{"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_count": 74, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00075477", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00075477.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 20-2413. Document 40. 08'20/2020. 2913550, Pagel of 74 \n20-2413 \nUnited States Court of Appeals for \nthe Second Circuit \nPlaintlff-Appelke, \n—against—\nGHISLA1NE MAXWELL, \nDefendant-Appellant, \nSHARON CHURCHER, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, \nRespondents, \nJULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD MEDIA COMPANY, \nALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, MICHAEL CERNOVICH, DBA CERNOVICH MEDIA \nIntervenors. \nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 15-CV-7433 (LAP) \nGhislaine Maxwell's Opening Brief \nTy Gee \nAdam Mueller \nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDen r \n2 \nTel. \nAttorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00075477\n", "char_count": 664}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page2 of 74 \nTable of Contents \nTable of Authorities \n iii \nIntroduction \n1 \nJurisdictional Statement \n2 \nIssues Presented \n3 \nStatement of the Case and the Facts \n3 \nThe defamation action and the Protective Order \n3 \nThe motion to unseal and the first appeal \n6 \nThe remand, the arrest, and the indictment. \n7 \nThe order unsealing the deposition material, including Ms. Maxwell's April \n2016 deposition transcript \n11 \nEvents after the filing of the notice of appeal and the critical new information 13 \nSummary of the Argument \n15 \nArgument \n16 \nI. Even without the benefit of the critical new information, the district court \nabused its discretion in ordering the unsealing of the deposition material \n16 \nA. Standard of review. \n16 \nB. The district court erred in ordering the unsealing.  \n17 \n1. The presumption of access to the deposition material is lower than the \npresumption of access this Court ascribed to the summary judgment \nmaterial \n21 \na. Ms. Maxwell's reliance interests, and those of Doe 1, outweigh any \npresumption of access. \n23 \ni \nEFTA00075478\n", "char_count": 1117}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page3 of 74 \nb. Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to remain silent outweighs any \npresumption of access. \n29 \nc. Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury \noutweighs any presumption of access \n35 \nd. Ms. Maxwell's privacy interests outweigh any presumption of \naccess \n39 \nConclusion \n41 \nCertificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A) \n43 \nCertificate of Service \n43 \nATTACHMENT 1: July 23, 2020 Transcript Ordering Unsealing of the Deposition \nMaterial \nATTACHMENT 2: July 28, 2020 Order Directing Process of Unsealing \nATTACHMENT 3: July 29, 2020 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider \nii \nEFTA00075479\n", "char_count": 677}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page4 of 74 \nTable of Authorities \nCases \nApplication of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990) \n40 \nAT&T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2005) \n26 \nBernstein v. Bernstein Li towitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2016) \n \n17 \nBrown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019) \npassim \nCrescent Publ'g Grp., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 246 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2001) \n17 \nFDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982) \n25 \nv. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) \n6, 25, 40 \nIn re Mazzeo, 167 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1999) \n17 \nIn re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987) \n37, 40 \nIn re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2011) \n1 \nJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) \n22 \nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012) \n34 \nLugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) \n 19, 21 \nMaldanado v. City of New York, Case No. 17-cv-6618 (AJN), 2018 WL 2561026 \n(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2018) \n35 \nMartindell v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) \npassim \nN.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. (NYCTA), 684 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. \n2012) \n18 \nNewsday LLC v. Cnoi. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2013) \n18, 20 \niii \nEFTA00075480\n", "char_count": 1284}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page5 of 74 \nNixon a Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) \nNosik a Singe, 40 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1994) \nPress-Enter. Co. a Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) \nS.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) \npassim \n34 \n37 \npassim \nSeattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) \n24 \nState a Cady, 414 P.3d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) \n19 \nUnited States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (\"Amodeo r') \n19, 22 \nUnited States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) (\"Amodeo II\") \npassim \nUnited States a HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) \n19, 20 \nUnited States a Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1995) \n17 \nUnited States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995) \n24 \nWu v. IN.S., 436 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2006) \n28 \nStatutes \n28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) \n2 \nRules \nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(1) \n22 \nFed. R. Civ. P. 20(A)(2)(a)(ii) \n22 \nFed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) \n28 \nFed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 \n24 \nFed. R. Evid. 615 \n39 \nS.D.N.Y. Local Criminal Rule 23.1  \n9 \niv \nEFTA00075481\n", "char_count": 1028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020. 2913550, Page6 of 74 \nConstitutional Provisions \nU.S. CONST. amend. V \npassim \nU.S. CONST. amend. VI \n35 \nEFTA00075482\n", "char_count": 158}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page7 of 74 \nIntroduction \nThis case, 15-cv-7433 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y), began as a defamation action, \nthough it is hardly recognizable as that anymore. The stakes are much higher now. \nThe government has indicted Ghislaine Maxwell. The media have all but \nconvicted her. \nIn the criminal case, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y.), the government alleges, \namong other things, that Ms. Maxwell committed perjury during her civil \ndeposition. But Ms. Maxwell sat for her deposition and was compelled to answer \nnumerous personal, sensitive, and allegedly incriminatory questions only after the \nplaintiff and the district court, through a stipulated Protective Order, guaranteed \nthe confidentiality of her answers. As this Court long ago recognized, and as this \ncase shows, \"witnesses might be expected frequently to refuse to testify pursuant \nto protective orders if their testimony were to be made available to the Government \nfor criminal investigatory purposes in disregard of those orders.\"' \nIt now appears that the district court's promise of confidentiality was \ndubious at best. Indeed, the promise is at risk of being broken entirely. \n' Martindell v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979), cited \nwith approval in In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2011). \n1 \nEFTA00075483\n", "char_count": 1351}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page8 of 74 \nThe government has obtained a copy of Ms. Maxwell's confidential \ndeposition, sealed pursuant to the Protective Order entered by the district court. \nThe criminal indictment quotes directly from it. And just three weeks ago, the \ndistrict court in the civil case ordered it to be unsealed. \nThe district court's unsealing order eviscerates the promise of \nconfidentiality on which Ms. Maxwell and numerous third parties reasonably \nrelied. It sanctions the perjury trap unfairly set for Ms. Maxwell, in violation of the \nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and it risks Ms. Maxwell's \ndue process right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. If the unsealing order goes into \neffect, it will forever let the cat out of the bag. \nTo vindicate Ms. Maxwell's reasonable reliance on the Protective Order, to \nprotect her constitutional rights to remain silent and to a fair trial by an impartial \njury, and for all the other reasons offered below, this Court should reverse the \nunsealing order. \nJurisdictional Statement \nThe district court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This \nCourt has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Corn, \n273 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 2001) (collateral order jurisdiction exists over order \nunsealing material within the scope of a protective order). \n2 \nEFTA00075484\n", "char_count": 1423}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page9 of 74 \nIssues Presented \nWhether the district court abused its discretion in ordering the unsealing of \nMs. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition transcript, the transcript of the deposition of \nDoe 1, and the district court filings that quote, summarize, or characterize both \ntranscripts. \nStatement of the Case and the Facts \nThe defamation action and the Protective Order. \nlleged that Ms. Maxwell defamed her. App. pp 121-24. \nThe alleged defamation centered on a statement from Ms. Maxwell's attorney-\nhired press agent generally denying as \"untrue\" and \"obvious lies\" plaintiff's \nnumerous allegations, over the span of four years, that Ms. Maxwell participated in \na scheme causing her to be \"sexually abused and trafficked\" by Jeffrey Epstein. \nApp. p 119. \nPlaintiff, a public figure required to prove actual malice, litigated her \ndefamation action by trying to transform it into a criminal or tort action for sexual \nabuse and sexual trafficking of minors. Her lawyers intended to prove the \ndefamation claim solely by, in effect, \"prosecuting\" Ms. Maxwell as a proxy for \nEpstein. App. p 116, ¶ffil 8-10; p 119 9¶ 27; p 122, ¶ 12; p 123, 51114, 16; p 124,9120. \n3 \nEFTA00075485\n", "char_count": 1239}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Pagel 0 of 74 \nPlaintiff chose this course of action because even she had to admit that numerous of \nher statements were false. \nDiscovery in the case was correspondingly intrusive, hard-fought, and wide-\nranging. It spanned more than a year and included voluminous document \nproductions, numerous responses to interrogatories, and thirty-some depositions, \nincluding depositions of plaintiff and Ms. Maxwell as well as several third parties, \nincluding Doe 1. See Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) \n(explaining that discovery was \"hard-fought\" and \"extensive\" and noting that the \ncourt file, which includes only a portion of documents created during discovery, \ntotals in the \"thousands of pages\"). \nPlaintiff sought and obtained a wide variety of private and confidential \ninformation about Ms. Maxwell, Doe 1, and others, including information about \nfinancial and sexual matters. Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 n.22. Given the amount of \npersonal, confidential material and information exchanged between the parties \nduring discovery, the district court entered a stipulated Protective Order protecting \nfrom public disclosure information the parties in good faith concluded was \nconfidential. App. pp 126-31. The Protective Order included a mechanism for one \nparty to challenge another party's confidentiality designation (such a challenge \nnever occurred) and expressly provided that it was not applicable to any \n4 \nEFTA00075486\n", "char_count": 1496}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Pagel 1 of 74 \ninformation or material disclosed at trial. App. p 128, ¶ 8; p 129, ¶ 11; p 130, TT 12-\n13. \n\"The Protective Order, despite the angst it is now causing, is unremarkable \nin form and function.\" App. p 516. Counsel for plaintiff originally proposed \nprotective order language that would have allowed for a \"law enforcement\" \nexception. In particular, Paragraph I(a)4 of the draft proposed that \n\"CONFIDENTIAL information shall not be disclosed or used for any purpose \nexcept the preparation and trial of this case and any related matter, including but \nnot limited to, investigations by law enforcement.\" App. p 609. \nThis language was rejected by Ms. Maxwell because of her concerns that \nplaintiff and her lawyers were acting as either express or de facto agents of the \ngovernment. App. p 570. In turn, the language agreed upon and made an order of \nthe district court specifically excluded an exception for law enforcement. App. pp \n126-31. \nHad the Protective Order included a law enforcement exception, Ms. \nMaxwell would have proceeded in a different fashion, including by invoking her \nconstitutional right to remain silent. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. App. p 570. She \ninstead relied on this language and the protection afforded to her by this Court \nunder established Second Circuit law, e.g., Martindell, 594 F.2d 291. \n5 \nEFTA00075487\n", "char_count": 1403}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page12 of 74 \nAfter the district court denied Ms. Maxwell's motion for summary \njudgment, the parties agreed to a settlement of the defamation claim, and the case \nwas dismissed. \nu. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428,436 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), \nvacated and remanded sub nom. Brown, 929 F.3d 41. As the district court below \nfound as a matter of fact, \"a significant, if not determinative, factor\" in reaching a \nsettlement was its confidentiality, a feature that echoes the purpose of the \nProtective Order on which Ms. Maxwell and numerous third parties, including Doe \n1, justifiably relied. Id. at 446. \nThe motion to unseal and the first appeal. \nOne year after the case was dismissed and closed, the Miami Herald sought \nto reopen the case and to unseal every sealed filing on the district court docket. \nApp. pp 381-402. The district court denied the motion to unseal. a, \n325 F. \nSupp. 3d 428. \nThe Miami Herald appealed, and this Court vacated. Brown, 929 F.3d at 44-\n45. The majority concluded that the district court erred in sealing the summary \njudgment materials. Id. at 47-48. Upon the issuance of the mandate, this Court \nunsealed the summary judgment materials to the public and the press, redacting \ncertain sensitive and private information, including \"deposition responses \nconcerning intimate matters where the questions were likely only permitted —and \n6 \nEFTA00075488\n", "char_count": 1427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page13 of 74 \nthe responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of continued \nconfidentiality.\" Id at 48 n.22. It remanded the case to the district court to \nconduct a particularized review of the remaining records to which the Herald \nsought access. Id at 53-54. \nJudge Pooler dissented in part. Id at 54. Although she agreed the district \ncourt erred, she would have had this Court unseal only the summary judgment \norder while leaving \"the remainder of the materials for the district court to review, \nredact, and unseal on remand.\" Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting in part). \nDespite the division among the judges, this Court was unanimous in its \nrecognition of \"the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may \naccompany public disclosure of hard-fought, sensitive litigation.\" Id. at 44. \nFinally, anticipating that the district court would not have the last word \nabout whether certain materials should remain under seal, this Court instructed \nthat \"[i]n the interests of judicial economy, any future appeal in this matter shall be \nreferred to this panel.\" Id. at 54. \nThe remand, the arrest, and the indictment. \nOn remand, the Miami Herald sought to unseal Ms. Maxwell's depositions \n(taken in April and July 2016) and the deposition of Doe 1 (taken in June 2016). Ms. \nMaxwell's April 2016 deposition transcript is part of the court file only because \n7 \nEFTA00075489\n", "char_count": 1443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page14 of 74 \nPlaintiff submitted the entire 418-page transcript as an exhibit to a motion to exceed \nthe presumptive ten deposition limit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n20(A)(2)(a)(ii). App. pp 188-215,1003-30,1214-1632. The submission of the \nentire deposition transcript was gratuitous and unnecessary and exactly the type of \nabuse of court filings this Court anticipated in Brown. 929 F.3d at 51-52.2 While the \nentire transcript of the Doe 1 deposition was not filed with the district court, those \nexcerpts that were filed likewise were gratuitous to the plaintiff's requested relief. \nMs. Maxwell accordingly filed an objection to the unsealing request, plaintiff \nand the Herald each filed a response, and Ms. Maxwell filed a reply. App. pp 403-\n22,480-513,527-66. \nOn July 2,2020, one day after Ms. Maxwell filed her reply, the government \nstaged a dramatic, forced entry at dawn into her home and arrested her. App. p 569. \nImmediately after Ms. Maxwell's arrest, Acting U.S. Attorney Audrey \nStrauss held a press conference and made numerous comments attacking Ms. \nMaxwell's credibility and expressing her opinion of Ms. Maxwell's guilt, e.g., that \n2 The transcript of Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition is contained at App. \npp 1214-1632, filed under seal with this Court. This Court, however, is already \naware of the nature of some of its contents, because it redacted statements made by \nMs. Maxwell from the July 2016 deposition when it released the summary \njudgment material to the public, some of which included excerpts of the July \ntranscript. Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 n.22. \n8 \nEFTA00075490\n", "char_count": 1667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page15 of 74 \nshe was guilty of \"l[ying]\" in her deposition \"because the truth, as alleged, was \nalmost unspeakable.\" App. p 569. \nPlaintiff's counsel piled on, offering their own opinions about Ms. Maxwell's \nguilt. For example, Bradley Edwards opined that Ms. Maxwell was \"a main \nfacilitator\" of Epstein's crimes who \"started the whole thing.\" App. p 569. And \nSigrid McCawley praised the prosecutors: \"[They] have done an incredible job and \nthey're being very meticulous, they want to make sure that the Indictments \nstick. . . . They took a lot of time to be very careful and thoughtful and that gives me \na lot of hope that [Ms. Maxwell] will remain in prison for the remainder of her \nlife. . . . [Ms. Maxwell] was really the central figure. . ..\" App. p 569. \nMs. Maxwell's motion for an order barring such extrajudicial comments led \nJudge Nathan (S.D.N.Y.), who is presiding over the criminal case, to admonish \n\"counsel for all involved parties [to] exercise great care to ensure compliance with \nthis Court's local rules, including Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and the rules of \nprofessional responsibility.\" App. p 586. Judge Nathan further \" warn[ed] counsel \nand agents for the parties and counsel for potential witnesses that going forward \n[the court] will not hesitate to take appropriate action in the face of violations of \nany relevant rules.\" App. p 586. Judge Nathan said she would ensure \"strict \n9 \nEFTA00075491\n", "char_count": 1483}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page16 of 74 \ncompliance\" with the rules and \"ensure that the Defendant's right to a fair trial \nwill be safeguarded.\" App. p 586. \nOn July 8, the government filed a superseding indictment alleging that Ms. \nMaxwell \"assisted, facilitated, and contributed\" to Epstein's abuse of minors. \nApp. p 588. The indictment turned to and relied on this civil action, alleging that in \n2016 Ms. Maxwell made \"efforts to conceal her conduct\" by \"repeatedly \nprovid[ing] false and perjurious statements\" in deposition testimony. App. p 596. \nQuoting verbatim from Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition transcript, the \nindictment alleges that Ms. Maxwell gave false testimony (a) when she testified \"I \ndon't know what you're talking about\" in response to a question whether Epstein \n\"ha[d] a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages . . . [i]f you know\"; \nand (b) when she testified, \"I'm not aware of anybody that I interacted with [other \nthan plaintiff] who was 17 at this point.\" App. pp 602-03. \nNone of these questions and answers was used in the summary judgment \nmaterials released by this Court in Brown. The transcript containing this testimony \nis sealed. \nOnly two parties—plaintiff and Ms. Maxwell—and their counsel had proper \naccess to the transcripts of Ms. Maxwell's depositions. The transcripts, which were \ndesignated \"confidential\" under the Protective Order, could only be disclosed to \n10 \nEFTA00075492\n", "char_count": 1472}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page17 of 74 \n\"attorneys actively working on this case\" and \"persons regularly employed or \nassociated with the attorneys who are working on this case.\" App. p 127. As \nexplained above, supra at 5, this language was negotiated by the parties specifically \nto exclude an exception for investigations by law enforcement. \nFrom Ms. Maxwell's indictment and arrest, two things are plain. One, as the \nindictment and superseding indictment establish, the government has a copy of the \ntranscripts from Ms. Maxwell's April and July 2016 depositions, both of which \nwere designated \"Confidential.\" \nTwo, the government did not obtain a copy of the deposition transcripts \nfrom Ms. Maxwell or her counsel. \nThe order unsealing the deposition material, including Ms. Maxwell's \nApril 2016 deposition transcript. \nOn July 23, over Ms. Maxwell's objection, Judge Preska —who is presiding \nover the civil case and the litigation about the unsealing of the district court \nfilings —ordered the complete unsealing of Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition \ntranscript and Doe 1's deposition transcript as well as numerous sealed or redacted \norders and papers that quote from or disclose information from the transcripts \n11 \nEFTA00075493\n", "char_count": 1270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page18 of 74 \n(collectively, the \"deposition material\").3 App. pp 835-51. That Ms. Maxwell was \nunder criminal investigation and had been indicted, the court ruled, \"is not entitled \nto much weight\" in determining whether the deposition material should be \nunsealed. App. p 839. The court did not address Ms. Maxwell's argument that she \nrelied on the Protective Order, let alone explain why that reliance was \n\"unreasonable.\" App. pp 836-49. \nOn July 28, the district court entered an order directing the public release of \nthe deposition material on July 30. App. p 567. \nMs. Maxwell filed a motion to reconsider on July 29. App. pp 568-76. The \nmotion asked the district court, should it deny the motion to reconsider, for a two-\nbusiness-day stay of its order to permit Ms. Maxwell an opportunity to seek relief in \nthis Court. App. p 568. \nThe court denied the motion to reconsider but stayed the unsealing until \nAugust 3. App. pp 779-80. \n3 The district court is poised next to consider whether Ms. Maxwell's July \n2016 deposition transcript should also be unsealed. \nWhat this brief refers to as the \"deposition material\" is included in \nAppendix Vol. V -VIII, filed under seal with this Court, and includes District \nCourt docket entries: 143,144-1,144-2,144-4,144-5,144-6,144-7,149,150-1,152, \n153-1,172,173-6,184,203,211,224, and 228. \n12 \nEFTA00075494\n", "char_count": 1412}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page19 of 74 \nOn July 29, Ms. Maxwell filed a notice of appeal from the district court's \nunsealing order. App. p 781. Ms. Maxwell also filed an emergency motion with this \nCourt to stay the unsealing order pending appeal. \nThis Court granted the motion to stay and, accepting Ms. Maxwell's \nsuggestion, ordered expedited briefing. \nEvents after the filing of the notice of appeal and the critical new \ninformation. \nOn August 5, just days after Ms. Maxwell filed the notice of appeal and this \nCourt stayed the unsealing order pending appeal, the government in the criminal \ncase produced discovery to Ms. Maxwell that revealed critical new information. \nThis information bears directly on the merits of this appeal, namely whether it was \nproper for the district court to unseal the depositions, and it supports a stay of the \ncivil case until the resolution of the criminal case. App. pp 787-89. Ms. Maxwell on \nAugust 7 reviewed the government's disclosure and on August 10 informed Judge \nPreska about the existence of the critical new information. App. p 787. \nAt the time, however, a protective order in the criminal case, entered by \nJudge Nathan, prevented Ms. Maxwell from informing Judge Preska about the \nnature of the new information. App. pp 787,791-802. The same protective order \nnow prevents Ms. Maxwell from disclosing to this Court the nature of the new \ninformation. App. pp 791-802. \n13 \nEFTA00075495\n", "char_count": 1470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page20 of 74 \nOn August 12, after learning that new information existed but unaware of \nwhat the new information was, Judge Preska took no action. App. pp 803-04. Judge \nPreska said she would reevaluate the matter should Judge Nathan modify the \ncriminal protective order to allow Ms. Maxwell to share with