{"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_count": 69, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00074599", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00074599.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n994 F.3d 1244 \nEditor's Note: Additions are indicated by Text and deletions \nby Text . \nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. \nIN RE: \nPetitioner. \nNo. 19-13843 \n(April 15, 2021) \nSynopsis \nBackground: Alleged victim of child sexual abuse brought \ncivil action against federal government, alleging that \ngovernment violated Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) by \nfailing to confer with alleged victim before entering into \nnon-prosecution agreement with alleged perpetrator. Alleged \nperpetrator intervened. The United States District Court for \nthe Southern District of Florida, No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM, \nKenneth A. Marra, Senior District Judge, 359 F.Supp.3d \n1201, determined that government had violated CVRA, but \nafter alleged perpetrator's death, alleged victim's requested \nremedies were denied and the action was dismissed, ' 41 I \nF.Supp.3d 1321. Alleged victim petitioned for writ of \nmandamus. The United States Court of Appeals for the \nEleventh Circuit, r 955 F.3d 1196, denied the petition. \n(Holding:( On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals, \nNewsom, Circuit Judge, as a matter of apparent first \nimpression, held that the CVRA did not create a private right \nof action authorizing crime victim to file stand-alone civil \nlawsuit to enforce CVRA rights. \nPetition denied. \nWilliam H. Pryor, Chief Judge, filed concurring opinion, in \nwhich Newsom, Lagoa, Tjoflat, Circuit Judges, joined. \nNewsom, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion. \nTjoflat, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion, in which \nWilliam H. Pryor, Chief Judge, and Wilson, Newsom, and \nLagoa, Circuit Judges, joined. \nBranch, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion, in which \nMartin, Jill Pryor, and Hull, Circuit Judges, joined. \nHull, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion. \nProcedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Petition for Writ of \nMandamus. \nWest Headnotes (21) \n111 \nFederal Courts I \nQuestions of Law in \nGeneral \nWhen the issues p\n... [truncated, 3410 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/0 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=0]", "char_count": 3410}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Pa. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nto enforce CVRA rights, including the right to \nconfer with federal government's attorneys and \nthe right to be treated fairly by them, before \nthe commencement of, or in the absence of, any \npreexisting criminal proceeding. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ \n3771(a), 3771(b), 3771(d)( 1). \n3 Cases that cite this headnote \n141 \nAction 0. Statutory rights of action \nLike substantive federal law itself, private rights \nof action to enforce federal law must be created \nby Congress. \n151 \nAction 4- Statutory rights of action \nA reviewing court must interpret the statute \nCongress has passed to determine whether it \ndisplays an intent to create not just a private right \nbut also a private remedy, in determining whether \na statute creates a private right of action. \n161 \nConstitutional Law \nCreation of rights of \naction \nAbsent clear expression of congressional intent \nto authorize would-be plaintiff to sue, a private \ncause of action does not exist and courts may not \ncreate one, no matter how desirable that might be \nas a policy matter, or how compatible with the \nstatute. \nConstitutional Law 0. Creation of rights of \naction \nA reviewing court may not plumb a statute's \nsupposed purposes and policies in search of the \nrequisite intent to create a private cause of action; \nrather, inquiry both begins and ends with careful \nexamination of the statute's language. \nStatutes 4- Express mention and implied \nexclusion; expressio unius est exclusio alterius \nA statute's express provision of one method \nof enforcing a substantive rule suggests that \nCongress intended to preclude others. \n191 \nStatutes 0. Plain language; plain, ordinary, \ncommon, or literal meaning \nIn all cases involving statutory construction, \ncourt assumes that the legislative purpose is \nexpressed by the ordinary meaning, not the \nidiosyncratic meaning, of the words used. \n(10) \nUnited States 0. Necessity of waiver or \nconsent \nThe United States is generally immun\n... [truncated, 3087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/1 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=1]", "char_count": 3087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nfrom any question of probable cause. U.S. Const. \nAmend. 4. \n1151 \nDistrict and Prosecuting \nAttorneys 0. Charging discretion \nAlthough as a member of the bar, the attorney \nfor the United States is an officer of the \ncourt, he is nevertheless an executive official \nof the Government, and it is as an officer of \nthe executive department that he exercises a \ndiscretion as to whether or not there shall be a \nprosecution in a particular case. \n1161 \nConstitutional Law 4- Prosecutors \nAs an incident of the constitutional separation \nof powers, courts are not to interfere with the \nfree exercise of the discretionary powers of the \nattorneys of the United States in their control \nover criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. art. 2, § \n3; U.S. Const. art. 3, § I et seq. \n1171 \nCriminal Law 0. Civil liabilities to persons \ninjured; reparation \nAny individual asserting rights under the Crime \nVictims' Rights Act (CVRA) must, at the very \noutset, demonstrate to the district court that she is \na \"crime victim\" entitled to statutory protection. \n18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3771(a), 3771(eX2)(A). \n2 Cases that cite this headnote \n[18[ \nConstitutional Law 0. Nature and scope in \ngeneral \nDistrict and Prosecuting \nAttorneys 0. Charging discretion \nThe commencement of criminal proceedings \nmarks a clear and sensible boundary on \nthe prosecutorial•discretion spectrum; before \ncharges are filed, when the government is still \nin the process of investigating and deciding \nwhether to prosecute, the prosecutoes authority \nand discretion are understood to be exclusive and \nabsolute. U.S. Const. art. 2, § 3; U.S. Const. art. \n3, § I et seq. \nI Cases that cite this headnote \n1191 \nConstitutional Law 4- Encroachment on \nJudiciary \nOnce the charging decision is made, the \nprosecutor steps into the court's jurisdiction, \nits house, so to speak, and thus necessarily \ncedes some of her control of the course and \nmanagement of the criminal case. U.S.\n... [truncated, 3323 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/2 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=2]", "char_count": 3323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nBefore WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON, \nMARTIN, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, LUCK, \nLAGOA, BRASHER, TJOFLAT, and HULL, Circuit \nJudges.*\nOpinion \nNEWSOM, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, \nin which WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON, \nLAGOA, BRASHER, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, joined, \nand in which in LUCK, Circuit Judge, joined as to Parts IB, \nII, III, IVA, IVB I-3a, IVC, IVD I, and V. \nWILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, filed a concurring opinion, \nin which NEWSOM, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit \nJudges, joined. \nNEWSOM, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion. \nTJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion, in which \nWILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON, NEWSOM, \nand LAGOA, Circuit Judges, joined. \nBRANCH, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which \nMARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and HULL, Circuit Judges, joined. \nHULL, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. \nNEWSOM, Circuit Judge: \n*1247 This petition for writ of mandamus arises under the \nCrime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Petitioner \nis one of more than 30 women who, according \nto allegations that we have no reason to doubt and therefore \naccept as true in deciding this case, were victimized by \nnotorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey Epstein. \nIn her mandamus petition, Ms. Wild asserts that when \nfederal prosecutors secretly negotiated and executed a non-\nprosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her \nrights under the CVRA—in particular, her rights to confer \nwith and to be treated fairly by the government's lawyers. \nWe have the profoundest sympathy for Ms. Wild and others \nlike her, who suffered unspeakable horror at Epstein's hands, \nonly to be left in the dark—and, so it seems, affirmatively \nmisled—by government attorneys. Even so, we find ourselves \nconstrained to deny Ms. Wild's petition. While the CVRA \npermits a crime victim like Ms. Wild to \"mov[e]\" for relief \nwithin \n... [truncated, 4550 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/3 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=3]", "char_count": 4550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nprosecutors arguing that, in fact, Epstein hadn't broken any \nfederal laws. By mid-September, the sides had exchanged \nmultiple drafts of what would become an infamous non-\nprosecution agreement (NPA). Pursuant to their eventual \nagreement, Epstein would plead guilty in Florida court \nto two state prostitution offenses, and, in exchange, he \nand any coconspirators (at least four of whom have since \nbeen identified) would receive immunity from federal \nprosecution. I In June 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty to the \nstate crimes as agreed and was sentenced to 18 months' \nimprisonment, 12 months' home confinement, and lifetime \nsex-offender status. \nThe district court found that \"[f]rom the time the FBI began \ninvestigating Epstein until September 24, 2007\"—when the \ngovernment formally executed the NPA with Epstein—\nfederal prosecutors \"never conferred with the victims about \na[n] NPA or told the victims that such an agreement was under \nconsideration.\" Doe I v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, \n1208 (S.D. Fla. 2019). Worse, it appears that prosecutors \nworked hand-in-hand with Epstein's lawyers—er at the very \nleast acceded to their requests—to keep the NPA's existence \nand terms hidden from victims. The NPA itself provided \nthat \"[t]he parties anticipate that this agreement will not be \nmade part of any public record\" and, further, that \"[i]f the \nUnited States receives a Freedom of Information Act request \nor any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the \nagreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making \nthat disclosure.\" Moreover, at approximately the same time \nthat the sides concluded the NPA, they began negotiating \nabout what prosecutors could (and couldn't) tell victims about \nthe agreement. Seemingly in deference to Epstein's lawyers' \nrepeated requests, the government held off—for nearly an \nentire year—on notifying Epstein's victims of the NPA's \nexistence. \nAnd to be clea\n... [truncated, 5164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/4 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=4]", "char_count": 5164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nInitially, in 2011 the district court \"addresse[d] the threshold \nissue whether the CVRA attaches before the government \nbrings formal charges against the defendant.\" P i Does, \n817 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. The court held that \"it does \nbecause the statutory language clearly contemplates pre-\ncharge proceedings.\"1 hi Having made that determination, \nthe district court \"defer[red]\" ruling on the question whether \nfederal prosecutors had violated the Act *1250 until the \nparties could conduct additional discovery. ?l id at 1343. \nFollowing another eight years of litigation, the district court \nissued a pair of rulings that prompted the mandamus petition \nnow before us. In February 2019, the court found that the \ngovernment had infringed Ms. Wild's CVRA rights. See \nDoe I, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1222. In particular, the court \nheld that federal prosecutors violated the Act by \"enter[ing] \ninto a[n] NPA with Epstein without conferring with [Ms. \nWild] during its negotiation and signing.\" Id. at 1218. \"Had \n[Ms. Wild] been informed about the Government's intention \nto forego [sic] federal prosecution of Epstein in deference \nto him pleading guilty to state charges,\" the district court \nemphasized, she \"could have conferred with the attorney for \nthe Government and provided input.\" Id. The court concluded \nthat it was precisely \"this type of communication between \nprosecutors and victims that was intended by the passage of \nthe CVRA.\"Id. at 1219. \nHaving found CVRA violations, the court directed the \nparties—which by then included Epstein as an intervenor \n—to address \"the issue of what remedy, if any, should \nbe applied.\" Id. at 1222. In response, Ms. Wild proposed \nmultiple remedies, including: (I) rescission of the NPA; \n(2) an injunction against further CVRA violations; (3) an \norder scheduling a victim-impact hearing and a meeting \nbetween victims and Alexander Acosta, the former United \nStates Attorney for the\n... [truncated, 5323 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/5 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=5]", "char_count": 5323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nA divided panel of this Court denied Ms. Wild's mandamus \npetition, holding \"that the CVRA does not apply before the \ncommencement of criminal proceedings—and thus, on the \nfacts of this case, does not provide [Ms. Wild] any judicially \nenforceable rights.\" Plik; re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1220 (11th \nCir. 2020), reh'g en bane granted, opinion vacated, 967 F.3d \n1285 (11th Cir. 2020). \nA majority of the active judges of this Circuit voted to rehear \nthe case en banc, and we directed the parties to address \ntwo questions: (1) Whether the CVRA creates rights that \nattach and apply before the formal commencement of criminal \nproceedings; and (2) Whether, even assuming that it does so, \nthe CVRA further creates a private right of action, such that \nany pre-charge right is judicially enforceable in a freestanding \nlawsuit. \nIn response to those questions, Ms. Wild contends that \nher rights \"to confer with the attorney for the Government \nin the case,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), and \"to be treated \nwith fairness,\" id. § 3771(a)(8), attached even before the \ncommencement of—and as it turns out, in the absence of—\nany criminal proceedings against Epstein and, further, that the \nCVRA authorized her to seek judicial enforcement of those \nrights in a stand-alone civil action. The government disputes \nboth propositions. 6\nIII We conclude that we needn't decide whether, in the \nabstract, the rights to confer *1252 and to be treated with \nfairness might attach prior to the formal commencement of \ncriminal proceedings or whether, if they do, they might be \nenforceable through, say, political or administrative channels. \nNor, for that matter, need we even decide whether, if the \nrights to confer and to be treated fairly apply pre-charge, a \nvictim could later seek to vindicate them during the course of \nan ongoing criminal prosecution. 7 Here, the only issue we \nhave to confront is whether the CVRA authorizes Ms. Wild to \nf\n... [truncated, 4102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/6 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=6]", "char_count": 4102}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nSubsection (b), titled \"Rights afforded,\" focuses specifically \non courts' responsibilities under the Act. Subsection (b)(I) \nstates that \"[i]n any court proceeding involving an offense \nagainst a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime \nvictim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a).\" Id. \n§ 3771(b)(I). Subsection (b)(2) pertains to \"Federal habeas \ncorpus proceeding[s]\" and provides that the \"court shall \nensure\" that the victim is afforded a more limited set of rights. \nId. § 3771(b)(2). \nSubsection (c), titled \"Best efforts to accord rights,\" imposes \nobligations on non judicial actors. One of its constituent \nclauses—which Ms. Wild calls the \"coverage\" provision—\nstates as follows: \nOfficers and employees of the \nDepartment of Justice and other \ndepartments and agencies of the \nUnited States engaged in the detection, \ninvestigation, or prosecution of crime \nshall make their best efforts to see \nthat crime victims are notified of, \nand accorded, the rights described in \nsubsection (a). \nId. § 3771(cX1). \nSubsection (d) addresses \"Enforcement and limitations.\" It \nopens by stating that either the crime victim, her authorized \nrepresentative, or the government \"may assert the rights \ndescribed in subsection (a).\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX1). The \nbalance of subsection (d) prescribes exactly how, when, and \nwhere those rights may be asserted, as well as the limitations \non judicial enforcement. In that connection, several of \nsubsection (d)(3)'s provisions are particularly relevant here. \nFirst, and most obviously given its title—\"Motion for relief \nand writ of mandamus\"—subsection (d)(3) gives victims \na \"motion\" remedy in the district court and a mandamus \nremedy in the court of appeals. With respect to the former, \nsubsection (dX3) states that \"[t]he district court shall take up \nand decide any motion asserting a victim's right forthwith.\" \nId. § 3771(d)(3). And with respect to the\n... [truncated, 5185 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/7 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=7]", "char_count": 5185}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nher rights, our lodestar is \nAlexander v. Sandoval, in \nwhich the Supreme Court (reversing an erroneous decision of \nours) unequivocally \"swor[e] off' its old \"habit of venturing \nbeyond Congress's intent\" to liberally \"imply\" private rights \nof action in favor of a rigorous attention to statutory text and \nstructure. \n532 U.S. 275, 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d \n517 (2001). \"Like substantive federal law itself,\" the Court \nexplained there, \"private rights of action to enforce federal \nlaw must be created by Congress.\" \nId. at 286, 121 S.Ct. \n1511. Accordingly, the Court emphasized, \"[t]he judicial \ntask\" is straightfonvard: A reviewing court must \"interpret \nthe statute Congress has passed to determine whether it \ndisplays an intent to create not just a private right but also \na private remedv\" \nId. (emphasis added). In making the \nlatter determination, the Supreme Court said, \"[s]tatutory \nintent ... is determinative.