{"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_count": 44, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00073493", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00073493.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n955 Pad 1196 \nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. \nIN RE: \nPetitioner. \nNo. 19-13843 \n(April 14, 2020) \nSynopsis \nBackground: Alleged victim of child sexual abuse brought \ncivil action against federal government, alleging that \ngovernment violated Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) by \nfailing to confer with alleged victim before entering into \nnon-prosecution agreement (NPA) with alleged perpetrator. \nAlleged perpetrator intervened. The United States District \nCourt for the Southern District of Florida, No. 9:08-cv-80736-\nICAM, Kenneth A. Marra, Senior District Judge, 359 \nF.Supp.3d 1201, determined that government had violated \nCVRA, but after alleged perpetrator's death, alleged victim's \nrequested remedies were denied and the action was dismissed, \n411 F.Supp.3d 1321. Alleged victim petitioned for writ of \nmandamus. \n(Holding:) The Court of Appeals, Newsom, Circuit Judge, \nheld that as a matter of first impression, victim rights under \nCVRA, including the right to confer with government's \nlawyers and the right to be treated fairly by them, do not \nattach until criminal proceedings have been initiated against \na defendant. \nPetition denied. \nTjoflat, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion. \nHull, Senior Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. \nProcedural Posture(s): Petition for Writ of Mandamus. \nWest Hcadnotes (9) \nCriminal Law 6•• Civil liabilities to persons \ninjured; reparation \nGovernment did not waive, for consideration by \nCourt of Appeals on alleged victim's petition \nfor writ of mandamus, an argument that Crime \nVictims' Rights Act (CVRA) did not apply if \ncriminal proceedings had not been initiated, \nthough government did not file a cross-appeal \nfrom district court's initial determination that \nCVRA was applicable, which determination had \nbeen made before district court dismissed alleged \nvictim's civil action against government because \nalleged perpetrator of child s\n... [truncated, 3544 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/0 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=0]", "char_count": 3544}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nMI \nStatutes \nConstruction based on multiple \nfactors \nIn construing a statute, the court begins with a \ncareful examination of the statutory text, looking \nto the particular statutory language at issue, as \nwell as the language and design of the statute as \na whole. \nStatutes 4- Statute as a Whole; Relation of \nParts to Whole and to One Another \nStatutes 4- Design, structure, or scheme \nStatutory construction is a holistic endeavor, and \na statutory provision that may seem ambiguous \nin isolation may be clarified by the remainder of \nthe statutory scheme. \n161 \nFederal Civil Procedure 0. Motions in \nGeneral \nA \"motion\" is a request filed within the context \nof an ongoing judicial proceeding, not a vehicle \nfor launching a new and freestanding piece of \nlitigation. \n171 \nFederal Courts 4- Mandamus \nWhile a petition for a writ of mandamus is an \noriginal application to the Court of Appeals, the \nwrit is not an independent grant of appellate \njurisdiction but, rather, may go only in aid \nof appellate jurisdiction that exists on some \nother basis; thus, the minimum condition for \nmandamus relief is that the case be one that may \nlie within the prospective future jurisdiction of \nthe Court of Appeals, or that has in fact come \nwithin its jurisdiction in the past. \n181 \nCriminal Law ar- Preliminary examination; \narraignment; appearance; bail \nThe Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not \nattach until, at the earliest, a suspect's initial \nappearance before a judicial officer. U.S. Const. \nAmend. 6. \n181 \nConstitutional Law \nNature and scope in \ngeneral \nThe Executive Branch has exclusive authority \nand absolute discretion to decide whether to \nprosecute a federal criminal case, and this \nprosecutorial discretion flows not from a desire \nto give carte blanche to law enforcement officials \nbut from recognition of the constitutional \nprinciple of separation of powers. \nAttorneys and Law Firms \n*1198 Paul Cass\n... [truncated, 3251 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/1 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=1]", "char_count": 3251}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nDespite our sympathy for Ms. Wild and others like her, who \nsuffered unspeakable horror at Epstein's hands, only to be \nleft in the dark—and, so it seems, affirmatively misled—by \ngovernment lawyers, we find ourselves constrained to deny \nher petition. We hold that at least as matters currently stand \n—which is to say at least as the CVRA is currently written—\nrights under the Act do not attach until criminal proceedings \nhave been initiated against a defendant, either by complaint, \ninformation, or indictment. Because the government never \nfiled charges or otherwise commenced criminal proceedings \nagainst Epstein, the CVRA was never triggered. It's not a \nresult we like, but it's the result we think the law requires. \nI \nThe facts underlying this case, as we understand them, are \nbeyond scandalous—they tell a tale of national disgrace. \nOver the course of eight years, between 1999 and 2007, \nwell-heeled and well-connected financier Jeffrey Epstein and \nmultiple coconspirators sexually abused more than 30 minor \ngirls, including our petitioner, in Palm Beach, Florida and \nelsewhere in the United States and abroad. Epstein paid his \nemployees to find minor girls and deliver them to him—some \nas young as 14. Once Epstein had the girls, he either sexually \nabused them himself, gave them over to be abused by others, \nor both. Epstein, in turn, paid bounties to some of his victims \nto recruit other girls into his ring. \nFollowing a tip in 2005, the Palm Beach Police Department \nand the FBI conducted a two-year investigation of Epstein's \nconduct. After developing substantial incriminating evidence, \nthe FBI referred the matter for prosecution to the United \nStates Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida. \nBeginning in January 2007, and over the course of the ensuing \neight *1199 months, Epstein's defense team engaged in \nextensive negotiations with federal prosecutors in an effort \nto avoid i\n... [truncated, 5360 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/2 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=2]", "char_count": 5360}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \na thorough investigation.\" The government sent an identical \nletter to another victim in May 2008, some eight months after \ninking the NPA. 2\nIf secrecy was the goal, it appears to have been achieved \n—there is no indication that any of Epstein's victims were \ninformed about the NPA or his state charges until after he \npleaded guilty. On the day that Epstein entered his guilty plea \nin June 2008, some (but by no means all) victims were notified \nthat the federal investigation of Epstein had concluded. But \nit wasn't until July 2008—during the course of this litigation \n—that petitioner learned of the NPA's existence, and until \nAugust 2008 that she finally obtained a copy of the agreement. \nWe are doubtlessly omitting many of the sad details of this \nshameful story. For our purposes, we needn't discuss the \nparticulars of Epstein's crimes, or the fact that the national \nmedia essentially ignored for nearly a decade the jailing of \na prominent financier for sex crimes against young girls. 3 \nToday, the public facts of the case are well known—Epstein \nwas eventually indicted on federal sex-trafficking charges in \nthe Southern District of New York, and in August 2019, while \nawaiting trial, he was found dead in his jail cell of an apparent \nsuicide. \n11 \nIn July 2008, petitioner brought suit in the United States \nDistrict Court for the Southern District of Florida, styling \nher initial filing an \"Emergency Victim's Petition for \nEnforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act.\" As the district \ncourt explained, \"because no criminal case was pending\" \nat the time—no federal charges having been filed against \nEpstein or anyone else—petitioner \"filed [her] petition as \na new matter ... which the Clerk of Court docketed as a \ncivil action.\" Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, \n1341 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Petitioner alleged that she was a \n\"crime victim\" within the meaning of the CVRA and that \nby keeping her\n... [truncated, 5091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/3 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=3]", "char_count": 5091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nFollowing another eight years of litigation, the district court \nissued a pair of rulings that prompted the mandamus petition \nnow before us. In February 2019, the court found that the \ngovernment had infringed petitioner's CVRA rights. See Doe \n1, 359 R Supp. 3d at 1222. In particular, the court held \nthat federal prosecutors violated the Act by \"enter[ing] into \na[n] NPA with Epstein without conferring with Petitioner[ ] \nduring its negotiation and signing.\" Id. at 1219. \"Had the \nPetitioner[ ] been informed about the Government's intention \nto forego federal prosecution of Epstein in deference to \nhim pleading guilty to state charges,\" the district court \nemphasized, she \"could have conferred with the attorney for \nthe Government and provided input.\" Id. at 1218. The court \nconcluded that it was precisely \"this type of communication \nbetween prosecutors and victims that was intended by the \npassage of the CVRA.\" Id. at 1291. \nHaving found CVRA violations, the court directed the parties \n—which by then included Epstein as an intervenor—to brief \n\"the issue of what remedy, if any, should be applied.\" Id. at \n1222. In response, petitioner proposed multiple remedies: (1) \nrescission of the NPA; (2) an injunction against further CVRA \nviolations; (3) an order scheduling a victim-impact hearing \nand a meeting between victims and Alexander Acosta, the \nformer United States Attorney for the Southern District of \nFlorida; (4) discovery of certain grand-jury materials, records \nregarding prosecutors' decision to enter into the NPA, and \nfiles concerning law-enforcement authorities' investigation \nof Epstein; (5) mandatory CVRA training for employees \nof the Southern District's United States Attorney's office; \nand (6) sanctions, *1202 attorneys' fees, and restitution. In \nAugust 2019, while the court was considering the parties' \nbriefing regarding remedies, Epstein died of an apparent \nsuicide; his death pro\n... [truncated, 5061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/4 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=4]", "char_count": 5061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nThe CVRA is a compact statute, occupying but one section \n(and only two pages) of the United States Code. See \n18 \nU.S.C. § 3771. The entire Act comprises just six subsections, \nthe pertinent portions of which we will summarize briefly. \n*1203 The Act opens, in subsection (a), with a catalogue of \n\"rights\" that federal law guarantees to \"crime victims.\" (The \nAct separately defines the term \"crime victim\" to mean \"a \nperson directly and proximately harmed as a result of the \ncommission of a Federal offense.\" . Id. § 3771(e)(2)(A).) \nThe version of the CVRA in effect during the events in \nquestion here—between 2006 and 2008—stated as follows: \n(a) Rights of crime victims.