{"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_count": 90, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00074500", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00074500.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nS2 20 Cr. 330 (MN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n[PROPOSED] JOINT REQUESTS TO CHARGE \nEFTA00074500\n", "char_count": 189}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nINTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS \n1 \nRole of the Court \n1 \nRole of the Jury \n2 \nSympathy: Oath As Jurors \n3 \nContact with Others/Social Media \n4 \nStatements of Counsel and Court Not Evidence; Jury's Recollection Controls \n5 \nImproper Considerations \n7 \nAll Parties Are Equal Before the Law \n8 \nPresumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof \n9 \nReasonable Doubt \n10 \nThe Indictment \n12 \nCHARGE \n13 \nSummary of Indictment \n13 \nMultiple Counts \n15 \nCount Two: Enticement to Engage in an Illegal Sexual Activity — The Statute \n16 \nCount Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity— The Elements \n17 \nCount Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element \n18 \nCount Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second Element \n19 \nCount Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Third Element \n20 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — The Statute  22 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — The Elements 23 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element  24 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element —\nConsent Irrelevant \n25 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second Element \n \n26 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second Element \n— Illegal Sexual Activity \n27 \nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Third Element —\nSexual Abuse in the Third Degree \n28 \nCounts Two and Four: Failure to Accomplish Intended Activity is Immaterial \n29 \nCount Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Statute \n30 \nCount Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Elements \n31 \nCount Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — First Element \n32 \nEFTA00074501\n", "char_count": 1871}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Second Element \n33 \nCount Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Third Element \n34 \nCount Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Fourth Element \n35 \nCounts Two, Four, and Six: Aiding and Abetting \n37 \nCounts One and Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Laws— The Statute \n40 \nCounts One and Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Laws— Conspiracy and \nSubstantive Counts \n41 \nCounts One, Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — The Elements \n43 \nCounts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — First Element \n44 \nCounts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — First Element: Object of \nthe Conspiracy \n48 \nCounts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — Second Element: \nMembership in the Conspiracy \n50 \nCounts One, Three, and Five Two: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — Third Element \n53 \nStatute of Limitations \n55 \nOTHER INSTRUCTIONS \n56 \nDirect and Circumstantial Evidence \n56 \nInferences \n58 \nCredibility of Witnesses \n60 \nCredibility of Witnesses — Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement \n62 \nConscious Avoidance \n63 \nVenue \n65 \nTime of Offense \n67 \nLaw Enforcement and Government Employee Witnesses \n68 \nFormal / Informal Immunity of Government Witnesses \n69 \nExpert Testimony \n70 \nLimiting Instruction — Similar Act Evidence \n71 \nDefendant's Testimony \n72 \nDefendant's Right Not to Testify \n73 \nUncalled Witnesses — Equally Available to Both Sides \n74 \nParticular Investigative Techniques Not Required \n75 \nUse of Evidence from Searches \n76 \nUse of Electronic Communications \n77 \nPersons Not on Trial \n78 \nPreparation of Witnesses \n79 \nEFTA00074502\n", "char_count": 1675}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Redaction Of Evidentiary Items \n80 \nCharts and Summaries — Admitted as Evidence \n81 \nStipulations \n82 \nPunishment Not to be Considered by the Jury \n83 \nRight to Hear Testimony; Election of Foreperson; Communications with the Court; Juror \nNote-Taking \n84 \nCONCLUDING REMARKS \n85 \nEFTA00074503\n", "char_count": 293}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS \nRole of the Court \nYou have now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the \nlawyers for the parties. My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to \naccept these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine them. \nOn these legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. Regardless of any \nopinion that you may have as to what the law may be—or ought to be—it would violate your \nsworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I give you. If an \nattorney or anyone else at trial has stated a legal principle different from any that I state to you in \nmy instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow. \nYou should not single out any instruction alone stating the law, but you should consider \nmy instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room. You may take a copy \nof these instructions with you into the jury room. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n1 \nEFTA00074504\n", "char_count": 1166}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Role of the Jury \nYour role is to pass upon and decide the fact issues that are in the case. You, the \nmembers of the jury, are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the weight of \nthe evidence or lack of evidence; you determine the credibility of the witnesses; you resolve such \nconflicts as there may be in the testimony; and you draw whatever reasonable inferences you \ndecide to draw solely based on the evidence and from the facts as you have determined them. \nThe evidence before you consists of the answers given by witnesses and the exhibits and \nstipulations that were received into evidence. If I have sustained an objection to a question or \ntold you to disregard testimony, the answers given by a witness are no longer part of the \nevidence and may not be considered by you. In determining the facts, you must rely upon your \nown recollection of the evidence. I will instruct you at the end of these charges about your \nability to request to have testimony read back and your access to other evidence admitted during \nthe trial. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n2 \nEFTA00074505\n", "char_count": 1230}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Sympathy: Oath As Jurors \nUnder your oath as jurors you are not to be swayed by sympathy or prejudice. You are to \ndetermine the guilt or innocence of the defendant solely on the basis of the evidence and subject \nto the law as I have charged you. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal -flay Instructions, Instr. \n2-12; and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. \nPurcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). \n3 \nEFTA00074506\n", "char_count": 432}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Contact with Others/Social Media \nDuring your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to \nanyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic devices or media, such as \na telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer; the Internet, or any \nintemet service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any internet chat room, blog, or \nwebsite, such as Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube, Twitter, or Snapchat, to \ncommunicate to anyone any information about this case or to conduct any research about this \ncase until I accept your verdict. In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone or in \nperson, correspond with anyone, or electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You \ncan only discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. \nAlong the same lines, you should not try to access any information about the case or do \nresearch on any issue that arose during the trial from any outside source, including dictionaries, \nreference books, or anything on the Internet. In our judicial system, it is important that you are \nnot influenced by anything or anyone outside of this courtroom. Your sworn duty is to decide \nthis case solely and wholly on the evidence that was presented to you in this courtroom. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n4 \nEFTA00074507\n", "char_count": 1503}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Statements of Counsel and Court Not Evidence; \nJury's Recollection Controls \nYou must determine the facts by relying upon your own recollection of the evidence. \nThis case is not to be decided on the rhetoric of either the attorneys for the Government or the \nattorneys for the Defendants. The lawyers' arguments are intended to convince you to draw \ncertain conclusions from the evidence or lack of evidence. Those arguments are important. You \nshould weigh and evaluate them carefully. But you must not confuse them with the evidence. If \nyour recollection of the evidence differs from the statements of the lawyers, follow your \nrecollection. \nYou should draw no inference or conclusion for or against any party by reason of lawyers \nmaking objections or my rulings on such objections. Counsel have not only the right but the duty \nto make legal objections that they think are appropriate. You should not be swayed against the \nGovernment or the Defendant simply because counsel for either side has chosen to make an \nobjection. Similarly, statements made by counsel when arguing the admissibility of evidence are \nnot to be considered as evidence. \nIf I comment on the evidence during my instructions, do not accept my statements in \nplace of your recollection. Again, it is your recollection that governs. \nDo not concern yourself with what was said at side bar conferences or during my \ndiscussions with counsel. Those discussions related to rulings of law, which are my duty, and not \nto matters of fact, which are your duty to determine. \nAt times I may have admonished a witness or directed a witness to be responsive to \nquestions, to keep his or her voice up, or to repeat an answer. My instructions were intended only \nto clarify the presentation of evidence. You should draw no inference or conclusion of any kind, \nfavorable or unfavorable, with respect to any witness or party in the case, by reason of any \n5 \nEFTA00074508\n", "char_count": 1939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "comment, question, or instruction of mine. Nor should you infer that I have any views as to the \ncredibility of any witness, as to the weight of the evidence, or as to how you should decide any \nissue that is before you. That is entirely your role. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n6 \nEFTA00074509\n", "char_count": 417}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Improper Considerations \nYour verdict must be based solely upon the evidence or the lack of evidence. It would be \nimproper for you to consider any personal feelings you may have about the defendant's race, \nethnicity, religion, national origin, sex, age, or any other such factor. Similarly, it would be \nimproper for you to consider any personal feelings you may have about the race, ethnicity, \nreligion, national origin, sex, age, or any other similar factor of any other witness or anyone else \ninvolved in this case. It also would be improper for you to allow any feelings you might have \nabout the nature of the crimes charged to interfere with your decision-making process. \nI remind you that before each of you was accepted and sworn to act as a juror, you were \nasked questions concerning competency, qualifications, fairness, and freedom from prejudice \nand bias. On the faith of those answers, you were accepted as jurors by the parties. Therefore, \nthose answers are as binding on each of you now as they were then, and should remain so, until \nthe jury is discharged from consideration of this case. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n7 \nEFTA00074510\n", "char_count": 1282}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "All Parties Are Equal Before the Law \nYou are to perform the duty of finding the facts without bias or prejudice as to any party. \nYou are to perform your final duty in an attitude of complete fairness and impartiality. \nThe fact that the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States of America \nentitles the Government to no greater consideration than that given to any other party to this \nlitigation. By the same token, the Government is entitled to no less consideration. All parties \nstand as equals at the bar of justice. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Lebedev, \n15 Cr. 769 (AN). \n8 \nEFTA00074511\n", "char_count": 706}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof \nThe law presumes the defendant to be innocent of all charges against her. She has \npleaded not guilty to the charges in the Indictment. As a result, the burden is on the Government \nto prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each charge. This burden never \nshifts to the defendant. In other words, she does not have to prove her innocence. \nThis presumption of innocence was with the defendant when the trial began remains with \nthe defendant unless and until you are convinced that the Government has proven the defendant's \nguilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the Government fails to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a \nreasonable doubt, you must find her not guilty. \n[If necessaty: Even though the defendant has presented evidence in her defense, the \npresumption of innocence remains with her. It is always the Government's burden to prove each \nof the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.] \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n9 \nEFTA00074512\n", "char_count": 1153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Reasonable Doubt \nThe question that naturally arises is: \"What is a reasonable doubt?\" What does that \nphrase mean? The words almost define themselves. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based in \nreason and arising out of the evidence in the case, or the lack of evidence. It is a doubt that a \nreasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence in the case. \nReasonable doubt is a doubt that appeals to your reason, your judgment, your experience, \nand your common sense. If, after a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you can \ncandidly and honestly say that you do have an abiding belief of the defendant's guilt as to any \ncrime charged in this case, such a belief as a prudent person would be willing to act upon in \nimportant matters in the personal affairs of his or her own life, then you have no reasonable \ndoubt, and under such circumstances it is your duty to convict the defendant of the particular \ncrime in question. \nOn the other hand, if after a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you can \ncandidly and honestly say that you are not satisfied with the defendant's guilt as to any charge, \nthat you do not have an abiding belief of her guilt as to that charge—in other words, if you have \nsuch a doubt as would reasonably cause a prudent person to hesitate in acting in matters of \nimportance in his or her own affairs—then you have a reasonable doubt, and in that \ncircumstances it is your duty to acquit the defendant of that charge. \nOne final word on this subject: Reasonable doubt is not whim or speculation. It is not an \nexcuse to avoid an unpleasant duty. Nor is it sympathy for the defendant. \"Beyond a reasonable \ndoubt\" does not mean mathematical certainty, or proof beyond all possible doubt. The law in a \ncriminal case is that it is sufficient if the guilt of the defendant is established beyond a reasonable \ndoubt, not beyond all possible doubt, and, therefore, if after a fair and impartial consideration of \n10 \nEFTA0\n... [truncated, 2008 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/13 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=13]", "char_count": 2008}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "all of the evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt with \nrespect to a particular charge against her, you should find the defendant guilty of that charge. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n11 \nEFTA00074514\n", "char_count": 362}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "The Indictment \nThe defendant, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, has been formally charged in what is called an \nIndictment. An indictment is simply a charge or accusation. It is not evidence. It is not proof of \nthe defendant's guilt. It creates no presumption and it permits no inference that the defendant is \nguilty. You are to give no weight to the fact that an indictment has been returned against the \ndefendant. \nI will not read the entire Indictment to you at this time. Rather, I will first summarize the \noffenses charged in the Indictment and then explain in detail the elements of each of the offenses. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, \n17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n12 \nEFTA00074515\n", "char_count": 770}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "CHARGE \nSummary of Indictment \nThe Indictment contains six counts, or \"charges,\" against the defendant. Each count \nconstitutes a separate offense or crime. You must consider each count of the Indictment \nseparately, and you must return a separate verdict on each count in which the defendant is \ncharged. I am briefly going to summarize each count, and then will give you the law in greater \ndetail. \nCount One of the Indictment charges GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, with \nconspiring—that is, agreeing—with others to entice an individual to travel in interstate and \nforeign commerce to engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal \noffense: Count One relates to multiple victims and the time period 1994 to 2004. \nCount Two of the Indictment charges the defendant with enticing an individual to travel \nin interstate and foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity for which a person can be \ncharged with a criminal offense. Count Two relates to Minor Victim-1 and the time period 1994 \nto 1997. \nCount Three of the Indictment charges the defendant with conspiring with others to \ntransport a minor in interstate and foreign commerce, with intent that the minor engage in sexual \nactivity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense. Count Three relates to \nmultiple minor victims and the time period 1994 to 2004. \nCount Four of the Indictment charges the defendant with transporting a minor in \ninterstate and foreign commerce, with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity for \nwhich a person can be charged with a criminal offense. Count Four relates to Minor Victim-1 \nand the time period 1994 to 1997. \n13 \nEFTA00074516\n", "char_count": 1690}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Count Five of the Indictment charges the defendant with conspiring to engage in sex \ntrafficking of minors. Count Five relates to multiple minor victims and the time period 2001 to \n2004. \nCount Six of the Indictment charges the defendant with sex trafficking of minors. Count \nSix relates to Minor Victim-4, and the time period 2001 to 2004. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n3-6. See United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1982). \n14 \nEFTA00074517\n", "char_count": 495}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Multiple Counts \nAs I mentioned, the Indictment contains six counts. Each count charges the defendant \nwith a different crime. You must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict of \nguilty or not guilty for each. Whether you find the defendant guilty or not guilty as to one \noffense should not affect your verdict as to any other offense charged, unless you are instructed \notherwise. \nWith that summary of the Indictment as background, I will now give you detailed \ninstructions that relate to the crimes charged in Counts One through Six. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 (AJN) and in United States v. Le, 15 \nCr. 38 (AJN). \n15 \nEFTA00074518\n", "char_count": 726}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Count Two: Enticement to Engage in an Illegal Sexual Activity — The Statute \nThe relevant statute for Count Two is Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422, which \nprovides that \"[w]hoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to \ntravel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to \nengage in ... in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense,\" is guilty of a federal crime. \n16 \nEFTA00074519\n", "char_count": 510}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity— The Elements \nTo prove the defendant guilty of Count Two, the Government must prove each of the \nfollowing three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: \nFirst, that the defendant knowingly persuaded or induced or enticed or coerced an \nindividual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce; \nSecond, that the individual traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; and \nThird, that the defendant acted with the intent that the individual would engage in sexual \nactivity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. \nCount Two relates to Minor Victim-1 during the period 1994 to 1997. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n64-6. \n17 \nEFTA00074520\n", "char_count": 751}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element \nThe first element of Count Two is that the defendant knowingly persuaded or induced or \nenticed or coerced an individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce. The terms \n\"persuaded,\" \"induced,\" \"enticed,\" and \"coerced\" have their ordinary, everyday meanings. \nThe term \"interstate or foreign commerce\" simply means movement from one state to \nanother state or between the United States and a foreign country. The term \"State\" includes a \nState of the United States and the District of Columbia. \n\"Knowingly\" Defined \nThe defendant must have acted knowingly. An act is done knowingly when it is done \nvoluntarily and intentionally and not because of accident, mistake, or some other innocent reason. \nNow, knowledge is a matter of inference from the proven facts. Science has not yet \ndevised a manner of looking into a person's mind and knowing what that person is thinking. \nWhether the defendant acted knowingly may be proven by the defendant's conduct and by all of \nthe facts and circumstances surrounding the case. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n64-7; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nPizzaro, 17 Cr. 151 (AJN) and in United States v. Le, 15 Cr. 38 \n(AN); the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. \nPurcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. \nWood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (ICMW); and the \ncharge of the Hon. Sidney H. Stein in United States v. Waqar, 18 \nCr. 342 (SHS). See United States v. Waqar, 997 F.3d 481, 484-85 \n(2d Cir. 2021) (stating that the \"statutory verbs\" in § 2422(b) \n\"'attempt, persuade, induce, entice, [and] coerce, though not \ndefined in the statute, are words of common usage that have plain \nand ordinary meanings\" (citation omitted)). \n18 \nEFTA00074521\n", "char_count": 1879}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second Element \nThe second element of Count Two is that the individual traveled in interstate or foreign \ncommerce as alleged in the Indictment. \nAs I just stated, \"interstate or foreign commerce\" simply means movement between one \nstate and another or between the United States and a foreign country. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, lnstr. \n64-8. \n19 \nEFTA00074522\n", "char_count": 456}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Third Element \nThe third element of Count Two is that the defendant acted with the intent that the \nindividual would engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense. \nCount Two alleges sexual activity for which a person could be charged with a crime \nunder the criminal (or penal) law of New York State. I instruct you as a matter of law that \nSexual Abuse in the Third Degree, the offense set forth in Count Two of the Indictment, was a \nviolation of New York State Penal law from at least in or about 1994 up to an including in or \nabout 1997, at the time the acts are alleged to have been committed. \nA person violates New York State Penal Law § 130.55, Sexual Abuse in the Third \nDegree, when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent. \nUnder New York law, \"sexual contact\" means any touching of the sexual or other \nintimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party. It \nincludes the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing, as well as \nthe emission of ejaculate by the actor upon any part of the victim, clothed or unclothed. \nAlso under New York law, lack of consent can result from incapacity to consent. A \nperson less than seventeen years old is deemed incapable of consent under New York Law. \nThus, the law deems sexual contact with such a person to be without that person's consent, even \nif in fact that person did consent. However, in order to find that the intended acts were \nnonconsensual solely because of the victim's age, you must find that the defendant knew that the \nvictim was less than seventeen years old. \n20 \nEFTA00074523\n", "char_count": 1765}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "\"Intentionally\" Defined \nA person acts intentionally when the act is the product of her conscious objective, that is, \nwhen she acts deliberately and purposefully and not because of a mistake or accident. Direct \nproof of a person's intent is almost never available. It would be a rare case where it could be \nshown that a person wrote or stated that, as of a given time, she committed an act with a \nparticular intent. Such direct proof is not required. The ultimate fact of intent, though subjective, \nmay be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon the defendant's outward \nmanifestations, her words, her conduct, her acts and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed \nby the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn from them. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, \nInstrs. 64-9, 64-18; New York Penal Law §§ 15.20(3), 130.00, \n130.05, 130.55; New York State Pattern Jury Instructions \n§ 130.55; the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. \nPurcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and the charge of the Hon. Ann M. \nDonnelly in United States v. Kelly, 19 Cr. 286 (AMD) (E.D.N.Y.). \nSee United States v. Murphy, 942 F.3d 73, 79-84 (2d Cir. 2019) \n(holding under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) that a defendant must know \nthe age of the victim where the victim's age distinguishes lawful \nfrom unlawful conduct). \n21 \nEFTA00074524\n", "char_count": 1384}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — The Statute \nThe relevant statute for Count Four is Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a), \nwhich provides that a person who \"knowingly transports any individual under the age of 18 years \nin interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that such individual engage in ... any sexual \nactivity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,\" is guilty of a federal \ncrime. \n22 \nEFTA00074525\n", "char_count": 493}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — The Elements \nIn order to prove the defendant guilty of Count Four, the Government must \nestablish each of the following three elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt: \nFirst that the defendant knowingly transported an individual in interstate or \nforeign commerce as alleged in the Indictment, \nSecond, that the defendant transported the individual with the intent that the \nindividual engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense; and \nThird, that the individual was less than seventeen years old at the time of the acts \nalleged in Count Four of the Indictment. \nCount Four also relates to Minor Victim-1 during the period 1994 to 1997. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n64-16; the charge of the Hon. Richard J. Arcara in United States v. \nVickers, 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 708 F. App'x 732 \n(2d Cir. 2017); and the charge of the Hon. Thomas P. Greisa in \nUnited States v. Gilliam, 11 Cr. 1083 (TPG), ard, 842 F.3d 801, \n805 (2d Cir. 2016). \n23 \nEFTA00074526\n", "char_count": 1140}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element \nThe first element of Count Four is that the defendant knowingly transported an individual \nin interstate or foreign commerce. The phrase, \"transport an individual in interstate or foreign \ncommerce\" means to move or carry, or cause someone to be moved or carried, from one state to \nanother or between the United States and a foreign country. \nThe Government does not have to prove that the defendant personally transported the \nindividual across a state line. It is sufficient to satisfy this element that the defendant acted \nthrough an agent or was engaged in the making of the travel arrangements, such as by purchasing \ntickets necessary for the individual to travel as planned. \nThe defendant must have knowingly transported or participated in the transportation of the \nindividual in interstate or foreign commerce. This means that the Government must prove that \nthe defendant knew both that she was causing the individual to be transported, and that the \nindividual was being transported in interstate or foreign commerce. As I have explained, an act is \ndone knowingly when it is done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of accident, mistake \nor some innocent reason. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal -hay Instructions, Instr. \n64-17; and the charge of the Hon. Richard J. Arcara in United \nStates v. Vickers, 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 708 F. \nApp'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017). See United States v. Mi Sun Cho, 713 \nF.3d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 2013) (sufficient to show transportation \nwhere defendant agreed to provide a prostitution job and \ncoordinated and prearranged the date and time of travel); United \nStates v. Shim, 584 F.3d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. \nEvans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 2002) (under general \nknowledge requirement of Mann Act, jury need not find that \ndefendant knew that the act being committed was unlawful). \n24 \nEFTA00074527\n", "char_count": 1996}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element \n— Consent Irrelevant \nWith regard to Count Four, whether or not the individual consented to being transported \nor to traveling interstate for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity for which any person can \nbe charged with a criminal offense, or the individual otherwise voluntarily participated, is \nirrelevant, as the consent or voluntary participation of the individual is not a defense. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Thomas P. Greisa in United \nStates v. Gilliam, 11 Cr. 1083 (TPG), aff'd, 842 F.3d 801, 805 (2d \nCir. 2016). See also United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 52 (1st \nCir. 1998) (\"Consent is a defense to kidnapping but not to a Mann \nAct charge.\"); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565-66 (7th \nCir. 1986); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir. \n1978); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1932). \n25 \nEFTA00074528\n", "char_count": 965}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second \nElement \nThe second element of Count Four is that the defendant transported the individual with \nthe intent that the individual engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged \nwith a criminal offense. \nIn order to establish this element, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that \nengaging in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense was the \ndefendant's sole purpose in transporting the individual across a state line. A person may have \nseveral different purposes or motives for such conduct, and each may prompt in varying degrees \nthe act or the person's actions. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, \nhowever, that a significant or motivating purpose of the conduct was to have the individual \nengage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. In other \nwords, the illegal sexual activity must not have been merely incidental to the trip. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, \nInstrs. and 64-4, 64-18; Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury \nPractice and Instructions, Instr. 60-07; and the charge of the Hon. \nDenise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). See \nUnited States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2013) \n(\"[T]he contemplated unlawful sexual activity need not be the \ndefendant's sole purpose for transporting a minor in interstate or \nforeign commerce. Rather, it must only be a `dominant purpose' of \nthe transportation.\"); United States v. Miller, 148 F.3d 207, 212 \n(2d Cir. 1998) (finding no error in jury instruction that engaging in \nillegal sexual activity \"need not have been [the defendant's] only \npurpose or motivation, but it must have been more than merely \nincidental; it must have been one of the dominant purposes of the \ntrip\"). \n26 \nEFTA00074529\n", "char_count": 1936}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second \nElement — illegal Sexual Activity \nCount Four alleges that the defendant knowingly transported the individual in interstate \nor foreign commerce with the intent that the individual engage in sexual activity for which any \nperson can be charged with a criminal offense. \nLike Count Two, Count Four alleges sexual activity for which an individual could be \ncharged with a crime under the criminal (or penal) law of New York State, specifically Sexual \nAbuse in the Third Degree. I have already instructed you regarding that crime, and those \ninstructions apply equally here. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 64-18; \nNew York State Penal Law §§ 15.20(3), 130.00, 130.05, 130.55; New \nYork State Pattern Jury Instructions § 130.55; the charge of the Hon. \nDenise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). \n27 \nEFTA00074530\n", "char_count": 952}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Third \nElement — Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree \nThe third element of Count Four is that the individual was less than seventeen years old \nat the time of the offense. Although the text of the law says the individual must be less than \neighteen, because the New York criminal law provides that a person can consent to sexual \nactivity if she is seventeen, this element requires that the individual was less than seventeen at \nthe time of the offense. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jay Instructions, Instr. \n64-19 (\"Although section 2423(a) requires that the person \ntransported be less than eighteen ... [i]f the defendant is charged \nwith transporting for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual \nactivity, and that underlying activity requires that the victim be less \nthan some other age, then it can only confuse the jury to charge \nthat the victim must be less than eighteen in this instruction and \nless than that other age elsewhere in the instructions.\"). See New \nYork State Penal Law §§ 15.20(3), 130.55 \n28 \nEFTA00074531\n", "char_count": 1125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Counts Two and Four: Failure to Accomplish Intended Activity is Immaterial \nNow, with respect to Counts Two and Four, it is not a defense that the sexual activity \nwhich may have been intended by the defendant was not accomplished. \nIn other words, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that anyone, in fact, \nengaged in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense with \nthe individual after she was enticed, for Count Two, or transported, for Count Four, across state \nlines. It is enough if defendant has the requisite intent at the time of the enticement or \ntransportation. \nAdapted from Edward J. Devitt, et al., Federal Juiy Practice and \nInstructions, Instr. 60-06. See United States v. Bromoneyer, 616 \nF.3d 120, 129-30 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2010) (\"The plain wording of the \nstatute requires that the mens rea of intent coincide with the actor \nreus of crossing state lines.\"); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. \n14, 20 (1946) (\"[G]uilt under the Mann Act turns on the purpose \nwhich motivates the transportation, not on its accomplishment.\"). \n29 \nEFTA00074532\n", "char_count": 1113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Statute \nThe relevant statute for Count Six is Title 18, United States Code, Section 1591, which \nprovides, in pertinent part, that \"Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate commerce, \nrecruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains, by any means a person ... knowing \nthat ... the person has not attained the age of eighteen years and will be caused to engage in a \ncommercial sex act\" is guilty of a crime. \n30 \nEFTA00074533\n", "char_count": 484}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Elements \nTo find the defendant guilty of Count Six you must find that the Government has proven \neach of the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: \nFirst: The defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or \nobtained a person; \nSecond: The defendant knew that the person was under the age of eighteen years; \nThird: The defendant knew the person would be caused to engage in a commercial sex \nact; and \nFourth:, The defendant's acts were in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. \nThis Count relates to the alleged abuse of Minor Victim-4 during the period 2001 to \n2004. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n47A-I8; and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in \nUnited States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). \n31 \nEFTA00074534\n", "char_count": 851}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — First Element \nThe first element of Count Six is that the defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, \nharbored, transported, provided, or obtained a person. The terms \"recruited,\" \"enticed,\" \n\"harbored,\" \"transported,\" \"provided,\" and \"obtained\" have their ordinary, everyday meanings. \nAdapted from the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United \nStates v. Aimonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d \n104, 122 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"In interpreting a statute, this Court gives the \nstatutory terms their ordinary or natural meaning.\" (internal quotation \nmarks omitted)). See, e.g., Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 517 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining that, because the verb \"entices\" is \"not \ndefined by Congress,\" it bears its ordinary meaning). \n32 \nEFTA00074535\n", "char_count": 825}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Second Element \nThe second element of Count Six is that the defendant knew that the person was under \neighteen years of age. \nIn considering whether the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of \neighteen, please apply the definition of \"knowingly\" previously provided to you. Remember \nwhether a defendant acted knowingly may be proven by what the defendant said and did and by \nall the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, since direct proof of a person's state of \nmind is rarely available. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n47A-20; and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in \nUnited States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). See United States v. \nThompson, 896 F.3d 155, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2018). \n33 \nEFTA00074536\n", "char_count": 820}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Third Element \nThe third element of Count Six is that the defendant knew that the person would be \ncaused to engage in a commercial sex act. \nThe term \"commercial sex act\" means \"any sex act, on account of which anything of \nvalue is given to or received by any person.\" The thing of value may be money or any other \ntangible or intangible thing of value that may be given to or received by any person, regardless of \nwhether the person who receives it is the person performing the commercial sex act. \nIt is not relevant whether or not the person was a willing participant in performing \ncommercial sex acts. Consent by the person is not a defense to the charge in Count Six of the \nIndictment. It is also not required that the person actually performed a commercial sex act so \nlong as the Government has proved that the defendant recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, \nprovided, or obtained the person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n47A-22; 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1) (2000) (defining \"commercial sex \nact\"); and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United \nStates v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (ICMW). See United States v. Jones, \n847 F. App'x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (affirming the \nuse of an instruction drawn from the statute and the Sand treatise); \nUnited States v. Corley, 679 F. App'x 1, 7 (2d Cir. 2017) \n(summary order) (\"[T]he statute does not require that an actual \ncommercial sex act have occurred.\"); United States v. Williams, \n529 F.3d I, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (\"Even if the minor had factually \nconsented, that consent would not have been legally valid. In all \nevents, factual consent would not eliminate the potential risks that \nconfronted the child.