\" t Id. Absent a clear expression \nof congressional intent to authorize a would-be plaintiff to \nsue, \"a cause of action does not exist and courts may not \ncreate one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy \nsuperior an additional \"range of disciplinary sanctions.\" \nId. § 45.10(d)—(e). As required by statute, the regulations \nprovide that the Ombudsman's decision is final and that \n\"[a] complainant may not seek judicial review of the \n[Ombudsman's] determination regarding the complaint.\" Id. \n§ 45.10(c)(8). \n121 With that primer, we proceed to address Ms. Wild's \nCH \n10 \ncase. \n*1255 III \n[31 As already noted, Ms. Wild initiated this litigation by \nfiling, a parte, a document styled an \"Emergency Victim's \nPetition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act.\" \nAs the district court explained, \"because no criminal case \nwas pending\" at the time, Ms. Wild \"filed [her] petition as \na new matter,\" which the court clerk \"docketed as a civil \naction\" against the United States. \n... [truncated, 4581 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/8 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=8]", "char_count": 4581}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nOnly two provisions of the Act speak directly to the issue of \njudicial enforcement-I  3771(b) and § 3771(d). Neither, we \nconclude, indicates that CVRA-protected rights are judicially \nenforceable outside the confines of an existing proceeding, \nlet alone that the Act creates a private right of action to \nenforce those rights before the commencement of criminal \nproceedings. And the evidence from the remainder of the \nCVRA—in particular from § 3771(f), which prescribes \nand details a mechanism for administrative enforcement—\nconfirms our conclusion that Congress didn't clearly manifest \nits intent to authorize crime victims to file stand-alone civil \nactions. \nA \nFirst up is § 3771(b), which is titled \"Rights afforded.\" To \nthe extent that § 3771(b) bears on the question before us, it \nstrongly indicates that the CVRA does not authorize judicial \nenforcement outside the context of a preexisting proceeding. \nSubsection (b)(1) states that \"[i]n any court proceeding \ninvolving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall \nensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described \nin subsection (a).\" Separately, subsection (bX2) states that \n\"[l]n a Federal habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a \nState conviction\"—i.e., a proceeding under ?9 28 U.S.C. § \n2254—\"the court shall ensure that a crime victim is afforded \nthe rights described in paragraphs (3), (4), (7), and (8) of \nsubsection (a).\" \nSection 377 I (b) is the only provision of the CVRA that \nexpressly directs the judiciary, in particular, to \"ensure\" \nthat victims' rights are protected, and it contains no \nsuggestion that the Act provides for judicial enforcement of \ncrime victims' rights outside the confines of a preexisting \n\"proceeding.\" Quite the contrary, subsection (b) indicates that \ncourts' responsibilities to enforce victims' rights (as distinct \nfrom the responsibilities of other government actors) arise \nonly in the contex\n... [truncated, 4547 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/9 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=9]", "char_count": 4547}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nTownes, Studies in American Elementary Law 621 (1911) \n(emphasis added)); see also 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, \nand Orders § I (2020) (\"The term 'motion' generally means \nan application made to a court or judge to obtain a rule or \norder directing some act to be done in the applicant's favor \nin a pending case.\" (footnotes omitted and emphasis added)); \n60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § I (2020) (\"The term 'motion' \ngenerally means an application made to a court or judge for \nthe purpose of obtaining a rule or order directing some act \nto be done in favor of the applicant in a pending case. A \nmotion is a request for relief, usually interlocutory relief, \nwithin a case.\" (footnotes omitted and emphasis added)); \nMotion (Movant or Move), The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier \nLaw Dictionary: Desk Edition (Stephen Michael Sheppard, \ned., 2012) (\"A motion is presented to a court in a pending \naction....\" (emphasis added)). \nJust as importantly here—if not more so—the term \"motion\" \nhas never been commonly understood to denote a vehicle \nfor initiating a new and freestanding lawsuit. As one legal \nencyclopedia summarizes matters: \"The function of a motion \nis not to initiate new litigation, but to bring before the court \nfor ruling some material but incidental matter arising in the \nprogress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is \nnot an independent right or remedy ....\" 56 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, \n§ I (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). A new suit is \ngenerally commenced through a \"complaint,\" which (per the \nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure) is a form of \"pleading\" and \nthus distinct from a \"motion.\" See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, 7. \"[A] \nmotion,\" put simply, \"is not a pleading.\" Garner's Dictionary \nof Legal Usage 591 (3d ed. 2011). 12\n*1258 The closest that the law seems to have come to using \nthe word \"motion\" to signify an instrument for initiating \na new action is 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which authorizes a \n\n... [truncated, 5554 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/10 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=10]", "char_count": 5554}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nenforcement apparatus—\"[t]he express provision of one \nmethod of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress \nintended to preclude others.\" \n532 U.S. at 290, 121 S.Ct. \n1511; see also, e.g., P PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d at \n1295 (observing that when Congress has expressly created an \nalternative remedy for enforcing federal rights, \"we ought not \nimply a private right of action\" (quotation marks omitted)). \n3 \nSubsection (dX6), which is conspicuously titled \"No cause of \naction,\" bolsters our view that the CVRA doesn't authorize a \ncrime victim to file a freestanding civil action to assert her \nrights even before the commencement of—and in the absence \nof—criminal proceedings. \na \nPerhaps most starkly, subsection (d)(6)'s first sentence \nstates that \"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed \nto authorize a cause of action for damages ....\" Far from \na t \nSandoval-qualifying clear statement of congressional \nintent to create a private right of action, that provision \nvery nearly forecloses one. Of course, one might object—as \now dissenting colleagues do—that subsection (dX6) doesn't \nexpressly rule out a private suit for declaratory or injunctive \nrelief. But under \nSandoval and its progeny, the question \nisn't whether Congress \"intended to preclude\" a private right \nof action, see Branch Dissenting Op. at 1307-08, but rather, \nwhether it intended to provide one. There is certainly nothing \nin subsection (d)(6)'s first sentence to suggest that it did. \n*1260 Contrast, by way of example, 18 U.S.C. § 2255, \nwhich expressly creates a \"[c]ivil remedy for personal \ninjuries\" arising out of particular child-sex crimes. That \nstatute specifies that a minor victim \"who suffers personal \ninjury\" as a result of a violation of any of various federal \ncriminal statutes can \"sue in any appropriate United States \nDistrict Court\" and recover compensatory and punitive \ndamages and, if appropriate, \"prelimin\n... [truncated, 4529 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/11 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=11]", "char_count": 4529}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n[171 As an initial matter, consider that the very first \ndetermination that a court must make when asked to enforce \nthe CVRA is whether the party seeking the Act's benefit \nis a \"crime victim.\" That's because the CVRA's opening \nprovision makes clear that the Act's protections—the rights \nenumerated therein—are available only to \"crime victim[s].\" \nIS U.S.C. § 3771(a) (\"A crime victim has the following \nrights ....\"). Notably for our purposes, the CVRA defines \nthe term \"crime victim\" to mean \"a person directly and \nproximately harmed as a result of the commission of a \nFederal offense.\" Id. § 3771(e)(2XA). Accordingly, any \nindividual asserting rights under the CVRA must, at the \nvery outset, demonstrate to the district court that she is a \n\"crime victim\" entitled to statutory protection. And, given \nthe statutory definition's terms, in order to determine whether \nthe individual has made the requisite showing, the court \nmust decide whether a \"Federal offense\" has occurred. When \na prosecutor has already commenced criminal proceedings \nagainst an identifiable individual for a specific crime, that \nprosecutor has made at least a presumptive determination that \nthe individual has in fact committed a \"Federal offense.\" So, \nas applied in the context of a preexisting criminal proceeding, \nthe \"crime victim\" determination is straightforward: An \nindividual who has been \"directly and proximately harmed\" \nas a result of the conduct charged by the government is \nentitled to CVRA protection and may assert her rights in court \naccordingly. \nNot so outside the context of a preexisting criminal \nproceeding. In that circumstance, if an individual were to \nassert CVRA rights as a \"crime victim,\" the court would \nfirst have to determine—but this time without any initial \ndetermination by the government in the form of a charging \ndecision and, indeed, presumably while the government's \ninvestigation remains ongoing—\n... [truncated, 5470 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/12 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=12]", "char_count": 5470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \npain of contempt) to conduct their prosecution of a particular \nmatter in a particular manner. \nTo be clear, even if all that Ms. Wild's interpretation \nrisked was pre-charge judicial intervention in ongoing \ncriminal investigations, the threat it posed to prosecutorial \ndiscretion would be reason enough to reject it. Freed from \nany line limiting judicial enforcement to the post-charge \nphases of a prosecution, courts would be empowered to \nissue injunctions requiring consultation with victims (to \nname just a few examples) before law-enforcement raids, \nwarrant applications, arrests, witness interviews, lineups, \nand interrogations. Needless to say, that would work an \nextraordinary expansion of an already-extraordinary statute. \nBut there's even more at stake here. What about the \ncircumstance in which a prosecutor has declined to bring \ncharges because she has determined that no crime was \ncommitted? Or, as in this case, where the prosecutor has \nsimply made the decision (right or wrong) that it isn't a \nwise use of government resources to litigate whether a \nfederal crime occurred because the presumed perpetrator \nis already slated to serve time in state prison? Ms. Wild's \nreading of the CVRA would permit a putative victim to \nchallenge the correctness, in either case, of the prosecutor's \nno-charge decision in *1263 court—effectively appealing \nthe prosecutor's exercise of discretion to a federal district \njudge. Judicial review of a prosecutor's decision whether to \nprosecute is the very quintessence of an \"impair[ment of] \nprosecutorial discretion.\" IR \nsss \n[18[ \n1191 The commencement of criminal proceedings \nmarks a clear and sensible boundary on the prosecutorial-\ndiscretion spectrum. Before charges are filed—when the \ngovernment is still in the process of investigating and \ndeciding \"whether to prosecute\"—its authority and discretion \nare understood to be \"exclusive\" and \"absolute.\" f Nixo\n... [truncated, 5191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/13 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=13]", "char_count": 5191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nthat \"[t]he bar for showing [the required] legislative intent \nis high.\" \nId. at 1352-53 (quotation marks and citations \nomitted). Most notably for present purposes, we observed \n(once again echoing \nSandoval) that if a statute \"provides a \ndiscernible enforcement mechanism ... we ought not imply a \nprivate right of action because `[t]he express provision of one \nmethod of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress \nintended to preclude others.' \"P 11d. at 1353. \nWe emphasized in P \"Love that the Air Carriers Access \nAct embodied its own remedial apparatus, which we \ndescribed as having two parts. First, the Act created \n\"an elaborate administrative enforcement scheme\"—which, \namong other things, permitted aggrieved individuals to \nfile complaints with the Department of Transportation, \nrequired the Department to investigate those complaints, and \nauthorized the Department to impose a range of sanctions. \n?SM. at 1354-55, 1358. Second, the Act authorized what \nwe called \"a limited form of judicial review\"—in particular, \nit permitted \"an individual with 'a substantial interest' in a \nDOT enforcement action [to] petition for review in a United \nStates Court of Appeals.\" \nId. at 1356, 1358. That two-track \nremedial regime, we concluded, \"belie[d] any congressional \nintent\" to create a freestanding \"private right to sue in a federal \ndistrict court.\" \nI Id. at 1354. Finding ourselves bound by \nCongress's intent—as reflected in statutory text and structure \n—we held that we couldn't \"create by implication a private \nright of action, no matter how socially desirable or otherwise \nwarranted the result may be.\" It \" Id. at 1359-60. \nLove's rationale—which, as noted, follows straightaway \nfrom [\"Sandoval—maps onto this case pretty closely. Just \nas it did in the Air Carrier Access Act, in the CVRA \nCongress created both a robust administrative-enforcement \nregime—complete with \"complaints,\" \"investiga\n... [truncated, 4816 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/14 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=14]", "char_count": 4816}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nIn sum, we find that numerous aspects of the CVRA \n—among them, subsection (dX3)'s specification of a \n\"motion\" remedy and warning against appellate review \nunduly delaying ongoing \"proceedings,\" subsection (d) \n(6)'s \"[n]o cause of action\" language and prohibition \non any construction of the Act that would \"impair ... \nprosecutorial discretion,\" and subsection (f)'s establishment \nof a detailed administrative-enforcement *1266 apparatus—\npreclude any conclusion that the Act reflects a? Sandoval-\nqualifying clear expression of congressional intent to \nauthorize a crime victim to file a freestanding civil action. \nD \nAgainst all this, Ms. Wild relies on two provisions of the \nCVRA that, she insists, authorize her to seek pre-charge \njudicial enforcement of her statutory rights. Neither, we \nconclude, clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to create a \nprivate right of action. \n1 \nFirst, and most prominently, Ms. Wild points to a single \nsentence—or, more precisely, a single comma phrase—in \n§ 3771(d)(3), which she calls the Act's \"venue\" provision: \n\"The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in \nthe district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted \nfor the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the \ndistrict court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" \nBasically, Ms. Wild's contention—which the district court \nadopted—is that the \"no prosecution is underway\" clause \nmust mean that CVRA rights can be enforced in court before \nthe commencement of criminal proceedings and, therefore, \nthat subsection (d)(3)'s \"motion\" remedy must constitute \na \nSandoval-qualifying expression of clear congressional \nintent to create a private right of action that would authorize a \nstand-alone pm-charge civil action. We respectfully disagree. \nSubsection (dX3) could just as easily—and far more sensibly, \ngiven the statutory context and the practical and constitutional \nproblems that Ms. Wi\n... [truncated, 5000 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/15 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=15]", "char_count": 5000}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nand employees of \"other departments and agencies of the \nUnited States\" that (like DOJ) are \"engaged in the detection, \ninvestigation, or prosecution of crime\"—e.g., IRS, ICE, and \nTSA. Those agencies' employees, like DOTS, must \"make \ntheir best efforts to see that crime victims\" are afforded \nCVRA rights. If subsection (c)(1) were intended to be a \n\"when\" *1268 provision, then the phrase \"in the detection, \ninvestigation, or prosecution of crime\" presumably would \nhave been situated differently in the provision, such that the \nfull sentence would read: \"Officers and employees of the \nDepartment of Justice and other departments and agencies \nof the United States engaged in-the detectionHnvestigation, \nor-preseeufien-oferime shall make their best efforts to see \nthat crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights \ndescribed in subsection (a) in the detection. investigation, or \nprosecution of crime.