{"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_count": 21, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00074479", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00074479.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nv. \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nx \nS2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION IN LIMINE \nTO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATED TO ACCUSER-3 \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue \nNew York, NY 10022 \nPhone: \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver CO 80203 \nPhone: \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n225 Broadway, Suite 715 \nNew York NY 10007 \nPhone: \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00074479\n", "char_count": 590}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nPage \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nBACKGROUND \n2 \nARGUMENT \n5 \nI. \nApplicable Law \n5 \nII. \nEvidence Related to Accuser-3 Is Not Proof of the Charged Conspiracies \n7 \nIII. \nEvidence Related to Accuser-3 Is Not Admissible Under Rule 404(6) and Should be \nExcluded Under Rule 403 \n 10 \nIV. \nIn the Alternative, the Court Should Preclude the Government and Accuser-3 from \nRepresenting that Accuser-3 Was a \"Minor,\" or that She Was \"Sexually Abused\" \nby Epstein, and Give the Jury an Appropriate Limiting Instruction \n 14 \nCONCLUSION \n16 \ni \nEFTA00074480\n", "char_count": 567}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nPage(s) \nCases \nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., \n509 U.S. 579 (1993) \n12 \nEsquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, \n137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) \n14 \nGrunewald v. United States, \n353 U.S. 391 (1957) \n8 \nHuddleston v. United States, \n485 U.S. 681 (1988) \n5, 6 \nSalinas v. United States, \n522 U.S. 52 (1997) \n8 \nUnited States v. Bagaric, \n706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) \n6, 7, 8 \nUnited States v. Benussi, \n216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), of 'd sub nom. United States v. \nSalmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) \n8 \nUnited States v. Carboni, \n204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000) \n6 \nUnited States v. Concepcion, \n983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) \n6 \nUnited States v. Cummings, \n60 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) vacated on other grounds 858 F.3d 763 \n(2d Cir. 2017) \n6, 7, 8, 9 \nUnited States v. Curley, \n639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) \n5, 6, II, 13 \nUnited States v. Dolney, \nNo. 04-CR-159 (NGG), 2005 WL 2129169 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. I, 2005) \n10, 15 \nUnited States v. Figueroa, \n618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980) \n13 \nEFTA00074481\n", "char_count": 1023}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "United States v. Garcia, \n291 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2002) \n11 \nUnited States v. Mahsffr, \n477 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) vacated in part on other grounds 285 \nFed. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2008) \n9 \nUnited States v. McCallum, \n584 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2009) \n5, 6, 11 \nUnited States v. Mills, \n895 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1990) \n12 \nUnited States v. Nektalov, \n325 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) \n6, 8, 9, 10 \nUnited States v. Pascarella, \n84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) \n11 \nUnited States v. Sliker, \n751 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1984) \n12 \nUnited States v. Townsend, \nNo. S1 06 CR. 34 (JFK), 2007 WL 1288597 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007) \n6, 9, 10 \nUnited States v. Walla, \nNo. 14—CR-213 (MKB), 2014 WL 3734522 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) \n12 \nStatutes \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) \n7 \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) \n7 \nMann Act \npassim \nOther Authorities \nFed. R. Evid. 401  \n12 \nFed. R. Evid. 402  \n11, 12 \nFed. R. Evid. 403 \npassim \nFed. R. Evid. 404(b) \npassim \nFed. R. Evid. 702 \n12 \nFed. R. Evid. 704 \n12 \niii \nEFTA00074482\n", "char_count": 979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully moves in lintine to exclude evidence related to \nAccuser-31 because it is not probative of the charged conspiracies and inadmissible under Rule \n404(b) and Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the alternative, Ms. Maxwell \nrespectfully moves (1) to preclude the government and Accuser-3 from referring to Accuser-3 as \na \"minor\" or asserting that she was a \"minor\" at the time of the alleged sex