—A crime victim has the \nfollowing rights: \n(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the \naccused. \n(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of \nany public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, \ninvolving the crime or of any release or escape of the \naccused. \n(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public \ncourt proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear \nand convincing evidence, determines that testimony by \nthe victim would be materially altered if the victim heard \nother testimony at that proceeding. \n(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public \nproceeding in the district court involving release, plea, \nsentencing, or any parole proceeding. \n(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for \nthe Government in the case. \n(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in \nlaw. \n(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable \ndelay. \n(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect \nfor the victim's dignity and privacy. \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). \nSubsection (b), titled \"Rights afforded,\" focuses on courts' \nresponsibilities under the Act. It provides—as relevant here \n—that \"[i]n any court proceeding involving an offense against \na crime victim, the court sha\n... [truncated, 4183 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/5 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=5]", "char_count": 4183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nenforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure compliance \nby responsible officials with the obligations\" concerning \nthose victims. \nId. § 3771(f)(1). \nWith that primer, we proceed to address petitioner's case. \nIV \nPetitioner contends—and \nas \nalready \nexplained, the \nundisputed facts show—that federal prosecutors in the \nSouthern District of Florida negotiated \"a secret non-\nprosecution agreement\" with Epstein, and that \"[f]rom the \ntime that the FBI began investigating Epstein through the \nconsummation of the secret NPA, the Government never \nconferred with Epstein's victims about the NPA [or] even \ntold them that such an agreement was under consideration.\" \nPetition for Writ of Mandamus at 4-5. By keeping her (and \nothers) in the dark concerning Epstein's NPA, petitioner \nasserts, the government violated the CVRA. \n[ II The unique circumstances of this case—and in particular, \nthe fact that Epstein was never charged in the Southern \nDistrict of Florida—tee up what the district court correctly \ncalled a \"threshold\" question: Does the CVRA apply in \nthe period before criminal proceedings are initiated, either \nby criminal complaint, information, or indictment? If it \ndoes, then we must proceed to consider a cascade of \nlogically subsequent questions—among them, (1) whether \nthe Act authorized the district court to rescind the NPA, \nboth generally and, more specifically, as applied to Epstein's \nalleged coconspirators; (2) whether petitioner was entitled \nto discovery of certain grand-jury materials, DOJ records \npertaining to prosecutors' decision to enter into the NPA, and \nFBI files concerning the Epstein investigation; (3) whether \npetitioner's participation in an Epstein-related victim-impact \nhearing in New York effectively moots her request for relief \nhere; and (4) whether federal law entitles petitioner to recover \nattorneys' fees. If, by contrast, the CVRA doesn't apply \nbefore the comme\n... [truncated, 5119 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/6 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=6]", "char_count": 5119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \ncorrectly interpreted the statute as currently written but that \nits scope should be expanded—then it should amend the Act \nto make its intent clear. \nA \n[4] In construing the CVRA, \"we begin, as we must, with \na careful examination of the statutory text,\" \n*1206 \nHenson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., — U.S. —, \n137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721, 198 L.Ed.2d 177 (2017), looking \n\"to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the \nlanguage and design of the statute as a whole,\" \nK Mart \nCorp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, \n100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). On balance, we conclude that the \nAct's terms—including the provisions on which petitioner \nrelies—demonstrate that its protections apply only after the \ncommencement of criminal proceedings. \n1 \n[51 We begin where petitioner does, with the catalogue of \n\"rights\"—quoted in full above—that the CVRA guarantees \nto \"crime victims.\" (As already noted, the Act defines the \nterm \"crime victim\"—more on that later.) Petitioner relies \nchiefly on \n§ 3771(a)(5)'s guarantee of a \"reasonable right \nto confer with the attorney for the Government in the case,\" \nand !' I § 3771(a)(8)'s guarantee of the \"right to be treated \nwith fairness.\" She contends that by failing to inform her—\nand worse, affirmatively misleading her—about its ongoing \nnegotiations with Epstein, the government violated both \nprovisions. We will address subsections (a)(5) and (8) in \ndue course, but because \"[s]tatutory construction ... is a \nholistic endeavor,\" and because \"[a] provision that may seem \nambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of \nthe statutory scheme,\" It a United Sam. Ass'n of Tex. a Timbers \nof Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. \n626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), we first examine the balance of \n[ § 3771(a).8\nIn the main, anyway—and there isn't any real dispute about \nthis—the CVRA's enumeration seems to focus on the post-\nchar\n... [truncated, 4862 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/7 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=7]", "char_count": 4862}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nSubsection (a)(5) guarantees a crime victim the \"reasonable \nright to confer with the attorney for the Government in \nthe case.\" Petitioner and her lead counsel (in his academic \nwritings) emphasize that this provision refers to the attorney \nhandling \"the case\" rather than \"the charges,\" Reply in Supp. \nof Pet. at 17, and they assert that the term \"case\" can \"refer \nboth to a judicial case before a court and an investigative \ncase pursued by a law enforcement officer,\" Cassell et al., \nsupra, at 72 (emphasis added).9 Although it's true, at least \nin the abstract, that the term \"case\" can mean either thing, \nin legal parlance the judicial-case connotation is undoubtedly \nprimary. See, e.g., Black's, supra, at 258-59 (defining \"case\" \nfirst as \"[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit or \ncontroversy at law or in equity\" and only second as \"[a] \ncriminal investigation\"); IVebsters New International, supra, \nat 415 (defining \"case\" as used in \"[flaw\" as \"a suit or action \nin law or equity; a cause\"). Moreover, and in any event, \ntwo contextual considerations convince us that, as used in \nsubsection (a)(5), the term \"case\" refers to an ongoing judicial \nproceeding, not a law-enforcement investigation. \nFirst, the Supreme Court has held that in the criminal \ncontext, a \"case\" does not \"encompass the entire criminal \ninvestigatory process,\" but rather \"at the very least requires \nthe initiation of legal proceedings.\" P M()Chavez it Martinez, \n538 U.S. 760, 766, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003). \nNotably, in so holding, the Court drew on longstanding \ntradition, citing its now nearly 150-year-old decision in \nBlyew a United States for the proposition that the word \n\"case\" is synonymous with the word \"cause\" and \"rnean[s] \na proceeding in court, a suit, or action.\" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) \n581, 595, 20 L.Ed. 638 (1872). Second, and separately, \nsubsection (a)(5) refers not just to \"the case\" in general\n... [truncated, 5333 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/8 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=8]", "char_count": 5333}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n2 \nWe are fortified in that conclusion by the only two provisions \nof the Act that speak directly to judicial enforcement of \nvictims' statutory rights. \n*1209 The first is \n§ 3771(b), titled \"Rights afforded.\" At \noral argument, petitioner's counsel invoked subsection (b)(1) \naffirmatively, noting—with emphasis—its directive that \"the \ncourt shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights\" \nenumerated in subsection (a). See Oral Arg. at 5:45-5:57. \nTrue, but that's only part of the story. In its entirety, subsection \n(b)(1) reads as follows: \"In any court proceeding involving \nart offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that \nthe crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection \n(a).\" C II 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain \nterms, then, subsection (bX1) empowers courts to enforce \nCVRA rights only during pending criminal proceedings—of \nwhich there were none here. \nThe second is \n§ 3771(d), which specifies—and strictly \ncircumscribes—the procedural mechanisms by which an \nalleged victim must assert and seek to enforce CVRA rights. \nTwo (related) points are worth making. As an initial matter, \nthe Act clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to \nauthorize private individuals to initiate stand-alone suits or \nactions, outside the confines of existing criminal proceedings, \nto enforce their statutory rights. Quite the contrary, in fact \n—subsection (d)(6), titled \"No Cause of Action,\" expressly \nstates that \"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to \nauthorize a cause of action for damages.\" f § 3771(d) \n(6)). Cf.? Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286, 121 \nS.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (explaining that \"[1]ike \nsubstantive federal law itself, private rights of action to \nenforce federal law must be created by Congress\"). \nsome action which is incidental to the main proceeding .... \nSuch action is invoked by an application usual\n... [truncated, 4912 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/9 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=9]", "char_count": 4912}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n(like DOJ) are \"engaged in the detection, investigation, or \nprosecution of crime\"—e.g., IRS, ICE, and TSA. Those \nagencies' employees, like DOJ's, must \"make their best \nefforts to see that crime victims\" are afforded CVRA \nrights. Subsection (c)(1) doesn't expressly *1211 speak to \nwhen CVRA rights attach, and it certainly doesn't clearly \ndemonstrate that those rights attach before the initiation of \ncriminal proceedings. Government employees (whether of \nDOJ or some other Dal-like agency) who are involved in \nall three of the referenced phases are necessarily involved \npost-charge. Subsection (cX1) simply makes clear that the Act \nreaches beyond prosecutors (and DUI) to reach other actors \nin the criminal justice system. IS\nSecond, and more importantly, petitioner's reliance on \nI § \n3771(c)(1) proves entirely too much. If, as petitioner thinks \nsubsection (c)(1) shows, CVRA rights apply during the \n\"detection\" and \"investigation\" of crime, then there is no \nmeaningful basis—at least no meaningful textual basis—\nfor limiting the Act's pre-charge application to the NPA \ncontext. To the contrary, on petitioner's reading, subsection \n(c)(1) would—to cite just a few examples—require law-\nenforcement officers to \"confer\" with victims, subject only \nto a squishy \"reasonable[ness]\" limitation, see \n§ 3771(a) \n(5), before conducting a raid, seeking a warrant, making \nan arrest, interviewing a witness, convening a lineup, \nor conducting an interrogation. Absent a much clearer \nindication, we cannot assume that Congress intended such \na jarring result. Presumably sensing the slipperiness of their \nposition, petitioner and her counsel have said that courts \ncan simply draw the line farther downstream—when, for \ninstance, as counsel put it at oral argument, an investigation \nhas \"matured\" to the point where (as here) prosecutors \"are \nnegotiating with defense attorneys and signing agreements.