her and this Court the \nnature of the new information. App. p 804. \nOn August 17, Ms. Maxwell filed a motion with Judge Nathan to modify the \ncriminal protective order to allow her in sealed submissions to inform Judge Preska \nand this Court about the new information.4 As of the filing of this brief, Judge \nNathan has not yet ruled on that request. Judge Nathan has ordered the \ngovernment to respond to Ms. Maxwell's motion by noon August 21. App. p 852. \nMs. Maxwell's reply is due at noon on August 24. App. p 852. \nIf Judge Nathan grants the motion to modify the criminal protective order, \nMs. Maxwell intends to ask this Court for a limited remand to permit Judge Preska \nto reevaluate her unsealing order based on the information previously kept from \nher. \n4 Because of the protective order entered by Judge Nathan in the criminal \ncase, Ms. Maxwell's motion to modify the protective order was itself filed under \nseal. \n14 \nEFTA00075496\n", "char_count": 1303}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page21 of 74 \nIf Judge Nathan denies the motion to modify, Ms. Maxwell intends to file a \nnotice of appeal from the order denying modification and to consolidate that appeal \nwith this one. \nAs explained below, however, even without the benefit of this critical new \ninformation, Judge Preska abused her discretion in ordering the unsealing of the \ndeposition material. \nSummary of the Argument \nThe district court erred in ordering the unsealing of the deposition material. \nFirst, the district court failed to address or even acknowledge the reliance interests \nof those who, like Ms. Maxwell, sat for a deposition confident in the guarantee of \nconfidentiality provided by the Protective Order. The district court's failure to \nacknowledge or address Ms. Maxwell's or Doe l's reliance interest is itself an \nabuse of discretion, particularly because, had the district court addressed the issue, \nit would have seen this Court's longstanding commitment to vindicating reasonable \nreliance on Protective Orders. \nSecond, the district court erred in dismissing outright the fact of the criminal \nindictment of Ms. Maxwell as a relevant consideration. In fact, the pending \nindictment of Ms. Maxwell—based in part on the government's possession of her \nsealed and confidential deposition—provides compelling reasons to keep the \n15 \nEFTA00075497\n", "char_count": 1393}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page22 of 74 \ndeposition material under seal. Unsealing the deposition would prejudice (or at \nleast prejudge) Ms. Maxwell's argument in the criminal case that the government \nimproperly obtained her sealed and confidential deposition. Releasing the \ndeposition material also would lead to prejudicial and unconstitutional pretrial \npublicity while also undermining the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial by \nleading witnesses to conform their testimony and recast their memories of events \nfrom decades ago. \nFinally, the district court did not give adequate weight to the privacy \ninterests of those, including Ms. Maxwell and Doe 1, about whom intimate, \nsensitive, and personal information is about to be spread like wildfire across the \nInternet. To be sure, the district court intends to release information of the type \nthis Court itself declined on privacy grounds to release in the first appeal when it \nredacted certain deposition answers from the summary judgment material. The \ncourt abused its discretion on this basis as well. \nArgument \nI. Even without the benefit of the critical new information, the district \ncourt abused its discretion in ordering the unsealing of the deposition \nmaterial. \nA. Standard of review. \nWhen reviewing a decision to unseal, this Court examines the district court's \nfactual findings for clear error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate \n16 \nEFTA00075498\n", "char_count": 1475}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page23 of 74 \ndecision to seal or unseal for abuse of discretion. Brown, 929 F.3d at 47 & n.11 \n(quoting Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132,139 \n(2d Cir. 2016)). A district court \"necessarily abuses its discretion if its conclusions \nare based on an erroneous determination of law.\" TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229 \n(quoting Crescent Publ'g Op., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 246 F.3d 142,146 (2d Cir. \n2001)). \n\"Reviewable-for-abuse-of-discretion, however, does not mean \nunreviewable.\" In re Mazzeo, 167 F.3d 139,142 (2d Cir. 1999). To the contrary, the \ndistrict court must address the relevant legal principles and arguments of the \nparties and it must explain its reasoning to permit meaningful appellate review. Id. \n(\"A principal purpose of the requirement for specific factual findings is to inform \nthe appellate court of the basis of the decision and to permit effective appellate \nreview.\"). \"An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court fails to make the \nrequired factual findings, or if those factual findings are clearly erroneous.\" United \nStates v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68,71 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). \nB. The district court erred in ordering the unsealing. \nThere are \"two related but distinct presumptions in favor of public access to \ncourt proceedings and records: a strong form rooted in the First Amendment and a \nslightly weaker form based in federal common law.\" Newsday LLC v. Cny. of \n17 \nEFTA00075499\n", "char_count": 1535}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page24 of 74 \nNassau, 730 F.3d 156,163 (2d Cir. 2013); see Brown, 929 F.3d at 47. These \npresumptions exist because of the \"need for federal courts, although \nindependent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a \nmeasure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the \nadministration of justice.\" United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,1048 (2d Cir. \n1995) (\"Amodeo Zr'). \nA presumption of access, however, is just that: a presumption. Brown, 929 \nF.3d at 49-50. There is no absolute right of access, and the presumption, where it \napplies, can always be overcome. Id; Newsday, 730 F.3d at 164. \"What offends the \nFirst Amendment is the attempt to [exclude the public] without sufficient \njustification,\" not the act of exclusion itself. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. \nTransit Auth. (NYCTA), 684 F.3d 286,296 (2d Cir. 2012); see Brown, 929 F.3d at \n48-51; Newsday, 730 F.3d at 165. That's because \nevery court has supervisory power over its own records \nand files, and access has been denied where court files \nmight have become a vehicle for improper purposes. For \nexample, the common-law right of inspection has bowed \nbefore the power of a court to insure that its records are \nnot used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal \nand when its files serve as reservoirs of libelous \nstatements for press consumption. \n18 \nEFTA00075500\n", "char_count": 1436}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page25 of 74 \nNixon a Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (cleaned up), quoted in \nBrown, 929 F.3d at 51.5\nWhen a nonparty seeks access to records in possession of a court pursuant \neither to the common law or the First Amendment, the threshold question is \nwhether the records qualify as \"judicial documents.\" United States v. HSBC Bank \nUSA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2017) (\"The threshold merits question in \nthis case is whether the Monitor's Report is a judicial document, as only judicial \ndocuments are subject to a presumptive right of public access, whether on common \nlaw or First Amendment grounds.\"). This Court has made clear that \"the mere \nfiling of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to render that paper a \njudicial document subject to the right of public access.\" Brown, 929 F.3d at 49 \n(quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141,145 (2d Cir. 1995) (\"Amodeo P'). In \norder to be designated a judicial document, \"the item filed must be relevant to the \nperformance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.\" Id. (quoting \nAmodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110,119 \n(2d Cir. 2006) (same). \n5 \"The parenthetical `cleaned up,' while perhaps unfamiliar, is being used \nwith increasing frequency to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, \nand/or citations have been omitted from a quotation.\" State v. Cady, 414 P.3d 974, \n977 (Utah Ct. App. 2018). \n19 \nEFTA00075501\n", "char_count": 1536}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page26 of 74 \nIn considering whether a record qualifies as a \"judicial document,\" this \nCourt must \"determine the degree of judicial reliance on the document in question \nand the relevance of the document's specific contents to the nature of the \nproceeding.\" Newsday, 730 F.3d at 166-67. The filing with the court of \"deposition \ntranscripts, interrogatories, and documents exchanged in discovery\" does not, \nfrom that fact of filing alone, convert the transcripts, interrogatories, and discovery \ndocuments into \"judicial documents\" for purposes of the right to access. HSBC, \n863 F.3d at 139. Nor does the \"mere fact that a dispute exists about whether a \ndocument should be sealed or disclosed\" render the disputed document a judicial \ndocument. Newsday, 730 F.3d at 167. Were the rule otherwise, it \"would bootstrap \nmaterials that are not closely related to judicial proceedings into judicial \ndocuments.\" Id. \nIf a filing qualifies as a judicial document triggering the presumptive right of \naccess, the court must determine the weight to be afforded to the presumption and \nthen balance the interest in access against competing considerations. Amodeo II, 71 \nF.3d at 1050. Competing considerations include, but are not limited to, the reliance \ninterests of those resisting disclosure, the constitutional rights attendant a criminal \ntrial, and the right to privacy. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229-31 (reliance); \n20 \nEFTA00075502\n", "char_count": 1487}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page27 of 74 \nMartindell, 594 F.2d at 293 (constitutional rights); Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1150 \n(privacy); see Brown, 929 F.3d at 47 n.13. \n1. The presumption of access to the deposition material is lower \nthan the presumption of access this Court ascribed to the \nsummary judgment material. \nIn Brown v. Maxwell, this Court directly released to the public the summary \njudgment order and material submitted in connection with the summary judgment \nbriefing, subject to minimal redactions. 929 F.3d at 53. This Court concluded that \nthe minimally redacted material was subject to a \"strong presumption\" of access \nunder the First Amendment and the common law. Id. at 47 & n.12 (citing Lugosch, \n435 F.3d at 121-22). \nThe deposition material at issue here, however, was not submitted to the \ndistrict court in connection with summary judgment briefing. Thus, as this Court \nfound in Brown, the presumption of access attached to it is \"somewhat lower than \nthe presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection with \ndispositive motions such as motions for dismissal or summary judgment.\" See id. at \n50. \nTake Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition. Plaintiff filed with the district \ncourt the entire 418-page transcript as an exhibit in support of her motion to exceed \nthe presumptive ten deposition limit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n21 \nEFTA00075503\n", "char_count": 1425}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page28 of 74 \n20(A)(2)(a)(ii). Doing so was unnecessary and gratuitous. See Brown, 929 F.3d at \n51-52 & n.42 (recognizing that court files should not \"serve as reservoirs of \nlibelous statements for press consumption\" or of \"redundant, immaterial, \nimpertinent, or scandalous\" material (quoting, among others, Nixon, 435 U.S. at \n598; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(0)). The deposition transcript (certainly in its entirety) was \nirrelevant to plaintiff's request to exceed the presumptive ten deposition limit. See \nJoy a North, 692 F.2d 880,893 (2d Cir. 1982) (\"We do not say that every piece of \nevidence, no matter how tangentially related to the issue or how damaging to a \nparty disclosure might be, must invariably be subject to public scrutiny.\"). \nYet, by filing the deposition transcript in its entirety, plaintiff improperly \nattempted to transform it into a \"judicial document.\" See Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145 \n(\" [T]he mere filing of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to render \nthat paper a judicial document subject to the right of public access.