acts, (2) to preclude \nthe government and Accuser-3 from representing that she was \"sexually abused\" by Jeffrey \nEpstein, and (3) for an appropriate limiting instruction concerning Accuser-3's testimony. \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nThe government and the defense agree on at least this much about Accuser-3: \nI. She was not a minor in the United Kingdom when she alleges that she was sexually \nabused by Jeffrey Epstein in 1994-1995; \n2. She cannot establish that Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein ever caused, or sought to \ncause, her to travel while she was a minor; and \n3. She cannot establish that she was a minor in the United States when she alleges that \nshe engaged in sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein at his various residences. \nEven if we assume for the sake of argument that everything Accuser-3 alleges is true (which it is \nnot), she has not alleged any illegal conduct whatsoever, much less conduct \"in furtherance of\" a \nconspiracy to entice or cause minor girls to travel to engage in unlawful sexual activity with Epstein. \nIt seems evident that the government originally included Accuser-3's allegations in the \nindictment as evidence of the charged conspiracies because it did not know that she was above \nthe age of consent in the U.K. The government presented Accuser-3's allegations to the grand \njury incorrectly assuming that she was a minor and that the alleged sex acts between Epstein and \nThis individual is described in the S2 Superseding Indictment as Minor Victim-3. Similarly, we refer to the \nindividuals identified in the indictment as Min\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/4 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=4]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Accuser-3 were illegal. Indeed, referring to Accuser-3 in the indictment as \"Minor Victim-3\" is \nentirely misleading — there is no evidence that she was a \"minor\" when any of the alleged sex \nacts took place. \nNevertheless, even after the defense pointed out in our pretrial motions that Accuser-3 \nwas not a minor and had not alleged any illegal conduct, the government repeated her allegations \nverbatim to the grand jury and in the S2 Superseding Indictment. This was not only misleading, \nit was also an end-run around Rule 404(b). Simply including the conduct alleged by Accuser-3 in \nthe indictment does not mean that it is evidence of the charged conspiracies. The conduct \nalleged by Accuser-3 is not within the scope of the charged conspiracies and the Court should \nnot admit this evidence as proof of those charges. Nor should the Court admit this evidence as \n\"other act\" evidence under Rule 404(b). This evidence would only be offered to show criminal \npropensity, despite the alleged conduct being entirely legal, and would mislead the jury and \nunfairly prejudice Ms. Maxwell. Accordingly, the Court should exclude evidence related to \nAccuser-3. \nBACKGROUND \nThe original indictment against Ms. Maxwell, filed on June 29, 2020, and the first \nsuperseding indictment, filed on July 8, 2020, included the following allegations related to \nAccuser-3: \nMAXWELL groomed and befriended [Accuser-3] in London, \nEngland between approximately 1994 and 1995, including during a \nperiod of time in which MAXWELL knew that [Accuser-3] was \nunder the age of 18. Among other things, MAXWELL discussed \n[Accuser-3's] life and family with [Accuser-3]. \nMAXWELL \nintroduced [Accuser-3] to Epstein and arranged for multiple \ninteractions between [Accuser-3] and Epstein. \nDuring those \ninteractions, MAXWELL encouraged [Accuser-3] to massage \nEpstein, knowing that Epstein would engage in sex acts with \n[Accuser-3] during those massages. [Accuser-3] provided Epstein \n2 \nEFTA00074484\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "with the requested massages, and during those massages, Epstein \nsexually abused [Accuser-3]. MAXWELL was aware that Epstein \nengaged in sexual activity with [Accuser-3] on multiple occasions, \nincluding at times when [Accuser-3] was under the age of 18, \nincluding in the context of a sexualized massage. \nSee Indictment (Dkt. 001) ¶ 7(c); S1 Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 017) ¶ 7(c). Both indictments \nalso alleged the following as an overt act of the charged conspiracies: \"Between in or about 1994 \nand in or about 1995, when [Accuser-3] was under the age of 18, MAXWELL encouraged \n[Accuser-3] to provide massages to Epstein in London, England, knowing that Epstein intended \nto sexually abuse [Accuser-3] during those massages.