\" \nOral Arg. at 8:\n... [truncated, 5462 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/10 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=10]", "char_count": 5462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nappearance before a judicial officer.\" a Rothgery v. Gillespie \nCounty, Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 199,128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d \n366 (2008). All of which is to say that even if petitioner \nand the district court were correct that the \"no prosecution \nis undenvay\" clause meant that CVRA rights apply \"before\" \nformal charges are filed, they may yet be incorrect that those \nrights should be understood to attach during a pre-complaint \ninvestigation. Subsection (d)(3) can be read sensibly enough \nto apply (and to *1213 give victims the right, for example, \nto \"confer\" with prosecutors, ' \n§ 377I(a)(5)) between the \nfiling of the criminal complaint and the suspect's initial \nappearance before a judge—and thus, for instance, to express \ntheir views to prosecutors about whether the defendant should \nbe granted pretrial release. See? I Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(d)( I )(C) \n(noting that pretrial-release decisions are made at the \"initial \nappearance\"). \nAlternatively, subsection (d)(3) could be interpreted to refer \nto the period after a \"prosecution\" has run its course and \nresulted in a final judgment of conviction. Petitioner and \nthe district court read the \"no prosecution is underway\" \nclause to say, in effect, \"no prosecution is [yet] underway\"—\nthereby necessarily pointing to the period \"before\" (their \nword) the prosecution's commencement. But subsection (d) \n(3)'s is temporally agnostic—on its face, it could just as \neasily mean that \"no prosecution is [still] underway.\" CI \nUnderway, Oxford English Dictionary, https://oed.com/view/ \nEntry/212225?rskey=h1o1T7 & result= I /kid (last visited \nApril 13, 2020) (defining \"underway\" as it pertains to \"a \nprocess, project, [or] activity\" to mean \"set in progress; in the \ncourse of happening or being carried out\"). No one doubts, \nfor instance, that a victim could file a post-judgment motion \nalleging that the government violated her rights during the \ncourse of the pros\n... [truncated, 5182 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/11 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=11]", "char_count": 5182}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nThe VRRA is similarly explicit when describing the sorts of \n\"services\" to which victims are entitled. Following subsection \n(a)'s direction, subsection (c) marches—methodically, and \nroughly chronologically—through the various \"stage[s]\" \nof a crime's commission, detection, investigation, and \nprosecution. Subsection (c)(1) states, for instance, that \"the \nresponsible official shall\"—presumably immediately in the \naftermath of a crime's commission, and thus by definition \nbefore any charges are filed—inform the victim where she \ncan \"receive emergency medical and social services.\" Id. \n§ 20141(c)(1)(A). Subsection (c)(2) then provides that the \nresponsible official shall ensure that the victim receives \n\"reasonable protection from a suspected offender\"—notably, \nnot \"the accused,\" *1215 as in the CVRA, but \"a suspected \noffender.\" Id. § 20141(c)(2). Continuing, subsection (c) \n(3) states that the official shall provide the victim \"the \nearliest possible notice\" of, among other things, and under \nappropriate circumstances, \"the status of the investigation of \nthe crime\" and \"the arrest of the suspected offender—both \nof which, obviously, refer to pre-charge events. Id. § 20141(c) \n(3)(A)—(B). It is not until subsection (cX3)(C)—which refers \nto \"the filing of charges against a suspected offender—that \nthe VRRA's focus conspicuously shifts to rights pertaining to \n\"charges,\" \"trial[s]?\"hearing[s],\" and \"proceedings.\" See id. \n§ 20141(cX3)(C)—(cX5). \nThe VRRA's provisions—about which Congress indisputably \nknew when it framed and enacted the CVRA—demonstrate \nthat when Congress wants to extend victims-rights \nprotections pre-charge, it knows how to do so, and does \nso expressly. The fact that the CVRA contains no similar \nlanguage counts heavily against petitioner's interpretation \nunder what we have called an entire \"family\" of interpretive \ncanons. See Fmemanville Iffater Sys., Inc. v. Poach Band of \nC\n... [truncated, 5330 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/12 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=12]", "char_count": 5330}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n—we too conclude that the interpretive balance tips in favor \nof a more limited reading. \nC \nThere is a final consideration here, and it is to ow minds \na weighty one. The CVRA's final substantive provision—\nwhich Congress slotted in just before statutory definitions \nand a closing directive to the Attorney General to promulgate \nimplementing regulations—states that \"[n]othing in this \nchapter [i.e., the entirety of the Act] shall be construed \nto impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney \nGeneral or any officer under his direction.\" f I 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(d)(6). For reasons we will explain, we conclude \nthat petitioner's \"constru[ction]\" of the Act—as applying \nbefore the initiation of criminal proceedings—would indeed \n\"impair ... prosecutorial discretion.\" \n[9] Broadly defined, the term \"prosecutorial discretion\" \nrefers to the soup-to-nuts entirety of \"[a] prosecutor's power \nto choose from the options available in a criminal case, \nsuch as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-\nbargaining, and recommending a sentence to the court.\" \nBlack's, supra, at 565. The core of prosecutorial discretion, \nthough—its essence—is the decision whether or not to charge \nan individual with a criminal offense in the first place. The \nSupreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle—\nwhich dates back centuries—that \"the Executive Branch has \nexclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether \nto prosecute a case.\" 1/ United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. \n683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (citing \nConfiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L.Ed. 196 \n(1869)). 23\n*1217 We believe that petitioner's interpretation of the \nCVRA risks \"impair[ing] ... prosecutorial discretion\" in at \nleast two fundamental ways. As an initial matter, consider \nthat the very first determination that a court must make when \nasked to enforce the CVRA is whether the party seeking \nthe Act's be\n... [truncated, 5084 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/13 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=13]", "char_count": 5084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nSeparately, even if the threshold \"crime victim\" barrier \ncould be overcome, the enforcement of CVRA rights in the \npre-charge phase would risk unduly impairing prosecutorial \ndiscretion. Consider, as a general matter, how CVRA \nenforcement occurs. If, for instance, an individual claiming \nto be a covered victim believes—as did petitioner here—\nthat the government hasn't \"confer[red]\" with her in the \nmanner prescribed by \n§ 3771(a)(5) or \"treated [her] with \nfairness\" as required by \n§ 377I(aX8), then she will—as \ndid petitioner here—ask a district court to \"order\" prosecutors \nto confer and to treat her \"fair[ly].\" See Emergency Pet. at 2. \nEven in the post-charge phase, those are pretty extraordinary \nrequests. It is no small thing to ask a judge to issue an \ninjunction ordering the government's lawyers (presumably \non pain of contempt) to conduct their prosecution of a \nparticular matter in a particular manner. But at least after the \ncommencement of criminal proceedings—and accordingly \nafter the government has submitted itself and its case to \nthe district court's jurisdiction and supervision—the CVRA \nexplicitly authorizes the court's intervention. Congress made \na clear determination that the intrusion was necessary and \nappropriate. \nBefore the commencement of criminal proceedings, \nthough, the intrusion would be significantly greater, \nboth quantitatively and qualitatively. As a quantitative \nmatter, petitioner's interpretation—pursuant to which the \nCVRA's protections would extend into the \"detection\" and \n\"investigation\" phases—risks greatly multiplying the sheer \nnumber of opportunities for judicial intervention in law-\nenforcement and prosecutorial affairs. Freed from any line \nlimiting the Act's applicability to the post-charge phases of a \nprosecution, courts would be empowered to issue injunctions \nrequiring (for instance) consultation with victims before raids, \nwarrant applications, \n... [truncated, 4999 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/14 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=14]", "char_count": 4999}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nstatutory analysis\" with \"rhetorical flourish\"—well, readers \ncan judge for themselves whose rhetoric is in fact more florid. \nSee, e.g., id. at 1224 (\"So how does the Majority bail the U.S. \nAttorney's Office out of its egregious CVRA violations ... ?\"); \nid. at 1224 (\"So how in the holy name of plain text ... ?\"); id. \n(\"The Majority hacks away at the plain text with four tools.\"); \nid. (\"The Majority cherry picks the meaning of `case' ....\"); id. \nat 1239 (\"Nonsense.\"); id. at 1240 (\"As its third tool to axe the \nplain text ....\"); id. (\"Do not fall for this.\"); id. 1241 (accusing \nus of ruling \"by judicial fiat\"); id. at 1245-46 (twice accusing \nus of fearing crime victims more than \"wealthy defendants\"). \nMore substantively, it remains unclear to us exactly how the \ndissent thinks the CVRA should be interpreted and applied. \nIt's obvious that our dissenting colleague doesn't particularly \nlike ow reading—namely, that CVRA rights don't attach \nbefore the initiation of criminal proceedings. (Which is fine \n—as we've already confessed, we don't particularly like \nit either.) But she offers no intelligible alternative of her \nown. At times, the dissent suggests—broadly, but without \nelaboration—that the Act should be construed to apply \"pre-\ncharge.\"See Dissenting Op. at 1226-27, 1237,1239-40 n.19, \n1240, 1243, 1244, 1245-46, 1246-47. That reading (while \nwe think wrong) at least has the benefit of coherence and \nclarity. But the dissent (we think wisely) doesn't seem eager \nto defend so sweeping an interpretation, presumably because \nit has no logical stopping point. Instead, the dissent hints—\nalthough again, without any real explanation—that CVRA \nrights should be understood to apply only (or at least?) \n\"once the criminal case has matured to plea negotiations.\" Id. \nat 1240.26 Where, though—or as ow dissenting colleague \nwould say, where \"in the holy name of plain text\"—does that \nlimiting criteri\n... [truncated, 5368 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/15 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=15]", "char_count": 5368}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \ninvestigate suspected criminal activity and whether to seek, or \nnot seek, an indictment from the grand jury. These pre-charge \ndecisions are the focus of this case. \nThe dissent interprets the CVRA as authorizing a victim to \nbring a U.S. Attorney *1222 to court for refusing to confer \nwith her about a matter under criminal investigation. To \nillustrate what would likely occur if we permitted the victim \nto do that—i.e., to envision how the dissent's interpretation \nof the CVRA would operate in practice—consider a simple \ncase of mail fraud. \nJane Doe is the victim of a fraudulent scheme. She finds \nout that the U.S. Attorney's Office is investigating the \nscheme and wants to discuss it with the attorney handling \nthe investigation. The attorney refuses her request, so she \nsues him. Applying the dissent's interpretation, the district \ncourt finds that the attorney violated the CVRA by failing \nto confer with the victim. The court issues an injunction \nrequiring the attorney to confer with Doe and to treat her \nfairly.3 Even if the court could craft such an injunction to \ncomply with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, \nwhich I doubt, the court would then be continually involved \nin the criminal investigation from the moment it issued the \ninjunction. At any moment during the inevitable twists and \nturns of a pm-indictment criminal investigation, the victim \ncould allege that the attorney had violated the injunction, \nand the attorney would be back in front of the district court \nto show cause why he should not be held in contempt. 