\" \nFinally, Ms. Wild's reliance on § 3771(c)(1) proves entirely \ntoo much. If, as Ms. Wild thinks subsection (c)(1) shows, \nCVRA rights are subject to judicial enforcement during \nthe \"detection\" and \"investigation\" of crime, then there \nis no meaningful basis—at least no meaningful textual \nbasis—for limiting the Act's pre-charge application. To the \ncontrary, Ms. Wild's reading of the term \"investigation\" in \nsubsection (cX1) would—as already noted—require law-\nenforcement officers to \"confer\" with victims, subject only \nto a squishy \"reasonable[ness]\" limitation, see § 3771(aX5), \nbefore conducting a raid, seeking a warrant, making an arrest, \ninterviewing a witness, convening a lineup, or conducting an \ninterrogation. Moreover, every cop on the beat is involved in \ncrime \"detection\"—even before any crime is committed. Of \ncourse, there can't be a \"crime victim\" until a crime occurs, \nso the inclusion of \"detection\" in the coverage provision \njust further demonstrates the misfit here. In other wo\n... [truncated, 5206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/16 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=16]", "char_count": 5206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nJeffrey Epstein was a bad man. By all accounts, he was. Nor \nis the question before us whether, as a matter of best practices, \nprosecutors should have consulted with Ms. Wild (and other \nvictims) before negotiating and executing Epstein's NPA. By \nall accounts—including the government's own—they should \nhave. Our sole charge is to determine, on the facts before us, \nwhether the CVRA provides Ms. Wild with a private right \nof action to enforce her rights outside of the context of a \npreexisting criminal proceeding. Despite our sympathy for \nMs. Wild—and the courage that she has shown in pursuing \nthis litigation—we find ourselves constrained to hold that it \ndoes not. \nPETITION DENIED. \nWILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, joined by NEWSOM, \nLAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, concurring: \nI join the majority's opinion in full. I write separately \nto respond to three fundamental errors in the dissenting \nopinions. First, by urging us to decide an issue that does not \naffect the outcome of this mandamus petition, our dissenting \ncolleagues have forgotten that we do not issue advisory \nopinions. Second, the dissents commit the most common error \nof statutory interpretation by reading individual subsections \nin isolation instead of reading the whole text of the statute. \nFinally, the dissents misunderstand what it means to interpret \n*1270 statutes with a presumption against implied rights of \naction. I address each mistake in turn. \nA. Federal Courts Lack the Power \nto Issue Advisory Opinions. \nWhen we ordered rehearing en bane, we asked the parties to \nanswer two questions in their briefs. First, does the Crime \nVictim Rights Act, I8 U.S.C. § 3771, \"grant[ ] a crime victim \nany statutory rights that apply before the filing of a formal \ncriminal charge by the government prosecutor?\" And second, \n\"[i]f a crime victim has statutory rights under the [Act] that \napply pre-charge, does the [Act] also grant a crime vic\n... [truncated, 5149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/17 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=17]", "char_count": 5149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nExecutive Branch. 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of \nJohn Jay 486-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed. 1891). As the Justices \nexplained *1271 in a letter to President George Washington, \n\"the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the \nthree departments of the government ... and our being judges \nof a court in the last resort[ ] are considerations which afford \nstrong arguments against the propriety of our extrajudicially \ndeciding the questions alluded to.\" Id. at 488. \nThe prohibition against issuing advisory opinions also runs \nthrough our caselaw all the way back to ?al Hayburn's Case, \n2 U.S. 408, 2 Dail. 409, I L.Ed. 436 (1792). A federal \nstatute authorized courts to determine disability pensions for \nRevolutionary War veterans. ?'Mistretta v. United States, \n488 U.S. 361. 402, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) \n(describing \nHayburn's Case). These determinations were \nsubject to review by the Secretary of War. t tld. The Supreme \nCourt was presented with a mandamus petition asking it to \norder a federal circuit court to consider a pension request. \n? I Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409. It decided \nnot to take up the petition until the next term. P yld. By \nthen, Congress had amended the statute and rendered the \ncontroversy moot. \nt Id. at 409-10. Although the Supreme \nCourt never issued an opinion, five justices considered the \nstatute while riding circuit, and the Supreme Court reporter \nincluded their opinions in a footnote. \nId. at 410 n.t. All \nagreed that requiring a federal court to issue nonbinding \nopinions advising the Executive on how to perform its \nduties breached the separation of powers inherent in the \nconstitutional structure. \nId. The circuit court for the district \nof North Carolina, which included Justice James Iredell, \ndoubted \"the propriety of giving an opinion in a case which \nhas not yet come regularly and judicially before\" it. ? I Id. \nat 414 n.t. \"\n... [truncated, 5087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/18 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=18]", "char_count": 5087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nOur dissenting colleagues' professed commitment to \ntextualism is laudable. But it is one thing to recite the canons \nof statutory interpretation, and it is an entirely different matter \nto apply them correctly. See \nRostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755-\n56 (Afito, J., dissenting) (\"The Court's opinion is like a pirate \nship. It sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually \nrepresents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice \nScalia excoriated ....\"). \nThe dissents commit a basic error of statutory interpretation \nby reading subsections (a)(5), (aX8), and (dX3) in isolation \nwithout looking to the rest of the Act. \"Statutory \nconstruction ... is a holistic endeavor?? a United Say. Assen of \nTex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, \n371, 108 S.Ct 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). \"In expounding a \nstatute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member \nof a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, \nand to its object and policy.\"? j Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. \ny. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 18, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d \n694 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"Perhaps no \ninterpretive fault is more common than the failure to follow \nthe whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter \nto consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of \nthe physical and logical relation of its many parts.\" Antonin \nScalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation \nof Legal Texts § 24, at 167 (2012). And although the dissents \ncite the whole-text canon, Branch Dissenting Op. at 1295-96, \nthey fail to apply it in their analysis. \nThe dissents' error manifests itself in several ways. Take, \nfor example, the dissents' focus on subsection (a), which \nprovides a list of crime victims' rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). \nMost of these rights make sense only in the context of \nongoing criminal proceedings, which supports the majority's \nview that crime vic\n... [truncated, 5709 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/19 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=19]", "char_count": 5709}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nimpair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General \nor any officer under his direction.\" Id. And as Judge Tjoflat \nmeticulously explains in his concurring opinion, allowing \nan individual to initiate a freestanding civil action seeking \ndeclaratory or injunctive relief under the Act in the absence of \nan ongoing criminal proceeding would unquestionably impair \nprosecutorial discretion. Tjoflat Concurring Op. at 1282-88. \nFinally, the dissents have no answer to the majority's point that \nthe United States has not clearly waived sovereign immunity. \nMaj. Op. at 1258-59 n.15. As a leading treatise explains, \n\"A statute does not waive sovereign immunity ... unless that \ndisposition is unequivocally clear.\" Scalia & Garner, Reading \nLaw § 46, at 281. No provision of the Act plausibly, much less \nunequivocally, suggests that the United States has consented \nto be sued in a civil action by a crime victim seeking to enforce \nhis or her rights under the Act. \nBy failing to read the whole text of the Act, the dissents \ncommit a common error of statutory interpretation. When \nread in the context of the entire statute, their interpretation of \nsubsections (a)(5), (a)(8), and (dX3) is implausible. \n*1274 C Statutes Are Interpreted with a \nPresumption Against Implied Rights of-Action. \nThe dissents expend significant time and energy asserting that \nthe majority opinion is wrong that f Alexander v. Sandoval, \n532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), \ncounsels against finding an implied cause of action in the \nAct. My colleagues may recall that our Court was reversed in \nSandoval. I fear that the lesson of that reversal still has not \nbeen learned by some. \nWe interpret statutes with a presumption against, not in favor \nof, the existence of an implied right of action. Scalia & Garner, \nReading Law § 51. at 313. The Supreme Court made this \nprinciple clear in \nSandoval when it said that it had \"swo\n... [truncated, 5107 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/20 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=20]", "char_count": 5107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n(alteration adopted) (citation *1275 and internal quotation \nmarks omitted). Terms like \"reasonable\" and \"sufficient,\" \nabsent any statutory guidance as to how they are to be \nmeasured, are \"far too tenuous to support the notion that \nCongress\" meant to confer judicially enforceable rights on \nindividuals. Ca\n \nBlessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S. 329, 345, \n117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997); see also!' Suter \nv. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 359-60, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 \nL.Ed.2d 1 (1992). We expect Congress to \"speak with a clear \nvoice[ ] and [to] manifest[ ] an unambiguous intent to confer \nindividual rights.\" PI Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, \n280, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (alteration \nrejected) (internal quotation marks omitted). \n\"The reasonable right to confer with\" a government attorney \nand \"[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect\" \ndo not provide the kind of administrable language that the \nSupreme Court has said—time and again—is required of \njudicially enforceable rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), (aX8). \nIt is one thing to say that these vague \"rights\" are enforceable \nin the context of a pending criminal action where the crime \nvictim already has far more specific rights, such as protection \nfrom the accused, id. § 3771(a)(1), accurate and timely notice \nof court proceedings, id. § 3771(aX2), the opportunity to be \nheard, id. § 3771(a)(4), and restitution, id. § 3771(aX6). But \nit is implausible that the Act creates judicially enforceable \n\"rights\" to confer reasonably and to be treated with fairness \nand respect in a standalone civil suit. \nsss \nOne final point merits a response. The dissents remind us that \n\"our role as judges is to interpret and follow the law as written, \nregardless of whether we like the result.\" Branch Dissenting \nOp. at 1314 (alteration rejected) (quoting \nBostock, 140 S. \nCt. at 1823 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). Respectfully, readers \n\n... [truncated, 5146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/21 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=21]", "char_count": 5146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nmy hope is that readers of today's decision will understand \nprecisely why we are compelled to deny Ms. Wild's petition. \nTo orient the reader, I will begin with a brief overview of the \npre- and post-charge CVRA litigation models. \nA. \nLet's start with the dissent's pre-charge model. 2 For now, I \nwill keep the analysis high-level, as I will walk through the \nproblems with this model in detail in parts II and III. \nIf a victim's CVRA rights are judicially enforceable pm-\ncharge, then any pm-charge efforts to vindicate those \nrights must begin, as the majority opinion explains, with a \nfreestanding civil lawsuit against the United States Attorney 3\nfor the district in which the alleged crime was committed. \nIn his civil complaint, the victim would need to allege that \nthere is probable cause to believe that a specific *1277 \nperson—for shorthand, \"the accused\"—committed a specific \nfederal crime, and that the victim is indeed a \"crime victim\" \nas defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3771(eX2). 4 The complaint \nwould also seek some relief, presumably an injunctive order \nrequiring the United States Attorney to honor the victim's \nrights under IS U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)—the \"reasonable right \nto confer\"—and (aX8)—the \"right to be treated with fairness \nand with respect.\" \nIn response, the United States Attorney would file an \nanswer5 to the complaint. It stands to reason that, in the \nanswer, the United States Attorney would prefer a general \ndenial—pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) \n(3)—to avoid revealing any specific information that could \njeopardize an ongoing federal investigation. Any attempt to \nkeep the investigation under wraps, however, would likely be \nthwarted by the victim's requests for discovery of information \nfrom the investigation that is relevant to the CVRA claim—\nspecifically the issue of probable cause. See,e.g.,Farnsworth \nv. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. \n1985)\n... [truncated, 4849 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/22 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=22]", "char_count": 4849}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \ninstances, the accused may have already pled guilty by \nthe time the crime victim files his motion, and thus any \nargument regarding the lack of probable cause would be \nwaived. See, \nUnited States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, \n1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (\"A defendant's unconditional plea \nof guilty, made knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit \nof competent counsel, waives all non-jurisdictional defects \nin that defendant's court proceedings.\" (alteration adopted)). \nAs a result, there is no need in the post-charge model to \ndetermine whether probable cause exists to believe a crime \nthat is currently being investigated was committed. \nII. \nWith these models in mind, I turn to two fairness concerns that \naccompany the dissent's pre-charge CVRA litigation model. \nA. \nFirst, the dissent's pre-charge model raises the question of \nwhether the individual accused of a federal crime must be \njoined in the crime victim's freestanding CVRA civil action. \nFor a variety of reasons, I believe the answer must be \"yes.\" \nRule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs \nthe joinder of parties. This Circuit has outlined a two-part \ntest for determining \"whether a party is indispensable\" under \nRule l9. \nFocus on the Fain. it Pinellas Suncoast Transit \nAuth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1279 (II th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). \n\"First, the court must ascertain under the standards of Rule \nI9(a) whether the person in question is one who should be \njoined if feasible. If the person should be joined but cannot \nbe (because, for example, joinder would divest the court of \njurisdiction) then the court must inquire whether, applying \nthe factors enumerated in Rule 19(b), the litigation may \ncontinue.\" C R Id at 1280 (citation omitted). \nPart one of our two-part Rule 19 test focuses on whether a \nperson is a \"required party.\" A person is a required party to a \nlawsuit when (I) \"in that person's absence, the court cannot \naccord co\n... [truncated, 4957 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/23 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=23]", "char_count": 4957}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nparty in the civil suit. Regardless of the remedy sought, a \ncrime victim's pre-charge CVRA suit will necessarily require \na determination by the district court that there is probable \ncause to believe a federal offense has been committed and that \nthe accused committed it. See supra part I.A. This is exact& \nthe same determination a magistrate judge is asked to make at \na Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 preliminary hearing. \nFed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(e) (\"If the magistrate judge finds probable \ncause to believe an offense has been committed and the \ndefendant committed it, the magistrate judge must promptly \nrequire the defendant to appear for further proceedings.\"). II\nIt goes without saying that a defendant's attendance is \nexpected at the preliminary hearing, and the defendant would \nbe permitted to cross-examine adverse witnesses and present \nevidence. Id. I see no reason that we should treat a pseudo-\npreliminary hearing in a pre-charge CVRA civil action any \ndifferently. \nIndeed, my position finds some support in the text of Rule \nI 9(aX1)(B)(i): \"A person who is subject to service of process \nand whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter \njurisdiction must be joined as a party if ... that person claims \nan interest relating to the subject of the action and is so \nsituated that disposing of the action in the person's absence \nmay ... as a practical matter impair or impede the person's \nability to protect the interest.\" Does the accused have an \n\"interest relating to the subject of the\" pre-charge CVRA suit? \nUndoubtedly. The pre-charge suit is litigating whether there is \nprobable cause to believe that the accused committed a federal \ncrime, and any ruling by the court on that issue may ultimately \naffect the accused's rights. So then, would disposing of the \naction in the accused's absence impair the accused's ability \nto protect those rights? Of course. A district court allo\n... [truncated, 5306 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/24 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=24]", "char_count": 5306}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \ncircumstances,\" I/ a Bass it Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th \nCir. 1999). \nConsider how the differing treatment of criminal defendants \nand civil litigants affects the majority's and dissent's positions. \nIn the majority's post-charge model, the accused is a criminal \ndefendant and thus has the right to counsel. f Garey, 540 \nF.3d at 1262. But in the dissent's pre-charge model, the \naccused—assuming she must be joined in the suit—is no \ndifferent than any other civil litigant and, as a result, has no \nright to counsel. This is an odd (and, I argue, unfair) result. \nIn the criminal context, it is abundantly clear that a defendant \nis entitled to counsel at a preliminary hearing, consistent \nwith the Sixth Amendment's \"purpose of protecting the \nunaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary.\" \nGoumia, 467 U.S. at 189, 104 S. Ct. at 2298. And yet, in \na civil suit litigating precisely the same issue as a criminal \npreliminary hearing—that is, whether there is probable cause \nto believe the accused committed a federal offense—the \ndissent's model hangs the accused out to dry. \nNow, one could argue that \n28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) provides \na safety valve for this *1282 type of situation. And while \nI concede that t \n§ 1915(e)(1) may, in some circumstances, \npermit the district court to appoint counsel for a civil litigant, \nour case law makes clear that this mechanism should be used \nsparingly: \"The appointment of counsel is ... a privilege that is \njustified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the \nfacts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the \nassistance of a trained practitioner?\" t tt Dean v. Barber, 951 \nF.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Poole v. Lambert, \n819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)). \nIt is not immediately clear to me that a district court would \nconclude that a civil CVRA suit is \"so novel or complex\" as \nto require t\n... [truncated, 5080 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/25 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=25]", "char_count": 5080}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nrepeated admonitions on this point from both the Supreme \nCourt and this Court, the dissent's pm-charge CVRA litigation \nmodel would inevitably embed federal courts in the United \nStates Attorney's investigation and prosecution of the case. \nsss \nFirst, consider the issue of confidentiality. As I discussed \nin part I.A., there is a presumption that a crime victim's \npre-charge civil action will be a matter of public record. \n1111 Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571 (stating that denying the \npublic access to litigation records must be necessitated by \na compelling governmental interest, and the denial must be \nnarrowly tailored to that interest). This presents a very real \nproblem for the United States Attorney. In a high-profile \ncase, the press will undoubtedly be active, and there is no \nguarantee in an unsealed case that witnesses—or even the \ncrime victim—would not disclose confidential information. \nThe disclosure of any confidential information regarding \nthe government's ongoing investigation could derail the \ninvestigation and have serious detrimental effects on the well-\nbeing of informants and cooperating witnesses. IS Indeed, \nwitnesses called *1284 in the pre-charge civil case—whose \ntestimony is now public—may become worthless to the \nUnited States Attorney in the subsequent criminal proceeding. \nTo this, one may say that district court judges should \nsimply seal these pre-charge cases as a matter of course, or \nperhaps that we should treat them as we would a grand jury \nproceeding. I have two points in rebuttal. The first proposal \n—a presumption of sealing—is directly contrary to ow \nprecedent. See id. (discussing the \"presumption of openness \nto civil proceedings\"). It would be an extreme deviation from \nour caselaw and tradition to find a freestanding right of action \nin the CVRA and only then try to shut Pandora's box by \nkicking the presumption of public access to the curb. 16 And \nwhile the s\n... [truncated, 5292 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/26 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=26]", "char_count": 5292}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nStates Attorney would pull out all the stops when questioning \nthe same witnesses she only lightly examined in the civil \ncase. 19 Those paying careful attention would reasonably \nconclude that the government sandbagged in the civil case so \nthat it could better prosecute the criminal one. \nUnfortunately, the dissent's model leaves the United States \nAttorney with little room to maneuver. The government can \n(1) admit that there is probable cause and face the wrath of \nthe public for failing to seek an indictment; (2) deny that there \nis probable cause, lose in the civil case, and still be expected \nby the public to prosecute the accused in a half-baked case; \nor (3) deny that there is probable cause, win in the civil case, \nbe expected to prosecute the accused, go forward with the \nprosecution, argue that there is probable cause, and thus give \n10 \nthe appearance of sandbagging. \n*1286 Two rocks on one \nside, a hard place on the other. \nsss \nFinally, consider how the pre-charge civil CVRA suit would \nlikely proceed in practice. The crime victim would file suit \nalleging that the United States Attorney failed to honor IS \nU.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)—the \"reasonable right to confer\"—\nand (a)(8)—the \"right to be treated with fairness and with \nrespect.\" After some motions, some discovery, and a pseudo-\npreliminary hearing, the parties would wind up before the \ndistrict judge for a bench trial to determine whether the \nvictim's CVRA rights have been violated. Assuming the court \nrules in favor of the victim, it must then craft a remedy—\nan injunction requiring the attorney to confer with the victim \nand to treat the victim with respect. This injunction poses two \nmajor problems for the dissent's model. \nTo start, how could a district judge craft an injunction that \ncomplies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65? Under \nthat rule, the order must be \"specific[ ]\" and \"describe in \nreasonable detail ... the act ..\n... [truncated, 5411 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/27 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=27]", "char_count": 5411}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \ninvestigation in conflicting ways. 23 This would essentially \ntransform federal courts from impartial arbiters to prosecution \nmicromanagers. \nPlainly, such interference is unacceptable. The notion that \na district court could have any input on a United States \nAttorney's investigation and decision whether to file a \ncomplaint or bring a case to the grand jury is entirely \nincompatible with the constitutional assignment to the \nExecutive Branch of exclusive power over prosecutorial \ndecisions. WU Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693, 94 S. Ct. at 3100. \nAdditionally, it is hard to imagine a bigger intrusion on \nexecutive autonomy than the possibility that a United States \nAttorney will be held in contempt for violating an injunction \nif her investigation is not handled as the victim and district \ncourt see fit. \nGiven the separation of powers problems the dissent's pre-\ncharge model raises, and given that the majority's post-charge \nmodel avoids those problems, the Court is compelled by \nthe canon of constitutional avoidance to adopt the latter \nmodel. See?.  Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864, \n109 S. Ct. 2237, 2241, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (\"It is \nour settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal \nstatute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable \nalternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.\"). \nThis conclusion is bolstered by the language of the CVRA, \nwhich explicitly states that none of the statute's provisions \nshould be read to diminish prosecutorial discretion: \"Nothing \nin this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial \ndiscretion of the Attorney General *1288 or any officer \nunder his direction.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). \nIV. \nSo, for all the reasons stated in the majority's opinion, and for \nthe fairness and separation of powers reasons I have outlined \nabove, I believe the Court is required to deny Ms. Wild's \npetition. \nBRANCH, Circuit Judge, joined\n... [truncated, 4845 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/28 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=28]", "char_count": 4845}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nunless the government decides to indict and commence court \nproceedings. I In other words, rather than discuss the \"rights-\ncreating\" language in the CVRA and its relevance to the \nremedy issue, the Majority avoids the first en bane issue. \nSee *1289 f - Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288, \n121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (noting that the \npresence or absence of \" `rights-creating' language\" in a \nstatute is \"critical to the Court's analysis\" of whether Congress \nintended to provide a private right of action to a particular \nbenefitted class). The Majority then, in essence, adds a new \nrequirement to the text of the CVRA—that there must be a \npreexisting indictment and ongoing court proceeding before \na crime victim may file a motion for relief under § 3771(d). \nI dissent because the Majority errs in failing to enforce the \nplain text of the CVRA and in concluding that this case should \nhave been dismissed at the outset in 2008. \nMy dissent proceeds in five parts. First, I review the facts \nsurrounding the plea deal with Epstein. Second, I review the \nprocedural history. Third, I turn to how Congress granted \nexpressly to crime victims in § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) a \n\"reasonable\" right to confer and a right to be treated fairly \nand those rights attach pre-charge. Fourth, I review (A) \nhow the Majority has misapplied and misinterpreted the \nSupreme Court's? Sandoval decision; (B) how the CVRA \ntext in § 377I(d) expressly provides victims who believe \ntheir CVRA rights were violated pre-charge with a statutory \nremedy—a private right to seek judicial enforcement of \ntheir statutory rights in § 3771(a)—when no prosecution is \nunderway; (C) how the statutory interpretation errors in the \nMajority's reading of § 3771(d) and (f) leads it to the opposite \nconclusion; and (D) how even under the Majority's analysis, \nthe existence of the administrative remedy in § 3771(1) does \nnot make the express \n... [truncated, 5224 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/29 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=29]", "char_count": 5224}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nSpecifically, rather than pursue the indictment, the U.S. \nAttorney's Office entertained a non-prosecution agreement, \nwhereby the U.S. Attorney's Office would defer federal \nprosecution of Epstein and his co-conspirators if Epstein \npleaded guilty to two state prostitution-solicitation charges. \nAnd on September 24, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office \nand Epstein signed a seven-page agreement, entitled \"Non-\nProsecution Agreement,\" documenting the government's \ncharging decision and Epstein's agreement with it. \nThe Agreement identified the federal crimes of Epstein and \nhis co-conspirators 4 and provided that the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice agreed that \"prosecution in th[e] District for these \noffenses shall be deferred\" provided that Epstein met certain \nconditions. Additionally, the Agreement extended immunity \nto Epstein's named co-conspirators, \n• \nLesley Groff, [and \n' as well as \"any \npotential co-conspirators\" of Epstein's. In return for federal \nimmunity, Epstein agreed to plead guilty to two low-level \nstate solicitation of prostitution charges and serve 18 months \nin the county jail.5\nA core term of the Agreement was that it remain secret \nfrom the public, even after it was finalized. The Agreement \nspecifically provided that \"[t]tle parties anticipate that this \nagreement will not be made part of any public record,\" \nand that, should the United States receive \"a Freedom of \nInformation Act request or any compulsory process *1291 \ncommanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide \nnotice to Epstein before making that disclosure.\" 6\nThe victims were not notified of the executed Agreement. \nInstead, for nine months after the September 2007 execution \nof the Agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office continued to \nnegotiate with Epstein's defense team about the extent of \ncrime victim notifications—a course of action which the \nU.S. Attorney's Office now admits is a deviation from the \ngovernme\n... [truncated, 5105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/30 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=30]", "char_count": 5105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nOnce the victims filed the petition in the district court, the \nU.S. Attorney's Office reversed course, contradicting what it \nhad stated expressly in multiple earlier letters to the victims. \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office now claimed that the CVRA rights \nnever attached \"pre-charge,\" and, therefore, because there \nwas no criminal indictment (or information or complaint) ever \nfiled, Epstein's victims never had any CVRA rights in the \nfirst place. It was only in the U.S. Attorney's Office's July \n9, 2008, responsive pleading in the district court that Wild \nlearned that, over nine months earlier in September 2007, the \nU.S. Attorney's Office had signed an agreement with Epstein \nnot to prosecute him for federal crimes if Epstein pleaded \nguilty to two state charges. \nIn August 2008, pursuant to a court order, the victims finally \nobtained a copy of the Agreement. What followed was more \nthan a decade of contentious litigation between the victims, \nthe government, and Epstein, who was allowed to intervene \nto oppose the victims' discovery requests. See c k Doe No. I \nv. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 2014). \nA. District Court's 2011 and 2013 Orders: Victims Have \nCVRA Rights That Attach \"Pre-Charge\" \nDuring the district court proceedings, the government argued \nthat \"as a matter of law the CVRA does not apply before \nformal charges are filed, i.e., before an indictment or similar \ncharging document.\" ti Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. \n2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The district court, in a \npublished order, rejected this argument, holding that \"the \nstatutory language [of the CVRA] clearly contemplates pre-\ncharge proceedings,\" and, therefore, \"those rights must attach \nbefore a complaint or indictment formally charg[ing] the \ndefendant with the crime\" is filed. \n11d. at 1341-42. \nFurthermore, in examining the statutory text and structure \nof the CVRA, the district court interpreted the\n... [truncated, 5002 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/31 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=31]", "char_count": 5002}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nD. Wild's Petition for Mandamus in this Court \nThereafter, on September 30, 2019, Wild filed a petition for \nwrit of mandamus with this Court, seeking review of the \ndistrict court's September 2019 order closing the case. See IS \nU.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (\"If the district court denies the relief \nsought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ \nof mandamus.\"). Her petition set forth various types of relief \nsought under the CVRA and explained why the petition was \nnot moot. \nThe government opposed Wild's arguments on the merits and \nargued, in relevant part, that: (1 ) the action was moot because \nany rights the victims had already had been or would be \nvindicated; (2) the victims had no rights under the CVRA \nbecause the government never filed formal federal charges \nagainst Epstein in a court; and (3) the CVRA did not authorize \nthe victims to file this case or authorize their requested \nremedies. \nOn April 14, 2020, a divided panel of this Court denied \nWild's mandamus petition. A majority of the panel agreed \nwith the government that the CVRA rights did not attach \"pre-\ncharge\" and that the victims never had any statutory rights \nunder the CVRA in the first place. 1 1/ In re Wild, 955 F.3d \nat 1219. The dissent disagreed, discussing why the victims \nhad CV RA rights under the plain text of the statute. 11d. at \n1223-25 (Hull, J., dissenting). All agreed that if the victims \nhad CVRA rights \"pre-charge,\" the prosecutors egregiously \nviolated them. Wild petitioned this Court for rehearing en \nbane. On August 7, 2020, this Court granted the petition, \nvacated the panel opinion, and directed the parties to brief two \nissues, which I discuss in turn. \nIII. CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS \"PRE-CHARGE\" \nThe first issue on which we ordered en bane briefing is \nwhether the CVRA grants crime victims the rights to confer \nand be treated fairly prior to the filing of an indictment. This \nquestion is about the\n... [truncated, 4534 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/32 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=32]", "char_count": 4534}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nstatutory language is determined by reference to the language \n*1296 itself, the specific context in which that language is \nused, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.\"). \nFurthermore, in determining the meaning of a statute, we \n\"assume that Congress used the words of the statute as they \nare commonly and ordinarily understood and must construe \nthe statute so each of its provisions is given full effect.\" \nP United States it McLymont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (I I th Cir. \n1995). Therefore, \"[w]e do not look at one word or term in \nisolation, but instead we look to the entire statutory context.\" \n[ • STME, 938 F.3d at 1314 (quotation omitted). \nAdditionally, under the conventional rules of statutory \nconstruction, when Congress has used a more limited term \nin one part of a statute, but left it out of other parts, courts \nshould not imply the term where it has been excluded. See \nKeene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 \nS.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993) (\"[W]here Congress \nincludes particular language in one section of a statute but \nomits it in another ..., it is generally presumed that Congress \nacts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion \nor exclusion.\" (quotation omitted)); C a Russello v. United \nStates, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) \n(declining to read a term appearing in two subsections of a \nstatute to have the same meaning where there is \"differing \nlanguage\" in the subsections). Thus, our statutory analysis \nbegins (and ultimately ends) with the language of § 377I(a) \n(5) and (a)(8). \nThe plain language of § 3771(a)(5) and (aX8) makes it clear \nthat the rights attach prior to the filing of any indictment. \nUnlike the rights described in § 377I(aX2), (a)(3), and (aX4), \nwhich contain temporally-limiting language that ties those \nrights to post-indictment court proceedings, § 3771(aX5) and \n(a)(8) contains no such language. The presenc\n... [truncated, 5397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/33 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=33]", "char_count": 5397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n[the] crime,\" and the use of the term \"prosecution\" would \nbe sufficient to sweep in all relevant actors, making the \n\"detection\" and \"investigation\" language in subsection (c) \nsuperfluous. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 176 (\"If a \nprovision is susceptible of (I) a meaning that gives it an effect \nalready achieved by another provision ..., and (2) another \nmeaning that leaves both provisions with some independent \noperation, the latter should be preferred.'). \nAdditionally, § 3771(d)(3) provides that \"lino prosecution is \nunderway,\" crime victims can assert the rights described in \nsubsection (a) \"in the district court in which a defendant is \nbeing prosecuted for the crime or, in the district court in the \ndistrict in which the crime occurred.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d) \n(3) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain statutory language of \nsubsection (dX3) demonstrates that the CVRA grants crime \nvictims' rights that apply prior to formal charges being filed. \nIt is noteworthy that the only other circuit court to address \nwhether the statutory rights under the CVRA attach pre-\nindictment has reached the same conclusion, holding that \" \n'Where are clearly rights under the CVRA that apply before \nany prosecution is underway.' Logically, this includes the \nCVRA's establishment of victims\"reasonable right to confer \nwith the attorney for the Government.' \"See ? j  In re Dean, \n527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (internal \ncitation and quotation omitted). Notably, the facts of ? In \nre Dean are similar to the facts in this case. Specifically, \nafter an explosion at a refinery owned and operated by BP \nProducts North America Inc. (\"BP\") killed 15 people and \ninjured more than 170, the Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") \ninvestigated and decided to bring federal charges against BP. \nId. at 392-93. However, prior to the filing of an indictment \nor information, the government filed a sealed ex pane \nmotion with the \n... [truncated, 5126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/34 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=34]", "char_count": 5126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nAs posited by the Majority, the second en bane issue requires \nus to determine whether Congress created in the CVRA \"a \nprivate right of action\"—Le., a statutory remedy in the form of \na freestanding lawsuit to enforce a victim's CVRA rights prior \nto the commencement of formal criminal proceedings. The \nMajority and I agree that \"[l]ike substantive federal law itself, \nprivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created \nby Congress.\"? • Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \nThus, our \"judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress \nhas passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create \nnot just a private right but also a private remedy.\" ? 11d. Our \ninquiry must focus on the \"text and structure\" of the statute. \nIt t Id. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \nApplying \nSandoval and its progeny to the CVRA, the \nMajority holds that, while Congress created a statutory \nremedy in § 3771(d) for crime victims to enforce their \nstatutory CVRA rights by filing a motion for relief in an \nongoing criminal proceeding, Congress did not authorize a \nfreestanding private right of action outside the context of \nongoing criminal proceedings. *1299 In other words, the \nMajority holds that when CVRA violations occur pre-charge, \ncrime victims have no statutory remedy. \nI disagree because, under the plain language of § 377I(d) \nand the CVRA's structure as a whole, Congress granted the \nvictims a statutory remedy—a right to file a freestanding \n\"[m]otion for relief' in \"the district court in the district \nin which the crime occurred\" when \"no prosecution [is] \nunderway.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX3). Congress created an \nexpress right of action in § 3771(d)(3) and our inquiry \nshould begin and end with the plain text of the CVRA. In \nholding otherwise, the Majority ignores the ordinary and \ncommon meaning of the statutory language in the CVRA and \nmisapplies ? 4 Sandoval. Because the Majority's holding is \np\n... [truncated, 4568 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/35 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=35]", "char_count": 4568}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \na proposed class, sued seeking to enjoin the English-only \npolicy, arguing that it violated DOJ's regulation because it \nhad the effect of discriminating against non-English speakers \nbased on their national origin. ?a M. at 279, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \nThe district court concluded that Sandoval could sue under \n§ 602 of to enforce the nondiscrimination regulation and \nenjoined the English-only policy. !II M. at 279, 121 S.Ct. \n151 I. We affirmed. t Id. Reversing, the Supreme Court held \nthat § 602 created no *1300 private right of action to enforce \nthe regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI. C a M. at \n281, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \nIn reaching its decision, the Supreme Court explained that, \ndespite the absence of express authorization in § 601, it was \nclear from the rights-creating language in § 601 that Title \nVI provided for a private cause of action for individuals \nto enforce the statutory rights guaranteed to them in § \n601 through which they could obtain injunctive relief and \ndamages. 15 \nId. at 279-80, 121 S.Ct. 1511. But as the \nSupreme Court noted, § 601 did not apply to the issue raised \nin Sandoval's case. 16 ?II Id at 285, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Thus, the \nissue in C Sandoval was whether individuals had a private \ncause of action under § 602 to enforce violations of agency \nregulations. t Id. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \nThe C ■ Sandoval Court first looked to the language of § 602 \nfor \"rights-creating language\"—te., whether the statutory \ntext evinced an intent on Congress's part to benefit a particular \nclass of persons. \nId. at 288-89, 121 S.Ct. 1511. The \nSandoval Court concluded that § 602 contained no \"rights-\ncreating\" language. ! I /d. The Supreme Court explained \nthat \"[s]tatutes that focus on the person regulated rather \nthan the individuals protected create 'no implication of an \nintent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.' \" \nAl \nt Id. at 289, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (emphasis added) (\n... [truncated, 5062 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/36 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=36]", "char_count": 5062}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nprivacy.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), (8) (emphasis added). \nAccordingly, the CVRA's statutory language, with its clear \nand unmistakable focus on \"the individuals protected\" (crime \nvictims), evinces Congress's clear \"intent to confer rights on \na particular class of persons.\" See ' \nSandoval, 532 U.S. at \n289, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (quotation omitted). In other words, the \ntext of the CVRA \"expressly identifies the class Congress \nintended to benefit\"—crime victims—and grants them certain \nstatutory \"rights.\" III  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690, 99 S.Ct. 1946. \nAnd \"it is a general and indisputable rule[ ] that where there \nis a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.\" I I  Marbuty \nv. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) \n(quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23). I agree \nwith the Majority, however, that the presence of rights-\ncreating language alone does not establish that crime victims \nhave a statutory remedy. P ° Sandoval made clear that the \nstatute must \"display[ ] an intent to create not just a private \nright but also a private remedy.\" f 1532 U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. \n1511 (emphasis added). Fortunately, unlike in P Sandoval, \nin which the statute in question did not provide expressly for \na private cause of action and the Court had to decide whether \none should be implied—we need not concern ourselves \nwith implying any remedy here. Rather, Congress's intent \nto provide crime victims with a private *1302 statutory \nremedy is crystal clear because it expressly provided for such \na remedy in § 3771(d)—the ability to file a freestanding \nmotion for relief when no prosecution is underway to enforce \napplicable rights under § 377I(a). \nB. Section 3771(d) expressly provides for a statutory \nremedy \nSection 3771(d), entitled \"Enforcement and limitations,\" \nprovides as follows: \n(d) Enforcement and limitations.—\n(1) Rights.--The crime victim ... may assert the rights \ndescribed in subsecti\n... [truncated, 5120 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/37 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=37]", "char_count": 5120}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \njudicial enforcement of a crime victims' statutory rights set \nforth in subsection (a) if no prosecution is underway by the \nfiling of a motion for relief in the district court in the district \nin which the crime was committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 377I(d) \n(3), (6). \nC. Errors in the Majority's statutory interpretation of § \n3771(d) \n1. Failure to honor common, ordinary definition of \n\"motion for relief in § 3771(dX3) \nThe Majority insists that the term \"[m]otion for relief' \ncan mean only \"a request filed within the context of \na preexisting judicial proceeding.\" The common legal \ndefinition of \"motion,\" however, is more general and \nbroader than the definition the Majority ascribes to it. \nSpecifically, a motion is \"[a] written or oral application \nrequesting a court to make a specified ruling or order.\" \nMotion, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also \nMotion, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-\nwebstencorn/dictionarylmotion (last visited March 16, 2021) \n(defining \"motion\" as \"an application made to a court \nor judge to obtain an order, ruling, or direction\"). This \ngeneral definition encompasses a motion initiating a new \nproceeding, as well as one filed mid-proceeding, and the \nMajority's demand that we ascribe only a more specific, \nnarrow definition to the word \"motion\" violates basic canons \nof statutory interpretation. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at \n69 (\"Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday \nmeanings—unless context indicates that they bear a technical \nsense.\"); see also M tr Walter Energy, 911 F.3d 1121, 1143 \n(11th Cir. 2018) (\"To determine the ordinary meaning of a \nterm, we often look to dictionary definitions for guidance.\"). \nFurther, although the Majority contends that \"motion\" can \nmean only a request filed in an ongoing judicial proceeding, \nthe federal rules and statutes provide for quite a few motions \nthat can be filed outside of an ongoing pro\n... [truncated, 5379 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/38 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=38]", "char_count": 5379}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nof third parties are respected, despite the fact that there \nis no ongoing court proceeding. 21 See In re Grand fray \nProceedings, 832 F.2d 554, 554 (11th Cir. 1987) (considering \na third party's \"claim of privilege to prevent disclosure of \ntheir state grand jury testimony\"). The motion to quash need \nnot—and in most cases could not—be filed in any ongoing \ncourt proceeding because in most instances no formal charges \nhave been brought. See, e.g., id. at 555; In re Grand fury \nMatter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 996 (11th Cir. 1992); In \nre Grand Jury Subpoena, 831 F.2d 225, 226 (I I th Cir. 1987). \nRather, motions to quash subpoenas are filed in the district \ncourt overseeing the grand jury. In short, nothing precludes \na \"motion\" *1305 from initiating a separate enforcement \naction. \nThe Majority also asserts that a reading of § 3771(d) that \npermits victims to file a freestanding motion for relief would \ncause the word \"motion\" to have two different meanings: \n(I) a freestanding motion; and (2) a motion filed in a \npreexisting judicial case. Wild's asserted interpretation of the \nstatute, however, does not create this so-called dual meaning \nof motion. Rather, the common, general definition of the \nword motion is \"[a] written or oral application requesting a \ncourt to make a specified ruling or order.\" Motion, Black's \nLaw Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). While the CVRA may \npermit motions to be filed in either the district where the \ncrime occurred or the district where the defendant is being \nprosecuted, the existence of alternative venues does not \nchange the fundamental, ordinary, and common meaning of \nthe word motion. That ordinary meaning—\"a written or oral \napplication requesting a court to make a specified ruling or \norder\"—is consistent in both contexts. The text of the CVRA \nauthorizes a motion for relief and specifically contemplates \nthe filing of such a motion both before and after the init\n... [truncated, 5382 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/39 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=39]", "char_count": 5382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nSecond, the Majority's reading also impermissibly adds to the \ntext of the statute the following requirements: (I ) all motions \nfor relief must be filed in a preexisting court proceeding \n(or after an indictment is filed); and (2) a crime victim can \nnever file a freestanding motion for relief. See L a Friends \nof Everglades it S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist, 570 F.3d 1210, \n1224 (11th Cir. 2009) (\"[W]e are not allowed to add or \nsubtract words from a statute; we cannot rewrite it.\"); see \nalso f Blount it Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 \nL.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\"[I]t is for Congress, not this Court, to \nrewrite the statute.\"). \nMoreover, § 377I(dX3) directs that \"if no prosecution is \nunderway\" a motion for relief must be filed \"in the district \ncourt in the district in which the crime occurred.\" See IR \nU.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). This directive reveals the flaw in the \nMajority's interpretation of the phrase \"if no prosecution \nis underway.\" Specifically, reading § 3771(d)(3)'s \"if no \nprosecution is underway\" language to refer only to post-\njudgment proceedings might require a victim to file a motion \nfor relief in the district where the crime occurred in which \nthere is no pending or closed court proceeding because the \ndefendant was prosecuted in a different district. In other \nwords, the motion for relief would initiate a freestanding \ncause of action, something the Majority insists the statute \ndoes not authorize. The Majority contends that this \"supposed \noddity\" is alleviated because, under the Sixth Amendment, \nthe district where the crime occurred will \"almost always\" be \nthe district in which the defendant is charged and prosecuted. \nSee U.S. Const. amend. VI (granting the accused the right to \nbe tried \"by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein \nthe crime shall have been committed.\"). But this explanation \nfalls short. \nFirst, had Congress intended the phrase \"if no prosecution \ni\n... [truncated, 5208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/40 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=40]", "char_count": 5208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (\"[W]e presume the availability of all \nappropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated \notherwise.\"). To be sure, if Congress intended to preclude all \ncauses of action regardless of the relief sought, it would have \nbeen unnecessary to carve out money damages explicitly from \nthe panoply of potential relief. See? Delgado it U.S. All5P \nGen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (\"[W]here Congress \nknows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is \ncontrolling.\" (quotations omitted)). Thus, because Congress \nprecluded causes of action for damages expressly, but did \nnot mention declaratory or injunctive relief, there is no basis \nfor concluding that Congress intended to preclude such other \nforms of relief. 25\nD. Misapplication of \nSandoval to the administrative-\nenforcement scheme in § 3771(0 \nI now turn to the Majority's argument that, under \nSandoval, \nthe existence of the administrative-enforcement scheme in \n§ 3771(0 counsels against and \"undermines any suggestion \nthat (without saying so) [Congress] intended to authorize \ncrime victims to file stand-alone civil actions in federal \ncourt.\" I disagree because nothing in the administrative-\nenforcement scheme evidences any congressional intent to \npreclude the availability of the statutory legal mechanism \nCongress expressly provided for in § 3771(d)(3) where \"no \nprosecution is underway.\" Moreover, as explained further, \ncrime victims whose rights are violated *1309 in the pre-\ncharge phase cannot avail themselves of the administrative \nscheme. 26\nSection § 377I (0 directs the Attorney General to \"promulgate \nregulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure \ncompliance by responsible officials with the obligations\" \nset out by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f)(1). Following this \ndirective, DOJ adopted administrative regulations, codified \nat 28 C.F.R. § 45.10, that set forth an administrati\n... [truncated, 5216 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/41 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=41]", "char_count": 5216}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nsought to enforce. In other words, the Supreme Court's ruling \nin ? Ti Sandoval did not leave the government free to run afoul \nof regulations promulgated under § 602, it simply recognized \nthat the statute prescribed a different enforcement mechanism \nto address the government's violation. \n532 U.S. at 290-91, \n121 S.Ct. 1511. But the administrative remedy in § 3771(f) \nrequires that a victim's complaint contain a \"district court \ncase number\" and \"[t]he name of the defendant.\" 28 C.F.R. \n§ 45.10(c)(2Xiii)—(iv). Therefore, crime victims, like those \nin this case, who suffer violations of their CVRA rights in \nthe pre-charge period when there is no prosecution underway, \nwould not be able to avail themselves of this administrative \nremedy. 27\n1. \nThe Majority also argues that our post-t Sandoval decision \nin ? u Love v. Delta Air Lines supports the conclusion that the \ncreation of the administrative scheme in § 377I (0 undermines \nany possibility that Congress intended for crime victims to \nbe able to file freestanding actions to enforce their CVRA \nrights, but the Majority's reliance on ? Love is misplaced. \nV :I \nIn \nLove, we held that no implied private cause of action \nexisted under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (\"ACAA\"), \n? 149 U.S.C. § 41705, for disabled individuals alleging \na violation of the ACAA's antidiscrimination provision. 