\" See Indictment (Dkt. 001) ¶¶ 11(d), \n17(d); S 1 Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 017)¶¶ 11(d), 17(d). \nMs. Maxwell filed a pretrial motion to strike the allegations related to Accuser-3 as \nsurplusage on the grounds that they could not support the charged conspiracies and were unfairly \nprejudicial to Ms. Maxwell. See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Strike Surplusage from \nSuperseding Indictment (Dkt. 146) at 1-3, 6-9. Ms. Maxwell noted that (1) according to \nAccuser-3's own allegations, she was above the legal age of consent in the United Kingdom (16 \nyears old) when the sex acts supposedly took place and therefore any sex acts that occurred were \nlawful and could not be considered \"sexual abuse\"; and (2) the indictment did not allege any \ntravel by Accuser-3, in interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise, let alone as a result of any \naction taken by Ms. Maxwell or Epstein, which was a critical element of both charged \nconspiracies. Id. at 4-5. \nIn its opposition, the government scrambled to paper over these problems by providing a \nmuch fuller proffer of Accuser-3's expected testimony. See Gov't Mem. in Opp. to Def.'s \nPretrial Motions (Dkt. 204) at 158-59 & n.56. The government attempted to defend its use of the \nphrase \"sexual abuse\" by assert\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/6 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=6]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Accuser-3 was expected to testify at trial that \"her subjective experience of these acts with a \nmuch older man as traumatic, exploitative, and abusive.\" Id. at 162 n.57 (emphasis added). The \ngovernment also represented for the first time that Accuser-3 is expected to testify that after the \nfirst two sexual encounters with Epstein in London, Epstein and Ms. Maxwell \"invited [Accuser-\n3] to travel with them to Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and New York\" and that during the \ncourse of those trips, Accuser-3 gave Epstein additional massages during which they engaged in \nsex acts. Id. at 159. The government conceded, however, that Accuser-3 \"does not recall \nwhether she was 17 or 18 when she took her first trip at Epstein and the defendant's invitation.\" \nId. Accordingly, Accuser-3 cannot establish that she was a minor when she traveled or when she \nallegedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein in the United States. \nDespite having been alerted to the problems with Accuser-3's evidence, the government \nrepeated the same allegations related to Accuser-3 in the second superseding indictment filed \nafter the pretrial motions were fully briefed. See S2 Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 187) (\"S2 \nIndictment\") ¶1 9(c), 13(d), 19(d). These included the misleading allegations that Accuser-3 was \na \"minor\" and that Epstein had \"sexually abused\" her. Id. \nIn its opinion and order denying Ms. Maxwell's motion to strike, the Court agreed that \nthe indictment did not allege that Accuser-3 traveled in interstate commerce or was underage \nduring sexual encounters with Epstein. 4/16/2021 Opinion and Order (Dkt. 207) at 27. \nNevertheless, the Court stated that it could not \"rule out that the allegations may reflect conduct \nundertaken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy or be relevant to prove facts such as \nMaxwell's state of mind.\" Id. The Court further stated that it would reserve the issue for trial \nand allow Ms. Maxwell to renew her motion then. Id. \n4 \nEFTA00074486\n", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "For the reasons stated below, the Court should not admit evidence related to Accuser-3 at \ntrial as evidence of the charged conspiracies or as \"other act\" evidence under Rule 404(b). In the \nalternative, the Court should preclude the government and Accuser-3 from referring to Accuser-3 \nas a \"minor\" or asserting that Accuser-3 was a \"minor\" at the time of the alleged sex acts. The \nCourt should also preclude the government and Accuser-3 from representing that Epstein \n\"sexually abused\" her and give the jury an appropriate limiting instruction that the alleged \nconduct was lawful and that the sexual activity cannot be considered \"illegal\" or \"criminal\" or \n\"unlawful\" for the purposes of the crimes charged in the indictment.2\nARGUMENT \nI. \nApplicable Law \nRule 404(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of evidence of \n\"crimes, wrongs, or acts\" other than those charged in the indictment. United States v. Curley, \n639 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). The rule provides, in relevant \npart: \n(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is \nnot admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on \na particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the \ncharacter. \n(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another \npurpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, \nplan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. \nFed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)-(2). For