4\nBut the event most likely to trigger such a hearing is the \nattorney's decision not to take the case to the grand jury, \nand that decision is completely within the Executive Branch's \nprosecutorial discretion. Therefore, applying the dissent's \ninterpretation of the CVRA would clearly interfere with the \nExecutive Branch's investigative and prosecutorial func\n... [truncated, 5364 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/16 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=16]", "char_count": 5364}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nof Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators had no statutory \nrights whatsoever under the CVRA. Instead, our Court should \nenforce the plain and unambiguous text of the CVRA and hold \nthat the victims had two CVRA rights—the right to confer \nwith the government's attorney and the right to be treated \nfairly—that were repeatedly violated by the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice in the Southern District of Florida. I\nHere, the U.S. Attorney's Office (I) drafted a 53-page \nindictment against sex trafficker and child abuser Epstein and \n(2) repeatedly wrote his defense team that the government \nhad proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he victimized more \nthan 30 women as minors. Shockingly though, the Office \nthen (1) conducted many days of extensive plea negotiations \nwith Epstein's attorneys and secretly entered into a Non-\nProsecution Agreement (\"NPA\"), granting Epstein federal \nimmunity in return for his plea to two state prostitution-\nsolicitation charges, (2) never conferred one minute with \nthe victims about the NPA or told the victims that such an \nagreement was under consideration, (3) worked closely with \nEpstein's lawyers to keep the NPA's existence and terms \nhidden from the victims, (4) actively misrepresented to the \nvictims that the criminal investigation continued when the \nNPA was already signed, and (5) never informed the victims \nabout the NPA until after Epstein pled guilty in State Court \nand the secret sweetheart deal was done. \nRemarkably too, without notice and conferral with the \nvictims, the NPA granted federal immunity not only to \nEpstein, but also to \"any potential co-conspirator of Epstein, \nincluding but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adrian Ross, \nLesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova.\" It is only because the \nvictims filed this lawsuit, and the District Court ordered the \nNPA be produced, that the victims and the public learned \nthe truth about the plea negotiations and the NPA's grant of \n\n... [truncated, 4796 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/17 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=17]", "char_count": 4796}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nthe petitioner crime victims did what the CVRA expressly \nauthorized them to do. \nTo be clear, nothing in the CVRA empowers crime victims \nto force a prosecutor to prosecute. See a id. § 3771(dX6). \nAs the Concurring Opinion well points out, the Executive \nBranch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion over \nprosecutorial decisions and whether to seek indictment or \nnot. Conc. Op. at 1221-22. But what the CVRA does do \nis grant victims a statutory right to have an opportunity to \nspeak to the prosecutor before the prosecutor makes that \ndecision. In f i § 3771(c), the CVRA even mandates that \nthe U.S. Attorney's prosecutors, while \"engaged in the ... \ninvestigation[ ] or prosecution of crime shall make their best \nefforts\" to accord victims these statutory rights in subsection \n(a). \nId. § 3771(c)(1). After conferral, the prosecutor has \nthe exclusive authority and discretion whether to indict or not. \nPre-charge, the Office spent days conferring and negotiating \nwith Epstein's defense team, but had not a minute for the \nvictims. \nUnlike the Majority, I agree with the Fifth Circuit that crime \nvictims have a CVRA right to confer with the government \nattorney, even if a plea deal is struck before any formal \nindictment is filed. See \n1 In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th \nCir. 2008). As the Fifth Circuit emphasized: \"In passing the \nAct, Congress made the policy decision—which we are bound \nto enforce—that the victims have a right to inform the plea \nnegotiations process by conferring with prosecutors before a \nplea agreement is reached.\" \nId. at 395. \nWhat's worse is that the Majority concedes, as it must, \nthat \n§ 3771(a)(5)'s conferral right and [ t § 3771(a)(8)'s \nright to be treated with fairness have no temporal limitation \non their face and that petitioners *1226 are \"not without \n[their] own textual arguments.\" Maj. Op. at 1206, 1208, \n1210. The Majority admits: \"The interpretation of the\n... [truncated, 5061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/18 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=18]", "char_count": 5061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nI. PROSECUTORS ADVISE \nVICTIMS HAVE CVRA RIGHTS \nThis case is not about the start or middle stages of a criminal \ninvestigation. Rather, as detailed below, this case is about (I) \na completed investigation of federal sex-trafficking crimes \nagainst minor girls and (2) the U.S. Attorney's Office's \nrepeated communications that it (a) had \"proof beyond a \nreasonable doubt\" that over 30 minor girls were victims of \nEpstein's criminal sexual conduct and (b) had \"decided to \nproceed with [Epstein's] indictment.\" Let's start with the \ninvestigation and how the Office in 2006 wrote the victims \nthat they did have CVRA rights pre-charge. \n*1227 A. 2005 — 2007 Criminal Investigation \nIn 2005, the parents of a 14-year-old girl reported to the Palm \nBeach Police Department that Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused \ntheir daughter. This report began the investigation into the \nthen 52-year-old billionaire Jeffrey Epstein—an investigation \nthat ultimately revealed that Epstein assembled a network \nof underage girls whom he sexually abused at his mansion \nin Palm Beach, Florida, elsewhere in the United States, and \noverseas. \nIn 2006, at the Palm Beach Police Department's request, the \nFederal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") opened a federal \ninvestigation into Epstein's and his personal assistants' use \nof facilities of interstate commerce to induce girls between \nthe ages of 14 and 17 to engage in illegal sexual activities. \nThereafter, the U.S. Attorney's Office accepted the case for \nprosecution and assigned specific federal prosecutors to the \ncase. \nThe FBI established that Epstein used young female recruiters \nand paid employees to find and bring minor girls to him, as \noften as three times a day, for his own and others' sexual \ngratification. Epstein also directed other people to sexually \nabuse the minor girls, including his co-conspirator Nadia \nMarcinkova. This in-depth federal investigation proved that, \nbetw\n... [truncated, 4610 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/19 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=19]", "char_count": 4610}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nthe forthcoming federal criminal charges. During this time, \nEpstein's defense team made multiple presentations to the \nOffice to try to convince them not to prosecute Epstein, \nmaintaining he committed no federal crimes.;  Those defense \npresentations were not successful. The record contains \nextensive communications showing that, as of August 2007, \nthe Office's prosecutors were recommending and ready to \nproceed with the federal indictment of Epstein. \nIn early September 2007, U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta \nmet with some of Epstein's defense team, along with the \nfederal prosecutors assigned to Epstein's case and the Chief \nof the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the \nDepartment of Justice's Criminal Division in Washington, \nD.C. Epstein's defense team again raised federalism-based \narguments that were rejected. As U.S. Attorney Acosta \nexplained, \"[a]fter considering the arguments raised at the \nSeptember 7th meeting, and after conferring with the FBI \nand with [the Chief of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity \nSection], our Office decided to proceed with the indictment.\" \nAt that time, the State of Florida had already charged Epstein \nwith one count of solicitation of prostitution. \nIV. NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nWhat happened next remains baffling, to put it mildly. During \nSeptember 2007, Epstein's defense attorneys engaged in \nmore intensive pre-indictment plea negotiations with the U.S. \nAttorney's Office. \nAlthough the record does not explain why, the Office then \ntook the position that two types of plea agreements could \napply to Epstein's federal crimes: (1) a plea agreement to \nfederal charges; or (2) a non-prosecution agreement, whereby \nthe Office would agree not to federally prosecute Epstein and \nhis co-conspirators, in return for which Epstein would plead \nguilty to a mere two state prostitution-solicitation charges and \nagree to an 18-month sentence in the county jail\n... [truncated, 5059 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/20 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=20]", "char_count": 5059}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nRoss, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova.\" 6 Apparently, the \ncoconspirators had not cooperated or assisted the government. \nRather, the sole consideration for their federal immunity was \nthat Epstein plead to two state *1230 charges and provide \npotential restitution to his victims, but only if the victims \nwaived all damages claims against Epstein. The NPA even \nstated \"that this agreement will not be made part of any public \nrecord.\"7\nB. Office Does Not Confer with Crime Victims \nAlthough the U.S. Attorney's Office accepted the case for \nprosecution and prepared a 53-page indictment, the Office \nnever conferred with the victims about the NPA and never \ntold the victims that such an agreement was being considered, \nmuch less being negotiated. While the Office spent untold \nhours negotiating the NPA's terms with Epstein's skilled \ndefense team, the Office never told the victims that it was \nnegotiating and signing an agreement that would grant federal \nimmunity to Epstein and his co-conspirators. The Office \nkept this information from Epstein's victims, despite earlier \nhaving sent most, if not all, of the girls the CVRA letters, \nwhich advised that the victims had a \"right to confer with the \nattorney for the United States in the case\" and a \"right to be \ntreated with fairness.\" \nV. SEPT. 2007 — JULY 2008: \nPROSECUTORS HIDE NPA \nThe U.S. Attorney's Office also failed to tell the victims about \nthe NPA for at least nine months after it was executed. Instead, \nthe Office misrepresented to the victims that \"this case\" was \nstill under investigation, advised them \"to be patient,\" and \nnever disclosed the government's NPA with Epstein. \nA. Prosecutors Negotiate With Defense about Notifying \nVictims \nDuring that nine-month period, the U.S. Attorney's Office \nand Epstein's defense team negotiated whether and to what \nextent the victims would be told about the NPA's resolution \nof the federal case. In this ca\n... [truncated, 4882 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/21 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=21]", "char_count": 4882}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n• \"P Section 3771 ... commands that `employees of the \nDepartment of Justice ... engaged in the detection, \ninvestigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their \nbest efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and \naccorded, the rights described in subsection (a).' \" \n• \"Our Non-Prosecution Agreement resolves the federal \ninvestigation by allowing Mr. Epstein to plead to a \nstate offense. The victims identified through the federal \ninvestigation should be appropriately informed, and ow \n[NPA] does not require the U.S. Attorney's Office to \nforego its legal obligations.