\"). Plaintiff \naccomplished this even though ordinarily the deposition would never be \"filed with \nthe court, but simply passed between the parties in discovery,\" and therefore \nwould \"lie entirely beyond the . . . reach\" of the presumption of access. Brown, 929 \nF.3d at 50 & n.31 (quotations omitted). \nA judicial document that \"play[s] only a negligible role in the performance of \nArticle III duties\" warrants \"little more than a prediction of public access absent a \n22 \nEFTA00075504\n", "char_count": 1601}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page29 of 74 \ncountervailing reason.\" Id. at 49-50 (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050). Thus, \nwhile a motion filed by a party necessarily calls for the court to exercise its judicial \npowers, the same cannot be said of a gratuitously filed exhibit attached to the \nmotion, irrelevant to the question presented and offered merely to \"humiliate and \nembarrass [an] adversar[y].\" See id. at 47. \nHere, the transcript of Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition falls into the \nlatter category. Attaching the entire deposition to a routine discovery motion was \nimproper and a plain effort to \"weaponize the discovery process\" against Ms. \nMaxwell. Id. at 47. This Court, therefore, should afford it nothing but a limited \npresumption of access. \nIn turn, as explained below, several countervailing interests rebut this \nminimal presumption of access. \na. Ms. Maxwell's reliance interests, and those of Doe 1, \noutweigh any presumption of access. \nTo begin with, the deposition material should remain sealed to vindicate Ms. \nMaxwell and other individuals' reasonable reliance on the judicial promise of \nconfidentiality. See TheStreet.Corn, 273 F.3d at 229-31 (recognizing the importance \nof reliance interests in assessing whether to allow access to sealed documents \n(citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296); see also Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 n.22 (recognizing \nthe propriety of sealing deposition material \"concerning intimate matters where \n23 \nEFTA00075505\n", "char_count": 1497}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page30 of 74 \nthe questions were likely only permitted—and the responses only compelled —\nbecause of a strong expectation of continued confidentiality\" (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. \n5.2)). That is the very purpose of protective orders. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinelzart, \n467 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1984) (\"The prevention of the abuse that can attend the \ncoerced production of information under a State's discovery rule is sufficient \njustification for the authorization of protective orders.\"). \nThe district court thought otherwise. But in ruling as it did, the district court \nfailed even to acknowledge, let alone address, the reliance interests of those who sat \nfor depositions only because of the security the Protective Order afforded. App. pp \n836-49. Failing to address this countervailing interest and make the required \nfindings is itself an abuse of discretion. United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588 (2d \nCir. 1995) (\"A district court is said to abuse its discretion when it fails to make the \nrequired factual findings or where the findings it does make are clearly \nerroneous.\"); see Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 (concluding, in the first appeal in this case, \nthat the discretion court committed \"legal error\" by failing to make \"specific, on-\nthe-record findings\" in support of its decision). \nHad the district court actually considered reasonable reliance, it would have \nseen that this Court's decisions support Ms. Maxwell's argument to keep the \ndeposition material sealed. In S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Corn, this Court held that \n24 \nEFTA00075506\n", "char_count": 1595}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page31 of 74 \n\"[w]here there has been reasonable reliance by a party or deponent, a District \nCourt should not modify a protective order granted under Rule 26(c) `absent a \nshowing of improvidence in the grant of [the] order or some extraordinary \ncircumstance or compelling need.\" 273 F.3d at 229 (quoting Martindell, 594 F.2d \nat 296; citing FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982)). The \ndeponents in TheStreet. Corn, however, could not have reasonably relied on the \nconfidentiality provisions of a January 2001 protective order, because they \"had \nprovided Confidential Testimony at least a month before the entry of that order.\" \nId. at 234. \nThe opposite is true in this case because Ms. Maxwell and numerous third \nparties, including Doe 1, unquestionably relied on the Protective Order in offering \ntheir deposition testimony. Indeed, many of the approximately thirty depositions in \nthis case were made possible only because of the Protective Order. The district \ncourt had to issue numerous orders compelling deposition testimony of third \nparties, which depositions took place only after everyone agreed on the record that \nthe testimony would be confidential and sealed pursuant to the Protective Order. \nJudge Sweet made factual findings on exactly this point, which this Court never \nquestioned in Brown.M325 F. Supp. 3d at 445, 446 (recognizing that Ms. \nMaxwell \"as well as dozens of third persons\" all \"relied upon the promise of \n25 \nEFTA00075507\n", "char_count": 1530}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page32 of 74 \nsecrecy outlined in the Protective Order and enforced by the Court\" and that there \nwere \"dozens of non-parties who provided highly confidential information relating \nto their own stories . . . . in reliance on the Protective Order and the understanding \nthat it would continue to protect everything it claimed it would\"). \n\"It is presumptively unfair for courts to modify protective orders which \nassure confidentiality and upon which the parties have reasonably relied.\" AT&T \nCorp. a Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). As to \nMs. Maxwell in particular, the unfairness in unsealing the deposition material is \nevident because the record of her reasonable reliance on the Protective Order could \nnot be clearer. Plaintiff's counsel stipulated to the Protective Order to facilitate \ntaking Ms. Maxwell's deposition, saying, \"I just want [Ms. Maxwell's] deposition . \n. . . It is that important to me.\" When that deposition finally occurred, on the \nadvice of counsel, Ms. Maxwell declined to answer numerous questions regarding \nher consensual adult sexual activity, invoking her constitutional right to privacy. In \nresponse, plaintiff filed a motion to compel, telling the court \"we have a protective \norder in place, and that assures Ms. Maxwell's right to privacy in answering those \nkinds of questions.\" The district court accepted plaintiff's argument and \ncompelled Ms. Maxwell to answer, saying, \"the privacy concerns are alleviated by \nthe protection order in this case drafted by the defendant.\" \n26 \nEFTA00075508\n", "char_count": 1619}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page33 of 74 \nThe district court's failure entirely to address Ms. Maxwell's reasonable \nreliance contrasts with its prior recognition of the reliance interest at stake. On July \n1, just before briefing on the motion to unseal concluded, the district court denied a \nmotion filed by Alan Dershowitz to modify the Protective Order \"to permit him \naccess to all filings and discovery materials, including third-party discovery, from \nthat case.\" App. p 514. The district court rightly rejected Mr. Dershowitz's \nmotion, explaining that this Court \"has held that where there has been reasonable \nreliance by a party or non-party in providing discovery pursuant to a protective \norder, a district court should not modify that order `absent a showing of \nimprovidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or \ncompelling need.\" App. p 520 (quoting TheStreet.Corn, 273 F.3d at 229). The \ncourt concluded: \n[T]here is no question that the plain terms of the Maxwell Protective \nOrder would justify such an expectation. The Maxwell Protective \nOrder incentivized parties to provide sensitive information in \ndiscovery by explicitly promising that said information would only be \nwielded in connection with litigating the claims at issue in that case \nand that case only. Had the parties producing discovery in Maxwell \nunder the auspices of the protective order anticipated that their \ninformation could eventually be turned over to make litigation of a \nrelated, but entirely separate, case more convenient, they may have \nnever produced information in the first place. The Court accordingly \nconcludes that such reliance on the Maxwell Protective Order \nprecludes modification. \n27 \nEFTA00075509\n", "char_count": 1761}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page34 of 74 \nApp. p 525. Having once appreciated the reliance interests of those, like Ms. \nMaxwell, who reasonably relied on the Protective Order, the failure of the district \ncourt even to address reliance in ordering the unsealing of the deposition material is \nall the more arbitrary and unreasonable. See Wu v. LN.S., 436 F.3d 157,161 (2d Cir. \n2006) (a decision will be reversed for an abuse of discretion when it \"(1) provides \nno rational explanation, (2) inexplicably departs from established policies, (3) is \ndevoid of any reasoning, or (4) contains only summary or conclusory statements\"). \nMs. Maxwell's reasonable reliance on the Protective Order is more than \nenough to overcome whatever limited presumption of access attaches to the \ndeposition material, much of which (including the entire 418-page transcript of the \nApril 2016 deposition) should never have been filed with the district court in the \nfirst place. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296-97 (\"In the present case the deponents \ntestified in reliance upon the Rule 26(c) protective order, absent which they may \nhave refused to testify. . . . [T]he witnesses were entitled to rely upon the terms of a \nconcededly valid protective order.\"). The district court erred in concluding \notherwise and abused its discretion by failing even to consider reliance on the \nProtective Order as a basis for keeping the deposition material sealed. \n28 \nEFTA00075510\n", "char_count": 1475}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page35 of 74 \nb. Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to remain silent \noutweighs any presumption of access. \nNext, in overruling Ms. Maxwell's objection to the unsealing of the \ndeposition material, the district court said that the indictment of Ms. Maxwell was \n\"not entitled to much weight.\" App. p 839. That was the sum of what the district \ncourt had to say on the matter. \nIn fact, however, Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to remain silent \noutweighs the limited presumption of access attached to the deposition material. \nSee U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Court's decision Martindell v. Int'l Telephone & \nTelegraph Corp. shows why. \nIn Martindell, the government moved in a civil action to which it was not a \nparty for access to transcripts of depositions of twelve witnesses, including some of \nthe civil defendants. 594 F.2d at 292. The government said it was investigating \npossible violations of federal criminal laws, including perjury, subornation of \nperjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy. Id. at 293. The government: \nspeculated that the pretrial deposition testimony might be relevant to \nits investigation into matters similar to those that had been the subject \nof the Martindell action and might be useful in appraising the \ncredibility, accuracy and completeness of testimony given by witnesses \nin the Government's investigation or might provide additional \ninformation of use to the Government. The Government, moreover, \nfeared that unless it could obtain the deposition transcripts, it would \nbe unable to secure statements from the witnesses because they would \n29 \nEFTA00075511\n", "char_count": 1662}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page36 of 74 \nclaim their Fifth Amendment rights in any investigative interviews by \nthe Government. \nId. The district court denied the government's request, holding that \"the \ndeposition testimony had been given in reliance upon the protective order, thus \nrendering unnecessary invocation by the witnesses of their Fifth Amendment \nrights, that the requested turnover would raise constitutional issues, and that \nprinciples of fairness mandated enforcement of the protective order.\" Id. \nOn appeal, this Court affirmed. It held that the government \"may not . . . \nsimply by picking up the telephone or writing a letter to the court . . . insinuate \nitself into a private civil lawsuit between others.