28\n? 1 310 F.3d at 1358-59. In reaching this holding, we applied \nthe principles set forth in ? \n_I Sandoval, emphasizing that \nthe focus was on interpreting the ACAA to determine \nwhether it displayed a congressional \"intent to create not \njust a private right but also a private remedy.\" ? l id. at \n1352 (quotation omitted). We noted that it was \"indisputable \nthat the ACAA d[id] not expressly provide a private \nentitlement to sue in district court,\" and, therefore, if there \nwas a private remedy, it would be an implied remedy. \nId. at 1354. However, \"the surroun\n... [truncated, 5170 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/42 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=42]", "char_count": 5170}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION \nIn an attempt to overcome the plain language of the CVRA, \nthe Majority emphasizes policy concerns that permitting \nvictims to file a motion for relief in a federal district court—\nin the absence of a preexisting indictment or court proceeding \n—would result in a number of ills, chief among them \n\"unduly impairing prosecutorial discretion.\" But statutory \ninterpretation begins and ends with the plain language of the \nstatute, and we are required to enforce that plain meaning \neven if the proper interpretation raises policy concerns. See \n?\" Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 \nL.Ed.2d 683 (2003). \"The wisdom of Congress' action ... is \nnot within our province to second guess.\" ? a Id. 29 *1312 \nBut even assuming arguendo that such policy concerns could \njustify abandoning the plain text of the statute, the Majority's \nconcerns fall apart upon closer inspection. \nFor example, the Majority and Judge Tjoflat's concurring \nopinion explain that enforcing victim's rights pre-charge \nwould require judges to identify victims and would risk \njudicial interference with ongoing \"law-enforcement raids, \nwarrant applications, arrests, witness interviews, lineups, \nand interrogations.\" In other words, pre-charge enforcement \nwould permit victims and/or judges to exert \"undue \ninfluence\" over each step of criminal investigations and \nthe government's charging decisions. I disagree because the \ntext of the CVRA alleviates any concern that pre-charge \nenforcement would unduly impair prosecutorial discretion. \nAs an initial matter, the Majority, Judge Tjoflat's concurring \nopinion, and I agree that the Executive has exclusive and \ncomplete authority over charging decisions. See? li United \nStates v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 \nL.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (\"[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive \nauthority and absolute discretion to decide whether to \nprosecute a \n... [truncated, 5139 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/43 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=43]", "char_count": 5139}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nof cases that have advanced to the stage where a government \nattorney is assigned, it will be obvious—as it was in this case \n—who the identifiable victims are. The government's actions \nin this case prove this point: AUSA Villafwia acknowledged \nthe status of petitioner and others as \"victims\" of Epstein \nand sent them a letter stating that \"as a victim ... of a \nfederal offense, you have a number of rights,\" including \n\"[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the \nUnited States in the case\" and \"[t]he right to be treated with \nfairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.\" \nAUSA Villafatla had no trouble identifying Epstein's victims \nas \"crime victims\" under the statute and treating them as \nsuch. 30 \nMoreover, the Majority's concern about impairment of \nprosecutorial discretion applies equally post-indictment. \nSpecifically, the Majority does not dispute that, post-\nindictment, the conferral right in § 3771(a)(5) attaches and is \nenforceable via a motion for relief under § 377l (d)(3). Given \nthe number of discretionary post-indictment decisions a \nprosecutor may make—reducing charges, upgrading charges, \ndismissing charges, and granting immunity—it is unclear \nhow the mere filing of an indictment alleviates the concerns \nabout \"unduly impairing prosecutorial discretion.\" Rather, the \nsame concerns set forth *1314 by the Majority are present \nregardless of whether a motion for relief is filed in the pre-\ncharge phase or the post-indictment phase, which leads to \nthe conclusion that these prosecutorial discretion concerns \nare overblown. Therefore, concerns about undue interference \nwith prosecutorial discretion exist regardless of whether a \nmotion for relief under § 377I(d)(3) is filed pre- or post-\nindictment. In any event, the CVRA expressly precludes such \ninterference; thus, this concern certainly provides no basis \nfor ignoring the plain language of the statut\n... [truncated, 5170 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/44 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=44]", "char_count": 5170}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nYet, to the extent one credits the Majority's concerns about \nprosecutorial discretion, I set forth a narrow \"conferral right\" \n*1315 ruling in Section 11.A., which holds that after the \ngovernment signed the Agreement, the Epstein victims had \nconferral rights under § 377I(a)(5). Once the ink was dry \non the Agreement, the U.S. Attorney had exercised his \ndiscretion and made his charging decision. The government's \npost-Agreement misconduct—not conferring and telling the \nvictims about the Agreement, its terms, and upcoming state \ncourt events for nearly a year—alone is sufficient to establish \nCVRA violations. While not all the conferral rights that the \nvictims request, this narrower ruling would decide the merits \nof the first issue and tee up concretely the second issue. \nIt \nThird, as to the second issue, I discuss t \nSandoval in detail \nbecause the Majority uses snippets out of context and fails to \nr \ntell the whole \nSandoval story. In t t Sandoval there was no \nstatute granting a private right of action, and [he l 'Sandoval \ninquiry was whether to imp_ly a private right of action for \nMs. Sandoval to enforce agency regulations. Here, though, \nthe question is whether a specific statute, § 3771(d) enacted \nby Congress, exprmly grants Ms. Wild, as a crime victim, \na private right of action to enforce her own CVRA statutory \nrights (not agency regulations). I explain how the Majority \nmisapplies f Sandoval.\nFourth, I review the Amicus Brief of three U.S. Senators \nthat also supports Judge Branch's conclusion that the CVRA's \nplain text does not condition a victim's rights and remedy \nupon a preexisting indictment. Fifth, I discuss why the \nMajority's ruling has far-reaching consequences beyond the \nEpstein case. \nI. FIRST EN BANC ISSUE: CONFERRAL RIGHTS \nThe conferral-right issue is an important legal question of first \nimpression in our Circuit. But the Majority blithely skips over \nthe issue, al\n... [truncated, 5188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/45 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=45]", "char_count": 5188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nopinion; (2) the seriousness of the federal sex-trafficking \ncrimes against petitioner Wild and the other 30-plus minor \nvictims; (3) the government's egregious misconduct; and (4) \nthe fact that if the Epstein victims' CVRA rights attached pre-\ncharge, the government's misconduct undisputedly violated \nthem. It defies basic fairness for the Majority, at this late \nstage, to avoid answering whether the Epstein victims had any \nCVRA rights pre-charge. \nChief Judge Pryor's concurrence alleges that our answering \nthe first question would be issuing \"an advisory opinion\" \nto the Executive Branch. Pryor Concurring Op. at 1269-72. \nInvoking Article III of the Constitution, his concurrence states \nthat (1) an advisory opinion is one \"that interpret[s] laws \nwithout resolving cases or controversies\": (2) \"[n]o principle \nis more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in ow \nsystem of government\" than the \"constitutional limitation\" \nimposed by Article Ill; and (3) the \"prohibition against \nadvisory opinions is the oldest and most consistent thread \nin the federal law of justiciability.\" Pryor Concurring Op. \nat 1270-71 (quotation marks omitted). His theory seems to \nbe that the victims-rights issue became non-justiciable the \nmoment a majority of this Court concluded the CVRA did not \nprovide Ms. Wild with a pre-charge remedy for any violation \nof her statutory rights. This advisory-opinion theory is flawed, \ndisregards the live controversy between the Epstein victims \nand the government as adverse parties, and disrespects the \nconcrete injury to those victims. \nArticle Ill of the Constitution grants our Court the power \nto decide \"Cases\" or \"Controversies.\" U.S. Const. art. Ill, § \n2. That constitutional phrase \"require[s] that a case embody \na genuine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby \npreventing the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.\" \nP a Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. —, 141 S. Ct.\n... [truncated, 5566 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/46 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=46]", "char_count": 5566}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \noccurred, and (2) \"[a]lternatively, at a minimum, Plaintiffs \nhave not shown [the defendant] violated clearly established \nfederal law\"); \nBundy v. Dugger 850 F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th \nCir. 1988) (\"Alternatively, if the procedural default doctrine \ndid not preclude us from examining the merits of the Faretta \ninquiry claim, we would conclude that [petitioner] was not \nentitled to relief on this ground.\"); F d Smith v. Local No. \n25. Sheet Metal Workers Intl Ass'n 500 F.2d 741, 744-45 \n(5th Cir. 1974) (reviewing a court's order of \"dismissal for \nlack of subject matter jurisdiction or alternatively a *1318 \ngrant of summary judgment on the merits\"). 2 Furthermore, \n\"in this circuit additional or alternative holdings are not dicta, \nbut instead are as binding as solitary holdings.\" ? Bravo v. \nUnited States 532 F.3d 1154, 1162 (1 I th Cir. 2008). \nThe mere fact that a court has decided one issue—procedural \nor otherwise—that is capable of resolving a case on its own \ndoes not mean that no case or controversy exists and remains \nas to the other issue. The Panel opinion's holding—that Ms \nWild's CVRA rights did not attach pre-charge—was not an \nadvisory opinion. And that holding alone resolved the case \nat the Panel stage. It makes no sense to conclude that this \nCourt at the Panel stage properly decided the justiciable issue \nof whether Ms. Wild's rights under the CVRA attached pre-\ncharge only up and until it concluded at the en banc stage that \nthe Congress provided her with no cause of action to enforce \nany rights she might have. \nPerhaps it's strategic to bypass the rights issue altogether, as \nthe Majority does, rather than to hold Ms. Wild has CVRA \nrights that were violated but no remedy as to the government's \nmisconduct. But it is wrong and a disservice to suggest \nthat our Court's ruling on whether Ms. Wild had conferral \nrights pre-charge would constitute an impermissible advisory \nopinion.  3\nII\n... [truncated, 4975 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/47 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=47]", "char_count": 4975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nB. Majority Repositions Its Blanket Post-Indictment \nRestriction from Conferral Right to Private Right of \nAction \nIt is telling too that, at the panel stage, the Panel Majority \nadded a blanket post-indictment restriction to the conferral-\nright text in 4 3771(a)(5) and held victims had no conferral \nrights before an indictment was filed. 1 In re Wild, 955 \nF.3d at 1198. The Panel Majority feared that recognizing \na conferral right pre-indictment created these problems: (1) \nundue interference with prosecutorial discretion; (2) the \nneed for mini-trials to identify the victims and the federal \noffenses committed; and (3) federal judges' \"injunctions \nrequiring (for instance) consultation with victims before raids, \nwarrant applications, arrests, witness interviews, lineups, and \ninterrogations.\" I Id. at 1216-18. \nNow the en banc Majority (1) bypasses the conferral-rights \nissue altogether, (2) transposes those exact same fears over \nto the second issue as to a private right of *1320 action, \nand (3) adds the blanket post-indictment restriction to the \nprivate-right-of-action text in § 3771(d). It repositions the \nsame arguments from the conferral-right issue to the private-\nright-of-action issue. Even if one credits those concerns, they \nevaporate under my narrow holding in Section II.A. that afler \nthe U.S. Attorney signed the Agreement, the victims had \nconferral rights that the government violated. 4\nC. A Holding Limited to the Facts Before Us \nThe Majority and concurring opinions posit multiple \noperational difficulties if victims may file a freestanding \nmotion in future cases. Although the CVRA expressly allows \na motion for relief when \"no prosecution is underway,\" \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), their opinions add a blanket post-\nindictment restriction to the statute and conclude a motion \nmay be filed only when a formal prosecution is already \nunderway. $c Maj. Op. at 1247, 1265-66; Tjoflat Concurr\n... [truncated, 4711 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/48 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=48]", "char_count": 4711}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \neffect. P . Id. at 278, 121 S. Ct. at 1515. Ms. Sandoval (a \nSpanish speaker) filed a lawsuit, as a class representative, \nto enjoin the English-only policy as discriminatory. t Id. at \n279, 121 S. Ct. at [515. The P u Supreme Court held Ms. \nSandoval did not have a private right of action to enforce the \nagency's regulations that forbid Alabama from using policies \nwith discriminatory impact. P.  Id. at 281, 285, 293, 121 S. \nCt. at 1517,\n`\n1519, 1523. Only the agency could enforce its \nregulations. t. \nSandoval discussed two statutes: §§ 601 and \n602 of the Civil Rights Act. \nP 1Sandoval's § 601 ruling. P I Sandoval recognized that \nunder § 601, individuals had a private right of action to \nenforce their statutory rights. P Id. at 279—80, 121 S. Ct. \nat 1516. The r Sandoval Court, citing P Cannon 6 and the \nparties' concessions, took it as a given that individuals would \nhave a private right to enforce their statutory rights in § \n601. V Id. But Ms. Sandoval was seeking to enforce agency \nregulations under § 602. P I Id. at 279, 121 S. Ct. at 1515. \ntis \nSandoval's § 602 ruling. The debated question in \nSandoval was about the § 602 statute, which authorized \nfederal agencies to issue regulations as follows: \nEach Federal department and agency \nwhich is empowered to extend \nFederal financial assistance to any \nprogram or activity, by way of \ngrant, loan, or contract other than a \ncontract of insurance or guaranty, is \nauthorized and directed to effectuate \nthe provisions of [§ 601] of this \ntitle with respect to such program or \nactivity by issuing rules, regulations, \nor orders of general applicability \nwhich shall be \nconsistent \nwith \nachievement of the objectives of \nthe statute authorizing the financial \nassistance in connection with which \nthe action is taken. \n42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Section 602 has no language about \n\"rights\" and no text authorizing a private right of action. \nrg Sandoval's no-ri\n... [truncated, 4196 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/49 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=49]", "char_count": 4196}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nMajority is using this italicized statement wholly outside of \nits actual factual context in the ! I Sandoval decision and \nsummarily applying it to a materially different statutory text \nand structure. \nSummarizing, in? . Sandoval the § 602 statute contained no \nlanguage or any evidence of congressional intent to create \neither a private right or a private remedy for Ms. Sandoval. \nThus, the Supreme Court\n` \nin ? \" Sandoval held Ms. Sandoval \ncould not sue. So what is ? Sandoval's meaning for this case \nthat involves a materially different statute? P.  Sandoval tells \nus what we must do: examine the text and structure of the \nCVRA for evidence of congressional intent to create both a \nprivate right and a private remedy, which I do below. \nB. CVRA § 3771(d) \nIn stark contrast to the § 602 text, the CVRA text, enacted \nby Congress, includes exactly the sort of \"rights-creating\" \nlanguage and private cause of action that the \nSandoval \nCourt found was absent from § 602. Sce  \nid. at 288, 121 \nS. Ct. at 1521; see also ? a Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d \n1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2002) (\"Rights-creating language is \nlanguage explicitly confer[ing] a right directly on a class of \npersons that include[s] the plaintiff in [a] case, or language \nidentifying the class for whose especial benefit the statute was \nenacted.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alterations \nin original)). \nThe CVRA statute is replete with \"rights-creating\" language, \nsuch as \"[a] crime victim has ... [t]he reasonable right to \nconfer with the attorney for the Government\" and \"[t]he right \nto be treated with fairness.\" IS U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), (8). The \nCVRA text, with its emphasis on a discrete class—crime \nvictims—shows Congress's clear \"intent to confer rights on \na particular class of persons.\" See f \nSandoval 532 U.S. at \n289, 121 S. Ct. at 1521 (quotation marks omitted); sec. also \nGeraaga_Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284, 122\n... [truncated, 4709 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/50 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=50]", "char_count": 4709}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nHere, we need not, and do not, \"imply\" a private right \nof action because the CVRA expressly creates a judicial \nenforcement mechanism: a \"[m]otion for relief' filed in \"the \ndistrict court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" IS \nU.S.C. § 377I(d)(3). Our Court can, and should, stop at the \nplain text of the CVRA and the most natural reading of that \ntext. \nSecond, the Majority keeps repeating: (I) \"we find no clear \nevidence\" that Congress intended crime victims to file this \ncase, and (2) we find no 4 5 Sandoval-qualifying clear \nexpression of congressional intent.