\" \n• \"[T]he Office believes that it has proof beyond a \nreasonable doubt that each listed individual was a victim \nof Mr. Epstein's criminal conduct while the victim was \na minor. The law requires us to treat all victims `with \nfairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and \nprivacy.' f U I S U.S.C. § 3771(aX8). We will not include \nany *1232 language that demeans the harm they may \nhave suffered.\" \n• \"[W]e will not remove the language about contacting \nAUSA Villafana or Special Agent Kuyrkendall with \nquestions or concerns. Again, federal law requires that \nvictims have a 'reasonable right to confer with the \nattorney for the Government in this case.'  t a  18 U.S.0 \n3771(a)(5).\" \nThe evidence shows the Office repeatedly told Epstein's \nattorneys that it had CVRA obligations to notify and confer \nwith the victims about the NPA and upcoming events. As \nthe state plea would resolve Epstein's federal sex-trafficking \ncrimes, the CVRA, as well as basic decency and fairness, \ndemanded the Office tell the victims of that critical fact and \nabout the State Court proceeding. \nYet, on December 19, 2007, U.S. Attorney Acosta sent a \nletter to Epstein's counsel addressing \"the issue of victim's \nrights pursuant to \nSection 3771.\" U.S. Attorney Acosta \nstated: \"I understand that the defense objects to the victims \nbeing given noti\n... [truncated, 4868 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/22 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=22]", "char_count": 4868}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nVI. JUNE 30, 2008: EPSTEIN'S STATE PLEA \nOn June 30, 2008, Epstein pled guilty in Florida State Court \nto (1) solicitation of prostitution and (2) procuring a person \nunder the age of 18 for prostitution. That same day, the State \nCourt sentenced Epstein to 18 months' imprisonment in the \ncounty jail. As the Majority concedes, there is no indication \nthat any of Epstein's victims were informed about the NPA or \nthe terms of his state plea until later. Maj. Op. at 1200. \nHaving still not been informed of the resolution of Epstein's \nfederal case, on July 3, 2008, attorney Edwards sent a \nletter to the U.S. Attorney's Office communicating the \nvictims' wishes that federal charges be filed against Epstein. \nAttorney Edwards explained: \"We urge you to move forward \nwith the traditional indictments and criminal prosecution \ncommensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has committed, \nand we further urge you to take the steps necessary to protect \nour children from this very dangerous sexual perpetrator.\" \nBecause Epstein was \"a sexual addict that focused all of his \nfree time on sexually abusing children,\" Edwards emphasized \nthat \"[f]uture abuse and victimization is obvious to anyone \nwho really reviews the evidence in this case, and future sexual \nabuse of minors is inevitable unless [Epstein] is prosecuted, \ntried and appropriately sentenced.\" \nVII. PROCEDURAL HISTORY \nOn July 7, 2008,  (proceeding as \"lane Doe 1\") \nfiled an emergency petition alleging that she was a victim of \nEpstein's federal crimes and that the U.S. Attorney's Office \nhad violated her CVRA rights (I) to confer with federal \nprosecutors, (2) to be treated with fairness, (3) to receive \ntimely notice of relevant court proceedings, and (4) to receive \ninformation about restitution. \nTwo days later, on July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office \nresponded, arguing for the first time, that the CVRA did \nnot apply at all to pre-indictment plea n\n... [truncated, 4974 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/23 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=23]", "char_count": 4974}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \ncourt of appeals for a writ of mandamus. ... In deciding \nsuch application, the court of appeals shall apply ordinary \nstandards of appellate review.\"). IS\n*1235 VIII. QUESTION PRESENTED \nThis appeal presents this legal question: Whether, after \ncompleting its investigation, preparing a 53-page indictment, \nand conferring with Epstein's defense team about a pre-charge \nplea, the Office violated the victims' CVRA rights by (I) not \nconferring with any of Epstein's victims before agreeing to \nthe NPA, (2) intentionally and unfairly concealing the NPA \nfrom the victims, and (3) affirmatively misrepresenting the \ncase status to the victims after the NPA was executed. The \nanswer depends solely on the text of the CVRA, to which I \nturn. \nIX. CVRA'S STATUTORY TEXT \nA. CVRA's Bill of Rights for Victims \nIn interpreting the CVRA, our Court is guided by the \ntraditional canons of statutory construction. \"Our 'starting \npoint' is the language of the statute itself.\" ? FFor v \nSTME. LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting \n? Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville. Inc., 593 F.3d \n1206, 1212-14 (11th Cir. 2010)). We \"assume that Congress \nused the words of the statute as they are commonly and \nordinarily understood and must construe the statute so each \nof its provisions is given full effect.\" \nUnited States v. \nMcLvmont 45 F.3d 400, 401 (11th Cir. 1995). Therefore, \n\"[w]e do not look at one word or term in isolation, but instead \nwe look to the entire statutory context.\" \nSTME, 938 F.3d \nat 1314 (quoting \nHarrison, 593 F.3d at 1212). \nThe CVRA grants crime victims these eight rights in \nsubsection (a): \n(I) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. \n(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice \nof any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, \ninvolving the crime or of any release or escape of the \naccused. \n(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public \ncourt\n... [truncated, 4109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/24 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=24]", "char_count": 4109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \ndoubtful (as the Majority suggests). Maj. Op. at 1206 & \nn.8. As enacted, Congress granted these rights to victims \nof crime, and though the rights are not wholly unlimited \nas discussed later, Congress did not restrict these rights to \nonly the time after an indictment is filed in federal court. \nIn interpreting a statute, when \"the language at issue has a \nplain and unambiguous meaning,\" we \"need go no further.\" \nUnited States v. St. Amour, 886 F.3d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir.), \ncert. denied, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 205, 202 L.Ed.2d \n141 (2018) (quoting ?II United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d \n1329, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2002)). 16 Our statutory analysis \nthus should start and end with the language of subsections (a) \n(5) and (a)(8). \nThe overall statutory structure of lin§ 3771 also supports \nthis plain text reading. Beyond their plain language, what \nCongress omitted from P u subsections (aX5) and P.  (a)(8) \nof § 3771, but expressly included in subsections (a)(2), (a) \n(3), and (aX4), is instructive too. In P v § 3771, subsection \n(a)(2) grants victims the right to \"notice of any public court \nproceeding\"; subsection (aX3) grants victims the right \"not \nto be excluded from any such public court proceeding\"; and \nsubsection (a)(4) grants victims the right \"to be reasonably \nheard at any public proceeding in the district court.\" \nIS \nU.S.C. § 3771(a)(2)-(4). \nIn stark contrast, in subsections (aX5) and (aX8), Congress \ngranted victims rights to confer and be treated fairly without \ntying those rights to \"public court proceedings\" or \"public \nproceedings in the district court.\" Congress's omission of the \ndistinct phrase of \"public court proceedings\" in subsections \n(a)(5) and (aX8) is highly significant. \nFirst, under the conventional rules of statutory construction, \nwhere Congress has used a more limited term in one part \nof a statute, but left it out of other parts courts should not \nimply the term where it h\n... [truncated, 5023 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/25 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=25]", "char_count": 5023}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nUnited States 559 U.S. 133, 139, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1270, 176 \nL.Ed.2d I (2010). Subsections (c) and (d) not only provide \ncontext for subsection (a), but expressly refer to the rights in \nsubsection (a). \nC a Section 3771(c), titled \"Best efforts to accord rights,\" \ninstructs that the Justice Department and \"other departments \nand agencies of the United States engaged in the detection \ninvestigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best \nefforts to see that crime victims are ... accorded[ ] the \nrights described in subsection (a).\" I\". 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c) \n(I) (emphasis added). Logically, there would be no reason to \nmandate that federal agencies involved in crime \"detection\" \nor \"investigation\" see that victims are accorded their CVRA \nrights if those rights did not exist pre-charge. Indeed, the use \nof disjunctive wording—the \"or\"—indicates agencies that fit \neither description must comply, and not just, for example, the \nFBI, which is at times engaged in both crime investigation \nand prosecution. \nA victim's right to conferral is with the government's attorney \nin the case, not with the FBI. But the fact that the FBI has \na \"best efforts\" duty during the criminal investigation to see \nthat a victim's conferral rights are honored is another textual \nsignal that the victim has conferral rights pre-charge, where \nthe case has matured to the point that a government attorney \nis assigned. \nLest any doubt remains, the CVRA's venue provision in \nf a § 3771(dX3) conclusively demonstrates that the Act \ngives crime victims rights pre-charge. ? Section 3771(d)(3) \nprovides: \"The rights described in subsection (a) shall be \nasserted in the district court in which a defendant is being \nprosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway in \nthe district court in the district in which the crime occurred.\" \nId. § 3771(dX3) (emphasis added). \nRead most naturally, this venue provision provides that, i\n... [truncated, 5164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/26 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=26]", "char_count": 5164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n*1239 of crime \"shall make their best efforts\" to see \nthat crime victims arc \"accorded[ ] the rights described \nin subsection (a).\" See \nid. § 3771(c)(1). And \"if no \nprosecution is undenvay,\" the venue provision directs victims \nthat \"[t]he rights described in subsection (a) shall be \nasserted ... in the district court in the district in which the crime \noccurred.\" See? id. § 377I(dX3). \nD. Majority's Flawed Statutory Analysis \nSo how in the holy name of plain text does the Majority add \nsuch a substantive and temporal restriction on the victims' \nrights to confer and be treated fairly and hold that victims have \nno CVRA rights until after the government files an indictment \nand commences proceedings? The Majority hacks away at the \nplain text with four tools. \nFirst, the Majority cherry picks the meaning of \"case\" in It § \n3771(a)(5) and narrows it to mean judicial case only. Maj. \nOp. at 1207. \"Case,\" however, has long had a much broader \nmeaning than the Majority uses. As stated in dictionary \ndefinitions, \"case\" is both \"a circumstance or situation (as \na crime) requiring investigation or action by the police or \nother agency\" and \"the matters of fact or conditions involved \nin a suit: a suit or action in law or equity.