\" (citations omitted)). \n34 \nEFTA00074537\n", "char_count": 1860}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Fourth Element \nThe fourth and final element of Count Six is that the defendant's sex trafficking activities \nwere in interstate or foreign commerce or affected interstate commerce. The Government need \nnot prove both that the activities were in interstate or foreign commerce and affected interstate or \nforeign commerce. \nI instruct you that acts and transactions that cross state lines, or which affect the flow of \nmoney in the stream of commerce to any degree, however minimal, are acts and transactions \naffecting interstate commerce. For instance, it affects interstate commerce to use products that \ntraveled in interstate commerce. \nIt is not necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant specifically knew or \nintended that the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining of a person \nto engage in commercial sex acts would affect interstate commerce; it is only necessary that the \nnatural consequences of such conduct would affect interstate commerce in some way, even if \nminor. \nIf you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the recruitment, enticement, harboring, \ntransportation, providing, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex \nacts was economic in nature and involved the crossing of state lines, or was economic in nature \nand otherwise affected the flow of money to any degree, however minimal, you may find that the \ninterstate commerce requirement of the offense of sex trafficking of a minor has been satisfied. \nI further instruct you that to find that this element has been proven beyond a reasonable \ndoubt, it is not necessary for you to find that any interstate or foreign travel occurred. Proof of \nactual travel is not required. \nAdapted from the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in \nUnited States v. A/monte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). See United States v. \nGraham, 707 F. App'x 23, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) \n35 \nEFTA00074538\n", "char_count": 1972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "(\"The conduct underlying Graham's conviction was inherently \ncommercial, and the government adduced evidence that its \ncommission as to all three counts involved the use of intemet \nadvertisements, condoms, hotels, and rental cars.\"); United States \nv. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Paris, \nNo. 03:06-CR-64 (CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *8 & n.10 (D. \nConn. Oct. 24, 2007) (use of cell phones, use of hotel rooms and \ndistribution of condoms all affected interstate commerce in sex \ntrafficking venture). \n36 \nEFTA00074539\n", "char_count": 548}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Counts Two, Four, and Six: Aiding and Abetting \nIn connection with the substantive crimes charged in Counts Two, Four, and Six, the \ndefendant is also charged with aiding and abetting the commission of those crimes. Aiding and \nabetting liability is its own theory of criminal liability. In effect, it is a theory of liability that \npermits a defendant to be convicted of a specified crime if the defendant, while not herself \ncommitting the crime, assisted another person or persons in committing the crime. As to Counts \nTwo, Four, and Six, therefore, the defendant can be convicted either if she committed the crime \nherself, or if another person committed the crime and the defendant aided and abetted that person \nto commit that crime. \nUnder the federal aiding and abetting statute, whoever \"aids, abets, counsels, commands, \ninduces, or procures\" the commission of an offense is punishable as a principal. You should give \nthose worse their ordinary meaning. \nIn other words, it is not necessary for the Government to show that the defendant herself \nphysically committed the crime charged in order for you to find her guilty. This is because a \nperson who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures the commission of a crime is \njust as guilty of that offense as if she committed it herself. Accordingly, you may find the \ndefendant guilty of the offenses charged in Counts Two, Four, and Six if you find beyond a \nreasonable doubt that the Government has proven that another person actually committed the \noffense with which the defendant is charged, and that the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, \ncommanded, induced or procured that person to commit the crime. \nAs you can see, the first requirement is that another person has committed the crime \ncharged. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal acts of another \nif no crime was committed by the other person. But if you do find that a crime was committed, \nthen you must consider whether the \n... [truncated, 2074 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/40 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=40]", "char_count": 2074}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "To aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the Government prove that \nthe defendant willfully and knowingly associated herself in some way with the crime committed \nby the other person and willfully and knowingly sought by some act to help the crime succeed. \nHowever, let me caution you that the mere presence of the defendant where a crime is \nbeing committed, even when coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being \ncommitted, or the mere acquiescence by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with \nguilty knowledge, is not sufficient to make the defendant guilty under this approach of aiding \nand abetting. Such a defendant would be guilty under this approach of aiding and abetting only \nif, in addition to knowing of the criminal activity, she actually took actions intended to help it \nsucceed. \nAn aider and abettor must know that the crime is being committed and act in a way that is \nintended to bring about the success of the criminal venture. \nTo determine whether a defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime with \nwhich she is charged, ask yourself these questions: \n1. \nDid the defendant participate in the crime charged as something she wished to \nbring about? \n2. \nDid the defendant knowingly and willfully associate herself with the criminal \nventure? \n3. \nDid the defendant seek by her actions to make the criminal venture succeed? \nIf she did, then the defendant is an aider and abettor, and therefore guilty of the offense. \nIf, on the other hand, your answer to any of these questions is \"no,\" then the defendant is not an \naider and abettor, and you must find her not guilty under that theory. \nAdapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n11-2; 18 U.S.C. § 2; the charge given by the Hon. Alison J. Nathan \n38 \nEFTA00074541\n", "char_count": 1835}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "in United States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AIN) and in United States v. \nPizarro, 17 Cr. 151 (AIN); and the charge given by the Hon. \nKimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). \n39 \nEFTA00074542\n", "char_count": 209}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Counts One and Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Laws— The Statute \nThe relevant statute for Counts One, Three, and Five is Title 18, United States Code, \nSection 371, which provides that \"if two or more people conspire [J to commit any offense \nagainst the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of \nthe conspiracy,\" each person is guilty of a federal crime. \n40 \nEFTA00074543\n", "char_count": 435}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Counts One and Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Laws— Conspiracy and \nSubstantive Counts \nCounts One, Three, and Five of the Indictment each charge the defendant with \nparticipating in a \"conspiracy.\" As I will explain, a conspiracy is a kind of criminal \npartnership—an agreement of two or more people to join together to accomplish some unlawful \npurpose. The crime of conspiracy to violate federal law is an independent offense from the \nactual violation of any specific federal law. Indeed, you may find the defendant guilty of \nconspiring to violate federal law even if you find that the crime which was the object of the \nconspiracy was never actually committed. \nAs I will explain, each of the three different conspiracy counts here alleges a different \npurpose: the purpose of the conspiracy charged in Count One is to commit the enticement of \nminors offense I described for Count Two; the purpose of the conspiracy charged in Count \nThree is to commit the transportation of minors offense I described for Count Four; and the \npurpose of the conspiracy charged in Count Five is to commit the sex trafficking offense I \ndescribed for Count Six. \nThe crime of conspiracy — or agreement — to violate a federal law is an independent \noffense. It is separate and distinct from the actual violation of any specific federal laws, which \nthe law refers to as \"substantive crimes.\" You may find a defendant guilty of the crime of \nconspiracy—in other words, agreeing to violate federal law—even if you find that the \nsubstantive crime which was the object of the conspiracy was never actually committed. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n19-2; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nLebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. \nWood in United States v. Abnonte, 16 Cr. 670 (ICMW); and the \ncharge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 \nCr. 081 (DLC). See also United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d \n... [truncated, 2155 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/44 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=44]", "char_count": 2155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "objective, the offense of conspiracy may be established even if the \ncollaborators do not reach their goal.\"). \n42 \nEFTA00074545\n", "char_count": 129}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Counts One, Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — The Elements \nTo prove the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the Government must \nprove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements: \nFirst, that two or more persons entered the unlawful agreement charged in the Indictment; \nSecond, that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy; \nand \nThird, that one of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one overt \nact in furtherance of the conspiracy. \nNow let us separately consider each of these elements. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n19-3; the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. \nAlmonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. \nCote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). \n43 \nEFTA00074546\n", "char_count": 855}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Counts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — First Element \nStarting with the first element, what is a conspiracy? A conspiracy is an agreement or an \nunderstanding, between two or more persons, to accomplish by joint action a criminal or \nunlawful purpose. \nThe essence of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement between two or more \npeople to violate the law. As I mentioned earlier, the ultimate success of the conspiracy, meaning \nthe actual commission of the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, is not an element of the \ncrime of conspiracy. \nIn order to show that a conspiracy existed, the evidence must show that two or more \npeople, in some way or manner, through any contrivance, explicitly or implicitly (that is, spoken \nor unspoken), came to a mutual understanding to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful \nplan. Express language or specific words are not required to indicate assent or attachment to a \nconspiracy. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more persons came to an \nunderstanding, express or implied, to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan, then \nthe Government will have sustained its burden of proof as to this element. \nTo satisfy this element of a conspiracy—namely, to show that the conspiracy existed—\nthe Government is not required to show that two or more people sat around a table and entered \ninto a solemn pact, orally or in writing, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the \nlaw and spelling out all of the details. Common sense tells you that when people, in fact, agree to \nenter into a criminal conspiracy, much is left to the unexpressed understanding. It is rare that a \nconspiracy can be proven by direct evidence of an explicit agreement. Conspirators do not \nusually reduce their agreements to writing or acknowledge them before a notary public, nor do \nthey publicly broadcast their plans. \nIn determining whether such an agreement existed, you may consider direct \n... [truncated, 2029 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/47 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=47]", "char_count": 2029}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "circumstantial evidence. The old adage, \"Actions speak louder than words,\" applies here. Often, \nthe only evidence that is available with respect to the existence of a conspiracy is that of \ndisconnected acts and conduct on the part of the alleged individual co-conspirators. When taken \naltogether and considered as whole, however, these acts and conduct may warrant the inference \nthat a conspiracy existed as conclusively as would direct proof, such as evidence of an express \nagreement. On this question, you should refer back to my earlier instructions on direct and \ncircumstantial evidence and inferences. \nSo, in considering the first element of the crime of conspiracy as charged in Counts One, \nThree, and Five—whether the conspiracy actually existed—you should consider all the evidence \nthat has been admitted with respect to the acts, conduct, and statements of each alleged \ncoconspirator, and any inferences that may be reasonably drawn from them. It is sufficient to \nestablish the existence of the conspiracy, as I've already said, if, from the proof of all the \nrelevant facts and circumstances, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of at least \ntwo alleged co-conspirators met in an understanding to accomplish, by the means alleged, the \nobject of the conspiracy. \nIn short, as far as the first element of the conspiracy is concerned, the Government must \nprove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least two alleged conspirators came to a mutual \nunderstanding, either spoken or unspoken, to