\" Id. This Court rejected the \ngovernment's argument that the district court's \"solicitude for the witnesses' \nFifth Amendment\" over the government's desire for the deposition transcripts \nwas an abuse of discretion. Id. at 295. It held that \"a more significant \ncounterbalancing factor\" is the civil rules' goal of encouraging witnesses to \nparticipate in civil litigation: \nUnless a valid Rule 26(c) protective order is to be fully and fairly \nenforceable, witnesses relying upon such orders will be inhibited from \ngiving essential testimony in civil litigation, thus undermining a \nprocedural system that has been successfully developed over the years \nfor disposition of civil differences. In short, witnesses might be \nexpected frequently to refuse to testify pursuant to protective orders if \ntheir testimony were to be made available to the Government for \ncriminal investigatory purposes in disregard of those orders. \n30 \nEFTA00075512\n", "char_count": 1695}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page37 of 74 \nId. at 296. After balancing the interests at stake, the Court held that absent \nimprovidence in issuing the protective order or some extraordinary circumstance \nor compelling need, witnesses must be permitted to rely on the protective order's \nenforceability. Id. The protective order should not be vacated or modified \"to \naccommodate the Government's desire to inspect protected testimony for possible \nuse in a criminal investigation, either as evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury \ncharge.\" Id. (emphasis added). \nUnsealing the deposition material in this case would sanction a Martindell \nviolation (or at least prejudge the issue) and prejudice Ms. Maxwell's right to seek \nrelief in the criminal case. Ms. Maxwell has a strong claim that the government \nviolated Martindell. \nThroughout much of the first year of this litigation plaintiff through her \ncounsel represented to the district court and defense counsel that plaintiff was \nprivy to and participating in an ongoing criminal investigation in which Ms. \nMaxwell was a \"person of interest.\" Toward that end plaintiff withheld documents \nresponsive to defense discovery requests for any documents relating to such a \ncriminal investigation. She asserted that the documents were subject to a law \nenforcement, \"investigative,\" or public interest \"privilege.\" \n31 \nEFTA00075513\n", "char_count": 1413}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page38 of 74 \nIn response to Ms. Maxwell's motion to compel the production of \ndocuments, App. pp 132-38, plaintiff submitted the \"law enforcement materials\" \nexparte and in camera to the district court, App. pp 139-49,155-56,139-78, Ms. \nMaxwell objected to the submission of the materials ex parte and in camera. App. pp \n150-54,179-87. The district court denied Ms. Maxwell's motion to compel. App. p \n1873. To this day, the district court in this case has not turned over the materials to \nMs. Maxwell. \nBased on plaintiff's claim of an ongoing investigation, Ms. Maxwell \nrequested, prior to her deposition, that plaintiff disclose any alleged \"on-going \ncriminal investigation by law enforcement\" or alternatively to stay the action \npending completion of any such investigation. App. pp 132-38. In part, Ms. \nMaxwell needed information concerning any such investigation to assess \"the \nimpact on any 5th Amendment privilege.\" App. p 134. The district court declined \nto afford Ms. Maxwell the requested relief. App. pp 805-33. \nThe day before Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition, the Court ordered that \n\"[a]ny materials that the plaintiff has with respect to any criminal investigations \nwill be turned over [by plaintiff] except for any statements made by plaintiff to law \nenforcement authority.\" App. p 825. Plaintiff produced no such materials, and the \ndeposition proceeded as scheduled the next day. App. p 575. \n32 \nEFTA00075514\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page39 of 74 \nIn reliance on the Protective Order, which included no exception for any law \nenforcement need or subpoena and based on plaintiff's failure to disclose any \"on-\ngoing criminal investigation,\" Ms. Maxwell did not assert her Fifth Amendment \nprivilege against self-incrimination during that deposition. \nThis history, culminating in plaintiff's gratuitously attaching the entire \ntranscript of Ms. Maxwell's April 2016 deposition to court submissions, and the \ngovernment's possession of the sealed materials, suggest a circumvention of \nMartindell: A perjury trap was set for Ms. Maxwell when plaintiff took her \ndeposition. \nThe civil case is not the appropriate forum to litigate the government's \napparent violation of Martindell. Ms. Maxwell intends to make that argument to \nJudge Nathan in the criminal case. But if Judge Preska's unsealing order is affirmed \nand Ms. Maxwell's deposition is released, her ability to make that argument before \nJudge Nathan will be prejudiced. Keeping the deposition material sealed will \npreserve the status quo and protect Ms. Maxwell's right to litigate Martindell and \nthe Fifth Amendment in the criminal proceeding. \nAt the time the parties briefed the unsealing of the deposition material, Ms. \nMaxwell was (as it turns out) only under criminal investigation. Only after the \nbriefing was concluded was Ms. Maxwell indicted, arrested, and held without bond. \n33 \nEFTA00075515\n", "char_count": 1482}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page40 of 74 \nThe stakes are much higher now, and the weight to be afforded the presumption of \naccess correspondingly lower as a result. \nIn a related context, this Court has recognized that district courts have the \npower to stay civil cases pending the resolution of pending criminal proceedings. \nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2012). \"In \nevaluating whether the `interests of justice' favor such a stay, courts have generally \nbeen concerned about the extent to which continuing the civil proceeding would \nunduly burden a defendant's exercise of his rights under the Fifth Amendment.\" \nId. Short of granting a stay, district courts are empowered to do exactly what the \ndistrict court did here: enter a Protective Order. Nosik v. Singe, 40 F.3d 592, 596 \n(2d Cir. 1994) (\"Although civil and criminal proceedings covering the same ground \nmay sometimes justify deferring civil proceedings until the criminal proceedings \nare completed, a court may instead enter an appropriate protective order.\"). \nEven absent an indictment, Ms. Maxwell's reliance on the Protective Order \nas a basis for not asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-\nincrimination would be reason enough to reverse the district court's order \nunsealing the deposition material. Now that Ms. Maxwell has been indicted, there \ncan't be any question that the deposition material should remain sealed. See \nMaldanado v. City of New York, Case No. 17-cv-6618 (AJN), 2018 WL 2561026, at \n34 \nEFTA00075516\n", "char_count": 1572}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page41 of 74 \n*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2018) (\"Whether the defendant has been indicted has been \ndescribed as `the most important factor' to be considered in the balance of \nfactors.\"). \nAccordingly, the district court erred in ordering the unsealing of the \ndeposition material. The district court's conclusory reasoning to the contrary—\nthat the criminal case against Ms. Maxwell was \"not entitled to much weight\" as a \nfactor weighing against unsealing the deposition material—was unreasoned and \nunsupported, and therefore an abuse of discretion. \nc. Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to a fair trial by an \nimpartial jury outweighs any presumption of access. \nThird, the deposition material should remain sealed to protect Ms. \nMaxwell's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. The \ndecision in Nixon a Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) shows why. \nIn that case, members of the media moved the district court to release audio \ntapes admitted into evidence in the trial of four of President Nixon's former \nadvisors. The media intended to copy the tapes for broadcasting and sale to the \npublic. District Judge Sirica denied the motion, principally on the ground that the \nrights of the four defendants, who had been convicted and had filed notices of \nappeal, would be prejudiced if they prevailed in their appeals. 435 U.S. at 595, 602 \nn.14. Judge Sirica noted that the transcripts of the audio tapes had been released to \n35 \nEFTA00075517\n", "char_count": 1538}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page42 of 74 \nthe public. Id. at 595. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held Judge Sirica abused \nhis discretion. \nThe Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rejected the media's \narguments that release of the tapes was required under the common law right of \naccess and the First Amendment. The Court noted with approval \"Judge Sirica's \nview\" that \"the public's `right to know' did not . . . overcome the need to \nsafeguard the defendants' rights on appeal.\" Id. at 595; see id. at 602 n.14 (noting \nthat \"Judge Sirica's principal reason for refusing to release the tapes [was] fairness \nto the defendants, who were appealing their convictions\"). The Court indicated \nthat the public interests in access to the tapes properly were balanced against \"the \nduty of the courts,\" id. at 602, including the duty to ensure fairness to the \ndefendants, see id. at 602 n.14. \nIn Nixon, the Court was properly concerned about the effect of unsealing \nmaterials notwithstanding that they were core judicial documents (audio tapes \nadmitted into evidence at the merits trial). And the Court continued to hold these \nconcerns even after the defendants had been convicted and had launched appeals. \nThe Court recognized that the right to a fair trial is a compelling interest in \n\"weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interests and \nthe duty of the courts,\" Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602. \n36 \nEFTA00075518\n", "char_count": 1478}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page43 of 74 \nAs this Court already recognized in the first appeal, preserving \"the right of \nan accused to fundamental fairness in the jury selection process\" is an entirely \nappropriate basis for sealing court filings from public view. Brown, 929 F.3d at 47 \nn.13 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). Here, the \nunsealing of the deposition material would result in substantial negative media \npublicity and speculation in an Internet world of the type foreshadowed in Brown. It \nwould, as in Nixon, generate substantial and irreversible publicity negatively \naffecting Ms. Maxwell's right to a fair trial. See also In re New York Times Co., 828 \nF.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing \"defendants' fair trial rights\" as an \n\"appropriate\" basis for sealing material). \nLest there be any doubt, the Miami Herald's response to Ms. Maxwell's \nemergency motion to stay settles the matter. In opposing Ms. Maxwell's request, \nthe Herald said: \"The documents at issue have been improperly sealed for years—\nin a way that allowed . . . Ms. Maxwell['s] . . . abuse of young girls to go on \nunchallenged and unpunished, and allowed a legal system that protected \nperpetrators over victims to go unquestioned.\" Resp. at 12. This unqualified \nstatement of Ms. Maxwell's alleged guilt is precisely the type of unfair and \nunconstitutional pretrial publicity that will result should the district court's \nunsealing order go into effect. \n37 \nEFTA00075519\n", "char_count": 1527}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page44 of 74 \nIn the criminal case, Judge Nathan has appreciated the potential for \nimproper and unreliable pretrial publicity to prejudice Ms. Maxwell and her ability \nto obtain a fair trial. App. p 586. In ordering the unsealing of the deposition \nmaterial, the district court in this case appears to be operating at a cross-purpose. \nOnly this Court can step in and strike the appropriate balance, a balance that \nweighs in favor of keeping the deposition material sealed since it enjoys \"little more \nthan a prediction of access\" that is substantially outweighed by numerous \ncountervailing considerations. \nApart from pretrial publicity affecting the ability to obtain a fair and impartial \njury, unsealing the deposition material also risks compromising the integrity of \nwitness testimony because it provides an opportunity for a witness to change his or \nher story to conform to the allegations made in the unsealed (and publicized) \nmaterial. Witnesses at the criminal trial are required to testify based on their own \nindependent recollection of events which, in this case, allegedly occurred decades \nago. If, by contrast, the deposition material is unsealed, these witnesses are likely to \n\"remember\" events differently than if called upon at trial to rely on their \nindependent recollection. Much like sequestering a witness during trial, keeping \nthe deposition material sealed will facilitate the truth-seeking function of a criminal \ntrial by preventing against tainted memories of witnesses, or at least, allowing Ms. \n38 \nEFTA00075520\n", "char_count": 1601}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page45 of 74 \nMaxwell and her counsel to explore the source of any refreshed memories. See Fed. \nR. Evid. 615, 1972 Advisory Committee Notes (\"The efficacy of excluding or \nsequestering witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging and \nexposing fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.