\" Case, Webster's \nThird New International Dictionary 345 (2002). Likewise, \nin Black's Law Dictionary, the term \"case\" can mean both \n\"[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy \nat law or in equity <the parties settled the case>\" and \"[a] \ncriminal investigation <the Manson case>.\" Case, Black's \nLaw Dictionary 258-59 (10th ed. 2014). As shown in my \nfactual background, everyone involved in Epstein's case—\nfrom AUSA Villafana, to the Deputy Attorney General, and \neven Epstein's defense team—called this a \"case\" before an \nindictment was filed. \nThe Majority brushes aside the fact that the term \"case\" can \nmean both a judicial case and an investigative case on \n... [truncated, 5195 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/27 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=27]", "char_count": 5195}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nidentifiable attomey—\"the attorney for the Government\"—\nfor Epstein's victims to confer with even though formal court \nproceedings had not yet commenced. We should take the \nvictims' rights granted in 1'1' § 377I(aX5) and P ' (aX8) at face \nvalue and not restrict them to benefit the privileged few. 2°\n*1241 As its third tool to axe the plain text, the Majority \ncontends that its reading of? 1§ 3771(a)(5) and \n(a)(8) is \nsupported by the canon noscitur a sociis that is, \n'a word \nis known by the company it keeps.' \" Scg ? \" S.D. Warren \nCo. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot. 547 U.S. 370, 378, 126 S. \nCt 1843, 1849, 164 L.Ed.2d 625 (2006); Maj. Op. at 1208-\n09. Do not fall for this. The noscitur a sociis principle is a \n\"useful rule of construction where words are of obscure or \ndoubtful meaning and then, but only then, its aid may be \nsought to remove the obscurity or doubt by reference to the \nassociated words.\" ? a Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, \n261 U.S. 514, 520, 43 S. Ct 428, 430, 67 L.Ed. 778 (1923). \nBut here, the meaning of the plain words in P § 3771(a)(5) \nand I (aX8) is not in doubt and all other contextual clues \nsupport that meaning. Thus, the canon cannot be invoked \nto defeat Congress's decision to grant crime victims these \nplainly-worded rights of conferral and fairness. See ? a Ali v. \nFed. Bureau of Prisons 552 U.S. 214, 226-27, 128 S. Ct 831, \n839-40, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008) (rejecting the invocation \nof this canon as an \"attempt to create ambiguity where the \nstatute's text and structure suggest none\"). \nMoreover, the cases the Majority cites for this canon involved \nstatutes with much stronger and closer contextual clues than \nin ?II § 3771(a). See \nGutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, \n254-58, 120 S. Ct. 740, 743.46, 145 L.Ed.2d 747 (2000) \n(applying the canon to narrow the phrase \"any &thou\" \nwhere it was closely surrounded by six specific references to \ngubernatorial elections); C g\n... [truncated, 5235 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/28 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=28]", "char_count": 5235}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nOnce filed, \"[t]he district court shall take up and decide any \nmotion asserting a victim's right forthwith.\" Id. \nIn considering the usage of \"motion\" in C8 § 377I(dX3), \nthe Majority asserts that a \"motion\" is solely a request filed \nwithin the context of an ongoing judicial proceeding. Maj. \nOp. at 1209-10. The Majority argues that, since CVRA rights \ncan only be asserted in a \"mid-proceeding `motion[ ],' \" the \nCVRA's protections apply only after court proceedings have \nstarted. See id. at 1209-10. \nAs with \"case,\" the Majority slices in half the definition of \nthe word \"motion.\" The common legal definition of \"motion\" \nis more general and broader: a motion is \"[a] written or \noral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling \nor order.\" Motion, Black's supra, at 1168. This general \ndefinition encompasses a motion initiating a new lawsuit or \nproceeding, as well as one filed mid-proceeding. In fact, \nthe federal rules and statutes allow quite a few motions \nto initiate new proceedings in the district court, such as \nmotions to quash grand jury and other subpoenas, Fed. \nR. Crim. P. 17(c)(2), and motions to vacate, set aside, or \ncorrect sentences, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See also 28 U.S.C. \n§ 1361 (mandamus *1243 proceedings are initiated as a \nnew lawsuit). This very case is a free-standing civil action \nlitigated for a decade because the CVRA expressly provides \nthat \"if no prosecution is underway,\" the \"[m]otion for relief' \nis filed \"in the district court in the district in which the \ncrime occurred.\" \nI8 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). If anything, [ \n§ \n3771(dX3) demonstrates that the Majority has added a very \nsubstantive restriction—victims have no CVRA rights until \nan indictment commences court proceedings—that has no \nmeaningful footing in the text of the statute.22\nE.? it In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) \nThe only other circuit court to address this precise issue \nhas come to the sa\n... [truncated, 4856 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/29 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=29]", "char_count": 4856}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n2008 WL 501321 at •11.15 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008). We \nshould join our Fifth Circuit sister. \n*1244 F. Majority's Slippery Slopes and Policy \nArguments \nThe Majority invokes a parade of horribles—\"a jarring \nresult\"—that it believes would follow if (I) the CVRA \nwas interpreted to grant crime victims the right to confer \nwith the government's attorney before an indictment is filed \nand (2) courts were \"[f]reed from any line limiting the \nAct's applicability\" to post-charge court proceedings. Maj. \nOp. at 1211, 1218. The Majority suggests that interpreting \n§ 3771(d)(3)'s \"no prosecution is underway\" clause to \nmean that CVRA rights attach pre-charge would open the \n❑oodgates to victim lawsuits seeking to make prosecutors \nconsult with victims before \"law-enforcement officers \nconduct a raid, seek a warrant, or conduct an interrogation[.]\" \nId. at 1213. The Majority also posits that interpreting the \nCVRA to grant rights during the \"investigation\" of a crime \nwould \"require law-enforcement officers to 'confer' with \nvictims ... before conducting a raid, seeking a warrant, making \nan arrest, interviewing a witness, convening a lineup, or \nconducting an interrogation.\" Id. at 1211. \nLike all slippery slope arguments, the soundness of the \nMajority's position depends on \"an empirical prediction that \na proposed rule will increase the likelihood of some other \nundesired outcome occurring.\" See f R H ex Tel Hawk v \nEaston Area Sch. Dist. 725 F.3d 293, 317 (3d Cir. 2013); \nFrederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, \n381 (1985) (\"[A] persuasive slippery slope argument depends \nfor its persuasiveness on temporally and spatially contingent \nempirical facts,\" and \"without empirical evidence\" of an \nunderlying reality, \"the slippery slope argument has nothing \non which to stand.\"). Yet, the Majority offers no empirical \nbasis for its slippery slope arguments or its professed need to \nadd, by judicia\n... [truncated, 5109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/30 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=30]", "char_count": 5109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nThird, f 1§ 3771(a)(5) grants crime victims the right to \nconfer with the government's attorney, but only to the \nextent that conferral is \"reasonable.\" The Majority summarily \ndiscards this reasonableness limitation as \"squishy.\" Maj. \nOp. at 1211. Yet, a victim's \"reasonable right to confer\" \nis a forceful limiting principle and embodies a common, \nworkable legal standard that is sufficient to stave off the \nMajority's speculations about \"enterprising\" crime victims \nand \"innovative\" judges. Reasonableness has long stood the \ntest of time in limiting other actors' conduct. See. e.g., \nj Hardy v Cross 565 U.S. 65, 69-70, 132 S. Ct. 490, \n493-94, 181 L.Ed.2d 468 (2011) (for purposes of the Sixth \nAmendment's Confrontation Clause, the \"lengths to which \nthe prosecution must go to produce a witness\" is a \"question \nof reasonableness\"); \nUnited States v. Banks, 540 U.S. \n31, 35.36, 124 S. Ct. 521, 524-25, 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) \n(for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the execution of \na warrant is subject to a reasonableness standard); \nOhio \nv. Robinette 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 \nL.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (\"We have long held that the 'touchstone \nof the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.\"); / \nKyles \nv. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-33, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565, \n131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (under the Due Process Clause and \n11  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 \nL.Ed.2d 215 (1963), prosecutors must disclose all evidence, \nupon request, that is favorable to the defense, so long as \nthe evidence is \"material,\" meaning it is reasonably probable \nthat the result of the proceeding would have been different \nhad the evidence been disclosed); \nDoggett v. United \nStates, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 654, 656, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690, \n2692.93, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (in determining whether \nthe government violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment \nspeedy trial right, courts must consider, inter alia, whether \n... [truncated, 5270 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/31 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=31]", "char_count": 5270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n(4) conclude that the Office violated the victims' right to be \ntreated fairly by not disclosing the signed NPA before the \nState Court hearing and by misrepresenting the case status to \nthe victims. \nH. Concurring Opinion \nNow, my brief response to my colleague's Concurring \nOpinion. His Opinion submits that \"the Executive Branch \nhas exclusive power over prosecutorial decisions\" and that \n\"authority obviously includes the decision ... whether to \nseek, or not seek, an indictment from the grand jury,\" both \npropositions with which I wholeheartedly agree. Conc. Op. at \n1221-22. \nThe Concurring Opinion contends, however, that \"the model \nthe dissent creates\"—requiring the U.S. Attorney's Office \nto confer with a victim about a criminal matter prior to \nindictment—(1) \"raises serious questions about whether, by \ndoing so, the judiciary would be violating the constitutional \nprinciple of separation of powers,\" and (2) \"would clearly \ninterfere with the Executive Branch's investigative and \nprosecutorial functions.\" Id. at 1221, 1222. The Concurring \nOpinion further states: \"The notion that a district court \ncould have any input on a U.S. Attorney's investigation \nand decision whether to bring a case to the grand jury is \nentirely incompatible with the constitutional assignment to \nthe Executive Branch of exclusive power over prosecutorial \ndecisions.\" *1247 Id. at 1222. The Opinion concludes, \ntherefore, that \"the CVRA is best understood as not applying \nuntil charges are commenced against a defendant\" because \n\"such an interpretation avoids raising serious constitutional \nquestions.