\" Maj. Op. at 1256, 1258 \nn.13, 1259, 1265-66, 1266, 1268-69. The Majority ignores \nthat ? I Sandoval's finding of no congressional intent to grant \nMs. Sandoval a private right of action was based on these \nkey textual clues: (I) the § 602 statute had no \"rights-creating \nlanguage\"; (2) the § 602 statute contained no text creating a \njudicial enforcement mechanism; (3) the § 602 statute only \nempowered the agency to promulgate regulations and was not \nenacted to benefit a discrete class of persons; and (4) the § 602 \nstatute focused on the agencies that will do the regulating, not \non the individuals protected. Precisely what was missing in § \n602 is fully present in § 377I(a) and (d). And that statutory \ntext in § 3771(a) and (d), enacted by Congress, expressly \ngrants the Epstein victims a private right of action when no \nprosecution is underway. \nThird, the Majority and Judge Tjoflat's opinions advance \npolicy reasons for the Majority's bright-line rule that are \nuntethered *1324 from \nSandoval's analytical framework. \nTo avoid impairing prosecutorial discretion, the Majority \nsays we need a \"line limiting judicial enforcement to the \npost-charge phases of a prosecution.\" Maj. Op. at 1262. \nThe Majority also contends that \"[i]nterpreting the CVRA \nto authorize judicial enforcement only in the context of \na preexisting proceedin\n... [truncated, 5192 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/51 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=51]", "char_count": 5192}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nCritically, as the panel majority acknowledged, its decision \nwas not compelled by statutory text. r 955 F.3d at 1205. \nThat comes as no surprise to the amici Senators who drafted \nthat text. Two rights conferred by the Act—the right \"to \nconfer with the attorney for the Government\" and the right \n\"to be treated with fairness and with respect\"—do not, by \ntheir text, depend upon the filing of formal charges. IS \nU.S.C. § 377I(aX5), (8). \nId. at 7. The Senators emphasize that, beyond the lack \nof any temporal limitation, two provisions—§ 3771(c)(1) \nand (dX3)—\"make clear that the Act's rights attach before \nformal charges are filed.\" Id. Section 3771(c)(1) requires \nthat government employees \"engaged in the detection, \ninvestigation, or prosecution of crime\" shall make best efforts \nto accord victims their rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 377I(c)( I). \nNext, the Senators submit that \"if any doubts remain,\" about \nthe pre-charge application of the CVRA, \"the Act sweeps \nthem away with its proviso [in § 377 I (d)(3)] that the rights \nestablished by the Act may be asserted if no prosecution is \nunderway, in the district court in the district in which the crime \noccurred.\" Senators' Amicus Br. at 7-8 (quotation marks \nomitted). \nThe Senators bolster their position by pointing to their \nstatements in the Congressional Record at the time of the \nCVRA's enactment. Senators Feinstein and Kyl \"emphasized \nthat it 'is important for victims' rights to be asserted and \nprotected throughout the criminal justice process'—and to \ndo that, victims need to be 'heard at the very moment when \ntheir rights are at stake.' \" Id. at 5 (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. \n7294, 7304 (2004)). To accomplish that goal, the CVRA gives \nvictims \"the right to confer with the Government concerning \nany critical stage or disposition of the case.\" Id. at 6 (quoting \n150 Cong. Rec. at 7302). \nThe Senators emphasize that the events giving rise to this \nlitig\n... [truncated, 4950 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/52 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=52]", "char_count": 4950}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Re. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nVI. CONCLUSION \nWhile the Majority laments how the national media fell \nshort on the Epstein story, this case is about how the U.S. \nprosecutors fell short on Epstein's evil crimes. Mysteries \nremain about how Epstein escaped federal prosecution and \nwhy, for nearly a year, the government made affirmative \nmisrepresentations to the Florida victims of his serious \nsex crimes and to the victims' counsel. The government \negregiously violated Ms. Wild's CVRA rights. \"Our criminal \njustice system should safeguard children from sexual \nexploitation by criminal predators, not re-victimize them,\" as \nthe prosecutors did here. u In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1249-50 \n(Hull, .I., dissenting). \nThe petition Ms. Wild filed in the district court was one \nthat the CVRA expressly authorizes when no prosecution \nis underway. Ms. Wild has spent over ten years seeking to \nvindicate her statutory rights expressly created by Congress. \nToday, the Majority tells Ms. Wild and Epstein's other victims \nthat all of that was for naught, since they never had the right \nto file their motion in the first place back in 2008. The Epstein \nvictims have no remedy as to the government's appalling \nmisconduct because the Majority rewrites the CVRA to add \na blanket post-indictment limitation and reads out of the \nstatute any ability for crime victims to judicially enforce their \nconferral rights outside of a preexisting criminal proceeding. \nThe Majority's ruling eviscerates the CVRA and makes \nthe \nI Epstein case a poster child for an entirely different \njustice system for crime victims of wealthy defendants. I \nrespectfully dissent, once again. See \" l id. at 1223-1250 \n(Hull, .I., dissenting). \nAll Citations \n994 F.3d 1244,28 Ha. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nFootnotes \nJudges Tjoflat and Hull were members of the en banc Court that heard oral argument in this case, both \nhaving elected to participate in this decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(\n... [truncated, 4304 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/53 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=53]", "char_count": 4304}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nrelief only if (and while) a criminal defendant \"is being prosecuted.\" Because that's not the case here, the \nargument goes, we lack jurisdiction even to entertain Wild's petition. We disagree for three reasons. First, § \n3771(e)(1)(A) is more properly understood as a venue provision than a jurisdictional provision—it specifies in \nwhich \"court of appeals\" a victim should file. Cf. United States v. Ross. 963 F.3d 1056. 1063 (11th Cir. 2020) \n(en banc) (noting \"the Supreme Court's directive that courts should avoid 'jurisdictionalizing' issues\" that are \nmore properly framed in other terms). Second, the governments position would render the CVRA internally \ninconsistent. By its terms, the Act clearly applies in the context of habeas corpus proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(b)(2). But, of course, no one \"is being prosecuted- in a habeas proceeding. So the government's \nposition would imply that there is no mandamus jurisdiction to address a violation that occurs during a habeas \nproceeding, which the Act plainly covers. Finally, the government's position defies common sense. If Ms. \nWild had sought mandamus relief in 2014, there would undoubtedly have been no bar to our review—there \nbeing no restrictive definition of \"court of appeals- at that time. But, the government asserts, with the passage \nof the 2015 amendment—which all agree was meant to enhance victims' rights—that jurisdiction somehow \nevaporated. That seems exceedingly unlikely. \nThis was the posture in which the \"attachment- issue arose in \nIn re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008), on \nwhich our dissenting colleagues rely. See Branch Dissenting Op. at 1297. Because the question we answer is \ndifferent from the one presented in \nDean, our decision creates no circuit split, as our dissenting colleagues \nimply. \n8 \nThe CVRA (as amended in 2015) provides that this Court \"shall apply ordinary standards of appellate review-\nto the issues presente\n... [truncated, 4986 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/54 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=54]", "char_count": 4986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nrather than the heightened \"clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion\" standard that typically applies \nin the mandamus context, \nIn re Loudermilch, 158 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1998)—it doesn't direct us \nto employ the rules of procedure that would apply if this were a typical appeal. \n11 \nOur dissenting colleagues come perilously close to saying that \"rights-creating\" language is a sufficient basis \nfor recognizing a private right of action. See Branch Dissenting Op. at 1300-02: Hull Dissenting Op. at 1322-\n23. That is incorrect, at least under \nSandoval. To be sure, such language is a necessary condition to \na cause of action's existence, but it's not sufficient To the contrary, as the Sandoval Court clarified—and \nas we have emphasized here in text—\"[t]he judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to \ndetermine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.\" \n532 \nU.S. at 286. 121 S.Ct. 1511 (emphasis added). \n12 \nOur dissenting colleagues insist that they have the \"common, ordinary\" meaning of the word \"motion\" on their \nside—so much so, in fact, that they claim to have \"dismantle[d]\" our \"tortured construction of the term. See \nBranch Dissenting Op. at 1302-03; Hull Dissenting Op. at 1324 n.7. Conspicuously, though, they offer no \nresponse to our exhaustive analysis of that word's accepted usage, as confirmed by legal dictionaries and \nencyclopedias. \n13 \nWe've been pointed to only two other instances, both arising out of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, \nin which the term \"motion\" is even arguably used to initiate legal proceedings: Under Rule 41(g), which \nestablishes the procedures governing searches during investigations, a third party may file a `motion\" to \nenforce her rights before a criminal prosecution is formally commenced; and under Rule 17(c)(2), a witness \nmay file a \"motion\" to quash a grand-jury subpoe\n... [truncated, 4828 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/55 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=55]", "char_count": 4828}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \ncourt, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive \ndepartment that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular \ncase. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere \nwith the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over \ncriminal prosecutions. \nId. (quoting \nUnited States v. Cox. 342 F.2d 167.171 (5th Cir. 1965)); accord, e.g., \nHeckler v. Chaney. \n470 U.S. 821.832. 105 S.Ct. 1649,84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (\"[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive \nBranch not to indict ... has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch \nas it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' \n\" (quoting U.S. Const. art. II. § 3)). \n17 \nTo be clear, its no answer to say—as our dissenting colleagues do—that because government prosecutors \nidentified Ms. Wild and others as \"crime victim[s]\" in the 2007 victim-notification letters, requiring a court to \nmake a \"crime victim\" determination prior to any charging decision wouldn't pose a problem. See Branch \nDissenting Op. at 1312-13. Needless to say, a prosecutor doesn't \"impair (her own] discretion\" by sending a \nvictim-notification letter. By contrast, were a federal court to determine before the fact—literally, to prejudge \n—that a criminal \"offense\" had (or hadn't) occurred, it would be stepping all over prosecutors' toes. That very \nreal concern is hardly a \"red herring[ ].\" Id. at 1312-13. \n18 \nJust a brief word in response to our dissenting colleagues' prosecutorial-discretion argument: They seem \nto say that their interpretation of the CVRA doesn't impair prosecution because § 3771(d)( 6 ) states—as of \ncourse it does—that nothing in the Act \"'shall be con\n... [truncated, 4864 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/56 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=56]", "char_count": 4864}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nera the significance of an administrative apparatus is that it \"suggests that Congress intended to preclude \nother\" means of enforcement. f ai Id. at 290, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \n21 \nMs. Wild objects that it would be odd, under the \"no prosecution is underway\" clause, to require a victim to \nfile a post-prosecution CVRA motion in the \"district in which the crime occurred\" rather than the \"district court \nin which the defendant is being prosecuted.\" But any supposed oddity is alleviated by the fact that under \nthe Sixth Amendment, those two districts will almost always be the same: \"In all criminal prosecutions, the \naccused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein \nthe crime shall have been committed ....\" U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (\"Unless a \nstatute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the \noffense was committed.\"). \nWe should note that there is still another way of understanding § 3771(d)(3)'s \"no prosecution is underway\" \nclause. That clause could be read to apply to the period of time between the initiation of criminal proceedings \n—which may occur as early as the filing of a criminal complaint under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 3—\nand the levying of formal charges in an indictment. The word \"prosecution\"—on which subsection (d)(3) pivots \n—is a legal term of art; in relevant part, it refers to a[t]he institution and continuance of a criminal suit [and] \nthe process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to \nfinal judgment on behalf of the state or govemment, as by indictment or information.\" Prosecution, Webster's \nNew International Dictionary (2d ed. 1944). Moreover, the law is clear, at least for Sixth Amendment right-to-\ncounsel purposes, that a \"prosecution\" does notbegin with the criminal compl\n... [truncated, 5253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/57 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=57]", "char_count": 5253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nthat the surplusage canon must be applied 'With careful regard to context\" and that \"a court may well prefer \nordinary meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage\"). \n1 \nAlthough I recognize that more than one dissenting opinion was written in this case, because multiple judges \nconcurred in Judge Branch's opinion, I will refer to her dissent as 'The dissent\" throughout my concurrence. \n2 \nIt is worth noting at the outset that I believe the pre-charge model would likely be used most frequently in \ncomplex cases—think wire fraud, financial fraud, etc. There is little need for CVRA enforcement of a victim's \nrights in a one-on-one crime, as the victim will almost certainly have been contacted by federal investigators \nto assist in investigating the offense. Indeed, it is likely that the attorney for the federal government would \nalso be in contact with the victim prior to filing a criminal complaint or seeking an indictment, as the victim \nwould presumably be a key trial witness. \n3 \nI refer to the United States Attorney here and throughout this concurrence for ease of analysis. Of course, \nin the typical case, the victim would sue the specific attorney—typically an Assistant United States Attorney \n—in charge of the criminal investigation. \nHowever, it is worth noting that, \"[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and \nits agencies from suit.\" \nFed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471. 475. 114 S. Ct. 996. 1000. 127 \nL.Ed.2d 308 (1994). This presents an additional hurdle for the dissent's model, but because the Majority \nalready ably discusses the sovereign immunity issue, Maj. Op. at 1258-59 n.15, I will assume it is not a \nbarrier to the victim's civil suit for the sake of analysis. \n4 \nThat provision states: -The term 'crime victim' means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result \nof the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the Di\n... [truncated, 4580 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/58 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=58]", "char_count": 4580}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n10 \nThe district court has a duty to join required parties on its own initiative. Fed R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2) (\"If a person \nhas not been joined as required, the court must order that the person be made a party.\"). \n11 \nIndeed, this is also the same determination a magistrate judge is asked to make when determining whether \nan arrest warrant should issue. Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (\"If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the \ncomplaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant \ncommitted it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to execute it.\"). \n12 \nSeparately, I posit that the potential for unfairness to the accused in such a suit may require a judicially-created \nrule that the accused be permitted to attend the civil \"preliminary hearing: regardless of the application of \nRule 19. Otherwise, I have grave concerns that the district court will appear biased against the accused \nand will give the public the appearance of impropriety. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges \nCanon 2A (2019) (\"An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the \nrelevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge's honesty, integrity, \nimpartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired. Public confidence in the judiciary is \neroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. ...\"). \n28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) specifically states that \"[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person \nunable to afford counsel.\" \n14 \nPuzzlingly. the dissent states that we must enforce the plain meaning of the CVRA 'even if the proper \ninterpretation raises policy concerns.\" Branch Dissenting Op. at 1311 (citing \nEldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. \n186. 222. 123 S. Ct. 769. 790. 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003)). Of course, that is only true to the extent that the \ndiss\n... [truncated, 4833 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/59 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=59]", "char_count": 4833}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \npreliminary hearings thought their testimony—which could be released to the public—carried with it the threat \nof harm, it is difficult to imagine that they would ever be completely candid. \n16 \nAs the Fifth Circuit has put it: \nLegal arguments, and the documents underlying them, belong in the public domain. American courts are \nnot private tribunals summoned to resolve disputes confidentially at taxpayer expense. When it comes to \nprotecting the right of access, the judge is the public interest's principal champion. And when the parties \nare mutually interested in secrecy, the judge is its only champion. \nBinh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp.. 990 F.3d 410. 