\"). \nFor these reasons, the public's right of access to the deposition material is \nsubstantially outweighed by the compelling interest in ensuring Ms. Maxwell's \nright to a fair trial. \nd. Ms. Maxwell's privacy interests outweigh any presumption \nof access. \nFinally, Ms. Maxwell's privacy interests, as well as those of Doe 1, outweigh \nthe limited presumption of access attached to the deposition material. \nOur legal process is already susceptible to abuse. Unscrupulous \nlitigants can weaponize the discovery process to humiliate and \nembarrass their adversaries. Shielded by the \"litigation privilege,\" bad \nactors can defame opponents in court pleadings or depositions without \nfear of lawsuit and liability. Unfortunately, the presumption of public \naccess to court documents has the potential to exacerbate these harms \nto privacy and reputation by ensuring that damaging material \nirrevocably enters the public record. \nBrown, 929 F.3d at 47. \nThese words, authored by this Court in the first appeal, could not be more \napt. At issue in this appeal are documents submitted to the district court in \nconnection with discovery disputes. The documents were not filed in conjunction \n39 \nEFTA00075521\n", "char_count": 1556}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page46 of 74 \nwith dispositive motions or admitted into evidence at trial. Many of the \ndocuments—like the complete transcripts of Ms. Maxwell's deposition—likely \nshould never have been filed with the district court in the first place. In this \ncontext, the privacy interests of Ms. Maxwell and Doe 1 take on even more \nimportance when balanced against the limited \"prediction of public access\" \napplicable to the deposition material. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 49. \nThe privacy interest of those resisting disclosure, and particularly of those \n\"innocent third parties[,] . . . should weigh heavily in a court's balancing \nequation.\" TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 232 (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050); see \nApplication of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74,79-80 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"[T]he privacy \ninterests of innocent third parties as well as those of defendants that may be \nharmed by disclosure of the Title III material should weigh heavily in a court's \nbalancing equation.\" (quoting In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116)); see also \nBrown, 929 F.3d at 47 n.12. This case was replete with \"allegations concerning the \nintimate, sexual, and private conduct of the parties and of third persons, some \nprominent, some private.\" \n325 F. Supp. 3d at 433. The district court \nshould have afforded more weight to this consideration. See Application of Newsday, \n895 F.2d at 79 (\"[T]he common law right of access is qualified by recognition of \nthe privacy rights of the persons whose intimate relations may thereby be \n40 \nEFTA00075522\n", "char_count": 1576}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page47 of 74 \ndisclosed.\"); Amodeo 11,71 F.3d at 1050 (\" [T]he privacy interests of innocent third \nparties . . . should weigh heavily in a court's balancing equation.\"). \nThis Court has already recognized as much. When, in Brown, this Court \nunsealed the summary judgment material, it redacted \"deposition responses \nconcerning intimate matters where the questions were likely only permitted —and \nthe responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of continued \nconfidentiality.\" 929 F.3d at 48 n.22. The district court, by contrast, intends to \nunseal the April 2016 deposition transcript in its entirety, without redaction. The \ndistrict court should not unseal material of the type this Court already declined to \nunseal, particularly because the material this Court declined to unseal enjoyed a \nstronger presumption of access (because it was part of the summary judgment \nrecord) than the material the district court has elected to unseal wholesale (because \nit was not part of the summary judgment record and should never have been filed in \nthe district court in the first place). \nConclusion \nThis Court should reverse the district court's order unsealing the deposition \nmaterial. \nAugust 20, 2020. \n41 \nEFTA00075523\n", "char_count": 1286}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page48 of 74 \nRespectfully submitted, \ns/ Adam Mueller \nTy Gee \nAdam Mueller \nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver, CO 80203 \nTel 303.831.7364 \nFax 303.832.2628 \ntgee@hmflaw.com \namueller@hmflaw.com \nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine \nMaxwell \n42 \nEFTA00075524\n", "char_count": 343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page49 of 74 \nCertificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A) \nThis brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. \nP. 32(a)(7)(B). It contains 9,112 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by \nFed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(III). \nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. \nP. 32(a)(5) and the typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). It has been \nprepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 pt. \nEquity. \ns/ Adam Mueller \nCertificate of Service \nI certify that on August 20, 2020, I filed Ms. Maxwell's Opening Brief with the \nCourt via CM/ECF, which will send notification of the filing to all counsel of \nrecord. I also certify that I mailed a copy of the opening brief to: \nThe Hon. Loretta A. Preska \nDistrict Judge \nUnited States District Court for the \nSouthern District of New York \n(via United States mail) \ns/ Nicole Simmons \n43 \nEFTA00075525\n", "char_count": 987}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40. 08/20/2020. 2913550. Page50 of 74 \nAttachment 1 to Opening Brief \nJuly 23, 2020 Transcript Ordering Unsealing of the \nDeposition Material \nEFTA00075526\n", "char_count": 179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020. 2913550. Page51 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n1 \n2 \n4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW \nCOURT \nYORK \nx \nPlaintiff, \n5 \nv. \n15 CV 7433 (LAP) \n6 \nRemote Zoom Conference \n7 \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \n8 \nDefendant. \n \nx \n9 \nNew York, N.Y. \n10 \nJuly 23, 2020 \n11:30 a.m. \n11 \nBefore: \n12 \nHON. LORETTA A. PRESKA, \n13 \nDistrict Judge \n14 \nAPPEARANCES \n15 \nBOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP \n16 \nAttorney for Plaintiff \nBY: SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY \n17 \nHADDON, MORGAN, AND FOREMAN, P.C. \n18 \nAttorney for Defendant \nBY: LAURA A. MENNINGER \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075527\n", "char_count": 654}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page52 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n(The Court and all parties appearing via Zoom) \nTHE COURT: Are we ready to begin or is there anyone \nelse we're waiting for? OK. \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nSo \ncounsel for \npinpointing \nexceedingly \nit easy for \nlet's begin. I wanted to start out by thanking \norganizing the docket entries by motion, by Doe, by \nthe references to the Does and the like. It was \nhelpful to the Court and really a model of making \nthe Court. \nMy law clerk is on the call and I'm going to invite \nhim to correct me if I make any mistakes in going over charts \nwhen we go document by document. \nTo remind us where we are in the process of unsealing \nmaterials from \nv Maxwell, the Court is to: \nOne, evaluate the weight of the presumption of public \naccess to the materials; \nTwo, identify and evaluate the weight of any \ncountervailing interests; and \nThree, determine whether the countervailing interests \nrebut the presumption. \nThe Court acknowledges that the presumption of public \naccess attaches to judicial documents, that is, to documents \nfiled in connection with a decided motion or to papers that are \nrelevant to the Court's exercise of its inherent supervisory \npowers. The documents at issue here relate to discovery \nmotions previously decided by Judge Sweet, and so the Court \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075528\n", "char_count": 1464}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page53 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nconcludes that they are judicial documents to which the \npresumption of public access attaches. Because the motions are \ndiscovery motions, the presumption is somewhat less weighty \nthan on a dispositive motion but is nevertheless important to \nthe public's interest in monitoring federal courts' exercise of \ntheir Article III powers. \nThe motions at issue today mention Does 1 and 2, the \nfirst long line of nonparties mentioned throughout the sealed \nmaterials. Pursuant to the protocol set out in docket \nno. 1044, these individuals were given notice of the motion to \nunseal and given the opportunity to request the material that \npertains to them and to object to its unsealing. Neither Doe \nrequested the material or lodged an objection to unsealing. \nThe Court notes that the names of Does 1 and 2, portions of \ntheir deposition transcripts, and portions of the Palm Beach \npolice report ascribed to them have already been made public. \nAlso, Doe 1 gave a press interview about the subject matter of \nthis action. \nAlso pursuant to the protocol, the parties were \npermitted to comment on the motion to unseal, and defendant \nMaxwell has lodged objections to unsealing. In her objections, \nMs. Maxwell relies on several countervailing interests, the \nmost weighty of which are that the material concerns personal \nmatters that, if released, might lead to annoyance or \nembarrassment, that the material was abusively filed or is \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075529\n", "char_count": 1652}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page54 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nuntrustworthy, and that the material concerns the subject of z, \ncriminal investigation. \nWith respect to the argument that the material \nconstitutes personal information which might lead to annoyance \nor embarrassment if unsealed, Ms. Maxwell proffers little more \nthan her ipsi dixit; she provides no specifics as to these \nconclusions. In her first deposition, which is among the \ndocuments being considered on this motion, Ms. Maxwell refused \nto testify as to any consensual adult behavior and generally \ndisclaimed any knowledge of underage activity. In the context \nof this case, especially its allegations of sex trafficking of \nyoung girls, the Court finds that any minor embarrassment or \nannoyance resulting from disclosure of Ms. Maxwell's mostly \nnontestimony about behavior that has been widely reported in \nthe press is far outweighed by the presumption of public \naccess. \nWith respect to the argument that the material was \nabusively filed or is untrustworthy, again, Ms. Maxwell \nproffers few specifics. That some of the exhibits to the \nmotion papers might not have been technically required on the \nmotion does not make the papers abusively filed. That \nMs. Maxwell's lawyers did not cross-examine some of the \nwitnesses relied on does not make the witnesses' testimony too \nunreliable to be unsealed. In any event, the Court is dubious \nthat such a fine-toothed comb review is required to evaluate \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075530\n", "char_count": 1636}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page55 of 74 \n5 \nK7N9GIUD \nthe public interest in access to these papers. Thus, the Court \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nfinds that these interests are entitled to little weight under \nthe facts of this case. \nFinally, that the material relates to a person now \nknown to be under criminal investigation, Ms. Maxwell, is not \nentitled to much weight here. Again, Ms. Maxwell has relied on \nipsi dixits and has not explained how the sealed material, if \nreleased, could, as she posits, \"inappropriately influence \npotential witnesses or victims.