\" Id. at 1223. \nThis Concurring Opinion is helpful because it highlights what \nis and what is not the issue in this appeal. First, nothing in \nthe CVRA as Congress wrote it permits the district court \nto suggest to a U.S. Attorney any investigation or grand \njury steps that he must take. The CVRA requirement is only \nthat the \n... [truncated, 5144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/32 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=32]", "char_count": 5144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \ninvasion of the legislative domain.\" C8 Stevens, 559 U.S. at \n481, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. \nAnother observation. The Concurring Opinion insists the \nproblems it identifies would not exist post-charge because, \nin *1248 that case, the district court would not be \n\"imposing a condition upon his prosecutorial discretion.\" \nConc. Op. at 1222-23. But a government attorney makes all \nsorts of discretionary prosecutorial decisions following an \nindictment, chief among them whether to enter into a plea \nagreement with the accused and potentially dismiss some or \nall of the charges. Thus, to the extent the Concurring Opinion \nperceives separation-of-powers issues with a district court \nordering the government's attorney merely to confer with \nvictims about prosecutorial discretionary decisions, it is not \nclear why the Majority's post-indictment restriction avoids \nthose issues, given the victims can complain about lack of \nconferral following an indictment too. \nIn any event, the Concurring Opinion usefully illustrates the \nimportance of the CVRA's mandate in § 3771(d)(6)—nothing \nin the Act \"shall be construed to impair ... prosecutorial \ndiscretion\"—as yet another forceful limiting principle in the \nCVRA text that alleviates any need for the Majority to \ntransplant its very substantive and temporal restriction on top \nof the plain text of \n§ 3771(aX5) and! 1(a)(8). \nX. REMEDY \nTo remedy the Office's proven CVRA violations, the \nvictims proposed the following: (1) an order scheduling \na public hearing in the Southern District of Florida in \nwhich the victims could participate and present victim-impact \nstatements to the District Court; (2) discovery of records \nregarding law-enforcement's investigation of the crimes \nagainst the victims; (3) discovery of records explicating why \nthe U.S. Attorney's Office decided to grant Epstein federal \nimmunity; (4) the Department of Justice's designation of a \nrepresentative \n... [truncated, 5070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/33 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=33]", "char_count": 5070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nat the New York hearing. The Office's claim on appeal that \nthe New York hearing was a sufficient remedy for its CVRA \nviolations wholly lacks merit. 24\nEpstein's death also heightened the need for the District \nCourt to carefully examine the victims' remedy request for \ndocument disclosure. Early on, the District Court denied \ncertain document requests based on attorney-client privilege. \nSubsequently, in the course of the litigation, the U.S. \nAttorney's Office made numerous representations about its \ndeliberations, both internally and externally with Epstein's \nattorneys, including a detailed affidavit from a line prosecutor \npurporting to describe those deliberations. Thereafter, the \nvictims filed motions claiming that the Office had waived, \nin whole or in part, the work-product privilege given what \nthe Office itself had now filed and how the Office sought to \ndefend its conduct in this case. The District Court never made \na waiver ruling, or any document-by-document findings, \nas to this remedy request. If anything, the informational \nremedies sought by the victims have enhanced importance \nnow. Mysteries still exist about how Epstein and his co-\nconspirators escaped federal prosecution for multiple sex-\ntrafficking crimes against over 30 minor girls in Florida.25\nXI. CONCLUSION \nWhile the Majority laments how the national media fell short \non the Jeffrey Epstein story, this case is about how the U.S. \nprosecutors fell short on Epstein's evil crimes. See Maj. Op. at \n1200. Our criminal *1250 justice system should safeguard \nchildren from sexual exploitation by criminal predators, not \nre-victimize them. The Majority concludes that our Court is \nconstrained to leave the victims \"emptyhanded,\" and it is up \nto Congress to \"amend the Act to make its intent clear.\" Id. at \n1205, 1221. Not true. The empty result here is only because \now Court refuses to enforce a federal statute as Congress \nwrote i\n... [truncated, 4160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/34 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=34]", "char_count": 4160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Ha. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n3 \nCf. David Folkenflick, A Dead Cat. A Lawyer's Call And A5-Figure Donation: How Media Fell Short on Epstein, \nNATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 22, 2019, 6:06 PM). https://www.npr.org/2019/08/22/753390385/a-dead-\ncat-a-lawyers-call-and-a-5-figure-donationhow-media-fell-short-on-epstei. \n4 \nA second petitioner joined the suit shortly after it was filed. For simplicity's sake—and to avoid confusion—\nwe will refer to \"petitioner's\" suit, in the singular. \n5 \nAlthough the CVRA instructs the court of appeals to \"take up and decides' any mandamus petition \"forthwith \nwithin 72 hours,\" the parties here stipulated to an extended briefing and decision schedule, which the CVRA \nauthorizes. \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). \n6 \nBefore considering the merits of the question whether the CVRA applies before the initiation of criminal \nproceedings, we must briefly address a front-end procedural issue. Petitioner contends (Reply in Supp. of \nPet. at 11-14) that the government waived any argument that the CVRA doesn't apply here when it failed \nto file a \"cross-appeal\" from the district court's 2011 order, which (as already explained) held \"as a matter of \nlaw [that] the CVRA can apply before formal charges are filed.\" Does, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. We reject \npetitioners waiver argument. It's true that in the usual case, the government's failure to cross-appeal the \ndistrict court's adverse 2011 order might well have precluded our review of that decision. See \nGreenlaw v. \nUnited States. 554 U.S. 237, 244-45, 128 S.Ct. 2559. 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008). This, though, isn't the usual \ncase. Petitioner didn't file an \"appear: rather, as the CVRA requires, she filed a petition for writ of mandamus. \nSee \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3): see also 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and \nProcedure § 3932 (3d ed. 2019) (explaining that a mandamus petition is \"an original application to the court \nof appeals\"). The question befo\n... [truncated, 4735 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/35 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=35]", "char_count": 4735}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n11 \nIn spending pages dissecting our citations to cases applying the noscitur a sociis canon, the dissent misses \nthe forest for the trees. See Dissenting Op. at 1240-42. The fundamental point is simply that subsection (a) \n(8)'s meaning should be informed by its surrounding statutory context, and that because subsections (a)(1)—\n(7) are most properly read to apply only after the commencement of criminal proceedings, it makes sense \n—absent some contrary indication—to interpret subsection (a)(8)'s vague fair-treatment provision the same \nway. \n12 \nAs already explained, subsection (d)(3) states that \"[t]he rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in \nthe district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the \ndistrict court in which the crime occurred.\" We address below petitioners contention that the \"if no prosecution \nis underway\" language demonstrates that the CVRA applies before the initiation of criminal proceedings. See \ninfra at 1212-13. \n13 \nA third aspect of .§ 3771(d)(3) likewise counsels—albeit perhaps a bit more indirectly—in favor of the \nconclusion that CVRA rights are intended to apply, and be enforced, only within the context of an ongoing \ncriminal prosecution. As already explained, under subsection (d)(3), a crime victim's sole recourse to this \nCourt is via petition for writ of mandamus. See \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (\"If the district court denies the \nrelief sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.\"). Although a petition \nfor mandamus is \"an original application to the court of appeals,\" the writ \"is not an independent grant of \nappellate jurisdiction\" but, rather, \"'may go only in aid of appellate jurisdiction' that exists on some other \nbasis.\" 16 Wright & Miller, supra, § 3932 (quoting \nParr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520, 76 S.Ct. 912, \n100 L.Ed. 1377 (1956)). The \"minimum\n... [truncated, 4937 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/36 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=36]", "char_count": 4937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nas attempting to broadly cover (perhaps using a belt-and-suspenders approach) all necessary government-\nemployee participants—in short, to ensure that the Acts protection extends beyond prosecutors. \n16 \nIn his article on the subject, petitioners lead counsel offered a similar limiting construction, which he framed \nthis way: \nCVRA rights attach when an officer or employee of the Department of Justice or any other department or \nagency of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime has substantial \nevidence that an identifiable person has been directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission \nof a federal offense ... and in the judgment of the officer or employee, that person is a putative victim of \nthat offense. \nCassell et at, supra, at 92 (emphasis added). Professor Cassell's proposal reads like a finely-tuned statutory \nprovision—but one that, unfortunately, Congress never enacted. \n17 \nFor reasons we will explain, the dissent's interpretation—so far as we can discern it—suffers from the same \nflaw. See infra at 1220-21. \n18 \nPresumably because it finds this the more difficult of the two interpretations of subsection (d)(3) to deal with, \nthe dissent labels it our \"alternative[ ]\" position and relegates its response to a footnote—notwithstanding \nthat we introduce it as the \"[f]irst, and perhaps most obvious[ ]\" reading. See Dissenting Op. at 1238 n.17. \nBy contrast, the dissent goes on for pages challenging what we offer (next page) as an \"alternative[ ]-\ninterpretation, (mis)stating our position as being that 'this venue provision is about 'post-judgment matters.-\nId. at 1237-39. \n19 \nWe concede that this reading isn't perfectly seamless, in that it would require the victim to file her post-\njudgment motion \"in the district in which the crime occurred\" rather than, as one might expect, in the district \nin which the prosecution occurred and the \n... [truncated, 4661 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/37 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=37]", "char_count": 4661}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n22 \nOne might reasonably ask why petitioner here didn't proceed under the VRRA, some of whose provisions \n(unlike, we conclude, the CVRA's) clearly apply before the initiation of criminal proceedings—and which, \ntherefore, the government here may well have violated. The answer, in short, is that the VRRA provides no \nmechanism for judicial enforcement whatsoever—not even the limited \"motion--based remedy that the CVRA \nauthorizes. See 34 U.S.C. § 20141(d) (\"This section does not create a cause of action or defense in favor \nof any person arising out of the failure of a responsible person to provide information as required ....\"). So, \nwhile (on our reading, anyway) the rights available under the VRRA are more broadly applicable than those \nunder the CVRA. they are not judicially enforceable—and thus, as we will explain shortly, don't give rise to \nthe practical concerns that a pre-charge application of CVRA rights would. \n23 \nThis prosecutorial discretion \"flows not from a desire to give carte blanche to law enforcement officials but \nfrom recognition of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.