violate the law in the manner charged in Counts \nOne, Three, and Five of the Indictment. \nLiability for Acts and Declarations of Co-Conspirators \nYou will recall that I have admitted into evidence against the defendant the acts and \nstatements of others because these acts and statements were committed or made by persons who, \nthe Government charges, were also confederates or co-conspirators of the defendant. \n45 \nEFTA00074548\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "The reason for allowing this evidence to be received against the defendant has to do in \npart with the nature of the crime of conspiracy. A conspiracy is often referred to as a partnership \nin crime: as in other types of partnerships, when people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an \nunlawful end, each and every member becomes an agent for the other conspirators in carrying \nout the conspiracy. \nTherefore, the reasonably foreseeable acts, statements, and omissions of any member of \nthe conspiracy, committed in furtherance of the common purpose of the conspiracy, are deemed \nunder the law to be the acts of all of the members, and all of the members are responsible for \nsuch acts, statements, or omissions. \nIf you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy \ncharged in the Indictment, then any acts done or statements made in furtherance of the \nconspiracy by a person also found by you to have been a member of the same conspiracy may be \nconsidered against that defendant. This is so even if such acts were committed or such \nstatements were made in that defendant's absence, and without the defendant's knowledge. \nHowever, before you may consider the acts or statements of a co-conspirator in deciding \nthe guilt of the defendant, you must first determine that the acts were committed or statements \nwere made during the existence, and in furtherance, of the unlawful scheme. If the acts were \ndone or the statements were made by someone whom you do not find to have been a member of \nthe conspiracy, or if they were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, they may not be considered \nby you in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, \nInstrs. 19-4, 19-9; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in \nUnited States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN) and in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 533 (MN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood \nin United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 \n... [truncated, 2108 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/49 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=49]", "char_count": 2108}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "(DLC). See also United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. \n1992) (\"In order to prove conspiracy, the government need not \npresent evidence of an explicit agreement; proof of a tacit \nunderstanding will suffice. The coconspirators need not have \nagreed on the details of the conspiracy, so long as they have agreed \non the essential nature of the plan, and their goals need not be \ncongruent, so long as they are not at cross-purposes.\" (citations \nomitted)). \n47 \nEFTA00074550\n", "char_count": 486}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Counts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — First Element: Object \nof the Conspiracy \nCount One charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, from at least in or \nabout 1994, up to and including in or about 2004, to entice minors to travel to engage in sexual \nactivity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. The object of the \nconspiracy charged in Count One of the Indictment is to entice minors to travel to engage in \nsexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. I have already \nreviewed the elements of that offense in connection with Count Two. If you find beyond a \nreasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person that those elements \nbe done, then the enticement of minors to travel to engage in sexual activity for which any \nperson can be charged with a criminal offense objective would be proved. \nCount Three charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, from at least in \nor about 1994, up to and including in or about 2004, to transport minors with the intent to \nengage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. The \nobject of the conspiracy charged in Count Three of the Indictment is to transport minors with \nthe intent to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal \noffense. I have already reviewed the elements of that offense in connection with Count Four. \nIf you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person \nthat those elements be done, then the transportation of minors with the intent to engage in \nsexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense objective would be \nproved. \nCount Five charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, from at least in or \nabout 2001, up to and including in or about 2004, to commit sex trafficking of a minor. The \nobject of the conspiracy charged in Count Five\n... [truncated, 2066 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/51 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=51]", "char_count": 2066}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "of a minor. I have already reviewed the elements of that offense in connection with Count Six. \nIf you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person \nthat those elements be done, then the sex trafficking of minors objective would be proved. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United \nStates v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). \n49 \nEFTA00074552\n", "char_count": 400}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Counts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — Second Element: \nMembership in the Conspiracy \nWith respect to each of Counts One, Three and Five, if you conclude that the \nGovernment has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant conspiracy existed, and that \nthe conspiracy had the object I just mentioned, then you must next consider the second element: \nnamely, whether the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the conspiracy with \nknowledge of its unlawful purpose and in furtherance of its unlawful objectives. \nIn order to satisfy the second element of Counts One, Three, or Five, the Government \nmust prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully entered into \nthe conspiracy with a criminal intent—that is, with a purpose to violate the law—and that she \nagreed to take part in the conspiracy to further promote and cooperate in its unlawful objective. \n\"Willfully\" and \"Knowingly\" \nAn act is done \"knowingly\" and \"willfully\" if it is done deliberately and purposely—that \nis, the defendant's actions must have been her conscious objective rather than a product of a \nmistake or accident, mere negligence, or some other innocent reason. \nTo satisfy its burden of proof that the defendant willfully and knowingly became a \nmember of a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful purpose, the Government must prove beyond \na reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that she was a member of an operation or conspiracy \nto accomplish that unlawful purpose, and that her action of joining such an operation or \nconspiracy was not due to carelessness, negligence, or mistake. \nNow, as I have said, knowledge is a matter of inference from the proven facts. Science \nhas not yet devised a manner of looking into a person's mind and knowing what that person is \nthinking. However, you do have before you the evidence of certain acts and conversations \nalleged to have taken place involving the defendant or in her presence. You may conside\n... [truncated, 2025 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/53 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=53]", "char_count": 2025}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "evidence in determining whether the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the \ndefendant's knowledge of the unlawful purposes of the conspiracy. \nIt is not necessary for the Government to show that a defendant was fully informed as to \nall the details of the conspiracy in order for you to infer knowledge on her part. To have guilty \nknowledge, a defendant need not have known the full extent of the conspiracy or all of the \nactivities of all of its participants. It is not even necessary for a defendant to know every other \nmember of the conspiracy. \nIn addition, the duration and extent of the defendant's participation has no bearing on the \nissue of her guilt. She need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset. The defendant may \nhave joined it for any purpose at any time in its progress, and she will be held responsible for all \nthat was done before she joined and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while she \nwas a member. Each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may \nperform them at different times. Indeed, a single act may be enough to bring one within the \nmembership of the conspiracy, provided that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy and \nknowingly associated herself with its criminal aims. It does not matter whether the defendant's \nrole in the conspiracy may have been more limited than or different in nature or in length of time \nfrom the roles of her co-conspirators, provided she was herself a participant. \nI want to caution you, however, that the defendant's mere presence at the scene of the \nalleged crime does not, by itself, make her a member of the conspiracy. Similarly, a person may \nknow, assemble with, or be friendly with, one or more members of a conspiracy, without being a \nconspirator herself. I also want to caution you that mere knowledge or acquiescence, without \nparticipation, in the unlawful plan is not sufficient. In other words, knowledge without agreement \nand participation is \n... [truncated, 2091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/54 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=54]", "char_count": 2091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purposes, and with an intent to aid in the \naccomplishment of its unlawful objectives. \nIt is also not necessary that the defendant receive or even anticipate any financial benefit \nfrom participating in the conspiracy as long as she participated in it in the way I have explained. \nThat said, while proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a scheme is not essential, if you \nfind that the defendant had such an interest, that is a factor which you may properly consider in \ndetermining whether or not she was a member of a conspiracy charged in the Indictment. \nOnce a conspiracy is formed, it is presumed to continue until either its objective is \naccomplished or there is some affirmative act of termination by the members. So too, once a \nperson is found to be a member of a conspiracy, she is presumed to continue as a member in the \nconspiracy until the conspiracy is terminated, unless it is shown by some affirmative proof that \nthe person withdrew and disassociated herself from it. \nIn sum, the defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful nature of the conspiracy, may \nhave intentionally engaged, advised, or assisted in the conspiracy for the purpose of furthering an \nillegal undertaking. The defendant thereby becomes a knowing and willing participant in the \nunlawful agreement—that is to say, she becomes a conspirator. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n19-6; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. \n769 (AN); and the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United \nStates v. Almonte, 16 G. 670 (ICMW). \n52 \nEFTA00074555\n", "char_count": 1709}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Counts One, Three, and Five Two: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — Third Element \nThe third element to establish the offense of conspiracy, is that at least one overt act was \nknowingly committed by at least one of the conspirators—not necessarily the defendant—in \nfurtherance of the conspiracy. \nThe overt act element requires the Government to show something more than mere \nagreement; some overt step or action must have been taken by at least one of the conspirators in \nfurtherance of that conspiracy. In other words, the Government must show that the agreement \nwent beyond the mere talking stage. It must show that at least one of the conspirators actually \ndid something in furtherance of the conspiracy. \nWith respect to the overt acts for Count One, the Indictment reads as follows: [The Court \nis respectfully requested to read the overt acts listed under Count One of the Indictment]. \nWith respect to the overt acts for Count Three, the Indictment reads as follows: [The \nCourt is respectfully requested to read the overt acts listed under Count Three of the Indictment'. \nWith respect to the overt acts for Count Five, the Indictment reads as follows: [The Court \nis respectfully requested to read the overt acts listed under Count Five of the Indictment]. \nIn order for the Government to satisfy this element, it is not necessary for the \nGovernment to prove that any of the specific overt acts alleged was committed. Nor does the \nGovernment have to prove that the defendant committed the overt act. It is sufficient for the \nGovernment to show that any of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed some \novert act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Further, the overt act need not be one that is alleged in \nthe Indictment. Rather, it can be any overt act that is substantially similar to those acts alleged in \nthe Indictment, if you are convinced that the act occurred while the conspiracy was still in \nexistence and that it was done in furtherance of the conspiracy as \n... [truncated, 2145 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/56 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=56]", "char_count": 2145}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "is sufficient as long as all of you find that at least one overt act was committed by one of the \nconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. \nYou should bear in mind that the overt act, standing alone, may be an innocent, lawful \nact. However, an apparently innocent act sheds its harmless character if it is a step in carrying \nout, promoting, aiding, or assisting the conspiratorial scheme. You are therefore instructed that \nthe overt act does not have to be an act which in and of itself is criminal or constitutes an \nobjective of the conspiracy. \nYou are further instructed that the overt act need not have been committed at precisely \nthe time alleged in the Indictment. It is sufficient if you are convinced beyond a reasonable \ndoubt, that it occurred at or about the time and place stated. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, \nInstrs. 19-7, 19-8; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in \nUnited States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN); the charge of the Hon. \nKimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); \nand the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. \nPurcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). \n54 \nEFTA00074557\n", "char_count": 1168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Statute of Limitations \nThere is a limit on how much time the Government has to obtain an indictment. Counts \nTwo, Four, Five, and Six are timely—that is, they are not barred by any statute of limitations. \nAs to Counts One and Three, in order to prove that this prosecution is timely, the Government \nhas to prove that least one of the overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy involved a victim \nother than Minor Victim-3. Put simply: you may not convict the defendant on Counts One or \nThree solely on the basis of Minor Victim-3 or an overt act involving Minor Victim-3. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jay Instructions, Instr. \n19-7. \n55 \nEFTA00074558\n", "char_count": 671}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "OTHER INSTRUCTIONS \nDirect and Circumstantial Evidence \nThere are two types of evidence that you may use in reaching your verdict. One type of \nevidence is direct evidence. One kind of direct evidence is a witness's testimony about \nsomething that the witness knows by virtue of his or her own senses-something that the witness \nhas seen, smelled, touched, or heard. Direct evidence may also be in the form of an exhibit. \nThe other type of evidence is circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is \nevidence that tends to prove one fact by proof of other facts. There is a simple example of \ncircumstantial evidence that is often used in this courthouse. \nAssume that when you came into the courthouse this morning the sun was shining and it \nwas a nice day. Assume that there are blinds on the courtroom windows that are drawn and that \nyou cannot look outside. As you are sitting here, someone walks in with an umbrella that is \ndripping wet. Someone else then walks in with a raincoat that is also dripping wet. \nNow, you cannot look outside the courtroom and you cannot see whether or not it is \nraining. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of the facts that I \nhave asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that between \nthe time you arrived at the courthouse and the time these people walked in, it had started to rain. \nThat is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer based on reason, experience, and \ncommon sense from an established fact the existence or the nonexistence of some other fact. \nMany facts, such as a person's state of mind, can only rarely be proved by direct \nevidence. Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence. It is a general rule \nthat the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires \nthat, before convicting each defendant, you, the jury, must be satisfied of each defendant's guilt \nbeyond a reasonable doubt from al\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/59 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=59]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(AJN). \n57 \nEFTA00074560\n", "char_count": 168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Inferences \nDuring the trial, and as I give you these instructions, you have heard and will hear the \nterm \"inference.\" For instance, in their closing arguments, the attorneys have asked you to infer, \nbased on your reason, experience, and common sense, from one or more established facts, the \nexistence of some other fact. I have instructed you on circumstantial evidence and that it \ninvolves inferring a fact based on other facts, your reason, and common sense. \nWhat is an \"inference\"? What does it mean to \"infer\" something? An inference is not a \nsuspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists \nbased on another fact that you are satisfied exists. \nThere are times when different inferences may be drawn from facts, whether proven by \ndirect or circumstantial evidence. The Government asks you to draw one set of inferences, while \nthe defense asks you to draw another. It is for you, and you alone, to decide what inferences you \nwill draw. \nThe process of drawing inferences from facts in evidence is not a matter of guesswork or \nspeculation. An inference is a deduction or conclusion that you, the jury, are permitted but not \nrequired to draw from the facts that have been established by either direct or circumstantial \nevidence. In drawing inferences, you should exercise your common sense. \nTherefore, while you are considering the evidence presented to you, you may draw, from \nthe facts that you find to be proven, such reasonable inferences as would be justified in light of \nyour experience. \nSome inferences, however, are impermissible. You may not infer that the defendant is \nguilty of participating in criminal conduct if you find merely that she was present at the time the \ncrime was being committed and had knowledge that it was being committed. Nor may you use \n58 \nEFTA00074561\n", "char_count": 1856}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "evidence that I have instructed you was admitted for a limited purpose for any inference beyond \nthat limited purpose. \nIn addition, you may not infer that the defendant is guilty of participating in criminal \nconduct merely from the fact that he associated with other people who were guilty of \nwrongdoing or merely because he has or had knowledge of the wrongdoing of others. \nHere again, let me remind you that, whether based upon direct or circumstantial evidence, \nor upon the logical, reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence, you must be satisfied of \nthe guilt of the defendant as to each count charged before you may convict her as to that count. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(MN). \n59 \nEFTA00074562\n", "char_count": 830}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Credibility of Witnesses \nYou have had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. It is your job to decide how \nbelievable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judges of the credibility of \nthe witnesses. How do you evaluate the credibility or believability of the witnesses? The answer \nis that you use your common sense, judgment, and experience. Common sense is your greatest \nasset as a juror. You should ask yourselves, did the witness impress you as honest, open, and \ncandid? Or did the witness appear evasive, as though the witness was trying to hide something? \nHow responsive was the witness to the questions asked on direct examination and on cross-\nexamination? Consider the witness's demeanor, manner of testifying, and accuracy of the \nwitness's recollection. In addition, consider how well the witness recounted what was heard or \nobserved, as the witness may be honest but mistaken. \nIf you find that a witness is intentionally telling a falsehood that is always a matter of \nimportance that you should weigh carefully. If you find that any witness has lied under oath at \nthis trial, you should view the testimony of such a witness cautiously and weigh it with great \ncare. You may reject the entirety of the witness testimony, part of it or none of it. It is for you to \ndecide how much of any witness's testimony, if any, you wish to credit. A witness may be \ninaccurate, contradictory, or even untruthful in some respects and yet entirely believable and \ntruthful in other respects. It is for you to determine whether such untruths or inconsistencies are \nsignificant or inconsequential, and whether to accept or reject all or to accept some and reject the \nbalance of the testimony of any witness. \nOn some occasions during this trial, witnesses were asked to explain an apparent \ninconsistency between testimony offered at this trial and previous statements made by the \nwitness. It is for you to determine whether a prior statement was inconsistent, and if\n... [truncated, 2128 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/63 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=63]", "char_count": 2128}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "trial. You can credit the prior inconsistent statement or credit the witness' statement at trial. \nYou make the determination based on your assessment of the witness. \nIn evaluating credibility of the witnesses, you should take into account any evidence that \nthe witness who testified may benefit in some way from the outcome of this case. If you find \nthat any witness whose testimony you are considering may have an interest in the outcome of \nthis trial, then you should bear that factor in mind when evaluating the credibility of his or her \ntestimony and accept it with great care. This is not to suggest that any witness who has an \ninterest in the outcome of a case would testify falsely. It is for you to decide to what extent, if at \nall, the witness's interest has affected or colored his or her testimony. \nYou are not required to accept testimony even though the testimony is not contradicted \nand the witness's testimony is not challenged. You may decide because of the witness's bearing \nor demeanor, or because of the inherent improbability of the testimony, or for other reasons \nsufficient to yourselves that the testimony is not worthy of belief. On the other hand, you may \nfind, because of a witness's bearing and demeanor and based upon your consideration of all the \nother evidence in the case, that the witness is truthful. \nThus, there is no magic formula by which you can evaluate testimony. You bring to this \ncourtroom all your experience and common sense. You determine for yourselves in many \ncircumstances the reliability of statements that are made by others to you and upon which you \nare asked to rely and act. You may use the same tests here that you use in your everyday lives. \nYou may consider the interest of any witness in the outcome of this case and any bias or \nprejudice of any such witness, and this is true regardless of who called or questioned the witness. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (A\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/64 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=64]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Credibility of Witnesses — Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement \n[If applicable] \nYou have heard evidence that a witness made a statement on an earlier occasion which \ncounsel argues is inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony. Evidence of a prior inconsistent \nstatement is not to be considered by you as affirmative evidence bearing on either defendant's \nguilt. Evidence of the prior inconsistent statement was placed before you for the more limited \npurpose of helping you decide whether to believe the trial testimony of the witness who \ncontradicted him or herself. If you find that the witness made an earlier statement that conflicts \nwith his or her trial testimony, you may consider that fact in deciding how much of the trial \ntestimony, if any, to believe. \nIn making this determination, you may consider whether the witness purposely made a \nfalse statement or whether it was an innocent mistake; whether the inconsistency concerns an \nimportant fact or whether it had to do with a small detail; whether the witness had an explanation \nfor the inconsistency; and whether that explanation appealed to your common sense. \nIt is exclusively your duty, based on all of the evidence and your own good judgment, to \ndetermine whether the prior statement was inconsistent, and if so how much, if any, weight to be \ngiven to the inconsistent statement in determining whether to believe all or part of the witness's \ntestimony. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Lebedev, IS Cr. 769 (MN). \n62 \nEFTA00074565\n", "char_count": 1565}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Conscious Avoidance \n[If applicable] \nAs I have explained, each of the counts charged in the Indictment requires the \nGovernment to prove that the defendant acted knowingly, as I have already defined that term. \nIf a person is actually aware of a fact, then she knows that fact. But, in determining \nwhether the defendant acted knowingly, you may also consider whether the defendant \ndeliberately closed her eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious. \nTo be clear, the necessary knowledge on the part of the defendant with respect to any \nparticular charge cannot be established by showing that that defendant was careless, negligent, or \nfoolish. However, one may not willfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact material and \nimportant to her conduct in order to escape the consequences of criminal law. The law calls this \n\"conscious avoidance\" or \"willful blindness.