other act evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b), (1) it \nmust be offered for a proper purpose, (2) it must be relevant to a disputed issue, and (3) the \nprobative value of the evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair \n2 For the same reasons, Ms. Maxwell also renews her motion to strike the allegations related to Accuser-3 from the \nS2 Indictment. \n5 \nEFTA00074487\n", "char_count": 1901}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "prejudice pursuant to Rule 403; in addition, (4) at defendant's request, the district court should \ngive the jury an appropriate limiting instruction. United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471, 475 \n(2d Cir. 2009) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)). \"'Other act' \nevidence serves a proper purpose so long as it is not offered to show the defendant's propensity \nto commit the offense.\" Curley, 639 F.3d at 57 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). \nWhen the government must prove a conspiracy charge, evidence of other acts committed \n\"in furtherance of the conspiracy\" is not \"other act\" evidence under Rule 404(b), but rather, it is \ndirect evidence of the acts charged in the Indictment. United States v. Townsend, No. SI 06 CR. \n34 (JFK), 2007 WL 1288597, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May I, 2007) (citing United States v. Concepcion, \n983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992)). However, \"other acts\" are only admissible as evidence of a \nconspiracy \"as long as they are within the scope of the conspiracy.\" United States v. Cummings, \n60 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) vacated on other grounds 858 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 2017) \n(quoting United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 1983)). \nEvidence of uncharged conduct is not considered other act evidence under Rule 404(6) \n\"if it [1] arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, [2] if it \nis inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or [3] if it is \nnecessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.\" United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d \n367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000)). \nHowever, \"where it is not manifestly clear that the evidence in question is intrinsic proof of the \ncharged crime, the proper course is to proceed under Rule 404(b).\" Townsend, 2007 WL \n1288597, at *1 (citing Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 372). \n6 \nEFTA00074488\n", "char_count": 1944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "II. \nEvidence Related to Accuser-3 Is Not Proof of the Charged Conspiracies \nAccuser-3's allegations, which pertain only to the Mann Act conspiracies charged in \nCounts One and Three of the S2 Indictment, are irrelevant to the charged conspiracies and do not \noffer any proof supporting those charges. The S2 Indictment alleges that Ms. Maxwell conspired \nwith Epstein to (i) violate 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), with the objective of enticing one or more \nindividuals to travel in interstate and foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in unlawful \nsexual activity (S2 Indictment¶¶ 11-12); and (ii) violate 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), with the objective \nof transporting an individual under age 18 with the intent that the individual engage in unlawful \nsexual activity (id. ¶¶ 17-18). As an overt act in furtherance of these conspiracies, the \ngovernment alleges that Ms. Maxwell \"encouraged [Accuser-3] to provide massages to Epstein \nin London, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse [Accuser-3] during those \nmassages.\" Id. ¶¶ 13(d), 19(d) (emphasis added). The Indictment further alleges that Epstein \n\"sexually abused\" Accuser-3. Id. ¶ 9c. \nThere is no cogent basis for the government to assert that Accuser-3's allegations are \ndirect evidence of the charged conspiracies. The object of the alleged conspiracies was to entice \nor cause one or more minors to travel in interstate or foreign commerce in order to engage in \nunlawful sexual activity. The government concedes that Accuser-3 (1) was not a minor under \nU.K. law when she allegedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein in London, (2) cannot establish \nthat she was invited to travel to the United States when she was under the age of 18, and (3) \ncannot establish that she was a minor when she allegedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein in the \nUnited States. See Gov't Mem. in Opp. to Def.'s Pretrial Motions (Dkt. 204) at 158-59, 162-163 \n& nn.57-58. Accuser-3 will therefore not provide any proof that Ms. Maxwell \"furthered\"\n... [truncated, 