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (footnote omitted). \n17 \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(B) reads: \nB) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter occurring \nbefore the grand jury: \n(i) a grand juror; \n(ii) an interpreter: \n(iii) a court reporter; \n(iv) an operator of a recording device: \n(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; \n(vi) an attorney for the government; or \n(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii). \n18 \nBecause the issue of probable cause would be tried as a bench trial, and not before a jury, the district court \nwould be required to enter findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n52(a)(1). As a result, there is simply no way that the district court can avoid making determinations regarding \nthe existence—or non-existence—of probable cause and the facts that support that conclusion. To shirk this \nRule 52(a)(1) responsibility would essentially preclude meaningful appellate review. \nOf course, once the district court has made its findings and conclusions, the court's decision becomes a final, \nappealable order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The fact that the victim could appeal the district court's denial \nof proba\n... [truncated, 4588 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/60 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=60]", "char_count": 4588}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n1312-13. Not so fast. As an initial matter, the majority is correct to point out that \"a prosecutor doesn't 'impair \n[her own] discretion' by sending a victim-notification letter.\" Maj. Op. at 1262 n.17. The Assistant United States \nAttorney's actions do nothing to alleviate the separation of powers concerns the dissent's model raises. And, \nin any event, the dissent misses the point: we are not only deciding Ms. Wild's case today. The majority's \nopinion will set precedent for how CVRA suits will proceed in the Eleventh Circuit. The mere fact that an \nAssistant United States Attorney in this case recognized certain individuals as victims says nothing about \nhow prosecutors and victims will act in future cases. \n1 \nBecause the prior panel held the victims had no pre-charge CVRA rights, it did not decide whether the victims \nhad a statutory remedy to enforce any CVRA rights. \n2 \nFrom June 2005 to June 2009, Acosta was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. \n3 \nAt that time, the State of Florida had already charged Epstein with one count of solicitation of prostitution. \n4 \nThe Agreement listed the following federal crimes: (1) using and conspiring to use a facility of interstate \ncommerce to persuade, induce, or entice minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2422(b), \n371, and 2; (2) traveling and conspiring to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit \nsexual conduct with minors, in violation of ? ill 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and r a (e); and (3) recruiting, enticing, and \nobtaining a minor to engage in a commercial sex act, in violation of ? II 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and 2. \n5 \nThe Agreement also provided that the ongoing grand jury proceedings would be suspended. Epstein also \nagreed to pay for a government-selected attorney for those specific individuals that the government had \nalready identified as \"victims\" under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and \n... [truncated, 4791 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/61 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=61]", "char_count": 4791}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nthis very case was \"a proceeding ancillary to a criminal investigation,\" wherein the victims had brought this \nlawsuit to enforce their rights under the CVRA. \nId. at 1001-04. \n9 \nAlthough the February 2019 order did not specifically mention the right to be treated fairly, the district court \nlater clarified, in its order denying as moot Wild's requested remedies, that the petitioners' \"right[s] to be \ntreated with fairness and to receive notice of court proceedings ... flow from the right to confer and were \nencompassed in the Court's ruling finding a violation of the CVRA.\" \nDoe I v. United States. 411 F. Supp. \n3d 1321. 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (footnote omitted). The government does not dispute that it never conferred \nwith the victims and kept the Agreement secret. See Gov't En Banc Brief at 5. \n10 \nIn July 2019, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (`SDNY\") had unsealed \nan indictment charging Epstein with a sex-trafficking conspiracy and substantive sex trafficking involving \nconduct that occurred in New York (and Florida to some extent). While he was in custody on these \ncharges, Epstein was found dead. Statement of Attorney General William P. Barr on the Death of Jeffrey \nEpstein (Aug. 10, 2018), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pristatement-attorney-general-william-p-\nbarr-death-jeffrey-epstein. In June 2020, the SDNY U.S. Attorneys Office indicted Ghislaine Maxwell for \nher participation with Epstein in the sexual abuse of numerous minor girls in New York and elsewhere. That \ncase remains pending. \n11 \nChief Judge Pryor's concurrence asserts that addressing the first en banc question results in an impermissible \nadvisory opinion. It is well-established that title exercise of judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution \ndepends on the existence of a case or controversy.\" \nPreiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, \n45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). Thus,\n... [truncated, 4667 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/62 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=62]", "char_count": 4667}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n14 \n15 \nIt is true that, unlike in this case, a criminal information was filed in \nIn re Dean. \n527 F.3d at 393. That \npoint is a distinction without a difference, however, because in \nIn re Dean, the court addressed the issue \nof the victims' CVRA rights prior to the filing of the criminal information. \nThis conclusion flowed in part from the Supreme Court's earlier decision in \nCannon, which in addressing \n§ 901 of Title IX—which is patterned atter § 601 of Title VI—recognized that both § 601 and § 901 contained \n\"rights-creating\" language that benefited a particular class of persons. \nCannon v. Univ. of Chicago. 441 \nU.S. 677. 683. 689-93. 99 S.Ct. 1946. 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The Supreme Court concluded that, although \nnothing in the text of § 601 or § 901 authorized a private cause of action for a violation of the statute, the \n\"rights-creating\" language in the statutes demonstrated clear congressional intent to provide for a statutory \nremedy to enforce the rights guaranteed in § 601 and § 901. \nId. at 694-703, 717, 99 S.Ct. 1946. And, as \nnoted in \nSandoval, \"Congress has since ratified \nCannon's holding.\" \n532 U.S. at 280. 121 S.Ct. 1511. \n16 \nThe Supreme Court explained that § 601 forbid only intentional discrimination, not disparate impact \ndiscrimination. \nSandoval. 532 U.S. at 280-81. 121 S.Ct. 1511. Thus, it was \"clear ... that the disparate-\nimpact regulation( ] [at issue did] not simply apply [the provision] of § 601—since [the regulation] indeed forbid \nconduct that § 601 permits—and therefore lit was also] clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 \n[did] not include a private right to enforce these regulations.\" \nId. at 285-86. 121 S.Ct. 1511. Accordingly, \nthe Supreme Court explained that a right to enforce the regulations 'must come, if at all, from the independent \nforce of § 602.\" \nId. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. \n17 \nFurther. § 602 provided numerous barriers even to an a\n... [truncated, 4473 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/63 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=63]", "char_count": 4473}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Ha. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n21 \nIn a prior interlocutory appeal in this case, we recognized the similarity between an action to quash a grand jury \nsubpoena and an action to enforce CVRA rights, noting that \"the victims' petition, like a grand jury proceeding, \nis ancillary to a criminal investigation.\" \nDoe No. 1 v. United States. 749 F.3d 999. 1005 (11th Cir. 2014). \n22 \nChief Judge Pryor's concurrence asserts that the alleged dual meaning of motion demonstrates that I have \nfailed to apply the whole-text canon and have erroneously read § 3771(a)(5), (a)(8), and (d)(3) in isolation. I \ndisagree. As explained above, the meaning of the word \"motion\" remains the same regardless of whether the \njudicial enforcement mechanism is available pre- or post-charge. Furthermore, \"[t]he whole-text canon refers \nto the principle that, when interpreting the meaning of a statute, the court should \"consider the entire text, \nin view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts: Scalia & Garner, supra, at \n167. Many other canons are derived from the whole-text canon, including the surplusage canon. Id. at 168. \nReading the CVRA as (1) providing crime victims with certain rights that attach pre-charge and (2) authorizing \na private right of action to judicially enforce those rights when no prosecution is underway adheres faithfully \nto the whole-text canon as it is the only one that gives full effect to the plain statutory text of the CVRA as a \nwhole, while simultaneously avoiding rendering portions of the statute superfluous and impermissibly adding \nwords to the text. \n23 \nThe Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 18 state that \"numerous statutes have been enacted to regulate \nthe venue of criminal proceedings, particularly in respect to continuing offenses and offenses consisting of \nseveral transactions occurring in different districts. These special venue provisions are not affected by the \nrule\" and are consistent \n... [truncated, 5208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/64 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=64]", "char_count": 5208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n—in subsection (d)—for victims to enforce their rights that exist separate and apart from the district court's \nindependent duty to ensure those rights are enforced in a proceeding over which it is presiding. 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(d). \n26 \nThe Majority asserts that in addressing the fact that the administrative remedy in § 3771(0 is not available \nto crime victims who believe they have suffered a violation of their statutory rights under the CVRA during \nthe pre-charge phase, I am somehow reasoning that \"if there is no visible remedy, courts should fashion \none.\" To be clear, that is not the basis of my reasoning. It is of course the task of the legislature to create a \nprivate remedy and, as explained previously, Congress created such a remedy expressly and unequivocally \nin § 3771(d)(3)—a In0otion for relief' filed in \"the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" \nWhile the existence of an administrative remedy in ? Sandoval counseled against implying a private cause \nof action, we are not faced with an implied remedy case. We can, and should, end our analysis with the plain \ntext of the CVRA statute and enforce the express private cause of action Congress authorized in §3771(d)(3). \n27 \nThe Majority itself never says that these victims can vindicate their rights through the administrative process \nin § 3771(f). Rather, the Majority states that the victims' rights \"might be enforceable through, say, political \nor administrative channels.\" (emphasis added). But given the language of the administrative scheme—\nwhich requires a victim's complaint to contain a district court case number—it is unclear to what political or \nadministrative channels the Majority refers. \n28 \nThe ACAA provides, in pertinent part, that \nproviding air transportation, an air carrier .... may not \ndiscriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on\" certain grounds related to that individual's \"physical \nor \n... [truncated, 5021 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/65 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=65]", "char_count": 5021}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nthe government has not presented any evidence suggesting any difficulties in identifying crime victims of \nfederal offenses or of mini-trials to do so. I stand by my conclusion that both the attachment pre-charge of \ncrime victims' rights to reasonable conferral and to be treated fairly and with respect and the enforcement of \nthose rights through a freestanding cause of action via a motion for relief if no prosecution is underway—as \nauthorized expressly by Congress—do not impair prosecutorial discretion in this case. \n1 \nFederal courts cannot issue advisory opinions because of the Constitution's case or controversy requirement. \nThus, to be justiciable, the first issue must involve a genuine live controversy involving a present claim by \none party and another party disputing it that can be determined judicially. See \nCarney. 592 U.S. at —. \n141 S. Ct. at 498. Whether the Epstein victims had conferral rights that the government violated is justiciable \nand should be decided for the reasons outlined above. \n2 \nSee also Hamm v. Comm'r, Ala. Dept of Corr.. 620 F. App'x 752. 782 (11th Cir. 2015) (\"[W]e conclude that [the \npetitioners] Brady claim here is procedurally defaulted and that a merits review is precluded. Alternatively, \nwe find the claim to be without merit.\" (emphasis added)); Harris v. Goderick. 608 F. App'x 760, 764 (11th \nCir. 2015) r[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that [plaintiff's] false arrest claims are not barred by the statute of \nlimitations, each non-immune defendant arguably possessed probable cause for actions taken in the course \nof prosecuting [plaintiff] for his probation violation ....\"); Davies v. Former Acting Dist. Dir.-Orlando. 484 F. \nApp'x 385. 389 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal of a Bivens claim as barred by the applicable \nstatute of limitations but noting that. \"(elven assuming arguendo that the statute of limitations did not bar this \ncase .... it is appa\n... [truncated, 4948 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/66 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=66]", "char_count": 4948}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \n6 \nJennings v. Rodriguez. 538 U.S. -. \n-. \n138 S. Ct. 830. 843-44, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (declining \nto apply the canon of constitutional avoidance because the statutory language at issue was not ambiguous). \nTo that end, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, \"rewrit[ing) a ... law to conform it to constitutional \nrequirements ... would constitute a serious invasion of the legislative domain.\" \nStevens. 559 U.S. at 481, \n130 S. Ct. at 1592 (second alteration in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted). \nCannon v. Univ. of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 99 S. Ct. 1946.60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). \n7 \nJudge Branch's Dissent dismantles the Majority's tortured construction of § 3771(d)(3)'s terms, like \"motion\" \nand \"no prosecution is underway.\" Her Dissent reviews how the Majority eschews the common, ordinary, \neveryday meaning of the word \"motion; and wrongly defines \"motion- to require a preexisting underlying \ncourt proceeding. Her Dissent explains the common meaning of \"motions\" and how federal law authorizes a \n\"motion- to be filed freestanding in numerous other areas of criminal law. I agree and need not cover this \nterritory. Rather, I show how the Majority strays from the plain text and muses about expectations. \n8 \nChief Judge Pryor's concurrence points out that each dissent spends at least 10 pages discussing \nSandoval, an implied cause of action decision, even though they contend that the CVRA grants a private \nright of action. The concurrence describes the dissents as \"puzzling\" and \"schizophrenic\" for this reason: \n\"If the Act expressly granted a private right of action, then \nSandoval would be beside the point.- Pryor \nConcurring Op. at —. \nAlthough clever wordsmithing, this is a non sequitur. \nSandoval is necessarily discussed. First, the \nMajority and the concurring opinions rely heavily upon it; yet our explication of \nSandoval reveals how \nthey misconstrue \nSandoval, an implied cause of acti\n... [truncated, 4551 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/67 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=67]", "char_count": 4551}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074599", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244 (2021) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 2701 \nat https://www.miamiherald.cominewsAocal/article247133141.html (\" 'Letting a well-connected billionaire \nget away with child rape and international sex trafficking isn't \"poor judgment\"—it is a disgusting failure. \nAmericans ought to be enraged,' Nebraska Sen. Ben Sasse, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Oversight \nSubcommittee, said in a statement Thursday afternoon.....'The DOJ's crooked deal with Epstein effectively \nshut down investigations into his child sex trafficking ring and protected his co-conspirators in other states. \nJustice has not been served,' Sasse added.\"). \nOPR's Report is viewed as a \"whitewash,\" letting everyone off the hook,\" \"offensive,\" \"hurtful,\" and like \nanother slap in the face to the victims.\" James Hill, Key takeaways from the Justice Department review \nof Jeffrey Epstein sweetheart deal, ABC News (Nov. 16, 2020), available at https&/abcnews.go.com/US/ \nkey-takeaways-justice-department-review-jeffrey-epsteln-sweetheartistory?id.74222922. Given the OPR \nReport, it is hardly surprising the victims continue to pursue this civil suit to discover and unravel the mystery \nof why the prosecutors not only signed such a sweetheart plea deal for the billionaire Epstein in the first \nplace but did so in secret and then for nearly a year took great efforts to hide the Agreement by affirmative \nmisrepresentations to the victims and their counsel too. \n11 \nIn 2020 alone, the DOJ executed 32 agreements to defer prosecution for corporate criminality. See Duke \nUniversity School of Law & University of Virginia's Legal Data Lab, Data and flonimp.nts, Corporate \nProsecution Registry, https://corporate-prosecution-registry.cornibrowse/; see also 2019 Year-End Update \non Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Gibson Dunn (Jan. 8, \n2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2019-year-end-npa-dpa-update/ (stating that the DOJ's use of NPAs \nand DPAs in white collar case\n... [truncated, 2265 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074599/68 or ?id=EFTA00074599&page=68]", "char_count": 2265}]}