the charges\"). \nNotwithstanding the Non-Prosecution Agreement, Petitioners are and have been free to \nconfer with attorneys for the government about the investigation and potential prosecution of \nEpstein. At least one attorney for the government (Assistant United States Attorney Villafafia \nfrom the USAO-SDFL) had spoken to Petitioners about the offenses committed against them by \nEpstein \n... [truncated, 2201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/38 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=38]", "char_count": 2201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:08-c‘C8Ct3E49464-0Ctfatitleffe2alite2urfe'ne&lft off iFecSEFEldtket CPNgE/901315Page 9 of 20 \n48 at 6 ¶ 8; see also DE 99 at 3, and government attorneys have on multiple occasions offered to \nconfer with Petitioners, see, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 13 (\"I will always confer, sit down \nwith Jane Doe 1 and 2, with the two agents and Ms. Villafana. We'll be happy to sit down with \nthem.\"). Indeed, on December 10, 2010, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of \nFlorida, accompanied by supervisory and line prosecutors from the USAO-SDFL, personally \nconferred with Petitioners' counsel and with Petitioner Jane Doe #1 and entertained discussion \nabout Petitioners' desires to see Epstein criminally prosecuted on federal charges.7 The United \nStates Attorney and prosecutors in the USAO-SDFL have also corresponded with Petitioners' \ncounsel on multiple occasions about Petitioners' desires to have Epstein criminally prosecuted on \nfederal charges.8\nAdditionally, \na number of districts outside the Southern District of Florida (e.g., the Southern \nDistrict of New York and the District of New Jersey) share jurisdiction and venue with the \nSouthern District of Florida over potential federal criminal charges based on the alleged sexual \nacts committed by Epstein against the Petitioners. \nEpstein is thus subject to potential \nprosecution for such acts in those districts. Furthermore, because of the nature of the allegations \nagainst Epstein, the filing of such potential charges against Epstein still remains temporally \nviable; charges for such sexual activities involving minors are not barred by the applicable \n7 The United States Attorney also offered to confer with Jane Doe #2, but Jane Doe #2 \ndeclined the invitation and did not attend the meeting that was scheduled with the United States \nAttorney. \n8 Since that time, the USAO-SDFL has been recused by the Department of Justice from \nprospective responsibility for any criminal investigation or potential\n... [truncated, 2427 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/39 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=39]", "char_count": 2427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:08-05a8071.369<a^0804142elitfulint alFsi2nEnttec'Ed 5rbeZILEE2101EktkIkeRk7/65/20)13.5 Page 10 of \n20 \nstatutes of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3283, 3299. Petitioners are free to contact the United \nStates Attorney's Office in those districts and seek to confer with government attorneys in those \noffices about investigating and potentially prosecuting Epstein based on the alleged federal \ncrimes committed against them.' \nPetitioners nonetheless have appeared to contend throughout these proceedings that the \nmany opportunities that they have been given to consult with the attorneys for the government \nabout Epstein's offenses and the potential charges against Epstein — opportunities which continue \nto be available to Petitioners — are not meaningful under the CVRA due to the existence of the \nNon-Prosecution Agreement. According to Petitioners, the Non-Prosecution Agreement has \ngiven Epstein a \"free pass\" on federal criminal charges for the offenses he committed against \nPetitioners and others. See, e.g., DE 9 at 15 (characterizing Non-Prosecution Agreement as \"a \n`free pass' from the federal government\"), 2 (contending that the Non-Prosecution Agreement \n\"allowed [Epstein] .. . to escape all federal prosecution for dozens of serious federal sex offenses \nagainst minors\"), 7 (\"the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal punishment\"), 12 (\"[T]he \nagreement prevents federal prosecution of the defendant for numerous sex offenses.\"); DE 77 at \n2 (describing Non-Prosecution Agreement as \"an agreement that blocked federal prosecution of \nEpstein for the multitude of sex offenses he committed again [sic] the victims\"), 17 (\"The [Non-\nThe USAO-SDFL has no present knowledge about whether the United States Attorney's \nOffices in those districts have opened any investigations into the allegations that have been made \nagainst Epstein, whether those offices are even aware of those allegations or the evidence \nsupporting them, or what investigative or prosecutorial act\n... [truncated, 2346 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/40 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=40]", "char_count": 2346}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 9:08-6,a807BEWAP8043ROcalftit Daatan£ttter?d bibsafEDBItaeRejeg9/20)13.5 Page 11 of \n20 \nProsecution Agreement] barred prosecution of the federal sexual offenses that Epstein had \ncommitted against Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 .. .\").1° That is simply not so. \nContrary to Petitioners' contentions, there has been no disposition by the government of \nany federal criminal charges against Epstein. No federal charges involving Petitioners have ever \nbeen brought against Epstein, and no such federal charges have been resolved. The Non-\nProsecution Agreement about which Petitioners complain disposes of M federal criminal \ncharges against Epstein, and that agreement does not bar the United States from bringing federal \ncriminal charges against Epstein. Instead, when addressing potential federal criminal charges \nagainst Epstein, the USAO-SDFL merely agreed in the Non-Prosecution Agreement that: \non the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be deferred \nin favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the \nfollowing conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth below. \nand that \nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no \nprosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any \nother offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal \nBureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses \nthat arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this \nDistrict, and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed. \nNon-Prosecution Agreement at 2 (emphasis added). \nThus, the Non-Prosecution Agreement simply obligated the government not to prosecute \nEpstein in the Southern District of Florida for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution \n10 This Court has also previously described \n... [truncated, 2615 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/41 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=41]", "char_count": 2615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:08-6.a807BE94AP804382eark4Bit E@tcsu?n£ntt0ced BibeiBa210111/tkikePatie9/2513.5 Page 12 of \n20 \nAgreement. The Non-Prosecution Agreement does not bar the United States from bringing \nfederal criminal charges against Epstein for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution \nAgreement in any other district in the nation.l I See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678, \n680 (5th Cir. 1979) (\"Where . . . the prosecutor is not found to have made promises relating to \nnonprosecution of charges in another district and the [defendant] is not found to have relied on \nsuch alleged promises, this Court will affirm the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the \nsubsequent prosecutions.