2210 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/10 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=10]", "char_count": 2210}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "should not be admitted as evidence of the conspiracies. See Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 437 \n(quoting Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 64); see also United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 311 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd sub nom. United States v. Sabnonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) (the \n\"scope of the conspiratorial agreement\" is the key to determining whether \"an overt act may \nproperly be regarded as in furtherance of the conspiracy\" (quoting Grunewald v. United States, \n353 U.S. 391, 397 (1957)). \nIn its opposition to Ms. Maxwell's motion to strike, the government argued that because a \nconspiracy \"does not require a completed substantive crime,\" Accuser-3's allegations could still \nbe admitted as direct proof of the charged conspiracies even though she did not travel as a minor \nor engage in illegal sex acts because Ms. Maxwell allegedly \"groomed\" her to engage in those \nsex acts. Gov't Mem. in Opp. to Def.'s Pretrial Motions (Dkt. 204) at 161-163 (citing Salinas v. \nUnited States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)). That argument misses the mark. While it is true that a \nconspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime, Salinas itself states that \"[a] \nconspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the \nelements of a substantive criminal offense.\" Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65. As to Accuser-3, the \ncompleted endeavor—La, her alleged sex acts with Epstein—was not a substantive criminal \noffense. Even if we accept her allegations as true (which we do not), there is nothing unlawful \nabout encouraging an adult to engage in entirely lawful sex acts. Hence, Accuser-3's allegations \nare not direct proof of the charged conspiracies regardless of whether Ms. Maxwell allegedly \n\"groomed\" her (which she did not). \nThe Court should not admit Accuser-3's allegations as intrinsic proof of the charged \nconspiracies either. See Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (listing three categories of \"intrinsic\" \nproof not considered Rule 404(b) evidence). The\n... [truncated, 2061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/11 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=11]", "char_count": 2061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "allege three distinct episodes of alleged sexual abuse, in three different locations, involving three \nseparate accusers. The allegations of Accuser-3 stand on their own and are not \"inextricably \nintertwined\" with the allegations of Accuser-1 or Accuser-2, nor do they stem from \"the same \nseries of transactions.\" In fact, they have no bearing on or connection to those allegations \nwhatsoever. Because Accuser-Vs allegations are conceptually distinct, they are also not \n\"necessary to complete the story\" of the charged conspiracies. See Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d at \n438 (defendant's prior crack arrests and firearms conviction not sufficiently connected to \nunderlying conspiracy to distribute crack and possessing firearms to be admissible); Townsend, \n2007 WL 1288597, at *2 (defendant's prior narcotics and firearm transactions with the same \nconfidential informant not \"inextricably intertwined\" with the charged narcotics conspiracy, even \nthough the conduct was \"generally similar to the conduct underlying the offenses charged in the \nindictment\"); United States v. Mahal, 477 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) vacated in \npart on other grounds 285 Fed. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2008) (similar prior financial crime not \ninextricably linked to the charged crime where prior act \"was a separate, discrete offense that \nmay be conceptually segregated from the charged offenses without impairing the jury's ability to \nunderstand the facts underlying the schemes alleged in the indictment\"); Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. \n2d at 369-70 (prior similar money laundering transactions between defendant and cooperating \nwitness not \"inextricably intertwined\" with the charged money laundering offense or \"necessary \nto complete the story\" of the charged conspiracy (emphasis in original)). \nThe fact that the government included Accuser-3's allegations in the S2 Indictment is of \nno consequence. Although Rule 404(b) typically governs the admissibility of \"other acts\" that \nare not charged in the indictm\n... [truncated, 2178 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/12 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=12]", "char_count": 