\" \nThus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was \na high probability a crime was being committed, but that the defendant deliberately and \nconsciously avoided confirming this fact, such as by purposely closing her eyes to it or \nintentionally failing to investigate it, then you may treat this deliberate avoidance of positive \nknowledge as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed \nthat she was not engaged in such unlawful behavior. In other words, a defendant cannot avoid \ncriminal responsibility for her own conduct by \"deliberately closing her eyes,\" or remaining \npurposefully ignorant of facts which would confirm to her that she was engaged in unlawful \nconduct. \nWith respect to the conspiracy counts, you must also keep in mind that there is an \nimportant difference between knowingly and intentionally participating in a conspiracy—which I \njust explained to you—and knowing the specific objective of the conspiracy on the other. You \n63 \nEFTA00074566\n", "char_count": 1931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "may consider conscious avoidance in deciding whether the defendant knew the objective of a \nconspiracy, that is, whether she reasonably believed that there was a high probability that a goal \nof the conspiracy was to commit the crime charged as objects of the conspiracy and took \ndeliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming that fact but participated in the conspiracy \nanyway. But conscious avoidance cannot be used as a substitute for finding that the defendant \nknowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy in the first place. It is logically impossible for \na defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if she does not actually know it exists. \nHowever, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly chose to \nparticipate in such a joint undertaking, you may consider whether the defendant took deliberate \nand conscious action to avoid confirming otherwise obvious facts about the purpose of that \nundertaking. \nIn sum, if you find that a defendant believed there was a high probability that a fact was \nso and that the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid learning the truth of that \nfact, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly with respect to that fact. However, if you \nfind that the defendant actually believed the fact was not so, then you may not find that she acted \nknowingly with respect to that fact. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN); the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel \nin United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC); and Sand et al., \nModern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 3A-2. See United States v. \nLange, 834 F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (\"Conscious avoidance may \nnot be used to support a finding as to . . .intent to participate in a \nconspiracy, but it may be used to support a finding with respect to . \n. . knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful goals.\" (internal \nquotation marks omitted)). \n64 \nEFTA00074567\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Venue \n[If requested by defense] \nWith respect to each of the counts in the indictment, you must also consider the issue of \nvenue, namely, whether any act in furtherance of the unlawful activity occurred within the \nSouthern District of New York. The Southern District of New York encompasses the following \ncounties: New York County (i.e., Manhattan), Bronx, Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, \nOrange and Sullivan Counties. Anything that occurs in any of those places occurs in the \nSouthern District of New York. \nVenue must be examined separately for each count in the Indictment. Venue on one \ncount does not establish venue on another count, though if applicable, you may rely on the same \nevidence to establish venue on multiple counts. \nAs to the conspiracy charges, the Government need not prove that any crime was \ncompleted in this District or that the defendant or any of her co-conspirators were physically \npresent here. Rather, venue is proper in this District if the defendant or any of her co-conspirators \ncaused any act or event to occur in this District in furtherance of the offense, and it was \nreasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the act would take place in the Southern District of \nNew York. \nAs to the substantive counts — that is, the non-conspiracy counts — the Government again \nneed not prove that any crime was completed in this District or that the defendant was physically \npresent here. Rather, venue is proper in this District provided that any act in furtherance of the \nessential conduct of the crime took place in the Southern District of New York. Again, the \ndefendant need not have specifically intended to cause an act or event to happen in this District, \nor even known that he was causing an act or event to happen here, as long as it was reasonably \nforeseeable to the defendant that such act would occur in this District and it in fact occurred. \n65 \nEFTA00074568\n", "char_count": 1926}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "On the issue of venue—and this alone—the Government need not prove venue beyond a \nreasonable doubt, but only by a mere preponderance of the evidence. A \"preponderance of the \nevidence\" means more likely than not. Thus, the Government, which does bear the burden of \nproving venue, has satisfied that burden as to venue if you conclude that it is more likely than not \nthat some act or communication in furtherance of each charged offense occurred in the Southern \nDistrict of New York, and it was reasonably foreseeable to each Defendant that the act would so \noccur. If, on the other hand, you find that the Government has failed to prove the venue \nrequirement as to a particular offense, then you must acquit the Defendant of that offense, even if \nall the other elements of the offense are proven. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jwy Instructions, Instr. \n3-11; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nLebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote \nin United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and the charge of the \nHon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 \n(PKC). See also United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279 (2d Cir. \n2021) (\"The government bears the burden of proving appropriate \nvenue on each count, as to each defendant, by a preponderance of \nthe evidence.\"). \n66 \nEFTA00074569\n", "char_count": 1376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Time of Offense \nThe Indictment alleges that certain conduct occurred on or about various dates or during \nvarious time periods. It is not necessary, however, for the Government to prove that any \nconduct alleged occurred exactly on such dates or throughout any such time periods. As long as \nthe conduct occurred around any dates or within any time periods the Indictment alleges it \noccurred, that is sufficient. \nThis is also a good opportunity to instruct you that it does not matter if a specific event \nor transaction is alleged to have occurred on or about a certain date, and the evidence indicates \nthat in fact it occurred on another date. The law only requires a substantial similarity between \nthe dates alleged in the Indictment and the dates established by the testimony and other \nevidence. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba \nM. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the \ncharge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William \nWalters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC). \n67 \nEFTA00074570\n", "char_count": 1111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Law Enforcement and Government Employee Witnesses \nYou have heard testimony from law enforcement officials and employees of the \nGovernment. The fact that a witness may be employed by the Federal Government as a law \nenforcement official or employee does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily \ndeserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary \nwitness. \nIn this context, defense counsel is allowed to try to attack the credibility of such a \nwitness on the ground that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional \ninterest in the outcome of the case. \nIt is your decision, after reviewing all the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of \nthe law enforcement or Government employee witness and to give to that testimony the \nweight you find it deserves. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n7-16; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(MN). \n68 \nEFTA00074571\n", "char_count": 1069}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Formal In formal Immunity of Government Witnesses \n[If applicable] \nYou have heard the testimony of [witnesses] who have testified under a grant of \nimmunity from this Court. What this means is that the testimony of the witness may not be used \nagainst him or her in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false \nstatement, or otherwise failing to comply with the immunity order of this court. \nSuch testimony should be scrutinized by you with great care and you should act upon it \nwith caution. You should examine it closely to determine whether or not it is colored in such a \nway as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witnesses' own interests. If you \nbelieve the testimony to be true and determine to accept it, you may give it such weight, if any, \nas you believe it deserves. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n7-8; and the charge of the Hon. Loran G. Schofield in United \nStates v. Calk, 19 Cr. 366 (LGS). \n69 \nEFTA00074572\n", "char_count": 1013}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Expert Testimony \n[If applicable] \nYou have heard testimony from a witness/certain witnesses who was/were proffered as \n(an) expert(s) in different areas. An expert is allowed to express his or her opinion on those \nmatters about which he or she has special knowledge and training. Expert testimony is presented \nto you on the theory that someone who is experienced in the field can assist you in understanding \nthe evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts. \nIn weighing an expert's testimony, you may consider the expert's qualifications, \nopinions, reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply \nwhen you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness's testimony. You may give the expert \ntestimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all the evidence in this case. \nYou should not, however, accept a witness's testimony merely because he or she is an \nexpert. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The \ndetermination of the facts in this case rests solely with you. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n7-21; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 (AJN). \n70 \nEFTA00074573\n", "char_count": 1283}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Limiting Instruction — Similar Act Evidence \n[If Applicable] \nThe Government has offered evidence tending to show that on different occasions, the \ndefendant engaged in conduct similar to the charges in the Indictment. \nLet me remind you that the defendant is on trial only for committing acts alleged in the \nIndictment. Accordingly, you may not consider this evidence of similar acts as a substitute for \nproof that the defendant committed the crimes charged. Nor may you consider this evidence as \nproof that a defendant has a criminal personality or bad character. The evidence of the other, \nsimilar acts was admitted for a much more limited purpose and you may consider it only for that \nlimited purpose. \nIf you determine that the defendant committed the acts charged in the Indictment and the \nsimilar acts as well, then you may, but you need not draw an inference that in doing the acts \ncharged in the Indictment, that defendant acted knowingly and intentionally and not because of \nsome mistake, accident, or other innocent reasons. You may also consider this evidence in \ndetermining whether the defendant utilized a common scheme or plan in committing both the \ncrimes charged in the Indictment and the similar acts introduced by the Government. \nEvidence of similar acts may not be considered by you for any other purpose. \nSpecifically, you may not consider it as evidence that the defendant is of bad character or has the \npropensity to commit crimes. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jwy Instructions, Instr. \n5-25; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN). \n71 \nEFTA00074574\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Defendant's Testimony \n[Requested only i f the defendant testifies] \n[The Government respectfully requests that the Court include the following instruction \nin its general instruction on witness credibility, rather than as a separate instruction:] \nThe defendant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. You should \nexamine and evaluate this testimony just as you would the testimony of any witness. \nSee United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 249 & n.8 (2d Cir. \n2006). \n72 \nEFTA00074575\n", "char_count": 505}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Defendant's Right Not to Testify \n[If requested by defense] \nThe defendant did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, a defendant has no \nobligation to testify or to present any evidence, because it is the Government's burden to prove \na defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden remains with the Government \nthroughout the entire trial and never shifts to a defendant. A defendant is never required to \nprove that she is innocent. \nYou may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendant did not testify. \nNo adverse inference against the defendant may be drawn by you because the \ndefendant did not take the witness stand. You may not consider this against the defendant in \nany way in your deliberations in the jury room. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jug Instructions, Instr. \n5-21; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(MN). \n73 \nEFTA00074576\n", "char_count": 993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Uncalled Witnesses — Equally Available to Both Sides \nThere are people whose names you heard during the course of the trial but did not appear \nto testify. [If applicable: One or more of the attorneys has referred to their absence from the \ntrial.] I instruct you that each party had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any of \nthese witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions as to \nwhat they would have testified to had they been called. Their absence should not affect your \njudgment in any way. \nYou should remember my instruction, however, that the law does not impose on the \ndefendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any \nevidence. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jwy Instructions, Instr. \n6-7; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Le, 15 Cr. 38 (AJN). \n74 \nEFTA00074577\n", "char_count": 964}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Particular Investigative Techniques Not Required \n[If applicable] \nYou have heard reference, in the arguments of defense counsel in this case, to the fact \nthat certain investigative techniques were used or not used by the Government. There is no legal \nrequirement, however, that the Government prove its case through any particular means. While \nyou are to carefully consider the evidence adduced by the Government, you are not to speculate \nas to why they used the techniques they did or why they did not use other techniques. The \nGovernment is not on trial. Law enforcement techniques are not your concern. \nYour concern is to determine whether or not, on the evidence or lack of evidence, the \ndefendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 \nCr. 151 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United \nStates v. illmonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); the charge of the Hon. \nDenise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and \nthe charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William \nWalters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC). \n75 \nEFTA00074578\n", "char_count": 1202}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Use of Evidence from Searches \nYou have heard testimony about evidence seized in connection with certain searches \nconducted by law enforcement officers. Evidence obtained from these searches was properly \nadmitted in this case, and may be properly considered by you. Such searches were appropriate \nlaw enforcement actions. Whether you approve or disapprove of how the evidence was obtained \nshould not enter into your deliberations, because I instruct you that the Government's use of the \nevidence is entirely lawful. You must, therefore, regardless of your personal opinions, give this \nevidence full consideration along with all the other evidence in the case in determining whether \nthe Government has proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As with all \nevidence, it is for you to determine what weight, if any, to give such evidence. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN). \n76 \nEFTA00074579\n", "char_count": 977}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "Use of Electronic Communications \nSome of the evidence in this case has consisted of electronic communications seized from \ncomputers or electronic accounts. There is nothing illegal about the Government's use of such \nelectronic communications in this case and you may consider them along with all the other \nevidence in the case. Whether you approve or disapprove of the seizure of these communications \nmay not enter your deliberations. \nYou may, therefore, regardless of any personal opinions, consider this evidence along \nwith all the other evidence in the case in determining whether the Government has proven the \ndefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as with the other evidence, it is for you to \ndetermine what weight, if any, to give such evidence. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN). \n77 \nEFTA00074580\n", "char_count": 895}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "Persons Not on Trial \nYou may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, towards the Government or \nthe defendant on trial from the fact that any person in addition to the defendant is not on trial \nhere. You also may not speculate as to the reasons why other persons are not on trial. Those \nmatters are wholly outside your concern and have no bearing on your function as jurors. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. \nAlmonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote \nin United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and the charge of the \nHon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 \n(PKC). \n78 \nEFTA00074581\n", "char_count": 827}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Preparation of Witnesses \nYou have heard evidence during the trial that witnesses have discussed the facts of the \ncase and their testimony with the Government lawyers, the defense lawyers, or their own lawyers \nbefore the witnesses appeared in court. \nAlthough you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, I \nshould tell you that there is nothing either unusual or improper about a witness meeting with \nlawyers before testifying so that the witness can be aware of the subjects he or she will be \nquestioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits \nbefore being questioned about them. Such consultation helps conserve your time and the Court's \ntime. In fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without such consultation. \nAgain, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his or \nher testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within \nyour discretion. \nAdopted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. \nAlmonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin \nCastel in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC). \n79 \nEFTA00074582\n", "char_count": 1377}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Redaction Of Evidentiary Items \n[If Applicable] \nWe have, among the exhibits received in evidence, some documents that are redacted. \n\"Redacted\" means that part of the document has been taken out. Material may be redacted for any \nnumber of reasons, including that it is not relevant to the issues you must decide in this case, among \nother reasons. You are to concern yourself only with the part of the item that has been admitted \ninto evidence, and you should not consider any possible reason for the redactions. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN); and the charge of the Hon. Richard \nJ. Sullivan, Jury Charge, United States v. Adony Nina, et al., 13 Cr. \n322 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). \n80 \nEFTA00074583\n", "char_count": 762}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Charts and Summaries — Admitted as Evidence \n[If Applicable] \nNow, some of the exhibits that were admitted into evidence were in the form of charts \nand summaries. For these charts and summaries that were admitted into evidence, you should \nconsider them as you would any other evidence, which includes assessing the accuracy of the \ninformation contained in those charts or summaries. \nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. \n5-12; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. \nJones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN). See also Fed. R. Evid. 1006. \n81 \nEFTA00074584\n", "char_count": 598}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "Stipulations \n[If Applicable] \nIn this case you have heard evidence in the form of stipulations. \nA stipulation of testimony is an agreement among the parties that, if called, a witness \nwould have given certain testimony. You must accept as true the fact that the witness would \nhave given the testimony. However, it is for you to determine the effect or weight to give \nthat testimony. \nYou also heard evidence in the form of stipulations that contain facts that were agreed to \nbe true. In such cases, you must accept those facts as true. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States \nv. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 \n(MN); the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. \nWilliam Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC); and from Sand, et al., Modern \nFederal Jury Instructions, Innis. 5-6 & 5-7. \n82 \nEFTA00074585\n", "char_count": 881}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "Punishment Not to be Considered by the Jury \nUnder your oath as jurors, you cannot allow a consideration of possible punishment that \nmay be imposed upon a defendant, if convicted, to influence you in any way or in any sense to \nenter into your deliberations. The duty of imposing sentence is mine and mine alone. Your \nfunction is to weigh the evidence in the case and to determine whether the defendant is or is not \nguilty upon the basis of evidence and the law. \nTherefore, I instruct you not to consider punishment or possible punishment in any way \nin your deliberations in this case. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 (MN); from the charge of the Hon. Denise \nL. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and charge \nof the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William Walters, 16 \nCr. 338 (PKC). \n83 \nEFTA00074586\n", "char_count": 897}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "Right to Hear Testimony; Election of Foreperson; Communications with the Court; Juror \nNote-Taking \nYou are about to go into the jury room and begin your deliberations. The documentary \nevidence will be sent back with you. If you want any of the testimony read to you, that can be \narranged. But please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want, so be as \nspecific as you possibly can in requesting portions of the testimony that you might want. \nYour first task as a jury will be to choose your foreperson. The foreperson has no greater \nvoice or authority than any other juror, but is the person who will communicate with the Court \nthrough written note when questions arise and to indicate when you have reached your verdict. \nYour requests for testimony—in fact, any communications with the Court— should be \nmade to me in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the Marshals. I will \nrespond to any questions or requests you have as promptly as possible, either in writing or by \nhaving you return to the courtroom so I can speak with you in person. In any communication, \nplease do not tell me or anyone else how the jury stands on the issue of the jury's verdict until \nafter a unanimous verdict is reached. \nFor those of you who took notes during the course of the trial, you should not show your \nnotes to or discuss your notes with any other juror during your deliberations. Any notes you have \ntaken are to assist you and you alone. The fact that a particular juror has taken notes entitles that \njuror's views to no greater weight than those of any other juror. \nFinally, your notes are not to substitute for your recollection of the evidence in this case. \nIf you have any doubt as to any testimony, you may request that the official trial transcript that \nhas been made of these proceedings be read or otherwise provided to you. \nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United \nStates v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN), in United State\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/87 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=87]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "CONCLUDING REMARKS \nMembers of the jury, that about concludes my instructions to you. The most important \npart of this case, members of the jury, is the part that you as jurors are now about to play as you \ndeliberate on the issues of fact. It is for you, and you alone, to weigh the evidence in this case \nand determine whether the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the \nessential elements of the crime with which each Defendant is charged. If the Government has \nsucceeded, your verdict should be guilty as to that Defendant and that charge; if it has failed, \nyour verdict should be not guilty as to that Defendant and that charge. \nYou must base your verdict solely on the evidence or lack of evidence and these \ninstructions as to the law, and you are obliged under your oath as jurors to follow the law as I \nhave instructed you, whether you agree or disagree with the particular law in question. \nUnder your oath as jurors, you are not to be swayed by sympathy. You should be guided \nsolely be the evidence presented during the trial and the law as I gave it to you, without regard \nto the consequences of your decision. You have been chosen to try the issues of fact and reach a \nverdict on the basis of the evidence or lack of evidence. If you let sympathy interfere with your \nclear thinking, there is a risk that you will not arrive at a just verdict. \nAs you deliberate, please listen to the opinions of your fellow jurors, and ask for an \nopportunity to express your own views. Every juror should be heard. No one juror should hold \ncenter stage in the jury room and no one juror should control or monopolize the deliberations. \nIf, after listening to your fellow jurors and if, after stating your own view, you become \nconvinced that your view is wrong, do not hesitate because of stubbornness or pride to change \nyour view. On the other hand, do not surrender your honest convictions and beliefs solely \nbecause of the opinions of your fellow jurors or because yo\n... [truncated, 2133 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074500/88 or ?id=EFTA00074500&page=88]", "char_count": 2133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074500", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "Thus, the verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to \nreturn a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree to it. Your verdict must be unanimous. \nIf at any time you are divided, do not report how the vote stands, and if you have \nreached a verdict, do not report what it is until you are asked in open court. \nA verdict form has been prepared for your convenience. After you have reached your \ndecision, your foreperson will fill in the form. At that point the foreperson should advise the \nmarshal outside your door that you are ready to return to the courtroom. \nFinally, I say this not because I think it is necessary, but because it is the custom in this \ncourthouse to say this: You should treat each other with courtesy and respect during your \ndeliberations. \nIn conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that if you listen to the views of your \nfellow jurors, and if you apply your own common sense, you will deliberate fairly. \nDated: New York, New York \nOctober \n2021 \nRespectfully submitted, \nDAMIAN WILLIAMS \n[Defense signature block] \nUnited States Attorney \nBy: \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n86 \nEFTA00074589\n", "char_count": 1166}]}