\"). Neither does the Non-Prosecution Agreement bar prosecution in any \ndistrict for offenses not identified in the agreement. \nPetitioners contend that the CVRA gives a victim the right to confer with the attorney for \nthe government before there is a disposition of contemplated, but-not-yet-filed federal criminal \ncharges arising from offenses against the victim. But, although the government disputes that the \nCVRA creates such a right,12 the Petitioners have never been denied any such right. The \nPetitioners have had and still have the ability confer to with the attorney for the government \nabout potential federal criminal charges against Epstein and about the potential disposition of \nany such charges, should they be filed. In fact, Petitioners are free to approach the United States \nAttorney's Offices in districts such as the Southern District of New York and the District of New \nJersey — whose authority to institute criminal charges against Epstein in their districts has not \nII Significantly, under the governing provision of the United States Attorney's Manual, the \nUSAO-SDFL did not have the authority to unilaterally bar Epstein's prosecution in any other \ndistrict in the country: \nNo district or division shall make any agreement, including any agreement not to \nprosecute, \n... [truncated, 2575 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/42 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=42]", "char_count": 2575}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 9:08-0.a80213E94AP00412eaMEtit ZetatRYiEnIterd 5thsfElLfEDJIDIS9cePatjeg9filibla5 Page 13 of \n20 \nbeen curtailed by the Non-Prosecution Agreement — to discuss the possibility of pursuing federal \ncriminal charges against Epstein.13 Nothing precludes Petitioners from doing so, and there is \nnothing to indicate that Petitioners' wishes to confer with government attorneys in those districts \nwould be rebuffed in any way. Indeed, it would be rank speculation by Petitioners to contend \notherwise. \nHere, Petitioners have acknowledged that the best relief they can hope to obtain through \nthese proceedings is the ability to confer with the attorneys for the government. See, e.g., July \n11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 7 (agreeing that \"the best [Petitioners] can get\" is the \"right to confer\"). \nYet, under the circumstances, a claim that Petitioners have been denied the opportunity to confer \nwith the attorney for the government about the filing and disposition of criminal charges against \nEpstein is premature and constitutionally unripe. \"This is plainly the type of hypothetical case \nthat [a court] should avoid deciding.\" Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc. \nv. Conger, 899 F.2d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1990). Any speculation by Petitioners that they might \nprospectively be denied the opportunity to confer with the government about still-legally-viable \nfederal charges against Epstein simply cannot ripen Petitioners' claims. See id. (recognizing that \ncourts \"do not generally decide cases based on a party's predicted conduct\"). \nFor these reasons, Petitioners' claims in these proceedings should be dismissed for lack \nof subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) \n(holding that claims that are \"based on events that may take place in the future\" are to be \n\"dismissed for lack of jurisdiction\") (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, \n1574 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) (\"[R]ipeness goes to whether the dist\n... [truncated, 2433 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00076068/43 or ?id=EFTA00076068&page=43]", "char_count": 2433}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 9:08-O,a89713f9gAP804Meafulfilt oaaanernaurd EnbeiEILISMIDIS9(eFlatieliVibla5 Page 14 of \n20 \njurisdiction to hear the case.\")); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1415 (11th Cir. 1994) \n(\"The question of ripeness `goes to whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.\"') \n(quoting Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1573); see also Jacksonville Property Rights Ass 'n, Inc. v. City \nof Jacksonville, 635 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that when plaintiffs ask a \ncourt \"to issue a declaration on an issue that might never impact their substantive rights,\" they \nare \"asking th[e] court either to issue an impermissible advisory opinion, or to decide a case that \nis not yet ripe for decision\"), reit g & reh:g en banc denied, Case No. 09-15629, \nFed. App'x \n(11th Cir. Jun. 29, 2011) (Table). \nConclusion \nFor the reasons set forth above, the United States respectfully requests that this Court \nenter an order dismissing the Petitioners' claims and these proceedings for lack of subject matter \njurisdiction. \n13 \nEFTA00076112\n", "char_count": 1053}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00076068", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 9:08-8a8013159,4108041tlitlitaiEtt DleanEErritgrEd OilieftegelakckeP2t7/69/2013.5 Page 15 of \n20 \nRespectfully submitted, \nWIFREDO A. FERRER \nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY \nDexter A. Lee \nAssistant United States Attorney \nFlorida Bar No. 0936693 \n99 N.E. 4th Street \nMiami. Florida 33132 \nTel: (305) 961-9320; Fax: (305) 530-7139 \nEmail: dexter.lee@usdoj.gov \nEduardo 1. Sanchez \nAssistant United States Attorney \nFlorida Bar No. 877875 \n99 N.E. 4th Street \nMiami, Florida 33132 \nTel: (305) 961-9057; Fax: (305) 536-4676 \nEmail: eduardo.i.sanchez@usdoj.gov \nA. Marie Villafatia \nAssistant United States Attorney \nFlorida Bar No. 0018255 \n500 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 400 \nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401 \nTel: (561) 820-8711; Fax: (561) 820-8777 \nEmail: ann.marie.c.villafana®usdoj.gov \nAttorneys for Respondent \n14 \nEFTA00076113\n", "char_count": 825}]}