2178}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Q. \nAnd did you also testify earlier that ... [Accuser-3] told you that \nMaxwell asked her to give Epstein massages when she was a \nminor? \nA. \nYes. \n3513-024 (6/29/2020 Grand Jury Testimony of FBI Special Agent \nat 11 \n(emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit A). The government repeated this error when they \nreturned the S2 Indictment. See 3513-029 (3/29/2021 Grand Jury Testimony of NYPD Detective \nMM) \nat 11 (attached as Exhibit B). The government's error in including Accuser-3's \nallegations in the indictment does not somehow convert this evidence into proof of the charged \nconspiracies. Such a rule would allow the government to entirely circumvent Rule 404(b) \nsimply by charging other act conduct in the indictment. \nMoreover, without a proper limiting instruction, there is a serious risk that the July will \nview this lawful conduct as evidence of criminal propensity. See United States v. Dothey, No. \n04-CR-159 (NGG), 2005 WL 2129169, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005) (benefit of applying Rule \n404(b) is \"the value that a limiting instruction will have in ensuring that the jury does not view \nthe defendants' alleged prior conduct as evidence of the defendants' propensity to engage in \ncriminal activity\"). At the very least, it is not \"manifestly clear\" that the evidence related to \nAccuser-3 is proof of the charged Mann Act conspiracies. Accordingly, \"the proper course is to \nproceed under Rule 404(b).\" Townsend, 2007 WL 1288597, at *1 (citing Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. \n2d at 372). \nIII. \nEvidence Related to Accuser-3 Is Not Admissible Under Rule 404(b) and Should be \nExcluded Under Rule 403 \nThe Court should also not admit evidence related to Accuser-3 as Rule 404(b) evidence \nbecause it will be offered solely to show Ms. Maxwell's criminal propensity and will be unfairly \n10 \nEFTA00074492\n", "char_count": 1816}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "prejudicial to Ms. Maxwell and will mislead the jury into believing that the alleged sex acts \nbetween Epstein and Accuser-3 were unlawful.;\nThe Second Circuit takes an \"inclusionary approach\" to Rule 404(b) evidence, which \nadmits \"other act\" evidence \"that does not serve the sole purpose of showing the defendant's bad \ncharacter and that is neither overly prejudicial under Rule 403 nor irrelevant under Rule 402. \nCurley, 639 F.3d at 56 (citing United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996)). The \ninclusionary approach, however, does not permit the government \"to offer, carte blanche, any \nprior act of the defendant in the same category of [activity].\" McCallum, 584 F.3d at 475 \n(quoting United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2002)). If other act evidence is \noffered for the purpose of establishing the defendant's knowledge or intent, the government must \n\"identify a similarity or connection between the two acts that makes the prior act relevant to \nestablishing knowledge of the current act.\" Id. (quoting Garcia, 291 F.3d at 137). \nThe government has argued that the conduct alleged by Accuser-3 is admissible under \nRule 404(b) to prove Ms. Maxwell's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi. See Gov't Mem. \nin Opp. to Def.'s Pretrial Motions (Dkt. 204) at 167. This argument is unavailing. Accuser-3's \nevidence could not possibly be proof that Ms. Maxwell knew of Epstein's \"attraction to minor \ngirls\" and knew that Epstein used massage to initiate sexual contact \"with minor girls\" because \nAccuser-3 was not a minor when the alleged sex acts took place. Id. For the same reason, \nAccuser-3's evidence could not possibly be proof that Ms. Maxwell \"intended for minor girls to \nengage in sex acts with Epstein.\" Id. \n3 As noted in Ms. Maxwell's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Government's Rule 404(b) Evidence, the government \ndid not give proper 404(b) notice with respect to any of its proposed 404(b) evidence, which includes Accuser-3's \nevidence. Nev\n... [truncated, 2425 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/14 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=14]", "char_count": 2425}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "The government's modus operandi argument appears to rest on the premise that \n\"grooming,\" however broadly that may be defined, constitutes a distinctive pattern of criminal \nactivity. See id.4 As the government itself pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi \nmust be \"sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence.\" United \nStates v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR-\n213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (\"Rule 404(b) permits evidence \nof similar acts to prove a `signature crime,' i.e., a modus operandi where the crimes are `so \nnearly identical in method as to ear-mark them as the handiwork of the accused.