\" United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d \n1243, 1246 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974). As we said in Ream—\nThe discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecution shall \nbe commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of policy wholly apart from any question of \nprobable cause. Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of the \ncourt, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive \ndepartment that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular \ncase. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere \nwith the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the Uni\n... [truncated, 5038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/38 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=38]", "char_count": 5038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nprosecutors (and the court) had violated their CVRA-based \"reasonable right to confer with the attorney for \nthe Government.\" \n18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). When the district court refused to reject the plea agreement, \nthe victims sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals. \nAlthough the Fifth Circuit ultimately declined to issue the writ, it observed—in what, given its ultimate \ndisposition, was technically dictum—that the district court had violated the CVRA by acceding to the \ngovernment's request that victims not be notified in advance of the plea deal. In so doing, it noted the district \ncourt's \"acknowledg[ment]\" that `[t]here are clearly rights under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is \nunderway.\" \n527 F.3d at 394. \"Logically,\" the court of appeals said, \"this includes the CVRA's establishment \nof victims' reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government.' \" \nId. (quoting \n18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771(a)(5)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit noted, \"[alt least in the posture of this case (and we do not speculate \non the applicability to other situations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable way to inform \nthe victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and to ascertain the victims' views on the possible details \nof a plea bargain.\" \nId. \nWe decline to follow \nDean's dictum for several reasons. First, the \nDean briefing reveals that the parties \nthere didn't even dispute whether the CVRA applies before the commencement of criminal proceedings; \naccordingly, the question that this case so clearly tees up was never subjected to adversarial testing. Second, \nand perhaps relatedly, the Fifth Circuit's three-sentence discussion—which does little more than echo the \ndistrict court's own \"acknowledg[ment]\"—is devoid of any analysis of the CVRA's text, history, or structural \nunderpinnings. Finally, even read for all it might be worth, the Fifth Circuit's observation that the CVRA a\n... [truncated, 4837 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/39 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=39]", "char_count": 4837}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nTherefore, such an injunction would not comply with Rule 65. To make matters worse, failure to comply with \nRule 65 would exacerbate the problem discussed below—specifically, excessive judicial interference with an \nongoing investigation—because the district court would frequently need to oversee disputes about whether \nthe attorney's handling of the investigation was violating the inherently vague injunction. \n4 \nMoreover, and perhaps worst of all, there is nothing stopping a victim from challenging the attorney's decisions \nat multiple steps along the way. Once the district court is involved, a victim could allege that the attorney did \nnot confer with her, or did not treat her fairly, whenever he makes each new investigatory or prosecutorial \ndecision. \n5 \nThe dissenting opinion asserts that it \"in no way injects judicial interference into a prosecutor's decisions\" \nbecause \"[t]he fact that a prosecutor must confer with a victim pre-charge does not mean the district court \ncan exercise any control over the prosecutor's ultimate decision whether to indict.\" Dis. Op. at 1247. But this \nis clearly wrong based on the facts of this case—prosecutors chose to enter an NPA with Epstein, and the \nvictim wants the Court to undo that agreement. My dissenting colleague would likely argue that, because the \nU.S. Attorney could re-enter an NPA with Epstein's co-conspirators after conferring with victims, forcing the \nU.S. Attorney to confer would not invade the executive's prosecutorial discretion. This riposte overlooks the \nreality that exclusive discretion does not come with caveats. In other words, imposing the dissent's conditions \nthat the executive must satisfy before it can exercise its prosecutorial discretion means that it does not truly \nhave exclusive discretion. \n6 \nPutting aside the separation of powers problem, under the dissent's approach, the judiciary, based on \nCongressional authority in the fo\n... [truncated, 5058 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/40 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=40]", "char_count": 5058}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nAttorney for Jeffrey Epstein. From June 2005 to June 2009, Acosta was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida. \n6 \nAt oral argument in this appeal, counsel for the respondent U.S. Attorney's Office agreed that it was \nhighly unusual—never seen before—that the government would extend federal immunity to Epstein's co-\nconspirators without having the co-conspirators sign onto a plea agreement or provide some cooperation in \nexchange for federal immunity. The co-conspirators did not sign the NPA and were not listed as parties to it. \n7 \nAs the NPA was being signed. Epstein's attorney Lefkowitz e-mailed AUSA Villafana, requesting: \"Marie—\nPlease do whatever you can to keep this (NPA) from becoming public.\" AUSA Villafana assured Lefkowitz \nthat the NPA would be kept confidential. \n8 \nEpstein's defense team had legitimate concerns that the State Court judge would not accept Epstein's plea \nif tied to such a broad, secret federal immunity deal. Under Florida law, a State trial judge is never bound to \nhonor a negotiated plea agreement. \nGoins v. State. 672 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 1996). During a plea colloquy, \na trial judge may announce that she is not bound by the plea agreement because other factors make the \ntrial judge's concurrence impossible. King v. State, 578 So. 2d 23. 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also \nFla. R. Crim. P. 3.171(d) (\"After an agreement on a plea has been reached, the trial judge may have made \nknown to him or her the agreement and reasons therefor prior to the acceptance of the plea. Thereafter, the \njudge shall advise the parties whether other factors (unknown at the time) may make his or her concurrence \nimpossible.\"). The NPA itself acknowledged that the entire deal was contingent on the State Court judge \naccepting the negotiated state plea agreement and sentence. \nIf the victims had been told the truth about the 2007 NPA, they would have had ample time to make th\n... [truncated, 4921 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/41 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=41]", "char_count": 4921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \nparty argues any fact-finding error occurred, and thus we review de novo the District Court's ruling that the \nvictims had pre-charge CVRA rights. If the victims had pre-charge CVRA rights to confer and be treated fairly, \nno party disputes those rights were repeatedly violated by the U.S. Attorney's Office. \n16 \nAs noted, the CVRA was enacted to protect crime victim& rights and ensure their involvement in the \ncriminal justice process. See Moussaoui 483 F.3d at 234; \nKenna, 435 F.3d at 1016. In this context, a \ncomprehensive construction of the victims' rights to confer and be treated fairly in \n§ 3771(a)(5) and ? 1(a) \n(8) is fitting. See? Yates v. United States 574 U.S. 528, _,135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) \n(explaining that \"[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the \nlanguage itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context \nof the statute as a whole\"). \n17 \nAlternatively, the Majority argues that ? § 3771(d)(3)'s \"no prosecution is underway\" provision applies to \nthe very narrow and specific period between the filing of a criminal complaint and levying formal charges by \nindictment. Maj. Op. at 1212-13. But there is, of course, no such temporal limitation in the plain language of \n§ 3771(d)(3), nor is there any indication this provision applies only to the subset of criminal proceedings \ninvolving a complaint. It is also not readily apparent why the Majority only looks to the Sixth Amendment \nright to counsel for its construction of \"prosecution\" and not also to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right \nin all criminal \"prosecutions.\" \nId. at 1212. The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right \"may attach before an \nindictment and as early as the time of arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.\" ) United States v. \nGouveia 467 U.S. 180, 190, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2298, 81 L.Ed.2d \n... [truncated, 4610 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/42 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=42]", "char_count": 4610}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00073493", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020) \n28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020 \n20 \nThe Majority does not dispute that prosecutors and defense counsel routinely negotiate pre-charge plea \nagreements, particularly in white-collar cases. Paul G. Cassell, et al.. Crime Victims' Rights During Criminal \nInvestigations? Applying the Crime Victims' Rights Act Before  Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104 J. Crim. L. \nand Criminology 59, 84 (2014). Guilty pleas. in fact, account for over 97% of all criminal convictions obtained \nby the government. See U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2019 Tables: Criminal Defendants Terminated. by \nType of Disposition and Offense (Table D-4) (Sept. 30, 2019) (only 1,663 of the 78,767 defendants convicted \nof federal crimes in the year ending September 30, 2019, were found guilty by a judge or jury after a criminal \ntrial; the rest pled guilty), htlps://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business2019-tables. \n21 \nUnable to find support in the CVRA's plain text, the Majority turns to language in an older victims-rights \nenactment—the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (\"VRRA\"). Maj. Op. at 1214-16. But the Majority \nfails to recognize the CVRA repealed significant parts of the VRRA because the legislation was ineffective. \nSee Justice for All Act of 2004, § 102(c). The CVRA's legislative history refers to earlier unsuccessful victims' \nlitigation under the VRRA and cautions that \"P]t is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled \ndown or marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. [The CVRA] ... is meant to correct, not continue, \nthe legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal Bustice] process.\" 150 Cong. Rec. S4269 \n(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). \nIn any event, the VRRA did not contain any \"right to confer,\" or a \"right to be treated with fairness. and thus \nit does not provide guidance for construing the CVRA's conferral and fairness rights here. More still. as the \nMajority hints at, had Con\n... [truncated, 4329 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00073493/43 or ?id=EFTA00073493&page=43]", "char_count": 4329}]}