\" Again, the Court finds that \nthis interest is entitled to little weight under the facts of \nthis case. \nAs should be clear from the above, the Court finds \nthat the countervailing interests identified fail to rebut the \npresumption of public access to the motions at issue and the \ndocuments filed in connection with those motions. Accordingly, \nthose papers shall be unsealed. \nThe Court also notes that several of the documents \nsealed on these motion papers have already been made public, \nand so those documents will not be discussed. \nAlso, personal identifying information as to any \nperson mentioned in the documents and the names of nonparties \nother than Does 1 and 2 and other portions related to such \nnonparties' specific conduct will be redacted from the \nmaterials being unsealed. Disclosure of the additional \nnonparty names will await notice to those parties and an \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075531\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page56 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nopportunity for them to be heard. \nI won't repeat this caveat as to each document but \nwill only comment when it is not applicable. So unless there's \na specific comment, personal identifying information should be \nredacted and the names of the other Does not yet identified. \nConsistent with the protocol, the Court will now \nannounce its findings with respect to the sealed documents \nrelating to Does 1 and 2 that are the subject of this motion to \nunseal. For ease of reference, as counsel knows, the Court \nwill proceed in the order of the documents listed on Exhibit A, \nthat is docket no. 1068-1. \nDocket entry 143. Plaintiff's motion to compel \ndefendant to answer deposition questions. Unseal subject to \nthe caveat which I won't keep saying. \n144. Plaintiff's declaration of Ms. McCawley in \nsupport of the motion. Unseal. \n144-1. Exhibit 1. Page 21 of Ms. Maxwell's April 22, \n2016 deposition. Unseal. \n144-2. Additional pages of Ms. Maxwell's April 22, \n2016 deposition. Unseal. \nSame thing for 144-4. \nSame thing for 144-5. \nSame thing for 144-6. \nSame thing for 144-7. \n149. Defendant's response to the motion. Unseal. \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075532\n", "char_count": 1352}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page57 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \n150. Declaration of Mister -- how does he say it, \nMr. Pagliuca? Say it again. \nMS. MENNINGER: Pagliuca. \nTHE COURT: Mr. Pagliuca in opposition to the motion \nto compel. Unseal. \n150-1. Additional pages from Ms. Maxwell's April 22, \n2016 deposition. Unseal. \n152. Plaintiff's reply memorandum of law on the \nmotion. Unseal. \n153. Ms. McCawley's declaration in support of the \nmotion to compel. Unseal. \nI'm sorry. I'm going to go back to 152 for a minute. \nUnseal the portions summarizing Doe l's public statements. \nThose appear on page 6. Unseal portions summarizing decease° \nnonparties' public statements. Page 6. OK. \nContinuing on. 153-1. Additional deposition \nexcerpts. Unseal. \n164. Defendant's motion to compel all attorney-client \ncommunications and work product put at issue by plaintiff and \nher attorneys. Unseal. \n165. Declaration of Ms. Menninger in support of that. \nThat can be unsealed in full because there are no -- there is \nno material within the caveat in the document. \n165-3. Exhibit C. This is a copy of a motion to join \nin Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 files in court. That document is \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075533\n", "char_count": 1328}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page58 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \nalready public. \n165-8. Excerpts from Ms. \nin the Dershowitz matter on January \n165-10. Copy of e-mail correspondence. \n165-11. Excerpts from Ms. \ndeposition taken \nUnseal. \nUnseal. \n( \n16, 2016. \ndeposition, \n6 \nMay 3, 2016. Unseal. \n7 \n184. Plaintiff's response in opposition to the \n8 \nmotion. Unseal the portions relating to Does 1 and 2 which \n9 \nappears on page 3. \n10 \n185. Ms. McCawley's declaration in opposition. That \n11 \ncan be unsealed in full because there is no material included \n12 \nin the caveats in the document. \n13 \n185-2. Copy of Jane Doe's no. 3 and 4 corrected \n14 \njoinder motion. Already filed in public. \n15 \n185-3. Response to the motion to intervene. Already \n16 \nfiled in public. \n17 \n185-11. Various deposition excerpts from \n18 \nMs. \ndeposition. The pages unsealed by the Second \n19 \nCircuit should, of course, remain unsealed. \n20 \n185-13. It's a copy of Ms. \nMay 30, 2016 \n21 \naffidavit. That can be unsealed in full. \n22 \n185-14. Copy of deposition excerpts from Mr. Cassell. \n23 \nUnseal. \n24 \n185-15. Copy of a transcript of the Scarola/Edwards \n25 \ninterview of April 7, 2011. Unseal in full. The document is \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075534\n", "char_count": 1287}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page59 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nalready public \n185-16. Copy of common interests agreement. Unseal. \n194. Ms. Menninger's declaration in support of the \nmotion to compel. Unseal in full. \n194-3. Excerpts of Ms. \nMay 3, 2016 \ndeposition. Unseal. \n172. Plaintiff's motion to exceed the presumptive ten \ndeposition limit. That may be unsealed. Obviously subject to \nthe caveat. \n173. Ms. McCawley's declaration in support. Unseal \n173-5. May 18, 2016 deposition transcript of Doe 162. \nPages released by the Second Circuit, of course, will remain \nsealed -- will remain unsealed. Let me say it again. The \npages unsealed by the Second Circuit, of course, remain \nunsealed and further unsealing awaits notice. \n173-6. Excerpts from Ms. Maxwell's April 22, 2016 \ndeposition. Same thing. Pages unsealed by the Second Circuit \nremain unsealed. The portions of the deposition relating to \nDoes 1 and 2 which appear pages 71, 72, 73, and 218 shall be \nunsealed. \n189. Response in opposition to the motion. Unseal \neverything except for the reaction \nI'm sorry, the redaction \non page 5 pending further nonparty notice. \n190. Ms. Menninger's declaration in opposition. That \ncan be unsealed in full. \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075535\n", "char_count": 1375}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page60 of 74 \nle \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \n190-1. Excerpts from Ms. \nleposition taken \non May 3, 2016. Unseal everything except for the inadvertently \nincluded letter on page 2. \n203. Response in support of the motion. The portions \nrelating to Does 1 and 2 which appear at pages 2, 5, and 6 may \nbe unsealed. \n204. Ms. McCawley's declaration in support. Unseal. \n204-1. Doe no. 162's deposition transcript. The \npages unsealed by the Second Circuit will, of course, remain \nunsealed and the remainder of the document remains sealed until \nnotice to the nonparty. \n204-2. It's Doe no. 151's rough deposition transcript \nexcerpts. The pages unsealed by the Circuit will remain \nunsealed. The remainder will await notice to that Doe. \n204-3. Deposition of John Doe 1. Unseal in full. \n211. That's the reply to the motion. The portions \nmentioning Does 1 and 2 which appear at pages 2, 5, and 6 may \nbe unsealed. \n212. Ms. Schultz's declaration in support of the \nmotion. The portions mentioning John Does 1 and 2 which appear \nat page 2 may be unsealed. \n212-1. Doe no. 162's deposition transcript excerpts, \npages unsealed by the Circuit will remain unsealed. \n212-2. Doe 151's final deposition transcript \nexcerpts. The pages unsealed by the Circuit will remain \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075536\n", "char_count": 1442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page61 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \nunsealed \n212-3. Doe l's deposition transcript excerpt. Unseal \nin full \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \n222 -- I'm sorry. 224. It's the reply on the motion. \nThe portions relating to Does 1 and 2 which appear at page 2 \nmay be unsealed. \n199. That's a motion for an extension of time to \ncomplete depositions. That's open in any event. \n228. The response in opposition to the motion. \nUnseal. \n229. Ms. Menninger's declaration in opposition. \nUnseal. \n221 -- 229-1. Excerpts of the deposition of Doe \nno. 151. Hold until notice to that Doe. \n229-2. The billionaire playboy's club book \nmanuscript. The pages unsealed by the Circuit will remain \nunsealed. \n229-4. Excerpts of plaintiff's deposition of May 3, \n2016. Unseal the pages released by the Circuit. \n229-10. This is correspondence released in the case \nbetween Ms. Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein from January 2015. \nUnseal in full. \n229-11. Notices of deposition and a subpoena for Doe \n84 -- Will, I can say these two names, right? \nTHE LAW CLERK: Yes, Judge. \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075537\n", "char_count": 1204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case20-2413,Document40,08/20/2020,2913550,Page62of74 \n12 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nTHE COURT: Joe Recarey and Michael Reiter together \nwith a letter of production from Ms. McCawley. Unseal in full. \n248. Reply memorandum of law in support of the \nmotion. We're going to await the notice to the Doe on that \none. \n249. Ms. McCawley's declaration in support of the \nmotion. Unseal in full. \n249-4. Ms. McCawley's correspondence with opposing \ncounsel. The portions relating to Does 1 and 2 which appears \nat pages 4 and 5 can be unsealed. \n249-13. Defendant's Rule 26 disclosures. The \nportions relating to Does 1 and 2 shall be unsealed. \n249-14. Ms. Schultz's correspondence with opposing \ncounsel. Unseal. \n249-15. Same. Same. \n230. Defendant's motion to reopen the deposition of \nplaintiff \nIt may be unsealed. However, the \ninformation currently redacted in the document relating to \nplaintiff's medical history shall remain redacted for obvious \nreasons. \n235. Ms. Menninger's declaration in support of the \nmotion. Unseal. \n235-4. The deposition of Ms. \nThe pages \nreleased by the Second Circuit of course remain unsealed. The \nportions relating to Doe 1 and 2 which appears -- which appear \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075538\n", "char_count": 1328}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page63 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nat pages 122, 126, 134, and 138 shall be unsealed. \n235-5. Ms. Menninger's declaration. The medical \nrecords on pages 5 to 12 should remain sealed; otherwise, \nunseal. \n235-6 are medical records. They shall remain sealed. \n235-7. Excerpts from the -- a deposition of Doe \nno. 131. That will remain sealed pending notice to the Doe. \n235-8. Production letters from Ms. Schultz to \nMs. Menninger. The exhibits will remain sealed. \n235 -- and they are medical records. \n235-9. Excerpts from the May 26, 2016 deposition of \nDr. Stephen Olsen. The material relating to plaintiff's \nmedical issues shall remain sealed. The other material in the \ndeposition, for example, how the doctor takes notes, how the \ndoctor gets new patients, how the doctor writes prescriptions \nand that sort of thing may be unsealed. \n235-10. Production letters from Ms. McCawley to \nMs. Menninger. Unseal. \n235-12. The June 1, 2016 errata sheet relating to \nm-. \ndeposition. Unseal. \n235-13. Plaintiff's third revised disclosure pursuant \nto Federal Rule 26. Unseal. \n260. Ms. McCawley's declaration in opposition to the \nmotion. The redactions which are medical information will \nremain. \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075539\n", "char_count": 1380}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document40,08/20/2020. 