\"' (quoting \nUnited States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 907 (2d Cir. 1990)). Here, Accuser-3 alleges that Ms. \nMaxwell asked her \"about her life and family,\" as she is alleged to have done with the other \naccusers. Gov't Mem. in Opp. to Def.'s Pretrial Motions (Dkt. 204) at 158. But engaging in \nsocial pleasantries and polite conversation does not in any way establish a unique or \"signature\" \npattern of behavior. See Walla, 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (prior acts that share similarities with \nthe charged offenses do not establish a modus operandi without a \"signature\" pattern of conduct) \n(collecting cases). In sum, Accuser-3's evidence will not be offered for any permissible purpose \nunder Rule 404(b) and will just serve as evidence of criminal propensity. The Court should \ntherefore exclude it. \nThe Court should also exclude Accuser-3's evidence under Rule 403 because it will \nunfairly prejudice Ms. Maxwell and mislead the jury as to the legality of the alleged conduct and \nthe purpose of its admission. Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence \"may be excluded if its \nprobative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the \nMs. Maxwell has moved separately to exclude the testimony of the government's proposed ex\n... [truncated, 2188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/15 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=15]", "char_count": 2188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, [or] waste of time.\" Fed. R. \nEvid. 403. According to the government, Accuser-3 is expected to testify that she was \"sexually \nabused\" by Epstein, not because she was underage and incapable of consent by law, but because \nher \"subjective experience\" of these incidents was that they were \"traumatic, exploitative, and \nabusive.\" Gov't Mem. in Opp. to Def.'s Pretrial Motions (Dkt. 204) at 162 n.57. If Accuser-3 is \nallowed to testify that she felt she was \"sexually abused\" by Epstein, the jury will naturally \nassume that the alleged sex acts were illegal, when they were not. Indeed, even if she is not \nallowed to use the phrase \"sexual abuse,\" the mere fact that Accuser-3 will be testifying about \nalleged sex acts that she participated in with a much older man when she was 17 years old will \nlikely lead the jury to assume that the conduct was illegal, especially after they have heard the \nexpected testimony of the other accusers in this case. \nHence, there is a strong likelihood that the jury will be misled by Accuser-3's evidence \nand will misapply it in evaluating Ms. Maxwell's guilt or innocence to the charged Mann Act \nconspiracies, both of which require that Ms. Maxwell acted with the intent that the accusers \nwould engage in illegal or criminal sexual activity. This risk substantially outweighs the limited \nprobative effect of Accuser-3's evidence. Even if the Court were to give the jury an appropriate \nlimiting instruction, there is a substantial risk that it would not be sufficient to ensure that the \njury did not misinterpret or misapply this evidence. See Curley, 639 F.3d at 60 (quoting United \nStates v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 946 (2d Cir. 1980) (\"limiting instructions cannot be regarded \nas a guaranty against prejudice\")). Accordingly, the Court should exclude Accuser-3's evidence. \n13 \nEFTA00074495\n", "char_count": 1909}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "IV. \nIn the Alternative, the Court Should Preclude the Government and Accuser-3 from \nRepresenting that Accuser-3 Was a \"Minor,\" or that She Was \"Sexually Abused\" \nby Epstein, and Give the Jury an Appropriate Limiting Instruction \nIf the Court determines that the evidence related to Accuser-3 is admissible, either as \ndirect evidence of the charged conspiracies or as 404(b) evidence, the Court should (I) preclude \nthe government and Accuser-3 from referring to Accuser-3 as a \"minor\" or asserting that she was \na \"minor\" at the time of the alleged sex acts, (2) preclude the government and Accuser-3 from \nrepresenting that she was \"sexually abused\" by Jeffrey Epstein, and (3) give the July an \nappropriate limiting instruction related to Accuser-3's testimony. \nThe government concedes that Accuser-3 alleges that she was 17 years old and above the \nage of consent in the U.K. when she purportedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein in London. \nThe government further concedes that Accuser-3 cannot establish that she was under the age of \n18 when she alleges that she first traveled to the United States and engaged in sex acts with \nEpstein at his residences. Accuser-3 was therefore not a minor under the laws of the relevant \njurisdictions when the alleged sex acts and the alleged international travel took place. It follows \nthat the Court should not permit the government or Accuser-3 to refer to herself as a \"minor\" or \nclaim that she was a minor when she allegedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein. \nSimilarly, the Court should not permit the government and Accuser-3 to assert that she \nwas \"sexually abused\" by Epstein. The phrase \"sexual abuse\" connotes criminal activity, even \nthough the alleged conduct was lawful. See Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 \n(2017) (\"'Sexual abuse of a minor,' the Government accordingly contends, 'most naturally connotes \nconduct that (1) is illegal, (2) involves sexual activity, and (3) is directed at a person younger than 18 \n\n... [truncated, 2302 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00074479/17 or ?id=EFTA00074479&page=17]", "char_count": 2302}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "activity\" with Epstein. That, in turn, may cause the jury to improperly convict Ms. Maxwell \nbased on a false assumption. \nFinally, the Court should give the jury an appropriate limiting instruction to ensure that \nthe July understands that the alleged conduct was not unlawful and does not consider it as \nimproper propensity evidence. If Accuser-3 is allowed to testify that she engaged in sex acts \nwith Epstein in London when she was 17, as the government has proffered, the jury will almost \ncertainly assume that the alleged conduct was unlawful, as it would be in certain U.S. states, and \nthat the testimony is being offered to prove that Epstein and Accuser-3 engaged in \"illegal sexual \nactivity\" in London. Accordingly, if Accuser-3 is allowed to testify, we request that the Court \ngive the jury a limiting instruction containing the following points: \n• \nThe legal age of consent for sexual activity in the United Kingdom \nis 16 years old. That was also the legal age of consent from 1994-\n1995, when Accuser-3 alleges she engaged in sex acts with Jeffrey \nEpstein in London when she was 17 years old. \n• \nThe alleged conduct that Accuser-3 has described in her testimony \nwas therefore not illegal. If you find that these incidents took place, \nI instruct you that this sexual activity cannot be considered \"illegal\" \nor \"criminal\" or \"unlawful\" for purposes of the crimes charged in \nthe indictment. \nIf the Court determines that Accuser-3's testimony may be admitted as 404(b) evidence, \nMs. Maxwell further requests that the Court also give the jury an appropriate propensity \ninstruction. See Doiney, 2005 WL 2129169, at *2 (\"In the absence of such a limiting instruction, \nthere exists a legitimate concern that the jury might misapply [the] evidence to conclude that if \nthe defendants engaged in criminal conduct prior to the charged conspiracy, then the conduct at \nissue in these charges must also be criminal.\"). \n15 \nEFTA00074497\n", "char_count": 1955}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "CONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should exclude evidence related to Accuser-3 \nbecause it is not probative of the charged conspiracies and inadmissible under Rule 404(b) and \nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the alternative, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests \nthat the Court (1) preclude the government and Accuser-3 from referring to Accuser-3 as a \n\"minor\" or asserting that she was a \"minor\" at the time of the alleged sex acts, (2) preclude the \ngovernment and Accuser-3 from representing that she was \"sexually abused\" by Jeffrey Epstein, \nand (3) give the jury an appropriate limiting instruction concerning Accuser-3's testimony that \nincludes the points discussed above. \nDated: October 18, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nRespectfully submitted, \nIs/ Christian R. Everdell \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue \nNew York, NY 10022 \nPhone: \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver, CO 80203 \nPhone: \nBobbi C. Sternheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim \n225 Broadway, Suite 715 \nNew York, NY 10007 \nPhone: \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \n16 \nEFTA00074498\n", "char_count": 1174}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00074479", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that on October 18, 2021, I served by email, pursuant Rule 2(B) of the \nCourt's individual practices in criminal cases, the within memorandum and any accompanying \nexhibits upon the following: \nU.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY \nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza \nNew York. NY 10007 \n/s/ Christian Everdell \nEFTA00074499\n", "char_count": 348}]}