2913550. Page64 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \n260-1. Will, is this only the authorization or is it \nthe authorization plus material? \nTHE LAW CLERK: Judge, I believe it's the \nauthorization on the first two pages and then the medical \nrecords on subsequent pages. \nTHE COURT: Thank you. The medical record \nauthorization may be unsealed. The subsequent pages which \nconstitute medical records will remain sealed. \n260-2. Dr. Lightfoot's June 27, 2016 correspondence. \nThat may be unsealed. \n267. The reply on the motion. The information \nrelating to plaintiff's medical history shall remain sealed. \n268. Ms. Menninger's declaration in support of the \nmotion. Unseal. \n268-1. Pages from plaintiff's medical records. They \nshall remain sealed. \n268-2. Excerpts from the deposition of Doe no. 67. \nThe pages unsealed by the Second Circuit will remain sealed - \nI'm sorry, will remain unsealed and the remainder of the \ndocument will remain sealed pending notice to the relevant \nDoes. \nCounsel, I will ask you to confer and to prepare the \ndocuments for unsealing pursuant to this order and post the \ndocuments within a week on the docket sheet as documents \nunsealed pursuant to the Court's order of July 23 or something \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075540\n", "char_count": 1391}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page65 of 74 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nlike that. \nCounsel, do you have any questions? \nMS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, on behalf of Ms. Maxwell I \nwould ask if we could have the opportunity for a brief stay in \norder to seek relief in the Second Circuit. There is not a \ncertain mechanism for doing that in an unsealing context but \nknow that the Brown Court at the conclusion of their opinion \nstated their intent for that panel to maintain jurisdiction \nover this case for purposes of any appeals taken from an \nunsealing order and so we would ask for two weeks, if we could, \nto seek relief in the Second Circuit. \nTHE COURT: Ms. McCawley. \nMS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. We obviously believe \nthat the material should be unsealed as quickly as possible so \nwe would prefer to obviously have the material unsealed. \nMS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, if I may briefly, to add \nto my record. While I understand and respect the Court's \nruling, there have been some significant changes with respect \nto my client's position since we concluded briefing. In \nparticular, and perhaps known to everyone listening to this, \nwhile we were speaking about a potential ongoing criminal \ninvestigation at the time we submitted our brief, since that \ntime Ms. Maxwell has been indicted and a trial has been \nscheduled for next July in another courtroom in the Southern \nDistrict. So while we were not able to provide specifics \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075541\n", "char_count": 1585}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020. 2913550. Page66 of 74 \n16 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \nnecessarily with regard to what witnesses might be relevant to \nany such criminal trial, now we are in a vastly different \nposition and certainly have great concerns about our client's \nability to seek and receive an impartial and fair trial and \njury given the intense media scrutiny around anything that is \nunsealed or anything that happens in this or any of the related \ncases. So while we -- your Honor had mentioned at the \nbeginning of this ruling that there was a lack of specifics on \nthe front of the pending criminal investigation, I think there \nmay be the ability to provide a lot more specifics about that \nat this time and certainly I think it's an issue that we would \nlike to, if we may, have a brief amount of time to submit. It \nis important either to this Court's analysis or to the Second \nCircuit. \nTHE COURT: So what are you asking me for? \nMS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, I ask for two weeks if we \ncould to file an emergency appellate motion in the Second \nCircuit and ask them to stay any further release. \nTHE COURT: I will give you a week to file the motion. \nIn the meantime I will still ask counsel to confer and to \nprepare the papers for release. If the Court of Appeals has \nnot ruled on your motion in a week, then you can let me know. \n(Court reporter dropped off the call; called back in \nand read record to the point where call dropped) \nTHE COURT: After that, I asked counsel to confer \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075542\n", "char_count": 1642}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Case20-2413,Document40,08/20/2020,2913550,Page67of74 \n17 \nK7N9GIUD \n4 \n5 \n6 \n7 \n8 \n9 \n10 \n11 \n12 \n13 \n14 \n15 \n16 \n17 \n18 \n19 \n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 \n24 \n25 \ngenerally along the outlines of the proposal in Ms. Maxwell's \nletter of April 3, docket no. 1045 to propose the next \nchronological set of motions to be considered for unsealing. \ni \nalso asked counsel to confer on ways to make the process more \nefficient, less time consuming, and to make it stretch out or \nover a shorter time period. For example, it occurs to me we \ncould shorten the briefing time. We could reduce the number of \npages of briefing, for example, to ten pages each side total or \nsomething like that. I'll ask counsel to confer and to report \nback within a week. \nFinally, going forward, as you all saw, Exhibit A to \nMs. \nmotion -- I said the number of it earlier but \nthat was exceedingly helpful. If you would like to propose a \njoint exhibit similar to that as we go forward with everybody's \npositions, I would welcome it. \nIs there anything else you want to ask, counsel? \nMS. McCAWLEY: No, your Honor. \nMS. MENNINGER: No, your Honor. Not from Ms. Maxwell. \nThank you. \nTHE COURT: Thank you and I'll just tell you lawyers \nagain how useful the work you did in organizing the docket \nentries was. Thank you for it again. \nMS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. \nTHE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. Thank you. \nMS. McCAWLEY: Good afternoon. Thank you. (Adjourned) \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. \n(212) 805-0300 \nEFTA00075543\n", "char_count": 1502}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 20-2413. Document 40. 08/20/2020. 2913550. Page68 of 74 \nAttachment 2 to Opening Brief \nJuly 28, 2020 Order Directing Process of Unsealing \nEFTA00075544\n", "char_count": 158}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "CaleataSW4D174.33c1sAPielltottnaWaCirt0ladinfl28P2CtiePage 14of 1 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nPlaintiff, \n-against-\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n15 Civ. 7433 (LAP) \nORDER \nLORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge: \nThe parties are directed to prepare for unsealing in \naccordance with the Court's order of July 23, 2020, (ECF Minute \nEntry, dated July 23, 2020), the documents listed in Exhibit A to \nPlaintiff \nOpposition to Defendant Ghislaine \nMaxwell's Objections to Unsealing Docket Entries 143, 164, 172, \n199, & 230, (dkt. no. 1068-1). Counsel shall file those documents \non the public docket, under a heading of \"Documents Ordered \nUnsealed by Order of July 23, 2020,\" no later than July 30, 2020. \nThe Court incorporates its rulings specific to each document--\nwhich are set forth in the transcript of the July 23 proceedings \n--herein. \nSO ORDERED. \nDated: \nNew York, New York \nJuly 28, 2020 \nortieae.fa \n)40e4 \nLORETTA A. PRESKA \nSenior United States District Judge \n1 \nEFTA00075545\n", "char_count": 1045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Case 20-2413, Document 40. 08/20/2020. 2913550. Page70 of 74 \nAttachment 3 to Opening Brief \nJuly 29, 2020 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider \nEFTA00075546\n", "char_count": 156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "CaleataBW4D174-13doNin efitotarfidailCM20\n11H135b29Parg \n14of 4 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nPlaintiff, \n-against-\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nNo. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP) \nMEMORANDUM & ORDER \nLORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge: \nThe Court has reviewed Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's letter \nrequesting reconsideration of the Court's July 23, 2020, decision \nto unseal (1) the transcripts of Ms. Maxwell's and Doe 1's \ndepositions, and (2) court submissions excerpting from, quoting \nfrom, or summarizing the contents of the transcripts. (See dkt. \nno. 1078.) \nMs. Maxwell's eleventh-hour request for reconsideration is \ndenied. As Ms. Maxwell acknowledges in her letter, reconsideration \nis an \"extraordinary remedy.\" In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 818 F. \nSupp. 2d 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting In re Health Mgmt. Sys. \nInc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). Such \nmotions \"are properly granted only if there is a showing of: (1) \nan intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of \nnew evidence; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent \nmanifest injustice.\" Drapkin v. Mafco Consol. Grp., Inc., 818 F. \nSupp. 2d 678, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). \"A motion for reconsideration \n1 \nEFTA00075547\n", "char_count": 1287}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "CageataSW-411,74-313cloMmefiloWntaft CtaMORif41357:129 414 \n24of 4 \nmay not be used to advance new facts, issues or arguments not \npreviously presented to the Court, nor may it be used as a vehicle \nfor relitigating issues already decided by the Court.\" Bennett v. \nWatson Wyatt & Co., 156 F. Supp.2d 270, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). \nHere, Ms. Maxwell's request for reconsideration hinges on her \nassertion that new developments, i.e., her indictment and arrest, \nprovide compelling reasons for keeping the deposition transcripts \nsealed. \n(See dkt. no. 1078 at 5.) \nBut, despite Ms. Maxwell's \ncontention that she could not address the effect of those events \nin her objections because they occurred after the close of \nbriefing, (id.), 1 \nthis is plowed ground. Indeed, in her original \nobjection to unsealing, Ms. Maxwell argued that the specter of \nongoing \ncriminal \ninvestigations \ninto \nunknown \nindividuals \nassociated with Jeffrey Epstein--a group that, of course, includes \nMs. Maxwell--loomed large over the Court-ordered unsealing \n1 The Court notes as a practical matter that Ms. Maxwell was \narrested on July 2, 2020--that is, three weeks prior to the Court's \nJuly 23 decision to unseal the materials at issue. To the extent \nthat they relate to the to the Court's balancing of interests in \nthe unsealing process, the issues that Ms. Maxwell raises in her \nrequest were surely plain the day that Ms. Maxwell was apprehended. \nMs. Maxwell, however, did not seek to supplement her objections to \nunsealing despite ample time to do so. In fact, the Court notified \nthe parties on July 21, 2020, that it would announce the unsealing \ndecision with respect to Ms. Maxwell's deposition, together with \nother documents, on July 23. (See dkt. no. 1076.) Even then, Ms. \nMaxwell made no request for delay or to supplement her papers. \nMs. Maxwell did not raise her \"vastly different position,\" \n(Transcript of July 23 Ruling at 16:2-3), until moments after the \nCourt had made its decision to unseal\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00075477/71 or ?id=EFTA00075477&page=71]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "CaleataSW4V4313c1DINFheatolainWrit anii0FaVit13115/29 At! pan 2.4of 4 \nprocess. (See dkt. no. 1057 at 5.) This argument, specifically \nMs. Maxwell's concern that unsealing would \"inappropriately \ninfluence potential witnesses or alleged victims,\" (id.), and her \nreference \nto \"publicly \nreported \nstatements \nby \nPlaintiff, \nPlaintiff's counsel, the United States Attorney for the Southern \nDistrict of New York, and the Attorney General for the U.S. Virgin \nIslands\" about those investigations, (id.), carried with it the \nclear implication that Ms. Maxwell could find herself subject to \ninvestigation and, eventually, indictment. The Court understood \nthat implication as applying to Ms. Maxwell and thus has already \nconsidered any role that criminal charges against Ms. Maxwell might \nplay in rebutting the presumption of public access to the sealed \nmaterials. \nMs. Maxwell's request for reconsideration of the \nCourt's July 23 ruling is accordingly denied. \nGiven the Court's denial of Ms. Maxwell's request for \nreconsideration, the Court will stay the unsealing of Ms. Maxwell's \nand Doe l's deposition transcripts and any sealed or redacted order \nor paper that quotes from or discloses information from those \ndeposition transcripts for two business days, i.e., through \nFriday, July 31, 2020, so that Ms. Maxwell may seek relief from \nthe Court of Appeals. Any sealed materials that do not quote from \nor disclose information from those deposition transcripts shall be \nunsealed on July 30, 2020, in the manner described by the Court's \nOrder dated July 28, 2020. (See dkt. no. 1077.) Ms. Maxwell's and \n3 \nEFTA00075549\n", "char_count": 1633}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00075477", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Cafeata EiCat17413 WW1 \ne tlfotihnSant ilage 0 ROM135f/29PACti eFtge Wof 4 \nDoe l's deposition transcripts and any sealed materials that quote \nor disclose information from them shall be unsealed in the manner \nprescribed by the July 28 Order on Monday, August 3, 2020, subject \nto any further stay ordered by the Court of Appeals. \nSO ORDERED. \nDated: \nNew York, New York \nJuly 29, 2020 \n04eatifoi )4/219\nLORETTA A. PRESKA \nSenior United States District Judge \n4 \nEFTA00075550\n", "char_count": 478}]}